From Aristotle’s Syllogistic
to Stoic Conditionals:
Holzwege or Detectable Paths?*
ABSTRACT: This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep,
but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle’s syllo-
gistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between
Aristotle’s metasyllogistic equimodality condition (as stated at APr.
I 24, 41b27–31) and truth-conditions for third type (Chrysippean)
conditionals (as they can be inferred from, say, S.E. P. II 111 and
189). In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle’s condition amounts to
introducing in his (propositional) metasyllogistic a non-truthfunc-
tional implicational arrow ‘⇒’, the truth-conditions of which turn out
to be logically equivalent to truth-conditions of third type condi-
tionals, according to which only the impossible (and not the possible)
follows from the impossible. Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely
this non-Scotian conditional logic in two so far overlooked passages
of (Latin and Hebrew translations of) Themistius’ Paraphrasis of De
Caelo (CAG V 4, 71.8–13 and 47.8–10 Landauer). Some further
consequences of Aristotle’s equimodality condition on his logic, and
notably on his syllogistic (no matter whether modal or not), are
pointed out and discussed at length. A (possibly Chrysippean)
extension of Aristotle’s condition is also discussed, along with a full
characterization of truth-conditions of fourth type conditionals.
Introduction
A few years ago, Jonathan Barnes wrote as a concluding
remark to finish off one of his outstanding specimens
of consummate scholarship:
If we are ever to trace the external philosophical influences on
Stoic logic, then we shall first need to unearth more evidence –
in particular we shall need to unearth some reliable biographical
evidence. We shall learn more only when Oxyrhinchus or
Herculaneum unrolls the papyrus biography of Chrysippus. This
biography may turn out to contain the sentence ‘Chrysippus loved
and studied the Prior Analytics’. It may, with equal probability,
contain the sentence ‘Chrysippus never knew anything about
Aristotelian logic’. The appearance of neither sentence ought to
surprise us – and we should not, of course, be surprised if neither
sentence appears.1
Nevertheless (and still without any further bio-
graphical evidence), I shall try here to substantiate a
somewhat different conjecture: Chrysippus was most
probably aware of some fundamental (albeit widely
Topoi 23: 113–137, 2004.
 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Mauro Nasti De Vincentis
unnoticed) features of Aristotle’s (Meta)Syllogistic, for
they have an impressively precise counterpart in
Chrysippus’ logic of conflict (µάχη) and connectedness
(συνάρτησις). To understand how and why, a few
logical technicalities are of course hardly dispensable.
Nevertheless, the present Introduction is nothing but an
abridged version of the subsequent sections, and hope-
fully a faithful one but, for the sake of a wider audience,
it is also aimed at following, as closely as possible, the
“maxim of minimum technicality”.
First of all, a point to be made is that Aristotelian
syllogisms, and simple ( α’ πλο ι̂, S.E. M. VIII 228) Stoic
undemonstrables (α’ ναπ όδεικτοι) as well, are not
argument forms or schemata: they are particular argu-
ments, namely interpretations (or, rather, instantiations
in natural language) of given forms or schemata.2 As
such, unless their modality is taken as unclear (think of,
say, “Proof exists” according to Sextus Empiricus), one
of the three fundamental (exhaustive and mutually
disjoint) modalities, namely: Necessary, Contingent,
Impossible, can be immediately and intuitively assigned
to them, even when they are in assertoric form (i.e. they
are not explicitly labelled by modality indicators such
as ε’ξ α’ ν άγκης for necessity, ε’νδ έχεται for contin-
gency, etc.). Needless to add that, as regards assertoric
premisses and conclusions, at least a disjunction of
fundamental modalities can always be assigned to them
even in unclear cases (‘Necessary or Contingent’ to ex
hypothesi true assertoric propositions, ‘Contingent or
Impossible’ to false assertoric propositions). Thus, for
any given syllogism (no matter whether categorical or
modal), it is always possible, at least in principle, to say
whether its major premiss P1, its minor premiss P2 (or,
notably, their conjunction P, i.e. P1 ∧ P2), and its
conclusion C, are equimodal (hereafter to be taken as
short for: both necessary, both contingent or both
impossible) or not. It should also be stressed, once
again, that the difference between an assertoric propo-
114 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
sition and a modalized (necessary, contingent, impos-
sible) one is, according to Aristotle, mainly ‘syntactic’
in nature (see APr. I 8, 29b36–30a1 as regards asser-
toric vs. necessary propositions, where προσκε ι̂σθαι at
30a1 is clearly apposite for words rather than for their
meanings). Nevertheless, when an instantiated assertoric
proposition clearly “signifies” its own modality, e.g. its
contingency, one could say, as Alexander does (cf. in
APr. 242.30–243.10 Wallies) and I shall do also, that it
is (also) contingent. More precisely, as Alexander
fastidiously adds (although pour cause, see below), one
should say that it is contingent, but only qua assertoric
(ω’ ς υ’ πάρχον, 243.9) and not secundum definitionem
(κατὰ τ ὸν διορισµ όν, 242.36–243.2). Thus, as regards
the fundamental modalities involved in Aristotle’s
modal similarity criterion (see below), they are normally
‘signified’ by the purely assertoric part of instantiations,
i.e. under the scope of (fundamental) modal indicators
and no matter whether any indicator is actually present
or not.
The starting point of our path from Aristotle’s
syllogistic to Stoic conditionals is a restatement of what
Aristotle says in APr. I 24 on modal similarity between
at least one premiss P1, P2 and the conclusion C of a
syllogism. According to Aristotle, this kind of modal
similarity by equimodality is a necessary condition for
any valid mood to be actually instantiable by syllo-
gisms. As I shall try to show, and despite appearances,
the restatement (namely: “P and C must be equimodal”)
is not stronger than Aristotle’s condition. In fact, they
are probably under an assumption supported by textual
evidence, not only in APr., but also including a plain
commentatorial reading of Aristotle’s texts by
Themistius (who mentions both APr. and Cael.). What
is made clear by both the restatement and Themistius’
testimony is that Aristotle’s metasyllogistic criterion of
modal similarity actually amounts to introducing a non-
classical propositional logic, since it has a non-classical
implicational arrow ‘⇒’ defined by strict implication
between equimodal clauses A, B (P ⇒ C being of
course a particular case of A ⇒ B). The Themistian tes-
timony is, so far as I know, almost unnoticed, hence it
will be discussed at length. Moreover, since Themistius’
passage ascribes to Aristotle the unorthodox tenet that
from the impossible only the impossible (and not the
possible) follows, it has also a startling consequence:
Aristotle’s non-classical implication and the so-called
third type implication of Stoic (most probably
Chrysippean) logic become logically equivalent. This,
in turn, depends upon a new rational reconstruction of
the truth-conditions of Chrysippean conditionals and, as
there is no room here for a detailed account of this
reconstruction, I shall limit myself to mentioning the
most relevant references on the subject. Thus, the situ-
ation appears to be more or less as follows. According
to plain textual evidence, Aristotle excludes from the
set of syllogisms an instantiated valid mood (i.e. a prima
facie good candidate to be a syllogism) such as:
‘(Impossibly) all cabbages are siamese cats,
(Impossibly) all Gwendolen’s cats are cabbages, there-
fore (Contingently) all Gwendolen’s cats are siamese
cats’. For the same reasons, Aristotle gets rid of syllo-
gisms (i.e., as already said, of natural language instances
of valid moods) such that neither of the (instantiated)
premisses has the same fundamental (i.e. necessity, con-
tingency, impossibility) modality of the (instantiated)
conclusion. The hypothesis H that all this is no less and
no more than an obvious immediate outcome of
imposing (also according to Aristotle) equimodality of
P and C to all (and only) allowed syllogisms is
supported not only by Themistius’ testimony but also
(and what is more) by the pervasive presence and
explanatory power of H both in APr. and its commen-
tatorial counterparts (Alexander’s commentary being the
main case in point). As we shall see, even the validity
of A
AA
-I (i.e., in standard notation, a syllogism in
Barbara with necessary major premiss, assertoric minor
and necessary conclusion), and the invalidity of
AA
A
-I as well, find perhaps their most plausible
justification just by means of H (which covers also the
case, duly mentioned by Aristotle, of a Celarent modal-
ized in the same way). Needless to add that the validity
(according to Aristotle’s apodeictic syllogistic, but not
to Theophrastus, Eudemus and many modern exegetes
as well) of A
AA
-I, seems to provide, at least prima
facie, a plain counterexample to H (along with the inva-
lidity, always according to Aristotle, of AA
A
-I).
Thus, it appears quite natural to test, and just on the test
bench of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic (i.e. when A
stands for P and B for C), the real explanatory power
of A ⇒ B, since its definiens (namely, as already said,
strict implication between equimodal A, B) amounts to
imposing modality-dependent truth-conditions for ‘⇒’.
In this connection, I shall discuss a few cases, as a small
sample of a universe that, of course, will not be covered
to its full extent here. It should be stressed that the very
nature of that sample also depends upon the more
general meaning of ‘⇒’, which, as I shall try to show,
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
amounts to providing, as Aristotle himself does, a
formal representation of the well-known (owing to an
equally well-known Barnesian proposal) Aristotelian
intuitive notion of ‘relevance’ τ ω̂˛ ταυ̂τα εˆι’ναι (cf. APr.
I 1, 24b20) of all and only the premisses of a syllogism
to its conclusion. Thus, as I shall show, a well-known
puzzle of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic, namely his
validation by Reductio of AAA-I (APr. I 15,
34a34–b6), can be solved, so to speak, ‘from the inside’,
i.e. by means of the Aristotelian non-classical (and not
coming ‘from the outside’) ‘⇒’.
An even more interesting case in point is the quite
mysterious “Aristotle’s Thesis” AT (APr. II 4,
57b13–14), according to which nothing can imply (or
be implied by) its own negation. The ‘mystery’ of
course depends upon the fact that both material and
strict implication are clearly unable to fulfil AT.
Nevertheless, as is easily seen, ‘⇒’ does fulfil AT, since
(owing to the definiens of ‘⇒’) both A ⇒ ¬A and its
converse become obvious negated modal theorems.
Moreover, one can prove that AT and the modal subal-
ternation MS (i.e. the modern counterpart
A → A
of ex necesse posse) are logically equivalent in any
standard modal system if the definiens of ‘⇒’ is sub-
stituted for ‘⇒’ in ¬(A ⇒ ¬A) (or in ¬(¬A ⇒ A)). In
fact, according to Barnes, to say that in a syllogism,
the conclusion C follows from the premisses amounts
to saying that (also according to Aristotle) the premisses
(notably: nothing less and nothing more than the pre-
misses) are intuitively relevant for the conclusion, i.e.
that C holds ‘because’ of them. According to the claim
here made, Aristotle himself provides, albeit, in a sense,
implicitly, a more formal explanans of that intuitive
relevance, namely (the definiens of) P ⇒ C. Now, the
intuitive meaning of AT, when written as the negation
of ¬A ⇒ A, is of course that ‘A holds because of its
own negation’ has no sense at all. More formally, a con-
tingent A is ruled out (by obvious modal theorems)
under the assumption of ¬A ⇒ A. Moreover, under the
same assumption, both an impossible and a necessary
A would yield, as is easily seen, ‘A is necessary and A
is impossible’, i.e. the negation of modal subalterna-
tion ex necesse posse. All this is far from being a
rigorous proof (but see later for more technicalities).
Nevertheless, if Aristotle’s thesis AT is to be taken
seriously (also owing to the logical equivalence between
AT and the obvious modal theorem MS of subalterna-
tion from necesse to posse), what about the ordinary
(non-modal) subalternation from a universal to a par-
115
ticular proposition (i.e from A to I or E to O)? From a
(modern) logical point of view the answer is straight-
forward, since predicate logic is not yielded by mere
juxtaposition to propositional logic, just because the
former is an extension of the latter (in modern jargon,
sentential letters are nothing but 0-adic predicate
letters). Therefore, a predicate logic only with ‘→’, and
without an extensive use of ‘⇒’, would be incoherent
with a propositional ⇒-logic. Nevertheless, the ascrip-
tion to Aristotle of any awareness of that incoherence
is no more than a wild conjecture, at least if one is
committed to any seriously history-laden standpoint. In
fact, even if one assumes (as is clearly suggested, inter
alia, by AT) a systematic and pervasive presence of ‘⇒’
in Aristotle’s propositional meta-syllogistic, this
assumption does not entail at all that he was actually
aware of the fact that his syllogistic (let alone a full
first-order predicate logic), being on its own an
extension of a ⇒-logic of propositions, should be
rewritten by substituting (everywhere possible) ‘⇒’ for
‘→’. Now, it is quite clear that this rewriting amounts,
first of all, to building up a new square of opposition
(hereafter NSO, and OSO for the old one), where the
universal affirmative (A) becomes something like:
(∀x)(Ax ⇒ Bx), hence E becomes (owing to the so-
called interdefinability of quantifiers): (∀x)(Ax ⇒
¬Bx), I , i.e. ¬(E), becomes: (∃x)¬(Ax ⇒ ¬Bx) and
O, i.e. ¬(A), becomes: (∃x)¬(Ax ⇒ Bx). It is fair to
add that textual evidence leaves no more than a shadowy
room, as a somewhat hidden alternative, to NSO, at least
so far as Aristotle’s logic is concerned. Thus, as is
almost immediately seen, NSO leaves no room for con-
tingent A, E, I, O, at least in an S5-like setting where
all true strict implications must be necessary and all
false strict implications must be impossible (for this
setting, as regards Aristotelian logic, see below).
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of NSO could be
hardly overlooked. The syllogisms in Barbara (and in
Celarent as well) with a totally false major premiss and
a true minor are a first case in point. According to
Aristotle, a totally false A premiss is defined by the
truth of the E premiss with the same terms (and
conversely for a totally false E). Now, Aristotle also
maintains (cf. APr. II 2, 53b26–35) that, e.g., there is
no ATFATAT-I, i.e. there is no syllogism in Barbara with
true conclusion if its major premiss is totally false and
its minor is true. The standard explanation amounts to
saying that this is obviously true since the syllogism in
Celarent with the same terms has true premisses and a
116 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
true conclusion, hence the corresponding conclusion
in Barbara must be false. Nevertheless, the standard
explanation is unable to get rid of unwelcome coun-
terexamples. Thus, a syllogism in Barbara, with major
term ‘decahedron’, middle term ‘regular polyhedron’
and minor term ‘regular decahedron’, is an unwelcome
guest, since of course its major premiss (‘All regular
polyhedra are decahedra’) is totally false (because, as
also Aristotle perfectly knew, no regular polyhedron can
be a decahedron), the minor (‘All regular decahedra
are regular polyhedra’) is true (since decahedra are
polyhedra) and the conclusion is (even analytically) true
(since ‘All regular decahedra are decahedra’ is true, so
to speak ex definitione and no matter whether there are
regular decahedra or not). Now, as I shall show, NSO
gets rid automatically of empty terms (such as the
minor ‘regular decahedron’), with no need of implicit
existential (extralogical) assumptions, just aimed at
‘refilling’ any possibly empty term in Aristotle’s syllo-
gistic. As is well known, these assumptions are the very
core of the so-called “doctrine of existential import”
according to which even ‘Nothing both is and is not’
should be ruled out, notwithstanding the fact that empty
terms were plainly allowed by Aristotle, since, e.g., ‘No
animal is a chimera’ was plainly allowed by him (and
his syllogistic as well). Moreover, and what is more,
NSO yields the rigorous validation of any conclusio ad
subalternatam (hence also, e.g., of conversions per
accidens and syllogisms in Darapti) by ruling out both
implicit (‘existential import style’) assumptions and
explicit additions of an existential proposition. These
latter additions, as is also well known, are required by
the Frege-Russell standard first-order transcription of
the OSO in order to validate 9 of the 24 traditionally
valid syllogistic moods (including the so-called
weakened moods). Nevertheless, as I shall show, under
these ‘modern style’ additions, A and O become con-
traries, in blatant inconsistency with a basic Aristotle’s
tenet, according to which they are contradictory to one
another. Moreover, against any common sense reading
of quantifiers (and most probably against Aristotle’s
reading too), Frege-Russell transcription, under the
simple assumption that ghosts do not exist, yields the
truth of ‘All ghosts are dogs’ and the falsity of ‘Some
ghosts are bad-tempered’. All these oddities are plainly
ruled out by NSO and even Aristotle’s apodeictic
syllogistic becomes more easy to understand. Thus, as
regards the already mentioned validity of A
AA
-I and
the invalidity of AA
A
-I as well, if one assumes that
the minor assertoric premiss in the first mood is true (as
Aristotle plainly does, cf. APr. I 9, 30a22, and as he does
ex hypothesi when ATFATAT-I is ruled out, see later) and
the assertoric major in the second mood is totally false,
NSO almost immediately yields (in an S5-like setting)
both the necessity of the minor premiss in A
AA
-I
(hence the validity of that mood) and the impossibility
of the major premiss in the second mood (hence the
invalidity of AA
A
-I, although it should also be
explained why, say, a totally false minor is not allowed
in A
AA
-I).
