A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005] Mr.
Mr. Chief Justice, I believe the manner the Court comported itself in the aforesaid
RE: LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 2005 OF ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA.
RESOLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
1 2001,4 required Atty. Sorreda to show cause why he should not be properly
In a letter to the Chief Justice bearing date February 21, 2005, with copies thereof
furnished all the Associate Justices of the Court and other government entities, RTC
judges and counsels listed thereunder, Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who identified himself
as "member, Philippine Bar", expressed his frustrations over the unfavorable
outcome of and the manner by which the Court resolved the following cases filed by
him, to wit:
1. UDK-12854, Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
2. G.R. No. 149334, Artemio Dalsen vs. Commission on Elections
3. G.R. No. 148440, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals
4. G.R. No. 152766, Lilia Sanchez vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
5. G.R. No. 154310, Noel Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
6. G.R. No. 155446, Allan Reynold Cu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
7. G.R. No. 156630, Ronilo Sorreda vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
8. G.R. No. 157046, Ronilo Sorreda vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
9. G.R. No. 164163, Glenn Caballes vs. People, et al.
10. G.R. No. 164677, Marissa Macarilay vs. Hon. Alba-Estoesta, et al.
In said letter, Atty. Sorreda recounted the alleged circumstances surrounding the
dismissal on February 7, 20002 of the very first case he filed with the Court, UDK-
12854, entitled Ramon Sollegue vs. Court of Appeals, et al. Frustrated with the
adverse ruling thereon, Atty. Sorreda had previously written a letter 3 dated April 2,
2001 addressed to the Chief Justice, copy furnished all the Associate Justices of this
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor General, denouncing the
Court, as follows:
case is totally execrable and atrocious, entirely unworthy of the majesty and office of
the highest tribunal of the land. It is the action not of men of reason or those who
believe in the rule of law, but rather of bullies and tyrants from whom "might is
right." I say, shame on the High Court, for shoving down a hapless suitor’s throat a
ruling which, from all appearances, it could not justify.
Reacting to the above, the Court, in an en banc Resolution dated August 14,
disciplined "for degrading, insulting and dishonoring the Supreme Court by using vile,
offensive, intemperate and contemptuous derogatory language against it".
In response to the "show cause" order, Atty. Sorreda addressed two (2) more letters
to the Court dated December 2, 20015 and June 16, 2002,6 arguing for the propriety
of his action and practically lecturing the Court on his concepts of Legal and Judicial
Ethics and Constitutional Law. In its Resolutions of January 15, 2002 7 and August 27,
20028, the Court merely noted said two letters.
Quoted from his earlier communications are the following statements of Atty.
Sorreda disparaging the Court with intemperate, insulting, offensive and derogatory
language, to wit:
"SOMETHING HAS GOT TO BE SERIOUSLY AND TERRIBLY WRONG WITH THE
COUNTRY’S JUSTICE SYSTEM"9
"WHAT IS HAPPENING TO THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THIS COUNTRY, MR. CHIEF
JUSTICE?
xxx xxx xxx
I therefore deplore and condemn in the strongest term such strong-handed
actuations as the Honorable Court has displayed. They are as one might expect in a
dictatorship or authoritarian regime."10
Persistent in imputing to the Court and its Justices offensive and uncalled remarks,
Atty. Sorreda again went on a rampage in his subject letter of February 21, 2005:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Chief Justice, I do not doubt that these ten cases are among the most palpably
meritorious cases that have ever been brought before the Supreme Court, or any
court of justice for that matter. I cannot doubt that were it not for
the Sollegue "miscounting," and the other incidents that ensued from it, at least
some of these ten cases would have met with entirely different endings, so obvious
and patent are their merits to any reasonable and impartial mind.
In short, Mr. Chief Justice, it is obvious that the High Court has taken it personally
against me. To the detriment of my innocent clients. And of justice.
Mr. Chief Justice, why should this be? If the Court had anything against me, I stood
ready to have the ax fall on my own neck, if it came to that. As I had stated in one
communication-
[I]f there is one thing I agree with in the High Court’s position, it is that x x x if indeed
I had wronged the Court in the way it had described, and if indeed my explanations
and arguments "lack merit," I should indeed be disciplined; and surely no less than
DISBARMENT will do. It should also be done as swiftly as possible, given the gravity of
the charge and the high dignity and importance of the institution attacked. Now on
January 22, 2002 and May 7, 2002, the Court has resolved to deny to the
undersigned the "full opportunity" for self-defense that he request … therefore he is
now left without any defense, and he can only wonder why no sanction has come
down until the present time.
Might it be because I had continued, "Of course, I shall also only expect that such
judgment, when it does come, will be a fully-reasoned one, as thoroughly discussed
perhaps as that in In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, for the proper guidance of all
concerned"- and the Court knows that it is not able to give such a "fully-reasoned
judgment" as I ask? But rather than admit it has done wrong and rectify the same, it
would rather "get back" at me by means of unfavorable rulings in the cases I elevate
to it- let the innocent litigants, whose only mistake was to hire me as their counsel,
and the cause of justice suffer as they may.
Mr. Chief Justice, that is not only unjust; that is craven cowardice, to deal with an
adversary like that. It is not something I would have expected from the supreme
judges of the land.
I can only view other happenings in the Honorable Court in such light. The same
verifications that were previously unfaulted, suddenly became course for dismissal.
What other interpretation can I give it, than that the court had run out of excuses to
dismiss, since I was being careful not to repeat the same adjudged "shortcomings";
and was now scrounging every which way for one, just so to make sure I continue to
get my "comeuppance."
That of the first nine cases, not one was assigned to the Third Division- only either to
the Second Division, then chaired by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, which handled
the Sollegue case; or the First Division, chaired by the Chief Justice, to whom I have
directly written afterwards. Could it be only a coincidence - or is it a more likely
explanation that the powers-that-be in the Court wanted to be very sure I never get
favorable ruling? Especially when it is considered that, following Justice Bellosillo’s
retirement on November 12, 2003, for the first time in the history of the nation’s
judiciary a vacancy in the Supreme Court was filled up way beyond the
constitutionally prescribed period of 90 days- and after so much mystery and intrigue
has surrounded the appointment of his successor, Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario. In
fact Justice Nazario was sworn in on July 14, 2004, just one day before a new
retirement took place, this time of Justice Jose C. Vitug. It was only following this
latest retirement, that for the first time this counsel had a case assigned to other
than the First and Second Division. Could it be that Justice Vitug, then Chairman of
the Third Division, and Justice Nazario, erstwhile presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, had redoubtable reputations for independent-mindedness; and the
powers-that-be in the court exercised their utmost influence to at least prevent the
both of them sitting in the bench at the same time, lest together they should "buck
the system" and divide the Court, if not successfully sway the Court to favorably rule
on the undersigned counsel’s cases before it?
xxx xxx xxx
But this time, in these ten cases I have recounted, I am wholly convinced that the
court is in the wrong. I cannot but thus be filled with both acute sadness and burning
indignation. Sadness as counsel, to come to the realization that the high institution
of which I am an officer has sunk to such a low. Indignation as a citizen, that the
public officers who are supposed to serve him and help him find justice, should
instead give judgments that so insult the intelligence and glare with iniquity.
Mr. Chief Justice, whatever gave the Court the notion that it could pronounce 29
days as greater than 60 days, and not to have to account for it? Who can believe that
the supposedly most illustrious legal minds of the land, would miss seeing grave
abuse of discretion in the actions of an agency that directly contravened numerous
laws and rules all at once? How could democracy’s vaunted "last bulwark" suffer a
widow and her children to thereafter live in their toilet, by sanctioning the plainly
void sale and illegal demolition of their erstwhile family home? Did the court pause
for even three minutes to put itself in the shoes of an evidently innocent man kept
locked up for three years now on a manifestly false and fabricated charge, before it
so blandly invoked its "discretion" not to entertain his appeal at all? Where did the
Court get such brazenness, such shameless boldness, as to dismiss on the ground
that the docket fees had not been paid, when the evidence clearly show they in fact
were? What manner of men are you- even challenging the citizenry to inform on the
corrupt, and the bar to become like "Frodo" in the fight against society’s evils in your
public speeches and writings, and yet you yourselves committing the same evils
when hidden from public view. Are all these rulings in the ten cases not the clearest
manifestation that the supreme magistrates have bought into the ‘What-are-we-in-
power-for’ mentality? (Underscoring ours)
Upon instructions of the Chief Justice, Atty. Sorreda’s aforesaid letter of 21 February
2005 was included in the March 15, 2005 en banc agenda of the Court.
11
In an en banc Resolution dated March 15, 2005, the Court again required Atty.
Sorreda to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for maliciously attacking the Court and its Justices.
By way of compliance to the second "show cause" order, Atty Sorreda, in his letter of
May 10, 200512, again with copies thereof furnished the Justices, judges and lawyers
thereunder listed, states that he "does not see the need to say any more" because
the "cause" has "already been shown as clear as day" in his earlier letter of 21
February 2005, adding that "[T]he need is for the High Tribunal to act on the instant
matter swiftly and decisively". While admitting "the great seriousness of the
statements and imputations I have leveled against the Court", he dared the Court
whether "it is capable of a judgment that will be upheld by the ‘Supreme Judge’".
After going over the records of the cases in which Atty. Sorreda accuses the Court of
being unfair in the resolution thereof, the Court stands by its rulings thereon. Atty.
Sorreda mockingly stated that the Court does not know how to count when it
dismissed the Sollegue case on ground of failure to file the petition therein within
the reglementary period. For the enlightenment of the good counsel, the Court
dismissed the petition in Sollegue not only for failure to have it filed within the
period fixed in Sec. 4, Rule 65 but also for failure to submit the duplicate original or
certified true copy of the questioned resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June
28, 1999 in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 65 and Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 2,
Rule 56.13 In another case, Ronilo Sorreda vs. CA, Atty. Sorreda claimed that said case
was dismissed on the mere ground of insufficient verification. Again, Atty. Sorreda
must be reminded that the petition was dismissed not merely for defective
verification but more so because the petition was evidently used as a substitute for a
lost remedy of appeal.14 We see no need to belabor the grounds for the dismissal of
the other cases enumerated by counsel, said grounds having been stated in the
respective minute resolutions which were plain, clear, simply worded and
understandable to everyone, even to those who do not have a formal education in
law. Suffice it to say that the dismissal of those petitions was the result of a thorough
deliberation among members of this Court.
Atty. Sorreda’s imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is
utterly baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to
bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no
useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or
contempt in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Ang vs. Castro15, this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive
and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.16
Atty Sorreda’s conduct likewise violated the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically -
CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx
Rule 11.03 – A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the courts.
Rule 11.04 – A lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or having no materiality to the case.
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his
client’s genuine interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
client’s rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, 17 he must do
so only within the bounds of the law.18 A lawyer is entitled to voice his criticism
within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must
be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. The lawyer’s fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense
of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the confines of
reason and common sense.19
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the
rulings of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with
error. But, certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign
the Court and bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-
bound "to act to preserve its honor and dignity … and to safeguard the morals and
ethics of the legal profession".20
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer21 are enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers."
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with
all good fidelity xxx to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold."
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,22 Justice Sanchez further
elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and
to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice."
Likewise, in Zaldivar vs. Gonzales,23 we held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No
one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirement of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, with the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.
As officer of the court, Atty. Sorreda has the duty to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice.24 No
less must this be and with greater reasons in the case of the country’s highest court,
the Supreme Court, as the last bulwark of justice and democracy
Atty. Sorreda must be reminded that his first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, to which his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The
use of intemperate language and unkind ascription can hardly be justified nor can it
have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. 25
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free
expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.26
We have constantly reminded that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his
professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 27
In the very recent similar case of Tacardon, et al vs. Ponce Enrile,28 we imposed on
the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the Bar. Here, as
in Tacardon, we find the exclusion of Atty. Sorreda from the Bar a fitting sanction
until he proves himself worthy to enjoy the privileges of membership to the
profession. It is imperative to instill in him sense of discipline that should teach him
anew of his duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal. This
rehabilitation must be done outside the brotherhood he has dishonored and to
which he will be allowed to return only after he has purged himself of his misdeeds. 29
WHEREFORE, ATTY. NOEL S. SORREDA is found guilty both of contempt of court and
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility amounting to gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. He is hereby indefinitely
SUSPENDED as a member of the Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice
of law until otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator to be distributed
to all courts for their information. This Resolution shall be spread in his personal
record and is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED. A.M. No. CA-04-38. March 31, 2004

FRANCISCO GALMAN CRUZ, appellee,

vs.
JUSTICE PORTIA ALIÑO-HORMACHUELOS, JUDGE VICTORIA FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO,
JUDGE CAESAR A. CASANOVA, JUDGE RENATO C. FRANCISCO, JUDGE MANUEL D. J.
SYCIANGCO and JUDGE ESTER R. CHUA-YU, appellants.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a verified Complaint-Affidavit dated September 29, 2002, Francisco Galman Cruz

charged Court of Appeals Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos of the Court of Appeals,
four presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, namely:
Judge Victoria Fernandez-Bernardo (Branch 18), Judge Caesar A. Casanova (Branch
80), Judge Renato C. Francisco (Branch 19) and Judge Manuel D. J. Syciangco (Branch
6); and Judge Ester R. Chua-Yu of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan
(Branch 1) with Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Law.

It appears that complainant was the defendant in Civil Case No. 94-98 for ejectment
before the MTC of Malolos, Bulacan involving a parcel of land owned by the Province
of Bulacan.1 The complaint was filed by the then "provincial attorney", now
respondent RTC Judge Syciangco, under a special power of attorney executed by
then Governor Roberto Pagdanganan in favor of the Provincial General Services
Officer, Engr. Romeo S. Castro.2Initially, the case was assigned to Branch 2 but when
the presiding judge of said court was transferred to another court, respondent, then
MTC, Judge Syciangco was appointed in his stead. Respondent Judge Syciangco
immediately recused himself because he was the former counsel for the plaintiff.
Civil Case No. 94-98 was then assigned to Branch 1, presided by Judge Mario
Capellan who also inhibited himself on motion of the complainant. In view thereof,
Executive Judge Natividad Dizon of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, designated
respondent Judge Chua-Yu of the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan, to try and decide said
ejectment case.3 On September 5, 1997, respondent Judge Chua-Yu rendered
judgment ordering the ejectment of complainant.4

Complainant filed an appeal with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as RTC Case
No. 884-M-97. The case was assigned to Branch 80 presided by respondent Judge
Casanova. On March 3, 1999, respondent Judge Casanova affirmed the decision
rendered by respondent Judge Chua-Yu.5
Dissatisfied, complainant filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52309.6On February 28, 2000, respondent Justice Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos, as ponente affirmed the judgment of the lower court.7
Undaunted, complainant further appealed to this Court but the same was dismissed
for having been filed out of time.
On October 15, 2001, complainant filed a petition for annulment of judgment with
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case No. 689-M-2001.8 The case was
raffled to Branch 19 presided by respondent Judge Francisco. On October 22, 2001,
respondent Judge Francisco denied the prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and preliminary injunction.9
On October 29, 2001, complainant filed a motion for inhibition of respondent Judge
Francisco.10 He also filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the prayer for
TRO. On November 5, 2001, respondent Judge Francisco voluntarily inhibited himself
from the case. The case was transferred to Branch 18 presided by respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo. On January 3, 2002, respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo
denied the motion for reconsideration.11 On September 10, 2002, complainant filed
a motion for voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo. On
October 1, 2002, respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo denied the motion for
inhibition.12
On September 30, 2002, complainant filed the complaint-affidavit against the above-
named respondents13 with the following allegations:
Respondent Judge Syciangco, as the then "provincial attorney", acted in connivance
with then Governor Pagdanganan in filing the complaint for ejectment which did not
have the sanction of the Provincial Board. Respondent Judge Chua-Yu tried and
decided the ejectment case although she did not have jurisdiction considering she
was a not a judge of Malolos, Bulacan where the property was located. Respondent
Judge Casanova affirmed the judgment of respondent Judge Chua-Yu. Respondent
Justice Aliño-Hormachuelos affirmed the judgment of respondent Judge Casanova.
Respondent Judge Francisco refused to grant a temporary restraining order (TRO).
Respondent Judge Fernandez-Bernardo refused to issue a TRO based on his motion
for reconsideration. All the respondents committed "misconduct and corruption,
inefficient (sic) and gross inexcusable negligence; and simple violation of law on
jurisdiction and fraud on administrative law; and knowingly rendering unjust
judgment – void judgment."14
Required to comment, each of the respondents filed separate comments denying
the allegations leveled against them. Respondent Judge Syciangco alleges that he is
being charged for acts he performed when he was the Provincial Legal Officer of
Bulacan. The other respondents aver that they acted in accordance with law and
jurisprudence in deciding the case before them. All the respondents submit that the
complaint is baseless and complainant should be sanctioned for filing an unfounded
complain which robbed respondents of precious time which could otherwise have
been devoted to the cases in court.
In its Evaluation Report dated January 29, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit inasmuch as
complainant questions the correctness of the decisions or orders issued by
respondents which is not within the province of an administrative case. The OCA
further recommended that complainant be required to show cause why he should
not be held in contempt of court.15
Approving the recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in a Resolution dated
February 24, 2003, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and required
complainant to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.16
On March 21, 2003, complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
of the complaint.17 The Court denied the same in a Resolution dated July 8, 2003 and
reiterated the Resolution dated February 24, 2003 requiring complainant to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.18
On August 4, 2003, complainant filed his compliance. He strongly reiterates that,
with all honesty and belief, his complaint contains "full of proof of pieces of
evidentiary facts" that would show a prima facie case against respondents which the
Court should investigate. Complainant points out that it was former Governor
Roberto Pagdanganan who ordered the filing of ejectment case against him in the
sala of Judge Syciangco who used to be the Legal Counsel of the Province of Bulacan.
Complainant submits that this fact proves connivance, fraud and deception between
Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan which he made as one of his basis
in filing the administrative case.19
In his Memorandum Report dated February 12, 2004, Court Administrator Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that complainant be cited for contempt of court for filing
an unfounded or baseless complaint. He opines:
Complainant’s explanation is lacking in substance, and his theory of conspiracy is
based on mere suspicion and speculation. The connection which complainant seeks
to establish from the order to file ejectment case against him and the decision
reached in said case is tenuous, and that the conclusion he seeks to draw that there
was conspiracy is without any basis.
.........
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to obstruct, embarrass or
influence the court in administering justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place
in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose and on the contrary
constitutes direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a violation of
the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the canons of professional ethics, for which
a lawyer like complainant may be administratively disciplined.
It is therefore appropriate to enjoin herein complainant and other members of the
bar who file administrative complaints against members of the bench that they
should do so after proper circumspection so as not to unduly burden the Court in the
discharge of its function of administrative supervision over judges and court
personnel.
The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary measures against erring judges,
including dismissal and suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest
efforts of the Bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers like complainant should also
bear in mind that they owe fidelity to courts as well as to their clients and that the
filing of unfounded or frivolous charges against judges such as the one at hand as a
means of harassing them whose decisions have not been to their liking will subject
them to appropriate disciplinary action as officers of the court.
The Court finds the recommendation of the Court Administrator to be well taken.
The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively liable for
mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or
gross ignorance on their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because
the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.20 Much less
can a judge be so held accountable where to all indications, as in this case, the
judgment complained of is far from erroneous. The judgment in the ejectment case
has gone through all the levels of review, it is high time that any doubts on the
validity of the decision be laid to rest.
Furthermore, there is no cogent reason to delve into the allegations of connivance,
fraud and deception between Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan as
they are not sustained by an iota of evidence but are only based on the unfounded
perception of complainant. Familiarity between Governor Pagdanganan and the
judges of Bulacan is insufficient proof, as connivance or conspiracy transcends
companionship. This Court can not give credence to charges based on mere
suspicion or speculation.21 It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his
complaint.22 In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the
presumption that the respondents have regularly performed their official duties,23 as
in this case.
A thorough review of the record also reveals that complainant has the penchant for
calling for the inhibition of judges when he perceives the judge is partial or when he
receives an unfavorable order or decision from a judge. In fact, the ejectment case
passed through more than five different judges due to complainant’s proclivity to file
motions for inhibition. In doing so, complainant has shown that he was avidly
shopping for judges favorable to his cause. His actuations caused needless clogging
of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss
of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Complainant may strongly disagree with the decisions of the respondents but
unsubstantiated allegations of grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law
serve no purpose other than to harass judges and cast doubt on the integrity of the
entire judiciary. As a member of the bar for half a century, 24 complainant should
know better than to file an unfounded administrative complaint.
Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although the Court will
never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm
of public accountability or diminish the peoples’ faith in the judiciary, neither will it
hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.25
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer26 are enlightening:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: `To
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against `unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be `with all good fidelity
. . . to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts
‘can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the
judicial office which he is bound to uphold.’
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is other’s lack of it. That is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court’s decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error,
fettered by fallibility.27
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,28 Justice Sanchez further
elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and
to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to
the proper administration of justice."
administration of justice — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt
of court.29 (Citations omitted)
In fine, the administrative case against respondents is utterly devoid of factual and
legal basis. It is frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast a groundless
aspersion on respondents’ integrity and reputation. Complainant’s unfounded
imputations against respondents is malicious and offends the dignity of the entire
judiciary. For this, complainant is guilty of contempt of court and must be sentenced
to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, complainant lawyers Francisco Galman Cruz is found guilty of
Contempt of Court and is FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00) with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was
necessary for the defense of his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney
to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-
bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but
to the administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate;
and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."
As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a judge from
the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is the
attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary
and the incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued
to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to
maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses
greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who presides
over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may
grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of
the bar even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly administration
of justice."

