ENGR. RANULFO C. FELICIANO v. NESTOR P. VILLASIN G.R. No.

174929, June 27, 2008

FACTS:
Feliciano was GM of Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) but when Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA) took over the management and policy-making functions of
LMWD due to default on the payment, administrative charges against Feliciano for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an LMWD official were filed (permitting disbursement
of payment of backwages to himself). The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) found Feliciano
guilty and recommended the penalty of dismissal, the Interim LMWD Board of Directors
approved the findings of the OGCC. When the take-over of LMWD by LWUA was lifted by the LWUA
Board of Trustees, Feliciano was asked to re-assume the post he had vacated. When Feliciano
appointed certain personnel, CSC Regional Office for approval. The CSCRO, disapproved the
appointments since GM Feliciano did not possess the required CSC-approved appointment himself
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, S. 1993. Feliciano appealed the Order to the CSC. CSC denied
the appeal on the ground that he was only a de facto officer since he himself lacked the required CSC-
approved appointment.

CSC denied Feliciano’s MR. Feliciano appealed CSC Resolutions to the CA via Petition
for Certiorari. CA denied the petition. MR was also denied. SC denied both on appealed via petition for
review on certiorari and MR. Upon finding that Feliciano has not yet submitted the required
appointment, he was declared by the CSC to be a mere de facto officer and ordered him to vacate
the position. Feliciano filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with application for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Injunction with the CA. While the case was still pending with
the CA, with no injunction having been issued, LMWD Board of Directors declared the GM position
occupied by Feliciano vacant. CA subsequently granted a TRO effective for sixty days but after
the lapse of the TRO, Villasin was appointed as the new GM. Both CA and SC dismissed Feliciano’s
appeal prompting the LMWD Board of Directors to unanimously approve the resolution
certifying that Villasin as GM. Feliciano thus filed with the RTC a Petition for Quo Warranto against
Villasin under Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that since the LWUA had no power to remove
a GM appointed by a regular Board of Directors, it should follow then that an interim Board of
Directors neither had the power to discipline or remove a regular GM of LMWD. Villasin filed his
Comment/Answer with Motion to Dismissthe Petition for Quo Warranto , on the ground of Forum
shopping; Feliciano’s disqualification from government service due to his dismissal from office
on 11 November 1991; that his claim that LMWD is a private entity defeats his petition since quo
warranto is a remedy of a person claiming a public office; that cause of action arose or beyond
the reglementary period; and that CA had already denied his petition for Review on Certiorari on
a previous resolution. RTC dismissed the petition. On MR, RTC held that the quo warranto was
prematurely filed considering that Felicianos Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, involving CSC, was still pending with the Court of Appeals. Hence, the issue of whether
Feliciano is holding the GM position in a de facto or a de jure capacity is yet to be resolved. Thus,
this case.

ISSUE:
Whether filing of quo warranto was proper.

RULING: No.
Felicianos Petition for Quo Warranto centers on his alleged right as the one legally entitled
to occupy the position of GM of LMWD. Contending that his appointment as GM in 1975 by the
LMWD Board of Directors and subsequent assumption of office bestowed on him a legal right
to the said position, Feliciano argues that Republic Act No. 9286 vested him with security of tenure. Feliciano
adds that the Interim LMWD Board of Directors, in fact, had no power to dismiss him when he was
dismissed in 1991.

It is well-established that Quo Warranto proceedings determine the right of a person to the use
or exercise of a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if the latters
claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. According to the
Rules of Procedure: The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General
or the fiscal against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office, position or franchise; a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of
his office; or against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated
or without lawful authority to so act. In the instance in which the Petition for Quo Warranto is
filed by an individual in his own name, he must be able to prove that he is entitled to the
controverted public office, position, or franchise; otherwise, the holder of the same has a right
to the undisturbed possession thereof. In actions for Quo Warranto to determine title to a public
office, the complaint, to be sufficient in form, must show that the plaintiff is entitled to
the office. In Garcia v. Perez , this Court ruled that the person instituting Quo
Warranto proceedings on his own behalf, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, must aver
and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute. Without such averment or
evidence of such right, the action may be dismissed at any stage. Feliciano lost any legal standing to
pursue via Quo Warranto proceedings his claim to the position of GM of LMWD considering this
Courts En Banc Resolutions denied with finality his Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court
of Appeals Decision upholding the legality of CSC Resolution that Feliciano as a de facto officer
and a usurper of or an intruder to the said position. The Court emphasizes that an action for Quo
Warranto may be dismissed at any stage when it becomes apparent that the plaintiff is not entitled to
the disputed pubic office, position or franchise. Hence, the RTC is not compelled to still proceed
with the trial when it is already apparent on the face of the Petition for Quo Warranto that it is
insufficient. The RTC may already dismiss said petition at this point.
SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA, Petitioner, vs.CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
and PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE, INC.,Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Does the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) have jurisdiction over complaints
seeking the cancellation of certificates of public convenience (CPCs) and other licenses it had
issued to the holders of duly-issued legislative franchises on the ground that the franchisees
had violated the terms of their franchises? The Court, in resolving that question, takes the
opportunity to elaborate on the dynamic behind the regulation of broadcast media in the
Philippines, particularly the interrelationship between the twin franchise and licensing
requirements.