As a (necessarily) short, but by no means irrelevant,
digression, think of the startling complexity of building
up a cognitive model (à la Johnson-Laird, see here
n. 17) of what a syllogism really is. Obviously enough,
this depends on the fact that now ‘⇒’ is no more “a
scullery Cinderella”, hence also without any room in
current elementary ‘handbook style’ accounts. When
‘⇒’ is pervasively present, notably within premisses
and conclusion, even a categorical Barbara is an
inherently modal object. Thus (and just because, quite
understandably, no more than the ‘handbook style’
version has been taken into account), Johnson-Laird’s
approach shows only the emerging top of an iceberg. As
is well known, this model amounts, in the (allegedly)
simple case of Barbara, to juxtaposing checklists of
(mental representations of) F-individuals, G-individuals,
H-individuals, where F, G, H of course stand for
(properties respectively denoted by the) minor, middle
and major term. Since, as regards couples F-G and
G-H, member-to-member juxtapositions provide the
model (or mental representation) of one-one or one-
many mappings, the transition from G-H and F-G
mappings to the mapping for the couple F-H becomes
very easy to grasp in an intuitive and almost ‘visual’
way. Now, a simple look at a version (possibly the most
simple one, see (7) below) of the definiens of (1), almost
immediately discloses the complexity of a model of this
kind when ‘→’ is duly replaced by ‘⇒’. In fact, as the
disjunction in (7) clearly shows, the model has a
branching, the first branch (i.e. the strict equivalence
branch) yielding a forcedly one-one mapping (e.g. from
F-individuals to G-individuals as regards the minor
premiss), whereas the other branch (i.e. the branch for
strict implication with a strictly stronger antecedent and
contingent clauses) is much more complex and yields a
forcedly one-many mapping. But what about a cogni-
tive model where the contingency of the clauses should
also be taken into account within the model? Perhaps
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
something like holographic strokes or virgules
(changing in colour or shape, according to the point of
view or visual angle), or even Cheshire cats-like van-
ishing and reappearing items, might provide at least a
faithful material counterpart to mental representations
of, e.g., G-individuals that are G only in a contingent
way. In this connection, one of the many problems is
that Johnson-Laird’s approach, albeit committed to
‘classical’ first-order logic, does not take into account
the addition of existential propositions, when needed by
‘classical’ (Frege-Russell) reading of quantifiers (see
below). Thus, a fortiori, any representation of knowl-
edge (for particular affirmative premisses or conclu-
sions) in terms of intuitive ‘compatibility’, even of per
se impossible properties, is outside the scope of a model
à la Johnson-Laird, notwithstanding the fact that just
this kind of compatibility is the immediate outcome of
the rendering of a particular affirmative by means of
(∃x)¬(Ax ⇒ ¬Bx). Therefore, further thought on these
subjects is clearly needed (most probably in the frame-
work of the so-called Model Based Reasoning), but it
could hardly find its room in history-laden inquiries,
as this one is aimed at being.
After this short digression, an almost equally short
account of the concluding part of the present paper finds
its natural room here. Thus, at §3, I shall discuss at
length the main problem of any logic of ‘⇒’, namely
to provide an answer to the question: what it exactly
means, in terms of standard connectives, to say that
A ⇒ B is not only true for some (allowed) instantia-
tions of A, B, but is also true for any conceivable
instantiation? Otherwise stated (in modern logical
jargon), how to characterize by means of standard
connectives the validity of A ⇒ B (i.e. its truth every-
where, in all possible worlds, and not only somewhere,
in at least one world)? Now, modern logic (to be more
precise, the so called logic of analytic consequential
implication, see below) provides a straightforward
answer to this question (according to a well-known
theorem TH, the validity of A ⇒ B amounts to the
validity of A ↔ B, i.e. to the logically true material
equivalence, in any normal modal system, between A
and B). So far as I know, there is no ancient counter-
part of this answer in Aristotle’s logic (although he was
obviously aware of the fact that, e.g., Aristotle’s Thesis
¬(¬A ⇒ A) is not counterinstantiable). This is quite
understandable, as no logical equivalence is allowed
between the conclusion of a syllogism and the con-
junction of its premisses. But what about Stoic
117
(Chrysippean) logic? As I shall argue at length, there
is some textual evidence of a Chrysippean ‘glimpse
beyond’, i.e. of an ancient counterpart of TH in
Chrysippus’ logic, but it is fair to add that it is a quite
tenuous evidence. Nevertheless, a thorough discussion
of this issue yields an interesting by-product, notably a
precise characterization of truth-conditions for the so-
called (and, as yet, quite misterious) fourth type
conditional. According to what Sextus says (P. II
110–112, see below), and to all serious scholars as well,
the fourth type conditional is stronger than the
Chrysippean (third type) conditional, since the former
(unlike the latter) does not permit strict equivalence
between the clauses (i.e. the antecedent A must be
strictly stronger than the consequent B wherever a
fourth type conditional, let be it called A ⇒+ B, is true).
Now, if, according to the claim here made, the definiens
of a third type conditional must be logically equivalent
to the definiens of the Aristotelian arrow ‘⇒’, then, as
is easily seen, a good candidate to define the former will
be something like: ‘either strict equivalence (no matter
whether the clauses are contingent or not), or strict
implication, but only with contingent clauses, the
antecedent clause being strictly stronger than its
consequent’ (see (7) below). This simply means that,
also according to a careful analysis of textual evidence,
A ⇒+ B will be defined by the second disjunct of (7),
namely:
A ⇒+ B =df (A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B.
(Think, say, of A as short for ‘It is day and the sky is
overspread with clouds’ and B as short for ‘It is day’;
moreover, the fourth type conflict obviously amounts
to contrariety restricted to contingent clauses, whence
fourth type α’ντικε ίµενα may not conflict with one
another.) This has at least one startling consequence,
namely that it is always possible, for every A, B, to
produce a counterinstantiation of A ⇒+ B. Otherwise
stated, in any normal (hence complete) modal system,
the definiens of the fourth type conditional A ⇒+ B can
never be a theorem (i.e. it may not be everywhere true)
just because there are no A, B such that ∇A, ∇B are
everywhere true. In fact, were any one of them (e.g.
∇A) everywhere true, both
A and
¬A would be
everywhere false hence, by closure under necessitation
(i.e. the necessitation rule ‘ A iff 
A’), both A and
its own negation would be everywhere false (or, if one
likes, A ∧ ¬A would be a theorem; for an ancient coun-
terpart of this argument, see below). This simply means
118 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
that no deductively correct argument is conditionaliz-
able by means of ‘⇒+’ (as its principal mark). In more
‘traditional’ terms, it is impossible to build up a crite-
rion of α’ κολουθ ία by means of a fourth type condi-
tional (denoted by ‘⇒+’). This, perhaps, explains why
the fourth type conditional had such an elusive life (at
least, so far as the few extant testimonies are con-
cerned).
1. Aristotelian modal similarity and Chrysippean
conditionals
As remarked earlier, according to what Aristotle says,
in order to build up a syllogism the premisses and the
conclusion must of course instantiate a valid mood, but
this is only a necessary condition and not a sufficient
one, since a further constraint (which has nothing to do
with the so-called classical logic) is explicitly intro-
duced on the allowed instantiations (in natural language)
of a valid mood. As Aristotle says (APr. I 24,
41b27–31), one or both the premisses must be similar
( ο’ µο ίαν α’ νάγκη γ ίνεσθαι, 41b28) to the conclusion,
hence, as Aristotle explicitly adds (41b30–31), they
must also have the same modality of the conclusion (no
matter whether they are necessary, assertoric,3 contin-
gent, or impossible). This sounds astonishing enough,
at least from the standpoint of current ‘handbook style’
treatments of syllogistic, since it amounts to ruling out
(seemingly) innocent instantiations of perfectly valid
moods, such as, say: ‘All numbers drawn by lot (right
now) are odd; all prime numbers greater than 2 and less
than 50 are drawn by lot (right now); therefore, all prime
numbers greater than 2 and less than 50 are odd’, where,
of course, both premisses are contingent (no matter
whether true or false), and the conclusion is necessary.
As I shall try to show (and notwithstanding the fact
that Aristotle’s equimodality criterion is apparently
fulfilled), the situation does not change if ‘integer’ is
substituted for ‘odd’, hence if (unlike the contingent,
and possibly contingently false, minor) the major
premiss has to be taken as necessary (since, of course,
numerals to be matched with balls drawn from a keno
goose may not be names, say, of transcendental, or even
non-integer rational numbers). Thus, as these instanti-
ations clearly show, a syllogism in Barbara with
necessary (or assertoric) major premiss, contingent (and
possibly false too) minor and necessary conclusion is
ruled out, either by Aristotle’s original equimodality
condition or by its own restatement (equimodality of P
and C), since at least one premiss, hence also their
conjunction (when it is not impossible), is contingent,
whereas the conclusion is not, whence the equimodality
conditions are not fulfilled. Of course, instantiations
such as the following: ‘All prime numbers greater than
2 are odd; all numbers drawn by lot (right now) are
prime numbers greater than 2; therefore all numbers
drawn by lot (right now) are odd’ would be accepted,
since they clearly meet Aristotle’s equimodality crite-
rion. In fact, at least one premiss (here the minor), and
the conjunction of the premisses as well, have the same
modality of the (here contingent) conclusion. Moreover,
as is clearly shown by the same instantiation (and pace
Aristotle, see below) it is quite possible, that, with a
necessary (or assertoric) major, the minor be false and
the conclusion be not. Moreover, Aristotle explicitly
introduces an intuitive propositional metalanguage,
where a single (meta)letter P stands, as already said, for
the conjunction P1 ∧ P2 of the premisses (the major P1
and the minor P2) and another letter C stands for the
conclusion.4 In this metalanguage, to say that any instan-
tiation of a syllogism must be an instantiation of a valid
mood, obviously amounts to saying that P strictly
implies C. Therefore, if the additional equimodality
condition is introduced, it is easily seen that a clearly
non-truthfunctional implication (denoted by ‘⇒’) of
C by P holds, namely:
(1) (P ⇒ C) ↔ ((P — 3 C) ∧ ((
P ∧
C) ∨
(
¬P ∧
¬C) ∨ (∇P ∧ ∇C)))
where ‘↔’ clearly denotes a definitional (material)
equivalence.5 It is worthy of note that what Aristotle
actually says is, as it stands, weaker than the second
conjunct in (1). In fact, Aristotle says, inter alia, that
(A)
C → (
P 1 ∨
P 2)
(B) ∇C → (∇P1 ∨ ∇P2)
must hold, hence
(C)
¬C → (
¬P1 ∨
¬P2)
(D)  C → (  P 1 ∨  P 2)
must also hold (by tacit undue restriction to com-
possible contingent premisses as regards (C), see
Alex.Aphr. in APr. 270.12–14 Wallies, notably by
contraposition from APr. I 15, 34a21–22; (D) is an
almost immediate consequence of (A) and (B)). Now,

P1 ∧
P2 ∧ → ∇C is allowed by (D), but it is not
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
allowed by the further, and quite obvious, constraint
P — 3 C (moreover, with compossible premisses,
(∇P1 ∧ ∇P2) — 3 ∇P holds). By analogous reasons, it
seems plausible to presume that C ∧ P1 ∧ ¬P2,
C ∧ P2 ∧ ¬P1, albeit allowed by (D), were actually
not allowed by Aristotle. In fact, the hypothesis of
Aristotle’s commitment to the further constraint
P ⇒ C is plausible not only because it appears to
provide the ‘best explanation’ of introducing (D) (hence
of getting rid of C ∧ ¬P1 ∧ ¬P2), but also because
some well-known puzzles of Aristotle’s modal logic can
be explained under the assumption that, according to
Aristotle, not only (D), but also (1) must hold. In fact,
as remarked earlier, what Aristotle says at the beginning
of APr. I 9 (see also Alex.Aphr. in APr. 270, 3–4
Wallies) amounts to saying, inter alia, that in a syllo-
gism (e.g., in Barbara), (i) the combination (where
‘(—)’ stands fo ‘assertoric’, see n. 3): 〈(—)P1,
P2,
C〉
is forbidden, whereas, (ii) 〈
P1, (—)P2,
C〉 is allowed.
As to (i), this means that, according to Aristotle, one
ought to take as unsound an obvious counterexample
(let be it called CE) with (contingent qua) assertoric
major: ‘All odd numbers drawn by lot right now are less
than 30’, necessary (secundum definitionem) minor:
‘Necessarily all prime numbers greater than 2 and less
than 10 drawn by lot right now are odd numbers drawn
by lot right now’ and necessary (secundum definitionem)
conclusion: ‘Necessarily all prime numbers greater than
2 and less than 10 drawn by lot right now are less than
30’. If one assumes that fulfilling (A), (B), (C) without
fulfilling (1) is, according to Aristotle, sufficient for
soundness of CE, then CE will be sound according to
him. But, according to Aristotle, CE should be unsound.
Thus, if (against a widespread opinion) one also
assumes that Aristotle is right, one must conclude that,
according to him, one should be committed not only to
(A), (B), (C) but also to (1).
(As an aside, the seemingly innocent CE, if taken as
sound, has the startling property that, whenever, by mere
contingency, its major is totally false (i.e. whenever no
odd number drawn by lot right now happens to be less
than 30), its conclusion becomes simultaneously, as
would be easily seen, both necessary and false, but see
below for adequate treatment of these kinds of
problems. Moreover (and pace J. Van Rijen, see here
n. 3 in fine), it should be stressed that ‘to be a number
less than 30’ is not predicated per accidens of ‘prime
number greater than 2 and less than 10’, no matter
whether these prime numbers are or are not numbers
119
whose numerals are well-matched with balls drawn by
lot right now, and notwithstanding the fact that ‘number
less than 30’ is predicated per accidens of ‘odd number
drawn by lot right now’. Nevertheless, when supple-
mented by (1), Van Rijen’s approach yields a better
understanding of Aristotle’s apodeictic syllogistic.)
As regards (ii), Aristotle’s tenet is less easy to under-
stand. Perhaps, a ‘default reading’ of ‘Necessarily P1
and P2’ as short for ‘Necessarily (P1 and P2)’ has some
room here (of course, no default reading of this kind is
possible for ‘P1 and necessarily P2)’. (I am indebted to
Roberto Gusmani for pointing out to me that, at least
in ordinary (non-technical) Greek, a similar default
reading is nothing but the outcome of a use α’ π ὸ
κοινο υ̂.) After all, regimentation problems are also
present in medieval logic (think of, say, the truth,
according to Albert of Saxony, of Socrates ab homine
differt vs. the falsity of Socrates differt ab homine). Be
that as it may, there are more compelling reasons for
introducing syllogisms with a necessary major premiss,
an assertoric minor and a necessary conclusion, but
these reasons will be more easily understandable after
a short inquiry of another well-known puzzle, namely
Aristotle’s tenet (APr. I 20, 39a10–11) according to
which syllogisms in Felapton, Ferison and Bocardo
with necessary major premiss and contingent minor
must have an assertoric conclusion. Of course, to avoid
blatant inconsistency with (A), (B), (C), one should add
that ‘assertoric’ is to be taken here as short for either
‘contingent ω ’ ς υ’ πάρχον’ or ‘necessary ω ’ ς υ’ πάρχον’
(cf. Alex.Aphr. in APr. 242.35–243.10 Wallies, where
the case of Bocardo is not explicitly mentioned). But it
is worth noting that Alexander seems to be committed
to (1), and not only to (A), (B), (C), since he says that
the conclusion must be (χρ ὴ λ έγειν, 243.8) contingent
ω’ ς υ’ π άρχον (in accordance with both (A), (B), (C)
and (1)), but he does not say that it could also be
necessary ω ’ ς υ’ πάρχον (in accordance only with (A),
(B), (C), and not with (1)). There is no room here for
a thorough scrutiny of Aristotle’s tenet, but, as regards
the explanatory power of (1), suffice it to say that a
syllogism in Felapton with necessary major premiss,
contingent minor and contingent ω ’ ς υ’ πάρχον conclu-
sion yields (by two simple steps of conversion per
accidens plus simple conversion of the minor) a syllo-
gism in Darii with the same terms, impossible major
premiss, contingent minor premiss and contingent ω ’ς
’υπάρχον conclusion: hence, according to (1), it yields,
with the same terms, no syllogism at all in Darii! This
120 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
is quite natural, since (as we already know) ⇒-validity
is stronger than standard →-validity. But (unlike a con-
tingent κατ ὰ τ ὸν διορισµ όν conclusion, at least if
inconsistency of a modal indicator with its own scope
ought to be avoided) a contingent ω ’ ς υ’ πάρχον con-
clusion, if the terms are changed, may well become an
impossible ω ’ ς υ’ πάρχον conclusion, i.e. an impossible
conclusion with no modal indicators. Thus, the role of
imposing a negative assertoric conclusion to the syllo-
gism in Felapton becomes more clear: to grant,
according to (1) and not only to (A), (B), (C), the exis-
tence of syllogisms also after the transition from (a
certain kind of modalized) Felapton to its ‘mapping’
in Darii. In a less serious vein, one could say that
Aristotle is so deeply committed to (1), that he seems
to forget that a Felapton with a necessary major
premiss, a contingent minor and an assertoric conclu-
sion is inconsistent, if taken at face value, with his own
criterion of modal similarity in its version (A), (B), (C)!
