UP VS DIZON(JUDGE OF RTC)

F: On August 30, 1990, the UP, through its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern Builders),
represented by its President and General Manager Servillanodela Cruz, for the construction of
the extension building and the renovation of the College of Arts and Sciences Building in the
campus of the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB).3

In the course of the implementation of the contract, Stern Builders submitted three progress
billings corresponding to the work accomplished, but the UP paid only two of the billings. The
third billing worth P273,729.47 was not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on
Audit (COA). Despite the lifting of the disallowance, the UP failed to pay the billing, prompting
Stern Builders and dela Cruz to sue the UP and its co-respondent officials to collect the unpaid
billing and to recover various damages.

After trial, on November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of the STERN
BUILDERS awarding, among others, moral damages

I: WON STERN BUILDERS CORPORATION IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES

R: the grant of moral damages in that manner contravened the law that permitted the recovery of
moral damages as the means to assuage "physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury."111 The contravention of the law was manifest considering that Stern Builders, as an
artificial person, was incapable of experiencing pain and moral sufferings. 112 Assuming that in
granting the substantial amount of P 10,000,000.00 as moral damages, the RTC might have had
in mind that dela Cruz had himself suffered mental anguish and anxiety. If that was the case, then
the RTC obviously disregarded his separate and distinct personality from that of Stern
Builders.113 Moreover, his moral and emotional sufferings as the President of Stern Builders were
not the sufferings of Stern Builders. Lastly, the RTC violated the basic principle that moral
damages were not intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant, but to restore
the plaintiff to his status quo ante as much as possible. Taken together, therefore, all these
considerations exposed the substantial amount of P 10,000,000.00 allowed as moral damages not
only to be factually baseless and legally indefensible, but also to be unconscionable, inequitable
and unreasonable.
 REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of
respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation
and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.The
award is for the satisfaction of a judgment against the Phlippine Government.On June 24, 1969,
respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Order declaring the decision final and
executory. Villasor directed the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to
execute said decision. The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several
Banks, especially on Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with Philippine Veterans Bank and PNB are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military
and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP. Petitioner, on certiorari,
filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and
garnishment are null and void.

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept
of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its
consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends. The State may not be sued without its
consent. A corollary, both dictated by logic and sound sense from a basic concept is that public
funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that where the State gives
its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s
action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government fund sand
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments,
is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be
covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
 REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units,
generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be
effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and
not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the
agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent
filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has
sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners have waived
their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act
is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission
is an act juri imperii. The state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the
premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The
maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its
governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
 Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for
security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA.
Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages
against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency
for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did
not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency.
Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that “the State may not be sued without its
consent” reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the
very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances.
The State may at times be sued. The State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent
may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a
contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity.

But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental
entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act
proprietary in character.

But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising
from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD
1145, the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
 Philrock vs Board of Liquidators

Facts:

Philrock bought on installment basis from REPACOM (now Board of Liquidators) a

rock- pulverizing machine. After sometime, it broke down and Phil rock filed in the RTC of
Manila for replacement of new one and in good condition plus refund with damages. BOL
countered that said machine was in good working condition and that claim is no longer under the
warranty period and that Philrock have not yet paid in full.

RTC decided in favor of Philrock for the BOL for reimbursements plus damages and
orders for the garnishment of funds of BOL in PNB. BOL through Solicitor General filed for
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals which set aside the decision of the
RTC. Philrock filed petition for review.

Issue

Whether or not the funds of REPACOM now Board of Liquidators in PNB may be
garnished considering that said funds per E.O. 629 s. 1980 are funds from liquidation and
payment of liabilities.

Ruling

The BOL is created not as profit or business entity of government and it is

unincorporated. Hence, when suit is directed against unincorporated government agency which,
because it is unincorporated, possess no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the
agency principal, i.e., the state.

