THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND ITALIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

ANALECT A HUSSERLIANA

THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

VOLUME XI

Editor:

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
Belmont, Massachusetts
THE GREAT CHAIN OF
BEING
and
ITALIAN
PHENOMENOLOGY

Edited by

ANGELA ALES BELLO

Centro Italiano di Fenomenologia, Rome
and
The World Institute tor Advanced Phenomenological Research
and Learning, Belmont, Massachusetts

SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.

 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

The Great chain of being and Italian phenomenology.

(Analecta Husserliana ; v. 11)

Includes research reports of the World Institute for Advanced
Phenomenological Research and Learning, the Centro italiano de
fenomenologia, and selected papers presented at two meetings held in Feb.
and Mar. 1979, in Viterbo and Rome, Italy.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Phenomenology-Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Husserl,
Edmund, 1859-1938-Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Ontology-
Addresses, essays, lectures. 4. Philosophy, Italian-20th century-
Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Ales Bello, Angela. n. Centro
italiano di fenomenologia. Ill. World Institute for Advanced Pheno-
menological Research and Learning. IV. Series.
B3279.H94A129 vol. 11 [B829.5] 142'.7s 80-19100
[142'.7]
ISBN 978-94-011-7988-1 ISBN 978-94-009-8366-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-009-8366-3

All Rights Reserved

Copyright © 1981 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by D. Reide1 Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1981
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1981
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 T ABLE OF CONTENTS

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA / The Theme - Counter to the

Spirit of Our Time and Italian Phenomenology ix

ANGELA ALES BELLO / Introduction xv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS x~

PART I: THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING IN

PHENOMENOLOGY

A. THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND CREATIVE IMAGINATION

ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA / Existence and Order 5

EUGENE KAELIN / Exposition: Man-the-Creator and the "Prototype
of Action" 11

B. UPSTREAM ENQUIRIES

ANGELA ALES BELLO / Le probleme de l'etre dans la phenomeno-

logie de Husserl 41
J. DE FINANCE / Les degres de l'etre chez saint Thomas d'Aquin 51
Y. BELA V AL / Leibniz et la chaine des etres 59
W. H. WERKMEISTER / Kant, Nicolai Hartmann, and the Great Chain
of Being 69
ROBERT SWEENEY / The "Great Chain of Being" in Scheler's Phi-
losophy 99
PHILIBERT SECRETAN / Edith Stein on the "Order and Chain of
Being" 113
CARDINAL KAROL WOJTYLA / The Degrees of Being from the
Point of View of the Phenomenology of Action 125

ANNEX

Program of the Roman Symposium (27-28 March 1976) 132

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART II: ITALIAN PHENOMENOLOGY

A. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

ANGELA ALES BELLO I Phenomenology and Science: An Anno-
tated Bibliography of Work in Italy 137
AURELIO RIZZACASA I Epistemological and Phenomenological
Considerations about the Natural Sciences in the Thought of E.
Husserl 147
PAOLO VALORI I Moral Philosophy and the Human Sciences 157
B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI/On the Psychopathology of
the Life-World 173
MAURIZIO DE NEGRI I Some Indications toward aPhenomenolog-
ically Oriented Approach to Child Neuropsychiatry 203
EUGENIO BORGNA / Phenomenology of the Schizophrenic Split 213

B. HUSSERLIAN INVESTIGATIONS
RENZO RAGGIUNTI I The Language Problem in Husserl's Phenom-
enology 225
FILIPPO COSTA / The Phenomenology of External Objects according
to Ding und Raum 279
ROSA MIGNOSI / Reawakening and Resistance: A Stoic Source of
the Husserlian Epoch/; 311
FILIPPO L1VERlIANI / The Phenomenology of Religion as a Science
and as a Philosophy 321
ELIO CONST ANTINI / Einflihlung und Intersubjektivitat bei Edith
Stein und bei Hussed 335

Annex: Conference Program (Viterbo, 24-25 February 1979) 341

INDEX OF NAMES 345

Angela Ales Bello speaking. Next to her are Mario San cipriano and A.-T. Tymieniecka.

Angela Ales Bello and A.-T. Tymieniecka at the heads of the table at one of our Roman
dinners. Among others at the table are Gareth Halett, Henrik Houtakker, and P. Santoro.
 ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

THE THEME

COUNTER TO THE SPIRIT OF OUR TIME

and
IT ALlAN PHENOMENOLOGY

The present volume contains the work deriving from the initial phase of the
collaboration between The World Phenomenology Institute and Italian
scholars, together with the proceedings of the Annual Convention of the
Centro Italiano de Ricerche Fenomenomenologiche of Rome held February
24-25, 1979, and some additional research. Together with volume IX of the
ANALECTA it assesses our fruitful work in Italy.
In our age, we may say, man is the center of attention. Yet the spirit
of "humanism" is lost. Such a variety of ways have been proposed by the
multifarious cultures clamouring to make themselves heard - ways of inter-
preting what it means "to be human" - that the essential sense of man's
"humanity" which lies at the ·roots of these approaches does not come into
its own. Indeed, it remains completely ignored.
This sense of humanity, or of "what makes man specifically human",
cannot be identified with any particular human faculty, with any peculiar
aspect of his existence, with any singular feature of his life-world. Neither
could their mere sum total yield the necessary insight into what makes up
the meaningfulness of human destiny. Although aiming, as we know, at the
vindication of the "complete man", the phenomenological anthropologies
remained limited to their own j;>iases, due predOminantly to the prevailing
assumptions of the cultures from which they have emerged. On the one hand,
the predominant prestige of positive science has left its "dehumanizing" mark
upon the life-world, the world of the thinker himself. On the other hand, a
concurrent "disillusionment" has corrupted the Western spiritual climate,
calling in question the higher aspirations and ideals of man, ideals which in
previous cultural epochs determined the "humanistic" faith of man, and so
undermined the very foundations of the culture of our times, causing our
view of man to shrink to the bare minimum. This shrinkage expresses itself
in the approach to any object of reflection or inquiry by a certain onesided-
ness, a certain limitation to some self-enclosed segment, which loses its link
to the whole - of which it is in fact an organic part.
ix
x ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

This shrinkage - as is only too well known and too much emphasised -
this shrinkage at the heart of the great majority of variants expressing Westent
culture appears with a striking force when contrasted with the way in which
our central phenomenological issue of man in-the-human-condition is received
by Italian scholars. Until now nurtured by the humanistic culture of the
Renaissance, which saw man fully "human" only when approached in the
entirety of his being and from within the viewpoint of his noblest and highest
aspirations, the Italian scholar has remained ever responsive to this profound
insight into the nature of man, while enriching it continuously through the
scientific and social debate of our times. The philosophies of Croce, Gentile,
Sciacca, which have prevailed in Italy until recently, continued the tradition
through their cultural and historical emphasis. Now that their influence has
faded away, our vast program of the phenomenology-of-man-and-the-human-
condition seems to offer to the Italian philosopher the best opportunity of
making a link between his innermost humanistic tendency and the possibility
of pursuing his own specific interests.
This appears to me to account clearly for the vivid and creative response
found in Italy to the activities and projects of The International Husserl and
Phenomenological Research Society - later expanded into The World Institute
for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning with its two other
International Societies reaching respectively into the field of Phenomenology
and Literature and that of Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. I believe
it explains also the expansion and unique enrichment of our common research
work brought about by the collaboration with our Italian colleagues.
In fact, our collaboration with the Italian scholars had already been in-
itiated by the participation in the second International Congress of our IHPRS
(held in September 1972 in New York), of Professor Mario San cipriano whom
I invited after I had become acquainted with his work on Husser!. But it took
on a larger scope in 1974 in Rome when Professor B. D'Amore entrusted us
with the task of moderating (together with Professor A. Dondeyne of Louvain)
the phenomenology session of the International Congress of Thomas Aquinas,
in the program of which all major contemporary trends were represented. It
was then that I had the opportunity of meeting with several Italian as well as
foreign phenomenological scholars that I had not previously met. This en-
counter became, in fact, not only a germinal point for our work in Italy but
also for its radiation into other spheres of collaboration.
In the first place we then met with the Italian Professors Paolo Valori,
Filipo Liverziani, Rizzacasa, Constantini and the professoressa Ales Bello,
who took the steering-wheel when we together formed The Centro Italiano di
 THE THEME xi

Fenomenologia shortly thereafter. On the same occasion, however, there were

present some foreign scholars such as Philibert Secretan, Andre de Muralt,
Jean Claude Piguet, and others who thereafter joined our work and also took
part in some of our other Italian symposia.
The Rome phenomenology center soon became an autonomous group,
bringing together not only Italian but also foreign scholars - such as our
American, French, and Swiss collaborators. Furthermore, during our Inter-
national Phenomenology Congress in Arezzo/Siena I launched the third of
the Institute's outward bound organs: The International Society for Pheno-
menology and Human Sciences. This focus upon our interdisciplinary pheno-
menology attracted much attention from Italian scholars, psychiatrists in
particular, who have joined our work in a vigorous fashion.
In a short time our work with the Italian group has gained an enthusiastic
response from our collaborators in our countries. Professor Paul Ricoeur
consented to preside over our YIth International Conference on Phenom-
enology at Arezzo/Siena, a conference which attracted much international
participation. Among the distinguished foreign scholars were Professor
Stephan Strasser from Nijmegen, Erling Eng from Lexington, Kentucky, and
others. In the honorary committee of the conference we were joined by our
collaborators from Japan, Germany, Switzerland, etc. as well as by all the
major centers of phenomenological research.
For some of them, like Cardinal Wojtyia, it has been easier to participate
in person in our Italian programs - as we see in the present volume - than
in our congresses in other countries where, with some exceptions, he had
to have his material read in absentia. It was on account of a Rome meeting
that we entered into contact with the Cardinal. In fact, when in the summer
of 1972 I was requested to represent American scholarship on the Scientific
Committee of the Thomas Aquinas Congress, I took the initiative - with the
approval of the organizers - to go personally on the 20th and 21 st of August
1973, to see the Cardinal in Cracow and to invite him to give a paper in the
phenomenology session. The Cardinal was at filSt hesitant to enter as a phi-
losopher on the international scene. Yet he accepted and read his paper at
the plenary session. He also participated in our debate and from this time on
continued to collaborate with the Institute. This collaboration took place at
several of our Congresses held in Europe but also extended into his July 1976
lecturing tour in the USA which I organized for him. (His lectures included
one on July 26th at Harvard, sponsored by the Harvard summer school, for
which we made the preparations together with Mr Thomas Crooks, the Direc-
tor, and one on July 29th at the Catholic University of America, sponsored
xii ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

by the Department of Philosophy and the Machette Foundation, which we

organized together with Dean Jude Dougherty.)*
Thus Italian phenomenology naturally entered the international scene; and
our VIIth International Congress - which the Institute with its three affiliated
societies held in July 1978 in Paris (organized with our French collaborators
under the patronage and active involvement of Professors Emmanuel Levinas,
Paul Ricoeur, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, Maria de Penha Petit and
others) - not only profited from the collaboration of the Italian Center in its
organization but also benefited from prominent scholarly representation by
Professors Ales Bello, Renzo Raggiunti, Maria Bianca d'Ippolito and our
faithful friend Mario Sancipriano.
The various volumes of the Analecta Husserliana document the concrete
details of this brief, all too brief appreciation.
Since the time of our first Rome encounter I have been regularly invited
to lecture at Italian universities and intellectual centers: the universities of
Rome, Padua, Macerata, Catania, among them, (I have even had the privilege
of being "the first woman philosopher" to give a formal lecture - in 1975
at the invitation of Dean Peter Henrici - at the Philosophy Faculty of the
Gregorian University in Rome!) and by Incontri Culturali in Rome, Salerno,
etc. Also several of our American and European collaborators have partici-
pated in the conferences and symposia sponsored independently, or together
with The Institute, by the Centro Italiano di Ricerche Fenomenologiche,
most expertly directly by Professor Ales Bello. This gave us the opportunity
to make known the basic trends and the research development of The Insti-
tute and to form a true philosophical community of minds. Indeed, this ever
intensifying collaboration had a good effect upon the entire program and
unfolding of our work in this common effort at philosophical communication.
As I have emphasized already, the cultural inheritance of humanistic
inspiration which is alive in the Italian scholar - whatever social or political
persuasion he might otherwise have - makes him particularly receptive to the
entire spread of human experience and unprejudiced intellectual wonder-
ment. He may pursue the empirical scientific matter-of-fact issues concerning
man and his world without becoming blind to the aspirations of the spirit
with which they are infused. Hence it is not surprising that it is within the

* Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, 'A page of history: from Osoba i Czyn to The Acting
Person by Cardinal Karol Wojtyla,' in Phenomenology Information Bulletin 3 (October
1979), published by The World Phenomenology Institute, Belmont, Mass., 348 Payson
Rd.
 THE THEME xiii

two "Italian" volumes of our series - volume nine, dedicated to The Teleo-
logies in Husserlian Phenomenology, and the present volume - that our
program of inquiry into man-and-the-human-condition has expanded through
a vast spectrum of issues beginning with the physis and reaching the level of
the metaphysics of being, as well as the eschatology of man's destiny.
And now Professor Ales Bello, the director of the Italian Center and the
editor of this volume will describe the life of the Center.
 ANGELA ALES BELLO

INTRODUCTION: THE DESCRIPTION OF THE

IT ALlAN CENTER OF PHENOMENOLOGY

The Centro Italiano di Richerche Fenomenologiche (Italian Center of Phe-

nomenological Research) was set up in Rome on 6 October 1974 by a group
of scholars who met as the local section of The International Busserl and
Phenomenological Research Society, whose aims were presented at the
inaugural meeting by A.-T. Tymieniecka. The IHPRS is an affiliate of The
World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
(Belmont, Mass.).
The Italian Center enjoys the support of well known scholars from various
academic environments (Rome, Siena-Arezzo, Catania, Macerata, Padua,
Genoa, Palermo, Naples, Messina, Trieste, Viterbo, Parma, Pisa, Bari) who are
inspired by their common desire for renewal. The scope of the Center, which
it shares with The World Institute, is in fact that of developing a new philos-
ophy of man in the culture of our times and, more particularly, in Italy,
where the lack of a valid philosophical orientation has become apparent ever
since the end of historicism.
In more concrete terms the project of reform is based on the further devel-
opment of the phenomenological method critically proposed by Husserl and
thus to respond to: (1) the need for interpreting scientific progress in such a
way as to make it meaningful for human life; (2) the consequent urgency of
establishing a new foundation for communication among the sciences, which
in the past have moved further and further apart; (3) and finally, the need to
give a valid foundation for what we seek now under the concept of "inter-
disciplinarity."
Phenomenology indeed has shown itself to be the type of inquiry that best
responds to these urgent needs of our culture, because it seeks the common
root of the sciences in relation to man, studying his characteristics and his
potential and analyzing the telos of his destiny.
During the five years since its foundation the activities of the Center have
comprised a series of international research seminars and conferences, on the
one hand, and, on the other, monthly meetings devoted to the discussion of the
significance of phenomenological methodology in the various fields of research
and in relation to other philosophical schools and currents. Two seminars were
held together with the International Husserl and PhenomenolOgical Research
xv
xvi ANGELA ALES BELLO

Society, directed respectively by A.-T. Tymieniecka and Angela Ales Bello

(organized in collaboration with cultural associations and university institutes)
in March 1976 and March 1977 with the themes of "The Great Chain of Being"
and "Creativity." Also jointly organised, The International Congress at Arezzo/
Siena was held in July 1976 on the theme "The Teleologies in Husserl's Phe-
nomenology", while a seminar at Catania and Vulcano from 26 September to
2 October 1977 was dedicated to the discussion of "Man and Nature."
Discussions during the academic year 1977-78 were centered on the
theme "Critical Bibliography of the Works on Husserl's Phenomenology
Published in Italy" (with A. Rigobello, E. Baccarini, F. Liverziani, P. Valori,
A. Ales Bello, A. Rizzacasa, G. Giannini, E. Costantini and B. M. D'Ippolito
acting as rapporteurs for the various sectors of research). On 20 May 1978
the Second Annual Conference was held in Rome on the theme "Man and
Nature" (the participants in the discussion included, among others, Prof.
A.-T. Tymieniecka and Prof. P. Prini, Director of the Specialization Courses
of the Teacher Training Faculty of Rome University).
The Italian Center also collaborated in the organization of the Interna-
tional Congress of The World Phenomenology Institute held in Paris from 7
to 10 July 1978, where the Center was represented by Professors M. Sanci-
priano, R. Raggiunti, A. Ales Bello and M. B. D'Ippolito.
The monthly meetings of the academic year 1978-79 were dedicated to
a panorama of phenomenological research in Italy and culminated in the
Third Annual Conference at Viterbo (24-25 February 1979). The major part
of the lectures focused upon the human sciences; however, at a special session
Cardinal K. Wojtyla's ideas were extensively debated for the first time, and
Prof. A.-T. Tymieniecka introduced the Cardinal's major opus in phenomeno-
logical anthropology entitled The Acting Person (Volume X of Analecta
Husserliana ).
The papers read during the monthly meetings as well as at the Viterbo Con-
ference brought out the variety and the vitality of phenomenological research
in Italy, as regards both the problems of method (F. Costa) and the applica-
tions in the various sectors, including morality (p. Valori), psychiatry (B.
Callieri, E. Borgna, M. De Negri, L. Paradisi, V. Rapisarda), history (B. M.
D'Ippolito), language (E. Raggiunti), science (A. Rizzacasa), and others. One
can note, that the section of the center dedicated to "Phenomenology and
the Human Sciences", which was constituted as the part of the International
Society of Phenomenology and Human Sciences founded during the Inter-
national Congress at Arezzo and Siena in 1976, was particularly active during
the past years.
 INTRODUCTION xvii

The Center maintained its international contacts in 1979 by inviting num-

erous foreign scholars to the National Conference at Viterbo, including H.
Kochler (Austria), R. Magliola (U.S.A.), J. C. Piguet (Switzerland), M. R.
Barral (U.S.A.) and M. Petit (France), and also by extending hospitality at its
April Seminar (held at the Teacher Training Faculty of Rome University) to
Prof. H. Meyn of The World Phenomenology Institute, who spoke on His-
toricism and the Idea of Philosophy as a Rigorous Science.
The activities organized by The Italian Center since its foundation have
given a considerable new impulse to phenomenological research in Italy. They
have made established contacts between numerous Italian scholars who pre-
viously worked in isolation without a continued and effective exchange of
the results of their researches, and they have also strengthened and extended
relations with the international phenomenological community, thereby creat-
ing a cultural pattern of cooperation which becomes more and more concrete
and fruitful.

Centro Italiano di Richerche Fenomenologiche ANGELA ALES BELLO

Rome
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The present volume took a long time to appear in print. From the moment
the nucleus of its first part, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING IN PHENOM-
ENOLOGY, had been presented, in March 1976, at the first symposium held
in Italy by The International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society
in collaboration with the Centro Italiano di Ricerche Fenomenologiche of
Rome, we kept on investigating this surprising topic and it took some time to
explore it further in relation to the classical phenomenological and philosoph-
ical thinkers.
The second part of the volume comprises the major portion of the research
reported to The Third Annual Convention of the Centro held in Viterbo,
February 24-25,1979.
This volume owes more than I could express to Professor Angela Ales
Bello, Director of the Centro Italiano. I am also particularly grateful to her
for having undertaken the editorship of the volume bringing into it also some
of the continuing research work of the Centro.
We are both thankful to Professors Paolo Valori and Peter Henrici for their
sponsorship of our first symposium, which had been held at the Gregorian
University, as well as for their continuing collaboration.
We would also like to express our warmest thanks to Professor Aurelio
Rizzacasa and to Mrs Fausta Rizzacasa for their wonderful work in the local
arrangements for the Viterbo convention.

A.-T. T.
 PART I

THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING IN

PHENOMENOLOGY
A. THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING
AND CREATIVE IMAGINATION
 ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

EXISTENCE AND ORDER

The question of the nature of the relation of phenomenology to metaphysics

is often raised. In order to deal with this issue at all we should know clearly
what we mean by "metaphysics." In the course of the history of philosophy
this term has acquired several different meanings. Since in principle we expect
a "metaphysical" theory, doctrine or unfmished inquiry in progress to deal
with issues which would be fundamental for the entire body of thOUght of
the given thinker, it is natural that each great thinker has in the history of
philosophy given his peculiar evaluation of what in his overall view is funda-
mental and how it should be approached. Suffice it to mention Aristotle,
Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Whitehead and Heidegger to see the spread of
perspectives within which a place has been allocated to "metaphysics." Con-
sequently it would seem that even raising the question about the relationship
between phenomenological inquiry and metaphysics is to take already a parti
pris.
Furthermore, since phenomenological inquiry itself is understood as
the quest after the ultimate ground of cognition and being, as a mathesis
universalis, could we naively expect to find within the one or the other
phenomenological body of inquiry an even more fundamental, but different,
explicit metaphysical theory or implicit position about an extraneous meta-
physical issue? Would this not be to contradict or deny the very aspiration
of phenomenology as a radical beginning of philosophical reflection to be
carried on with an equally radical self-explicitness of the given? It would seem
then that phenomenology in order to remain faithful to its most significant
proposition cannot but either supersede what in history has been considered
as a specifically "metaphysical" discipline or renounce the raising of issues
which appeared and reappeared in history as "metaphysical" so long as they
do not appear within the orbit of the analysis of concrete givenness.
Although I would entirely subscribe to such an attitude, yet another
point of view appears to be possible, by which I have been so struck in the
latest course of my research as to consider it a "discovery." In fact, only
after this "discovery" did it occur to me that, first, there is an overall meta-
physically "monistic" aspect to Hussed's transcendentalism which is opposed
to Ingarden's "ontological pluralism"; and, second, that in both enquiries
5