We are now ready for a better understanding of the
first Aristotelian puzzle concerning syllogisms (no
matter whether in Barbara or in Celarent) with a
necessary major premiss, an assertoric minor and a
necessary conclusion (A
AA
-I, see above for this
standard notation). If a syllogism S of this kind is in
Barbara, it will yield of course a syllogism S′ in
Celarent with the same terms and an impossible major
premiss. Now, were the minor premiss of S a contingent
ω’ ς υ’ π άρχον premiss (i.e. a contingent premiss in
assertoric form, with no contingency indicator), its con-
clusion C(S), according to (1), would be contingent, as
well as the corresponding conclusion C(S′) of S′, since
¬C(S) must be contingent and (as remarked earlier and
discussed at length later) the subalternation from C(S′)
to ¬C(S) must be written as C(S′) ⇒ ¬C(S) in order to
be logically true (or, better, not to admit of falsifying
instantiations in natural language). Whence, again (i.e.
just as in the case of the transition from Felapton to
Darii) S′ would not be a syllogism at all, according to
(1), since the conjunction P of its premisses would be
impossible, with a contingent C(S′). Therefore the minor
premiss of S may not be contingent, if taken in
assertoric form. In order to get a syllogism S′ from S,
the terms (〈minor, middle, major〉) of S must be
changed. Think, say, of a transition from 〈number drawn
by lot (right now), prime number greater than 2, odd〉
(see above) to 〈cube, regular polyhedron, polyhedron〉.
With this new triple, both S and S′ are syllogisms, S
having a necessary major premiss, an assertoric minor
and a necessary conclusion, just as Aristotle maintains,
and rightly maintains as well, since the minor is nothing
but a necessary proposition in assertoric form. Thus,
both Aristotle’s puzzling tenets and the explanatory
power of (1) are, once again, vindicated. (There is no
room here to show that (1) is actually required in
Alexander’s well-known argument to prove that
A
AA
-I is valid just because one can prove, contra
Theophrastus and Eudemus as well, that OAO-III also
is, and just owing to the peiorem rule, see in APr.
123.25–127.16 Wallies, esp. 127.3–11 as to the use of
that modalized Bocardo.) Actually, if (1) is taken
seriously, these allegedly wrong tenets become more
clear, and are by no means an outcome of Aristotelian
blunders: they are nothing but a subtle way out. Simple
operations (conversions for the transition from Felapton
to Darii, obvious modal equivalences for the transition
from Barbara to Celarent) should transform syllogisms
into syllogisms. Nevertheless, if a syllogism is an
argument, and not a mere argument form, i.e. is nothing
but an instantiated valid mood (such that (1) is ful-
filled), then ‘to be a syllogism’ is, quite understandably,
not closed with respect to those simple operations. Thus,
Aristotle’s alleged blunders are, most probably, also
aimed at providing a remedy for this disease. It is fair
to add that a much simpler way out amounts to consis-
tently putting (as already remarked in the Introduction)
‘⇒’ instead of ‘→’ also within premisses and conclu-
sions (thus a universal affirmative becomes (∀x)(Gx ⇒
Fx), etc.). In this way, as we already know, no contin-
gent premisses or conclusions are allowed, at least in an
S5-like framework, hence Aristotle’s subtle way out is
no more required and this, perhaps, shows that he had
only, or at least primarily, (∀x)(Gx → Fx) in mind.
Thus, after all, an implicit but clear (see also n. 3 in
fine) commitment of Aristotle to (1) appears to be not
too unpalatable. Let (I) be: ‘All lonesome polecats are
polyhedra; all cubes are lonesome polecats; therefore all
cubes are polyhedra’; let (II) be: ‘All polyhedra are
regular polyhedra; all cubes are polyhedra; therefore
all cubes are regular polyhedra’, and let (III) be: ‘All
cubes are polyhedra; all regular polyhedra are cubes;
therefore all regular polyhedra are polyhedra’. In fact,
to give up not only (I), but also (II) and (III), there is
no real need of any (more or less formalized) deduc-
tion or conditionalization theorem for ‘⇒’. The more
vague and intuitive idea that, if ‘implicationally follows
(from a conjunction of premisses)’ does not hold, then
‘deductively follows (from these premisses)’ does not
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
hold either, is most probably a sufficient condition for
committment to (1) and not only to (A), (B), (C).
Without giving up completely this intuitive idea, one
could even consistently maintain that, in a few special
and ‘fundamental’ cases, deductive patterns are self-
evident (as regards Aristotle’s syllogistic, think, say, of
Barbara and Celarent). Therefore (as in modern
‘Gamma theories’) even the existence of their corre-
sponding implicational patterns can be ruled out. Thus,
as regards Aristotle’s logic, the commitment to (1) most
probably depends only upon a simple fact, notably that
συµβα ίνει, ’ε´πεται and their cognates have also both
an implicative and a deductive sense. Therefore, intu-
itive falsification of a mood by means of ‘contrasted
instances’, i.e. intuitive countermodels with duly instan-
tiated terms, is always a falsification of both a condi-
tional and a deduction, their falsity going always on a
par. The obvious extension of all this, mutatis mutandis,
from ‘→’ to ‘⇒’ has, as its almost immediate outcome,
the transition from (D), i.e.  C → ( P1 ∨  P2), to
C → (P1 ∧ P2), i.e. to:
(D′) ¬ P → ¬ C
and, more generally (whenever, for any A, B, A ⇒ B
holds) to
(D″) ¬ A → ¬ B
just because, whenever (or rather: wherever, i.e. ‘in all
possible worlds where’) A is false and B is true, (the
definiens of) A ⇒ B must be false.
This is precisely what Themistius ascribes to
Aristotle. Thus, teste Themistio, Aristotle was aware of
the fact that (just because (D′) holds for any allowed
instantiation of P and C) the second conjunct of (1) and
the conjunction (A) ∧ (B) ∧ (C) are provably equiva-
lent (although the former, as it stands, is stronger than
the latter). In fact, if Df (A ⇒ B) is short for the
definiens of A ⇒ B (i.e. for the definiens in (1) when
A replaces P and B replaces C), then Df (A ⇒ B) →
(D″) is short for a valid formula. Moreover, if taken at
face value, Themistius’ more immediate Aristotelian
counterpart (Cael. I 12, 281b15) seems also to be
concerned with (D″), rather than with its special case
(and obvious consequence as well) (D′). Perhaps, unlike
the so intuitively plausible (1), its weakened outcomes
(A), (B), (C) are explicitly mentioned by Aristotle just
because of the unifying power and great generality of
his notion of similarity (and not only of modal simi-
121
larity, of course) between one or both premisses and the
corresponding conclusion.
On the meaning of (1), a few points are quickly
made. Firstly, (1) amounts to providing a logical
explanans (more precisely, a clear metalinguistic coun-
terpart, in modal propositional form) of a basic tenet of
Aristotelian logic, namely that from false premisses a
true conclusion is deducible, but per accidens tantum.
This well-known Latin vulgata obviously covers phrases
such as πλὴν ου’ δι ότι α’ λλ’ ’ότι (53b8–9), and a simple
look at (1) makes clear what this actually means: in a
true implication, a false antecedent and a true conse-
quent are allowed iff they are both contingent (since,
according to Aristotle’s equimodality criterion, ‘→’
must be replaced by ‘⇒’ in any metalinguistic propo-
sitional counterpart of a (conditionalized) syllogism).6
Thus (1) (hence also Aristotle’s equimodality criterion
in its APr. I 24 version) provides a (formal) version of
the nova (at the time) elucidatio of τ ω̂˛ τα υ̂τα εˆ’ιναι
(APr. I 1, 24b20) by means of an intuitive notion of (a
logic of) relevance.7
The close relation, according to Aristotle, between
contingency and (non-eternal) accidentality is almost
obvious, and the claim that strict implication with a false
antecedent and a true consequent must be permitted, but
rather ε’ν το ι̂ς διαλ όγοις than in mathematics, where
strict equivalence (between necessary propositions) is
much more frequent, since nothing accidental is
assumed, is clearly stated in APo. I 12, 78a 6–13 and
has its finished counterpart in APr. II 2–4. But, within
a theory of syllogisms in its more ‘technical’ sense, a
counterpart is already in APr. I 24, since Aristotle’s
criterion of modal similarity (whence also equimodality
as formally translated by (1)) has the almost immediate
outcome that strict implication without strict equiva-
lence between P and C (whence possibly also a false P
with true C) is permitted iff P and C are both contin-
gent.8 A ‘common sense’ restatement, in concise form,
of (1) obviously amounts to saying that the possible
does not follow from the impossible or, a bit less
concisely, that, from the impossible, the impossible, but
not (also) the possible, follows. It is perhaps relevant
to note that precisely this restatement can be found in
an ancient source, namely in (both the Latin and the
Hebrew) translatio of Themistius’ Paraphrasis of De
Caelo (notably, of Cael. I 12, 281b15: συµβα ίνει δ’
α’ δ ύνατον ε’ξ α’ δυνάτου). So far as I know, neither
translation of Themistius’ passage has been (until now)
mentioned (let alone pointed out or discussed) in any
122 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
‘modern’ treatment of Aristotelian logic; therefore, it
is worth quoting and discussing at least the Latin
passage9 (with a few remarks on its more concise
Hebrew10 parallel). The translatio latina runs as follows:
His praeterea alium modum adiunxit, qui scopo ab eo proposito
suffragatur, aitque: accidit autem impossibile ex impossibili,
siquidem affirmare voluit, ad id, quod fieri non potest, id, quod
fieri non potest, non autem id, quod fieri potest, omnino sequitur;
nec non etiam ad falsum omnino falsum consequitur, quemad-
modum in Primo de Syllogismo declaravit.
Here, “accidit [. . .] ex” (“it comes out [. . .] from”)
is of course a rendering of Aristotle’s (281b15, see
above) συµβα ίνει [. . .] ε’ξ, but the Latin translation
(unlike the Hebrew one, see 47.10 Landauer) prefixes
a somewhat unexpected omnino11 (perhaps the Latin
rendering of a Themistian α’ πλω̂ς) to “sequitur”. To be
fair, what Themistius says is more general than (1)
since, unlike (1), it covers also the case in which any
propositional (meta)letter A is substituted for P and any
propositional (meta)letter B is substituted for C.
Moreover, “nec non etiam [. . .] declaravit” is interesting
too. There, the meaning of the first occurrence of falsum
in (71.12) (i.e. in “ad falsum omnino falsum conse-
quitur”) is explained by 70.32 (“Falsum quoque, aut ex
suppositione aut absolute erit”). Since (as, e.g., the
Hebrew translation of the almost pleonastic “omnino
et absolute” (70.28) clearly shows) the meaning of
“omnino falsum” is (almost) the same of “absolute
falsum” in 70.35–36 (“absolute vero falsum dicitur, ut
si, non ambulante aliquo, se ambulare dixerit”), the
meaning of “ad falsum omnino falsum consequitur” is
most probably something like ‘from a false proposition,
no matter whether hypothetically or absolutely (i.e. tout
court, but not ex suppositione), an absolutely (hence,
not ex suppositione) false proposition follows
(consequitur, 71.12)’.12 Now, this becomes blatantly
false when the “omnino falsum” is also impossible and
the falsum in “ad falsum” is not impossible (also
according to Themistius, see a few lines above, 71.5–7:
“id, quod fieri non potest, omnino falsum est, non autem
e contra, ut scilicet quod falsum est, omnino fieri non
possit”). Thus, Themistius, as it may well be suggested
even by simple reference to “Primo de Syllogismo”
(71.13), has actually in mind a particular case both of
falsum (in “ad falsum”, 71.12), and of falsum (in
“omnino falsum”), namely a case in which neither of
them is impossible. Thus, according to Landauer’s quite
plausible proposal,13 Themistius has in mind APr. I 15,
where actually Aristotle says (APr. I 15, 34a25–27) that,
from a ‘hypothetically false’ and not impossible propo-
sition, another false and not impossible (hence, a con-
tingently false) proposition will follow. To be fair,
Aristotle says only that the συµβα ι̂νον will be (in a
clearly iussive sense, i.e. ‘must be’) false and not impos-
sible (34a27). But if one assumes that what Aristotle
says here should also be consistent with his own
equimodality condition (41b27–31), then, at least a
necessary συµβα ι̂νον will also be ruled out. Therefore
(at least if Themistius really had in mind both APr. I 15,
34a25–27 and APr. I 24, 41b27–31, taking also for
granted their consistency)14 both “nec non etiam” and
“quemadmodum” (71.12) appear to be quite apposite.
In fact, a simple step of contraposition yields ‘the
contingent does not follow from the impossible’ from
‘the necessary does not follow from the contingent’: in
fact, two particular cases of ‘the possible, unlike the
impossible, does not follow from the impossible’, as
Themistius overtly says. Therefore, supported also by
Themistius15 (and as an updated counterpart of the
Aristotelian equimodality condition), we can also write
the more general form of (1) (where, unlike the case of
P and C, A and B may also coincide):
(1′) (A ⇒ B) ↔ ((A — 3 B) ∧ ((
A ∧
B) ∨
(
¬A ∧
¬B) ∨ (∇A ∧ ∇B))).16
Now, if one asks why, according to Themistius,
(A ⇒ B) ∧
¬A ∧ ¬
¬B is false (for every instanti-
ation of A, B allowed by a true A ⇒ B), the almost
immediate answer will be that, according to (1′), strict
implication without strict equivalence is allowed only
for a couple of contingent clauses A, B. In fact, one
can easily prove that, even in a purely definitional
extension KT′ of KT (i.e. in KT + (1′)), (1′) and
(2) (A ⇒ B) ↔ (((A — 3 B) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B) ∨
((A = B) ∧ ¬(∇A ∧ ∇B)))
are interderivable. This, albeit (almost) obvious (from
a logical point of view), sounds surprising enough. In
fact, as was argued at length,17 the definiens in (2) (i.e.
its right principal material equivalent) must be logically
equivalent (and possibly identical) to the definiens
of the so-called third type (and most probably
Chrysippean) Stoic implication. Every time that it is not
dangerous to shift to metalanguage, the left member
of (2) can be replaced by S(A, B), namely by an
abbreviation of “ ‘if A then B’ is Chrysippean true” (i.e.:
at least one instantiation in natural language of ‘if A
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
then B’ is Chrysippean true). Thus, if one likes, and
(again) as is easily seen, one can write both
(2′) S(A, B) ↔ (((A — 3 B) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B) ∨
((A = B) ∧ ¬(∇A ∧ ∇B))),
and also
(2″) C(A, B) ↔ (((A — 3 ¬B) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B) ∨
((A = ¬B) ∧ ¬(∇A ∧ ∇B)))
as a definitional equivalence for the Chrysippean
conflict C(A, B) between A and B (i.e. of B with A or,
equivalently, of A with B).18
It should be stressed that (2), (2′) and (2″) are not
supported by direct textual evidence from Stoic sources
(unlike their Peripatetic equivalents (1), (1′), as regards
Peripatetic sources), although they are far from being
the outcome of a mere guess. In fact, the starting point
is available in some widely unnoticed but clearly
concordant sources, including Sextus (P.), Apollonius
Dyscolus (Conj.) and Boethius (in Cic. Top.).19 Since
Sextus’ passage (S.E. P. II 189) is perhaps more directly
related with Chrysippus’ doctrine of connectedness and
conflict, it is also a good candidate for more extensive
examination here. As Sextus says, it is impossible
(according to the Dogmatists) for a sound conditional
to be constituted from conflicting clauses.20 Now, this
amounts to writing:
(3)
¬(S(A, B) ∧ C(A, B)).
Thus, as is easily seen, the modern Strawson’s Law (not
((if A, then B) and (if A, then not-B))) had an ancient
Stoic necessitated counterpart, since C(A, B) can be
replaced by S(A, ¬B).
Now, if B coincides with A, (3) can be (denecessi-
tated and) rewritten as S(A, A) → ¬S(A, ¬A) and, since
S(A, A), according to all sources, holds for any
(instantiation of) A, one gets ¬S(A, ¬A), hence also
¬S(¬A, A), for any A and this strongly recalls the well-
known (APr. II 4, 57b13–14) Aristotle’s thesis,
according to which ‘if not-A, then A’, if taken as
¬A ⇒ A, is impossible (i.e. false for any A). Moreover,
since (by transitivity for ‘⇒’, hereafter ⇒-Transitivity)
((A ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ ¬A)) → (A ⇒ ¬A) holds for every
A, B and (by contraposition and double negation)
B ⇒ ¬A can be replaced by A ⇒ ¬B, a final step of
contraposition (for ‘→’) yields: ¬(A ⇒ ¬A) →
¬((A ⇒ B) ∧ (A ⇒ ¬B)), hence (by replacement)
¬(¬A ⇒ A) → ¬((A ⇒ B) ∧ (A ( ¬B)). Therefore,
Chrysippus’ Thesis (if Sextus’ testimony is to be taken
123
seriously) is logically equivalent to Aristotle’s Thesis
(as stated in APr. II 4, 57b13–14).