I.

Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting Service,
Inc. (PBS) were incorporated in 1961 and 1965, respectively. Both are involved in the operation
of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the grantees of legislative
franchises by virtue of two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582. R.A. No. 7477,
enacted on 5 May 1992, granted PBS a legislative franchise to construct, install, maintain and
operate radio and television stations within the Philippines for a period of 25 years. R.A. No.
7582, enacted on 27 May 1992, extended CBS’s previous legislative franchise1 to operate radio
stations for another 25 years. The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of the three networks
that comprise the well-known "Bombo Radyo Philippines."2

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582 contain a common provision
predicated on the "constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of public utilities."3 The
common provision states:

SEC. 9. Democratization of ownership.― In compliance with the constitutional mandate to

democratize ownership of public utilities, the herein grantee shall make public offering through
the stock exchanges of at least thirty percent (30%) of its common stocks within a period of
three (3) years from the date of effectivity of this Act: Provided, That no single person or entity
shall be allowed to own more than five percent (5%) of the stock offerings.4

It further appears that following the enactment of these franchise laws, the NTC issued four (4)
Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6) Provisional Authorities to CBS, allowing them to install,
operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout
the nation.5 These Provisional Authorities were issued between 1993 to 1998, or after the
enactment of R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582.
Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia6 filed two complaints both dated 1 March 1999 with the
NTC, respectively lodged against PBS7 and CBS.8 He alleged that he was "the actual and
beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS and CBS
separately,9 and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582 mandating the
public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS and CBS, both entities had failed to
make such offering. Thus, Divinagracia commonly argued in his complaints that the failure on
the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate of their legislative franchise is a misuse of
the franchise conferred upon it by law and it continues to exercise its franchise in contravention
of the law to the detriment of the general public and of complainant who are unable to enjoy
the benefits being offered by a publicly listed company."10 He thus prayed for the cancellation
of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of PBS and CBS on account of the alleged violation of
the conditions set therein, as well as in its legislative franchises.11

On 1 August 2000, the NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints.12 While
the NTC posited that it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional Authority or CPC
for violations or infractions of the terms and conditions embodied therein,13 it held that the
complaints actually constituted collateral attacks on the legislative franchises of PBS and CBS
since the sole issue for determination was whether the franchisees had violated the mandate to
democratize ownership in their respective legislative franchises. The NTC ruled that it was not
competent to render a ruling on that issue, the same being more properly the subject of an
action for quo warranto to be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.14

After the NTC had denied Divinagracia’s motion for reconsideration,15 he filed a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.16 On 18 February 2004,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision17upholding the NTC. The appellate court agreed with
the earlier conclusion that the complaints were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative
franchises of CBS and PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out
the issues raised in the complaints.

Hence this petition, which submits as the principal issue, whether the NTC, with its retinue of
regulatory powers, is powerless to cancel Provisional Authorities and Certificates of Public
Convenience it issued to legislative franchise-holders. That central issue devolves into several
narrower arguments, some of which hinge on the authority of the NTC to cancel the very
Provisional Authorities and CPCs which it is empowered to issue, as distinguished from the
legislative franchise itself, the cancellation of which Divinagracia points out was not the relief
he had sought from the NTC. Questions are raised as to whether the complaints did actually
constitute a collateral attack on the legislative franchises.

Yet this case ultimately rests to a large degree on fundamentals. Divinagracia’s case rotates on
the singular thesis that the NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and CPCs, or in
effect, the power to cancel the licenses that allow broadcast stations to operate. The NTC, in its
assailed Decision, expressly admits that it has such power even as it refrained from exercising
the same.18 The Court has yet to engage in a deep inquiry into the question of whether the NTC
has the power to cancel the operating licenses of entities to whom Congress has issued
franchises to operate broadcast stations, especially on account of an alleged violation of the
terms of their franchises. This is the opportune time to examine the issue.

C.

Now, we shall tackle jointly whether a law or policy allowing the NTC to cancel CPCs or licenses
is to be narrowly tailored to achieve that requisite compelling State goal or interest, and
whether such a law or policy is the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. We
addressed earlier the difficulty of envisioning the compelling State interest in granting the NTC
such authority. But let us assume for argument’s sake, that relieving the injury complained off
by petitioner – the failure of private respondents to open up ownership through the initial
public offering mandated by law – is a compelling enough State interest to allow the NTC to
extend consequences by canceling the licenses or CPCs of the erring franchisee.