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI,5-10.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
6 ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

there is an underlying skeleton - a "Great Chain of Being". Consequently I

have been able to give an interpretation of the otherwise disparate fragments
of Ingarden's work - which otherwise seemed to remain without any explicit
or implicit connections - as of a systematic philosophical effort in his contro-
versy with HusserI. This personal insight of mine, this "discovery" has allowed
me to view the entire phenomenological enterprise in a novel perspective.'
It is a fact that even the formulation of the "ultimate" questions of meta-
physics (e.g., concerning beingness and being, the absolute, the immortality
of the soul, etc.) would have to wait in the programmatic progress of phe-
nomenological inquiry till the complete analytic groundwork be ready to
bring forth the gigantic network of givenness to reveal the status quo of the
respective "metaphysical" controversies. It is also to be observed in the work
of Husserl, Ingarden, and Ricoeur that this analytic groundwork spreads,
on the one hand, further and further into domains of experience and its
conditions and that, on the other hand, the more it expands the more the
accomplishment of the entire quest eludes us; like sailing upon a sea either we
get into ever larger horizons and the shore gets lost from sight, or - as in
Ingarden's case - the ship loses its tiller and the voyage comes to a dead
end. Should we then agree with those who claim that the sense of the phe-
nomenological inquiry would consist precisely in its being "an endless task"
which would never yield any even approximately complete picture of the
philosophical reconstruction of the human universe? What sense would
there be then in the mathesis universalis if each of its phases were to depend
upon the discovery of the entire field, which would not itself be accomplished.
Accepting such an understanding of phenomenology we renounce its very
meaningfulness and sink into radical scepticism.
If phenomenology's proposal to be a fundamental philosophical inquiry
into man and his world - and if the human condition is at all legitimate - it
cannot be an ever advancing flux of search, advancing with the progress of
the human mind and following it passively without guideposts or an internal
schema which the progress itself could bring to light; even if the fragments
supporting it may be lacking or may be changeable and transformable with
the advance itself, yet the blueprint of an edifice must be present from the
beginning so that there may be something to guide the search, otherwise
haphazard and futile. Hence the new question that I want to raise: Is not
the basic phenomenological program, as first proposed and then reformulated
several times by Husserl himself, dealing at its core with the great meta-
physical issue of EXISTENCE VERSUS ORDER?
I submit that this issue takes as many forms in Husserl's thought as this
 EXISTENCE AND ORDER 7

thought is revised in the attempts to dig deeper and deeper into the origin
of cognition and its condition on both sides: one, the origin and progress of
the cognitive-constitutive flux itself; the other, the order of this progress as
related to the objective to be cognitively established or constituted. Once the
emphasis falls upon the unfolding of the process itself, then it reflects upon
the structural rules and patterns in order to advance and in order to coalesce
toward a life-world of which the unfolding consciousness is the fulcrum and
the center.
Although we may agree with those who believe that the direct ways in
which the problem of existence has been traditionally formulated in philoso-
phy - the idealism/realism dispute - is overcome in the Husserlian perspec-
tive, yet existence as the tantalizing object of philosophical wonder is not
only present throughout the Husserlian reflection but this reflection proceeds
as stimulated by the urge to fmd the right measure, the right proportion and
the proper distribution of roles in the interplay between the order which is
being established (and which articulates the constitutive advance and once
surged makes it proceed) and the genesis of man and his life-world affirming
its presence and establishing man's beingness.
The problem of existence might well be avoided through the bias of
regional ontologies, each of them taking care of its own modality of beingness,
but it is precisely the proportion between the structural complexities and the
respective modalities of beingness which respond to the urge to account for
the puzzling nature of existence in its various modes and the entire order of
beingness that takes its place. The problem of "real existence" might well be
pushed aside with the assumption of the total exfoliation of the human
consciousness within its life-world in the constitutive genesis, and yet the
continuous line which Husserl's effort takes to reach deeper and deeper into
the articulations of the pre-conscious, the "empirical", instinctive, etc. in-
dicates a preoccupation to fmd in this way the proper measure between the
ordering and the establishment in existence of what is being ordered.
In particular, while retracing with Husserl the articulations of the constitu-
tive genesis we cannot fail to obseve the multiplicity of the levels of ordering,
which interlace and found each other, discovered, from the most complex
down to the simplest seen by Husserl, as the originary point of the constitu-
tion. However even at this point the thread of order does not stop. It tends to
encompass all. Beyond the threshold of the originary impression and of its
passage into the most elementary ordering of givenness, the thread of order
continues into the pre-constitutive realms of instincts, impulses, drives, etc. in-
to which his reflection is drawn and, spreading ever further, it is never grasped
8 ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

in its entirety. The plenitude of organizing articulation is never grasped in its

completeness; and the existence of the given is never established.
We find, on the one hand, an analogical - if not identical - quest after
totality as expressed by the descending scale of ordering structural patterns in
the hermeneutical approach. And here again, following the constitutive model
of Husserl, no complete picture may be expected to appear even on the hori-
zon. On the other hand, we witness the same struggle to sift the ultimate
ordering out of the sedimentations of forms and patterns of linguistic forma-
tions; yet that order ever escapes and remains out of reach; though the em-
phasis upon it calls for totality as a condition for the articulation of existence.
As I have, however, willingly admitted, this tension between two factors-
existence and order - underlying the Husserlian reflection does not take the
form of the epistemological or metaphysical formulation typical of tradi-
tional thought. Ingarden, who made a gigantic attempt to bring the Husserlian
project on to the well-beaten track of the idealism/realism controversy,
did not advance above Husserlian idealism. 2 Their efforts did however reveal
something most significant; namely, that brought to its last conclusions,
phenomenology which emphasizes order reveals a hierarchical plurality of
modes of being.3 Yet the right proportion, not lacking existential ties, can be
found among them, and so they float lifelessly in a vacuum until their exist-
ence vanishes.
The distinction of several realms of being is already an inheritance from
Brentano. However, Brentano did not give preference to any of them. On the
contrary, the intentional level of human consciousness had in his estimation
no demarcation line from empirical acts; and they, in tum were naturally
embedded in the physiology of the existent. 4 The disruption of this existen-
tial harmony came with Husseri's emphasis upon the ideal and specifically
distinctive intentional ordering of conscious acts.
Yet the plurality of hierarchically arranged realms of beingness came in
with Brentano. We can see its direct expression in the "many-layered struc-
ture", designed to approach reality through its existential ties which the
early Husserlians, almost without exception, adopted together with N.
Hartmann, each giving it a different elaboration within the development of
his thought. In the later phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur it
lies along the demarcation line between the thematic and the pre-predicative.
The retrieval of the latter in its ordering proportion would be equal to ac-
counting for its existence. The intention to avoid the epistemological, Car-
tesian approach to existence seems to bring back the classic emphasis upon
the entirety of being as diversified in endless levels of structures, unities,
 EXISTENCE AND ORDER 9

complex units, realms and domains. Their ties within and among the plenitude
of forms" 5 in the philosophia perennis of Leibniz accounted for their estab-
lishment in beingness, for their existence.
It occurred to me then that the great metaphysical issue of existence and
order, which is the wonderment prompting the phenomenological enterprise,
has taken - albeit in several variations - the implicit form of what Alexander
Pope and Kant after him called "the great chain ofbeing".6
This would mean a recurrence of the classic issue of metaphysics at the
heart of the phenomenological inquiry and it would merit serious attention.
But, as I have mentioned above, it has not been crowned with success. If
phenomenology - the genetic as well as the hermeneutic - seems unable to
ever encompass its own project, it is because the pivot of this very project
remains ignored. What would offer us the key to these labyrinths of the self-
prompting inquiry? Obviously recognition of the reappearance of the great
chain of being within the framework of phenomenological inquiry does not
suffice to assure one of the solution of its grand issue: existence versus order.
To do it justice we have to learn the lesson from the preceding efforts and to
undertake a new project; the phenomenological reconstruction of the human
universe.
Discovering that the often over-absolutised constitutive function of man is
neither his unique nor his primordial function, that not cognition but action
is the main access to existence and, lastly, that the ultimate factor for the
establishment of human beingness is not intentional ordering but the CREA-
TIVE IMAGINATION, we shall find that in full-fledged phenomenological
inquiry, so understood, the great chain of being takes on an entirely new
form.
I am privileged that my friend and collaborator Professor Eugene Kaelin
has cared to present, in what follows, my own philosophical undertaking in
this perspective.

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological

Research and Learning, Belmont, Mass.

NOTES

1 My interpretation of Ingarden's analytic endeavor, which otherwise remains a number

of disconnected fragments, has been, indeed, possible due to the discovery of this grand
classic design as intrinsic to it. With respect to this Ingarden's aesthetic as well as his
fundamental ontological investigation, together with his analysis of the causal structure
10 ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA

of the real wor!d on the one hand, and of human responsibility on the other hand, find
the clue to "what it is ultimately all about." It should, however, be made clear that this
clue is not expressed in any way by Ingarden himself, nor does it seem probable that he
was aware of it. On the contrary he is said to have finally considered his grand design a
failure. For the role of the 'great chain of being' in my interpretation of Ingarden in his
controversies with Husserl, cf. 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism controversy with
Husser!' and 'The Contextual Phase of Phenomenology', pp. 335-341, Part III; chapter
3, pp. 371-373, ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA, vol. IV, 1976.
2 Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, 'Roman Ingarden ou une nouvelle formulation du
probIeme Idealisme/Realisme,' Les Actes du XI Congres International de Philosophie,
Brussels, 1953.
3 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with
HusserI' and 'The contextual Phase of Phenomenology', op. cit.
4 Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, 'Die Phaenomenoiogische Selbstbesinnung I: Der Leib
und die Transzendentalitaet in der gegenwaertigen phaenomenologischen und psychiatri-
schen Forschung' pp. 1-3, ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA, vol. I, 1971.
5 Cf. pp. 335-341, op. cit.
6 Cf. pp. 371-373, op. cit.
 EUGENE F. KAELIN

EXPOSITION: MAN-THE-CREATOR AND THE "PROTOTYPE

OF ACTION"
A contemporary formulation of The Great Chain of Being

Man, the mediator between the natural and the cultural, finds himself in the
unlucky happenstance dramatized so poignantly by Pascal in the seventeenth
century: on the one hand, a reed blown about by the wind; and on the other,
possessed of a mind capable of understanding his situation between the "two
infinities" of the incomparably great and the infmitesimally small. But a mind
is a fragile thing, and the same imagination that enables us to project other
possible worlds, the same symbol systems that permit our understanding of
the real world and to contemplate a better one, may victimize the symbolizer,
render most alienated the most powerful of imaginations. For this reason, man
is the weakest link in "the great chain of being", one of those "unit ideas", 1
which, according to Arthur O. Lovejoy, permits the development of a disci-
pline that has come to be known as "the History of Ideas."
In explaining his methodology Lovejoy states,
The type of 'idea' with which we shall be concerned ... consists in a single specific
proposition or 'principle' expressly enunciated by the most influential of early European
philosophers, together with some further propositions which are, or have been supposed
to be, its corollaries. 2

And lest a unit-idea be interpreted as a simple idea or kind of unit "building

block" that may enter into relationships with other simples to construct a
more complex idea of perceptual or only conceptual density, he stipulates
further:
We shall fIrst discriminate, not, indeed, a single and simple idea, but three ideas which
have, throughout the greater part of the history of the West, been so closely and con-
stantly associated that they have often operated as a unit, and have, when thus taken
together, produced a conception ... which came to be expressed by a single term: 'The
Great Chain of Being' .... 3

The idea entered into the history of philosophy through Plato's distinction
between intelligible and sensible "worlds."
Once one distinguishes ontologically between an independent realm of
immutable, universal Ideas and a dependent realm of changing, particular
11

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 11-37.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
12 EUGENE F. KAELIN

events, processes or things, two further philosophical inqumes become

necessary: fIrst, an epistemology laying out the principles of knowledge
by which one may be said to know both universals and particulars; and
secondly, a cosmology, or theory of the universe in which both universals and
particulars are related in the context of our experienced world. We may recall
the Theaetetus and the sixth and seventh books of the Republic as being
primarily epistemological, and the Timaeus as containing Plato's solution to
the "cosmological" problem.
Owing to different orientations in ontology, epistemology, or cosmology
- not to mention sheer errors of logic itself - the Great Chain of Being will
reoccur in subsequent epochs of the history of philosophy, beginning already
with Aristotle, in slightly revised forms. For this reason, Lovejoy stipulates
three composite principles within his unit-conception: besides the distinction
between the other-worldly and this-worldly orientations of Platonism, there
are the associated cosmological principles of "fecundity" and "continuity."
The fIrst of these subordinate principles goes by the name "the principle of
plenitude", one corollary of which is that at some time everything that is
possible will eventually be realized.
According to the assumptions made by a particular philosopher or going to
make up the ideology of an age, different explanations have been given for
the existence of our natural world. Thus the fecundity of nature is explained
by Plato through the effIcacy of the form of the Good, that form of all forms
which can only be intuited; by Plotinus, through the perfection of the One,
which, being perfect, can only "overflow"; by Aristotle, through the existence
of the First Cause; by the medievals, through the creative goodness of the
"ens perfectissimum"; etc. Descartes adopts the principle by having it regulate
our derivation of the world of nature from possible states of affairs; Leibnitz,
from possible sequences of events.
The philosophical problems endemic within the tradition espousing some
form of the great chain of being are too numerous to detail fully. So I mention
only a few relative to the theme of this article: beyond Leibnitz's "Why is
there something rather than nothing?", the following questions demand
answer: What is the nature of man? and How can man, a determined element
of nature, exercise any freedom, if only to create a novel work of art? What
is the relationship between man as created and man as creator? How can man
do what we know that he does, i.e. create a unique system of cultural entities
of signifIcance not only to himself, but to others as well? What is the nature
of specifIcally human activity?
The contemporary formulation of the great chain argument I shall be
 MAN-THE-CREA TOR 13

exposing to criticism is that of Mme Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, who claims

that the scheme of the great chain of being underlies the entire phenome-
nological program. Her own adaptations of the phenomenological method
supply theoretical links to epistemology and ontology. I shall attempt to
create the picture by considering the development of her philosophical
reflections during the past two decades. According to her implicit criticism,
phenomenology has struggled in vain to solve its problems.