The situation can be restated more or less as follows.
The meaning of A ⇒ B, according to Aristotle’s crite-
rion of modal similarity as stated in APr. I 24, is clear
enough (strict implication with equimodal clauses) and
we also know that Chrysippean implication (notwith-
standing the fact that its explicit definition is lost) must
(to avoid overt inconsistency with plain, albeit widely
unnoticed, testimonies) be definitionally equivalent to
the right member of (2), which in turn is provably equiv-
alent to the Aristotelian definiens of A ⇒ B in (1′).
Moreover, a principal outcome of Aristotle’s definition,
the so-called Aristotle’s Thesis (APr. II 4, 57b13–14),
is provably equivalent to a principal outcome (according
to Sextus’ testimony in S.E. P. II 189) of the corre-
sponding Chrysippean definition of third type
implication. In fact, albeit directly unavailable,
Chrysippus’ definition must be logically equivalent to
(2), and (3) is almost immediately derivable from (2),
just as Aristotle’s Thesis is an almost immediate
outcome of Aristotle’s criterion of modal similarity
between premisses and conclusion of a syllogism, since
equimodality of A, ¬A may not hold unless they are
both contingent, but in this case neither of them can
strictly imply the other: hence, according to (1), (1′),
Aristotle’s Thesis must hold for any A.21 Thus,
Aristotle’s equimodal implication and Chrysippean
implication appear to be so peculiarly characterized, and
so closely related, that it seems not so likely (pace
Barnes) that the latter, with respect to the former, had
been built up in a completely independent way. It is
fair to remark that we know some examples of (almost)
completely independent but proven equivalent
approaches (Schroedinger and Heisenberg versions of
quantum mechanics are a case in point, to which other
cases could be added). According to a well-known
Laertian testimony (D.L. VII 179), Chrysippus (just as
the physicist Enrico Fermi, more than two thousand
years later), so far as his own doctrines were not con-
cerned, accepted to read the main conclusions, but
refused to read their proofs, since he preferred to find
them by himself, with no ‘external’ help. Thus, what
Laertius says in VII 179 might also be referred to
Aristotle’s logical dogmata. Be this as it may, it must
be stressed that, notwithstanding the logical equivalence
between Aristotle’s ‘⇒’ and Chrysippus’ ‘⇒’ (an
equivalence so strong that the use of a unique mark is
permitted, at least when there is no danger of any
124 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
misunderstanding), the role of ‘⇒’ is more fundamental
in Stoic logic. This clearly depends upon the fact that
the role of a propositional logic is more fundamental
in Stoic logic (in Aristotle’s syllogistic, propositional
logic is no more than a kind of ‘underlying logic’ or
metatheoretical tool). Thus, the Stoic counterpart of
Aristotle’s thesis is an idée maîtresse, since it also
becomes an outcome of the irreflexivity of conflict
(according to the characterization of S(P, Q) (by means
of its ‘definiens’ (S.E. P. II 111) C(P, ¬Q)), ¬S(P, ¬P),
hence also ¬S(¬P, P) is deduced if ¬C(P, P) is assumed
to hold for any P). Now, a good candidate for the (lost)
explicit definiens of conflict is of course something like
‘incompossibility of two propositions, neither of them
being impossible when the other is not necessary’,
which rules out any conflict between impossible
propositions, hence also, a fortiori, any self-conflict.22
It is worth noting that, by a simple step of denecessita-
tion, plus an obvious propositional thesis, (3) can be
rewritten (by substituting S(A, ¬B) for C(A, B) and
A ⇒ B, A ⇒ ¬B for S(A, B), S(A, ¬B) respectively)
as
(3′) (A ⇒ B) → ¬(A ⇒ ¬B).
This perhaps sounds more Aristotelian than Chrysippean,
since it is not implausible to think that ‘→’, according
to (the Skeptic doxography concerning Stoic condi-
tionals, hence also) Chrysippus’ tenets on third type
conditionals, should be no more than a shorthand for the
negajunction of A and ¬B. (3′) is currently known as
Weak Boethius’ Thesis, and, unlike (A ⇒ B) ↔
¬(A ⇒ ¬B), is actually a valid formula of KT′ (hence
also a theorem, since KT′ is complete and decidable).
Nevertheless, the equivalential formula is true under
suitable assumptions since, say:
(3″) (¬∇A ∧ ¬∇B) → ((A ⇒ B) ↔ ¬(A ⇒ ¬B))
is KT′-valid.23
2. Modal similarity, modal subalternation,
Aristotle’s thesis and Aristotle’s syllogistic
The central role of the Stoic counterpart of Aristotle’s
thesis strongly suggests a more extended scrutiny of the
role of this thesis within Aristotelian logic, no matter
whether that Stoic counterpart is completely indepen-
dent from its Aristotelian ancestor or not. Now we know
that Aristotle’s thesis is an almost immediate outcome
of Aristotle’s criterion of modal similarity (i.e.
equimodality, hereafter EM) between P and C (and,
more generally, between A and B).24 But, after all, why
impose also, as Aristotle does, a condition of similarity
by equimodality – besides a condition of similarity by
quality (affirmative or negative) of P, C? As we already
know, the answer is that equimodality (of clauses P, C
such that P strictly implies C) appears to be, according
to Aristotle, the formal representation of an intuitive
(as pointed out by J. Barnes) notion of ‘relevance’
τ ω̂˛ ταυ̂τα εˆι’ναι of the premisses to the conclusion (a
relevance which strict implication alone is unable to
represent, just because an impossible P strictly implies
– but in an irrelevant way, and besides an impossible
C – a contingent or necessary C). Now, this formal
representation is also a way of translating (by substi-
tuting the definiens for the definiendum as given by (1′))
a ‘nonstandard’ implication (marked by) ‘⇒’ into
standard modal notions (and connectives as the material
conditional marked by ‘→’). In this sense, it is note
worthy that (under (1′)) Aristotle’s thesis AT becomes
nothing but a variant of an obvious modal theorem,
well-known to Aristotle, both in the form ‘nothing may
be both necessary and impossible’ (see e.g. APr. I 15,
34a32–33 for the variant ¬( A ∧ ¬ A)) and in the
(equivalent) form of modal subalternation (hereafter
MS) ‘ex necesse posse’
A → A (see, say, Int. 13),
which, in turn, is of course an outcome of the Law of
Contradiction, plus closure under necessitation, plus the
theorems
¬A →
¬A and
(A ∧ B) ↔ (
A ∧
B).
In fact, it is not difficult to prove that, if (1′) is assumed,
then AT and MS are interderivable even in KT. To
understand why, a straightforward lemma is of some
help. The lemma amounts to the KT-equivalence
between the right member of (1′) (let be it called
Df(1′)) and the alternative definiens DfP (of A ⇒ B):
(A — 3 B) ∧ (
B →
A) ∧ ( B →  A).25 Now, if
(by a Reductio procedure) ¬AT, i.e. ¬A ⇒ A, is
assumed, it becomes (by DfP): (¬A — 3 A) ∧ (
A →

¬A) ∧ ( A →  ¬A), which in turn yields, by
Simplification, (¬A — 3 A) ∧ (
A →
¬A), hence (by
Replacement, since (¬A — 3 A) ↔
A is a KT-
theorem) one gets, under ((1′) and) ¬AT, and by means
of three obvious steps of Simplification, MPP, and
∧-Introduction):
A ∧
¬A). Thus, one also gets
(under (1′): (¬A ⇒ A) → (
A ∧
¬A), i.e. (by clas-
sical →-Contraposition, plus an obvious propositional
theorem and use of shorthands): MS → AT (under (1′)
which, on its own, is of course a theorem of KT′, i.e.
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
of KT + (1′)). Since the converse is also (short for) a
theorem (of KT′, and just because MS is (short for) a
KT-theorem), Aristotle’s thesis becomes nothing less
and nothing more than (a logically equivalent variant
of ) the familiar Modal Subalternation ‘ex necesse posse’
(because AT and MS are provably equivalent in a purely
definitional extension KT′ of KT).26
The close relation between (the classical theorem MS
concerning) Aristotle’s modal square and (the non-
classical theorem) AT clearly shows that the question:
‘To what extent Aristotle’s equimodality criterion can
actually improve our understanding of Aristotle’s
syllogistic (including of course modal syllogistic)?’
cries out for a thorough and precise answer. Needless
to say, this in turn requires extended systematic inquiry,
but, as a first (small) sample, one or two cases will be
examined here. The first one is suggested by
Alexander’s commentary on the equimodality criterion,
where he clearly (albeit implicitly: ω ’ ς δε ίξει, “as
〈Aristotle〉 will show”, 270.17 Wallies)) refers to what
Aristotle says (see e.g. APr. II 2, 53b26–35) on syllo-
gisms with false premisses and true conclusion.
According to what Aristotle says there, no true conclu-
sion is allowed when a (categorical) syllogism is in
Barbara, its minor premiss is true and its major is
totally false (i.e. the universal negative with the same
terms is true), i.e., with obvious abbreviations for
‘T(rue)’ and ‘T(otally) F(alse)’, ATFATAT-I cannot hold.
Now, Aristotle’s claim seems to be clear enough, and
easily provable as well, even by common sense rea-
soning. To provide an updated example, there is no hope
to deduce as a true conclusion that all French towns are
U.S. towns, notwithstanding the fact that all French
towns are European towns, since (and just because) the
U.S. and Europe are disjoint, hence no European town
is a U.S. town. Otherwise stated, the falsity of the
conclusion in Barbara depends upon the fact that the
corresponding syllogism in Celarent having the same
terms has true premisses and a true conclusion.
Nevertheless, this seemingly innocent specimen of
common sense reasoning clashes with first-order clas-
sical logic, as the following unwelcome counterexample
clearly shows: All regular polyhedra are decahedra, All
regular decahedra are regular polyhedra  All regular
decahedra are decahedra, where of course ‘decahedra’
means ‘ten-faced polyhedra’ and ‘polyhedra’ is short for
‘simple (convex) polyhedra’.27 This syllogism, with
obvious abbreviations, becomes: All RP are D, All RD
are RP  All RD are D. If ‘R’ stands for ‘regular (solid)’,
125
‘P’ stands for ‘polyhedron’ and ‘a’ is the name of an
arbitrarily chosen individual, RPa is definitionally equiv-
alent to Pa ∧ Ra, and RDa is definitionally equivalent
to Da ∧ Ra. Now, as also Aristotle knew, the major is
totally false: under the axioms of geometry, no regular
polyhedron is a decahedron. What about the minor and
the conclusion? In fact, their traditional tachygraphical
transcriptions (such as A(RD, RP) (i.e. ‘All RD are RP’)
or RPaRD,(i.e. ‘RP applies to all RD’) for the minor, and
A(RD, D) or DaRD for the conclusion) cry out for
elucidation which, if provided by first-order classical
logic, yields the following simple proofs. As to
the minor, the sequence of steps is: (∀x)(Dx → Px),
Da → Pa, (Da → Pa) → ((Da ∧ Ra) → (Pa ∧ Ra)),
RDa → RPa, (∀x)(RDx → RPx). Since the steps of
∀-Elimination and ∀-Introduction are obviously sound
and (∀x)(Dx → Px) is obviously true, the minor
(∀x)(RDx → RPx) is also true, because the third step,
namely (Da → Pa) → ((Da ∧ Ra) → (Pa ∧ Ra)), is a
substitution instance of a theorem of classical proposi-
tional logic known as Factor’s Law (actually, a variant
of the so-called monotonicity principle). As regards the
conclusion, i.e. (∀x)(RDx → Dx), its truth is an almost
immediate outcome of the logical truth of a substitu-
tion instance of Simplification Law, namely (Da ∧ Ra)
→ Da.28 For anybody that is (strictly) committed to
classical logic, the only way out is to take seriously, also
in this case, the so-called doctrine of existential import,
a well-known device to avoid the (first-order) invalidity,
according to classical logic, of 9 (traditionally taken as)
valid syllogistic moods. Thus, according to that
doctrine, to validate, e.g., Darapti and Felapton, an
extralogical supplementary assumption is required
(namely, (∃x)Bx, where B is the middle term). As
regards our counterexample, given that Da and Ra are
incompossible (under the axioms of geometry), the
remedy amounts to impose non-emptiness of the minor
term. Since ¬(∃x)(RDx) of course holds, one seemingly
gets rid of the counterexample. Unfortunately, to avoid
adhocness, the doctrine of existential import must be
stronger, and it actually amounts to imposing non-
emptiness of any term of a syllogism. But, again, this
almost immediately clashes with a basic tenet of the
Aristotelian square of opposition, namely that, say, a
universal affirmative (A) and a particular negative (O)
proposition (with the same terms) must contradict each
other, i.e.: ‘BaA iff not-BoA’ must hold. Now if,
according to the doctrine of existential import
(plus classical first-order logic), BaA is (∃x)Ax ∧
126 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
(∀x)(Ax → Bx) and BoA is (∃x)(Ax ∧ ¬Bx), they are
not contradictory, since they are contrary to each other,
just because ¬(∃x)Ax  ¬((∃x)Ax ∧ (∀x)(Ax → Bx)),
¬(∃x)Ax  ¬(∃x)(Ax ∧ ¬Bx) and, when BoA lacks
existential import (i.e., ¬(∃x)Ax holds), BaA and BoA
become both false, at least under classical first-order
transcription of A and O propositions (with the same
terms). Thus, in a Baconian vein, one could say that
the (existential import) remedy is (as most seditions are)
worst than the disease, and the only alternative appears
now to be an extension of Aristotle’s equimodality
condition to the linguistic level. This simply means
that GaF becomes (∀x)(Fx ⇒ Gx), GeF becomes
(∀x)(Fx ⇒ ¬Gx), hence (owing to Aristotelian equiv-
alences GaF ↔ ¬GoF, GeF ↔ ¬GiF, plus (Double
Negation and) standard (inter)definability of (∀x)
as ¬(∃x)¬, and of (∃x) as ¬(∀x)¬) GiF becomes
(∃x)¬(Fx ⇒ ¬Gx) and GoF becomes (∃x)¬(Fx ⇒ Gx),
where ‘⇒’ is of course defined by Df(1′).29 Thus,
Aristotle’s proofs of Darapti now become perfectly
sound. In fact, its reduction to Darii (APr. I 6,
28a17–22) is sound because accidental conversion is
now sound, since subalternation becomes valid (whereas
it is invalid under standard first-order transcription).