There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive remedy that is
afforded by the law. Such remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and the Court of Appeals – the
resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise
may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office, position or franchise."61 Even while
the action is maintained in the name of the Republic62 , the Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon complaint, and upon good reason to
believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66 can be established by proof.63

The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the Government can call
upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public
franchise.64 It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or
whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the
subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to
the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a
public wrong and not a private injury."65 A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a
direct proceeding for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law
and its unlawful exercise is primarily a concern of Government.66Quo warranto is specifically
available as a remedy if it is thought that a government corporation has offended against its
corporate charter or misused its franchise.67

The Court of Appeals correctly noted that in PLDT v. NTC,68 the Court had cited quo warranto as
the appropriate recourse with respect to an allegation by petitioner therein that a rival
telecommunications competitor had failed to construct its radio system within the ten (10)
years from approval of its franchise, as mandated by its legislative franchise.69 It is beyond
dispute that quo warranto exists as an available and appropriate remedy against the wrong
imputed on private respondents.
Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the cancellation of the provisional authority
and CPCs, and not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a remedy. The argument
is artificial. The authority of the franchisee to engage in broadcast operations is derived in the
legislative mandate. To cancel the provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the
franchise or otherwise prevent its exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated to frustrate such
mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the provisional authority or the CPC for reasons
other than the orderly administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.

What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts conclude that private respondents have
violated the terms of their franchise and thus issue the writs of quo warranto against them,
then the NTC is obliged to cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw
strength from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not already been made clear,
then licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and provisional authorities are junior to the
legislative franchise enacted by Congress. The licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal
footing with the franchising authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by
the NTC implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner that
the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its own laws. And
similar to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the implementation of laws by
Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper delegation by Congress, prevent the
exercise of a legislative franchise by withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the
traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted
with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and
obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the franchise
specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of law, and not for an
administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has been delegated by
Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude
Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the
viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed
enough by the franchisees’ violation of the franchises extended to them.

Evidently, the suggested theory of petitioner to address his plaints simply overpowers the
delicate balance of separation of powers, and unduly grants superlative prerogatives to the NTC
to frustrate the exercise of the constitutional freedom speech, expression, and of the press. A
more narrowly-tailored relief that is responsive to the cause of petitioner not only exists, but is
in fact tailor-fitted to the constitutional framework of our government and the adjudication of
legal and constitutional rights. Given the current status of the law, there is utterly no reason for
this Court to subscribe to the theory that the NTC has the presumed authority to cancel licenses
and CPCs issued to due holders of legislative franchise to engage in broadcast operations.
ABRAHAM C. SISON, petitioner, vs.HON. EPI REY PANGRAMUYEN, Commissioner of Civil
Service

Petition denominated as for certiorari us and quo warranto and (1) seeking the annulment of
the actions of respondents Regional Director and commissioner of Civil Service in respectively
attesting and affirming such attestation of private respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag's
appointment as Assistant City Assessor of Olongapo City, extended by the respondent Mayor of
said city on November 23, 1973, and (2) assailing the validity of said respondent
Commissioner's decision of May 3, 1974 dismissing petitioner's protest and his resolution dated
June 24, 1974 denying reconsideration of said decision, and (3) further asking that respondent
Commissioner be mandated to appoint petitioner as such Assistant City Assessor and that
private respondent Maliwanag be declared as unlawfully usurping said position under a void
and illegal appointment.

In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since at the time of the appointment in
dispute, he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising, according to his allegation, immediate
administrative control and supervision over respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy
Assessor, and inasmuch as he has superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities
to those of said respondent, the appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by
respondent City Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank.
Petitioner maintains that upon the promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of
City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed
thereto.

We have carefully considered petitioner's contentions in his petition as well as his reply to the
answers of the respondents and, at best, We find the issues raised by him to be rather
controversial, with the result that it is difficult for Us to categorize respondent public official's
impugned actuations as tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Maliwanag's appointment was
recommended by the City Assessor and his reasons therefor, stated in said official's
indorsement to the Mayor recommending dismissal of petitioner's protest thereto and quoted
in the record, are substantial and well taken, as, in fact, they have been reviewed by
respondent Commissioner and found to be sustainable, as he did sustain them. We are loathe
to substitute Our own judgment for that of the Commissioner of Civil Service who is primarily
charged with the administration of the Civil Service Law and rules and regulations, absent, as in
this case, convincing showing of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. After all as We see
it, petitioner rests his case mostly on the Organization Chart and the position description or CSC
Form No. 122-D of respondent Maliwanag, prepared by petitioner himself, which do not carry
the approval of the Mayor, as Department Head, contrary to requirement of Memorandum
Circular No. 5, S. 1963 of the Commission of Civil Service touching on the basis for determining
the hierarchical relationships of positions, and, therefore, are not necessarily controlling.