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3(d)
of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A
STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT"
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law
professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause
Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enumerated therein.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this
as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly
irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the
October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.
With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind,
the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was
adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar,
the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or tangential to the issues at
hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently
behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are
members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free
and democratic republic.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as
follows:
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall
not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the
proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the
court.
Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak
their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical
standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to
condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter, for a decision it has
rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not
the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect
everyone’s attention from the actual concern of this Court to determine by
respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have
crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and
violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third
parties to a pending case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents
themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which
they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the
Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and
academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the
legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is
not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in
open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to respondents’
invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not
merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring
attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be
ignored nor glossed over by this Court.
To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos
to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
Antecedent Facts and Proceedings
On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del
Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated.
On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable
Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are
virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and
constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international
human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in
the relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human rights
of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga
omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty.
Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their
charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya
decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S
JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE
PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only
of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized
sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying
the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya
decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary
Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations
in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime."11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on
July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article,
entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak
website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19,
2010.13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared
in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof.
Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the
Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent,
had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by
Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international
law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration
filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available
here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-
supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and
citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-
authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is
that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery,
and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite.
The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court
in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya
decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:
Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few
days.
Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as
a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human
rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of
my law review article on rape as an international crime in your esteemed Court’s
Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230,
Judgment of 28 April 2010).
My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the
Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI),
where I sit as trustee.
In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in
footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the
article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic since the article
was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust
that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made
in the article.
I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues
raised by this letter.
With respect,
(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20
In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to
Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc
Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of
Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed
as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to
comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the
Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A
report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as
the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was
likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board
allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court,
through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated
August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:
The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines
Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona
Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:
We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-
]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points
could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.
Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law
(Emphases supplied.)
The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the
actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law
professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient
reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced here:
RESTORING INTEGRITY
A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came
out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women",
waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their own government
as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of
judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28
April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.
It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed
plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism
and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual scholars whose work
have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the
integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.
In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of
another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and
stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions,
including all the effort and creativity that went into committing such ideas and
expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions
were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial
system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all
judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme
Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a
complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.
A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the
ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed
them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the
circumstances, however, because the Decision has been promulgated by the Court,
the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the
Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of
the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing
speaks for itself.
So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and
the spokesman of the Court.
It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles
is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not
acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding
and summarizing those primary sources are precisely the subject of plagiarism. The
inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates,
instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a
deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and
analyzing those primary sources.
It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar
with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal
unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and
citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of diligence and competence
expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan
Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the
conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main
source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that the classification of the
crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained
the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on
behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article
to arrive at the contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of
copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud
by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.
The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with
State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of
war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies
against such injury or damage. National courts rarely have such opportunities to
make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women"
who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent
on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with
urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years,
oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court.
When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the
Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and
nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values
of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the
standing of the Philippine legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems
are truly at stake.
The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and
cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed
upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very
foundation of its authority and power in a democratic society. Given the Court’s
recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of
such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further
erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of
this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women
elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and
exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the
petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without
ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is
beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but
also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are credible and
beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not
casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of
reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment
of a higher standard of professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and
Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the
Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court
as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and
integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting
demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed
upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the
University of the Philippine College of Law that:
(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high
standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional
competence expected of the Supreme Court;
(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and
credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly
the decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents
through dubious means;
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of
the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who
have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein;
(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the
dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court
as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any
other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;
 (5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the
manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches (SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS
and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar Assistant Professor Assistant Professor
acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and
Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing
in pleadings, practice, and adjudication. LECTURERS

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010. (SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA
(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
Dean and Professor of Law
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN (SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995) (SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA (SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of (SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
Dean (1995-1999)
Law
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)
REGULAR FACULTY
Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his
sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’
(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL letter here:
Professor Assistant Professor
Glasgow, 18 August 2010

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR
DAWAY
Associate Dean and Associate
Professor
(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN
Associate Professor
(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
Assistant Professor
(SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
Assistant Professor
Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)
Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice
Your Excellency,
My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the
University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my
publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s
Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the
table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word
by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes
in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic
reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a
citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the
substantive passages reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered
an appropriate form of referencing.
I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the
Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory
reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that
the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm place in
contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he
present study attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and
thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding
section notes that "the preceding chapters show that the concept is now a part of
the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the
practice of States" (p. 309).
With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work
should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach.
More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s
Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging it.
On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable
Court.
I remain
Sincerely yours
(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the
August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics
Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was
not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the
letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26
hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a
copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages
the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all.
Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81
faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual
signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the
Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty.
Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not
included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus,
the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same
Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was
already under consideration by the Court.33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following
observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the
allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not
only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction
over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the
quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of
the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for
the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the
Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of
the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism
only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya
case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the
motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the
oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico
A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J.
Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez,
Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from
receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.37
Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the
pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee,
for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful
reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38
In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular
administrative matter.
Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19,
2010 Show Cause Resolution
On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:
(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37
respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in
relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa
Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in
relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03; and
(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen
Lynch.
Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul
Vasquez)
Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a
common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common
Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed
that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the discharge of the ‘solemn
duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as
members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of
vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of
intentions" and pointed out that "none of them was involved either as party or
counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the
Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that
respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law
professors and officers of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41
By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:
(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions
In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal
processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the
appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their Statement,
respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but
rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive
action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear
and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest
quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was reputedly "in
keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development
of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in
the improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law
and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics,
they allegedly have a "special interest and duty to vigilantly guard against
plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences
have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our law schools."47
Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the
Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of
its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the
Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the
Court "was not going to take any action on the grave and startling
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published
on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator
Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona
would not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter
of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the
gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents
claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the
dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that
impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.
(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo
committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance with
the standards of academic writing
A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion
of the merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially
argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del
Castillo is the correct view and that they are therefore justified in issuing
their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common
Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of
Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice
Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper
attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that
appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an
International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law
Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and
International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in
support of their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from
said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54
(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when
others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"
In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the
plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public
issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the
issue of plagiarism, specifically:
(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple
Romero;56
(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57
(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25,
2010;58
(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in
the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59
(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General
Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August 5,
2010;60
 (vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published
in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61
(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the
resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune
and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62
(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar
Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the
calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The
Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on
August 11, 2010;63
(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo
from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the
Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of
Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan
Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010;64 and
(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of
Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65
In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled
them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated
October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.
(d) Freedom of expression
In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly
discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be
seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the Bar,
officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a
democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition
for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom
In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their
Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in
an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the
Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he national university has the
right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they
claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free
and healthy discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of study
without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their]
integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and
generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence
and discipline for research and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have
communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are
inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or relevance to
one’s conduct."71
In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the
following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v.
Hernandez,72 to wit:
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial
course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by
chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case.
The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing,
jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the
courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be
regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.73
On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the
Common Compliance stated, thus:
WHEREFORE:
A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of
the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:
1. the foregoing be noted; and
2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the
Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents
have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers
of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
 this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."
B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer,
respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their
due process rights, that before final judgment be rendered:
1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;
2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or
address the findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause
Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of a lack
of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate
procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that
will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and
In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and
3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts,
records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74
Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista
Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-
Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the
Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the Common
Compliance with some additional averments.
Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to
challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore,
"[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge
and hearing."75
Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith
and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to
resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment
and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what motivated her to sign the
Statement.
On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in
her view highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to
institutions of higher learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for
themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how lessons shall be taught and
who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the
schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the
University of the Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how
lessons shall be taught.
Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of
respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed
when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public
health or other legitimate public interest.78
Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez
On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate
Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof.
Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He
alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation among the UP Law
faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly
contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy
of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that,
agreeing in principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the
same in utmost good faith.79
In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez
also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic
society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the attention of the Court
to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur)
2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained
any illusion that he could or should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the
Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing
on respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who
wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:
13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some
espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an
essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that
plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the perpetrator, the way it has
always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for
academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that
plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as
one’s own.85 (Emphases supplied.)
Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he
"might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the
Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with a
respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully complied with the
Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.
Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10
in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this
Court
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the
UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the
UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of the
thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A
copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31
August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature,
but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of
the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was
publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010.
Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the
Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College of Law on 11 August
2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.
"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and
which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP
College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish
to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to
Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.")
and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8) other members of the
faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87
For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II
are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the
discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III
was never submitted to this Court.
On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came
about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:
2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement
in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print
the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so that those who
wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty
roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed
draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into
being.
2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean
Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable
Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April
2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the
process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC.
2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the
members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to
sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the College of
Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for
one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that
time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that they
would sign as soon as they could manage.
2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring
Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his
staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for
posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in
relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the
signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first printed
 draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note
following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88
According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the
names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant
not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such
documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements with blanks would be
an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90
With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in
Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen
attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In
his Compliance, he narrated that:
2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the
reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name
of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was
not among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the
inclusion of the Justice’s name among the "(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring
Integrity II.
2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken
to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to
her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents.
Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving for the United
States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not
entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)
Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer,
however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other
faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were
signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their signatures
physically to the document."93
However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff
reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s
signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:
2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice
Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign
the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its
contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized
the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he
could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he was about to leave for the
United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate,
still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.
2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable
to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the
following week.
2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza
when he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after
his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign.94
According to the Dean:
2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he
received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza
confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was
brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he declined to sign it because it
had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would
take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those
circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a
former Associate Justice and not wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing
the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)
With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of
Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and
the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the version
of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38 members of the UP Law
Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was
circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s
staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean
assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted signing pages, and so
mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law
faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96
Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of
the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He
emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three
versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This purportedly is merely Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it
"reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to must be forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality
continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very
evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness
the future, each one reflecting the same text but with more and more to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In
signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act
not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the
participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to
misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the
with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the
be signatories thereto."99 Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he
signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110
In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of
Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the ISSUES
Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members
who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories to, the Statement. He Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of
also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:
Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable
Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the 1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of
hope that its points would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en expression?
banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen
posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no
2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom
dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an
as law professors?
administrative sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the
Code of Professional Responsibility.102
3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should
not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and
Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the
records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in
4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving Justice Del Castillo.
he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?
Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)
5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for
For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a
hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to require
member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of
the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the
Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He further alleges
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have
that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court
access to the records and transcripts of, and the witnesses and evidence
of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice
and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."103 In signing the
Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak
DISCUSSION
effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers
The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.
It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show
Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right
to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind
respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right
to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence"
respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as a
"legitimate public issue."
This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show
that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court
nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language by
which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have
expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the
"proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution.
The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the
issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s
Restoring Integrity Statement.
To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that
Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief
as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge
[that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a
pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause
Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement
that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain
those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be
considered as fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for
the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional
attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of
deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of
"polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the
Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of
the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of
expression when it stated that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a
free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism
only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than
objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya
case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the
motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not
controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment
against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the
oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this
Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be
balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the
Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics
are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed
the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the
courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits
of fair comment and common decency.
As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J.
Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following
paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of
the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We
wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want
that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas,
resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage
of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost
desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state
sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of
justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)
The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor
necessary and further held that:
[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss
to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done,
because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by
reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene
and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of
questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case
he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of
denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the
victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of
the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of
justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred
in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of
justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)
Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from
the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements
made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are
neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any
standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’
theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle:
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as
any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its
integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In
re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements
in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’
Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.
Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position.
In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the
Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a
member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to Surrender
Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his
client committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described,
thus:
He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are
calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His
client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the
cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the
silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a
prayer that
"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession." 121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on
the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and
comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority. However,
the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts, whether done in
court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this
view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are
not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all
good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The
first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the
bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
xxxx
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political
campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed
that:
[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting
the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the
administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings.
Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court, by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have
justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from
outside coercion or interference. x x x.
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or
unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may
be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to
the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously
erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision. x x x.
xxxx conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been xxxx
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the
adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe action.
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
xxxx
of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in
and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other
responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. x x x.
foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

xxxx
That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be
easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes
high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration
In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the
(Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the
imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the
integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice
guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:
by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language
(In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language
As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
(Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive,
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other
manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to
to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not
the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January
mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated in Tiongco vs.
1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180,
Hon. Aguilar:
and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and
uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he [1989]).
cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an
officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-
Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which
580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer
responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to underscoring supplied.)
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official
In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple
misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon
him, we had the occasion to state:
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the
bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their
clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of
a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even
in his pleadings must be dignified.128
Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of
Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,129 relied upon by
respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the
right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society
preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not an absolute.
It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should
remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for
recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)
One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to
judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate,
reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held
as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely
suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements
grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No
one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems
unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be
adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no
antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering
justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for
delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases
supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the
Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.
The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.
It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,
guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what
they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there
is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject
matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers
who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without observing
proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in
any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also
law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative
proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence
the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.
Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other
bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is
that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and
to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our
mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad
definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered
engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than
lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the
ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must
be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to
acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common
Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to
"participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts
in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice" under Canon
4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled
that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due
respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to
influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which
canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors
are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their
preferred portions thereof.
The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1,
11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and
academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their
submissions.
With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a)
the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del
Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on
said issue.
The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch
belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this
Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a
lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause there is simply no excuse for
denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts
and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly
upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in
this case with more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case,
denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public
statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."
That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the
Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the
following paragraphs from the same:
And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of
Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors
of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief
and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.
xxxx
(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to
the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to
all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the
petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case
had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and
conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate
proceedings. The Court considers it highly inappropriate, if not tantamount to
dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of
Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to
attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del
Castillo in the present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the
time of the filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As
respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest
in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their
plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their own
administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was
intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the
intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were
hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous, dishonest and lacking in
concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can
ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students
that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point
of view is to be offensive.
This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately
quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast
between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the
Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who would expectedly be
affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are
beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey
their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the
Court why respondents could not do the same. These foreign authors’ letters
underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each
other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can
express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and
unproductive recriminations.
As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take
"constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its
veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why
was the same published and reported in the media first before it was submitted to
this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by
the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to
generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’
colleague on the UP Law faculty.
In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity
and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the
matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision
itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub judice or pending
final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point,
respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010,
they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued
the Statement under the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the
ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time
from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication
and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already
been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their
perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it became known that
the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from
recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into account in the
interest of fairness.
Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the
respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the print media
and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary,
these same annexes to the Common Compliance show that it is not enough for one
to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or
contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and
weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism
comes from persons outside the profession who may not have a full grasp of legal
issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism
are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law
professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair
commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this
Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal
education in our country.
With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering
that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been involved in
disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of
the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the issuance of the
Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be
mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to
offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there
are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule
in all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction
obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the
fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was
justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office
should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.)
Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this
case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind,
according to him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such
concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others,
by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it
imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it
deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)
Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,
notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from
intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.
With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his
Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the
respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was
able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign the Statement. He was
candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and
that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty
prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
was the uncertainty brought about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful
or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to
acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the
language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without
having to retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for
undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of
deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected
from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they
recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair.
We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can
grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these
reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the
State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court,
he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that
while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a
model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the
threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of
Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect
among legal professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal
standards of decency and fairness.
The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of
Canon 10.
To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the signed Statement.
In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not
a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I,
because looking at the text or the body, there were no differences between the two.
He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature pages of the two
versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving
pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise
stresses that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the
members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories
thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the
signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public
manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific
point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that point. The value of
the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the
persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority mainly
depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same.
Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the
"importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly
speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.
Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact
that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to
this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its
retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn out, according to Dean
Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due
to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean’s
office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of
Justice Mendoza as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an
unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the
signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring
Integrity I.
The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a
website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be
indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the
reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate blanks is necessitated by
vandalism concerns.
However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a
signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual
signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that is
transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the actual signed
document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010.
There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this
Court even with its blanks and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of
vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for
the care of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean
Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain
the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of
lack of candor.
Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course
of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that
Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a
footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him to indicate them as
signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time
Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one
purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean
Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court
that a person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.
We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection
and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that
there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated
as having actually signed the Statement when all he had was a verbal communication
of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay
information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was
truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court,
we see no reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who
indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting
the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to
secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for
abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that
he was able to secure.
We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual
signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all
asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a pleading with a
deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary
submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However,
the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his
misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s
professed good intentions, the Court deems it sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen
for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as
required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are
unmeritorious.
In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs
should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause
Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the
production or presentation of witnesses and evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism
case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the
records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate
Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect
contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished
only after charge and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents’ premise that these
reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.
The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.
Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case
springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt
in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majority’s purported failure to follow the
procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the
Show Cause Resolution.
However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt
proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As
explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an
administrative matter.
The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary
proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the
Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof,
save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation,
through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on
the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary
that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be followed.
As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require
a trial type hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits
is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot feign
denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his
side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to
due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)
In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio143 that:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an
investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)
In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon –
On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further
observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort
to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis
for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his
unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both
the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this
regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer
and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of
the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The
Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of
respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter
under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary
hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional
misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or
formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately
exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been
given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been
afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query
and Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases supplied.)
Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and
their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings.
Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a
hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence,
documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.
Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case
and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court which
were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or
were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the
primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented in
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only
incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the
submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as
Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating
that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that
the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems
objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the
Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and
internet sources that are already of public knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language
of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing,
dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness
or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these
facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is
any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.
We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as
September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice
Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a
copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would
take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the
Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the
Statement’s principles, could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on
an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court
should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to
refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases
for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their
respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because
they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out.
Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above
jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary
cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and
evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.
A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain
rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it
should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with
good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.
WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:
(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the
Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.
 (2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P.
Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L.
Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D.
Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors
are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the
Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration
of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the
charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further
ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an
officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor
and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from
these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a
professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of
responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the
threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records
of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 11668
JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil (respondent), praying that the latter be
disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal of trust.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch Xl,
Davao City, relative to an illegal dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12,
filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers in her small banana
plantation.2Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to
prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of ₱8,000.003 as attorney's
fees.4 Despite constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of
her position paper, complainant discovered that he still failed to file the same.5 As
such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 6 based on the
evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable to the workers in the total
amount of ₱633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about the said
ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm
workers.8 Because of respondent's neglect, complainant claimed that she was left
defenseless and without any remedy to protect her interests against the execution of
the foregoing judgment;9 hence, she filed the instant complaint.
In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
directed respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint.
In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to
file a position paper on behalf of complainant. However, he maintained that said
omission was due to complainant's failure to adduce credible witnesses to testify in
her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant instructed her to
prepare an Affidavit12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her
witness; nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo's
affidavit were not to be interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would
not know what he would be testifying on. Respondent added that complainant's
uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness, refused to execute an
affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her
conduct and that the complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit.13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBPCBD found
respondent administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-
CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the aforesaid Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification,
however, as to the penalty in order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial
practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust
and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-
mindful of their cause, and accordingly, exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to maintain, at all times, a
high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and
competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept
them for a fee or for free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and
honest means to attain lawful objectives.18 These principles are embodied in Rule
10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the CPR, which respectively read as
follows:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.1âwphi1
CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between
complainant and respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her
behalf before the NLRC and, in connection therewith, received the amount of
₱8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services. Case law instructs that a
lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to
handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter,19 as
in this case. From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his
client with competence and diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he
admittedly failed to file the necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in
fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against his client, i.e., herein complainant. To be
sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to produce any credible
witnesses in support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification for
respondent to completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking up
complainant's case, respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and
defend the latter's interest therein. Verily, he owes fidelity to such cause and must
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.20 In A bay v. Montesino,21 it
was explained that regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his
client's cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's
cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to
the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law,
legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from
an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the
correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the
public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects
the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar,
and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.22 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent
should be held administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the
CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the CPR. Records show that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he
admittedly prepared23 and notarized24 the affidavit of complainant's intended
witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured witness. In Spouses
Umaguing v. De Vera,25the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer to
not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz. :
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also
to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every
lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well
as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence,
therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule
10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."26 (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act
described in these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the
appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored
that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public
document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the
basic requirements in the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of
the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined."27

Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines

the proper penalty.

The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the

exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v.
Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his
failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client.
Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer for
his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of
his client. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the
penalty recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends respondent from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as in the case of Dela Cruz v.
Zabala,30 where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document, the Court
hereby revokes respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from
being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule

10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Resolution. Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he
is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let
copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office
of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8380 November 20, 2009
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, INC. Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEOVIGILDO H. MIJARES III, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This disbarment case is about the need for a lawyer to account for funds entrusted
to him by his client.
The Facts and the Case
The facts are taken from the record of the case and the report and recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Sometime in January 2004, complainant Arellano University, Inc. (the University)
engaged the services of respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the Bar,
for securing a certificate of title covering a dried up portion of the Estero de San
Miguel that the University had been occupying. The property was the subject of a
Deed of Exchange dated October 1, 1958 between the City of Manila and the
University.
In its complaint for disbarment against Mijares, the University alleged that it gave
him all the documents he needed to accomplish his work. Later, Mijares asked the
University for and was given ₱500,000.00 on top of his attorney’s fees, supposedly to
cover the expenses for "facilitation and processing." He in turn promised to give the
money back in case he was unable to get the work done.
On July 5, 2004 Mijares informed the University that he already completed Phase I of
the titling of the property, meaning that he succeeded in getting the Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) to approve it and that the documents had already
been sent to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The
University requested Mijares for copies of the MMDA approval but he unjustifiably
failed to comply despite his client’s repeated demands. Then he made himself
scarce, prompting the University to withdraw all the cases it had entrusted to him
and demand the return of the ₱500,000.00 it gave him.
On November 23, 2005 the University wrote Mijares by registered letter, formally
terminating his services in the titling matter and demanding the return of the
₱500,000.00. But the letter could not be served because he changed office address
without telling the University. Eventually, the University found his new address and
served him its letter on January 2, 2006. Mijares personally received it yet he did not
return the money asked of him.
In his answer to the complaint, Mijares alleged that he and the University agreed on
a number of courses of action relating to the project assigned to him: first, get the
University’s application for a survey plan which the DENR-NCR approved for a
"facilitation cost" of ₱500,000.00; second, get a favorable MMDA endorsement for a
"facilitation cost" of another ₱500,000.00; and, third, the titling of the property by
the Land Registration Authority for a "facilitation cost" of still another ₱500,000.00.
Mijares also alleged that the DENR-NCR Assistant Regional Director told him that he
needed to get a favorable endorsement from MMDA and that the person to talk to
about it was Undersecretary Cesar Lacuna. Mijares later met the latter through a
common friend. At their meeting, Mijares and Lacuna allegedly agreed on what the
latter would get for recommending approval of the application. Later, Mijares said,
he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna through their common friend on Lacuna’s
instruction.
Mijares next alleged that, after he received the money, Lacuna told him that the
University filed an identical application earlier on March 15, 2002. Mijares claimed
that the University deliberately withheld this fact from him. Lacuna said that,
because of the denial of that prior application, he would have difficulty
recommending approval of the present application. It appeared that Lacuna
endorsed the previous application to the Mayor of Manila on July 23, 2003 but the
latter did not act on it.
Mijares finally alleged that he and Lacuna wanted to bypass the Mayor of Manila in
the paper work but they were unable to arrive at a concrete plan. Mijares claimed
that the University gave him only ₱45,000.00 as his fees and that it was with the
University’s conformity that he gave the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna.
The IBP designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as Commissioner to conduct a formal
investigation of the complaint. Despite numerous settings, however, Mijares failed to
appear before the Commissioner and adduce evidence in his defense.
On October 17, 2008 Commissioner Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation1 in the case to the Integrated Bar of the Phillippines’ Board of
Governors. The Report said that the University did not authorize Mijares to give
₱500,000.00 to the then MMDA Deputy Chairman Cesar Lacuna; that Mijares had
been unable to account for and return that money despite repeated demands; and
that he admitted under oath having bribed a government official.
Commissioner Funa recommended a) that Mijares be held guilty of violating Rules
1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon
18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and meted out the penalty
of disbarment; b) that he be ordered to return the ₱500,000.00 and all the pertinent
documents to the University; and c) that Mijares’ sworn statement that formed part
of his Answer be endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and, if
warranted, for prosecution with respect to his shady dealing with Deputy Chairman
Lacuna.
On December 11, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XVIII-2008-
631, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but
modifying the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension from the practice of
law and ordering Mijares to return the ₱500,000.00 and all pertinent documents to
the University within six months from receipt of the Court’s decision. 2
The Question Presented
The only question presented in this case is whether or not respondent Mijares is
guilty of misappropriating the ₱500,000.00 that his client, the University, entrusted
to him for use in facilitating and processing the titling of a property that it claimed.
The Court’s Ruling
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or
suspension of a lawyer for the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority to do so.3
Every lawyer has the responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client
such that he must promptly account for whatever money or property his client may
have entrusted to him. As a mere trustee of said money or property, he must hold
them separate from that of his own and make sure that they are used for their
intended purpose. If not used, he must return the money or property immediately to
his client upon demand, otherwise the lawyer shall be presumed to have
misappropriated the same in violation of the trust reposed on him.4 A lawyer’s
conversion of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics.5
Here, respondent Mijares chose not to be heard on his evidence. Technically, the
only evidence on record that the Court can consider is the University’s evidence that
he got ₱500,000.00 from complainant for expenses in facilitating and processing its
title application; that he undertook to return the money if he did not succeed in his
purpose; that he falsely claimed having obtained the MMDA approval of the
application; and that he nonetheless refused to return the money despite repeated
demands. Unopposed, this evidence supports the finding of guilt of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
Besides, even if the Court were to consider the defense that Mijares laid out in his
answer, the same does not rouse sympathy. He claims that he gave the ₱500,000.00
to Undersecretary Lacuna, with the University’s conformity, for a favorable MMDA
endorsement to the Mayor of Manila. He also claims that, in a complete turnaround,
Lacuna later said that he could not provide the endorsement because, as it turned
out, the MMDA had previously given such endorsement of the University’s earlier
application and the Mayor of Manila did not act on that endorsement.
But, if this were so, there was no reason for Mijares not to face the University and
make it see that it had no cause for complaint, having given him clearance to pass on
the ₱500,000.00 to Lacuna. Instead, Mijares kept silent. He did not deny that the
University went all over town looking for him after he could not return the money.
Nor did he take any action to compel Lacuna to hand back the money that the
University gave him. More, his not showing up to testify on his behalf at the
investigation of the case is a dead giveaway of the lack of merit of his defense. No
evidence exists to temper the doom that he faces.
Even more unfortunate for Mijares, he admitted under oath having bribed a
government official to act favorably on his client’s application to acquire title to a
dried-up creek. That is quite dishonest. The Court is not, therefore, inclined to let
him off with the penalty of indefinite suspension which is another way of saying he
can resume his practice after a time if he returns the money and makes a promise to
shape up.1avvphi1
The Court is also not inclined to go along with the IBP’s recommendation that the
Court include in its decision an order directing Mijares to return the ₱500,000.00
that the University entrusted to him. The University knowingly gave him that money
to spend for "facilitation" and processing. It is not naïve. There is no legitimate Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012
expense called "facilitation" fee. This term is a deodorized word for bribe money. The
Court will not permit the conversion of a disbarment proceeding into a remedy for AMPARO BUENO, Complainant,
recovering bribe money lost in a bad deal. vs.
ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Leovigildo H. Mijares III, a member of the
Bar, GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 15, Rule 15.05, Canon 16, DECISION
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, and Canon 18, Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. He is, in addition, PER CURIAM:
directed to return to complainant Arellano University, Inc. all the documents in his
possession covering the titling matter that it referred to him.
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed
on March 3, 1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Let the sworn statement of respondent Mijares, forming his Answer, be forwarded Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and
to the Office of the Ombudsman for whatever action it deems proper under the subsequently Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-
circumstances. finding investigation on the complaint.