Moreover, the proof by έκθεσις
’ amounts to assuming,
besides the premisses, Gn (where n is an arbitrarily
chosen individual and G is the middle term, F and H
being respectively the minor and the major terms) and
deducing (by means of two steps of MPP) from the
major and the minor premiss (in quantifier-free form,
Gn ⇒ Hn, Gn ⇒ Fn respectively), Hn and Fn respec-
tively, hence also Fn ∧ Hn, which in turn (since it
immediately yields  (Fn ∧ Hn) and, according to
Df(1′), compossibility is stronger than negated conflict)
yields (Fn ⇒ ¬Hn) and, by a step of (∃)-Introduction,
it also gives the conclusion (∃x)¬(Fx ⇒ ¬Hx). It is
relevant to note that this conclusion holds (in plain
accordance with common sense reasoning) also in a
world where ¬(∃x)G(x) is impossible. In fact, following
a well-known instantiation in ‘existential import style’,
let ‘G’ be replaced by ‘D(ragon)’, ‘F’ by ‘S(erpent)’ and
‘H’ by ‘(spitting)F(ire thing)’. Now of course Dn is
impossible (in the ‘real’ world W), where the major
premiss (by a simple ⇒-Ctrp step) amounts to saying
that ‘to be a thing which does not spit fire’ and ‘to be
a thing which (necessarily) is not a dragon’ are strictly
equivalent to one another (since ¬Dn and ¬Fn must be
both necessary (in W)), if the former connexively (or,
better, equimodally) follows from the latter, and, for the
same reasons, the minor premiss yields the impossibility
(in W) of both Dn and Sn. Nevertheless, ¬(Sn ⇒ ¬Fn),
hence (∃x)¬(Sx ⇒ ¬Fx), i.e. ‘Some serpents spit fire’
is true (also) in W, just because of Df(1′) or rather, as
one could also say in (Chrysippean) Stoic jargon, just
because non-conflict between impossible clauses is
allowed according to (2).30
Even at first glance, this shift from the classical first-
order translation of Aristotle’s square of opposition does
not seem too unpalatable. After all, the classical trans-
lation appears to be closely committed with meta-
physical realism, much more than Aristotle actually
was. In fact, even according to a common sense reading
of quantifiers, ‘Some ghosts are poltergeists’ is currently
taken as true (notably, also by those who do not believe
in the real existence of ghosts) and ‘All ghosts are
horses’ as false, notwithstanding the fact that (with
obvious abbreviations) (∃x)(Gx ∧ Px) is false and
(∀x)(Gx → Hx) is true (in the ‘real’ world). Moreover,
according to the doctrine of existential import, Aristotle
could not say: ‘No animal is a chimera’, ‘No simple
convex polyhedra are regular decahedra’ or even utter
(the variant of) the Law of Contradiction: ‘Nothing both
is and is not’, just because, in these propositions, some
terms quite obviously lack existential import.31 Thus,
always in a Baconian ‘disease and remedy’ vein, one
could say that, after all, a not so bad sedition amounts
to substituting ‘⇒’ for ‘→’ also within the Square of
Opposition. Moreover (and what matters more) the
substitution is sufficient to get rid quite naturally of the
unwelcome counterexample with ‘regular decahedron’
as minor term, since the crucial step in order to prove,
under the obvious truth of ‘All decahedra are polyhedra’
the truth of the minor premiss, and the crucial step to
prove the (analytic) truth of the conclusion as well,
become both unsound. In fact, as is easily seen, Factor’s
Law becomes invalid when the (non-principal) arrows
are (occurences of) ‘⇒’ and not of ‘→’. By the same
reasons (amounting to the non-scotian nature of ‘⇒’),
Simplification Law (with ‘⇒’ instead of ‘→’) fails to
hold when its antecedent is an impossible conjunction,
as is the case in the (alleged) counterexample (i.e. the
minor term RD in the counterexample is self-
inconsistent). Otherwise stated, ⇒-Factor’s Law and
⇒-Simplification are invalid formulas. This of course
does not mean that they become unsatisfiable since, e.g.,
as regards ⇒-Monotonicity,
(4) ¬Df(1′) → ((A ⇒ B) → ((A ∧ C) ⇒ B)),
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
i.e. ⇒-Monotonicity holds when A and B are not
equimodal.32 Thus, the real import of µηδεν ὶ ω ˛’ˆ τὸ B
in APr. II 2, 54a13 has most probably nothing to do with
extralogical existential import. Despite appearances, it
presupposes a background presence of ‘⇒’ (instead of
‘→’) within premisses and conclusions, in order to
logically yield a non-empty B. Of course, this presence
is not without some problems, since (as already
remarked, see n. 3) A ⇒ B may not be contingent in
any S5-like setting (in S5 any true strict implication,
hence also any strict equivalence, see (2) above, is
necessary if true, and impossible if false). Nevertheless,
Aristotle overtly speaks of contingent premisses or con-
clusions. A plausible explanation is perhaps that this
kind of contingency only refers to an intuitive reading
(actually, as a mere façon de parler) of ‘if A, then B’
with ‘→’ instead of ‘⇒’, and this reading does not rule
out the (so to speak) principal reading A ⇒ B. In fact,
one could (rightly) say that, e.g., wherever A and B are
both contingent, the material equivalence between
A ⇒ B and ¬(A ⇒ ¬B) fails to hold if A → B and
A → ¬B are both contingent or, alternatively but equiv-
alently, one could say that, wherever A and B are both
contingent, the material equivalence between A ⇒ B
and ¬(A ⇒ ¬B) fails to hold if A ⇒ B and A ⇒ ¬B
are (somewhere or even everywhere) contrary to one
another. Thus, to say (under the more intuitive rendering
of GaF by means of ‘→’) that ∇(∀x)(Fx → Gx) is
(somewhere, but not everywhere!) true, amounts, in an
S5-like setting, to equivalently saying (under the less
intuitive rendering of GaF by means of ‘⇒’) that
∇(∀x)(Fx ⇒ Gx) is somewhere necessary or
impossible. After all, in Aristotle’s proof (APr. II 4,
57b3–17) of ¬((A ⇒ B) ∧ (¬A ⇒ B)), συµβα ίνει
(57b16) may well (also) stand for ‘→’, just to provide
an ancient counterpart of the pacific coexistence of ‘→’
and ‘⇒’, even within a single formula.
As a further example of what Aristotle’s equi-
modality condition can do for a better understanding
of his syllogistic, it is worth discussing his validation
proofs of Barbara with assertoric major, contingent
minor and contingent conclusion, i.e. of AAA
(APr. I 15, 34a34–b6). This passage is only one of the
many cruces of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic, but
Aristotelian procedure appears to be, in this case, of
remarkable ingenuity. As already mentioned, to assume,
as regards the minor, that ∇A(F, G) is (somewhere) true
(no matter whether A(F, G) is (somewhere) true or
(somewhere) false) and that, as regards the conclusion,
127
∇A(F, H) holds33 (in the same sense), amounts to saying
that, since (∀x)(Fx → Gx) and (∀x)(Fx → Hx) are
(assumed to be) both contingent, (∀x)(Fx ⇒ Gx),
(∀x)(Fx ⇒ Hx) are both false. In an S5-like setting,
where a (contingent material implication, i.e. a) false
strict implication is impossible, this also means they are
both impossible. Anyway, as regards the modality of the
minor, Aristotle’s (more or less explicit) first move is
to shift to the metalanguage, hence to substitute
‘(∀x)(Fx → Gx) holds and is contingent’34 for
‘∇(∀x)(Fx → Gx) holds’ and, less explicitly, he appears
to make the same shift as regards the conclusion HaF
(i.e. A(F, H)). Thus, his first Reductio move (always
with ‘→’ instead of ‘⇒’ within the premisses and the
conclusion) should actually amount to assuming ‘either
HoF holds or HaF is not contingent’, i.e. ‘either HoF
holds, or HaF is necessary, or HaF is impossible’. Now,
the last alternative (no matter whether the conclusion
is universal affirmative or not) is obviously ruled out,
since, by hypothesis, the conjunction of the premisses
is false but not impossible. Nevertheless, the second
alternative, i.e. ‘HaF is necessary’, is of course an
unwelcome guest, since it yields an impossible HoF.
This explains the further assumption that the minor GaF
is not only contingent, but also (contingently) false.
Thus (if one also assumes that the conclusion is not per
accidens), the unwelcome guest is ruled out (in a way
which is functional to what Aristotle wants to prove).
Therefore, one easily gets a Bocardo with the same
major term H, minor term G and middle term F, a
necessary major HoF, a false (albeit possible) assertoric
minor GaF, hence with a conclusion HoG which must
also be impossible, since it is the negation of the
original assertoric (true) major HaG of the Barbara to
be validated, whence, in an S5-like setting, it is also
the negation of a necessary (∀x)(Gx ⇒ Hx). This means
(by a single and, somme toute, optional exportation
step, plus closure under necessitation) that, in the true
strict conditional GaF — 3 (HoF → HoG), the principal
antecedent is (assumed to be false and) not impossible,
and the principal consequent is impossible, as Aristotle
overtly says (34b1–2) to point out an absurdity to be
discharged. Therefore, the original Barbara with major
term H, minor term F and middle term G, assertoric
major premiss and contingently false minor premiss is
rightly validated by Aristotle, at least if one assumes
that the contingent conclusion is also false, that the
modalities assigned to the minor premiss and the con-
clusion are to be referred to their rendering by means
128 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
of ‘→’, that an S5-like setting is presupposed and that,
in order to assign modalities to premisses and conclu-
sion in an S5-like setting, their true rendering is by
means of ‘⇒’ rather than of ‘→’.
Under this ‘reconstruction’, however, Aristotle’s
strategy clearly appears to be unnecessarily cumber-
some, since (1) much more simply requires a contingent
C when P is contingent, P is contingent when the major
is (taken as) true and the minor is (taken as) contin-
gent; moreover, after all, Barbara can be taken as
self-evident. Nevertheless, within Aristotle’s (meta)syl-
logistic, (1) is fully introduced not before I 24, hence
also as an outcome, rather than a prerequisite, with
respect to the content of the preceding chapters.
Moreover, even in an S5-like setting, in order to assign
the right modalities (and, as already seen, to rule out
unwelcome counterexamples) a transcription of pre-
misses and conclusions by means of ‘⇒’ rather than of
‘→’ is needed, and this transcription is far from being
so self-evident (and to yield a self-evident modalized
Barbara) to permit a bold introduction of (1) as a kind
of arrêt de rejet.35 In fact, this would require having a
full propositional logic of ‘⇒’, not only as a meta-
linguistic tool, but also as the underlying logic of
Aristotle’s syllogistic, and of course this would be much
more apposite for a piece of Stoic, rather than
Aristotelian, logic (to say nothing of the self-evidence
of ⇒-Transitivity with respect to standard (→-)Transi-
tivity). Nevertheless, it must be stressed that Aristotle’s
proof is perfectly consistent with a metalinguistic propo-
sitional logic of ‘⇒’. Curiously enough, this is made
clear by an old (alleged) counterexample to that proof
built up by H. Tredennick and M. T. Knox.36 According
to Tredennick and Knox, let F be instantiated by
‘graduate’, G by ‘Fellow’ and H by ‘wise’. Thus, as is
easily seen (and as Tredennick and Knox rightly
suppose), if ‘A’ stands for ‘All Fellows are wise’, ‘D’
for ‘Some graduates cannot be wise’ (i.e. for ‘HoF is
necessary’), ‘E’ for ‘All graduates are Fellows’, ‘F’ for
the conclusion in Bocardo ‘Some Fellows are not wise’,
then the underlying ‘Tacit Assumption’ TA which
(always according to Tredennick) legitimates Aristotle’s
proof is something like: ‘if (i) the conjunction P of the
premisses is D ∧ E, (ii) the conclusion C is F, (iii) F is
incompatible with a given hypothesis A and (iv) E is
compatible with A, then D must be incompatible with
A’. Now, it is quite obvious, as Tredennick points out
that (of course without any use of S5 and Aristotle’s
equimodality condition), TA appears to be unsound,
since both D and E are, singulatim, compatible with A
(whereas their conjunction is not). But what about the
stronger (than incompossibility) incompatibility defined
as (Chrysippean) conflict? Now, since both (D ∧ E) ⇒
F and F ⇒ ¬A hold, a single step of ⇒-Transitivity
gives (D ∧ E) ⇒ ¬A; therefore, to prove TA amounts
to deducing the conclusion D ⇒ ¬A from the premisses
(D ∧ E) ⇒ ¬A and ¬(E ⇒ ¬A). Suppose (by a
Reductio step) that ¬(D ⇒ ¬A) holds. Since (by axiom
E of S5) neither of D and A is contingent, ¬(D ⇒ ¬A)
can be equivalently replaced, owing to (3″), by
D ⇒ A. Moreover, since D and A are not equimodal
(no matter whether they are transcribed, although as a
mere façon de parler, by means of ‘→’ or, more
properly, by means of ‘⇒’), D ⇒ A yields, owing to
(4), (D ∧ E) ⇒ A. But this, owing to Weak Boethius’
Thesis, is inconsistent with (D ∧ E) ⇒ ¬A. Therefore,
(D ⇒ ¬A) must hold if (D ∧ E) ⇒ ¬A holds and, since
¬(E ⇒ ¬A) also holds, (D ⇒ ¬A) w (E ⇒ ¬A) must
hold too (‘w’ being an exclusive disjunction mark).
Thus, Aristotle’s ‘tacit assumption’ TA, pace
Tredennick and Knox, is proven sound, as a single step
of the last Chrysippean undemonstrable clearly shows.37
In a deliberately provocative way (and clearly
untenable as well, at least if taken at face value), one
could say that no less and no more than Chrysippus’
fifth α’ ναπ όδεικτος, besides some properly selected
specimens of his logic of conflict and connectedness,
is required for adequate scrutiny of a well-known crux
of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic.
3. A Chrysippean ‘glimpse beyond’?
In a more serious vein, however, there is a very impor-
tant question which Aristotle apparently did not answer,
whereas, perhaps, Chrysippus did, notably how to
provide a necessary and sufficient condition, in simple
(truth-functional) terms, for ‘A ⇒ B cannot have
counterinstantiations’ (in modern terms, for “A ⇒ B is
a theorem of a suitable formal system for ‘⇒’”). As
regards Aristotle, so far as I know, no testimony is
actually available. As regards Chrysippus, the evidence
in favor of an actual (and right) answer by him is quite
tenuous and, to a large extent, circumstantial, but, first
of all, it is worth giving the right answer. In fact, and
not so many years ago, it has been proven (by C. Pizzi)
that A ⇒ B is a theorem (i.e. a valid formula in a
complete system as, say, CI.0 is) iff A ↔ B is, i.e. (in
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
the intuitive metatheory and with obvious abbrevia-
tions):
(5) CI.0 A ⇒ B iff CI.0 A ↔ B,
where of course ‘⇒’ is the CI.0 consequential (impli-
cation) arrow defined by DfP.38 Pizzi’s formal and
rigorous proof lacks any conceivable direct ancient
counterpart, since it is based on the so-called double
cancellation property (for KT). Nevertheless, it is
possible to provide (within the scope of common sense
reasoning) an informal (and by far simpler) proof, a
variant of which could be more or less as follows. First
of all, if any wff is somewhere (i.e., in at least one world
of, e.g., the canonical KT model, with reflexive acces-
sibility) false, then it is also somewhere (possibly some-
where else) impossible. Of course, possible world jargon
is beyond any conceivable properly Chrysippean jargon,
but a (possibly) Chrysippean counterpart of our starting
point amounts to the quite obvious remark that if ‘Not
(the first and not the second)’ can be falsified (i.e. it
admits of any falsifying instantiation in natural
language), it also admits of a falsifying instantiation
such that ‘the first’ stands for a necessary lekton and
‘the second’ for an impossible one (hence also ‘Not (the
first and not the second)’ becomes impossible). Thus,
if ‘If the first, then the second’ (with a Philonian ‘if
. . . then’) can be instantiated by the contingent
Philonian conditional ‘If (now) it is day, then Barnes is
now smoking his pipe’ (under the assumption that, now,
it is day and Barnes is not smoking his pipe), it can be
also instantiated by ‘If 3 is not 4, then 6 is 8’. Thus,
more generally (and by a single step of contraposition),
if A is nowhere impossible (i.e., in updated jargon, A
is a theorem, since it is everywhere true), then A does
not admit of any false instantiation (i.e. A is also a
theorem), hence of course ‘ A iff  A’ holds. This
of course means that, since ∇A is defined by
A ∧ ¬A, ∇A can be (for some A) somewhere true,
but (as already said, and unlike its own negation) it
cannot be everywhere true, i.e.  ∇A must not hold
(otherwise A ∧ ¬A would be everywhere true). This
also means that if A and B are both contingent and A
is strictly stronger than B, i.e. if (A — 3 B) ∧
¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B is somewhere (but not every-
where!) true, then (somewhere else) A is strictly
stronger than B, but A and B are not both contingent,
i.e. (A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ¬(∇A ∧ ∇B) is also
(somewhere else) true. Thus, in the intuitive metatheory
one can write (with obvious notations for the evalua-
129
tions V of truth-values 1, 0 of formulas in worlds W,
W′):
(6) If there is a world W such that V((A — 3 B)
∧ ¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B, W) = 1, then
there is also a world W′ such that
V((A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ¬(∇A ∧ ∇
B), W′) = 1.
Again, any direct ancient counterpart of (6) is quite
obviously out of the question. Nevertheless, if ‘the first’
stands for ‘I am conversing’ and ‘the second’ stands for
‘Not (it is day and I am not conversing)’, it is not so
implausible to presume that something like “ ‘If the first,
then the second’ is Chrysippean true” was actually
accepted by Chrysippus (since the first strictly implies
the second and these clauses (A and B respectively)
are instantiated by contingent propositions, hence,
according to (2), A ⇒ B holds). Moreover, it is plau-
sible to presume that Chrysippus was aware of the fact
that if A ⇒ B holds with some (instantiated) contin-
gent clauses (when, say, A stands for ‘I am conversing’
and B stands for the Philonian conditional ‘If it is day,
I am conversing’ (possibly taken as a mere variant of
‘Not (it is day and I am not conversing)’), i.e. for “ ‘It
is day’ → ‘I am conversing’ ”), then it is always possible
to (re)instantiate A, B in such a way that A ⇒ B does
not hold. Think of what happens when, say, A becomes
contingent because it is now instantiated by ‘It is light’
and B becomes necessary because it is now instanti-
ated by the true strict implication ‘If it is day, it is light’
(hence “ ‘It is day’ ⇒ ‘It is light’ ” is true, and even
necessary in S5, according to (2)). Now, under this
reinstantiation, A ⇒ B of course does not hold, since
the contingent ‘It is light’ is disconnected from the
necessary ‘If it is day, it is light’ (there is διάρτησις
between them, according, e.g., to (2)). Anyway, this is
precisely what Sextus says (any mention of (2) apart, of
course) in M. VIII 430, where the disconnectedness of
‘It is light’ from ‘If it is day, it is light’ is overtly pointed
out. The (most probably Chrysippean) instantiation in
S.E. M. VIII 430 is obviously a case (let be it called a
‘second case’) in which A (‘It is light’) and B (“ ‘It is
day’ ⇒ ‘It is light’ ”) are not both contingent and A is
strictly stronger than B (i.e. A strictly implies B, but the
converse does not hold). Thus, it does not seem too
implausible to presume that a comparison was actually
made with a ‘first case’ in which A and B are both
contingent and the former is still strictly stronger than
the latter. Given the instantiation of S.E. M. VIII 430,
130 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
the shift from the first to the second case becomes
straightforward, since the tautological nature of Q →
(P → Q) (and the non-tautological nature of its
converse) preserves the greater strength of A with
respect to B (when A — 3 B is taken into account) and
it also permits (according to (2)) the substitution salva
veritate (in ‘If A, then B’) of ‘⇒’ for ‘— 3’ when A
and B are both contingent (i.e. when A becomes ‘I am
conversing’ and B becomes ‘If it is day, (then) I am
conversing’, i.e. when this latter ‘If . . . (then)’ becomes
a contingent Philonian conditional). This would explain
(although as a mere conjecture) why the puzzling
second case instantiation of S.E. M. VIII 430, was
actually made, namely because of a comparison with the
first case instantiation in the framework of an indirect
ancient counterpart of (6), i.e. in order to simply point
out that the shift from the first case instantiation to the
second case instantiation is always (immediately and
intuitively) possible. But why point out such a simple
fact? An equally simple look at the ‘good candidate’ for
a genuinely Chrysippean definition of ‘⇒’ (which has
been already mentioned, cf. (**), n. 18) can provide an
interesting answer, if (**) is rewritten as
(7) (A ⇒ B) ↔ ((A = B) ∨ ((A — 3 B) ∧
¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B)).