Withal, the most fatal drawback of petitioner's cause is that he came to the courts out of time.
As already stated, the appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and
respondent Maliwanag assumed office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not
been paid her salary. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975,
clearly more than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question
arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor.

Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private
respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also
for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct. As earlier
noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil
down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she
has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor.
Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification o her
appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy,
therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already
settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. (Cornejo vs. Sec. of Justice, L-
32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663.) And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the
intervening period of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding
administrative outhorities. The resort to such administrative remedy does not abate the period
for the judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436; Galano vs. Roxas, G.R. L-31241, Sept. 12,
1975, 67 SCRA 8.)

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the restraining order heretofore issued is hereby
lifted effective immediately. No. costs.
Cristobal v MelchorFacts:
C r i s t o b a l w a s f o r m e r l y e m p l o y e d a s a p r i v a t e s e c r e t a r y i n t h e Presid
ent's Private O ce. He is a third grade civil service eligible.
On Jan 19 !" then #$ec%tive &ecretary %t%c informed him that hisservices were termin
ated e(ective that day. &imilar letters wereaddressed to some other employees in
said O ce. )he dismissedemployees appealed to the President for a
reconsideration of theirseparation from the service. *%t &ec. %t%c denied their
re+%est. )h%s" ,ve of the other employees ,led a civil action before the C-
. )his case was entitled / ngles v %t%c/. )he said reached the &Cw0c declared that the
employees2 removal as illegal" ordering theirreinstatement. *%t it is worth
mentioning that when the said civilcase was still pending in the C- " the other
dismissed employeeswho ,led said action were recalled to their positions in the O ce
of t h e P r e s i d e n t " w i t h o % t p r e 3 % d i c e t o t h e c o n t i n % a t i o n o f t h e i r c i v i l a c t
ion. 4ith respect to the other employees who were not
reinstated" e(orts were e$erted by &ec %t%c to loo5 for placementso%tside of
alaca6ang so that they may be re7employed.
Cristobalw a s o n e o f t h o s e w h o h a d n o t b e e n f o r t % n a t e e n o % g h
t o b e reappointed to any positions as be,ts his +%ali,cations. He waitedfor &ec
%t%c to ma5e good his ass%rance that he wo%ld be recalledt o t h e s e r v i c e " % n t i l
&ec. %t%c was replaced by other
e$ec%tives e c r e t a r i e s w h o l i 5 e w i s e a s s % r e d h i m o f a s
s i s t a n c e t o b e reemployed at /the opport%ne time./ &o after the &C
decided
thec a s e o f ngles v %t%c" Cristobal addressed the O ce
o f t h e President" re+%esting reinstatement to his former position
" i n accordance with the decision of the &C in the aforementioned
case. )his re+%est" however" was denied repeatedly. Hence" he ,led ac o m p l a i n t i n t h e
C- . 8 n s w e r i n g t h e c o m p l a i n t " t h e d e f e n d a n t s represented by the
O ce of the &ol en alleged that Cristobal hadno ca%se of action as he is deemed to
have abandoned his o ce forfail%re to instit%te the proper proceedings to assert his
right withinone year from the date of separation p%rs%ant to &ec. 1 " :%le of the
:%les of Co%rt" he having come to co%rt only after the lapse
of m o r e t h a n n i n e y e a r s " t h e r e b y i n e ( e c t a c + % i e s c i n g t
o h i s separation. )he C- dismissed his complaint th%s this appeal to the&C.
Issue
1. 4O; his dismissal was
illegal<! . 4 O ; h e w a s b a r r e d b y l a c h e s f o r h a v i n g f a i l e d t o
, l e h i s complaint within the one7year period provided for in &ec 1 " :%le of the
:%les of Co%rt<