SO ORDERED. Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation 2 dated

September 29, 2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution
dated December 11, 2008.

In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
transmitted to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of
Resolution4 and the records of the case.

Factual Antecedents

In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to

represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno

paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him

P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer

fee paid.

Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings.
On several occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.

Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This
amount would allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing
Civil Case No. 777, so that they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not
to tell anyone about the matter. She immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to
raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty. Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in
December 1988, because the amount she had previously given was inadequate.
Bueno then sold her sala set and colored television to raise the demanded amount,
which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment
on the adverse party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the
case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to comply with the court’s directive. According to
Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development from her. In fact, she was shocked
when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute the decision against
them.
Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case.
Atty. Rañeses told her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered
from court records that Atty. Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision on
December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty. Rañeses about her discovery and
showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply denied any knowledge
of the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked
his client for money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly
asked her to deliver a telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her
aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that
Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was
then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her
(Bueno’s) presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt
but Atty. Rañeses refused to issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared
to demand a receipt for sums received from them.
Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed
to attend the hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20,
2000,[7] on May 11, 20008 and on October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on October
2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an Order10 declaring Atty. Rañeses in default.
Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies
of the Complaint and Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty.
Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be
reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had prior commitments on the
scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the supporting
papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of
substantial justice, Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on
November 16, 200012
Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same
hearing, Commissioner Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty.
Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a copy of the complaint. Commissioner
Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2001. He stated that
if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution
after the complainant submits her memorandum.13
Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day,
Commissioner Gonzaga declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the
complainant’s submission of her memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who
scheduled another hearing on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and
her counsel were present. The Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a
telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the hearing’s resetting because he had prior
commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty. Rañeses never filed an
answer and the case had already been submitted for resolution. Thus, Commissioner
De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of
evidence and her documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file
any formal offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as
attachments to her complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco
recommended that Atty. Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found
him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and
certifications that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have
proven that Atty. Rañeses had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without
these documents, which are not difficult to procure from the courts, Commissioner
Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with Bueno’s bare allegations which
could not support a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses
solicited money to bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner
Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in
secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her statements in her
affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim
before the investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and
Request for Copies of the Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive
the complaint against him, a fact belied by the registry receipt card evidencing his
receipt.
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for
failure to maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s
Report and Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from
the practice of law.19
The Court’s Ruling
The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the
practice of law in accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and
based on our own observations and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should
serve their clients with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides
that "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation."
Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him
liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause
and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them."20 A client
is entitled to the benefit of all remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is
expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these remedies or defenses.21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an
appellant’s brief amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court
even found the respondent lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous
mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a notice of appeal with the
DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing
his clients.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s
offer of evidence and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to
negligence. However, as noted by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support
her allegations with court documents that she could have easily procured. This
omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are insufficient to prove Atty.
Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to
get a favorable decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and
persistently called his residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The
Court found that the respondent lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs lawyers to refrain from any
impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance of
influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he
committed a fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and
the Judiciary. These are exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during
the investigation of his case; he practically disregarded its processes and even lied to
one of the Investigating Commissioners regarding the notices given him about the
case.
While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the
Investigating Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports
the Investigating Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco
succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would
necessarily take place in secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and
complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant Amparo Bueno has executed sworn
statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this regard in hearings held
before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for his part,
has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less
appear in any hearings scheduled in this investigation.25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners
reveals his propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that A.C. No. 8371
Bueno’s affidavits depict him to be.
SPOUSES GERARDO MONTECILLO and DOMINGA SALONOY, Complainants
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court vs.
believes that Atty. Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of ATTY. EDUARDO Z. GATCHALIAN, Respondent
disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by
his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should not be, in a lawyer’s relations RESOLUTION
to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and
fraudulent.1âwphi1 It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty.
This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 filed by Spouses Gerardo
Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the
Montecillo and Dominga Salonoy (complainants) against Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian
exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the judge and the
(respondent) before the Office of the Bar Confidant charging him of grave
Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law for being negligent in handling
through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not
complainants' case. In a Resolution2 dated August 9, 2010, the case was referred to
the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
its disciplinary proceedings.
recommendation.

From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the
The Facts
"take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The
Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let
Complainants engaged the legal services of respondent for an ejectment case in
this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers, their clients and the general public –
which they were the defendants.3After filing their Answer to the complaint,
that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend
complainants received a notice from the court setting the preliminary conference on
the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions composing it,
March 25, 2009 at 8:30 in the morning. When complainants went to respondent's
and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided
office to confer with him about it, the latter told them that he did not receive the
members of the Bar.
notice and that he could not attend the preliminary conference due to a conflict in
his schedule. Complainants expressed that they can attend the conference even
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is
without him. He allegedly advised them not to attend anymore as he would arrange
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
with the court for a new schedule when he is available. 4
Decision. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the respondent.
Complainants relied on respondent's advice and did not attend the preliminary
conference anymore. Thereafter, they found out that respondent not only failed to
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated
attend the scheduled preliminary conference, but also failed to take any steps to
Bar of the Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
have it cancelled or reset to another date. They also learned that, contrary to
respondent's representation, he did receive the notice setting the date of the
SO ORDERED. preliminary conference. Subsequently, complainant received an Order 5 dated March
25, 2009 that deemed the ejectment case submitted for decision due to
complainants' failure to appear during the preliminary conference. When they
approached respondent about it, he belittled the matter and told them not to worry
as he would take care of it.6
Subsequently, the trial court issued a Decision7 dated April 21, 2009 adverse to the Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found complainants' version of facts
complainants. Respondent received it on May 4, 2009 but failed to inform more in line with common experience as opposed to respondent's version. Notably,
complainants about the status of the case as to enable them to prepare the next there was no cogent explanation why complainants would dismiss his alleged
course of action. Complainants learned about the adverse ruling upon inquiring with instruction to attend the conference without him. 16
the trial court only on May 13, 2009, or nine (9) days after respondent's receipt
thereof, when their period to appeal was almost about to lapse. 8 In a Resolution17 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Complainants went to respondent's office wherein the latter prepared a Notice of
Appeal. Afterwards, complainants terminated respondent's legal services and Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied m a Resolution18 dated
engaged another lawyer to prepare their Memorandum of Appeal. On appeal, the September 23, 2016.
ejectment case was remanded to the court of origin.9
The Issue Before the Court
In sum, complainants assail respondent's negligent and complacent handling of their
case. 10 The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
In his Comment, 11 respondent contended that when complainants informed him
about the scheduled preliminary conference, he told them that he would be unable The Court's Ruling
to attend due to a conflict in schedule, as he was committed to attend a criminal
case hearing in Quezon City. Nevertheless, he instructed complainants to attend the
The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.
preliminary conference even without his appearance and inform the court about the
conflict in schedule. He denied having advised complainants not to attend the
Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and
preliminary hearing and belittled the Order dated March 25, 2009. Finally, he alleged
competence, and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. 19 A lawyer owes
that the Order dated March 25, 2009 was complainants' fault, due to their failure to
fidelity to the clients' cause20 and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required
attend the preliminary conference, and upon telling this to complainants, they
degree of diligence in handling their affairs. 21 Consequently, he is expected to
terminated his legal services. 12
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote one's full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or for
On June 22, 2011, while the case was pending before the IBP, complainants filed a
free. 22 The relevant provisions of the CPR read thus:
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint. 13
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
In the IBP's Report and Recommendation14 dated August 29, 2013, the Investigating
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for six (6) months for breach of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer's duties of competence and diligence include
(CPR). He explained that the submission of the ejectment case for resolution and the
not merely reviewing cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly
eventual adverse decision against complainants were attributable to respondent's
representing a client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and
negligence. Knowing that he had a conflict in schedule, respondent should have
prepared and filed an appropriate motion to cause the cancellation and resetting of conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client
the scheduled preliminary conference. Whether he advised complainants to attend
or the court to prod him to do so.23 A lawyer's negligence in fulfilling these duties
the preliminary conference on March 25, 2009 or not is immaterial. What was
subjects him to disciplinary action. 24
relevant was his course of action when confronted with a conflict of schedule in his
court appearances. 15
Guided by these edicts, the Court rules that respondent failed to exercise the
diligence required of lawyers in handling complainants' case. Based on the records,
he failed to file the necessary motion to postpone the hearing due to a conflict in his
schedule, and as a result, complainants lost their opportunity to present their
evidence in the ejectment case. As complainants' counsel in the ejectment case,
respondent was expected to exercise due diligence. He should have been more
circumspect in preparing and filing the motion, considering the serious consequence
of failure to attend the scheduled preliminary conference - i.e. the defendant's
failure to appear thereat entitles the plaintiff to a judgment,25 as what happened in
this case.
from the finality of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the
Bar.1âwphi1 Furthermore, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate
them to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

The Court likewise finds respondent liable for failing to immediately inform
complainants about the trial court's adverse decision. To emphasize, a lawyer has an
obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding the status of a case as expressed in
Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR:

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

To be clear, a lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must
advise them without delay about matters essential for them to avail of legal
remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to immediately notify complainants
about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants not inquired with
the trial court, they would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason,
respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.

As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances where
lawyers neglected their clients' affairs by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to
update clients about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the practice of
law for six (6) months. In Caranza V da.de Saldivar v. Cabanes,26 a lawyer was
suspended for failure to file a pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary
conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 27 a lawyer was likewise suspended for
not attending pre-trial, failing to inform clients about the dismissal of their case, and
failing to file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda, 28 a lawyer suffered the
same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled hearing despite due notice, which
resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these cases, the
Court agrees with the IBP's recommendation to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo Z. Gatchalian is found GUILTY of violating

Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective

A.C. No. 5281 February 12, 2008
MANUEL L. LEE, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000, complainant Manuel L. Lee charged
respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and the ethics
of the legal profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr.,
never executed the contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will contained the
forged signatures of Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses to
its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim
Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee,
half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965.1 Complainant, however, pointed out that the residence certificate2 of the
testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5,
1962.3 Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature
as donor in a deed of donation4 (containing his purported genuine signature).
Complainant averred that the signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the
deed of donation were "in any way (sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from (sic)
one another in all angle[s]."5
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the residence certificates of
the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had
likewise been forged and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was on file in the
archives division of the Records Management and Archives Office of the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this connection, the certification of
the chief of the archives division dated September 19, 1999 stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of 1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT
executed by BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is available in this
Office[’s] files.6
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001 claimed that the complaint against
him contained false allegations: (1) that complainant was a son of the decedent
Vicente Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was fake and spurious. He alleged
that complainant was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr. and the last will and
testament was validly executed and actually notarized by respondent per affidavit7 of
Gloria Nebato, common-law wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by the joint
affidavit8 of the children of Vicente Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N. Lee,
Jr. xxx."9
Respondent further stated that the complaint was filed simply to harass him because
the criminal case filed by complainant against him in the Office of the Ombudsman
"did not prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainant’s contention that no copy of the will was on
file in the archives division of the NCCA. He claimed that no copy of the contested
will could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that complainant had no valid cause of action against
him as he (complainant) did not first file an action for the declaration of nullity of the
will and demand his share in the inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.10
In his report, the investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of violation of
pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as found in the Revised Administrative
Code. The violation constituted an infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon
111 and Rule 1.0112 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).13 Thus, the
investigating commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended
the suspension of respondent for a period of three months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006,
resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
 considering Respondent’s failure to comply with the laws in the discharge of
his function as a notary public, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby
suspended from the practice of law for one year and Respondent’s notarial
commission is Revoked and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years.14
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law,
to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death.15 A will may either be notarial or holographic.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the execution of
wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guarantee their truth and authenticity.16
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and
of one another.17
The will in question was attested by only two witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be considered void.18 This is in consonance with
the rule that acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses.19 The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it was segregated from the other requirements under
Article 805 and embodied in a distinct and separate provision.20
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary public that
the same is his or her own free act and deed.21 The acknowledgment in a notarial will
has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise
and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to
be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this
particular requirement was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For one,
there was the conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the
notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation
of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear
breach of the law. These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. As we held
in Santiago v. Rafanan:22
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public.
They are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate
(or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of such certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded, considering the degree
of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents.23 A notary
public, especially a lawyer,24 is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
The Notarial Law then in force required the exhibition of the residence certificate
upon notarization of a document or instrument:
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of [cedula] residence
tax. – Every contract, deed, or other document acknowledged before a
notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper [cedula] residence certificate or are exempt from
the [cedula] residence tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public
as a part of such certificate the number, place of issue, and date of each
[cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.25
The importance of such act was further reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax
Act26 which stated:
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in this Act acknowledges any
document before a notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such person xxx
with whom such transaction is had or business done, to require the
exhibition of the residence certificate showing payment of the residence
taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the law seeks to establish the true and
correct identity of the person to whom it is issued, as well as the payment of
residence taxes for the current year. By having allowed decedent to exhibit an
expired residence certificate, respondent failed to comply with the requirements of
both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said of his
failure to demand the exhibition of the residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy
of the notarized will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witness. The notary public shall not be required to retain a
copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the
notarized will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for having failed to make the necessary
entries pertaining to the will in his notarial register. The old Notarial Law required
the entry of the following matters in the notarial register, in chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him;
2. person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
6. give each entry a consecutive number; and
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief description of the substance of the
instrument.27
In an effort to prove that he had complied with the abovementioned rule,
respondent contended that he had crossed out a prior entry and entered instead the
will of the decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy of his notarial register. To
reinforce his claim, he presented a photocopy of a certification28 stating that the
archives division had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome Ramirez.
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It is not admissible unless it is shown that
the original is unavailable. The proponent must first prove the existence and cause of
the unavailability of the original,29 otherwise, the evidence presented will not be
admitted. Thus, the photocopy of respondent’s notarial register was not admissible
as evidence of the entry of the execution of the will because it failed to comply with
the requirements for the admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondent’s attempt to controvert the certification dated
September 21, 199930 must fail. Not only did he present a mere photocopy of the
certification dated March 15, 2000;31 its contents did not squarely prove the fact of
entry of the contested will in his notarial register.
Notaries public must observe with utmost care32 and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties, otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of notarized deeds will be undermined.33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities prescribed by law render the entire will
invalid. This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in view of the importance and
delicate nature of a will, considering that the testator and the witnesses, as in this
case, are no longer alive to identify the instrument and to confirm its
contents.34 Accordingly, respondent must be held accountable for his acts. The
validity of the will was seriously compromised as a consequence of his breach of
duty.35
In this connection, Section 249 of the old Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. — The following derelictions of duty
on the part of a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of
first instance, be sufficient ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula
certificates.36
These gross violations of the law also made respondent liable for violation of his oath
as a lawyer and constituted transgressions of Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court37 and Canon 138 and Rule 1.0139 of the CPR.
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all the courts of the land, the Integrated
the Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.40 For a lawyer Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as made part of the
is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted personal records of respondent.
the administration of law and the dispensation of justice.41
SO ORDERED.
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and obey the law is an obligation imposed
on every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well beyond the basic
requirements of good citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer should moreover
make himself an example for others to emulate.42 Being a lawyer, he is supposed to
be a model in the community in so far as respect for the law is concerned. 43

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.44 A breach of these

conditions justifies disciplinary action against the erring lawyer. A disciplinary
sanction is imposed on a lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that he has
engaged in professional misconduct.45 These sanctions meted out to errant lawyers
include disbarment, suspension and reprimand.

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction.46 We have held in a

number of cases that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution47 and
should not be decreed if any punishment less severe – such as reprimand,
suspension, or fine – will accomplish the end desired.48 The rule then is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court.49

Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed in the performance of the elementary

duties of his office. Contrary to his claims that he "exercised his duties as Notary
Public with due care and with due regard to the provision of existing law and had
complied with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties xxx," we
find that he acted very irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question. Such
recklessness warrants the less severe punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the revocation of his commission 50 and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned as a notary public. 51

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby found guilty of

professional misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer’s Oath; (2) Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court; (3) Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (4)
Art. 806 of the Civil Code and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.

Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year
and his notarial commission REVOKED. Because he has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a notary public and as an officer of the court, he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public.
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015 Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano
[Formerly CBD 09-2555] Turla,10 filed a Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant, Case No. 09-269.12
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent. The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano
Turla,13 which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos
x-----------------------x drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.15

A.C. No. 10584 In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-examination:
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. CARINGAL
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
....
RESOLUTION
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the
LEONEN, J.: plaintiff[,] since she was about four years old.

These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for A : Yes, sir.
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong
of the plaintiff, isn’t it?
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-
Complaint4 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to
the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to one of her cousins.
disciplinary action.5
....
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was
falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
when in fact, she died in 1990.6
THE WITNESS
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication7 executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
THE COURT
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit
the estate of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir
: What’s the name of the mother?
entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the original underscoring supplied)

ATTY. CARINGAL
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla. : At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal
ethics because it is not the issue in this case.
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
....
THE WITNESS
ATTY. CARINGAL
: Yes, sir.
....
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina
Turla, isn’t it? Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have
been duly notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28,
A : Of course. page number 7, book

Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness. number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your
attention to the document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote, "Being her
which you requested to be marked as Exhibit B. surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the estate
of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other heir
entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have
THE COURT
drafted into this document . . . true or false?
: Exhibit?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
ATTY. CARINGAL
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that
would impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra
immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to
judicial settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I
impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject of my
have just learned from you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff
continuing objection from the very beginning.
here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE COURT
THE WITNESS
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have
: Yes, sir.
practically opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this document.

Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial.
ATTY. REY SANTOS

A : Yes, sir. : Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late
Mariano Turla, your Honor. That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication. marking the said documents, your Honor.

ATTY. REY SANTOS THE COURT

: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question? THE WITNESS

ATTY. REY SANTOS : I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu 17 she
is entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang bahala kay
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation. Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of
Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic]properties for himself.18 (Emphasis
ATTY. CARINGAL supplied)

: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?] Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal
(Atty. Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardino’s
Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with
ATTY. REY SANTOS
conflicting interests.21 He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos
would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.22
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality
and impertinency and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called
"Dead Man’s Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing information or matters of
THE COURT
fact occurring before the death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be
unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his professional relation with his
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged
consistent with the ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s communication[.]"24
it true or false?
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of
THE WITNESS Professional Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants of
Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In other words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
: No, that is not true.
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of
ATTY. CARINGAL Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla,
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano
have drafted a document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d] Turla’s niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other
Rufina Turla. heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:

THE WITNESS 14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen
years ago, he is fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that
: Yes, sir. time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for
the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a
.... husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife who is
a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes due the government;
ATTY. CARINGAL
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in
the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell
leave any descendant, xxx, or any other heir entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . .
anybody[,] ten or five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
[.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano
Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla had no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano
Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano
Turla’s properties that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty.
Santos received the rental income.34 Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos
cited the repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He
explained that the death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given
to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in
the death certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not
represent and was not representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was
already dead.39 Further, "he [was] representing Marilu Turla against those who ha[d]
an interest in her father’s estate."40 Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
never stated that there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the
sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not
commit forum shopping because the various cases filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being
held by his client as the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano
Turla.43 According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s
funds could be considered as "expenses of administration."44 Also, payment of Atty.
Santos’ legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to
question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed
that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu
Turla’s birth certificate was registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended that Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the
death certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted
funds from Mariano Turla’s estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline
stated that the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos "knowingly cited
a repealed law."50 Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The
various cases filed involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty.
Caringal that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. 52 The Report
and Recommendation53 of the Commission on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03
specifically proscribes members of the bar from representing conflicting interests.
The Supreme Court has explained that "the proscription against representation of
conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not
make the prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no
secret. The respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and
evenon the witness stand admitted that he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of
Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano
Turla’s daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turla’s daughter, the
respondent admitted that he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu
Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of
Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla
is Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to
Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of
Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole
heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,]
placed himself in a position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings
and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal
dated July 15, 2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court
which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3)
months from the practice of law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution. However, this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension
from the practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client
relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with
utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of
the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained what
conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would
necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he
agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the
only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009
testimony in the Civil Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed
with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr.
Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of
properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan
yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself." This very admission proves that the
respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina
Turla’s estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."63 Respondent had the duty to
inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to
obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu
Turla in March 2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain
Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not present evidence showing that he
disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted
him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of
interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding that respondent
violated Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa
loquitor[sic] finds that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client Mariano
Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the
existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the
respondent failed to uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards
of justice and protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his
duty and acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath
but was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so,
lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent
was far from being honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir,
he acceded to Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolutions dated
May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987
Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s "plenary disciplinary authority
over attorneys"70 and discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of
the court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as
regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional
mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is
an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in
the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society.71 (Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court
to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to
discipline lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be
delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar,
however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of
this court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.74

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified
complaint of any person." However, this authority is only to assist this court with the
investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best,
the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one
of the most important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an
officer of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing."76 (Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar.1âwphi1 This
disciplinary authority is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by
this court.77 The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best,
recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be equated with
Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court. WHEREFORE, we find respondent
Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule
10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813 x-----------------------x

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant OCA IPI NO. 11-2399-MTJ

vs
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, AMOR V. ABAD, FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS, ROMER H. A VILES, EMELINA J. SAN
Respondent MIGUEL, NORMAN D.S. GARCIA, MAXIMA SA YO and DENNIS
ECHEGOYEN, Complainants,
x-----------------------x vs.
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47,
A.M. N0.12-1-09-MeTC PASAY CITY,Respondent.