In fact, suppose that one assumes both (I) A ⇒ B is
a theorem (i.e. a valid formula in complete systems) and
(II) there is at least one world W, where A = B is false
(a plausible ancient counterpart of this informal, but
‘modern style’, assumptions would be of course some-
thing like ‘assume that A ⇒ B is not counterinstantiable
in natural language, whereas A = B is’). Now, (I), (II)
and (7) immediately yield that (A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A)
∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B must be true in W (of course, the ancient
counterpart of ‘true in W’ amounts to building up as
an (obviously sound) instantiation what I called, a few
lines above, a first case instantiation). But, by (6), this
means that also a world W′ must exist, where A is still
strictly stronger than B (hence A = B is false), but where
A and B are not both contingent (in ancient terms, one
could say that if a first case instantiation is possible,
then a second case instantiation can also be made). But
of course, (A = B) ∨ ((A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A) ∧
∇A ∧ ∇B) is false in W′ (since its disjuncts are both
false in W′), whence, by (7), A ⇒ B is also false in W′
(translations of these falsities into ancient jargon are
also straightforward), and this obviously clashes with
(I). Therefore, by a simple Reductio step, one must
conclude that if A ⇒ B is a theorem, then no world W′
can actually exist (of course, any world where A is
strictly weaker than B would be also immediately ruled
out by (7)), i.e. that if A ⇒ B is a theorem, then also
A = B must be a theorem, and a simple look at (7)
almost immediately yields that the converse must also
hold. Therefore, in ‘old style’ terms, one easily gets an
ancient counterpart of (a proof of) (5), that is, an
informal and not fully rigorous proof, albeit built up in
‘modern style’ by means of possible worlds jargon. For,
even an intuitive grasp of closure under necessitation
provides there the straighforward interchangeability
between ‘↔‘ and ‘⇒’. Following the ‘puzzling instan-
tiation’ in S.E. M. VIII 430, one could say that, since
Q and P → Q verify (the second disjunct of the definiens
in (7), hence also) A ⇒ B in (7) when A is Q, B is
P → Q, and (besides P) A, B are both contingent, it is
always possible to have just a puzzling instantiation by
a reassignment of the fundamental modalities
(Necessary, Contingent, Impossible) to A and B such
that (with contingent P, Q) A is contingent and B
becomes necessary (therefore, A ⇒ B becomes false,
since both disjuncts in the definiens of A ⇒ B in (7)
become false). Needless to say that ‘it is always
possible’ is justified by the fact that there are no A, B
such that ∇A, ∇B are not counterinstantiable (i.e ∇A,
∇B cannot be logically true).
It is fair to add that to ascribe to Chrysippus any
awareness of this kind of intuitive argument (as a
starting point in order to prove his own counterpart of
(5)) is no more than a conjecture, but not a wild one,
after all, in so far as the ‘puzzling instantiation’ is
actually made at S.E. M. VIII 430 (and 435 as well) and,
as regards the Chrysippean definition of (the funda-
mental) modalities, any change in ‘external circum-
stances’ (which are always mentioned in their
definientia) may well (also) yield a reassignment of the
modalities to the clauses. Now, all this (in order to be
just a bit more than mere guessing) cries out for restate-
ment, in properly Chrysippean terms, of (5). Of course,
any Chrysippean counterpart of (5) should amount to
providing a way of proving the soundness of arguments
by means of conflict and connectedness. Quite naturally,
‘undemonstrated’ arguments, notably Chrysippus’ five
basic α’ νάπόδεικτοι, must not be included (otherwise
they would not have been taken, at least stricto sensu,
as undemonstrated), i.e. they will be excluded from any
ancient version of (5), no matter whether tacitly (since
the exclusion is obvious) or not. In fact, the ancient
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
version should say that an argument is sound iff (every
conceivable instantiation of the argument is such that,
i.e.: in all possible worlds) its negated conclusion ¬C
completely conflicts with the conjunction P of the
premisses or, equivalently, that an argument is unsound
iff (there is at least one instantiation of the argument
such that) ¬C does not completely conflict with P. Now,
as is well known, this latter equivalent version is
actually provided by a Laertian testimony (D.L. VII 77),
but with an important difference, since ‘does not
conflict’ is substituted for ‘does not completely conflict’
(and the instantiation provided by Laertius fits well to
both of them, since both P and C are instantiated by
contingent clauses). Moreover, sometimes ‘conflict’
appears to be short for ‘complete conflict’ since, say,
when Sextus is most probably aimed at providing a
definiens (rather than an obvious outcome) of (the truth-
conditions of) strict exclusive disjunction, he speaks of
‘conflict’ between its clauses and not, as he should do,
of ‘complete conflict’, cf. S.E. P. II 191, where µάχης
most probably stands for µάχης τελε ίας, since it is an
outcome of what a sound disjunction ‘announces’ or
‘promises’ (ε’παγγ έλλεται, ibid.).39 In fact, a simple
juxtaposition of the two ε’παγγελ ίαι of strict exclusive
disjunction provided by Sextus (at both P. II 191 and
P. II 162) clearly shows the plain interchangeability of
µετὰ µάχης τελε ίας (S.E. P. II 162) and µετὰ µάχης
(S.E. P. II 191). Moreover, as shown, e.g., by A.D.
Conj. 219.14–15 (and S.E. P. II 191 as well) the
ε’παγγελ ία of strict exclusive disjunction is sometimes
stated in an elliptic way, as if it were referred to conflict
rather than to complete conflict. Thus, Frede’s general
remark on Stoic usage (cf. the preceding note) is to a
large extent justified, at least as regards ‘conflict’ as
short for ‘complete conflict’ and the corresponding
ε’παγγελ ία as well.
To sum up, the path leading from Aristotle’s meta-
syllogistic equimodality criterion to the final and prodi-
gious Chrysippus’ ‘glimpse beyond’, notably to a
Chrysippean ancestor of the modern notion of validity
of a consequential implication, is perhaps a detectable
path rather than a path leading nowhere. Further thought
is still needed, of course, and many other paths from
Aristotle’s syllogistic to Stoic conditionals are still to
be detected.40 But, according to a well-known (Tristram
Shandy’s) alibi, it would not be decorous for any writer
to pretend to say all in a single book, let alone in a
single article. After all, I began with an explicit, and
(a few modest proposals apart) what follows is not
131
aimed at being much more than a gloss to that
explicit.
Notes
* I am indebted to Giovanna Corsi and Walter Cavini for many
useful suggestions as regards both content and style, although I have
been sometimes unable to be fully faithful to them. Thus, any short-
coming is now (so to speak, a fortiori) only mine.
1
Cf. Barnes 1999, pp. 52–53. Hereafter, the following logical
symbols will be used: ‘¬’ for negation, ‘∧’ for conjunction, ‘∨’ for
(inclusive) disjunction, ‘w’ for exclusive disjunction, ‘→’ for material
conditional, ‘↔’ for material biconditional, ‘— 3’ for strict implica-
tion, ‘
’ for strict equivalence, ‘
’ for the necessity operator, ‘’
for the possibility operator (i.e. as short for ‘¬
¬’), ‘∇’ for the
contingency operator (i.e., ‘∇A’ is short for ‘A ∧ ¬A’). As to the
meaning of ‘⇒’, see below. For the sake of the readers (if they are
unacquainted with standard updated notations for modal systems) I
add here that: K is short for (both the system and its characteristic
axiom)
(P → Q) → (
P →
Q), whose ancient counterpart of
course amounts to saying that a necessary Philonian implication with
a necessary antecedent has also a necessary consequent; T is short
for
P → P (ex necesse esse), KT for K+T, 4 for
P →

P, 5
(or E) for P →
P, S4 for K+T+4, S5 for K+T+5, K45 for K+4+5,
etc.
2
As for (simple) undemonstrables, cf. Frede 1974, pp. 167–171
(also cited in Bobzien 1996, pp. 134–135 n. 3). As for syllogisms,
see e.g. the phrase η’ µὲν υ’ π άρχειν η’ δ’ ε’ νδέχεσθαι σηµαίνη˛
(APr. I 17, 36b29), according to which a premiss “signifies” its own
assertoric or contingent nature (i.e. has an assertoric or contingent
sense, see also 36b30, 37b19, 37b30, etc.). Of course, this phrase
would not be apposite for a premiss in schematic form. Moreover,
the sense of a given instantiation in natural language is the pre-
requisite to (soundly) assuming (λαµβάνωσιν 36b26, τιθεµένων
36b28, etc.) that the corresponding premiss has a given modality
(possibly to be explicitly included within the premiss itself), thus
the ancient path is from instantiations to their schemata (unlike the
‘modern’ path, notably from a formula to its interpretation(s)).
3
In modern jargon, one could say that an assertoric ( υ’ πάρχουσα,
32b 36) premiss corresponds to a (somewhere and ex hypothesi) true
sentence A with ‘null case’ modality (whence such that neither of

A (necessity),
¬A(impossibility), ∇A (contingency, i.e. ¬
A ∧
¬
¬A) is explicitly stated as a label to A, although an assertoric
premiss may also be taken κατὰ χρόνον). Moreover, in possible
worlds jargon one could perhaps say that a premiss A of an
Aristotelian syllogism is assertoric iff A (i.e. ‘A is not impossible’)
is somewhere true and ¬A is somewhere (possibly only somewhere
else) true too (since neither logical theorems nor negated logical
theorems are actually instantiated in a syllogism of APr. or APo.).
Suppose now that, in a syllogism where the major has the form
A
and the minor has the form ∇B (with A, B metalinguistic short for
a (non-modal) universal negative (E) and an affirmative (A, I)
respectively), the conclusion has the form ∇C (with C short for a
negative (E, O)) in accordance with Aristotle’s similarity criterion
(taken in its strong metalinguistic sense: the conclusion and the
conjunction of the premisses must be equimodal, see below). Suppose
132 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
also that the modality of the conclusion is not explicitly assumed,
notwithstanding the fact that C is short for a proposition that
“signifies” its own contingency. Thus, C can be rewritten as (—)C
(where ‘(—)’ is short for the ‘null case’ modality). Therefore, in
Aristotle’s jargon, and without any real contradiction with the
equimodality condition, one could say that, from a necessary
universal negative major and a contingent particular minor, an asser-
toric negative conclusion is also generated, as Aristotle actually says,
see also Wallies’ apparatus criticus ad loc., i.e. ad Alex.Aphr. in
APr. 270.7 (CAG II 1); on Alexander’s “record of honest perplexity”
concerning this point, see ibid., 6–8. Otherwise stated, a modern
counterpart of Aristotle’s move can be easily found even in
elementary handbooks (e.g. E. J. Lemmon’s well-known Beginning
Logic) where a wff of the classical (non-modal) propositional
calculus, iff it is neither a tautology nor a negated tautology, is cur-
rently called, at an intuitive metalinguistic level, a “contingency” or
a “contingent” wff. Nevertheless, it may well be that Aristotle was
fully aware of a more subtle feature of a purely modal nature, namely
that if a given arbitrarily chosen propositional form(ula) is instan-
tiable (in natural language) both by (intuitively) true and by (intu-
itively) false propositions, it does not follow that this formula is also
contingent, whereas the converse holds (if ∇F is somewhere true,
then F is true somewhere and false somewhere else). In a more
rigorous way, one could say that there are, in (infinitely) many modal
systems, formulas F such that they are strongly (and non-banally)
satisfiable (i.e. they are neither theorems nor negated theorems of the
system) and they are also logically non-contingent (i.e. there is no
world of the (complete) system where ∇F is true). An obvious
example is P — 3 Q (where the ‘boat hooked’ mark is, see also above,
n. 1, a strict implication mark, i.e. P — 3 Q is, as usually, defined by
Box-labeled material implication:
(P → Q); hereafter (see n. 1), we
shall use ‘↔‘ for material equivalence, ‘=’ for strict equivalence
and ‘⇒’ for the special kind of (consequential) non-truthfunctional
implication which, as we shall see, is required to provide a plausible
account of what Aristotle’s equimodality condition actually means).
In fact, pace the layman’s opinion, not only in S5, but also in K45
(i.e. S5 without the banalization axiom T), and in the infinitely many
non-collapsing extensions of S5, there is a non-empty class of
logically non-contingent strongly satisfiable formulas. P — 3 Q is a
case in point, since, e.g., in S5, owing to the axiom E, any strict
implication, wherever true is also necessary, and wherever false is
also impossible (an even more simple F is of course P). Now, there
is more than one reason to presume that little room (or even no room
at all) was left by Aristotle for a contingently true or contingently
false strict implication (cf. Nasti De Vincentis 2002, p. 88 n. 112).
A case in point is the syllogism in Barbara of APr. I 19, 38a36–b2,
where the major is in problematic form (“It is contingent that all
animals have motion” is perhaps a faithful, albeit not literal de dicto
rendering), the minor is assertoric (“All waking things are animals”)
and the conclusion is apodeictic (“It is necessary that all waking
things have motion”). Now, to fulfil the equimodality condition in
an S5-like setting, one should necessitate the minor, no matter
whether its formal representation is made by means of ‘— 3’ or ‘→’
(although ‘→’, unlike ‘— 3’, can be necessitated only because of
what the particular instantiation of the minor actually means). As
regards the major, only a material mark is allowed, since of course
∇(∀x)(Bx — 3 Ax) is logically false in an S5-like setting, hence, to
meet the equimodality condition, both ‘— 3’ and ‘→’ must be allowed
to formalize the premisses, at least if, in the given example, one likes
more a necessitation of the minor premiss by means (also) of the
axiom E of S5. Nevertheless, it may well be that a faithful paraphrase
of the major premiss ζ ώ˛ ω˛ [. . .] παντὶ ε’ νδέχεται (sc. κίνησις, 38b1,
see also 38a39–40) is assertoric (something like “All (default)
animals (B, following Aristotle’s notation) are motile (M)”). Now,
the formal representation of this paraphrase (with an obvious step of
∀-Elimination, where ‘a’ stands for (the name of) an arbitrarily
chosen object) is of course Ba — 3 Ma (taken as an assertoric major).
As we shall see, this formula can be replaced by Ba ⇒ Ma (since
the clauses are obviously to be taken as contingent, see below). This
simply means that, even in this case, a treatment by means of a
categorical syllogistic with ‘⇒’ (instead of the truth-functional ‘→’)
does not seem, after all, so unpalatable. Be that as it may (but see
below), and notwithstanding the fact that there is no room here for
a thorough scrutiny, so far as I know there are no real counter-
examples in APr. to the equimodality condition in its strong form
(necessity, contingency or impossibility of both the conclusion and
the conjunction of the premisses), but cf. Van Rijen 1986, p. 211).
4
This move is explicitly made in APr. I 15, 34a22–24 and implic-
itly in 57b, Ch. 4 in fine (where Aristotle tacitly shifts (just at the
last phrase of 57b17) from ‘A and B stand for distinct singular terms’
to ‘A stands for P and B stands for C’; in fact, there is no real ground
for Maier’s excision of ω ’ ς δι ά τρι ω̂ν). Moreover, in 57a36–b17,
some remakable outcomes (including the so-called Aristotle’s Thesis,
see below) of the equimodality condition are stated and discussed.