Held & Rationale

1. =es. n the case of ngles" it was clari,ed that positions primarilycon,dential in nat%re
are s%b3ect to the removal at the pleas%re
of t h e a p p o i n t i n g p o w e r . ) h % s " t h e i n c % m b e n t o f a p r i
marily con,dential position holds o ce at the pleas%re only
o f t h e appointing power and when s%ch pleas%re t%rns into displeas%re"the
inc%mbent is not /removed/ or /dismissed/ b%t his term merely/e$pires>. n this casem
Cristobal" is a civil service eligible with eight ?@A yearsof service in the government. He was
Private &ecretary with
ann%alc o m p e n s a t i o n o f P B " 1 @ @ . . ;o evidence was add%ced by t
hego ver n m en t to sh o w t h at Cr ist o b a l's p o sit ion wa s /p r im a r
i l y con,dential/. 8s stated in the case of ngles" /o cers or employeesin the %nclassi,ed/
as well as /those in the classi,ed service/ arep r o t e c t e d b y t h e p r o v i s i o n i n t h e
o r g a n i c l a w t h a t / n o o c e r o r employee in the Civil &ervice shall be removed or
s%spended
e$ceptf o r c a % s e a s p r o v i d e d b y l a w / ? & e c t i o n B " 8 r t i c l e
D " 19E Constit%tionA. n this case" there was no ca%se for his removal.!. =es.
)he circ%mstances s%rro%nding this partic%lar case showsthatF ?aA Jose Cristobal
consistently pressed for a reconsideration of his separation from the serviceG ?bA he
was give n ass%rance thatw o % l d b e r e c a l l e d a t t h e o p p o r t % n e t i m e G a n d
? c A t h a t h e s % d d e n termination of his employment witho%t ca%se after eight
years of s e r v i c e i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t i s c o n t r a r y t o l a w f o l l o w i n g t h e
r%ling n g l e s v s " %t%c which in%res to the bene,t of Cristobal
who
i s s i m i l a r l y s i t % a t e d a s t h e p l a i n t i ( s i n s a i d c a s e a n d w h o m e r e l y de
sisted from 3oining the s%it beca%se of the ass%rance given himthat he wo%ld be
recalled to the service 7 with all these factors" 4erepeat" there is 3%sti,cation for not
applying e$isting 3%rispr%denceto his case. )his Co%rt" applying the principle of e+%ity"
need not be bo%nd to arigid application of the law" b%t rather its action sho%ld
conform tothe conditions or e$igencies to a given problem or sit%ation in orderto grant a
relief that will serve the ends of 3%stice.
JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO
ARCALA, defendants-appellees.

Jose C. Cristobal appeals from a decision dated May 18, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila in Civil Case No. 83962 which dismissed this complaint for declaratory relief and
reinstatement in the government service. 1

The incidents which led to this suit are set forth in the decision of the court a quo, thus:

The plaintiff was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's

Private Office, Malacañang, Manila, having been appointed to that position on
July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00 per annum. He is a third grade civil service
eligible. On or about the second week of January, 1962, the then Executive
Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962,
informed the plaintiff that his services as private secretary in the President's
Private Office were "terminated effective today." A similar letter was addressed
by Secretary Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President. The
dismissed employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated
January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962 for a reconsideration of their separation
from the service. In a letter dated February 27, 1962, their request for
reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting by authority of the
President.

On March 24, 1962, five of the employees who were separated (not including
the herein plaintiff) filed a civil action before the Court of First Instance of Manila
against Secretary Mutuc and the cash disbursing officer of the Office of the
President praying for reinstatement and the payment of their salaries effective
as of January 1, 1962, entitled "Raul R. Ingles. et al vs. Amelito R. Mutuc et als."
Civil Case No. 49965. From a judgment dismissing their complaint, the said
employees appealed to the Supreme Court which rendered a decision
promulgated on November 29, 1968 reversing the dismissal of their complaint
and declaring their removal from office as illegal and contrary to law, and
ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their salaries from January 1,
1962 up to the date of their actual reinstatement (G.R. No. L-20390).

Sometime in Ma 1962, when the civil action filed by Raul R. Ingles, et als. was still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila. the dismissed employees who
filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the President,
without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action, With respect to the
other employees who were not reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary
Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañang so that they may be re-
employed. The herein plaintiff was one of those who had not been fortunate
enough to be reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications.
 He waited for Secretary Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be
recalled to the service, until Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other executive
secretaries who likewise assured the plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at
"the opportune time."

After the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20390 was promulgated on
November 29, 1968, the plaintiff addressed a letter to the Office of the President
dated January 19, 1969, requesting reinstatement to his former position and the
payment of salary from January 1, 1962 up to the time of actual reinstatement,
supposedly in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in the
aforementioned case. This request was denied repeatedly by the Office of the
President in successive letters addressed to the plaintiff dated September 1,
1969, January 19, 1970, April 23, 1970, May 23, 1970, and May 19, 1971, the last
of which declared the matter "definitely closed." (pp. 151-153, CFI Record)

Having received the letter of May 19, 1971, from the Office of the President, Jose Cristobal filed
on August 10, 1971, with the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint naming then
Executive Secretary, Alejandro Melchor and Federico Arcala, cash disbursing officer, Office of
the President of the Philippines, as defendants, and praying for the following:

1. Declaring plaintiff's dismissal as illegal and contrary to law;

2. Ordering defendant Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor to certify the

name of plaintiff in the payroll of the Office of the President of the Philippines, to
be retroactive as of January 1, 1962. the effective date that the plaintiff was
illegally dismissed from the service;

3. Ordering defendant Federico Arcala to pay all the emoluments and/or salary
to which the plaintiff is entitled effective as of January 1, 1962, the date of his
illegal termination from the service; and

4. Ordering the defendants to allow plaintiff to continue with the performance of

hi duties in the Secretary Office Staff, Office of the President of the Philippines.