RE: LETTER DATED 21 JULY 2011 OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO AND x-----------------------x
THREE (3) OTHER JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASAY CITY, FOR
THE SUSPENSION OR DETAIL TO ANOTHER STATION OF JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH OCA IPI NO. 11-2378-MTJ
47, SAME COURT.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLAS ITO, VICE EXECUTIVE JUDGE BONIFACIO S.
x-----------------------x PASCUA, JUDGE RESTITUTO V. MANGALINDAN, JR., JUDGE CATHERINE P.
MANODON, MIGUEL C. INFANTE (CLERK OF COURT IV, OCC-METC), RACQUEL C.
A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836 DIANO (CLERK OF COURT Ill, METC, BRANCH 45), EMMA ANNIE D. ARAFILES
(Formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115- MeTC) (ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT, OCC-METC), PEDRO C. DOCTOLERO, JR. (CLERK OF
COURT Ill, METC, BRANCH 44), LYDIA T. CASAS (CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH
RE: LETTER DATED MAY 2, 2011 OF HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, 46), ELEANOR N. BA YOG (LEGAL RESEARCHER,METC,BRANCH 45), LEILANIE A.
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY. TEJERO (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 46), ANA MARIA V. FRANCISCO
(CASHIER I, OCCMETC), SOLEDAD J. BASSIG (CLERK III, OCC-METC), MARISSA
MASHHOOR RASTGOOY (RECORDS OFFICER, OCC-METC), MARIE LUZ M. OBIDA
x-----------------------x
(ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, OCC-METC), VIRGINIA D. GALANG (RECORDS OFFICER I,
OCC-METC), AUXENCIO JOSEPH CLEMENTE (CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 48),
A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1815
EVELYN P. DEPALOBOS (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 44), MA. CECILIA
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2401- MTJ)
GERTRUDES R. SALVADOR (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 48), JOSEPH B.
PAMATMAT (CLERK Ill, OCCMETC), ZENAIDA N. GERONIMO (COURT STENOGRAPHER,
LEILANI A. TEJERO-LOPEZ, Complainant, OCC-METC), BENJIE V. ORE (PROCESS SERVER, OCC-METC), FORTUNATO E. DIEZMO
vs. (PROCESS SERVER, OCCMETC), NO MER B. VILLANUEVA (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASA Y METC), ELSA D. GARNET (CLERK Ill, OCCMETC), FATIMA V. ROJAS (CLERK III, OCC-
CITY, Respondent. METC), EDUARDO E. EBREO (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 45), RONALYN T. ALMARVEZ
(COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 45), MA. VICTORIA C. OCAMPO (COURT
x-----------------------x STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 45), ELIZABETH LIPURA (CLERK III METC, BRANCH
45), MARY ANN J. CAYANAN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 45), MANOLO MANUEL E.
OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ GARCIA (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 45), EDWINA A. JUROK (UTILITY WORKER,
OCC-METC), ARMINA B. ALMONTE (CLERK III, OCC-METC), ELIZABETH G. VILLANUEVA
JOSEFINA G. LABID, Complainant, (RECORDS OFFICER, METC, BRANCH 44), ERWIN RUSS B. RAGASA (SHERIFF III, METC,
vs. BRANCH 44), BIEN T. CAMBA (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44),
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY MARLON M. SULIGAN (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44), CHANDA B.
CITY, Respondent. TOLENTINO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44), FERDINAND R. MOLINA
(COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 44), PETRONILO C. PRIMACIO, JR. (PROCESS JUDGE EMILY L. SAN GASPAR- GITO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20,
SERVER, METC, BRANCH 45), EDWARD ERIC SANTOS (UTILITY WORKER, METC, MANILA, Complainant,
BRANCH 45), EMILIO P. DOMINE (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 45), ARNOLD P. vs.
OBIAL (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 44), RICARDO E. LAMPITOC (SHERIFF III, JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY
METC, BRANCH 46), JEROME H. A VILES (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH CITY, Respondent.
46), ANA LEA M. ESTACIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 46), LANIE F.
AGUINALDO (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 44), JASMINE L. LINDAIN (CLERK III, METC, RESOLUTION
BRANCH 44), RONALDO S. QUIJANO (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 44),
DOMINGO H. HOCOSOL (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 48), EDWIN P. UBANA PER CURIAM:
(SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 48), MARVIN 0. BALICUATRO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II,
METC, BRANCH 48), MA. LUZ D. DIONISIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC,
We hereby consider and resolve respondent Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration
BRANCH 48), MARIBEL A. MOLINA (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48),
with Explanation for the Show Cause Order filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated
CRISTINA E. LAMPITOC (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 46), MELANIE DC.
on November 22, 2016 disposing against her as follows:
BEGASA (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 46), EV ANGELINE M. CHING (CLERK III, METC,
BRANCH 46), LA WREN CE D. PEREZ (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 46),
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU
EDMUNDO VERGARA (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 46), AMOR V. ABAD (COURT
GUILTY of GROSS INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS
INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 47), ROMER H. A VILES (COURT STENOGRAPHER II,
MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY; OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT
METC, BRANCH 47), FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC,
UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from the
BRANCH 47), MAXIMA C. SAYO (PROCESS SERVER, BRANCH 47), SEVILLA B. DEL
service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS, except
CASTILLO (COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 48), AIDA JOSEFINA IGNACIO
accrued leave credits, and further DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement or
(CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), BENIGNO A. MARZAN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48),
appointment to any public office or employment, including to one in any
KARLA MAE R. PACUNAYEN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), IGNACIO M. GONZALES
government-owned or government-controlled corporations.
(PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 48), EMELINA J. SAN MIGUEL (RECORDS OFFICER,
OCC, DETAILED AT BRANCH 47), DENNIS M. ECHEGOYEN (SHERIFF III, OCC-METC),
NORMAN GARCIA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 47), NOEL G. LABID (UTILITY WORKER Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10)
I, BRANCH 47), Complainant, days from notice why she should not be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
vs. the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics as
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, outlined herein.
PASAY CITY,Respondent.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for
x-----------------------x its information and guidance.

OCA IPI NO. 12-2456-MTJ SO ORDERED.1

JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO, JUDGE BONIFACIO S. PASCUA, JUDGE RESTITUTO V. In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative
MANGALINDAN, JR. and CLERK OF COURT MIGUEL C. INFANTE, Complainants, offenses for which she was held guilty, and insists on the absence of proof to support
vs. the findings against her. She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on the
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, following:
PASAY CITY,Respondent.
1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
x-----------------------x
The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest
A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1821 against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was
only directory because of the use of the permissive word may. In addition to A.O. No. Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. What the other judges should
19-2011 being noncompliant with the requirements of a valid administrative order, have done was to avail themselves of the appropriate remedy.9
the requirement of night court duty violated Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code,2 which limited the working 4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid
hours for government officials and employees. It was also not illegal to write to the
Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT) considering that he was the The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual and legal
requesting authority regarding the rendering of the night court duty. She did not bases.10 Moreover, she should be presumed to have acted in good faith if she
publicly broadcast her disobedience to A.O. No. 19-2011 when she wrote the letter misconstrued the rules on approval of application of leave.11
to the Secretary. There was no law prohibiting her from writing the protest letters.
At any rate, she had the right to do so under the Freedom of Speech Clause. She did
5. Allowing on-the-job trainees
not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011 because she actually allowed her staff to report
for night duty. She did not willfully and intentionally disobey because her protest had
The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks.
legal basis. She would also violate Section 3(a)3 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
She asserts that she could not remember their affidavit. She had no personal
and Corrupt Practices Act) if she would comply with the patently illegal A.O. No. 19-
knowledge that the trainees were made to serve as assistant court stenographers.
2011.4
Based on what she heard, the trainees were only in the premises of her court for a
few hours. She reminds that she allowed the trainees to merely observe
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani
proceedings. OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was impliedly amended when paralegals
Tejero-Lopez
and law students were allowed to be trained under the Hustisyeah Project.12

The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment because
6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-
rejection was different from protesting the appointment. She merely exercised her
lawyer
statutory right as a judge to question the appointment of the branch clerk of court
assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when
for the Philippine Judiciary,5 she was mandated to bring to the proper authorities the
she designated an officer-in-charge. There was no proof showing that she willfully
irregularities surrounding the appointments. Moreover, the contents of the
and deliberately intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA recognized Mr.
complaint letter and the protest could not be used against her pursuant to the
Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her branch in several letters. There was no proof that
constitutional right against self-incrimination. She did not also commit any act of
cruelty against Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms. Tejero-Lopez who she violated Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of
evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court was allowed under the Rules of Court, as
"went beyond the norms of decency by her persistent and annoying application in
well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, and Administrative
my court that it actually became a harassment." Her opposition against the
Circular No. 37-93.13
appointment of Ms. Lagman was meritorious. She only employed the wrong choice
of words with her choice of the term privileged communication that was viewed
negatively. There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or 7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel
oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez. It was not proper to penalize a
judge based on a "letter with few words that other people find objectionable." 6 The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal
proceedings despite absence of counsel. In so doing, she relied in good faith on the
3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges rulings in People v. Arcilla,14Bravo v. Court of Appeals,15 and People v.
Malinao.16 Under Section l(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person without the assistance of
The respondent posits that the show-cause order she issued to her fellow judges had
counsel.17
legal basis because "anything that is legal cannot be an assumption of the role of a
tyrant wielding power with unbridled breath."7 It was premature to rule that she
thereby abused and committed misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on 8. Sending of inappropriate email messages
the explanation by the other judges.8 She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and
The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the
certification by the SC-MISO was not presented to her, depriving her of the
opportunity to object. Her granting access by the MISO to her private e-mails was
conditional to prove tampering. Her
Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely waive her right to privacy.
Considering that she did not authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were
inadmissible for being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full name written in
capital letters as the sender did not emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN
accounts carried her name with only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails
reproduced in the decision were not the same messages that she had requested
Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she did not write on the e-
mail messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing
style was different from what appeared in the e-mail messages. She denies having
opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to penalize her based on
assumptions and speculations. She did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and
innocent comments were not actionable documents. The certification by the SC
MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness of the contents of the e-mail
messages and as to the identification of the sender or author of the messages. It was
wrong and unjust to impute wrongdoing to her when there was no proof that she
had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the e-mails were not printed
in the decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the
messages without her consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule.
Letters and communications in writing were guaranteed and protected by Sections
2,18 3(1),19 Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and Article 723 of the Civil
Code,20 Articles 22621 and 22822 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 2756 of
the Revised Administrative Code,23 Sections 3224 and 3325 of the R.A. No. 8792. There
was no proof that she had apologized through e-mail, and had sent messages with
sexual undertones and lewd graphics. Judge Gita had a dirty mind because nothing
was wrong with the 69 image by Felicien Raps. She (respondent) did not commit
internet stalking. She had difficulty in remembering the private communications,
which were taken out of context. It was Judge Gita who must have a problem
because she had kept the trash messages. She (respondent) did not transgress any
law. The allegations against her were hearsay. She submitted a letter proposal for a
"winwin" solution so that she would not pursue any criminal action against Judge
Gito. She did not violate Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct because it was one of her staff who had typed the letter addressed to Atty.
San Gaspar. To find her to have abused her power and committed impropriety was
unwarranted. Her absence from the investigation conducted by Justice Abdulwahid
could not be taken against her and could not be construed as her admission of
wrong doing or as an evasion of truth. There was no proof that she had used the
phrase our court to advance her personal interest.26
Ruling of the Court
We deny the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the
Show Cause Order for the following reasons.
1.
The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit
The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with
Explanation for the Show Cause Order were matters that the Court had already
exhaustively considered and fully resolved in the decision of November 22, 2016. We
deem it unnecessary to dwell at length on such submissions. We still hold and
declare that the respondent flagrantly and blatantly violated the Lawyer's Oath, and
several canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canon of
Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct.
Nonetheless, we propose to expound on some points for greater enlightenment on
the issues and grounds taken into consideration in removing the respondent from
the Judiciary, and for purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the ruling on
the directive for her to show sufficient cause in writing why she should not also be
disbarred from the Roll of Attorneys.
The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the
Court. She is absolutely mistaken. The records involved in these cases were
voluminous, because they consisted of the affidavits and other evidence submitted
by the several complainants as well as her own pleadings and motions, most of
which constituted proof of her administrative wrongdoings. As the per
curiam decision of November 22, 2016 indicated, her explanations vis-a-vis the
complaints often backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by
systematically exposing her personal and professional ineptitude and stilted logic. In
short, the evidence against her was too compelling to ignore, and sufficed to warrant
the supreme action of her removal from the Judiciary. She was more than aware that
the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings like these was
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.27
The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-
incrimination has no basis. As a judge, she was quite aware that the constitutional
guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to answer incriminating
questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally liable. The
constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness - whether a party or not - the
right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. 28 The privilege did
not prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule only
finds application in case of oral testimony and does not apply to object evidence. As
the Court has pointed out in People v. Malimit:29
[The right against self-incrimination], as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United
States, "x x x is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him x x x" It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the [accused] 's own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It docs
not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question
now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of
his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise,
then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all
the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession
and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles - a clear reduction ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
privilege, x x x but testimonial compulsion.30
The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional
proscription against self-incrimination. She had not been subjected to testimonial
compulsion in which she could validly raise her right against self-incrimination.
Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to be present and
to confront the complainant and her witnesses and evidence during the
administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid.
She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the complainant and her
witnesses but the voluntary and knowing waiver of her presence divested her of the
right to insist on the right to confrontation, if any.
The respondent contends that she was not given the opportunity to raise her
objection to the certification issued by the SC-MISO. This contention is dismissed also
because of the same voluntary waiver of her presence from the proceedings held
before Justice Abdulwahid.
At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion and mercy, and
vows not to repeat the same transgressions. In this connection, she would have the
Court consider in her favor the following mitigating circumstances pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil
Service,31which provides thus:
1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated charge;
2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;
3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;
4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as analogous
circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;
6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated charge;
7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated
charge;
8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator Jose
Midas Marquez and Assistant Court Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous
circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the
unsubstantiated charge;
10. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the
unsubstantiated charge; and
11. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the
unsubstantiated charge.32
The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.
Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on how
her having medications for allergies was analogous to physical illness under Section
48(a) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service. Although the list of
circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive because the provision expressly
recognizes other analogous circumstances, she cannot simply state any situation
without pointing out why it would be analogous to the listed circumstances. The
Court is unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for allergies
could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive
conduct that manifested themselves in the periods material to the administrative
complaints.
Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith.
Good faith implies the lack of any intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the
totality of her acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of intent to
commit a wrong cannot be probable. According to Civil Service Commission v.
Maala,33 good faith as a defense in administrative investigations has been discussed
in this wise:
In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of
mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law,
together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which
render transaction unconscientious."
In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something
internal, we can ascertain a person's intention by relying not on his own
protestations of good faith, which is self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct and
outward acts. (bold emphasis supplied)
The respondent is reminded that her removal from the Judiciary by reason of her
gross insubordination and gross misconduct did not proceed only from her non-
compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011. Other acts and actuations were also efficient
causes, namely: (1) her refusal to abide by the directive of MeTC Executive Judge
Bibiano Colasito that resulted in the disruption of orderliness in the other Pasay City
MeTCs to the prejudice of the public service and public interest; (2) her direct
communications to the DOT Secretary and other agencies that seriously breached
established protocols, thereby opening an irregular avenue to publicly broadcast her
defiance to the directive of the Court itself; and (3) her willful disregard of the direct
advice by the Court Administrator despite the latter being the official expressly
authorized by law to assist the Court in exercising administrative supervision over all
lower courts and personnel.34
Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of
November 22, 2016 the following:
In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination
and gross misconduct. By her refusal to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011,
she deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law at all
times. She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of
the Court as the duly constituted authority on court procedures and the supervision
of the lower courts. To tolerate her insubordination and gross misconduct is to abet
lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed from the service because she
thereby revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary. (Bold emphasis
supplied)
We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the respondent's
recalcitrant streak did not end with her unbecoming repudiation of and defiance to
A.O. No. 19-2011. To recall, she also exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting the
valid appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez despite being fully aware
that the appointing powers pertained to and were being thereby exercised by the
Court, and that she was bereft of any discretion to control or reject the
appointments. Under no circumstance could she be justified in draping herself with
the mantle of good faith in regard to her insubordination and arrogance.
We also reject the respondent's appeal for relief based on her supposed lack of
experience as a neophyte judge, and her previously received awards and outstanding
court performance. Lack of experience had no relevance in determining her
administrative liabilities for acts and actuations fundamentally irregular or contrary
to judicial ethical standards. We even believe that her being a novice in the Judiciary,
instead of mitigating her liability, could have aggravated her offense, for her being a
neophyte judge should have impelled her instead to practice greater prudence and
caution in her daily actuations and performance. But instead of pausing and
hesitating, she acted rashly and imprudently by condescendingly asserting herself
over her peers, by flagrantly disobeying her superiors, including this Court, and by
ignoring obvious boundaries that should have kept her in check or reined her in. On
the other hand, the awards for outstanding performances as a professional and as a
judge, far from accenting her good qualities as a person, rather highlighted her
unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her misconduct and general
bad attitude as a member thereof has put the awards and recognitions in serious
question.
2.
Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent
The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In
the decision of November 22, 2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member
of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through
disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to show good and sufficient cause why
her actions and actuations should not also be considered grounds for her
disbarment, justifying our directive in the following manner, viz.:
The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic
Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials
Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar, relevantly states:
basic rules of judicial conduct should not remain as a member of the Bar because she
had thereby also violated her Lawyer's Oath.
Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial
conduct embodied in the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary would constitute a breach of the following canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers. CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN
THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or public duties.
otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on OTHERS.
the ground of gross misconduct and willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court. Given her wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her open
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant
or behavior before the Courts.
to her judicial office, and her penchant for threatening the defenseless with legal
actions to make them submit to her will, we should also be imposing the penalty of
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and
disbarment.1âwphi1 The object of disbarment is not so much to punish the attorney
misconduct as a judicial officer. By penalizing her with the supreme penalty of
herself as it is to safeguard the administration of justice, the courts and the public
dismissal from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain a member
from the misconduct of officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to remove from
of the Law Profession.
the Law Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby
proved themselves unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them
as members of the Bar. However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any
way dispense with or set aside the respondent's right to due process. As such, her
disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to comment
The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were
on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. To accord due
also grounds for disciplinary actions against members of the Bar could easily be
process to her, therefore, she should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her
treated as justifiable disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of the Bar. This
professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine whether or not
treatment is explained by the fact that her membership in the Bar was an integral
to disbar her.
aspect of her qualification for judgeship. Also, her moral and actual unfitness to
remain as a Judge, as found in these cases, reflected her indelible unfitness to
remain as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who disobeyed the
In her comment, the respondent reiterates her submissions in the Motion for
Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order. Considering that we
have dismissed her pleadings altogether for the reasons given earlier, her
disbarment is now inevitable.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A
member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for
the Show Cause Order with FINALITY; DISBARS EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B. YU pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation
of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics; and
ORDERS the striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and
guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record as a member of the
Bar.
SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful

disobedience of any lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an
attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of
these grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a
consequence.

We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby

imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood.
Disbarment is intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that
those taking part in it as attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to
enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in
them.35

Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys who undeservedly think
too highly of themselves, their personal and professional qualifications and qualities
at the expense of the nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the
respondent that membership in the Law Profession is not like that in any ordinary
trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only the individuals who are competent and fit
according to the canons and standards set by this Court, the law and the Rules of
Court may be bestowed the privilege to practice it.36

Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his
calling. The practice of law is a privilege, and only those adjudged qualified are
permitted to do so.37 The respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting
her expulsion from the profession.
 Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate in the
A.C. No. 8242 October 2, 2009 meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow
teleconferencing.
REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant,
vs. On 24 March 2004, Comtech’s new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to
ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent. return or account for the amount of ₱90,466.10 representing her unauthorized
disbursements when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004,
DECISION Comtech received Soledad’s reply, signed by respondent. In July 2004, due to
Soledad’s failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a
CARPIO, J.: complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutor’s Office. In the
proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as
The Case Soledad’s counsel.