BOL funds deposited in PNB are government funds and therefore not subject to
garnishment. Even if the state consents to be sued it doesn’t mean it waives its lawful defenses.
Government funds are disbursed subject to appropriation and therefore cannot be garnished.
Even under judgment that it has to refund, it can only do so only by appropriation, not by
garnishment.
 Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Facts:

Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land reform

program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in the death of 12
rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 11
creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation. The most significant recommendation of the Commission was for the
heirs of thedeceased and wounded victims to be compensated by the government.
Based on such recommendation, the victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for
damages against the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity

(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held:

The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as claimed by the
petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean that liability attaches to the
State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the creation of the Commission and,
therefore, whatever is the finding of the Commission only serves as the basis for a
cause of action in the event any party decides to litigate the same. Thus,
the recommendation of the Commission does not in any way bind the State.
The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who allegedly were
responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers acted beyond the scope
of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a person can commit no wrong.
The military and police officers who were responsible for the atrocities can be held
personally liable for damages as they exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot
be considered official.
 Veterans v CA

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11, 1989. On May 12,
1986, aMemorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed
the minimummonthly contract rate per guard for eight (8)hours of service security per day. On
June 29, 1987,Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-
throat competition.PADPAO and PC-SUSIA found VMPSI guilty and recommended its
expulsion from PADPAO andthecancellation of its license to operate a security agency. As a
result, PADPAO refused to issue aclearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it
requested one. VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 against the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA in
theRTC-Makati Branch 135, on March 28, 1988. On thesame date, the court issued a restraining
order enjoining the PC Chief andPC-committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-
renewaChief and PC-had not given consent thereto andthe restraining order or preliminary
injunction would not serve any purpose because there wasnomore license to be cancelled.
Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion. On April 18, 1988 thelower coVMPSI reiterated its
application for the issuance of preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA hadrejected payment of
the penalty for its failure to submit its application forrenewal of its license. OnJune 10, 1988, the
RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond ofPC-Chief and PC-SUSIA
filed a Motion forReconsideration of the above order, but it was denied bythe court. On
November 3, 1988, the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA soughtrelief by a petition for certiorariin the
Court of Appeals. On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.

HELD:
Wherefore, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMEDin
toto.The State may notbe sued without its consent. Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA, beinginstrumentalities of the national governmentexercising a primarily governmental
function ofregulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, orsecurity
guard agencies,nt seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in acertain way, but
worse, because VMPSIseeks actual and compensatory damages in the sumsaid public
respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may notbeenforced
because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose
 Sanders v. Veridiano

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station (NAVSTA) in
Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph Wyers are American citizens
permanently residing in the Philippines and who were employed as gameroom attendants in the
special services department of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that
their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. In a
letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer’s report of the
reinstatement of private respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents
allege that the letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed and thus
filed for damages against petitioners.

ISSUE:
1) Were the petitioners acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts for which the private respondents sued them for damages?
2) Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioner are being called to
account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Given the official
character of the letters, the petioners were, legally speaking, being sued as officers of the United
States government. As such, the complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be
held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued. The private respondents must pursue their
claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the Unites States of which they are
all citizens and under whose jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed for the Philippine
courts have no jurisdiction over the case.
 US VS GUINTO
February 26, 1990

FACTS:

These cases are consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity.

1)US VS GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection
with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base which was won by a
certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that
Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a
rebidding.

2} US VS RODRIGO (GR No 79470)

Genove, employed as a cook in the Main Club at John Hay Station, was dismissed after it had been
ascertained in an investigation that he poured urine in the soup stock. Genove filed a complaint for
damages against the club manager who was also an officer of USAF.

2)US VS CEBALLOS (GR No 80018)

Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp ODonnel, was arrested following a buy-bust operation
conducted by petitioners who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. A trial
ensued where petitioners testified against respondent Bautista. As a result of the charge, Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that because
of the latter’s acts, he was removed from his job.
3)US VS ALARCON VERGARA (GR No 80258)
Complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against individual petitioners for injuries
allegedly sustained by handcuffing and unleashing dogs on them by the latter. The individual petitioners,
US military officers, deny this stressing that the private respondents were arrested for theft but resisted
arrest, thus incurring the injuries. In all these cases, the individual petitioners claimed they were just
exercising their official functions. The USA was not impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on the
ground that they are in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of state immunity applicable in the cases at bar?

HELD

A state may not be sued without its consent. This doctrine is not absolute and does not say the
state may not be sued under any circumstance. The rule says that the state may not be sued without its
consent, which clearly imports that it may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may
be manifested expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
Consent is implied when the sate enters into a contract or it itself commences litigation. When the
government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. Waiver is also
implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counter claim. The USA, like any
other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity.
 United States of America vs. Ruiz

Facts:

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of
thoseprovided in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent
alleges thatit won in the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of wharves in said
base that was wronglyawarded to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance
was filed by him against theUS.