Plaintiff prays for such other relief or remedy as this Honorable Court may deem
just and equitable under the premises. (pp. 1-3, Ibid.)

Answering the complaint, the defendants represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
alleged that plaintiff Jose Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have abandoned
his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from
the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to
court only after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his
separation, and therefore he is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment.
(pp. 38-40, Ibid.)
On October 16, 1971, an amended complaint was submitted to the trial court to include as
additional defendants Leticia B. Nonato who was allegedly appointed to the position of Jose
Cristobal and Simplicio Nonato, husband of Leticia B. Nonato, and to invoke the additional relief
for reinstatement to the position occupied by defendant Leticia B, Nonato. (pp. 55-58, Ibid.)

The Nonato's were served with summons but did not file an answer to the complaint, hence, on
motion of the plaintiff Cristobal, they were declared in default in an order dated January 15,
1972. (p. 94, Ibid.)

A pre-trial was held after which parties submitted "a partial stipulation of facts" dated February
26, 1976. (pp. 102-104, Ibid.)

Trial on the merits was held during which plaintiff Cristobal submitted his documentary
evidence marked respectively as Exhibits "A" to "P" inclusive all of which were admitted by the
trial court. Counsel for the defendants then manifested that no Evidence was being presented
for the government.

On May 18, 1972, as already adverted to above, the trial court then presided by the Honorable
Conrado Vasquez, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint reasoning in the following manner:

Section 16 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that an action

against a public office or employee may not be filed for the plaintiff's ouster
from office unless the same is commenced within one year after the cause of the
ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold such office or position arose. This
period of one year is a condition precedent for the existence of the cause of
action for quo warranto (Bumanlag vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-11482, November
29, 1960). The rationale of this doctrine is that the Government must be
immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office
or position in the civil service, as against another actually holding, it, so that the
Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two
salaries, one for the person actually holding the office although illegally, and
another for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so (Madrid
vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-12523, May 31, 1960). The fact that the petitioner
sought to pursue administrative remedies to secure his reinstatement does not
excuse the failure to file the action within the one year period.

'The pendency of administrative remedies does not operate to

suspend the period of one year within which a petition for quo
warranto should be filed. While it may be desirable that
administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled
or bound to do so, and as said remedies neither are pre-requisite
to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, they
should not be allowed to suspend the period of one year. Public
 interest requires that the right to a public office should be
determined as speedily as practicable' (3 Moran, 1963 Ed., p. 207,
citing Torres vs. Quintos G.R. No. L-3304, April 5, 1951). (pp. 154-
155, Ibid.)

We are now confronted with the following assignment of errors in appellant Cristobal's brief, to
wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT GUILTY OF

ABANDONMENT OF ACTION FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THIS CASE BEING BASED O
ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAS BEEN DECLARED BY THE SUPREME COURT
AS ILLEGAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
SUBSTANTIATE LAW ON PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION. (p. 26, rollo)

The primary question to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not Appellant Cristobal his
right to seek judicial relief for not having filed his complaint within the one-year period
provided for in Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. In short, is the principle of laches or
non-compliance with the "Statute of Limitations" applicable against appellant?

The Government holds fast to Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court and so did the court a
quo in upholding the dismissal of appellant's complaint which according to both is essentially
a quo warranto proceeding.

We agree with defendants-appellees that in this jurisdiction the consistent doctrine followed by
this Court is that in actions of quo warranto involving right to an office, the action must be
instituted within the period of one Near from the time the cause of action arose. 2

Verily, this Court has stated in Unabia vs. City Mayor, et al., 99 Phil. 253, 257:

... This has been the law in the Island since 1901, the period having been
originally fixed in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190). We
find this provision to be an expression of policy on the part of the State that
persons claiming a right to an office of which they are illegally dispossessed
should immediately take steps to recover said office and that if they do not do so
within a period of one year, they shall be considered as having lost their right
thereto by abandonment. There are weighty reasons of public policy and
convenience that demand the adoption of a similar period for persons claiming
rights to positions in the civil service. There must be stability in the service so
 that public business may not be unduly retarded; delays in the statement of the
right to positions in the service must be discouraged. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Further, the Government must be immediately informed or advised if any person

claims to be entitled to an office or a position in the civil service as against
another actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the
predicament of having to pay two salaries, one, for the person actually holding
the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service
although entitled to do so. We hold that in view of the policy of the State
contained in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo
warranto may be instituted, any person claiming right to a position in the civil
service should also be required to file his petition for reinstatement with the
period of one year, otherwise he is thereby considered as having abandoned his
office.