II

Although the connection between my three problems, the question concerning

man's being (Le. his manner of existence), his potentiality for creating novel
significances, and the traditional doctrine of the great chain of being are in no
way obviously connected, a careful consideration of the phenomenological
treatment of aesthetic objects may point the way towards Mme Tymieniecka's
suggested solution to the cosmological question, posed so long ago by Leibnitz.
Since she does repose the question, "Why is there something rather than
nothing?" ,4 in a challenge to Heidegger's inaugural lecture at Freiburg,5
and this question can only arise in the experience of a real, living, human
individual situated in the "context of the real world", one could be led to
expect an answer to the question based upon some kind of analysis of the
existential structures implicit in man's mode of being. She begins her own
analysis by attempting to show the inadequacies of the phenomenological
analyses of Ingarden, her teacher, and Husserl, whose controversy exhibits
the reasons for which she believes neither of them could cope with the issues
under discussion. 6
In what follows I shall trace the development of "the three phenome-
nologies" - the transcendental-constitutive of Husserl, the existential-ontol-
ogical of Ingarden, and the contextual-cosmological of Tymieniecka. Since
the evidence for this development is textual, I can offer no apology for these
three stages on the phenomenologist's way, except perhaps to Kierkegaard,
whose three stages have the distinct advantage of beginning in the aesthetic
sphere of existence. I propose in the remainder of this section to examine
only the nrst two of these "stages."

L The Husserlian methodology

From the evidence of the phenomenological epoche two kinds of "objectivi-

ties" - and hence two different realms of being - are brought to conscious-
14 EUGENE F. KAELIN

ness: the immanent perceptions of the perceiving consciousness and the

transcendence of the objects of the real world. Consciousness through an
analysis of its immanent objectivities, both the noematic nuclei of meanings
by which it interprets the meaning of the world, be it the earlier "world of
nature" or the later "life-world", and its own noetic acts, can achieve cer-
tainty within its own sphere; but since the objects of perception are presented
to it by a series of aspects or profiles, any series of which may be supplanted
by further perceptions, consciousness must appeal in the last analysis to the
continuity within a single stream of conscious experience of the "same"
objects, and ultimately to the intersubjective experiences of many monadic
subjects, in order to establish the "reality" of the world.
Although the epoche does not deny the existence of the world, indeed
could not, unless the meaning of the transcendency of objects itself is denied,
it merely calls for the suspension of belief in the truth of all theories, all
former uninvestigated claims to knowledge one may have gained in the purely
"natural" attitude in which a subject worked out its daily affairs. The cer-
tainty of the knowledge gained in the epoche, the adequacy of its evidence,
is based upon the intuition of essences (eide). Essential intuition is achieved
through the imaginative variation of the factual data given in perception. That
structure which remains unchanged, throughout the variation, as a constitutive
element of the noematic nucleus of meanings by which consciousness intends
its objects is the essence of the objects intended.
But to move from this description of the phenomenological method to the
statement that consciousness constitutes in its acts the existence of the "real"
world is, according to Ingarden, an unwarranted conclusion. It is no part of
the essence of any real individual that it exist; essences are merely ontological
possibilities. From a purely epistemological starting point, no substantive
conclusions concerning the reality of objects intended may be properly drawn.
To claim otherwise is to declare oneself an idealist, and to call such an idealism
'transcendental' goes nowhere to establish the validity of the conclusion.
Hussed's program is no different in principle from that of the subjective
idealist Berkeley (who, by the way, never doubted the existence of the real
world) or that of the phenomenalist Hume, who, in at least some of his
attitudes - those taken up in his closet - did.
The error in all three instances is to have sought a basis for ontology in
epistemology. Ontology must be made into an independent inquiry, a task
undertaken by Ingarden through his criticism of Hussed's mistakes.
Hussed, of course, was aware of the petitio principii involved in pre-
phenomenological epistemology whereby the assumed qualities of real objects
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 15

are appealed to in order to explain the differences between the so-called

'primary' and 'secondary' qualities of objects. His reduction was to place the
epistemological inquiry within the area of transcendental consciousness, and
from an analysis of its acts, to deduce the nature of all real, ideal, or merely
intentional objects. Yet his "Streichen wir das reine Bewusstsein, so streichen
wir die Welt", 7 seems to indicate that transcendental phenomenology had
not gotten beyond the conception of an object as existing for the cognizing
consciousness, but never in itself.

ii. Ingarden's criticism

As early as 1918, Ingarden had communicated to Husserl by letter that he

remained unconvinced that transcendental idealism was the only solution to
the controversy over the existence of the world, indicating that four possibili-
ties might be argued, even within the restrictions of the reduction: (1) that
objective reality is dependent, and that consciousness is autonomous in its
existence; (2) that the being of both reality and consciousness is autonomous;
(3) that reality is autonomous, but consciousness is dependent upon it; and
(4) that the being of both is dependent, and dependent upon each other. 8
Ingarden's aesthetic works were composed to show the structures of purely
intentional objects as ontologically heteronomous, i.e. having their foundation
in something other than themselves, while the Controversy 9 was begun during
the War, and written in Polish as a form of resistance to the brutal German
occupation, so that an ultimate solution to the problem of the controversy
could be resolved on a rational, i.e. critical, rather than a dogmatic basis.
The Controversy was to be a three volume work, but was left unfinished
at Ingarden's death in 1970. Professor Tymieniecka has indicated in her own
way how one might go beyond the controversy between Ingarden and his
mentor,10 so I limit myself here to the threads connecting the analysis of
works of art with Ingarden's general ontology. The argument must perforce
be sketchy, and I shall assume familiarity with Ingarden's multi-stratified
essence of the literary work of art.
The difference between real and ideal objects on the one hand and the
purely intentional object that is a work of art on the other is adumbrated in
the stratum of "represented objectivities." We fmd in this stratum of the
literary work of art a number of "spots of indeterminacy." Fictional worlds
are created as phonic materials reveal semantic meaning units, and as these
units intend the represented objectivities, the states of affairs referred to by
the sentences of the text. The states of affairs make their appearance in the
16 EUGENE F. KAELIN

cognitive acts of readers. But in the creation of such fictional worlds, not
every aspect of the represented world nor of the objects in it can be referred
to by the author. Some statements are left unsaid, but are yet implied by
those which are. These implications may be either of an individual or a general
nature.
The fourth stratum, that of "aspects and aspect continua" , which through
the stratum of semantic unities are motivated by the author's sentences, are
held in readiness by the reader to concretize further the imaginary appearance
of the represented states of affairs. Again, not all aspects are referred to
by the author's text; some are left to the free fancy of the reader as his
"concretization" of the text fulfills the intentional being of the literary work.
There are better and worse concretizations of a given text, but that judgment
is based upon an interpretation of the total "polyphonic harmony" of the
interplay between aesthetically valent qualities of the four strata, as con-
cretized by the reader. Both real and ideal objects are cognized without such
spots of indeterminacy.
For Ingarden, the essence of "real" objects contains the following charac-
teristics: (1) every real object is unequivocally and universally (in every
respect) determined; (2) all determinations of real objects jointly constitute
a primary concrete unity [These characteristics are intentionally separated
from the total unity by the perceptual acts of the perceiver; and since the
aspects of the object are possibly infinite, our natural perception of real
objects can cognize them as a unit only inadequately.] ; (3) every real object
is absolutely individual [Thus, if one characteristic of an object is of a general
or eidetic nature, such as "colored", that essence must be individuated in a
particular value and saturation of a particular hue.] Real objects are in-
dividuated by the fusion of individual determinations, Le. by funding into a
total structural quality, but this fusion is autonomous, founded in the being
of the objects themselves. 11
For the phenomenological grounding of these assertions, Ingarden appeals
to "the essence" of transcendent objects, by which he means, I think, that for
a real object to be intended by an act of consciousness [the eidetic meaning
of the transcendence of that object] it must possess these characteristics. 12
The being of transcendent objects, that is their manner of existence, is there-
fore autonomous; it possesses its determination in itself as essentially de-
scribed. If I am permitted such an epithet, this is the basis for Ingarden's
"transcendental realism."
Works of art, on the contrary, lack this mode of being; they are hetero-
nomous since the foundation of their being is to be found in the intentionality
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 17

of an author, a reader, or a text. Ingarden wrote The Controversy to qualify

further the difference between real, intentional, and ideal being. Formal-
exisential ontology, as developed in that work, constructs various models
of a possible world, but leaves open the question of the real existence of any
such merely possible world. Lovejoy's principle of "plenitude" could only
beg the question we are attempting to clarify, Why this world rather than
another? Or, indeed, why any real world at all?
Significantly, besides the autonomy-heteronomy distinction between
possible modes of being, Ingarden isolates three other "determinations" by
which, according to their ontological idea [seiner Idee nach] , the possible
world may be described: originality/derivation, separateness/inseparateness,
and self-dependence/contingency. Combining these properties according to
their logical implications yields one possible description of an absolute being,
and seven descriptions of relative beings. This admission of the possibility
for consciousness to "combine" determinations according to implications
indicates that consciousness does more than merely bestow meaning upon the
objects of the world. Mme Tymieniecka, looking for a basis of human activity
within consciousness, will follow a similar procedure, beginning with Husserl's
notion of the "passive" genesis of the synthetic unity of a perceptual idea,
and ending with an outright "conjecture" as to the structure of the real
cosmos. But of this more later.
For Ingarden, it is the task of metaphysics to decide which merely possible
world exists in reality. But in this decision it is aided by a further "formal"
and "material" ontological determination, as well as, hypothetically, the
results of the special sciences when their procedures have been erkentniss-
theoretisch justified by an a priori analysis of eidetic structures. Ontology,
then, prepares the way for a metaphysical interpretation of the reality of the
world, but it cannot of itself pronounce upon the actual existence of any-
thing at all. Yet Ingarden never did reach beyond ontology proper in his
development of this problem; nor did he ever offer us a material-existential
ontology upon which his entire edifice was to depend.
So much in general for the state of the art (and practice) of phenomenology
when Mme Tymieniecka took up the cudgels.