5
It is perhaps worth noting that, as already said, if (the instantia-
tions of) P1, P2 clearly “signify” their own modality (necessity, con-
tingency, impossibility), then (1) covers also the case in which at
least one of the premisses is assertoric. Thus, in the instantiation
of Barbara of APr. I 19, 38a36–b2 (see above, n. 3) P2, albeit
assertoric, is clearly intended as necessary (cf. ’εξ αµφοτέρων ’
α’ ναγκαίων, 38a37). Moreover, Alexander provides an unclear
( ’άδηλος) instantiation of P2 (i.e., the truth-value of which is unclear),
whose modality is presumably contingency (“The celestial hemi-
spheres have the same number of stars”), to substantiate Aristotle’s
equimodality criterion, just as given by (1) since the conclusion is
also unclear, but (presumably) contingent (“The total number of stars
is even”, see also, say, S.E. P. II 97 for this very popular instantia-
tion), the implicit major being of course necessary: “All the sums of
two equal addenda are even”, see Alex.Aphr. in APr. 270.20–23
Wallies, where (ll. 20–21: καὶ [. . .] ’έσται) Alexander says also
that at least one of P1, P2 must be unclear if C is unclear, and this
quite obviously shows that ‘⇒’ is non-scotian (i.e.: from the impos-
sible, the possible does not follow). In fact, were ‘⇒’ a scotian mark,
everything would follow from the impossible, hence an unclear C
would follow from P1, P2 also when at least one of them is impos-
sible (i.e. if P is impossible) and no matter whether the other one is
unclear or not, see below.
6
It is fair to add that, by simple Textnähe, and (of course) without
any ‘advanced’ logic, even an ‘old-fashioned’ translator (as H.
Tredennick was) clearly understood that, say, ε’ ν τοι̂ς ε’ ποµένοις
λεχθ ήσεται (53b10) is an implicit reference to 57a40–b17 (cf. n. b,
p. 410 of (any reprint of) the well-known Loeb Classical Library
edition (1938) of APr.), i.e. to some almost immediate outcomes
(including Aristotle’s Thesis, see below) of (1), hence also of
Aristotle’s equimodality criterion as stated in APr. I 24.
7
Cf. Barnes 1980, p. 172. It is worthy of note that in this seminal
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
article an equally seminal idea was already present, namely that both
Aristotle and the Stoics anticipated some modern version of a logic
of relevance (though the right version was actually unavailable when
Barnes’ article was published).
8
This seems to provide further evidence pro Barnes’ well-known
hypothesis on the relations between Aristotle’s theory of scientific
demonstration and Aristotelian syllogistic, cf. Barnes 1981.
9
71. 8–13 Landauer (CAG V 4).
10
47.8–10 Landauer. Hearty thanks are due here to Mauro Zonta,
whose consummate scholarship made an almost word-by-word under-
standing of this passage possible to me.
11
Actually, an almost immediate consequence of (1) is that ‘⇒’
may not be weaker than strict implication (and omnino covers not
only ‘to the fullest extent’ but also ‘to the highest degree’), but what
is directly meant here by (the Latin translation of) Themistius is
somewhat different. Although the meaning of ‘omnino sequi’ is not
explicitly explained, it most probably amounts to (somewhat redun-
dantly, see the next note) saying that something ‘omnino sequitur’
from something else if the truth-value of the latter is taken absolute,
i.e. as true or false tout court, hence not ex suppositione, cf. 70.32–39
Landauer.
12
Thus, omnino is somewhat redundant in “omnino sequitur”, since
what ‘follows from’ is never the immediate outcome of a step of
Assumption Rule. As already remarked, any counterpart of omnino
is lacking here in the Hebrew translation (whose archetypal code
(Florence, Bibl. Naz. Centr. II. II. 528) was unknown to Landauer,
cf. Zonta 1994).
13
Landauer’s apparatus (p. 71) has only: “13 Primo] Anal. Prior.
I, cap. 15”, but the transition from APr. I 15 to 34a25–27 is almost
uniquely determined by a further constraint, namely that the intended
locus should not only agree with Themistius’ locus, but also be a
passage where strict implication without equimodality is clearly
excluded. Thus, say (unlike 34a25–27), 34a22–24 does not clearly
rule out, when B is the sumbainon ex A, that A be contingent and B
necessary.
14
The cautious parenthesized proviso is also an outcome of the fact
that (1), as it stands, is not sufficient to entail what Aristotle says in
APr. I 15, 34a25–27, since a contingently false P and a contingently
true C are plainly permitted by (1), whereas only a false A and a false
B (according to Aristotle’s notation in 34a25–27 for P and C
respectively) seem to be allowed in I 15. This is of course false under
(1) alone, as is shown by the following instant-made syllogism: under
the hypothesis that the numbers drawn by lot are exactly 3 and 9, P
is contingently false and C is contingently true if C stands for “All
numbers drawn by lot are odd”, and P stand for the conjunction of
the major “All prime numbers drawn by lot are odd” and the minor
“All numbers drawn by lot are prime numbers drawn by lot”. (The
point would be even more quickly made by saying that “If this is red,
it is coloured” holds not only when this is colourless but also when
this is green.) Of course, to make true what Aristotle says in I 15,
besides (1) a supplementary assumption is needed, namely, say (in
the quicker version) that the clauses are necessarily equivalent (as,
e.g., “This is an isosceles triangle” and “This is a triangle with at
least two angles equal to each other”). As καὶ τὸ συµβαι̂νον διὰ
τ ὴν υ’ π όθεσιν (34a26) cries out for reference to τὸ δ ὲ διὰ ταύτα
συµβαίνειν (24b20–21), what Aristotle says in I 15, 34a 25–27 is
perhaps an outcome of an intuitive (but wrong) extension by analogy
of what is said in APo. II 16, 98b33–38 to what is said in APr. I 1,
133
24b20–22. Otherwise stated, to say (as in APo. II 16) that, as regards
some (i.e. deciduous) trees, they have a dry sap iff they have falling
leaves, since their leaves are falling because and only because their
sap is dry, does not permit the extension of the same pattern to what
is said in APr. I 1, namely to the claim that, in a syllogism nothing
less and nothing more than the premisses P1, P2 is needed to deduce
C. In fact, by undue extension, one could also say that C holds
because and only because P holds, whence one could say that C holds
iff P holds, no matter whether P and C are both contingent or not.
Now, since (1) is a metalinguistic representation in conditional form
of (the allowed instantiations of) a special kind of ‘relevant’ deduc-
tion, namely a deduction τ ω̂˛ ταυ̂τα εˆι’ναι, in order to validate a mood
one has only to prove that there are no instantiations such that P
becomes true and C false, when there is no occurrence of ‘→’, but
only of (the definiens, as provided by the right member of (1), of)
‘⇒’ within (the formal representation of) what P and C stand for. In
a less general and less cumbersome way, this amounts to saying that,
e.g., a conclusion in Barbara with minor term F and major term H
(the middle term being G) must be written, in quantifier-free form,
as Fa ⇒ Ha, and not as Fa → Ha. As a side (but by no means insignif-
icant) remark, any direct proof that, say, ((Fa ⇒ Ga) ∧ (Ga ⇒ Ha))
⇒ (Fa ⇒ Ha) is a valid formula (of, e.g., KT or S5, when ‘⇒’ is
replaced by its own definiens according to (1)) is ruled out, since
(as would not be so difficult to prove, see below) A ⇒ B is valid
iff A ↔ B is, whereas ((P ⇒ Q) ∧ (Q ⇒ R)) ↔ (P ⇒ R) is obvi-
ously invalid (whereas ((P ⇒ Q) ∧ (Q ⇒ R)) → (P ⇒ R) is provably
valid, and this also holds for Modus Ponens MPP in conditionalized
form). Therefore, as regards the incorrect ψευ̂δος in 34a27,
Aristotle’s mistake is by no means a trivial blunder, since it most
probably depends upon the fact that (as we shall see), although he
(intuitively) knew that some particular formulas (such as ¬((A ⇒ B)
∧ (¬A ⇒ B)) and ¬(¬A ⇒ A)) are valid, he – perhaps unlike
Chrysippus, as we shall see – was still not (even intuitively) aware
that ‘A ⇒ B is valid’ can be replaced by the more simple ‘A ↔ B
is valid’ (or equivalently, if an intuitive grasping of closure under
necessitation is admitted, by ‘A = B is valid’). Moreover (see below),
to impose as a further constraint that no truth can follow from con-
tingent falsity, could also be functional to his strategy in order to
prove that a Barbara with assertoric major and contingent minor must
yield a contingent conclusion (APr. I 15, 34a34–b6). Be that as it
may, what Alexander says in his commentary of APr. I 24 (ad 41b31,
see 270.10–28 Wallies) about the fact that a true conclusion some-
times follows (συναχθ ήσεται) from false premisses (see 270.16)
must be intended, to avoid overt inconsistency, as concerning only
contingent clauses, since he adds, a few lines later, that at least one
premiss must be unclear if the conclusion also is (see above, n. 5).
In fact, to provide an updated counterexample (to the claim that
impossible premisses are actually within the scope of ποτε, 270.16
Wallies), ‘All breathing cats are infinite in number’ is impossible,
‘All twin prime numbers are breathing cats’ is impossible too,
whereas ‘All twin prime numbers are infinite in number’ is (still)
unclear, since it is a principal number-theoretic undecided conjecture
(for the layman, one should perhaps add that a prime number p is a
twin prime number iff either p – 2 or p + 2 are prime numbers too).
(As a side remark, it could be added that what Alexander says (καὶ
ει’ [. . .] ’έσται, 270.20–21 Wallies) strongly recalls a Sextan testi-
mony (M. VIII 334) on the Skeptic tenet according to which a
conditional with unclear consequent must be unclear too.)
134 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
15
Thus, in a more concise updated form, one could say that, in both
(Cael. and APr.) loci, συµβαίνει, συµβαι̂νον (and their cognates)
are to refer to ‘⇒’ rather than to ‘— 3’, at least according to the real
import of (71.12 Landauer) “nec non etiam”.
16
Of course, when A is P and B is C, A — 3 B is granted (by closure
under necessitation and) by  A → B. Hereafter (and no matter
whether A, B are both contingent or not), A — 3 B is to be taken as
an outcome (also) of intuitive deducibility of B from A (thus, ‘This
is coloured’ is intuitively deducible from ‘This is red’, notwith-
standing the fact that ‘If this is red, this is coloured’ is not logically
true).
17
The (quite long) story is told in Nasti De Vincentis 2002, passim,
where one can also find other references as regards this subject
(including, at n. 5, p. 15, a short account of cognive models à la
Johnson-Laird of syllogistic inference). Here, it should be stressed
that all arguments leading to (2′) and (2″), and from the latter to the
former as well, are actually completely independent of their so-close
Aristotelian relatives (1), (1′), (2), but, since (unlike, e.g., (1)), (2),
(2′) do not have any immediate textual support, what Themistius says
can at least be taken as an almost immediate textual evidence that
something logically equivalent to (2′) was actually and overtly
available both in Aristotelian and commentatorial texts. It should also
be stressed that, in a sense, (2) is an epistemological outcome of the
well-known Quinean (see Quine 1970, p. 7 and (the revised edition)
Quine 1992, pp. 14–15) “maxim of minimum mutilation” (of the ‘old’
received view, according to which Chrysippean implication does not
significantly differ from strict implication). I am indebted to Claudio
Pizzi for pointing out, although in a different setting, the import of
that maxim and to Antonio Rainone for providing (to me) more
precise Quinean references. I am also indebted to Giovanna Corsi for
rightly pointing out that the KT + (1′) + (2)-interderivability of (1′)
and (2) is also a K + (1′) + (2)-interderivability.
18
This simply means that conflict amounts either to contradicto-
riety or to contrariety, provided that, unlike contradictoriety, con-
trariety is restricted to contrariety between contingent propositions,
namely:
(*) C(A, B) ↔ ((A = ¬B) ∨ (
¬(A ∧ B) ∧ (¬A ∧ ¬B)
∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B)).
After all, if one plausibly restates what Galen (Inst.Log. 9.17–10.3
and 33.6–14 Kalbfleisch) says on conflict as “either contradictoriety
or contrariety”, it is also plausible to think that the same proviso is
tacitly made by him, since the (modern style) contrariety between,
say, ‘3 is 4’ and ‘6 is 8’ (let alone the self-contrariety of any of them),
or between any one of them and ‘Galen is now conversing’ is most
probably ruled out by the intended meaning of, e.g., Galen’s half-
way (ε’ ξ η‘ µίσεως) conflict. It is worth noting that, under this reading,
what Galen says does not overtly disagree with Barnes’ ‘relevant’
definition of conflict (cf. Barnes 1980, p. 170) or with Frede’s
remarks on the “trivial fulfilment” of conflict (cf. Frede 1974 p. 83),
although the exclusion of any conflict between contrary clauses
(when they are not both contingent) is by no means an evident
outcome of Barnes’ definition and Frede’s remarks. Finally, it could
be added that, to go from (2′) to (2″), or vice versa, it is sufficient
(besides classical double negation) to plausibly rewrite as a defini-
tional equivalence Sextus’ well-known testimony (S.E. P. II 111)
on third type conditionals, namely to transcribe what Sextus says
as: S(A, B) ↔ C(A, ¬B). Thus, (*) is obviously matched with another
definitional equivalence, according to which S(A, B) is equivalent to
either strict equivalence (no matter whether A, B are both contin-
gent or not) or strict implication between contingent clauses such that
A is strictly stronger than B, namely:
(**) S(A, B) ↔ ((A = ¬B) ∨ ((A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A)
∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B)).
It is relevant to note that (**) is perhaps a good candidate in order
to provide a plausible definiens for Chrysippus’ implication, since
(according to Sextus’ arrangement by increasing strength of the four
types of conditionals, and to what Sextus says on the fourth type as
well, see S.E. P. II 110–112) it naturally yields, simply by getting
rid of the first disjunct in (**), a definiens for the fourth type too,
namely: (A — 3 B) ∧ ¬(B — 3 A) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇B. This also means
that, since (for any A, B, and quite obviously, see below) ∇A ∧ ∇
B may not be everywhere (i.e. logically) true, the fourth type condi-
tional may not represent (by means of conditionalization) a sound
argument, and this could also explain its elusive nature, at least
according to almost all the (actually available) sources.
19
Again, the only available (updated) reference is, until now, Nasti
De Vincentis 2002, since articles on the subject by J. Barnes and L.
Castagnoli, albeit forthcoming, are still unpublished.
20
α’ δ ύνατον δέ ε’ στι κατ ’αυτο
’ ὺς συνηµµένον υ’ γιὲς εˆι’ναι ε’ κ
µαχοµένων αξιοµ άτων συνεστ ώς (S.E. P. II 189 = FDS fr.
’
961.9–11 Hülser). A parallel passage (as pointed out by L. Castagnoli
and discussed at length also by J. Barnes, and by myself too) is A.D.
Conj. 218.11–12 (and 15) Schneider (= 76.14–15 (and 18) Dalimier).
Moreover, the whole Boethian doctrine of repugnant conditionals
(and his hypothetical syllogistic as well) are crucially dependent upon
widely overlooked Boethian passages, notably Boeth. in Cic. Top.
352.19–21 Orelli which is closely related to Sextan and Apollonian
testimonies (as pointed out by myself). Again, the only published
reference is, until now, Nasti De Vincentis 2002, but Barnes’ and
Castagnoli’s articles are now soon to be published. It is perhaps worth
noting that the quite plausible correction ξυµβάσ〈εις〉 by Dalimier
(78.13 = 219.10 Schneider) provides (of course) a cognate of
συµβαι̂νον, and the context of Apollonius’ passage also suggests a
reference (albeit indirect and mediated by Stoic doctrines) to the
Aristotelian use of this term as a logical term (hence to a use that is
also related to (1)). As regards Apollonius’ passage (78.12–13
Dalimier: Φαµέν γ〈ου̂ν συνάρ〉 τησιν καὶ ’έτι ξυµβάσ〈εις〉 τ ὰς
φιλίας τ ω̂ν 〈. . .〉 καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ηˆ’ διαζευκτικά) – since, as
already seen, Conj. 218.11–12 (and 15) Schneider is closely related
to Sextus’ S.E. P. II 189 = FDS fr. 961.9–11 Hülser – γ〈ου̂ν συνάρ〉
is perhaps better (as a Stoic-laden version of ο ι‘ [. . .] α’ κολουθία˛ ,
218.15 Schneider = 76.18 Dalimier) than Dalimier’s conjecture and,
moreover (although as a mere guess), 〈συναπτικ ω̂ν〉 (218.13
Schneider = 76.16 Dalimier, but here, more generally, as ‘colligated
things’, rather than ‘colligators’) could be substituted for 〈. . .〉 (thus,
in a very Apollonian way, καὶ ’έτι ξυµβάσ〈εις〉 τ ὰς φιλίας τ ω̂ν
〈. . .〉 should be taken as the insertion of a complementary/contrastive
parenthetical remark).
21
As extraordinary as it may seem, this obvious point is not
currently made. On different approaches (including my own at the
time, which becomes hardly defensible, at least within an S5-like
setting, see here n. 3 above) to the problem of Aristotle’s Thesis, cf.
Nasti De Vincentis 2002, n. 130, pp. 98–99.
22
This definiens of conflict of course amounts to saying that (Q
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
conflicts with P iff) they are incompossible and, when P (or Q) is
impossible, Q (or P) must be provably equivalent to ¬P (or ¬Q,
respectively). A late implicit restatement of the irreflexivity of
conflict, in eclectic Stoic-Peripatetic form, can be clearly found in
Boeth. in Cic. Top. 347.32–33 Orelli: “in repugnantibus [. . .] dis-
similitudo” (since of course nothing may be dissimilar from itself).