The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint1 for disbarment against
(complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship and for representing an
interest which conflicted with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide In his Answer,2 respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on
Solutions Philippines, Inc. (Comtech). process and procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted
him about the legal requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February
The Antecedent Facts 2003, Soledad engaged his services as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged
that from February to October 2003, neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations of the corporation.
computer software development. From February 2003 to November 2003, Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech.
respondent served as Comtech’s retained corporate counsel for the amount of
Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003,
₱6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October 2003, complainant
complainant met with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by-
personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential
laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board
amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003,
meetings.
respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow
participation during board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the
Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as
Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.
proxy during the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison
instructed him to observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that he
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant
objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm because the corporate by-
became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda
laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the participation of board
Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who
members by teleconferencing.
was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus,
Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective
Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented
November 2003.
Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already
a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal
In a stockholders’ meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy
case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries he handled
for Gary Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members
with Comtech.
of the Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting
was called to order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum.
 The IBP’s Report and Recommendation In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of
In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006,3 the IBP Commission on Bar Governors First Division. The IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s motion for
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of reconsideration but reduced his suspension from two years to one year.
Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with that of
Comtech as his former client. The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B7of the Rules of Court.
The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtech’s retained
counsel from February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the The Ruling of this Court
course of the meetings for the intended amendments of Comtech’s corporate by-
laws, respondent obtained knowledge about the intended amendment to allow We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines to participate in
board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBP-CBD noted that respondent knew Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship
that the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to allow the
teleconferencing. Hence, when respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm through teleconferencing on the
ground that the corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, he made use of a
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after
privileged information he obtained while he was Comtech’s retained counsel.
the attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)
The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech,
We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainant’s consultations, respondent
respondent represented an interest in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-
obtained the information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow
CBD ruled that the fact that respondent represented Soledad after the termination
board members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings through
of his professional relationship with Comtech was not an excuse.
teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a
for one year, thus:
stockholders’ meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The
physical presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders’ meeting
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that herein
because a member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of
respondent be found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be suspended
incorporation or by-laws.8 Hence, there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm to
from the practice of law for one (1) year.4
participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent their proxies to the
meeting.
In Resolution No. XVII-2006-5835 passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate
Commissioner with modification by suspending respondent from the practice of law
by-laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a
for two years.
confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may
be effected by "the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.6 the owners of at least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a
majority of members of a non-stock corporation."9 It means the stockholders are
In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that aware of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be
respondent’s motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a delegated to the board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to
rehash of his previous arguments. However, the IBP Board of Governors First Division show that a delegation was made in the present case. Further, whenever any
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only one amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the
year.
new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of
attached to the original articles of incorporation and by-laws.10 The documents are merit.
public records and could not be considered confidential.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality.11 The client must intend the communication to be
confidential.12 Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a
majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with
the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the
disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting could not be
considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within the contemplation
of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Representing Interest in Conflict With the Interest of a Former Client

The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a
former client, in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

We do not agree with the IBP.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,13 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict

of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked
to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.14 The Court has ruled that what a lawyer owes
his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him.15

We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed

by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed
by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would
show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired
while he was still Comtech’s retained counsel. Further, respondent made the
representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A
lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.16 The intent of the law is to impose
upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.17

A.C. No. 6174 November 16, 2011
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-1961 of the Board of
Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint 2 for
disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of
respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City
Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the
respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the
checks.3Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period
indicated in the demand letter before filing her complaint.
On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila.4
On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation5 filed by
respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the
latter’s daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003,
respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila.
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In his Comment,6 respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted that
he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in
deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional
engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee
for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that complainant
would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that complainant,
based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Año.
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by
complainant against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on
the demand letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A.
Año.
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the
criminal cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are
likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are "comares" for more than 30 years since
complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba.7 Respondent claimed that it is in this
light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughter’s request that they be
represented by him in the cases filed against them by complainant and
complainant’s daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for
Consolidation which is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of
a lawyer-client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his
appearance in the joint proceedings should only be construed as an effort on his part
to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the parties.
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the
parties achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported
that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant
the amount of ₱50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No.
03G-19484-86.
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the
other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly
led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant administrative case for
conflict of interest.
In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
and approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They
found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and for
the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.8
We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner,9 as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant
regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by
respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S. No.
03G-19582-84 entitled "Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba". Respondent stated that the
movants in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants are likewise
mother and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same transaction.
Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of evidence and
witnesses.
Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal
favor to complainant who is a close friend.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the
close friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was
established the moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding
the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed
such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal
complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to
represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the Investigating
Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as "my client" in the demand letter
sent to the defaulting debtor10, respondent admitted the existence of the lawyer-
client relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from claiming otherwise.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from
complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The
prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established
and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.11 We held in Burbe
v. Atty. Magulta12 that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised or
charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been sought.13
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts." Respondent was therefore bound to refrain
from representing parties with conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing so,
without showing any proof that he had obtained the written consent of the
conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned.
The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste.14 In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the
lawyer learns of the facts connected with the client’s case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree.15
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.16
The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat17 is instructive on this concept, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties.1awp++i1 The test is ‘whether or not in behalf of one client, it
is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client.’18 This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used.19 Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also
whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.20 Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.21
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Año who was
eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a client’s
cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to
represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a
violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.
Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, the disbarment sought in the
complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors
of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice
of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished
all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to
append a copy of this Decision to respondent’s record as member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 5098 April 11, 2012

JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is
charged of: (1) violating the lawyer’s duty to preserve confidential information
received from his client;1 and (2) violating the prohibition on representing conflicting
interests.2

In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously

engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her
favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law
husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when
he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in
behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant
accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in
filing the civil case.

Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and
execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential
information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was
instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint
who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint
for this reason.

The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint
to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation
dated November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty.
Sabitsana administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP
Commissioner opined:

In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a
contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting
that Zenaida L. Cañete, respondent’s present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not
initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the
confidences and information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of
the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to
decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Cañete in view of the rule
prohibiting representation of conflicting interests.
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests
in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured by
respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Cañete’s counsel-of-record. x x x
xxx
Complainant and respondent’s present client, being contending claimants to the
same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be
inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to
contend for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if
he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client. Such is the case with which we are now confronted, respondent
being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and
valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)3
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.4
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after
finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and
rules.5 The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioner’s
recommended penalty.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of
Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests.
The Court’s Ruling
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information
to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the
lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with the client.6 Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to
avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action."7 The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be called upon to
contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or
that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated." 8 To be
held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in one case,
one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of
the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the performance of
the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."9
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the
above rule is present in a given case.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other
client.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm -
_ftnThus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same
lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that
duty.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm - _ftn Still
another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous
employment.10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/aug2005/ac_6708.htm
- _ftn [emphasis ours]
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to
support Atty. Sabitsana’s violation of the above rule, as established by the following
circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect
her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal
advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared
and executed in the complainant’s favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Cañete to discuss the latter’s legal
interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty.
Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Cañete’s interest clashed
with the complainant’s interests.
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two
clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Cañete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsana’s actual knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed
a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Cañete; second, he
impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third, the case
he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously
prepared and executed for the complainant.
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another
client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that entailed him to
contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal
services had been previously retained.
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
an exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the
exception due to Atty. Sabitsana’s failure to comply with the requirements set forth
under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the
complainant and to Zenaida Cañete before he accepted the new engagement with
Zenaida Cañete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a
letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Cañete’s adverse claim to the
property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim;
Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being
engaged as counsel by Zenaida Cañete.11 Moreover, the records show that Atty.
Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, we find — as the IBP Board of Governors did — Atty. Sabitsana guilty of
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty
of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the
administrative offense of representing conflicting interests.12
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the
ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of
confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty.
Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process
rights since he only answered the designated charge.
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsana’s due process rights. Although there was
indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint
itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on
the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8 of
the complaint:
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now
Zenaida Cañete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where lawyer
Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second sale[.]
Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.13 He also
averred in his Answer that:
6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he
would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Cañete was his former client (herein
complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Cañete (which she granted)
that he would first write a letter (Annex "4") to the complainant proposing to settle
the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object
to respondent’s handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Cañete on the ground she is now
invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint
against her.14 1âwphi1
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.15 These opportunities
were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above circumstances. A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.16 In the exercise of PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account vs.
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their RESOLUTION
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney.17 This is all that we did in this case.
CORONA, J.:
Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this
Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients and encroachment of professional services.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4To induce them to
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
practice of law.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James

Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for
take effect.
a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
SO ORDERED.
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
 Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
Tel: 362- soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. 7820 Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
Rm. M-01 Fax: (632) respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar 362-7821 heavier penalty.
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926)
2701719 We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.

Back The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
SERVICES OFFERED:
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD. Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
1avvphi1
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of
the bar is called.14

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

(emphasis supplied)
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
Hence, this complaint. solicit legal business.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11of the Code of
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of
the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. 20 Again
the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list
nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office.21Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium
for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the
prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s
cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for
the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A
lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or
use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase March 23, 1929
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the Duran & Lim for respondent.
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the Government.
absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and
MALCOLM, J.:
distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last general elections he
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a
follows:
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
LUIS B. TAGORDA
be dealt with more severely.
Attorney
Notary Public
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
Province of Isabela
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed of sale
for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral office; can
SO ORDERED.
renew lost documents of your animals; can make your application
and final requisites for your homestead; and can execute any kind
of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help you collect your loans
although long overdue, as well as any complaint for or against you.
Come or write to him in his town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve the poor.)

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a

lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in Ilocano, which letter, in
translation, reads as follows:

ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928

MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the

approaching date for our induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month. Before my
induction into office I should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the province in general and
for your barrio in particular. You can come to my house at any time
 here in Echague, to submit to me any kind of suggestion or
recommendation as you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I will
have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the session of the
Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on the following day
here in Echague to live and serve with you as a lawyer and notary
public. Despite my election as member of the Provincial Board, I
will exercise my legal profession as a lawyer and notary public. In
case you cannot see me at home on any week day, I assure you
that you can always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform
you that I will receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before
me as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the reason
that some people are in the belief that my residence as member of
the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would then be disqualified to
exercise my profession as lawyer and as notary public. Such is not
the case and I would make it clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have my residence here in
Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to your
barrio people in any of your meetings or social gatherings so that
they may be informed of my desire to live and to serve with you in
my capacity as lawyer and notary public. If the people in your
locality have not as yet contracted the services of other lawyers in
connection with the registration of their land titles, I would be
willing to handle the work in court and would charge only three
pesos for every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the applicable legal
provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as originally conceived related
to disbarments of members of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar
Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end
thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of Professionals Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908 and by the Philippine Bar
Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must
be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or circulation of
ordinary simple business cards, being a matter of personal taste or local
custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not per se improper. But
solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or
trust companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or
offering retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing
or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct,
the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. — It is
unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do
so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or
other causes of action and inform thereof in order to the employed to bring
suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal
injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them
as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or
reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of
such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court or prison
officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal,
the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional
services. A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every
member of the bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
 practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the offender Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
may be disbarred.
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels between vs.
individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the penalties for this offense THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
when committed by an attorney was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the
same evil have been provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of R E SO L U T I O N
the bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind statutes of
this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession and not a business. The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so
would be unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
REGALADO, J.:
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of
advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said
solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a great profession. It
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements
lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
community in the integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation
and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or
Annex A
suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

SECRET MARRIAGE?
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted facts, the
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the
ANNULMENT. VISA.
action which should here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined
the representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case,
suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC.
go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this character of 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this
nature would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, Annex B
circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that
he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at GUAM DIVORCE.
the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A
modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it DON PARKINSON
should be distinctly understood that this result is reached in view of the
considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce
particular instance and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office
convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment. hours.

In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa
respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of
attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
 Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US
Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-2041; 521-
0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as
a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said
advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law
but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of
modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona,2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised
herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar
Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP),
and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar
associations readily responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation
of which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of
the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it
proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position
papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda
submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support
services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily
dictate that the same are essentially without substantial
distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice
of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make
issue with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the
IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of
concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper
publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of
this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from
undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed.4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that
it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services
to the public, the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact
simply assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently
because this (is) the effect that the advertisements have on the
reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be
traced, first of all, to the very name being used by respondent —
"The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted
connotes the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just
like a medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes
lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with (the)
scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression
that it is being operated by members of the bar and that it offers
legal services. In addition, the advertisements in question appear
with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer
from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering
"legal support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal
services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent would
have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in
the minds of the reading public that legal services are being
offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the general
public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements,
however, emphasize to Guam divorce, and any law student ought
to know that under the Family Code, there is only one instance
when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a
marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of
permanent union between a man and woman
entered into accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relation during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that
the message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only
misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of
Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition,
which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just
Married" on its bumper and seems to address those planning a
"secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability.
Worse, this particular advertisement appears to encourage
marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral
publication of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can
readily be concluded that the above impressions one may gather
from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are
being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity
simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression
that respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that
it offers legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals, good
customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning
the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined
from causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or
any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or
offering some of the services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal
research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence,
and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and should
not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct
of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be
better performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for
admission to the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon
the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits
and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a typewriter,
even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to
allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for
the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more
importantly, for the protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to
perform all of its services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar.
Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's
services ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to
suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are
bigamous or otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a
legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on
which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for
illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or
perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But
nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for
profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and
every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court.5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law
but engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen,
through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment).
This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding out
itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.,"
and soliciting employment for its enumerated services fall within
the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a
certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies
its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of
lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to
look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the
practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it.
Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely,
the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly
admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons
and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage
in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves
under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the
persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the
issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but
also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and
punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It
claims that it merely renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary
Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5
of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on
Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign
divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and
such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the
aforesaid law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto,
the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava
Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount
consideration should be given to the protection of the general
public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons
or entities who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous
four-year course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations.
Only then, is a lawyer qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as
an aid to the administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would
qualify these paralegals to deal with the general public as such.
While it may now be the opportune time to establish these courses
of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these
do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public
from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the
general public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being
qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected
from the dangers which may be brought about by advertising of
legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under
the present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it
appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly,
measures should be taken to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise legal services without being
qualified to offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent,
however, seems to give the impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration,
visa extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal matters , will be given to
them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The
Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression
again that Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely
by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that there are
lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions
of its President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave
an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to
solicit cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of
Professional Responsibility of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters
it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the
celebration of a secret marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has to go to
said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling
the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized
only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ
an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners
legal services for their particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter of the petition, for
one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal
act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project
that secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a
fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they
could go about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in
this country there is none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good morals and
is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to
do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code of
Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held
that solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character
justify permanent elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law,
such as management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether
run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by
Respondent does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can
be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty
of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render effective service unless he
is familiar with such statutes and regulations. He
must be careful not to suggest a course of
conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear
that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and
his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with broad features
of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law —
accurate or inaccurate — moulds our conduct
not only when we are acting for ourselves, but
when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar
with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who
draws plans and specification in harmony with
the law. This is not practicing law.
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to
omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in
support of some measure that he recommends,
a decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are
not, provided no separate fee is charged for the
legal advice or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a
building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise
him and the architect in respect to the building
code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be
considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of the
industrial relations experts are the officers and
business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate
employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in
such matter, and without regard to legal thinking
or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger
employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing
into a recognized profession for which
appropriate courses are offered by our leading
universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have
no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the
graduates in their business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law,
we should consider his work for any particular
client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine
defendant being engaged primarily to advise as
to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client along the path
charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are
along economic and psychological lines. The law
only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law.
Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his
work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part
of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the
adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is
not per se the practice of law. Anyone may use
an agent for negotiations and may select an
agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to
accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may
be an exception where the business turns on a
question of law. Most real estate sales are
negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if
the value of the land depends on a disputed
right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of
the dispute and persuade the opposite party to
the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a
controversy between an employer and his men
grows from differing interpretations of a
contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that
defendant should not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the
employer before administrative agencies of the
federal government, especially before trial
examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by
virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties
before such agency. The State of New Jersey is
without power to interfere with such
 determination or to forbid representation before
the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give
to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31.
'Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and
ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this
phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53
A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to
Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a
lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-
legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code
of Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or
occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear
to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render
wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and
making arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is
actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the Legal
Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,
absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and
"B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not
constitute of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the subject and determines
on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to
take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely
giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such
would constitute unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a
legal text which publication of a legal text which
purports to say what the law is amount to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem
does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text
and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful
practice of law. But that is the situation with
many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A
PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly
the defendant's publication does not purport to
give personal advice on a specific problem
 peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice
of law . . . . There being no legal impediment
under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was
no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce,
separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment
against defendant having an interest in any
publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal
contact with any prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support, however, the finding
that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation
and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other
legal remedies and assistance in the preparation
of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting
the practice of law, particularly with reference to
the giving of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to specific problems of
particular individuals in connection with a
divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State
v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such
would constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this
light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for
the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give
the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a
secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other
requisites of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The
second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the
first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal
services?" or "legal support services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes
exigent for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles
and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to
inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the
legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice
of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients.
It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title
Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their right under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173,
176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill,
a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy
trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's
own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information
by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly
non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of
computers and modern information technology in the gathering,
processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information
and communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings prepared
by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations;
and assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services
from government or non-government agencies, like birth,
marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and other
matters that do not involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software
for the efficient management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of
research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to
laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy
thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its
attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to be
taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion
will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients
in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the
January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose
and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal
Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building
along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem,
and even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors
are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These specialist are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend
in the medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who
cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come,
we start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also.
They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take
your temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on.
That's how we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or
follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter
of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital,
 out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common
cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt
with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of
property, we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put
in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right
to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were
other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need
a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of
the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the
statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has caused to be
published and are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-
stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal
services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of
law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such
in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would
wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice
of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted
to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law
is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied with all
the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound
knowledge of legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the construction,
interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the
bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the
judicial department can exercise little control.27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept
in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession
be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and
not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,
there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the
"paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines
for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even
been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in
the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what
may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not
duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in
behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited
in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into
the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his
talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The
prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests
on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus,
in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade.
The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a
normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of
the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two
broad categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public
offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and
offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing
of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience
of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for
which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold
that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-
mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved
in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such
authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the general rule,
such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the
canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as
in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after
the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with
respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent
would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the
legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media
and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the
face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid
a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P.
Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the
purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect
since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter
be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or
engage in the practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing some so-called
paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern
and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for
the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof.
That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as
Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics
as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General
for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
A.C. No. 5299 August 19, 2003 In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the
Information Office,Complainant, interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising;
vs. that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Respondent. the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling
x-----------------------x that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public
policy and public order as long as it is dignified.4
G.R. No. 157053 August 19, 2003
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation,
report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, Petitioner,
Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation
vs.
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity
Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one
as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.
(1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. 7
RESOLUTION
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,8 which was
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 20029

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads:
entitled, "Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar
"ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667."1
Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, Respondents." This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the per the Court’s Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest
Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation
pleadings.10 Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is
of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a
not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. 11 Respondent, on the
other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6,
2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star. 2
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Rule 2.03. – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative
solicit legal business.
complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation
of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 3
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.12 It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.15 The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in
which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an "officer of the court" to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his contrition rings hollow
considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight
months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14,
2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he caused the
same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled "Annulment of Marriage Specialist," he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still
considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained
in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact encourages
people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from
dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to
the lawyer and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names
of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as
advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even
the use of calling cards is now acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v.
Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to
the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in
other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their
written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated
or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of
the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,
publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in vs.
the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.
of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a
telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis DECISION
and italics supplied)
PER CURIAM:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S.
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
'L1halingcos (resrondent) with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
Professional Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
severely.
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent’s first marriage was
subsisting.1
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required
information and guidance.
respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
SO ORDERED. recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record. 4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a
Notice5 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005.
During the conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and
respondent. They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by

nonpayment of fees to complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having

married thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while
complainant submitted his on 01 August 2005.8

Complainant’s Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a
financial consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the
latter’s numerous petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts.
Complainant claimed that they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be
entitled to ₱ 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they would
handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by their clients. He alleged
that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in millions of
pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together.
Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of ₱ 900,000 for the 18
Stay Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total
of ₱ 4,539,000 from the fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant appended to his
Complaint several annexes supporting the computation of the fees he believes are
due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in
violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly
respondent set up two financial consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.
and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal
services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his
Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10 letter-proposals to
clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made to the
latter by their clients.12
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of
committing two counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first
marriage was subsisting. He submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by
the Office of the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that
Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage thrice: first, on 15 July
1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time
on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the
third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita, Manila. 13
Respondent’s Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that
complainant was not an employee of his law firm – Tabalingcos and Associates Law
Office14 – but of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that complainant was unprofessional and
incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant, resulting in the latter’s
dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them
regarding the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of complainant had been
paid.17
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He
contended that his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.,
whereby the firm would handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case;
and that the latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case’ such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To support this
contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint Venture Agreement
dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices
and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena,
Vice-President for Operations of the said company.19
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by
William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as
having no probative value, since it had been retracted by the affiant
himself.20 Respondent did not specifically address the allegations regarding his
alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage
Contracts.21 To the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage
Contracts referred to in the Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended
Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places and names of the contracting parties
indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered
into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a marriage that took
place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July
1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G.
Piñon, and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28
September 1987.24 The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between
respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7 September 1989 in
Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage Contracts, respondent was
described as single under the entry for civil status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit
filed by complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the
mandatory conference or submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus,
respondent was supposedly deprived of the opportunity to controvert those
documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by
the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Respondent
further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and
Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Biñan, Laguna, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed
another Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at
the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions,
he claimed that he had recently discovered that there were Marriage Contracts in
the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon
and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they
were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a
clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the
Commission that he would not attend the hearing,30respondent manifested his
willingness to attend and moved for the suspension of the resolution of the
administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed
with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts he
discovered to be bearing his name.31
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original
copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent,
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32The first criminal
case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage
contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his marriage with
Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as Criminal Case No. 07-
257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting
marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was
still subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of
P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the
same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings
pending the outcome of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTC–
Laguna. Thus, the Commission resolved that the administrative case against him be
submitted for resolution.36
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first
charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was
dismissed for lack of merit. The Commission ruled that the charge should have been
filed with the proper courts since it was only empowered to determine respondent’s
administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed to prove dishonesty on the
part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found respondent to
have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for
the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he
violated.39
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross
immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. It found that
complainant was able to prove through documentary evidence that respondent
committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the latter’s first
marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off
the roll of attorneys.41
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
154, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.42 On 01 August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
arguing that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends that
the Commission should have suspended the disbarment proceedings pending the
resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the annulment of the marriage
contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts with other
women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to
establish that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the
punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to archive the administrative
proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of
Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.43
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending
respondent’s disbarment.44
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP’s dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not
concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the
former’s share in the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is
violative of Rule 9.0245 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is
proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services
rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients that
complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer
convincing evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a
layperson to share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null
and void, and that the lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct.
Considering that complainant’s allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising
legal services through various business entities. Complainant submitted
documentary evidence to prove that Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel
Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the
latter’s legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the truth
of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was
breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities
mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services,
purporting to be specialized in corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of
the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting
cases for the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation.
Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in
such a manner as to be inconsistent with the lawyer’s duties as a member of the bar.
This inconsistency arises when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can be used as a
cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf; or is of a nature that, if handled
by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed
a vehicle used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment;
specifically for corporate rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a
letterhead of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal
services. The letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the
proposed fees, respondent would render legal services related to the former’s loan
obligation with a bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates
the Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law firm.
Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client
whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in
those occupations related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical
considerations governing the attorney-client relationship may be operative in one
and not in the other.51 In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is not clear
whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of
this practice by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter
for violating Rules 2.03 and 15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the
Marriage Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The
latter objected to the introduction of these documents, claiming that they were
submitted after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are not persuaded by his
argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the
qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the
procedural technicalities in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure — such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant — do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer's qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We
have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and
is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.1âwphi1 For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In
this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true copies to prove that respondent
entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he resorted to
vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other
marriages. He submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the
RTC of Laguna – one in Biñan and the other in Calamba – to declare the second and
the third Marriage Contracts null and void.55
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not
disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies
of the Marriage Contracts presented by complainant to prove the former’s marriages
to two other women aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment
proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified
by the NSO, which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the
birth, marriage and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency,
the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries with it a
presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not presented any competent
evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third
marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the
attached Petitions for Annulment and found that his allegations therein treated the
second and the third marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as
special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on marriage. He
did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage, prior to its
amendment by the Family Code. Respondent’s regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of
marriage or his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul
a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.
What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into
marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro
v. Alejandro,56 we held thus:
We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty
of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of
them not only as a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise,
for their continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in
his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an
attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected to be competent,
honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws
in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor
lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as
the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The
administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer
of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his
part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as
a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution
demanding respect and dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted
grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court.58
Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that
his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S.
Tabalingcos as follows:
1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and
solicitation.
3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly
immoral conduct.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. A.C. No. 6593 February 4, 2010
Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
Roll of Attorneys.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit1 and a supplemental affidavit2 for

disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty.
Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-
affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage
on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was
solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children,
namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo,
Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. x x x x

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of
my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of
1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child
of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May
Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August 1990,
she saw my husband strolling at the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively
xxx