Issue:

Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmentalfunctions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of
anotherstate without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles
of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;
theyare constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,
it hasbeen necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and
private,commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to
sovereign andgovernmental acts.The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. A statemay be said to have descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitlygiven its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where thecontract relates the exercise of its
sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably afunction of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercialor business
purposes.
 IBP vs Zamora

Facts

At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to
join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.

The PNP Chief formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2
Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila
through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those that are
well-trained, disciplined and well-armed and active or former PNP/Military personnel.

Issue

Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols
violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP.

Decision

No. It was the under the sole discretion of the President to call the military vested in his
wisdom, thus, this act poses a political question and not justiciable. There is no equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the military.

The real authority in the situation is still the PNP since the military’s function is limited
per LOI. The civilian authority is still upheld.
 People vs Lagman

FACTS

The accused were charged with and convicted of refusal to register for military training
as required by the National Defense Act. On appeal, Sosa argued that he was fatherless, had a
mother and eight (8) brothers to support, while Lagman alleged that he had a father to support,
had no military training and never wished to be killed. Both claimed that the statute was
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the National Defense Act is unconstitutional.

HELD:

The Supreme Court affirmed its conviction holding that the law in question was based on
Sec. 4, Art. XVI of the Constitution. It added that the National Defense Act, insofar as it
established compulsory military services, does not go against any provisions of the Constitution,
but is in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the government to defend the state cannot be
performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the people
would be to make this duty of the government excusable should there be no sufficient men to
volunteer to enlist therein.
 Imbong vs Ochoa

Facts

The RH law took effect on March 15, 2013 but on March 19, after considering the
petitions, the court ordered a status quo ante which effected a 120 day halt on the implementation
or until July 2013.

The status quo ante summarizes the steps the government has taken in the last decade in
support of this kind of bill in attempt to control population growth vis a vis the government’s role
in poverty reduction.

The petitions contended that the, among others, the right to life.

Issue

Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to life.

Ruling

No. The issue her pertains to when life begins in order to define life. In the deliberation of
this law, it was established that life begins at fertilization so when there is no union yet of the
sperm and egg, there is no life to speak of, and there is no life to be protected yet.

Contraceptives that kill the fertilized egg are banned and only those that prevent the
union of the egg and sperm are permitted to be used.

traceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck
down.
 Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005

Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28,
1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine
Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the
Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without
trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?

Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is
a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations. “Civil Courts will not
interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or
property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.”
Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

TANADA vs Angara
I. THE FACTS
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by
the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote
the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further,
they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement
“place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

II. THE ISSUE

Do provisions of the WTO contravene with our constitution?

III. THE RULING

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT contravene with our constitution. It does prohibit
our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and
from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

The Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign
investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the
Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments
into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair.

The constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”

What the Senate did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the
worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our
people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows
withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.

Lim vs Executive Secretary

Facts:

Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the
constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-
intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers.
SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their
organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the
operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT) between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only
provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against
the Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does
not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue:

Is the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling:

The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and it is the
VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the
current Balikatan exercise.

The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging war on
Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the
Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of future
violation of the Terms of Reference.

Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of “Balikatan-02-1” joint
military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for the
correction on its part.

The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

 Razon vs Tagitis

FACTS:

Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic
Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu.

More than a month later Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with
the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt.
Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief,
Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben
Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.

Mary Jean gathered information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified
that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men, that Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of
police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo,
seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her
husband was not missing but was with another woman having good time somewhere, which is a
clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police assistance in locating her
missing husband.

Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely
Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the
National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her efforts produced no positive
results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for financial help
from friends and relatives.

She filed a petition and the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing.

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any
involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of
the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless,
or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed
that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and
locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.

THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an
"enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried
"great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and
belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the
abduction of Tagitis.

Moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:

The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct
evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his
room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion,
however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities –
is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in
terms of the portions the petitioners cite):

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct
of the investigation, together with any report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the
person responsible for the threat, act or omission.