III

The third stage on the phenomenological way traced by Mme Tymieniecka,

she calls "contextual." Unlike the first, Husserlian stage, which from the
point of view of method was genetic, searching for the analytical structures
18 EUGENE F. KAELIN

by which the pure Ego was thought to constitute the world (or at least
its significance), and which from the point of view of its conclusions was
"monistic" in that all kinds of "objectivities" - ideal, real, or merely inten-
tional - depended upon the constitutive functioning of the "pure" conscious-
ness, the second, Ingardenian, stage can be characterized methodologically
as both eidetically analytical and ontologically pluralistic, admitting only
one real world, but constituted by both "Ideas" - themselves structurally
determined by the relations of ideal qualities or contents that are universal
(the constants of an eidetic analysis) and individual qualities, or "variables"
that "fill out" the universals as if from below - and real, individual things
that are completely determined by the structural properties of the related
ideal qualities. Both these stages suffered from a serious deficiency.
Husserl had difficulties relating the functions of the pure consciousness
with the embodied consciousness of a living human being, since the body is
part of the world that was placed within the brackets of the phenomenological
reduction. Ingarden's analysis, on the other hand, describes a series of possible
worlds, but is unable to make the connection between these possible worlds
and the one real world in which all humans must live. Mme Tymieniecka
wishes to retain the Ingardenian pluralism, but to go beyond its constructi-
vism by devising a "contextual" explanation of "the nature of man and his
condition" within the ongoing processes of both culture and Nature. What
the phenomenologist seeks, according to this program, is those structures of
the human condition that are irreducible to his purely natural basis, but
which yet grow out of his necessary link to "Elemental Nature". 13
If successful, this same analysis, together with the conjectural synthesis
the newer method demands, should indicate the specific creative function of
man as a means by which the human animal succeeds in realizing his or her
own self-projecting.
Although this program is adumbrated in her Why is there Something rather
than Nothing? (1966),14 its ultimate suspassing of Ingarden is perhaps more
easily understandable from her explanation of Ingarden's "solution" of the
problem of the relations between Ideas, immutable and autonomous as in
Plato, and the changing, equally autonomous things of nature. That article
appeared as "Eidos, Idea and Participation", in 1960-1961,15 We should
remember here that Lovejoy traces the idea of the Great Chain of Being to
Plato's distinction between the other-worldly and the this-worldly nature
of changing individuals.
The ancient separation of the intelligible from the sensible worlds posed an
insoluble problem. For Plato, the discrete separation between Idea and thing
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 19

was to be. bridged by an absolute similarity between the Idea itself and the
things which exemplified it. But since similarity was of the nature of another
form, the spectre of the 'third man' arose to defeat this Platonic notion of
participation. Aristotle would have the universals existing within things, and
abstracted from them by the active intellect. Individual things that are the
primary substances of Aristotle's metaphysics are qualified by the secondary
substances (genera and species) with respect to which alone they could be
"scientifically" known. The impasse of this solution is apparent in the med-
ieval interpretation of the problem of defming individuals: the essence of
Socrates, we remember, was the defmition of Socrates, if Socrates had a
definition. The mode of definition in Aristotle, through proximate genus
and essential difference, could not be applied to individuals.
The impasse found in the Platonic doctrine of participation or of the
Aristotelian inability to defme individuals could be remedied if the following
conditions were met: (1) that Ideas themselves have an autonomous status,
i.e. not be dependent upon anything else for their being; (2) that the Ideas
be structured, i.e. composed of elements that may be found in the structures
of individual things; (3) that there be a structural sameness in the constitution
of Ideas and things; and (4) that the structures of individual things be amen-
able to change as the elements entering into these structures themselves
undergo change, regulated by a kind of "internal mechanism."
These conditions are met as follows:
First, with respect to the Ideas. The dual characteristics of Ideas, to be
universal and at the same time inherent within the conc;rete things of nature,
indicate their two-fold nature: to be determined as they are internally, and to
possess specific contents that are actualized in the concrete. What makes them
distinct from the ideal objects of mathematics and the purely intentional
objects of fiction is precisely this characteristic: the ontical structures con-
tained within Ideas are there in the mode of a constituting principle for
something other than themselves. Ideas, then, may be distinguished according
to their "matter", their "form", and their "existential modalities", this latter
determined by their manner of inherence in other kinds of being, whether
the autonomous and concrete objects of the natural world (relative to the
world context), an absolute being (as a possibly self-determined existent),
processes and events, or purely intentional objects. All objects of any kind are
describable in terms of the matters found within Ideas.
These "matters", on the other hand, are either "constants", i.e. actually
contained within the ideas as its universal quality, or "variables", i.e. singular
determinations that are "indicated" by these same universals. For example,
20 EUGENE F. KAELIN

a specific hue, chroma and saturation are all indicated by any universal color,
say, red. The variables are really present in the concrete things, such as a red
apple.
The matters contained within an Idea therefore constitute the structural
elements of things we may refer to as "ideal qualities." The connections
between the matters are necessarily determined, either in a pattern of co-
existence with each other or as "indicating" a necessary implication of
instantiation in the concrete. Thus the red of an apple, in its specific deter-
mination, is indicated by the universal red, which is one of the possible ways
for a thing to be colored. As components of Ideas, the matters determine
each other, and how they should be found in concrete objects. An "ideal"
quality, therefore, is the smallest distinct unit of a determined being. Such
qualities are atemporal, motionless, and subsist in the permanent mode of
ideal existence.
What bridges the gap between the universal Idea and the individual concrete
thing is neither a "third man", an image, nor anything reduced to the rela-
tionship of similarity. The variable matters, which are integral parts of the
universal Ideas, by their inherence in concrete individual things constitute
the principle of multiplicity within a single species (itself defined as a unity
of essence within a multiplicity); and the constants guarantee that the multi-
plicity of features are linked to the structure of a single unified being. Thus,
the separation between Ideas and things is not purely existential (indicating
a different mode of existence) but functional, i.e. based upon the way in
which ideal qualities coalesce into the structure of a single being. Ideas merely
constitute the function as "indicating" or "prescribing" the qualities found
within the structural composition of a concrete being.
Enough has been said, perhaps, for anyone to understand in what sense
Ingarden's position is "structuralistic." Yet two issues remain to be explained.
Concrete things undergo change, while Ideas are immutable. Is this difference,
too, purely functional? And how can we know the reality of any concrete
being of nature?
We have already indicated that Ideas are not forms to be filled out with
material contents. That is the distinction, ust,d by both Plato and Aristotle,
that was replaced in the structural analysis indicated above. Hence, to under-
stand the generation and corruption undergone by concrete things, we must
reconsider the possible structural relations between the ideal qualities con-
stituting the matters of the Ideas. The actio and passio which according to
Aristotle were predicable of individual primary substances are thought of as
contained within the inner structure of concrete things, determined by the
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 21

Ideas as above. Ideal qualities are merely first order elements of a structural
complex; the relations between these first order elements which determine
the structural unity of the thing produce a distinctive determination. In a
similar way, the aesthetic properties of a visual object are determined by the
patterns of relations between the specific determinations of unit sensible
matters.
For a formal (read "structural") determination of these fust order matters,
one must consider those contents which are "proper to the self-same thing" ,
i.e. the subject of properties and those which are properties of this thing qua
structured. In using the expression, "the constitutive nature of a thing", we
refer to the compactness of its qualities, to the "choice" of the matters that
necessarily inhere within the structure of the thing. As a distinct possibility,
the entire structure of any being is already present in the matters of the Ideas.
The essence (eidos) of a thing is what governs the possibilities of mutability.
Consider; the constitutive nature of some things contain virtualities. Certain
kinds of matters, according to the extent of the requirements of the universal
Ideas, possess the power to remain as they are; others are structured in such
a way as to allow for change. When a constitutive nature demands only some,
but not all the implicates of an Idea, an essence of a real thing is formed.
"Essence" here refers to the "absolutely proper properties" of the being in
question. Yet other implicates of the Idea remain possible, and constitute
the accidents, i.e. those other non-unequivocally determined properties
attributed to the tIring. This is the basis of virtualities as belonging to the
essence of things. The fading of the color red to yellow is one of the virtual
properties of a red thing, yet belongs to the essence. And with any change
of the first order constituent "ideal" qualities found in the structure of a
thing, the second-order structural properties undergo change. Yet what we
call a "thing" is still completely determined by its inherent properties.
Consciousness, in this scheme, is powerless to bestow meaning upon the
objects of nature. This is the gravamen of the argument between Husserlian
transcendental idealism and Ingardenian structural realism.
Mme Tymieniecka has found three "fallacies" in Ingarden's formal-
existential ontology. First, there is the assumption that the noetico-noematic
intentional system of structures and processes is the essential and ultimate
determination of "objectivity." Second, reality is interpreted solely through
the intentionally constituted objective system (the system of meanings
delimiting the possibilities in Ingarden) rather than the internal mechanisms,
each endowed with its own rules of operation (as for example in the Leibnitz-
ian conception of a monad). And third, in consequence of the above, the
22 EUGENE F. KAELIN

criterion of "bodily giveness" that was initially meant to guarantee our access
to the real is limited to the objectifying intuition of things and beings. 16
Yet, she points out, there is at least one system of organic existence that is
"experienced", if not "known" in a pre-reflective human attitude, and that is
the lived-body itself. Thus, if phenomenology is to continue to make headway
and if we are to arrive at an answer to the second question noted above, we
must surpass the earlier attempts at a purely eidetic analysis, and develop a
technique for analyzing the inherent lived structures found in man's necessary
relationship to some contextual world. And what we have to account for in
our search for a method is an explanation of man's position within the Great
Chain of Being, situated tragically between the infinitely great and the in-
fmitesimally small. 17 Man is bound to nature by the subliminal, pre-reflective
tie he must have with Elemental Nature; and we observe that his life project,
whether as an individual or as a member of a community of persons, generates
a telos that is not determined by nature but is governed by the laws of its
own unfolding.
Such was the new program called for in 1976.
As indicated above, Mme Tymieniecka had already sought to expand the
phenomenological method to comprehend both the analysis and synthesis of
our expanding cosmos as early as 1962.18 She refers to the method by which
she has attempted to construct her "contextual phenomenology" variously as
"postulational" or "conjectural inference." The remainder of this section will
be devoted to an explanation of this theoretical gambit.
Both Husserl and Ingarden leave us with nagging questions concerning our
knowledge of the lived human condition. In opposition to the structural
abstractedness of their conception of real being, she proposes a new analysis
of the "real individual." A living, conscious human being is, after all, a
concrete individual. As such the being of this individual carmot be understood
without considering its relationship to the concrete "context" in which its life
span is worked out. This is apparent from the naturalistic standpoint already
at the level of man's biological existence. How is it possible for a human body
describable from one point of view by purely physical determinants suddenly
to take on properties of a higher order? And how do living organic beings
evolve for themselves another order of existence with transcends the biological
in order to achieve a peculiarly significant cultural order of existence? Either
the Great Chain of Being has gaps, precisely at these levels of man's existence,
or man himself ensures the continuity within the Chain. But how is this
possible?
The explanation begins once again with her challenge to the Ingardenian
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 23

categories of the real individual seen as an abstract "object." For her, on the
contrary, a human being is a concretum, existing autonomously as a real
individual, even through that existence is derived from biological parents
and constantly wrought out of the invading world process. The individual
autonomous being is therefore "contingent." This contingency takes the form
of existential "transitoriness"; and the analysis of his functional structure
indicates that the concrete individual is lacking in both a "sufficient reason"
and personal finality.
Existentially (materially) derivative, transitory, and lacking in sufficient
reason, a man must work out the significance of his life. To rationalize this
condition, therefore, we must "postulate" the existence of a world order.
Hence we read: "Indeed, the constitutive system of the totality of being
corresponds as a postulational correlate to the conjectural inference which
has its foothold in the intrinsic pattern of the individual." 19 Later she states
more boldly,