5. x x x x

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure
the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said
child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty.
Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978.
 7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty.
Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us
our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped
schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the
same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I
suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings
and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,3 Atty. Garrido denied Maelotisea’s charges and imputations.
By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was
already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further
alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his "bad boy" image
before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due
to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty.
Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied
that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing
that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from
college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. 4 Atty.
Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her
profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the
death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea
were born before he became a lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,5 Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty.
Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since
the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing
marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea
knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they
(Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her
relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty.
Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty.
Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her
silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty.
Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings6 in view of the
criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity7 (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of
merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss8 the complaints after the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and
Maelotisea "an absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints
against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any
immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the
acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.9
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against
the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty.
Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.10 The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline likewise denied this motion.11
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the
respondents’ disbarment.12 The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of
Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation
with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This
resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which
lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P.
Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18,
2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for
review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross
immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations
to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his
promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
(Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment
on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to
reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-
year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by
filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal
also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to
Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure – such as the verification of
pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the
filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant – do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer’s qualifications and fitness for membership in the
Bar.13 We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this
ruling.14 First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.15 The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued
enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the
violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of
public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome
of the charge is wholly his or her own;16 effectively, his or her participation is that of
a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts
charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification
of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his
continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this
perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before
Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v.
Castillo,17 the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and
a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership
in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral
fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.18 Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications
to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary even after admission to the Bar.19
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary
authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the
Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the
implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take
before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotisea’s affidavit of
desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant
in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only
after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Court’s
examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance.
We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to
disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion
(and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show
a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community.20 Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
community’s sense of decency.21 We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.22
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who
contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,23 the respondent lawyer entered into multiple
marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the
respondent’s pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and
family – institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for
the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate
other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his
marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondent’s act of
contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified
the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,25 where the
respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in
Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage – a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared
his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and
morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of
Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible
to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies;
thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other
women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his
reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he
was already married to Constancia.26 This was a misrepresentation given as an
excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding
the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an
illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his
six (6) children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon
the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a
daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited
and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his
wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more
than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary
to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up
to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his
legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage
declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the
ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar.27 As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s oath,28 Section 20(a) of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,29 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,30 all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second
marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted
his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that he "shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the same Code, which
demands that "[a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that
he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the
laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs
and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public
impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and
abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to
free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards
and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.31 Lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing.32 Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful
public eye and community approbation.33Needless to state, those whose conduct –
both public and private – fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.34
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty.
Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross
immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978
when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good
moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the
lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage
to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x
x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null
and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that
degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.35
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective
reality.36 To have good moral character, a person must have the personal
characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation,
i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known.37 The requirement of good
moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.38 Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty.
Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or
to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s admitted
confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she
entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the
subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the
knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without
being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice
was sought by another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not
aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking
advice, thereby effectively alienating the other person’s feelings and affection from
his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null
and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six
(6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s
advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their
children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and willingness, Atty.
Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This
scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second
marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While
this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the
declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe
at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not
within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the
nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a
clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage
together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent
valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong39 leads us to the
opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia
afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her
"husband." Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live
and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this
marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all "sharing" her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse
sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions
grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for
she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom
he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high
degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two
previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be
scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the community’s sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family
build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her
husband with the woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited
the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly
to the highest standards of morality.40 In Barrientos v. Daarol,41 we held that lawyers,
as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these
standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of
the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be
withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the essential
qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the
power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal
professional and as an officer of the Court.42
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is
one of them. The records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral
misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral
character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of
supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his
plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of
the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances
are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally
demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply
brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without
placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an
on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant
in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another
copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena
P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the
civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
REMOTO, Petitioner, formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would
vs. require conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent. non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion;" anathema to religious
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
PUNO, C.J.:
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice
religious freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of
Mariano C. del Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion to
religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent with this
underscore some points that I deem significant.
policy of neutrality.6 (citations omitted and italics supplied)

FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run afoul
Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the
of the non-establishment clause1 of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on the
constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal – much less constitutional –
or political rights.7 Ang Ladlad’s right of political participation was unduly infringed
terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition for registration as a sectoral party principally
when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of its
on the ground that it "tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e.,
constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a
Christian2 and Muslim3) beliefs." To be sure, the COMELEC’s ruling is completely
morality police.
antithetical to the fundamental rule that "[t]he public morality expressed in the law
is necessarily secular[,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement"8 with
the state from establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions." 4 As we
religion by arguing that we "cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing, whether
explained in Estrada v. Escritor,5 the requirement of an articulable and discernible
Christian or Muslim"9 since the "moral precepts espoused by [these] religions have
secular purpose is meant to give flesh to the constitutional policy of full religious
slipped into society and … are now publicly accepted moral norms."10 However, as
freedom for all, viz.:
correctly observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the Philippines has not seen fit to
disparage homosexual conduct as to actually criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State
Religion also dictates "how we ought to live" for the nature of religion is not just to
has legislated to this effect, the law is vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy
know, but often, to act in accordance with man's "views of his relations to His
grounds.11 These alleged "generally accepted public morals" have not, in reality,
Creator." But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment of
crossed over from the religious to the secular sphere.
this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the affirmative
"establishment" of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This
Some people may find homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and offensive.
agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the "war of all sects against
Nevertheless, private discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be attributed or
all"; the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social contract produced
ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the United States (U.S.)
by religious truce.
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas,12 opined:
Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or "public morals" in the Revised
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
Penal Code, or "morals" in the New Civil Code, or "moral character" in the
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious
Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand,
beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional
and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality referred to
family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which
thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the
question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power
of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the …
law. "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code."13
SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition of the term "sexual
orientation,"14 as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with
men,15 as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals
a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal
liberty. For, the "ability to [independently] define one’s identity that is central to any
concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the
"emotional enrichment from close ties with others."16 As Mr. Justice Blackmun so
eloquently said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 17 (overturned by the
United States Supreme Court seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas18):
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality[.]"19 The fact that individuals
define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right"
ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds.20
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of giving
individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact
that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in holding that the
clearly important state interest in public education should give way to a competing
claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal schooling threatened their
way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no assumption that today's majority is
‘right’ and the Amish and others like them are ‘wrong.’ A way of life that is odd or
even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be
condemned because it is different."21 The Court claims that its decision today merely
refuses to recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the
Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have
in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others. (italics supplied)
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.22 Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain
intimate conduct.23 These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause.24 At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.25 Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.26 Lawrence v. Texas27 is again instructive:
To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for us to acknowledge
that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. When
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice. (italics supplied)
THIRD. The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals
and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause.
Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of
judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only
show that the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest.
I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation
is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review.
Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection
challenges in the main have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a
deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law
unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.28 However, Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas,29 carved out an exception to this general rule, such that prejudice to
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires stricter judicial
scrutiny than mere rationality, viz.:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a
stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our
fundamental law, the Court ruled in favor of the Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. in this wise:
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power,
we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file
employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso.
xxxx
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is
also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the
latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the class of
rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993,
Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and
SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxxx
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees
from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly...
xxxx
The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued
operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653,
thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates
to the constitutionality of the classification — albeit made indirectly as a
consequence of the passage of eight other laws — between the rank-and-file of the
BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but
must also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its
operation, so as practically to make unjust distinctions between persons who are
without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions:
Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage
of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand
constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude the rank-
and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so unbridled as
to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity
manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and
progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal
protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can only be
invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately, as opposed to a
discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and
(b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of
the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby
proscribing any evaluation vis-à-vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several
similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the
mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a
policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on
a policy determination — even those that have been declared to contravene the
Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to sustain the validity of a
statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever prosper.
There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or
by the Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the
Constitution.
xxxx
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL,
there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so
as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to
mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not
only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and the seven other GFIs.
xxxx
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the
other seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination
— no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the
subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when
such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes without any
rational basis.
xxxx
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and
its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in
consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law.
There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting
edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed,
the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the special status and
protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and
international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in the
Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority
to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes
discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general
principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education,
the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in
favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more
reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of
work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace — the factory,
the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which employers treat
their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to
both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial
obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in
Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
xxxx
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational
basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right,
or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down
any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This is true
whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or the
government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down
regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the
lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that
are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees are
limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank — possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement — are given higher compensation packages to
entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees
consist of people whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the officers — who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of
the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services,
extend to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all."
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves
strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (citations omitted and italics
supplied)
Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal
protection grounds is subject to one of three levels of judicial scrutiny. The level of
review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with the type of classification utilized and the
nature of the right affected.30
If a legislative classification disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon the
exercise of a "fundamental right," then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the
statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.31 Over the
years, the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for
equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage,
national origin, and ancestry.32 The underlying rationale of this theory is that where
legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of
constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken
down.33 In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the
government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.34
On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives
rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a
"quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened
review.35 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an
important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but
the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on
broad generalizations.36 Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-
suspect classes include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.37
If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be
tested for mere rationality.38 This is a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the
Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a
legislative task and an unavoidable one.39 The presumption is in favor of the
classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate
grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which the State acted.40
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative
classifications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has looked to four factors,41 thus:
(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the
legislation;42
(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical
class member's ability to contribute to society;43
(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond the
class members' control;44 and
(4) The political power of the subject class.45
These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, as to individually demand a certain weight.46 The U.S.
Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a flexible manner; it has neither
required, nor even discussed, every factor in every case.47 Indeed, no single talisman
can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the
equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny;
experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide. 48
In any event, the first two factors – history of intentional discrimination and
relationship of classifying characteristic to a person's ability to contribute – have
always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied.49 They have been
critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a
group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.50 However, the last two factors –
immutability of the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group – are
considered simply to supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need
for heightened scrutiny exists.51
Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex
or gender – albeit on a male/female, man/woman basis – have been previously held
to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classification on the basis of
sexual orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect
classification that prompts intermediate review.
The first consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful
unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation.52 One cannot, in good faith,
dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been, and continue to be, the
target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual
orientation.53Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration for party-
list accreditation in fact state:
6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence
perpetuated against the LGBT Community, among which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents
and/or guardians to make them conform to standard gender
norms of behavior;
(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are
butch lesbians to be raped[, so as] to "cure" them into becoming
straight women;
(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school,
NGOs, and choirs because of their identity;
(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused
admission from (sic) certain schools, are suspended or are
automatically put on probation;
(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work benefits
once one’s sexual orientation and gender identity is (sic) revealed;
(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age, are broken up by their parents or
guardians using the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;
(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed
on gays and lesbians to "reform" them;
(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric
counseling and therapy to cure them[,] despite the de-listing (sic)
of homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association;
(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-
identity as women and dress as such, are denied entry or services
in certain restaurants and establishments; and
(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed
against gay men, but were not acknowledged by police as hate
crimes or violent acts of bigotry.
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testified
that as a young gay person in the Philippines, he was subjected to a variety
of sexual abuse and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could not
report to [the] police [or speak of] to his own parents.
Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden placed
on lesbian and gay people as a class is "more likely than others to reflect deep-
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective."54
A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to the
person’s ability to contribute to society.55 Heightened scrutiny is applied when the
classification bears no relationship to this ability; the existence of this factor indicates
the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice.56 Insofar as
sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of
Public Health,57 viz.:
The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person's
ability to participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts have
acknowledged, as well. x x x If homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of
impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire
phenomenon of ‘staying in the [c]loset’ and of ‘coming out’ would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status. x x x In this critical respect, gay persons stand
in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect
class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the distinguishing
characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or capacity to perform
certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in society.58
Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears no
relation at all to [an] individual's ability to contribute fully to society." 59 Indeed,
because an individual's homosexual orientation "implies no impairment in judgment,
stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities";60 the observation of
the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national origin -all suspect
classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection- "are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in
such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy"61 is no less
applicable to gay persons. (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to perform
and contribute to society than is heterosexual orientation.62
A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a
class are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is whether
the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or otherwise
beyond their control.63 Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay persons
from others and qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group is the
characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism, namely,
their attraction to persons of the same sex.64
Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because the
inability of a person to change a characteristic that is used to justify different
treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather "‘basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual
responsibility.’"65 However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is
not reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is
absolutely impossible to change.66 That is, the immutability prong of the suspectness
inquiry surely is satisfied when the identifying trait is "so central to a person's
identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing
to change [it]."67
Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to
repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory
treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's
identity.68 Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be altered [if at all] only at
the expense of significant damage to the individual’s sense of self," classifications
based thereon "are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable
characteristic."69 Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type of human trait
that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary
or susceptible to self-help.70
The final factor that bears consideration is whether the group is "a minority or
politically powerless."71 However, the political powerlessness factor of the level-of-
scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political
powerlessness.72 Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be "whether the
group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and
discrimination through traditional political means."73
Applying this standard, it would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are
entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political
progress.74 The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and
severe – even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to
contribute to or perform in society – that it is highly unlikely that legislative
enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination.75 Furthermore, insofar
as the LGBT community plays a role in the political process, it is apparent that their
numbers reflect their status as a small and insular minority.76
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and
stereotyping.77
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the
intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and
intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is
born of animosity toward the class of persons affected78 (that is, lesbian, gay,
bisexual and trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based
classification undertaken for its own sake cannot survive.79
FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the
party-list system because it is not a "marginalized and underrepresented sector"
enumerated either in the Constitution80 or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941.81 However,
this position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC,82where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the LGBT
community as marginalized and underrepresented, considering their long history
(and indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my
humble view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation encompasses
social marginalization as well. To hold otherwise is tantamount to trivializing socially
marginalized groups as "mere passive recipients of the State’s benevolence" and
denying them the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream of representative
democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them."83 The party-list
system could not have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of
their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and
MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B .
Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C.
Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria
Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco
& Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C.
Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses
Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C.
Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children,
Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C.
Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho &
Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi
Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on
behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion
M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON
WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon,
THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao,
M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC.,
represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I.
YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its
National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A.
Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic
and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and
Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO,
M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For
Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD,
WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO
collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for
themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as
Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z.
CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL
ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO,
JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS
FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of
Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a
developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy
and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to
be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose,
that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the
country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures
and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until
it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the
Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis
the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely
circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker campaigns,3 from
rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the
society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No.
10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M.
Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens,
lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the
Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on
behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life
Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De
Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens
(Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen
(Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and
the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as
a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
 (9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and
Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens,
taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines
Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-
Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation,
Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and
members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and
several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ
Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein
M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his
capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY)
, an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it
causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners
contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs
to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers
such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical
officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public
health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to
implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. 40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona
services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a
medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health
services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of
the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed
that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive
use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for
"any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to
be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs
and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they
shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and
judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to
explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right
to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners
note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and
operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by
the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory
reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to
raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining
to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the
parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority
to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of
legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to
the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient
and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section
26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units
(LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is
contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at
the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective
comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside
from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in
behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the
Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH), 58 Ana
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective
Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013,
Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no
actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation
of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until
July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the
parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and
the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On
July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral
argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of
the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their
clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June
18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale,
Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although
contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or
distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions
relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on
Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered as
the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that
promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16,
1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the
Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family
planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means
will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and
morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued
Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others,
made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all
acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on
the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy,
the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family
planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made
in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August
14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, "
which, among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health
services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on
galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million
Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year
2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that
the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that
its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To
make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to
provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth
to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right
to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect
and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the
passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se.
As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly
licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under
the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from
the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the
fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and
provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the
program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full
range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court
has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it
behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it
should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect the
compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the
political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of
the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the
validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its
face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of
the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which
obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in
the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment
of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of
separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government,
in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional.
Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or
political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done
within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law,
it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those
cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review
may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation
that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches,
since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that
they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the
actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v.
COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In
Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. "
Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional
provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue
which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
"judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation
of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that
balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and
that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal
right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a
real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an
actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would
be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued
that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no
concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act
in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a
law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that
the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present
a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but
also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right
of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple
expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as
a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners
cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule
is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government
act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule
on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more
than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition
for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public,
but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of
all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right
to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional
rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of
society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before
taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the
life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120 Suffice it to
state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-
one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood"
and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices,
and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G
Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress
to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than
technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights,
the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose
and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions,
ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not
be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real
subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable
human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe
that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the
unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section
4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary
to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient"
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research
shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized
ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the
petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural
law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not
prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually
supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used
for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH
Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-
abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and
supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that
contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was
enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World
Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that
the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment
only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's
right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life
begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that
the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled
"An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country
has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the
years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods
evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on
the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights
and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from
R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No.
9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has
always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not
merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous
with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of
the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez
v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle
of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming
pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental
Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S.
Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
[Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme
Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy"
and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is
fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of
human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question
that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically
says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in
nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly,
as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a
geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital
signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has
life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the
moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this
happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only -
and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if
the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be
human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not
"from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life
begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us
here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the
Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of
writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life
begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and
that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life
begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we
should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point.
Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right
now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg
meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine
whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because
it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in
the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized
ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the
uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called
contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned under
this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state
whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and
based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress
from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life,
recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the
point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of
the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just
like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of
the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner
Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive.
There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some
contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which
has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the
moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will
have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even
admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal
ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche: Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet. And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158

Justice Bersamin: Medical Meaning

There is no life. That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s
Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning
Atty. Noche: of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and
forms a viable zygote."159
So, there is no life to be protected.
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote
Justice Bersamin: from which the embryo develops."160

To be protected. The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by

medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person)
begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
Atty. Noche:
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition
that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Under Section 12, yes.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human
Justice Bersamin:
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
So you have no objection to condoms? events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary
oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the
Atty. Noche: sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This
fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or
Not under Section 12, Article II. primordium, of a human being."162

Justice Bersamin: The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They
wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity? because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism
is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
Atty. Noche: pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is
restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic
unity."
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I
am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper
on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded
Justice Bersamin:
that:
Alright.
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA
maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that
conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment
of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the
purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point
along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human
being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape
this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined
"moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view
of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can
be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus.
The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being
complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been conceptualized
only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of
any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine
wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record
of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception,
explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever
passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at
this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice
Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus
for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized
ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall
be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities,
services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the
purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of
reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to
decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing
and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free
of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do
so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health:
Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law,
presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those
that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an
abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life
and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear
because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first
kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing
or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH
Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon.
Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given
upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that:
one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two,
the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way
until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized
and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum
prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the
fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's
position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is
implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by
the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys
the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that
"any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The
FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used
as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the
contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9,
as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA
that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be
used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the
second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any
means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used
for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely
abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law
defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern
family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that
prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes
as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and
be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well
taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
"primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole
known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of
the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an
abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the
PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with
the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is
sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other
in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of
being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution." 175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the
constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires
the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family
products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same
in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of
developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral
contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the
risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is
contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a
threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under
Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed
legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex
lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not
self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy.
Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the
claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard,
the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to
health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for
the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power
to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do
not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the
status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a
duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are
made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot
be dispensed and used without prescription.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which
is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female
ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent
introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of
preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act
shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921
provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly
established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An
relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the
Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH
Law which provides:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell,
dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a
procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a
whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government
qualified medical practitioner.
bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The
supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels
and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space
or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and
monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by
the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for
public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on
the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative
only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not
Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of
the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that
the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without
the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not
covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their
religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially
claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing
participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner
PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is
contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of
the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the
transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives,
arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee
of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon
the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health
services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to
in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred to
in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH
Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the
requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add
that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they
tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health
services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they
are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer
the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider infringes
on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling
participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the
right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the
RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to
justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or
threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development,
health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are
being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be
couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to
obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to
participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious
beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim
that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs
afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that
a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither
imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only
seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality
reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the
Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices,
which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no
one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be
allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to
religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the
entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily
infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the
duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents
claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be
couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any
information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State. 204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family
planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy.
Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of
the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general
acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is
made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds.
History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious
people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom
they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the
preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody our
ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence
and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition
and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the
State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the
mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption
of church property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and
optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of
separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot
impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are
good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in
its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house
of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier
to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays
down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of
the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's
chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the
liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose
is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as
being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970)
But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which
has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish
its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led.
2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe,
and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in
Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when
weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom
of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State
and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by
the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent
and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was
further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application
or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts." 217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state
interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject
to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning
with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court
mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless,
this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona
case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether
it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case
mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law
of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least
restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went
back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger"
test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went
back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican Bible
Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present
danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another,
religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the
other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will
not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which
was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed
the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed
the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test
was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and
Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not
congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising
from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's
interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and
far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However,
not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the
words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is
an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus
the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing
of interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not
appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the
fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy
burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining
which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness
shall be the guide. The "compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering
religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount
interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state,
without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be
compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against
his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of
Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all
methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods which
have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as
those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have
the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly
of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance
with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs,
taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and
people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector
and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women,
the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the
needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing
and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic
concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases
supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because
the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the
State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes
simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church
and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and
unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under
the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the
Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an
intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates
the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at
the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a
false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in
conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal,
but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the
right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This
in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his
mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks
to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals,
on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and
information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to
enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the
RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and
conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the
constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found
in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health
Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate,
supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions. 226 The
Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the
person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more
complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the
same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail
or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the
Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services
and in the performance of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of
health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well
aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to
allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the
common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to
ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is
bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right
the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare
service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which Congressman Lagman:
the Court cannot allow.
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR) thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads: Justice Mendoza:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But
officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal
virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others,
provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the
objectors. provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors." Do you agree with this?
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious
objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health Congressman Lagman:
officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered
exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom Justice Mendoza:
to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its
free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the government.
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can
be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional
hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in right to the religious belief?
the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or
through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or
Congressman Lagman:
in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
association.229
prevail.230
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in
Compelling State Interest
the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the
Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-
IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail. The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in
defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling
state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render;
Justice Mendoza:
and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the
least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52,
you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain.
religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing
that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to
Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG
maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes
disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling
State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses
to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State
interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free
speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the
relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to
become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who
object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be
momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the
very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to
achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The
health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may
perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and
motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter
reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional
freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure
that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand
now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act
of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of
Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and
programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services
and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The
State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-
responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle
and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall
be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices,
interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address
pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family
planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and
health services without prejudice to the primary right and duty of
parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections,
including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like
breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions
and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and
children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance
towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual
dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years;
and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health
problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and
projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide
women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information
and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government
education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing
of the youth and the development of moral character and the right
of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human
dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods
including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the
compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to
substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that
the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling
state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in
the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible,
the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill
in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional
harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a
"good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the
mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he
can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible
to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above
principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not
intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of
abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their
lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering
the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of
the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the
life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 239 as a condition for the issuance
of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the
religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for
would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding
and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods
to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly
noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during their attendance in the
required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are
completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It
argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than
promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the
basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the
family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth,
contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars
the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process
regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their
authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any
person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following
persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and
vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision
between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the
founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State
shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a
family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their
right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them " is equally recognized.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have
equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between
parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of
marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was
first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in
Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in
and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked
Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
institution.241
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would
affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their
The Family and Parental Consent
children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure
belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they
chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is
not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a
need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice,
and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and
father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent
is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It
is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an
inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents.
It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-
held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition
that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as
one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in
the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or
has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution
of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under
Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and
access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court
finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would
enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After
all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the
life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable
a person to make informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance
of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must
be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance
and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or
reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such
cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the
spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently
needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck
down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective
surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases
where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions
discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence
of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right
of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of
academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe
that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies
conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-
of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion
and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of
promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH
Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet
to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One
can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be
used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the
premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is
superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-
reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and
teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents; women's
rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development;
and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and
Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage
behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents
- the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health
education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well
be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing
such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section
14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs,
the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates
the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l)
mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held
punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They
argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a
"private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service
and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are
also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or
from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and
providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every
part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care
service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution,
which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and
operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment
and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity,
or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care
professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health
worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker
who has undergone training programs under any accredited government and NGO
and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after
having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance
with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law,
instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion
for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information
and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes
health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide
incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or
intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range
of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a
copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the
requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public
health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and
correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their
own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health,
their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The
public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under
the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They
argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially
those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound
on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been
embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness
in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper
weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be
made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given
priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The
State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor
to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does
not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion
and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement
of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have
and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While
the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to
have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into
its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the
poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive
health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the
mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational
institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed
provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of
the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service
providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services,
actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners
to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17
can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health
care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro
bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth
being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate
it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the
power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or
trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point
of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes
the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers
to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or
whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made
upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive
imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods
fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be
called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH).
Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health
products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the
implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of
health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity,
safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve
as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for
compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers,
importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
 "x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to
the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity,
and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,
wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health
products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that
said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint
for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That
for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty
(30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process
has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any
health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury
to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe,
dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement
the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the
appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are
specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the
country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the
mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting
only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the
declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient,
and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in
Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected
reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature
may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section
17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties
and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall
continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant
to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other
powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded
projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works
and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and
those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered
under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government
under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic
facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs
against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy
is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the
RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged
to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For
said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment
by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can
be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy.
Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the
ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of
the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the
guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners
simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government,
which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power
to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the
veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the
relationship between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot
be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects
which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. 275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say
that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating
a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man
emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a
statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not
enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere
thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and
theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a natural
right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it
was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and
whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law
is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights
inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of
life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by providing information and making
non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to
the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks
to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As
earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society
cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the
Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the
Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues
is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population
growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run.
The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations
ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers
is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and
fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but
they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our
Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-
bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support
them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below
the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should
not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is
to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as
saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the
law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if
that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and
cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the
law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must
confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and
enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but
with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The
Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the
adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares
R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they:
a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to
modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar
as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical
procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR,
particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No.
8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one
which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses
to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders
 the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his
or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the
rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect
the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the
qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they
are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of
the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its
Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action
for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo
Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments,
plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to
the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de
minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court,
we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important
to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly
demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their
reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the
underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the
petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour
shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi
or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for
car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in
their "boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners,
he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned
that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon,
while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his
armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was
hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the
same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule
was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However,
on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the
previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth
P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he
adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for
"Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his
daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single
centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount
spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice
adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab
units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated
his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment
was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila
Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners
with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor
arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the same and such
unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who
claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private
respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed
by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that
Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left
their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed
the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally
terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering
petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this
resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition
is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public
respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions
are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical
and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray
any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114
of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no
showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the
taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents
must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require
his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made
for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is
engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the
practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or
desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for
loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly,
the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi
driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents
stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required
such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to
private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal
interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
 1988 720.00 760.00 200.00 Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer
who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00 law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