In effect, it is the doctrine of laches which is invoked to defeat Jose Cristobal's suit, for not only
did Cristobal fail to file his complaint within one year from the date of separation but, it is
claimed, he allowed almost nine years to pass before coming to court by reason of which he is
deemed to have acquiesced to his removal.

In Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, this Court stated that in a general sense, laches is failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.3

However, as will be indicated below, there are certain exceptional circumstances attending
which take this case out of the rule enunciated above and lead Us to grant relief to appellant.
Thus —

1. There was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of Jose Cristobal amounting to

abandonment of his right to reinstatement in office.

We lay stress on the findings of the trial court based on the uncommitted evidence of plaintiff
Cristobal that upon receipt of the letter or January 1, 1962, advising him of his separation from
the service, Cristobal, with the other dismissed employees, sought reconsideration in a letter
dated January 3, 1962, calling inter alia the attention of then Executive Secretary Amelito
Mutuc that he (Cristobal) was a civil eligible employee with eight years of service in the
government and consequently entitled to security of tenure under the Constitution. This was
followed by another letter of January 26, 1962. 4
Reconsideration having been denied, a complaint was filed on March 24, 1062, with the Court
of First Instance of Manila entitled "Raul R. Ingles, et al. vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, et al.", (Civil Case
49965) which prayed for reinstatement and payment of salaries as of January 1, 1962. The trial
court dismiss this complaint but upon appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed
in a Decision promulgated on November 29, 1968, in G.R. L-20390, the Court holding that the
removal of the plaintiff-employees was illegal and contrary to law and that they were entitled
to be reinstated with payment of their salaries from January 1, 1962 up to the date of their
actual reinstatement.5

Cristobal was not one of the plaintiffs in the civil case, it is true, but his non-participation is not
fatal to his cause of action. During the pendency of the civil case Cristobal continued to press
his request for reinstatement together with the other employees who had filed the complaint
and was in fact promised reinstatement as will be shown more in detail later.

More importantly, Cristobal could be expected — without necessarily spending time and
money by going to court — to relied upon the outcome of the case filed by his co-employees to
protect his interests considering the similarity of his situation to that of the plaintiffs therein
and the Identifical relief being sought. On this point, We find a statement of justice Louis
Brandeis of the United States Supreme Court in Southern Pacific vs. Bogert, relevant and
persuasive, and We quote:

The essence of laches is not merely lapse of time. It is essential that there be also
acquiescence in the alleged wrong or lack of diligence in seeking a remedy. Here
plaintiffs, or others representing them, protested ... and ever since they have ...
persisted in the diligent pursuit of a remedy ... Where the cause of action of such
a nature that a suit to enforce it would be brought on behalf, not only the
Plaintiff, bit of all persons similarly situated, it is not essential that etch such
person should intervened in the suit brought order that the be deemed thereafter
free from the laches which bars those no sleep on the rights. (250 U.S. 483, 39 S.
Ct. 536, 63 L. Ed. 1099, 1106-1107; Emphasis supplied. See also Overfield vs.
Pennroad Corporation, et al.. 42 Fed. Supp. 586, 613)

2. It was an act of the government through its responsible officials more particularly then
Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc and his successors which contributed to the alleged delay in
the filing of Cristobal's present complaint for reinstatement.

The evidence of Cristobal establish the following: After the Ingles suit was filed in court, the
dismissed employees, Cristobal included, continued to seek reconsideration of their dismissal. It
was then that Executive Secretary Mutuc assured the employees that without prejudice to the
continuation of the civil action, he would work for their reinstatement. Accordingly, some f the
dismissed employees were recalled to their respective positions in the Office of the President
among whom were the plaintiffs in the civil case and several others who were not parties
therein.' Secretary Mutuc even tried to place the others outside of the Malacañang Office. An
affidavit of Emiliano Punzal, retired Presidential Records Officer, attests to the fact that Jose C.
Cristobal "was among those in the list of separated employees ordered for placement to a
position commensurate to his qualification and experience." In the meantime, however,
Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other Executive Secretaries to whom Cristobal over and over
again presented his request for reinstatement and who gave the same assurance that Cristobal
would be recalled and re-employed at "the opportune time." 8

It was this continued promise of the government officials concerned which led Cristobal to bide
his time and wait for the Office of the President to comply with its commitment. Furthermore,
he had behind him the decision of the Supreme Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc which he believed
should be applied in his favor. But when Cristobal, in answer to his various letters, received the
letter of May 19, 1971 from the Office of the President denying his reinstatement and declaring
the matter "definitely closed" because of his failure to file an action in court within one year
from his separation, 9 it was only then that he, set the necessity of seeking redress from the
courts.

Surely, it would now be the height of inequity and cutting a deep wound in Our sense of justice,
if after Cristobal relied and reposed his faith and trust on the word and promises of the former
Executive Secretaries who dealt with him and who preceded the herein respondent Executive
Secretary Melchor, We are to hold that he lost his right to seek relief because of lapse of time.