The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory pleading,
the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of
the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who
actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because
these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that
the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture
of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
 Imbong vs Ochoa

Facts

The RH law took effect on March 15, 2013 but on March 19, after considering the
petitions, the court ordered a status quo ante which effected a 120 day halt on the implementation
or until July 2013.

The status quo ante summarizes the steps the government has taken in the last decade in
support of this kind of bill in attempt to control population growth vis a vis the government’s role
in poverty reduction.

The petitions contended that the, among others, the right to life.

Issue

Whether or not the RH Law violates the right to life.

Ruling

No. The issue her pertains to when life begins in order to define life. In the deliberation of
this law, it was established that life begins at fertilization so when there is no union yet of the
sperm and egg, there is no life to speak of, and there is no life to be protected yet.

Contraceptives that kill the fertilized egg are banned and only those that prevent the
union of the egg and sperm are permitted to be used.
 Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Facts:

The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all
citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same
was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said
resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."
4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as
a matter of judicial notice.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?

HELD: YES

Petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The
right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s
forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of
that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
 Hacienda Luisita vs PARC

FACTS:

Following the promulgation of the Courts Decision, the petitioners present for resolution several
issues concerning the said Decision. To recall, the Court ordered, among others, that the lands
subject of Hacienda Luisita Incorporateds (HLI) stock distribution plan (SDP) be placed under
compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP and declared that the
original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as
stockholders of HLI.

ISSUES:

VII. Whether or not the ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI is valid

HELD:

Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs will never have control
over these agricultural lands for as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In line with Our
finding that control over agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We
reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control given the present
proportion of shareholdings in HLI.

Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no
longer be operating under SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the
FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be treated as ordinary stockholders and will no
longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.

In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and homelots
received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them, since, as
We have mentioned in our July 5, 2011 Decision, "the benefits x x x were received by the FWBs
as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and other fringe benefits were granted to them
pursuant to the existing collective bargaining agreement with Tadeco."
 Limbona vs Mangelin

Facts:

Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Assembly of Central Mindanao. On October 21,
1987, Congressman Matalam invited Limbona in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Limbona accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly Members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the
House Committee hearing of Congress.

However, the Assembly held a meeting on November 2, 1987, and unseated Limbona from his
position. Limbona prays for the session to be declared null and void and that he still be declared
Speaker of the Regional Assembly.

Pending the case, the SC also received a resolution from the Assembly expelling Limbona’s
membership.

Issues:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over autonomous governments?

Held:

Yes.

PD 1618 mandates that “the President shall have the power of general supervision and control
over autonomous regions”. Hence, courts of law can assume jurisdiction. The courts can validly
review the removal of Limbona as Speaker.

However, the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions are declared invalid since at the time Limbona
called the “recess”, it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. Secondly, the
invitation by the House of Representatives’ Committee on Muslim Affairs provides a plausible
reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does
not appear that respondents called his attention to his mistake. What appears is they opened the
sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under these circumstances,
equity is on his side. The “recess” was called on the ground of good faith.

The court held that Nov. 2, 1987 was invalid.

 Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections

FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong,filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due
course.Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied
his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance
candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code.The COMELEC noted that such candidates
“could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not nominated by a political party or
not supported by a registered political party with national constituency.”

Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for
public service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was
indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most
qualified among all the presidential candidates” and supported the statement with his legal
qualifications, his alleged capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his
government platform.

ISSUES

Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along
with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public
service.

HELD

No. Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject
to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination,
then the equal access clause is not violated.The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for
limitations on electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly
elections. In the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone,
including those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run.

Legaspi vs. CSC G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987

Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on
the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly
represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed
by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the
information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel
the respondent CSC to disclose said information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted
that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest in the civil service
eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case
of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object
of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen,
and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the
alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.

Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain

Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). It was not to materialize for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition,
for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD
including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of
the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.

Issues:

Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987
Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act
No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an
appropriate remedy;
Held:

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present
MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly
dissimilar provisions compared to the original.
MOA-AD is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific
provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between
the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state
and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary (EO 475 and 478, duties for crude oil and oil products)
Facts:

The Pres. Issued EO 438 imposing additional 5% to all imported articles including crude
oil and other oil products.

Another EO 475 was issued reducing the duties except for crude oil and other oil
products.

EO 478 was issued again imposing a special duty of 0.95 per liter of crude oil and 1.0 per
liter for imported oil.