1990 605.00 570.00 Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily
1991 165.00 2,300.00 imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's
representative is a lawyer. 8
———— ———— ————

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P
Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car
2,700.00
wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and
effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to
respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date
withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even
of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's
deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition.
SO ORDERED.
We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since
the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed
the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his
decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter
of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to
restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and
as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s)
(private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the
amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find
nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the
driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car
wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private
respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their
P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty
is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents'
authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC
or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent
their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H.
G.R. No. 190957 June 5, 2013
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
APAC MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by CESAR M. ONG, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
SERRENO, CJ.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedures, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the Court of Appeals
(CA)1 correctly affirmed the court a quo2 in holding petitioner liable to respondent
for attorney’s fees.
The Antecedent Facts
Considering that there are no factual issues involved, as the Court of Appeals (CA)
adopted the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
96, we hereby adopt the CA’s findings, as follows:
The present case involves a simple purchase transaction between defendant-
appellant Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), represented by
defendants-appellants Rogelio Espiritu and Rolando Macasaet, and plaintiff-appellee
APAC, represented by Cesar M. Ong, Jr., involving crushed basalt rock delivered by
plaintiff-appellee to defendant-appellant PNCC.
On August 17, 1999, plaintiff-appellee filed with the trial court a complaint against
defendants-appellees for collection of sum of money with damages, alleging that (i)
in March 1998, defendants-appellants engaged the services of plaintiff-appellee by
buying aggregates materials from plaintiff-appellee, for which the latter had
delivered and supplied good quality crushed basalt rock; (ii) the parties had initially
agreed on the terms of payment, whereby defendants-appellants would issue the
check corresponding to the value of the materials to be delivered, or "Check Before
Delivery," but prior to the implementation of the said payment agreement,
defendants-appellants requested from plaintiff-appellee a 30-day term from the
delivery date within which to pay, which plaintiff-appellee accepted; and (iii) after
making deliveries pursuant to the purchase orders and despite demands by plaintiff-
appellee, defendants appellants failed and refused to pay and settle their overdue
accounts. The complaint prayed for payment of the amount of ₱782,296.80 "plus
legal interest at the rate of not less than 6% monthly, to start in April, 1999 until the
full obligation is completely settled and paid," among others.
On November 16, 1999, defendants-appellants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the complaint was premature considering that defendant-appellant PNCC had
been faithfully paying its obligations to plaintiff-appellee, as can be seen from the
substantial reduction of its overdue account as of August 1999.
In an Order dated January 17, 2000, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Thus, defendants-appellants filed their answer, alleging that the obligation of
defendant-appellant PNCC was only with respect to the balance of the principal
obligation that had not been fully paid which, based on the latest liquidation report,
amounted to only ₱474,095.92.
After the submission of the respective pre-trial briefs of the parties, trial was held.
However, only plaintiff-appellee presented its evidence. For their repeated failure to
attend the hearings, defendants-appellants were deemed to have waived the
presentation of their evidence.
On July 10, 2006, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, ordering
defendants jointly and solidarily to pay:
1. ₱782,296.80 as actual damages;
2. ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus ₱3,000.00 per court appearance;
3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Defendants-appellants filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that during the
pendency of the case, the principal obligation was fully paid and hence, the award by
the trial court of actual damages in the amount of ₱782,269.80 was without factual
and legal bases.
In an Order dated October 6, 2006, the trial court considered defendants-appellants’
claim of full payment of the principal obligation, but still it ordered them to pay legal
interest of twelve per cent (12%) per annum. Thus:
"WHEREFORE, the decision dated July 10, 2006 is hereby modified, by ordering
defendants jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff as follows, to wit:
1. ₱220,234.083
2. ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus ₱3,000.00 per court appearance;
3. Cost of Suit.
SO ORDERED."
Defendants-appellants filed the present appeal which is premised on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING INTEREST AT THE
RATE OF 12% PER ANNUM AMOUNTING TO ₱220,234.083 AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING DEFENDANTS ROGELIO
ESPIRITU AND ROLANDO MACASAET JOINTLY AND SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH
DEFENDANT PNCC.
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
On 9 July 2009, the Special Fourth Division of the CA promulgated a Decision 3 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 88827, affirming with modification the assailed Decision of the court a
quo. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated October 6, 2006 is affirmed, subject to the
modification that defendant-appellant PNCC is ordered to pay legal interest at six per
cent (6%) per annum on the principal obligation, computed from January 8, 1999
until its full payment in January 2001. Defendants-appellants Rogelio Espiritu and
Rolando Macasaet are absolved from liability. The Order dated October 6, 2006 is
affirmed in all other respects.
On 29 July 2009, herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which raised
the lone issue of the propriety of the award of attorney’s fees in favor of
respondent.4 It should be noted that in said motion, petitioner fully agreed with the
CA Decision imposing 6% legal interest per annum on the principal obligation and
absolving Rogelio Espiritu and Rolando Macasaet from any liability as members of
the board of directors of PNCC. Thus, the main focus of the Motion for
Reconsideration was on the CA’s affirmation of the court a quo’s Decision awarding
attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. However, the appellate court’s Former
Special Fourth Division denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in a
Resolution dated 18 January 2010.6
THE SOLE ISSUE
Aggrieved, petitioner now assails before us the 9 July 2009 Decision of the CA by
raising the sole issue of whether the CA gravely erred in awarding attorney’s fees to
respondent.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines states the policy that should
guide the courts when awarding attorney’s fees to a litigant. As a general rule, the
parties may stipulate the recovery of attorney’s fees. In the absence on such
stipulation, this article restrictively enumerates the instances when these fees may
be recovered, to wit:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the
plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;
 (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's of fact and law that would bring the case within the ambit of these enumerated
liability laws; instances to justify the grant of such award, and in all cases it must be reasonable.

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; We can glean from the above ruling that attorney’s fees are not awarded as a matter
of course every time a party wins. We do not put a premium on the right to litigate.
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; On occasions that those fees are awarded, the basis for the grant must be clearly
expressed in the decision of the court.1âwphi1
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. Petitioner contends that the RTC’s Decision has no finding that would fall under any
of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2208 of the new Civil Code. Further, it
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. alleges that the court a quo has not given any factual, legal, or equitable justification
for applying paragraph 11 of Article 2208 as basis the latter’s exercise of discretion in
holding petitioner liable for attorney’s fees.9
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA,7 this Court had the occasion to expound on the
policy behind the grant of attorney’s fees as actual or compensatory damages:
We agree with petitioner on these points.
(T)he law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered
as actual or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in We have consistently held that an award of attorney’s fees under Article 2208
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. demands factual, legal, and equitable justification to avoid speculation and
conjecture surrounding the grant thereof.10 Due to the special nature of the award of
attorney’s fees, a rigid standard is imposed on the courts before these fees could be
The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
granted. Hence, it is imperative that they clearly and distinctly set forth in their
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They
decisions the basis for the award thereof. It is not enough that they merely state the
are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
amount of the grant in the dispositive portion of their decisions. 11 It bears reiteration
award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable
that the award of attorney’s fees is an exception rather than the general rule; thus,
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
there must be compelling legal reason to bring the case within the exceptions
incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where
provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award.12
no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
We have perused the assailed CA’s Decision, but cannot find any factual, legal, or
8 equitable justification for the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondent. The
In Benedicto v. Villaflores, we explained the reason behind the need for the courts
appellate court simply quoted the portion of the RTC Decision that granted the
to arrive upon an actual finding to serve as basis for a grant of attorney’s fees,
award as basis for the affirmation thereof. There was no elaboration on the basis.
considering the dual concept of these fees as ordinary and extraordinary:
There is therefore an absence of an independent CA finding of the factual
circumstances and legal or equitable basis to justify the grant of attorney’s fees. The
It is settled that the award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general
CA merely adopted the RTC’s rational for the award, which in this case we find to be
rule; counsel's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of
sorely inadequate.
the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Attorney's fees,
as part of damages, are not necessarily equated to the amount paid by a litigant to a
The RTC found as follows:
lawyer. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to
the latter; while in its extraordinary concept, they may be awarded by the court as x x x since it is clear that plaintiff was compelled to hire the services of a counsel, to
indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party. litigate and to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party,
Attorney's fees as part of damages are awarded only in the instances specified in plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00 which it
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. As such, it is necessary for the court to make findings paid as acceptance fee and ₱3,000.00 as appearance fee.13
The only discernible reason proffered by the trial court in granting the award was
that respondent, as complainant in the civil case, was forced to litigate to protect the G.R. No. 173188 January 15, 2014
latter’s interest. Thus, we find that there is an obvious lack of a compelling legal
reason to consider the present case as one that falls within the exception provided THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE CADAVEDO AND BENITA
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Absent such finding, we hold that the award of ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased), substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA,
attorney’s fees by the court a quo, as sustained by the appellate court, was improper PASTORA, Heirs of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR., and
and must be deleted. ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners,
vs.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 9 July VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados, Respondents.
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88827 is MODIFIED, in that the award
of attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000 as acceptance fee and ₱3,000 as DECISION
appearance fee, in favor of respondent APAC Marketing Incorporated, is hereby
DELETED. BRION, J.:

No pronouncement as to costs. We solve in this Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to the
October 11, 2005 decision2 and the May 9, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED. (CA) inPetitioners, CA-G.R. CV No. 56948. The CA reversed and set aside the
September 17, 1996 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, of
Dipolog City in Civil Case No. 4038, granting in part the complaint for recovery of
possession of property filed by the petitioners, the Conjugal Partnership of the
Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo against Atty. Victorino (Vic) T.
Lacaya, married to Rosa Legados (collectively, the respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

The Spouses Vicente Cadavedo and Benita Arcoy-Cadavedo (collectively, the spouses
Cadavedo) acquired a homestead grant over a 230,765-square meter parcel of land
known as Lot 5415 (subject lot) located in Gumay, Piñan, Zamboanga del Norte. They
were issued Homestead Patent No. V-15414 on March 13, 1953andOriginal
Certificate of Title No. P-376 on July 2, 1953.On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo
sold the subject lot to the spouses Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez (the spouses
Ames) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4792 was subsequently issued in the
name of the spouses Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed an action5 before
the RTC(then Court of First Instance) of Zamboanga City against the spouses Ames
for sum of money and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter
failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo initially
engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons, later
withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty. Lacaya.
On February 24, 1969, Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of Planters in Good Faith with prayer for Preliminary Injunction. The spouses Cadavedo,
the sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses Ames as thru Atty. Lacaya, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and to
gross violation of the public land law. The amended complaint stated that the cancel TCT No. T-25984 (under the name of the spouses Ames’ children).
spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee basis. The contingency fee
stipulation specifically reads: On October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 1721,andthe spouses Cadavedo were placed in possession
10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forced to hire a lawyer of the subject lot on October 24, 1981. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-half of the subject
on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the subdivision of the subject lot into two equal
will pay the sum of ₱2,000.00 for attorney’s fees.6 portions, based on area, and selected the more valuable and productive half for
himself; and assigned the other half to the spouses Cadavedo.
In a decision dated February 1, 1972, the RTC upheld the sale of the subject lot to
Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-in-law entered the portion
the spouses Ames. The spouses Cadavedo, thru Atty. Lacaya, appealed the case to
assigned to the respondents and ejected them. The latter responded by filing a
the CA.
counter-suit for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC); the ejectment
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 215. This incident occurred while Civil Case No.
On September 18, 1975, and while the appeal before the CAin Civil Case No.
3352was pending.
1721was pending, the spouses Ames sold the subject lot to their children. The
spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No. T-25984was
On May 13, 1982, Vicente andAtty. Lacaya entered into an amicable settlement
issued in their children’s names. On October 11, 1976, the spouses Ames mortgaged
(compromise agreement)8 in Civil Case No. 215 (the ejectment case), re-adjusting
the subject lot with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in the names of
the area and portion obtained by each. Atty. Lacaya acquired 10.5383 hectares
their children.
pursuant to the agreement. The MTC approved the compromise agreementin a
decision dated June 10, 1982.
On August 13, 1980, the CA issued itsdecision in Civil Case No. 1721,reversing the
decision of the RTC and declaring the deed of sale, transfer of rights, claims and
Meanwhile, on May 21, 1982, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action
interest to the spouses Ames null and void ab initio. It directed the spouses
against the DBP for Injunction; it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3443 (Cadavedo v.
Cadavedo to return the initial payment and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel
DBP).The RTC subsequently denied the petition, prompting the spouses Cadavedo to
the spouses Ames’ TCT No. T-4792 and to reissue another title in the name of the
elevate the case to the CAvia a petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the petition
spouses Cadavedo. The case eventually reached this Court via the spouses Ames’
in its decision of January 31, 1984.
petition for review on certiorari which this Court dismissed for lack of merit.