The doctrine of laches is an equitable principle applied to promote but never to defeat
justice.10 Thus, where laches is invoked against a plaintiff by reason of the latter's failure to
come to court within the statutory period provided in the law, the doctrine of laches will not be
taken against him where the defendant is shown to have promised from time to time to grant
the relief sought for.11 Again, We have jurisprudence that where a defendant or those claiming
under him recognized or directly or impliedly acknowledged existence of the right asserted by a
plaintiff, such recognition may be invoked as a valid excuse for a plaintiff's delay in seeking to
enforce such right.12 In brief, it is indeed the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches
when to do so, manifest wrong and injustice would result. 13

3. The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of this Court's
Decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc.

In Ingles the defendants-appellees maintained before this Court that the principal issue in the
case was whether or not the plaintiffs- employees were occupying positions primarily
confidential in nature and therefore subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing
power, and that this issue was to be resolved in the affirmative. The Court speaking through
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Roberto Concepcion, held inter alia that one holding in the
government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and that "officers or
employees in the unclassified" as well as "those in the classified service" are protected by the
provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article XII, 1935 Constitution); that
while the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure only of the
appointing power and such pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or
"dismissed" but that his term merely "expires"; that there was no evidence to indicate that the
respective positions of the dismissed plaintiffs were "primarily confidential" in nature and on
the contrary the compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely
or at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and consequently,, considering that the plaintiffs
were admittedly civil service eligibles with several years of service in the Government, their
removal from office was "illegal and contrary to law". 14

The Court's Decision in Ingles vs. Mutuc constitutes the law of the case now before Us.

Appellant herein, Jose Cristobal, is a civil service eligible with eight (8) years of service in the
government. He was holding "Item 9" — "Private Secretary I" — in the Budget for the
"President's Private Office" with annual compensation of P4,188.00. No evidence was adduced
by the government to show that Cristobal's position was "primarily confidential".15 On the
contrary as stated by this Court in Ingles vs. Mutuc the compensation attached to this item and
the other items except for one and the designation of the position indicate the purely nature of
the functions of the employees dismissed from the service. In fact, none of the letters sent to
the herein appellant from the Office of the President ever indicated that he was holding his
position at the pleasure of the appointing power or that his services were terminated because
his term of office had "expired". The only reason given — and this appears in the letter of
September 1, 1969 from the Office of the President — was that he failed to institute the proper
proceeding to assert his right, if any, to the position within the period of one year from the date
of termination and under settled jurisprudence he is deemed to have abandoned his right to
said office or acquiesced in his removal.16

To summarize, with the circumstances thus surrounding this particular case, viz: (a) Jose
Cristobal consistently pressed for a reconsideration of his separation from the service; (b) he
was give n assurance that would be recalled at the opportune time; and (c) that he sudden
termination of his employment without cause after eight years of service in the government
is contrary to law following the ruling Ingles vs, Mutuc which inures to the benefit of Cristobal
who is similarly situated as the plaintiffs in said case and who merely desisted from joining the
suit because of the assurance given him that he would be recalled to the service - with all these
factors, We repeat, there is justification for not applying existing jurisprudence to his case.

This Court, applying the principle of equity, need not be bound to a rigid application of the law,
but rather its action should conform to the conditions or exigencies to a given problem or
situation in order to grant a relief that will serve the ends of justice.

To paraphrase then Chief Justice John Edwin Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, let
us to complete justice and not do justice by halves. 17 Just as in Ingles vs. Mutuc this Court gave
justice to plaintiffs, so shall We do justice to Jose Cristobal.

In granting relief to the herein appellant on the matter of back salaries. We note, however, that
there is no proof to show that during all these years from January 1, 1962, to the present,
appellant at no time worked or was employed at some other office. In fairness to the
Government We cannot ignore t e probability of Cristobal's having sought employment
elsewhere during that period to support himself and his family.

Applying by analogy the rulings of this Court in the matter of fixing backwages to employees
who were victims of unfair labor practices of their employers so as to obviate the necessity of a
hearing on the point and avoid further delay, and considering the lapse of almost nine years
before appellant filed this suit, We resolve, to grant back salaries at the rate last received by
him only for a period of five (5) years without qualification and deduction.18

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS, the decision of the court a quo is set aside.
Defendants-appellees or the Public Officials concerned are directed:

1. To reinstate Jose Cristobal, either in the Office of the President or in some other government
office, to any position for which he is qualified by reason of his civil service eligibility, subject to
present requirements of age and physical fitness; and

2. To pay appellant Cristobal back salaries for a period of FIVE YEARS at the rate of Four
Thousand, One Hundred Eighty-eight Pesos (P4,188.00) per annum without qualification and
deduction.

So Ordered.