23
In order to substitute a material equivalence mark for the prin-
cipal mark of (3″) without losing validity, a more general assump-
tion must be substituted for the principal antecedent of (3″). As
regards this point, and the role of Boethius so far as (3′) is concerned,
cf. Nasti De Vincentis 2002, ch. 5).
24
In Aristotle’s language, ‘to be similar’ amounts to sharing at least
one (not irrelevant) πρ όσθεσις (determination), as both ‘quality’
(affirmative or negative) and modality (i.e., a determination of inher-
ence of the predicate to its subject) of propositions surely are. This
(quite obvious) remark makes clearer the elegance and unifying
power of Aristotle’s similarity condition as stated in APr. I 24. In
fact, the first seven lines of Alexander’s commentary ad loc. (41b
27, see 269.26–32 Wallies) are nothing but a restatement of well-
known features of syllogistic (an affirmative conclusion belongs to
a valid mood only if both premisses are affirmative too, hence they
are similar in quality to the conclusion, etc.).
25
As to the lemma Df(1′) ↔ DfP, from left to right: if (A — 3 B)
∧ A ∧ B holds (i.e.: is true in some KT-world), then (A — 3 B) ∧
(B → A) ∧ (B → A) of course holds too, and the latter also holds
no matter whether (A — 3 B) ∧ ¬A ∧ ¬B, or (A — 3 B) ∧ ∇A ∧ ∇
B replace (i.e. are substituted for) (A — 3 B) ∧ A ∧ B; from right to
left, since the disjunction of the 9 modality assignments to A, B of
the three modalities N(ecessary), I(mpossible), C(ontingent) is
obviously a theorem of KT, and since (the modality assignments,
with obvious abbreviations) NC, NI, CI are ruled out by A — 3 B,
and IN, CN are ruled out by B → A and IC is ruled out by
B → A, thus, if DfP holds, then the disjuncts NC, NI, CI, IN, CN,
IC are all false and the disjunction NN ∨ II ∨ CC, i.e. (A ∧ B) ∨
(¬A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (∇A ∧ ∇B) must be true; therefore, if DfP holds, then
Df(1′) also holds. It is fair to add that, although more elegant and
straightforward proofs are also available, the proof here provided has
the advantage of being understandable (or even findable) by any
ancient logician. As to the subsequent proof, to say that ‘⇒’ is
contrapositive, obviously amounts to saying that ⇒-Ctrp, i.e.
(A ⇒ B) ↔ (¬B ⇒ ¬A) is a theorem (which surely has its ancient
counterpart as regards both Aristotelian and Stoic logic). Now, under
⇒-Ctrp, the proper subformula (A — 3 B) ∧ (B → A) of DfP can be
equivalently replaced by (¬B — 3 ¬A) ∧ (¬A → ¬B), hence
(because strict and material arrows are also contrapositive) by
(A — 3 B) ∧ (B → A) too. Moreover, the (proper) subformula
(A — 3 B) ∧ ( B →  A) can be replaced, in the same way, by
(¬B — 3 ¬A) ∧ (¬¬B → ¬¬A), i.e. by (A — 3 B) ∧ (B → A).
Now, as is easily seen, DfP can be equivalently rewritten as
(A — 3 B) ∧ (B → A) ∧ ¬(IC). Therefore, when A is replaced by
¬A and B by A (and thus ¬(IC) and ¬(CN) are automatically ful-
filled), DfP can be truncated, no matter whether B → A or B →
A is cancelled, if ⇒-Ctrp holds and ¬(IC), ¬(CN) are automatically
fulfilled. Again, modern jargon (‘theorem of a purely definitional
extension of KT’, ‘Replacement of proved equivalents’, etc.) surely
has, in this case, its ancient counterparts which can be (re)stated by
means of a clear and intuitively plausible ‘common sense’ transla-
tion in terms of ‘no counterinstantiations in natural language’, etc.
135
26
The equivalence between ¬(A ⇒ ¬A) and MS has been proved
(by C. Pizzi, unpublished) under the assumption CMS that the clauses
of a conditional cannot have an incompatible modal status, i.e.
wherever any one of them is (prefixed by)
, the other may not be
(prefixed by) ¬
, and wherever any one of them is (prefixed by) ,
the other may not be (prefixed by) ¬  . This is of course a very
interesting and important result on its own (since CMS and Df(1′)
are obviously equivalent), although, as we now know, what Aristotle
actually says, notably as represented by (1′), more directly amounts
to a criterion of equimodality (necessity, contingency, impossibility)
of the clauses of a strict implication. Moreover, as rightly pointed
out by Giovanna Corsi, even the only K (+ Df(1′)) is sufficient to
prove the equivalence between AT and MS.
27
No reference at all is made to the inconsistency of what Aristotle
says in APr. II 2, 53b26–29 with a standard first-order transcription
of Barbara, even in accurate modern (translations and) commentaries,
cf. e.g. (Mario Mignucci’s commentary, in) Aristotele, Gli Analitici
Primi, Naples: Loffredo, 1969, p. 583 n. 10.
28
It is now (hopefully) clear that the modality of the total falsity
(of the major) is of no import, as shown by the syllogism (obviously
under the assumption that no number drawn by lot (right now) be
odd): ‘All numbers drawn by lot (right now) are odd; all twin prime
numbers drawn by lot (right now) are numbers drawn by lot (right
now); therefore all twin prime numbers drawn by lot (right now) are
odd’.
29
Thus, say, the equivalence between GiF and FiG now depends
upon ⇒-Ctrp (whereas, under first-order standard transcription, it is
an outcome of ∧-Commutativity), Aristotle’s (non modal) subalter-
nation (GaF → GiF, GeF → GoF) becomes a (KT′-) theorem (as is
easily seen, it is an outcome of suitable substitution instances of
Weak Boethius’ Thesis (3′)), whereas, as is well-known, subalter-
nation is not a theorem (i.e. it is invalid) under first-order standard
transcription. All these features of the alternative (non-classical)
transcription are of course weaker than (1′), hence, quite under-
standably, they are also an outcome of implication (marks) which
do not coincide with ‘⇒’ (no matter whether they are truth-functional
or not). Unfortunately, the first alternative proposals were either
(albeit seminal in the long run) not fully developed (cf. the
pioneering, yet widely unnoticed, article Nelson 1932), or (cf. Angell
1986) not immune to severe shortcomings (as pointed out by
Montgomery and Routley, in Angell’s system with subjunctive
conditionals no substitution instance of (subjunctively conditional-
ized) Simplification is allowed (hence also even the simplification
from P ∧ P to P is forbidden), but see now Angell 2002, pp. 471–473,
where a new system, very interesting on its own but, alas, three-
valued and without ⇒-Ctrp, is proposed and discussed at length).
The modest proposal made here (and worked out on a forcedly very
small sample, but as the harbinger of a (bonsai) research programme,
if one likes) amounts, as already said, to systematically testing
Aristotle’s own definition of ‘⇒’ in APr. I 24 as a tool for better
understanding his (categorical and) modal syllogistic. The advan-
tage is (hopefully) twofold, since, (i): a full formalization (which is
immune to the old shortcomings of properly connexive systems of
Angell and McCall) is now available by means of complete and
decidable systems of modal-connexive logic (as, say, Pizzi’s CI.0
system of analytic consequential implication (with suitable Box
definition by means of ‘⇒’)) or, equivalently, by means of KT + DfP
and (ii): DfP, and its Chrysippean variants as well, albeit built up in
136 MAURO NASTI DE VINCENTIS
a completely independent way, happen to be logically equivalent to
what Aristotle actually said, i.e. to (1′), far from being, so to speak,
no more than guests from outside. An outside, I would add, whose
merits and dangers, even as a mere tool, ought to be, case by case,
carefully evaluated, notwithstanding the fact that (mainly by those
who are blatantly unable to understand modern logical jargon) it is
sometimes an a priori unwelcome tool. It must also be stressed, once
and for all, that there is no room, here at least (but cf. Nasti De
Vincentis 2002, passim), for citation (let alone for discussion) even
of the most relevant outcomes of modal-connexive (consequential)
logic (and of the most recent achievements in ‘rational reconstruc-
tion’ of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic as well).
30
Thus, ’άν ληφθ η̂˛ [. . .] τὸ N (28a24–25) has the proper meaning
of ‘if Gn is assumed’, no matter whether Gn is (somewhere) impos-
sible or not. In fact, in a (fantasy) world W′ where dragons exist,
i.e. (∃x)Dx is true, Dn, Sn, Fn are all to be taken as contingent, hence,
according to Aristotle’s equimodality criterion (or, equivalently, to
the Chrysippus-laden (2)), ‘⇒’ is translated by a strict implication
mark and ‘Some serpents spit fire’, which is translated by
(∃x)¬
(Sx → ¬Fx), is derived from ¬
(Sn → ¬Fn), i.e. from
(Sn ∧ Fn). This of course means that (in the canonical model, no
matter whether with KT- or S5-accessibility) there is at least
one world W″ (accessible to W′) where Sn ∧ Fn, hence also
(∃x)(Sx ∧ Fx), is true. This simply means that, so far as serpents,
dragons and spitting fire things are concerned, the standard first-order
‘conjunctive’ translation of a particular affirmative conclusion in
Darapti becomes (far from being the outcome of any extralogical
existential import (∃x)Dx move) no more than a special case for
worlds where dragons exist. (As a side remark, it is perhaps worthy
of note that a clear counterpart of ∃-Introduction is ascribed by Sextus
to the Dialecticians, see M. VIII 98.) Moreover, Aristotle also
mentions a reductio (διὰ το υ̂ α’ δυνάτου, 28a23) proof of Darapti
without any further detail. Under the intended (according to
Aristotle’s equimodality criterion) rendering of premisses and con-
clusion, the initial Reductio step (as far as the instantiation with S,
D, F terms is concerned) is of course (∃x)(Sx ⇒ ¬Fx) which, by
∀-Elimination and ⇒-Ctrp, yields Fa ⇒ ¬Sa. Thus, since the major
premiss becomes, always by ∀-Elimination, Da ⇒ Fa, obvious steps
of ⇒-Transitivity and ∀-Elimination (from the minor premiss) yield
the negation (Da ⇒ ¬Sa) ∧ (Da ⇒ Sa) of a substitution instance of
Weak Boethius’ Thesis (3′). From this contradiction, a single
Reductio step validates (this instantiation of) Darapti.
31
Some of these instantiations can be found in Angell 1986, pp.
215 and 212. It is worthy of note that, so far as quantifiers are con-
cerned, logical equivalence appears to be somewhat coarser than
common sense reading. Thus, say (as made clear enough by quick
tests), the utterance of ‘Some jolly good fellows are ghosts’ is
ascribed to believers in the real existence of ghosts more frequently
than ‘Some ghosts are jolly good fellows’ is. In this case, current rep-
resentations of knowledge most probably ascribe by default (to the
‘real’ world) the interpretations of terms such as ‘jolly good fellow’,
notwithstanding their ambiguous overlapping, where real and
(possibly) unreal worlds are both concerned. In fact, when overlap-
ping lacks (as, say, in ‘Some relatives of Donald Duck are Junior
Woodchucks’ or ‘Some hobbits are pallohides’), the ascription by
default is, of course, always to a single world and the terms become
interchangeable (within existential quantification) even in ordinary
language. It is also relevant to note that Johnson-Laird and Byrne’s
cognitive approach to Aristotle’s syllogistic is (quite understandably)
based on most current handbooks rather than on serious and detailed
scrutiny of Prior Analytics. Thus, it is quite natural that they actually
overlook even the old-fashioned doctrine of existential import (to say
nothing of Aristotle’s equimodality criterion), as simple instantia-
tions clearly show (I am indebted to Marcello Frixione for a good
instantiation in Fesapo, where the problem of existential import for
the middle term is clearly not taken into account by current ‘repre-
sentations of knowledge’ à la Johnson-Laird). Nevertheless, the
overall relevance of Johnson-Laird’s approach strongly suggests an
implementation of the already mentioned (bonsai) Research
Programme, notably (and quite naturally) in order to provide a refur-
bished cognitive model where, according to the meaning of ‘⇒’,
‘Some A are B’ is analysed in terms of ‘non-conflict’, i.e. of modal-
connexive compatibility (which is of course weaker than mere
compossibility) of A with B. Needless to say that any specimen of
history-laden (or even built up ex novo) hypothetical/explicative
reasoning (from, say, the demostrative strategy of Newton’s Principia
to Hegel’s criticism of that strategy) can be analyzed in terms of its
underlying modal-connexive logic, hence also within the wider
framework of the so-called Model Based Reasoning.
32
Even in ‘old’ connexive systems (as S. McCall’s CFL)
⇒-Simplification is of course lacking. Nevertheless, ⇒-Factor’s Law
is unduly present as an axiom of CFL, whereas the corresponding
axiom in CI.0 has the weakly nonmonotonic form ¬((P ∧ R) ⇒ ⊥)
→ ((P ∧ Q) → ((P ∧ R) ⇒ (Q ∧ R))), where ‘⊥’ of course stands
for ‘¬(P ∨ ¬P)’, hence the principal antecedent stands for (P ∧ R).
Thus, the principal consequent, i.e. ⇒-Factor’s Law, is invalid (it is
false wherever (P ⇒ Q) is true and (P ∧ R) ⇒ (Q ∧ R) is false).
33
Aristotle’s abbreviations are: A for the major term H, B for the
middle term G and Γ for the minor term F.
34
To be fair, Aristotle shifts to ‘A(F, G) is possible and false’
(34a36–38), see below.
35
For the case in hand, the pourvoi to be rejected is of course (the
truth of)
C (in some allowed instantiations of Barbara).
36
Cf. the Loeb Classical Library edition of APr., cit., pp. 270–271
n.d.
37
As is easily seen (hence also left to the reader), the alternative
procedure of validation sketched by Aristotle in APr. I 15, 34b2–6
(and starting from the validity of Barbara with contingent major,
assertoric minor and contingent conclusion) is also, following the
same strategy, provably sound (unlike Tredennick-Knox’s corre-
sponding counterexample, cf. ibid., p. 272 n. a), thus there is no need
to excise Aristotle’s passage as A. Becker did.
38
See Pizzi 1996, p. 651 (Theorem I). This proof is (also) an
outcome of T. Williamson’s remark, according to which, when the
consequential arrow is a principal operator, it collapses on the
material equivalence (the collapse becomes immediately evident (by
(7), plus closure under necessitation) when ∇A, ∇B are negated
theorems). It is worth noting that, if Chrysippus and his followers
actually had an intuitive grasp of the reducibility of Chrysippean
⇒-validity to Philonian ↔-validity, then the general ascription to
‘the Stoics’ (by Sextus, see e.g. P. II 104) of a ‘Philonian’ account
of conditionals would become less difficult to explain, as well as its
matching with the instantiations occurring at S.E. P. II 105 and M.
VIII 246.
39
According to Frede’s remark, the ambiguous use of (too) general
terms (also when reference to a more specific notion is actually made)
 FROM ARISTOTLE’S SYLLOGISTIC TO STOIC CONDITIONALS
is frequent apud Stoicos (so oft, cf. Frede 1974, p. 84). Besides
Frede’s overall remark, it is worth noting that, say, the definiens of
‘Impossible’ by Laertius (D.L. VII 75) is actually inconsistent with
his own definiens of ‘Necessary’ (at least under the obvious assump-
tion that a negated necessary proposition is impossible), unless (as
regards ‘Impossible’) something like ‘or it admits of being true, but
is prevented from being true by external circumstances’ is taken as
implicit (besides the explicit part ‘it does not admit of being true’).
40
As regards further thought, think of the fact that actual (extant)
instantiations of Stoic ‘proofs’ (where intelligible pores, rich men,
lactating women, etc., are mentioned) are almost always an MPP
instantiated by necessary major premisses with contingent clauses,
hence their corresponding conditionals, according to (the second
disjunct in the definiens of) (7), can actually have ‘⇒’ as a prin-
cipal mark. Nevertheless, something like an ancestor of modern
‘Gamma theories’ is required in the general case (when, e.g., the
minor of MPP is impossible and the conclusion necessary), since
the characteristic feature of a Gamma theory amounts to permitting
(without any inconsistency) non-conditionalizable sound arguments
(whenever the principal arrow of the corresponding conditional is a
relevant arrow). Thus, say, in Anderson-Belnap’s systems E or R
for relevant implication, the principle of disjunctive syllogism is
accepted as a deduction pattern, but it is not conditionalizable by
means of a (principal) relevant implication mark, and this is just what
Chrysippus should have done, and perhaps actually did, for his basic
α’ ναπόδεικτοι, including of course the fifth one). (As a side remark,
if ‘Gamma theory style’ unprovability really has a Chrysippean
ancestor, a new justification of the Apuleian rendering of
α’ ναπόδεικτος as indemonstrabilis becomes easily available.)
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University of Salerno
Department of Communication Sciences
84084 Fisciano (Salerno)
Italy
E-mail: mauronasti@mclink.it