Abandoning the spurious quest after a specific type of cognition as means to assess the
actual existence of the merely possible things and beings we would, in this roundabout
way, frod such means in the a priori existential postulate intrinsic to the universal
order of Being; by the same stroke the traditional metaphysics would be once more
vindicated. 20

Where the prior two phenomenological methods begin with the transcenden-
tally pure or ontologically possible, the newer method is to begin with spelling
out what is required for actuality to be what it is.
To outline the process: beginning with the description of a real individual
within the world context, we note that radical (three-fold) contingency
described above. But owing to the "positive clues" of the description we may
postulate, by conjectural inference, the constructive design of the contextual
world, an expanding sequence of types, or levels, of being it is science's
business to interrogate. Should the "infinite project of science" complete its
task, we should be awarded with a complete architectonic of the world order.
The real universe, if it could be so described, would be traced through orders
of causality back to a beginning and would thus necessarily have an end; so
the world order, too, would be contingent. Indeed, it would take two ideas,
that of the real individual and of the constructive world design, to formulate
an adequate notion of the principle of sufficient reason sought by Leibnitz.
That notion is of the totality of Being, a total functioning system of events
and processes within which we can determine both the structural elements
and their constitutive functions in determining the whole. The totality
24 EUGENE F. KAELIN

of Being itself is thus a teleologically oriented functional system which

outlines the rules, relations and structural connections between the concrete
elements (ultimately the "ideal qualities" of Ingardenian ontology) of the one
actual reality developing autonomously, as a system, without any "direct
interference." 21
At least we can see from this final conjecture that the universe is no
fulguration from the divine essence following the dictates of a pre-established
harmony. The comparison with the Leibnitzian system has been apparent
from the moment Mme Tymieniecka began to seek reducing the "contin-
gency" of the real individual and its contextual world order. She concludes
her short treatise with the pithy but programmatic sentence, "In short the
question why anything exists at all naturally leads to an inquiry into the
constitutive system of cosmic creation." 22 And whether she will be followed
by many phenomenolOgists to complete such an inquiry is a question yet to
be answered.

IV

Mme Tymieniecka gives three reasons why the Ingardenian ontology can-
not answer the problems of philosophy created by the contingency of real
individuals and the contextual world order. Ingarden's eidetic analysis of
the possibilities of real existents suffices to uncover the Ideas and their
dual function which bridges the gap between the intelligible and sensible
worlds, the "ideal qualities" forming the elements entering into higher
orders of structural units, even the purely intentional beings with respect
to which man may project different possible worlds in his creative fictions.
Yet no purely structural explanation seems possible for the following three
phenomena postulated in Mme Tymieniecka's contextual phenomenology:
first, the reasons for the actual emergence of any real individual; second,
the reasons for any real individual to establish its particular pattern of
existence; and last, the "initial spontaneity" of the living, human, real
individual.
The remainder of this section will be dedicated to an explanation of these
phenomena. Beginning with "the initial spontaneity," I shall consider in order
the "human cipher" deciphered from the context of a specifically human
action and then creativity as the "irreducibile element" of the human condi-
tion. In this way we should fmd the place of art and the artist within the
great chain of being.
 MAN-THE-CREA TOR 25

(i) The Initial Spontaneity 23

Mme Tymieniecka maintains that the need for the postulation of an initial
emergent spontaneity in the development of men in the context of the real
world is subjacent to the transcendental genesis, and has been felt in phe-
nomenology since Husserl's Crisis. What was the exasperating blockage to the
further development of the European sciences, if not the consequence of an
over-optimistic rationality? To clear the way for a continued advance in
science itself it would be necessary to reconsider the foundations for our
claims to know anything at all. In the past, ontology and metaphysics were
derivative from an empiricist epistemology. Questioning the ground for that
epistemology - a theory of sensation and perception -led to a reinstauration
of the primacy of ontology in the works of both Ingarden and Heidegger.
And, as might be expected, a crisis in the sciences produced a concomitant
crisis in our concepts of culture and the human condition. Quite simply put,
the drive to rationality led to frustration and an accompanying pessimistic
view of the nature of man.
The shock was felt in literature as well as in the laboratory; in art, as well
as on the psychoanalyst's couch. The eighteenth century ideal of locating
man in a firm position within the great chain of being seemed to have been
blown apart. Man, an alienable if not alienated personality, began to search
his own inner depths, into the inner structures of the Self, for an understand-
ing of his condition, which perversely remained untouched by an objectivizing
science. The literature of a Kafka, a Joyce, a Sartre, a Beckett sought to
plumb the depths: to examine all actions, reactions and personal relations to
discover hidden motivations within given life situations; to locate the deeper
self hidden behind human virtualities, but which could be revealed in the
examination of extraordinary circumstances; and to layout the conditions for
achieving an "authentic self" that would explain an ultimate human allegiance
that would be founded on something other than a biological inheritance,
social convention, or cultural conditioning.
To what was man dedicated, to sheer animal survival? If so, he would still
be a reed blown about by the wind - or to a unique drive towards an active
self-creation? In which case, the greater the force of the winds, the more
sublime his effort to achieve a personal significance. What was needed was an
appeal to a primal human spontaneity, to the effects of a genuine human
freedom, as small as it might be, within the framework of man's determined
natural world.
The phenomenological efforts to reverse the trend of the natural and
26 EUGENE F. KAELIN

cultural scientific crises were, unfortunately, a failure. In its transcendental

tum, as a reaction to the abuse of reason, things as they are were left as they
were, essentially unexamined except for the conditions according to which
they made their appearance to human sUbjectivity. Both the Husserlian -
the transcendental-constitutive -- and the Ingardenian - the ontological-
existential - analyses failed in their genetic descents into the pre-theoretical
givenness of brute fact. The life-world in its roots within the elemental forces
of nature was left untouched by the intentional network of conscious struc-
turing. Moreover, any radically novel or original projects of creative human
action, and the objects they produced within the culture, suffered the same
fate. Results: man sunk further into the depths of pessimism.
So far have we progressed from the notion that ours is the best of all
possible worlds that the optimists among us are reduced to finding some
reason for saying that it is any good at all! The reason: man continued to
look for his significance in objectivity; the structures of the life-world and
the eidos of man were thought to inhere within man's basic "rationality." As
a consequence, we have lost sight of the "inspiring, dynamic factor of our
human experience" ,24 of an appropriate Ethos for human aspiration.
Grounding the contemporary search for an adequate Ethos in man's "initial
spontaneity", an intentional correlate of the system - man-acting-within-the-
context-of-nature - one of the necessary a priori conditions for any form of
human action at all. There were already hints of the necessary postulation of
an initial spontaneity in man's behavior in the phenomenological synthesis
of both Husserl and Ingarden. But the insights, in both cases, were ignored.
Husserl, we remember, talked of a "spontaneous" unfolding of the con-
stitutive acts of the pure Ego. Beginning with the passive synthesis of the
matters of perception, Husserl's intentional network could not grasp the
nature of the matters as they exist in themselves. His postulation was of an
Urimpression, concerning the nature of which one must remain mute. And
once the forces released by the passive genetic system were put into play, one
had to postulate as well as "originary association" , resulting from the mutual
motivation of primal affective elements of experience found after analysis
among the constitutive data of the field of consciousness. The activity of
human consciousness was there, but once employed, did nothing but con-
stitute an ever-the-same rational interpretive system.
Ingarden, on the other hand, in his attempts to reunite the "pure" and
"empirical" ego's isolated a set of formal principles stemming from the
stream of consciousness - the unifying function of the ego-pole of human
experience- and of material contents, such as passions, blind strivings, and
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 27

all other affections united within the concept of the "soul." But the real
concrete individual is neither body nor soul, but rather the Leib or lived-body
in whose experience there is traced a soul-body territory. Yet even he could
not establish the link between the lived soul-body territory and the human
body as an element of nature.
For this reason, Tymieniecka's contextual phenomenology will begin by
"postulating" the existence of an "initial spontaneity" at the onset of a
human life. This initial spontaneity - the antithesis of a pre-established order
- carries, by conjecture, all the germinal virtualities accruing to it by the
elemental forces of nature; and eventually works out its destiny by channeling
the blind, haphazard elements of the same source into significant patterns
of its own making. Such is the ground for the appearance of a real human
individual within the world context of actual experience. The basis of the
conjecture is now evident: for a man to be able to do what we know he does
he must have a beginning in the elemental forces of nature, and he must
possess an initial spontaneity for the self-determination of his own destiny.
By a kind of Gedankenexperiment Mme Tymieniecka suggests three possi-
ble modes of conceiving this process of development: either man's course
flows into its pre-arranged bed by the sheer force of things, or, possessing
an initial spontaneity, is canalized into the same kind of bed by the same
forces - both of these positions are deterministic -, or, again, man's initial
spontaneity is caused to flow, and continues to flow in a bed of its own
making. This latter is her preference. The first two possibilities would be
the causes of the cultural pessimism noted above. The latter of the three
alternatives does not guarantee a certain ground for optimism, but at least
opens up the possibility for human self-determination.
The initial spontaneity is by conjecture differentiated into distinct func-
tional modalities, and after "bringing forth the will to create", lifts the real
concrete human individual to its specifically human status. In this way, she
speculates, the necessary "initial spontaneity" is neither driven from behind
nor whimsically projected into the future.
In order to achieve its complete human form, the initial spontaneity will
traverse the following stages: (1) the dynamic, including all the nuances,
intensities, and degrees of vividness and dullness that "color" human tem-
porality; (2) the "enjoyment" of its own temporalization, horizontally as
being pleasant or painful, as well as vertically uplifting or degrading; and (3)
the axiological, which infuses the other spontaneities with their distinctive
affective value. The process is completed in the achievement of the highest
values of human experience, aesthetic, moral and "spiritual."
28 EUGENE F. KAELIN

(ii) The human cipher 25

Like the precedent, this second concept is the result of the postulation of an
entity representing the necessary condition for the possibility of human
communication through the use of symbols. It takes its inspiration from a
more recent, "hermeneutical" phase of phenomenology according to which
a written text is deciphered to uncover its deeper meanings. If human in-
telligence is required to decipher such meanings, then it is conjectured that a
similar, but asymmetrical and partly unconscious activity was necessary to
construct the text to be deciphered.
What Heidegger has called a personal or communal "forestructure" for
interpreting a text's significance in her procedure reveals a subjacent creative
mechanism at one with her notion of the creative function of man. On her
analysis, which differentiates drastically the reading and the writing of a text,
a reader in his conscious "reconstruction" of the text merely follows a pre-
delineated, intelligible pattern of the past modalities that have grown out of
the "initial spontaneity." To "decipher" a text means to discover, to dis-
cover, or to uncover the "ciphers" embodied within. The same process may
be applied to human conduct in general. Armed with the phenomenological
notion of a concrete individual which cannot exist except in relationship to
the context of his life-world, the hermeneut will seek to reconstruct his "fore-
conception" in terms of the universal constitutive system of the rational,
reflective consciousness in relation to the forces of Elemental Nature. But
these two determinants - Elemental Nature and the constitutive consciousness
- present the interpreter with the alien texture of an already constituted
world-context. What's missing is the "live center" of the initial spontaneity,
now called an "entelechial determinant" of an unc~arted, significant future.
To supply this missing determinant of human creative behavior it is
necessary to tum the process around, and to examine the manner in which
a significant text is constructed in the first place. If interpretive reading is the
deciphering of a text, writing is its "ciphering." "Ciphering a text" means
literally inventing ciphers: not the center of an onion which reveals itself as
a nothing by multiple removal of the layers of dgnificance of a text or action,
but a unit which is itself meaningless, yet which achieves a significance
ultimately by virtue of other such units with which it enters into relationship.
Like the hermeneutical reconstructive method of analysis, this basically
constructive method is applicable to human action. Only one caveat is in
order: declining the gambit to start with Ingarden's positing of the real
individual as one possible ontological structure that realizes itself with respect
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 29