Petitioner filed a motion assailing the validity of EO 475 and 478 contending that the
constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills to the Congress and not to the President.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

Ruling:

The court ruled that there was no undue delegation of power since the constitution under
Art. 6, Sec. 28 (2) provides explicit constitutional authority. Futhermore, both EO’s were moved
by the desire to generate additional public revenues making it within the scope of the delegated
power of the President.

Araneta vs Dinglasan
Facts:
Presidents of the Philippines issued Executive Orders in pursuance to the Act. No 671
which delegates Emergency Power to the President by act of the Congress in times of war. In
case at bar, there are four EO’s involved, which are the following:
1. Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential
buildings.
2. Executive Order 192, promulgated on December 24, 1948, which aims to control
exports from the Philippines.
3. Executive Order 225, dated on June 15, 1949, which appropriate funds for the
operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950.
4. Executive Order 226, promulgated on June 15, 1949, which appropriates P6,
000,000.00 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to the hold lug of
the national elections to be held in November, 1949.

In these cases, petitioners rest their proposition that the Emergency Power Acts (C.A. No.
671) has ceases to have any force and effect.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the Emergency Power Acts has ceases to have any force and effect, thereby
invalidating EO’s 62, 192, 225, 226.

Ruling: Although CA No. 671 providing the delegation of Emergency Power to the President
does not expressly provides the duration of the effectiveness of such power, it is however in
pursuance to the provision of the Article VI Section 26 of the Constitution which expressly
provides that emergency power shall be for limited period only. Limited period was defined as
restrictive in duration which signifies that the Congress intended it to be temporary.
In question whether or not CA No. 671 has ceases its force an effect, the court ruled that by the
time the Congress convenes following the war, its effect has ceases and thereby having no force
at all. CA 167 is only valid and effective during the emergency and will atomically ceases upon
the end of the emergency in which it was created.

Memory Aid:
War
4 Executive Orders pursuance to CA 167
Article VI Section 26
Emergency ceases upon the end of the emergency
 Eulogio Rodriguez VS Vicente Gella

Facts:

Petitioners seek to violate the Presidential Decrees issued which appropriates sums of
money for urgent and essential public works and for relief for cities visited by calamities. They
sought to Vicente Sella (National Treasurer) be enjoined from releasing the said funds pursuant
to the EO’s. These EO’s are pursuant to CA 671 which was declared inoperative by the SC in the
same case as Araneta VS Dinglasan, where HB 727 passed by the Congress intending to revoke
CA 671 but was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War that was still subsisting as a fact.

Issues:

W/N the EO’s are valid

Rulings:

No, executive orders no. 545 and 546 are null and void being in pursuance to CA 671
which shall be rendered ineffective. There were no actual emergencies or calamities emanating
from the last world war which intended. Even if the President vetoed the repealing bill of the
Congress, the Congress must be given due weight. For the Congress may delegate its power by
simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by 2/3 votes.
 Osmena vs Orbos

Facts:

PD 1956 creating a Special Account in General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund. OSPF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and
imported petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the
world market prices of crude oil. It was subsequently reclassified into “trust liability account” by
the virtue of E.O. 1024.

President Aquino amended the PD and promulgated EO 137 expanding the grounds for
reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost underrecovery.

Petition avers that the creation of trust fund is a violation to the Constitution as money collected
under the amended PD must be treated as “Special Fund,” not as trust account. It shall be used
for specified purpose, and not channeled to another government objective. Petitioner further
points out that the was collected through taxing power of the state.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power to ERB to impose additional aount for
petroleum products.

Ruling:

No. The court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose
additional amount on petroleum products provides sufficient standard by which the authority
must exercised. While the funds collected maybe referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the
exercise of police power. Furthermore, it is the general policy of the law to protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing pump rates which requires expediency of action from
the delegate.

Memo Aid:

Fluctuation of the prices of crude oil.

OSPF
 Tablarin vs Gutierrez

FACTS

Republic Act 2382 known as the “Medical Act of 1959”, was enacted for the purpose of
standardization and regulation of medical education. It created the Board of Medical Education
to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the proper implementation requirements
into medical school. Ministry of Education Culture and Sports (MECS), a member of the board
established NMAT, an aptitude test, as an additional requirement into medical school.