The records do not clearly disclose the proceedings subsequent to the CA decision in
Meanwhile, the spouses Ames defaulted in their obligation with the DBP. Thus, the
Civil Case No. 3443. However, on August 18, 1988, TCT No. 41051was issued in the
DBP caused the publication of a notice of foreclosure sale of the subject lot as
name of the spouses Cadavedo concerning the subject lot.
covered by TCT No. T-25984(under the name of the spouses Ames’ children). Atty.
Lacaya immediately informed the spouses Cadavedo of the foreclosure sale and filed
an Affidavit of Third Party Claim with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff on On August 9, 1988, the spouses Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action9 against the
September 14, 1981. respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise agreement. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4038 and is the root of the present case. The spouses
Cadavedo prayed, among others, that the respondents be ejected from their one-
With the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 1721,Atty. Lacaya filed on
half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to render an accounting of the
September 21, 1981 a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.
produce of this one-half portion from 1981;and that the RTC fix the attorney’s fees
on a quantum meruit basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty. Lacaya
On September 23, 1981,and pending the RTC’s resolution of the motion for the
incurred while handling the civil cases.
issuance of a writ of execution, the spouses Ames filed a complaint7 before the RTC
against the spouses Cadavedo for Quieting of Title or Enforcement of Civil Rights due
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 4038, the spouses Cadavedo executed a Deed
of Partition of Estate in favor of their eight children. Consequently, TCT No. 41051
was cancelled and TCT No. 41690 was issued in the names of the latter. The records
are not clear on the proceedings and status of Civil Case No. 3352.
The Ruling of the RTC
In the September 17, 1996 decision10 in Civil Case No. 4038, the RTC declared the
contingent fee of 10.5383 hectares as excessive and unconscionable. The RTC
reduced the land area to 5.2691 hectares and ordered the respondents to vacate
and restore the remaining 5.2692hectares to the spouses Cadavedo.
The RTC noted that, as stated in the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya, the
agreed attorney’s fee on contingent basis was ₱2,000.00. Nevertheless, the RTC also
pointed out that the parties novated this agreement when they executed the
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case), thereby giving Atty.
Lacaya one-half of the subject lot. The RTC added that Vicente’s decision to give Atty.
Lacaya one-half of the subject lot, sans approval of Benita, was a valid act of
administration and binds the conjugal partnership. The RTC reasoned out that the
disposition redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership as it was done
precisely to remunerate Atty. Lacaya for his services to recover the property itself.
These considerations notwithstanding, the RTC considered the one-half portion of
the subject lot, as Atty. Lacaya’s contingent fee,excessive, unreasonable and
unconscionable. The RTC was convinced that the issues involved in Civil Case No.
1721were not sufficiently difficult and complicated to command such an excessive
award; neither did it require Atty. Lacaya to devote much of his time or skill, or to
perform extensive research.
Finally, the RTC deemed the respondents’ possession, prior to the judgment, of the
excess portion of their share in the subject lot to be in good faith. The respondents
were thus entitled to receive its fruits.
On the spouses Cadavedo’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC modified the
decision in its resolution11 dated December 27, 1996. The RTC ordered the
respondents to account for and deliver the produce and income, valued at ₱7,500.00
per annum, of the 5.2692hectares that the RTC ordered the spouses Amesto restore
to the spouses Cadavedo, from October 10, 1988 until final restoration of the
premises.
The respondents appealed the case before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
In its decision12 dated October 11, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s
September 17, 1996 decision and maintained the partition and distribution of the
subject lot under the compromise agreement. In so ruling, the CA noted the
following facts: (1) Atty. Lacaya served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel from 1969
until 1988,when the latter filed the present case against Atty. Lacaya; (2) during the
nineteen (19) years of their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lacaya represented the
spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases –Civil Case No. 1721, Civil Case No. 3352, and
Civil Case No. 3443; (3) the first civil case lasted for twelve years and even reached
this Court, the second civil case lasted for seven years, while the third civil case
lasted for six years and went all the way to the CA;(4) the spouses Cadavedo and
Atty. Lacaya entered into a compromise agreement concerning the division of the
subject lot where Atty. Lacaya ultimately agreed to acquire a smaller portion; (5) the
MTC approved the compromise agreement; (6) Atty. Lacaya defrayed all of the
litigation expenses in Civil Case No. 1721; and (7) the spouses Cadavedo expressly
recognized that Atty. Lacaya served them in several cases.
Considering these established facts and consistent with Canon 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (enumerating the factors that should guide the
determination of the lawyer’s fees), the CA ruled that the time spent and the extent
of the services Atty. Lacaya rendered for the spouses Cadavedo in the three cases,
the probability of him losing other employment resulting from his engagement, the
benefits resulting to the spouses Cadavedo, and the contingency of his fees justified
the compromise agreement and rendered the agreed fee under the compromise
agreement reasonable.
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners essentially argue that the CA erred in: (1)
granting the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half or 10.5383 hectares of the subject
lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of confirming the agreed contingent attorney’s fees of
₱2,000.00; (2) not holding the respondents accountable for the produce, harvests
and income of the 10.5383-hectare portion (that they obtained from the spouses
Cadavedo) from 1988 up to the present; and (3) upholding the validity of the
purported oral contract between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya when it
was champertous and dealt with property then still subject of Civil Case No. 1721.13
The petitioners argue that stipulations on a lawyer’s compensation for professional
services, especially those contained in the pleadings filed in courts, control the
amount of the attorney’s fees to which the lawyer shall be entitled and should
prevail over oral agreements. In this case, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya
agreed that the latter’s contingent attorney’s fee was ₱2,000.00 in cash, not one-half
of the subject lot. This agreement was clearly stipulated in the amended complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 1721. Thus, Atty. Lacaya is bound by the expressly stipulated
fee and cannot insist on unilaterally changing its terms without violating their
contract.
The petitioners add that the one-half portion of the subject lot as Atty. Lacaya’s
contingent attorney’s fee is excessive and unreasonable. They highlight the RTC’s
observations and argue that the issues involved in Civil Case No. 1721, pursuant to
which the alleged contingent fee of one-half of the subject lot was agreed by the
parties, were not novel and did not involve difficult questions of law; neither did the
case require much of Atty. Lacaya’s time, skill and effort in research. They point out
that the two subsequent civil cases should not be considered in determining the
reasonable contingent fee to which Atty. Lacaya should be entitled for his services in
Civil Case No. 1721,as those cases had not yet been instituted at that time. Thus,
these cases should not be considered in fixing the attorney’s fees. The petitioners
also claim that the spouses Cadavedo concluded separate agreements on the
expenses and costs for each of these subsequent cases, and that Atty. Lacaya did not
even record any attorney’s lien in the spouses Cadavedo’s TCT covering the subject
lot.
The petitioners further direct the Court’s attention to the fact that Atty. Lacaya,in
taking over the case from Atty. Bandal, agreed to defray all of the litigation expenses
in exchange for one-half of the subject lot should they win the case. They insist that
this agreement is a champertous contract that is contrary to public policy, prohibited
by law for violation of the fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and a client.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that the compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
215 (ejectment case) did not novate their original stipulated agreement on the
attorney’s fees. They reason that Civil Case No. 215 did not decide the issue of
attorney’s fees between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya for the latter’s
services in Civil Case No. 1721.
The Case for the Respondents
In their defense,14 the respondents counter that the attorney’s fee stipulated in the
amended complaint was not the agreed fee of Atty. Lacaya for his legal services.
They argue that the questioned stipulation for attorney’s fees was in the nature of a
penalty that, if granted, would inure to the spouses Cadavedo and not to Atty.
Lacaya.
The respondents point out that: (1) both Vicente and Atty. Lacaya caused the survey
and subdivision of the subject lot immediately after the spouses Cadavedo
reacquired its possession with the RTC’s approval of their motion for execution of
judgment in Civil Case No. 1721; (2) Vicente expressly ratified and confirmed the
agreement on the contingent attorney’s fee consisting of one-half of the subject lot;
(3) the MTC in Civil Case No. 215 (ejectment case) approved the compromise
agreement; (4) Vicente is the legally designated administrator of the conjugal
partnership, hence the compromise agreement ratifying the transfer bound the
partnership and could not have been invalidated by the absence of Benita’s
acquiescence; and (5) the compromise agreement merely inscribed and ratified the
earlier oral agreement between the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya which is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
While the case is pending before this Court, Atty. Lacaya died.15 He was substituted
by his wife -Rosa -and their children –Victoriano D.L. Lacaya, Jr., Rosevic Lacaya-
Ocampo, Reymar L. Lacaya, Marcelito L. Lacaya, Raymundito L. Lacaya, Laila Lacaya-
Matabalan, Marivic Lacaya-Barba, Rosalie L. Lacaya and Ma. Vic-Vic Lacaya-
Camaongay.16
The Court’s Ruling
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
The subject lot was the core of four successive and overlapping cases prior to the
present controversy. In three of these cases, Atty. Lacaya stood as the spouses
Cadavedo’s counsel. For ease of discussion, we summarize these cases (including the
dates and proceedings pertinent to each) as follows:
Civil Case No. 1721 – Cadavedo v. Ames (Sum of money and/or voiding of contract of
sale of homestead), filed on January 10, 1967. The writ of execution was granted on
October 16, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3352 – Ames v. Cadavedo (Quieting of Title and/or Enforcement of
Civil Rights due Planters in Good Faith with Application for Preliminary injunction),
filed on September 23, 1981.
Civil Case No. 3443 – Cadavedo v. DBP (Action for Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction), filed on May 21, 1982.
Civil Case No. 215 –Atty. Lacaya v. Vicente Cadavedo, et. al. (Ejectment Case), filed
between the latter part of 1981 and early part of 1982. The parties executed the
compromise agreement on May 13, 1982.
Civil Case No. 4038 –petitioners v. respondents (the present case).
The agreement on attorney’s fee
consisting of one-half of the subject
lot is void; the petitioners are entitled
to recover possession
The core issue for our resolution is whether the attorney’s fee consisting of one-half
of the subject lot is valid and reasonable, and binds the petitioners. We rule in the
NEGATIVE for the reasons discussed below.
A. The written agreement providing for
a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 should prevail
over the oral agreement providing for one-
half of the subject lot
The spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of ₱2,000.00 and
not, as asserted by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in
the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the spouses
Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the Spouses Cadavedo undertook
to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their
favor.
Contrary to the respondents’ contention, this stipulation is not in the nature of a
penalty that the court would award the winning party, to be paid by the losing party.
The stipulation is a representation to the court concerning the agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya, on the latter’s compensation for his services
in the case; it is not the attorney’s fees in the nature of damages which the former
prays from the court as an incident to the main action.
At this point, we highlight that as observed by both the RTC and the CA and agreed
as well by both parties, the alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of one-half
of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior to or, at most, at the start of Atty.
Lacaya’s engagement as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in Civil Case No. 1721.An
agreement between the lawyer and his client, providing for the former’s
compensation, is subject to the ordinary rules governing contracts in general. As the
rules stand, controversies involving written and oral agreements on attorney’s fees
shall be resolved in favor of the former.17 Hence, the contingency fee of ₱2,000.00
stipulated in the amended complaint prevails over the alleged oral contingency fee
agreement of one-half of the subject lot.
B. The contingent fee agreement between
the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya,
awarding the latter one-half of the subject
lot, is champertous
Granting arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered into
an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of the subject lot,
the agreement is nevertheless void.
In their account, the respondents insist that Atty. Lacaya agreed to represent the
spouses Cadavedo in Civil Case No. 1721 and assumed the litigation expenses,
without providing for reimbursement, in exchange for a contingency fee consisting
of one-half of the subject lot. This agreement is champertous and is contrary to
public policy.18
Champerty, along with maintenance (of which champerty is an aggravated form), is a
common law doctrine that traces its origin to the medieval period. 19 The doctrine of
maintenance was directed "against wanton and in officious intermeddling in the
disputes of others in which the intermeddler has no interest whatever, and where
the assistance rendered is without justification or excuse."20 Champerty, on the
other hand, is characterized by "the receipt of a share of the proceeds of the
litigation by the intermeddler."21 Some common law court decisions, however, add a
second factor in determining champertous contracts, namely, that the lawyer must
also, "at his own expense maintain, and take all the risks of, the litigation."22
The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were created in response "to medieval
practice of assigning doubtful or fraudulent claims to persons of wealth and
influence in the expectation that such individuals would enjoy greater success in
prosecuting those claims in court, in exchange for which they would receive an
entitlement to the spoils of the litigation."23 "In order to safeguard the
administration of justice, instances of champerty and maintenance were made
subject to criminal and tortuous liability and a common law rule was developed,
striking down champertous agreements and contracts of maintenance as being
unenforceable on the grounds of public policy."24
In this jurisdiction, we maintain the rules on champerty, as adopted from American
decisions, for public policy considerations.25 As matters currently stand, any
agreement by a lawyer to "conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the
expenses thereof or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of
the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law."26 The rule of the profession
that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for part of the thing in litigation
in exchange for conducting the case at the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent
the lawyer from acquiring an interest between him and his client. To permit these
arrangements is to enable the lawyer to "acquire additional stake in the outcome of
the action which might lead him to consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client or to accept a settlement which might take care of his interest in the verdict to
the sacrifice of that of his client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to his
client’s cause."27
In Bautista v. Atty. Gonzales,28 the Court struck down the contingent fee agreement
between therein respondent Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales and his client for being
contrary to public policy. There, the Court held that an reimbursement of litigation
expenses paid by the former is against public policy, especially if the lawyer has
agreed to carry on the action at his expense in consideration of some bargain to have
a part of the thing in dispute. It violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client.29
In addition to its champertous character, the contingent fee arrangement in this case
expressly transgresses the Canons of Professional Ethics and, impliedly, the Code of
Professional Responsibility.30 Under Rule 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, a
lawyer may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or beat the
expense of litigation.31 The same reasons discussed above underlie this rule.
C. The attorney’s fee consisting of
one-half of the subject lot is excessive
and unconscionable
We likewise strike down the questioned attorney’s fee and declare it void for being
excessive and unconscionable.1âwphi1The contingent fee of one-half of the subject
lot was allegedly agreed to secure the services of Atty. Lacaya in Civil Case No.
1721.Plainly, it was intended for only one action as the two other civil cases had not
yet been instituted at that time. While Civil Case No. 1721 took twelve years to be
finally resolved, that period of time, as matters then stood, was not a sufficient
reason to justify a large fee in the absence of any showing that special skills and
additional work had been involved. The issue involved in that case, as observed by
the RTC(and with which we agree), was simple and did not require of Atty. Lacaya
extensive skill, effort and research. The issue simply dealt with the prohibition
against the sale of a homestead lot within five years from its acquisition.
That Atty. Lacaya also served as the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel in the two
subsequent cases did not and could not otherwise justify an attorney’s fee of one-
half of the subject lot. As assertedby the petitioners, the spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya made separate arrangements for the costs and expenses foreach of these
two cases. Thus, the expenses for the two subsequent cases had been considered
and taken cared of Based on these considerations, we therefore find one-half of the
subject lot as attorney’s fee excessive and unreasonable.
D. Atty. Lacaya’s acquisition of
the one-half portion contravenes
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code
Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or
assignment, the property that has been the subject of litigation in which they have
taken part by virtue of their profession.32 The same proscription is provided under
Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.33
A thing is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is
subject of the judicial action.34Following this definition, we find that the subject lot
was still in litigation when Atty. Lacaya acquired the disputed one-half portion. We
note in this regard the following established facts:(1)on September 21, 1981, Atty.
Lacaya filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721;
(2) on September 23, 1981, the spouses Ames filed Civil Case No. 3352 against the
spouses Cadavedo; (3)on October 16, 1981, the RTC granted the motion filed for the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 1721 and the spouses Cadavedo took
possession of the subject lot on October 24, 1981; (4) soon after, the subject lot was
surveyed and subdivided into two equal portions, and Atty. Lacaya took possession
of one of the subdivided portions; and (5) on May 13, 1982, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya
executed the compromise agreement.
From these timelines, whether by virtue of the alleged oral contingent fee
agreement or an agreement subsequently entered into, Atty. Lacaya acquired the
disputed one-half portion (which was after October 24, 1981) while Civil Case No.
3352 and the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No.
1721were already pending before the lower courts. Similarly, the compromise
agreement, including the subsequent judicial approval, was effected during the
pendency of Civil Case No. 3352. In all of these, the relationship of a lawyer and a
client still existed between Atty. Lacaya and the spouses Cadavedo.
Thus, whether we consider these transactions –the transfer of the disputed one-half
portion and the compromise agreement –independently of each other or resulting
from one another, we find them to be prohibited and void35 by reason of public
policy.36 Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are contrary to public
policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are considered in
existent and void from the beginning.37
What did not escape this Court’s attention is the CA’s failure to note that the transfer
violated the provisions of Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, although it recognized the
concurrence of the transfer and the execution of the compromise agreement with
the pendency of the two civil cases subsequent to Civil Case No. 1721.38 In reversing
the RTC ruling, the CA gave weight to the compromise agreement and in so doing,
found justification in the unproved oral contingent fee agreement.
While contingent fee agreements are indeed recognized in this jurisdiction as a valid
exception to the prohibitions under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, 39 contrary to
the CA’s position, however, this recognition does not apply to the present case. A
contingent fee contract is an agreement in writing where the fee, often a fixed
percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the
success of the litigation.40 The payment of the contingent fee is not made during the
pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property but only after the judgment
has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer.41
In the present case, we reiterate that the transfer or assignment of the disputed
one-half portion to Atty. Lacaya took place while the subject lot was still under
litigation and the lawyer-client relationship still existed between him and the spouses
Cadavedo. Thus, the general prohibition provided under Article 1491 of the Civil
Code, rather than the exception provided in jurisprudence, applies. The CA seriously
erred in upholding the compromise agreement on the basis of the unproved oral
contingent fee agreement.
Notably, Atty. Lacaya, in undertaking the spouses Cadavedo’s cause pursuant to the
terms of the alleged oral contingent fee agreement, in effect, became a co-
proprietor having an equal, if not more, stake as the spouses Cadavedo. Again, this is
void by reason of public policy; it undermines the fiduciary relationship between him
and his clients.42
E.The compromise agreement could not
validate the void oral contingent fee
agreement; neither did it supersede the
written contingent fee agreement
The compromise agreement entered into between Vicente and Atty. Lacaya in Civil
Case No. 215 (ejectment case) was intended to ratify and confirm Atty. Lacaya’s
acquisition and possession of the disputed one-half portion which were made in
violation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. As earlier discussed, such acquisition is
void; the compromise agreement, which had for its object a void transaction, should
be void.
A contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy is in existent and void from the beginning.43 It can never
be ratified44 nor the action or defense for the declaration of the in existence of the
contract prescribe;45 and any contract directly resulting from such illegal contract is
likewise void and in existent.46
Consequently, the compromise agreement did not supersede the written contingent
fee agreement providing for attorney’s fee of ₱2,000.00; neither did it preclude the
petitioners from questioning its validity even though Vicente might have knowingly
and voluntarily acquiesced thereto and although the MTC approved it in its June 10,
1982 decision in the ejectment case. The MTC could not have acquired jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the void compromise agreement; its judgment in the
ejectment case could not have attained finality and can thus be attacked at any time.
Moreover, an ejectment case concerns itself only with the issue of possession de
facto; it will not preclude the filing of a separate action for recovery of possession
founded on ownership. Hence, contrary to the CA’s position, the petitioners–in filing
the present action and praying for, among others, the recovery of possession of the
disputed one-half portion and for judicial determination of the reasonable fees due
Atty. Lacaya for his services –were not barred by the compromise agreement.
Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis
In view of their respective assertions and defenses, the parties, in effect, impliedly
set aside any express stipulation on the attorney’s fees, and the petitioners, by
express contention, submit the reasonableness of such fees to the court’s discretion.
We thus have to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.
"Quantum meruit—meaning ‘as much as he deserves’—is used as basis for
determining a lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract x x x taking into
account certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees."47 "Its essential requisite is
the acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged for the services
rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
performing the task was expecting to be paid compensation"48 for it. The doctrine of
quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.49
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court50 and Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,51factors such as the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy, the time spent and the extent of the services rendered, the
customary charges for similar services, the amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client from the service, to name a few, are considered in
determining the reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled.
In the present case, the following considerations guide this Court in considering and
setting Atty. Lacaya’s fees based on quantum meruit: (1) the questions involved in
these civil cases were not novel and did not require of Atty. Lacaya considerable
effort in terms of time, skill or the performance of extensive research; (2) Atty.
Lacaya rendered legal services for the Spouses Cadavedo in three civil cases
beginning in 1969 until 1988 when the petitioners filed the instant case; (3) the first
of these civil cases (Cadavedo v. Ames) lasted for twelve years and reaching up to A.C. No. 7337 September 29, 2014
this Court; the second (Ames v. Cadavedo) lasted for seven years; and the third
(Cadavedo and Lacaya v. DBP) lasted for six years, reaching up to the CA; and (4) the ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant,
property subject of these civil cases is of a considerable size of 230,765 square vs.
meters or 23.0765 hectares. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.

All things considered, we hold as fair and equitable the RTC’s considerations in RESOLUTION
appreciating the character of the services that Atty. Lacaya rendered in the three
cases, subject to modification on valuation. We believe and so hold that the DEL CASTILLO, J.:
respondents are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth [1/10] of
the subject lot), with the fruits previously received from the disputed one-half
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct 1 filed with this
portion, as attorney’s fees. They shall return to the petitioners the remainder of the
Court on September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against
disputed one-half portion.
respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas (respondent).

The allotted portion of the subject lot properly recognizes that litigation should be
Factual Antecedents
for the benefit of the client, not the lawyer, particularly in a legal situation when the
law itself holds clear and express protection to the rights of the client to the disputed
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor
property (a homestead lot). Premium consideration, in other words, is on the rights
case2 he filed against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On
of the owner, not on the lawyer who only helped the owner protect his rights.
February 26, 2001, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of
Matters cannot be the other way around; otherwise, the lawyer does indeed
the case as follows:
effectively acquire a property right over the disputed property. If at all, due
recognition of parity between a lawyer and a client should be on the fruits of the
disputed property, which in this case, the Court properly accords. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondents Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of
the following, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We
AFFIRM the decision dated September 17, 1996 and the resolution dated December
27, 1996of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 10,in Civil Case No. 4038, 1. Backwages ........................... ₱146,726.67
with the MODIFICATION that the respondents, the spouses Victorino (Vic) T. Lacaya
and Rosa Legados, are entitled to two (2) hectares (or approximately one-tenth 2. Separation Pay ......................... 24,000.00
[1/10] of the subject lot) as attorney’s fees. The fruits that the respondents
previously received from the disputed one-half portion shall also form part of the
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay ......... .1,538.46
attorney’s fees. We hereby ORDER the respondents to return to the petitioners the
remainder of the 10.5383-hectare portion of the subject lot that Atty. Vicente Lacaya
4. Attorney's Fees ........................ .17,226.51
acquired pursuant to the compromise agreement.

SO ORDERED. or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Fom Hw1dred Ninety One
Pesos & 64/100 (Pl89,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office,
wjthin ten (10) days from receipt hereof

All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision. ₱17,226.57 representing respondent's professional fees has to be deducted, leaving
During the implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that
a balance of ₱172,275.13.6 Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he
respondent had already collected the total amount of ₱95,000.00 from spouses
Lopez. Respondent received said amount in the following manner: will get ₱100,000.00 and the balance of ₱72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as
and for his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and reimbursement for all expenses he
incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the amount of ₱95,000.00
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose
and deducting therefrom the amounts of ₱20,000.007 attorney's fees, ₱17,000.00
0210512004 7802 ₱20,000.00 Attorney's fees
earlier given to complainant, and ₱2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left to

02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment respondent was only ₱56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below
the promised 25o/o attorney's fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of
0212612004 7848 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment ₱72,275.13.
03/12/2004 7894 20,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum
0410212004 7932 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment greater than what he expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to
receive from spouses Lopez the sum of ₱93,491.60. Adding the Pl 7,000.00
0410612004 7941 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
respondent previously remitted to complainant, the latter will get a total amount of
04/13/2004 7944 5,000.00 Partial payment for judgment ₱110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent, exceeds the amount of

04/16/2004 7954 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment ₱100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.

0413012004 7977 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment IBP's Report and Recommendation

Total Amount: ₱95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that
he is authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is
not. Consequently, complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to
remit to him the amount of ₱95,000.00, less his attorney's fees of ₱20,000.00. But
respondent did not budge. Thus, complainant lodged a complaint before the Office
of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod City. Respondent, however, ignored
the summons to attend a conference before the barangay to resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received ₱95,000.00 from spouses
Lopez on installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He
explains that complainant agreed to pay him additional attorney's fees equivalent to
25o/o of the total monetary award, on top of the attorney's fees that may be
awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses respondent incurred
relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of ₱189,491.60, the sum of
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the
Investigating Commissioner issued his Report and Recommendation9 with the
following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be
meted the penalty of two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return,
in restitution all the amounts in his possession which are due to complainant, less his
rightful attorney's fees.10 On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
Resolution No. XX-2011-139,11 which approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner suspending respondent from the practice of law for
two years, but with the modification that respondent should restitute the sum of
₱85,500.0012 to the complainant.
Issue
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct for his failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the
course of his professional engagement and return the same upon demand.
The Court's Ruling
"The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and
good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary
relationship."13 Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the
duty to "account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client." Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand, mandates that "[a] lawyer shall deliver
the funds xx x of his client when due or upon demand."
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April
30, 2004 received payments for attorney's fees and partial payments for monetary
awards on behalf of complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of
times over close to three months he had been receiving payment, respondent
neither informed the complainant of such fact nor rendered an accounting thereon.
It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being implemented when
complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the total
amount of ₱95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him
by the labor tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the
complainant said amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even
after demand. Complainant brought the matter before the barangay, but respondent
simply ignored the same. Such failure and inordinate refusal on the part of the
respondent to render an accounting and return the money after demand raises the
presumption that he converted it to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding of the
funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him.15
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to
receive payment. He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he
received from spouses Lopez to his additional 25o/o attorney's fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in the total amount of
₱72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of ₱95,000.00 the amounts
of ₱20,000.00, ₱17,000.00, and ₱2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his
dismay was only ₱56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
other than his self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would
support respondent's claim that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither
is there proof that complainant agreed to pay him additional 25% attorney's fees and
reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in connection with the case.
Respondent did not present any document, retainer's agreement, or itemized
breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim.1âwphi1 In any
event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the
same does not exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the
amounts he received in the course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary
nature of the relationship between counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty
to account for the money or property collected or received for or from the client. He
is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client."16 "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on
the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the
obligation to make a prompt accounting." 17Moreover, a lawyer has no right "to
unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone that the
client owes him attorney's fees."18
In sum, "[r]espondent's failure to immediately account for and return the money
when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his
lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary
action."19
The Penalty
"The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand
of a lawyer to account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has
been suspension from the practice of law for two years."20Thus, the IBP Board of
Governors did not err in recommending the imposable penalty. Considering,
however, that this is respondent's first offense and he is already a
nonagenarian,21 the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion,
finds that a penalty of one year suspension is sufficient. WHEREFORE, the Court finds
respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and accordingly
SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year upon the finality of this
Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense
shall be dealt with more severly.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this
Resolution, the net amount of ₱85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from finality of this Resolution until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply
with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted
in Atty. Sanicas' record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED. A.C. No. 8391 November 23, 2010
[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]

MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated January 10, 2006 for disciplinary action against
respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico (Yuhico) for
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at the Office of the City
Prosecutor in Pasig City on May 4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the
preliminary investigation of a Complaint for Estafa against one Jose S. Chicharro, who
was then being represented by Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became
acquainted as they frequently saw each other during the hearings of the case.

On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez phoned him and asked for a cash
loan of ₱30,000.00. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the
medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed
the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was
expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.

On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, this time in the amount of
₱60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also
hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty. Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank
check amounting to ₱60,000.00.2 Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans
totalling to ₱90,000.00 "within a short time."

On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to
pay. In a text message on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:

I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to think that I may be taking
advantage of our friendship. You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's fees
since last week from my client Ogami from japan. It's more or less more than 5m and
its release is delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering. From my estimate
it wud be collected by me on or b4 august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial
difficulty as everyone is.
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from him again. He
said Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed ₱70,000.00 to pay the fees required
to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him
that he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005. In his text message on July
12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez said:
As you are aware of these past few days were really great trials 4 me. My mother
died, my wife got sick and now my bro in law died. These events led me to struggling
finances. To get me going I tried to sel my car but my buyer backed out. Now my
immediate problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter needs for her
payment sa US medical board. I dnt want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me
again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls. Thanks.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead,
he demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another
text message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005 and requested him to give him another
week to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans from Gutierrez from August to
December 2005. Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times promised to pay,
but always failed to do so. At one point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account
number and promised to deposit his payment there, but he never deposited the
payment.
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter3 to Gutierrez to pay his
debts, but to no avail.
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the
complaint against him.4
In his Answer,5 Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the one who offered to lend him
money in gratitude for the assistance he extended to the latter when he was under
threat by his clients. He, however, admitted that he accepted the loan due to
compelling circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no intention of evading his
obligation to pay his debts, but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he cannot
pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his debts when his financial condition
improves.
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to appear at the mandatory
conference before the IBP-CBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties to submit their respective
position papers.
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant's
counsel attended. There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez,6 had already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross
misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his debts and his issuance of worthless
checks.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found
Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount
of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00) to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the
Court that, instead of rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred
anew effective upon the expiration of the sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004
Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we do not have
jurisprudence on the issue of double or multiple disbarment, the American
jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments as well as the
minimum requirement of five (5) years for readmission to the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
649, resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve
it with modification as to the payment of the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(₱90,000.00), this time, without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitute gross misconduct,
for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law.
Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which This Decision shall be immediately executory.
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the SO ORDERED.
Code of Professional Responsibility.7

In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the
loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation.
Neither can he justify his act of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition.
Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity
to pay.1avvphi1

Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and

misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of
paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of
paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent
to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without
actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts
demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.

We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,8 the Court had already disbarred
Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just
debts and issuance of bouncing checks.

In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the findings of the IBP, we cannot,
however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time,
considering that Gutierrez had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP
pointed out, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or
jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year requirement
for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the
penalty of disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated December 11, 2008, of the IBP,
which found FRED L. GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is
ORDERED to PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00) to the
complainant immediately from receipt of this decision with interest.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly recorded in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.