to the achievement of some moral ideal (an autonomous, but transcendental

being such as the idea of Justice), we must begin with the real "constitutive
nature" of a man including within its innermost structure all the virtualities of
its future development. 26 In this way, writing is a vital, personal and creative
self-explication of an author, whose initial spontaneity is viewed as developing
toward a pattern of coordinated functions we call a life project. When the
successful author has thus "expressed" himself, he has "inscribed himself into
the world-context" via the world-symbols or sounds that are a part of the
heritage of every living subject.
For an understanding of this process we must be able to imagine the
interiority of the subjective "synthesis" as a personal reaction to what is
other than the purely personal subjectivity. This reaction constitutes the basis
for the significance felt by the author; and its embodiment in the verbal
context introduces a novel element into human history, made common by
the act of expression.
To summarize, in order to discover the emotions, tendencies, reflections
and aspirations of an author or agent within the context of his expression,
in order to be able to "decipher" a text, that text must first have been
constructed by the agent's creative imagination (Imaginatio Creatrix).27 As
virtualities of the hidden "initial spontaneity" they will remain hidden until
the accomplishment of a creative act. In this way, reconstruction is possible
only if there is a prior construction; and creativity is the personal orchestration
of a man's functional growth. In the end this "creative ciphering" shows the
restricted instrumental significance of the structural/intentional correlation so
emphasized and absolutized in the Ingardenian ontological aesthetics." 2 8
Thus, it is not the abstract essence of the autonomous work of art (In-
garden's four layered construct of the intentional object) that guides an
author in his work: it is his personal "vision." Nor is it the "powers" of his
language. "This imperative demand for an expression new and unprecedented
with respect to the already given defies all the rules." 29 All intrinsic rules
and regular, conventional procedures do nothing more than to supply the
apparatus for expression; and ultimately "This apparatus becomes the tool
to be refashioned according to the needs of the [imagined] work." 30

(iii) Creativity, "the irreducible element" of the human condition 31

Having been led from the concept of an "initial spontaneity", through the
"ciphering process" by which that spontaneity gives itself expression, we
arrive at long last at the confluence of the two general themes announced in
30 EUGENE F. KAELIN

the title of this article. Man, the artist, through his expressive works of art is
not a passive link in the great chain of b~ing; in making himself through his
works he generates the active force that changes the elemental forces of
nature into culture. The unity of being arose as a problem in the first place
because of the supposed distinction between the ontological status of actually
existent entities, such as a man, and the world of ideal forms. To complete
the picture of the complete sequence of things (the cosmos in creation),
including the human ties to Elemental Nature and man's actual life-world,
the prototype of action must be described as both free and creative. How
can man be free when he is tied to Nature and the conditions of his own
life-world?
Mme Tymieniecka has exposited in two different places the reigning
"paradoxes" of human freedom. 32 First, since we feel determined or con-
strained by our relationship to others and our lived worlds, revolt seems to be
the only expression of our aspirations to be free. But this revolt is against our
very own natures, and should it succeed we should destroy the necessary
reactional field necessary to support our own actions. Secondly, freedom is
thought by some to be a right to remove oneself from all external constraints,
including any entangling relations with others. This, too, would be possible
only if the subject accepts the passive restraints of Nature. Third, there is the
dogma of social liberalism that maintains human freedom to be a right to
choose one's own personal destiny, while insisting on the necessity of civil
institutions, including the State, which inevitably produce demands of some
conformity amongst citizens. Lastly, the doctrine of moral freedom since Kant
and even before poses the opposition between man's empirical self, determined
by the course of Nature, and the freedom of man's will (a postulate to
the moral order, in Kant) as a faculty of a noumenal Self. Each of these
paradoxes, it seems, maintains the gap between an intelligible, universal and
immutable essence and the concrete, individual and mutable essence of a
single person -- the same separation that caused the initial conception, if
Lovejoy was right, of the great chain of being.
According to Mme Tymieniecka, the tradition up to and including Ingarden
has been misled in its attempts to fmd a "prototype" of free human action in
morality; the clearest such prototype is the creative act by which an artist
introduces a novel object and through it an original value into the texture of
his contextual world. The separation of intelligible and sensible worlds does,
however, indicate how the creative process is to be envisioned.
The traditional concepts of "mind", "soul" and "body" only indicate
abstractions; within a creative act these "functions" of the human developing
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 31

essence express themselves in an initial conflict. This conflict is felt between

the passive and active virtualities of a stimulated organism, between the effects
of Elemental Nature - both external and internal to the constitutive nature
of that organism - and the individual drive or impulse to extend the bounds
of the given. This would account for the role of our "natural life" in our
creative acts; but to overemphasize this role, as happens in a deterministic
psychology, would "submerge" the artist into Elemental Nature. Yet, nature
cannot be avoided, or evaded, as the paradoxes of freedom explained above
indicate; and when indeed it is not evaded by an act of a perverse will, creation
represents a reconciliation between nature and a creative mind. Something of
this sort is the ultimate source of Sartre's theory of committed literature,
and of Heidegger's description of the "working" of works of art. Indeed,
Heidegger's description of the essence of artworks as the strife between
"the earth" and "a world" seems a concise image of the same process here
postulated. 33
In her own description of the creative process, Mme Tymieniecka leans
heavily on poetry, making extensive use of Paul Valery's work to illustrate
her analysis. 34 Allow me to summarize her conception, worked out through
a purely phenomenological fore-structure. In the strife between the passive
and active elements within a concrete human expression, the passivity is
represented by "sensation." And there is no sensation without an accom-
panying primal affectivity, which may be transformed by the activity of mind
into an expressed emotion. 35 To my own mind Sartre's explanation of the
connection between sensation and affectivity is still the best example to be
found in the phenomenological literature. According to him, for every aware-
ness of the qualities of objects cognized thetically, consciousness is non-
thetically aware of its own affective condition. Mme Tymieniecka refers to
this intentional relationship as a "union of exterior and interior" , expressing
man's essential connection with Elemental Nature and one's own lived world.
At the same time this connection opens us to the influence of the external
forces, it makes it possible for us internally to become masters of ourselves
while remaining open to further experience. This connection is felt and lived
within the human bodily schema. The lived body, as Merleau-Ponty has it,
is the instrument of human expression; and whatever "mental" functions
come to play within the experience must be derivative from the intentional
arc established between man and nature by the lived body.
As man's behavior ascends the dialectic of orders from the physical to the
vital to the cultural, its adjustment patterns develop from the syncretic forms,
in which a response is dictated by the exigencies of an environment, to the
32 EUGENE F. KAELIN

mutable, wherein the response appropriate to one context of the environment

may be transposed to another, and ultimately to the symbolic, wherein forms
may be perceived for their "autosignificance", and out of which a second
nature may be said to be created by human responses to its environment.
Mind, then, develops in the maturation of the concrete individual as one of
its intrinsic virtualities. It is the consciousness of the agent having "separated"
itself from its original ties to Elemental Nature. This agency organizes new
structures, establishes possible connections, and concentrates its reflective
action. It is opposed to the passive nature of the living organism, but cannot
function as isolated from its connection to a body. At this stage of human
expression emotion emerges as the consciousness of one's flesh, the em-
bodiment of the active principle of mind.
At this point Mme Tymieniecka begins to interpret, using the technique
of conjecturing the "postulated" entities and mechanisms of the creative
process. From our experience of the world as flesh, there emerges a subjacent
thread of the creative molding of experience. Valery's image is of La Jeune
Parque, of Clotho, the Fate who spins out the destiny of man. Through the
mind-body connection we experience as flesh, the passive and active functions
of the human subject appear within the field of consciousness, and ultimately
are amenable to phenomenological inspection.
Our "world" becomes unified by the threat of "the pure self" acting as
conductor of all our conscious activity. Having acted, and having achieved
the condition of reflection, the "pure mind" surveys its transformed empire
in which the initial inner conflict between the intelligible and the sensible
has been expressed in a dynamic, active dialectical relationship between the
creative self and its world.
Within this creative process there is a new opening toward an original
experience in which the new, created form destroys the old framework as a
new content bursts the former limits of conscious forms. In the throes of the
creative gestation the artist faces a "vertiginous" array of future "possible
worlds". By choice and an effort of will he may strive to bring into existence
another world that is mediated by his vision of a purely intentional object,
his projected work of art. At the same time a new form of life emerges. The
artist's constitutive nature undergoes change in the emerging effort of creative
inspiration.
This account of artistic inspiration may be expanded into a phenome-
nological deSCription of the way in which the mind-body system within
the field of consciousness functions as "the inventor of potencies." The
contextual conjecture merely widens. The inward orchestration of possible
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 33

structures (purely intentional beings) that we have named "inspiration" may

be described as passing through three stages of the developing spontaneity:
first, the active revolt against the given, constituted world by an initial, critical
scrutiny of its structural forms; second, the generation of a vision of novel
forms produced within the horizon of the constituted world; and third,
the new forms emerging as the result of novel orchestrations of the purely
intentional - imaginatively projected - possible structures found in the
initial inspiration.
The terminal phase of the creative process is the embodiment in nature of
the chosen structural essence. The intentionally devised object must be made
to exist within the context of the real world. There is thus a third postulated
stage, the intermediary between inspiration and execution, which the Greeks
referred to as techne.
The technique of the artist, however, is not a factual given; it is the phy-
sical adaptation of means to the exigencies of the vision. Contemporaneously
we refer to this actual structuring process as "style", "artistry", or "skill-
fulness."
Skillfulness involves the choice of an appropriate medium, the successful
working of which implies the fulfillment of the following set of conditions.
First of all, the qualities of the working materials must be adjusted to the
artist's inspired vision as either sustaining or failing to sustain that vision. And
secondly, the constitutive genesis of the artist's life-world must eventually be
effected by the artist's project in such a way as to change its contextual
structure. If and when these conditions have been met, the artist, by his
creative activity, would have shown how the great chain of being achieves
its continuity; the "principle of plenitude", with which this essay began, is
thus nothing more than human creativity.
The principle of explanation, call it "sufficient reason" if you will, of our
expanding cultural universe is in this way postulated by what we observe
as a phenomenon: the necessity of a human agent to be anchored in an
"Elemental Nature"; and by the expressed freedom of his activity, within the
constraints of that relationship, the creation of a second "nature", or universal
world of cultural experience. Thus we read

... in order to invent, select and develop the appropriate style, the creative orchestration,
of which the creative agent is the center, has to transmute the natural, constitutive line
of the stereotyped human functioning into one appropriate for the purpose. 36

The "subliminal realm" of the creative spirit, in this way, must develop a
style, a distinctive manner of living its fleshy contact with the world in order
34 EUGENE F. KAELIN

to influence the universal condition of its prior constituted world. Creation

therefore brings us back to the bodily movements of an inspired mind:

The created movement of our hand, eyes, legs, arms, in order to have acquired the skill
prescribed by the style of the created work, holds tight to the virtualities of the mobility
of Nature, condition of every motion. 37

Outside of his primeval connection with Elemental Nature man can do

nothing; but with it, the skilled exercise of his creative imagination, and the
development of the intrinsic virtualities of his own being, the artist surpasses
the limits imposed upon him by Nature. Man transcends himself through his
art.

v
A brief evaluation of Mme Tyrnieniecka's "contextual phenomenology" as a
solution to the problem of the links in the great chain of being is now in
order. As that problem originally arose in the history of philosophy with the
Platonic distinction of the intelligible and sensible worlds, it would perhaps
be simple minded to suggest that the Ideas were initially postulated as the
necessary conditions guaranteeing the validity of human knowledge, and that
"participation" of particulars in ,the structures of the universal Ideas then
posed insurmountable problems for both ontology and cosmology. Ultimately
these problems created the crisis in the European sciences noted by Husserl.
Husserl's solution was yet strictly epistemological. By the transcendental-
phenomenological reduction the natural world is reduced to its phenomenal
appearances, within which essences (the equivalents of the Platonic Ideas) are
produced by the active variation of perceptual data by an act of imaginative
reconstruction. The real trees of a forest may be burned to the ground;
but the essence of a tree, the noematic nucleus of intentional meanings
corresponding to the noetic acts of consciousness, is immune from such a
contingency. Isolating the structures of such essences into a set of "formal"
and "material" regional ontologies would thus constitute a firm ground for a
renewed scientific activity. Unifying all the acts of consciousness is the "pure
Ego", the residue of the ultimate reduction, fulfilling all the functions of the
constitutive consciousness outlined in the Cartesian Meditations.
Ingarden entered the fray to charge Husserl with an unwarranted "ideal-
ism." We passed from the transcendental constitutive phase of phenomenology
to the eidetic-ontological. But this phase ended with a description of possible
kinds of being: "ideal", "real", and the "purely intentional." How each of
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 35

these kinds of being related to the real structure of the natural world was left
as a task for metaphysics. Mme Tymieniecka has attempted to solve this
problem by bringing phenomenology into its "third phase", her "contextual
phenomenology", as described in the previous sections of this article.
Has she succeeded? Since her work remains in progress, and what I have
examined are mainly its fragments, and since her long promised treatise on
the phenomenology of creative experience has not yet appeared, this remains
to be seen.