The Center for Educational Measurement, one of the respondents, conducted NMAT for
SY 1986-1987.

Petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the next school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT).

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and
Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
contending that there was undue delegation in enacting RA 2382 because it failed to establish the
necessary standard to be followed by the delegate.

The trial court denied the petition. Petitioner prayed with the Supreme Court for reversal.

ISSUE

Whether or not there was undue delegation of power of the legislative department to the
Board of Medical Education.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner’s petition and finds that there was no undue
delegation of legislative power when it delegated the Board of Medical Education for the
determination of requirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine.

There was an implied standard which shall be followed by the delegate, which is Sec 5(a)
and Sec 7 and the body of the statute itself. And these considered together are sufficient
compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.

Petition is dismissed.
 Eastern Shipping V POEA (Memo. Cir. No. 2, overseas)

Facts:

Vitaliano Saco was a Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an
accident in Tokyo, Japan. His widow, private respondent Kathleen D. Saco, sued the petitioner
for damages and the latter argued that the complaint was not in the jurisdiction of POEA but by
SSS since the deceased was not an OFW. However, POEA assumed jurisdiction and ruled in
favor of the complainant with an award in the sum of 192,000.00, in accordance with the
Memorandum Circular No. 2.
Petitioner immediately comes to the court prompting the SG to move for dismissal and
further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of the principle of non-delegation
of legislative power since no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

Issue:

Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of the principle of non-

delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is not a violation to non-delegation of power since POEA is

an administrative agency and is vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the
quasi-judicial and cannot be considered a violation of due process as long as the rights are laid
down. Such memorandum circular is an administrative regulation and was just exercising its
vested power which was permitted under EO 797, Sec 4 (A). It further upholds its mandate to
“fair and equitable employment practices”.
 Pelaez vs. Auditor General

Facts:

The President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative

Code, issued Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129 creating 33 municipalities.
Philippine Vice Pelaez instituted a civil action against the Auditor General to restrain
from passing in audit and disbursement of expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
executive orders. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, because Section
68 has been impliedly repealed, in which denies the president in creating new barrios and negates
bigger power to create a municipalities. Petitioner claimed that the act of the President
constitutes an undue delegation of power.
Respondent answered upon the theory that new municipality can be created without
creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality.

Issue:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of power to the President in creating 33 municipalities.

Ruling:
Yes, there is an undue delegation of power. The authority to create Municipal Corporation
is essentially legislative in nature. The Congress may delegate power to another branch of
government, given that the said law delegating the power is (1) be complete in itself, and has (2)
fix standard-the limits of which are sufficiently determinable.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, where the issuance of the Executive
Orders relied upon, does not enunciate any policy to be carried out and implemented by the
President. It does not fix the details in the enforcement of the law
 Demetrio Demetria vs. Manuel Alba

Facts: Petitioners as tax payers and member of the National Assembly sought to prohibit Manuel
Alba, then Ministers of Budget from disbursing funds pursuant to P.D 1777 or the budget reform
Decree of 1977. Dementria assailed on the Constitutionality of paragraph 1 sec.44 of PD 1777.
This section provides that- the president is authorized to transfer, any funds from to other
different offices, agencies, bureau of the executive department which are included in the GAA to
any program, project or activity included in the GAA or approved after it enactment. Demetria
claims that it is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 constitution.

Issues: w/n Par.1 of sec.44 of PD 1777 is Constitutional?

Rulings: No. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit
and categorical under the 1973 constitution. The constitution allowed the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose if augmenting an item from savings in another
item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway
granted was thus limited. The purpose and condition were specified. However, Par.1 of Sec.44
PD 1177 unduly overextends the transfer of funds from one department or office of the Ex. Dept
to any projects or activities of the Ex.Dept. w/o regard as to w/n the transfer is for the purpose if
augmenting the item for w/c transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor therefore. Indeed such constitutional infirmities
render the provision null and void.
 Philippine Interisland Shipping vs CA

Facts:

Harbor pilots cried for an increase in pilotage rates. In response, President Marcos issued EO
1088 “Providing for Uniform and Modified Rates for Pilotage Services Rendered to Foreign and
Coastwise Vessels in All Private and Public Ports.” The said EO substantially increases the
Pilotage rates previously fixed by the PPA.

However PPA refuse to implement the EO, and instead, they issued administrative order
overriding the it which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and what is worst, even let the
contracting parties to decide on the amount of the fee.

Issue:

Whether or not the PPA has the authority to override the EO 1088 by issuing administrative
orders.

Ruling:

No. PPA, as administrative body and as a delegate, they are bound to obey and implement the
Executive Order of the President who at that time also acting as legislature. PPA duty is to
enforce the law not to usurp the power of the President.
 Us v Tang Ho

Facts: Act. No 2868 was passed penalizing the monopoly and hoarding of speculation in palay,
rice and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale and
authorizing the Governor-General to issue the necessary rules and regulations and making an
appropriation. The gov gen then issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold. The defendant was imprisoned guilty of the change with the sale of rice at an excessive
price.

Issue: W/N Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation.

Ruling: Yes. There is undue delegation since the Act. itself did not pass the two test for
delegation. The said act, although it authorized the Gov gen to issue rules and regulation, did not
set parameters to what extent the delegate must fill. It is not complete itself.
 Abakada Guro vs Executive Secretary Ermita

FACTS

RA 9337 (VAT REFORM ACT) imposes 10% Vat on sale of goods and properties,
importation of goods and sale of services and use or lease of properties.

Petitioner filed a petition alleging that it contains a uniform proviso authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after satisfaction of two conditions.

Petitioners contended that VAT is a tax and that there is undue delegation of legislative
power as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes
by passing the same to the President, in his stand-by authority.

Respondents claim that there is due delegation of power because the law is complete and
leaves no discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once the two conditions are
satisfied.

ISSUES

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of the

Constitution.

RULING

There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it,
and what is the scope of his authority.

Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The
intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President
is to simply execute the legislative policy. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the
12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive

It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and

administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition.
 Defensor v Guingona

Facts: The senate of the Phil.convened its first regular session of the 11th Congress presided by
Sen. Osmeña. The main agenda is the election of officers.

Senator Fernan was declared the Pres of the senate that time and Ople as the tempore and Sen.
Drilon as majority leader.

Sen. Tatad claimed that he should be in the position of minority leader since he belong to the
losing nominee of the Senate Pres. But Sen. Guingona Jr. Was elected instead.

Sen. Satiago and Tatad filed a petition alleging that Sen. Guingona is unlawfully holding the
position.

Issue:

Does the court have jurisdiction?

Ruling:

The court has no jurisdiction over the case since it is a political question. It has no power to solve
issues within the jurisdiction of the congress because the court only answers the legality and
constitutionality of an act, not its wisdom. Thus, the issue is within the domain of the legislature.
 Angara vs Electoral Commission

Facts: petioners and respondents were candidates voted for the position of members of the
national assembly for the first district of Tayabas. the provincial board proclaimed Angara as
member-elect of the nat'l assemblyand later took his oath of office

Later the nat'l assembly issued a resolution fixing the last date to file the election protest. Ynsua
filed his protest praying that he be named/declared member of the Nat'l assemblyor that the
election of said position be nullified. the commission later issued another resolution fixing the
last day of protest. Angara contended that the supreme court has no jurisdiction to hear the case
for the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon electoral commission solely as regards
the merits of contested elections to the nat'l assembly. ISSUES: W/N the electoral comm has
acted w/o or in excess of its jurisdiction Rulings: the electoral comm has acted within the
legitimate exercise of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent. The creation of the electoral comm is a constitutional creation , invested with thee
necessary authority in the performance and exercise of the limited and specific function assigned
to it by the constitution
 PANTRANCO vs PSC

Facts:

Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc has been engaged in the business of transporting
passengers for the past 20 years. On August 26, 1936, PANTRANCO filed with Public Service
Commission and application to operate additional busses. PSC granted the application with two
additional conditions of its existing certificates. Being not agreeable with the conditions,
PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration with the PSC, which was denied by the latter.

Issue:

Whether or not the legislative power delegated to PSC constitute undue delegation of
power.

Ruling:

No. What has been delegated to the PSC is the administrative function involving the use
of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly. This will involves the promotion of
the public interest in a suitable manner.

The certification granted to the PANTRANCO is a license in which PSC has the control
to ensure the good of the public. PSC has the power to modify or amend the conditions specified
in the certificate.

Memo Aid:

Additional busses
Two Additional Conditions