Florida State University

Tallahassee

NOTES

1 The Great Chain of Being, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950).

2 Ibid., p. 14.
3 Ibid., pp. 20-2l.
4 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Why is there Something rather than Nothing? (Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1966). Hereinafter WSN.
5 Martin Heidegger, Was 1st Metaphysik?, 6th edition; (Frankfurt a.M.: Vittorio Kloster-
mann, 1960), p. 42.
6 See WSN, pp. 77-93, and 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with
Husserl - The New Contextual Phase of Phenomenology,' Analecta Husserliana, IV
(1976),376-92. Hereinafter, BICH.
7 See Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism,
A Hannibalsson, trans. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 21. The sentence is
quoted from a seminar lecture attended by Ingarden.
8 Ingarden, 'The Letter to Husserl about the VI [Logical] Investigation and Idealism,' in
Analecta Husserliana, IV (1976), 436.
9 Ingarden, Der Streit um der Existenz der Welt (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag,
1964), VoL 1.
10 A. T. Tymieniecka, BICH, 241-418.
11 Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, G. G. Grabowicz, trans. (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1973),246-47.
12 For his discussion of the "Idea" of transcendence, see Ingarden, 'What is New in
Hussed's Crisis?' Analecta Husserliana, II (1972), 35-6.
13 Tymieniecka,BICH,384-7.
14 Op. cit.
15 In Kant-studien 52 (1960/61),59-87.
16 BICH,374.
17 See WSN, pp. 9-13.
18 In her 'Eidos, Idea, and Participation: The Phenomenological Approach,' lac. cit. Cf.
her WSN, p. 79.
36 EUGENE F. KAELIN

19 WSN, p. 22, italics hers.

20 BICH, p. 340.
21 WSN, p. 159.
22 Ibid., Cf. her Leibniz' Cosmological Synthesis (Assen: Royal Van Gorcum, 1965).
23 This section contains my exegetical account of her 'The Initial Spontaneity,' Analecta
Husserliana, V (1976),3-37.
24 Ibid., p. 17.
25 This section contains my exegetical account of her 'The Creative Self and the Other
in Man's Self-Interpretation,' Analecta Husserliana, VI (1977), 151-86.
26 Mme Tymieniecka develops a phenomenological theory of creativity in Eros et
Logos: Esquisse de phenomenologie de l'interiorite creatrice (Louvain: Editions Nau-
welaerts, 1972).
27 See her 'Imaginatio Creatrix,' Analecta Husserliana, III (1974), 3-41.
28 'The Creative Self and the Other ... " loco cit., p. 179.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 This section contains my exegetical account of her 'The Prototype of Action: Ethical
or Creative?', Analecta Husserliana, VII (1978), 177-211.
32 See her 'Liberti e Liberazione Creatrice,' Incontri Culturali, 1976, 152-60, and 'The
Prototype of Action ... " loco cit., 183-86.
33 See Heidegger, 'Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,' in Holzwege, 4th edition; (Frankfurt
a.M.: Klostermann, 1963), pp. 7-68.
34 Op. cit.
35 Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, paperback reprint (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1958) for a similar account of artistic expression.
36 'The Prototype of Action ... " p. 208.
37 Ibid., p. 211.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cobb-Stevens, Veda: 'Contextual-Phenomenology and the Problem of Creativity,'
Analecta Husserliana, VII (1978), 163-73.
Collingwood, R. G.: The Principles of Art, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958.
Gide, Andre: The Immoralist, Dorothy Bussy, trans. New York: Vintage Books, 1958.
Heidegger, Martin: Was ist Metaphysik? Sixth edition; Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann,
1960. Original, 1929.
Heidegger, Martin: Holzwege, Fourth edition; Frankfurt a.M.: Klosterman, 1963.
Ingarden, Roman: Der Streit um der Existenz der Welt, Tiibingen: Niemeyer Verlag,
1964. 3 vols.
Ingarden, Roman: 'What is New in Hussed's Crisis?' Analecta Husserliana, II (1972),
23-47.
Ingarden, Roman: 'The Letter to Husser! about the VI [Logical] Investigation and
"Idealism",' Analecta Husserliana, IV (1976), 419-38.
Ingarden, Roman: On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, A.
Hannibalsson, trans., The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975.
Ingarden, Roman: The Literary Work of Art, G. G. Grabowicz, trans., Evanston: North-
western University Press, 1973.
 MAN-THE-CREATOR 37

Lovejoy, Arthur 0.: The Great Chain of Being, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1950.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'Eidos, Idea, and Participation: The Phenomenological
Approach,' Kant-studien, 52 (1960/61),59-87.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary European
Thought, New York: The Noonday Press, 1962.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: Leibniz' Cosmological Syn thesis, Assen: Royan Van Gorcum,
1965.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: Why Is there Something rather than Nothing? Assen: Van
Gorcum, 1966.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: Eros et logos: esquisse de la phenomenologie de l'interiorite
creatrice, Paris and Louvain: Nauwelearts, 1972.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'Phenomenology Reflects upon Itself,' Analecta Husserliana,
II (1972), 3-17.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'Imaginatio Creatrix,' Analecta Husserliana, III (1974),
3-4l.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'Beyond Ingarden's Idealism/Realism Controversy with
Husser!,' Analecta Husserliana, IV (1976), 241-418.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'The Initial Spontaneity,' Analecta Husserliana, V (1976),
3-37.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'Liberta e Liberazione Creatrice,' Incontri Culturali, 1976,
152-60.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'The Creative Self and the Other in Man's Self-Interpreta-
tion,' Analecta Husserliana, VI (1977),151-86.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'The Prototype of Action: Ethical or Creative?' Analecta
Husserliana, VII (1978), 177 -211.
Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa: 'Man the Creator and his Triple Telos,' Analecta Husserliana,
IX (1979),3-29.
B. UPSTREAM ENQUIRIES
 ANGELA ALES BELLO

LE PROBLEME DE L'ETRE DANS LA PHENOMENOLOGIE

DE HUSSERL

L'un des points fondamentaux de la difference entre la metaphysique classique

- et plus particulierement la metaphysique elaboree pendant la periode
medievale - et la phenomenologie de Hussed, semble consister precisement
dans Ie theme de l'''etre''. Alors que la philosophie chretienne a considere ce
theme avec une attention particuliere, et en a fait, dans un certain sens, Ie
point focal de sa retlexion et Ie moment caracteristique de son originalite
par rapport a la pensee grecque, HusserI imprima un toumant radical dans sa
position philosophique, en eliminant precisement du cadre de sa recherche
la probIematique existentielIe, c'est-a-dire en mettant entre parentheses
l'existence des choses et du monde; en d'autres termes, il n'a pas affronte la
question relative a l"'etre". C'est pour cette raison pre cisement que Ie point
de vue conscientiel et idealiste de la position de HusserI, oppose au point de
vue "realiste" de la metaphysique medievale, est considere traditionnellement
comme Ie moment crucial de la distinction entre les deux speculations.
S'il est vrai, d'une part, que, en s'inserant dans Ie courant de la speculation
"modeme" qui, de Descartes a Kant, avait souligne la necessite d'un point de
depart lie a la subjectivite, HusserI arrete son attention sur la description
de celle-ci, proposant la forme particuliere d'idealisme qu'est l'idealisme
transcendantal, je voudrais souligner, d'autre part, que l'on ne saurait saisir
la complexite de sa position en l'encadrant simplement dans certains schemas
culturels, mais qu'elle ne peut etre saisie qu'apres une comprehension authen-
tique de cette perspective et, a la limite, apres un "exercice" phenomenologi-
que concreto
En d'autres termes, les considerations qu'il est legitime de formuler sur
ce theme, ne sauraient etre separees de l'observation concrete du procede
methodique, et en ce cas moins que jamais.
Une telle retlexion preliminaire tend it justifier Ie point de vue adopte ici;
on ne peut tenter de repondre a la question "qu'est-ce alors que l'etre pour la
phenomenologie husserlienne", que dans la mesure Oll l'on analyse la signi-
fication de la phenomenologie elle-meme.
Dans cette direction, je tenterai une double approche - historique et
interpretative - de ce qui est, en perspective, fondamental dans cette re-
cherche meme. Aussi, eu egard aux questions posees plus haut, a propos d'une
41

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 41-50.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
42 ANGELA ALES BELLO

confrontation schematique entre metaphysique et phenomenologie, n'ayant

pas l'intention d'approfondir la confrontation, mais plutot de considerer la
signification de la recherche husserlienne, je voudrais mettre en evidence et
a
developper plusieurs points, savoir: 1) que les affinites entre la philo sophie
moderne dans son aspect subjectiviste et la phenomenologie husserlienne,
sont plus problematiques qu'il ne semble, la seconde ouvrant une perspective
a
differente et plus radicale; 2) que cette perspective est liee la fa90n d'en-
tendre la reduction transcendantale; 3) que Ie but de la reduction meme est
la "connaissance de l'etre"; 4) que, de cette fa90n, Ie probIeme de l'etre est
a
pose nouveau et affronte, mais d'un point de vue nettement different de
celui de la metaphysique c1assique.
Parmi les points que je viens de citer,je considere Ie second comme fonda-
mental; c'est dans l'epoche, an effet, que se joue la valeur et que se dessine
la signification de la phenomenologie husserlienne, ce qui justifie l'insistance
de HusserI sur ce theme, et son retour continuel sur la reduction, dans la
tentative de trouver la vraie voie.
a
L'accusation d'idealisme laquelle donne lieu la profonde opposition entre
la phenomenologie et la metaphysique classique, decoule d'une interpretation
possible de l'une des voies de la reduction, dite "voie cartesienne." Celle-
ci, en effet, dont on trouve des traces dans les Idee der Phanomenologie,
Cartesianische !vJeditationen, Ideen, se propose de trouver un terrain absolu
et indubitable, un "Anfang" qui soit apodictique, et elle l'identifie dans la
conscience comme "residu" de la mise entre parentheses de l'existence du
monde. Mais, meme cette position, qui peut etre consideree comme "ideallste",
etant donne qu'elle identifie l'absolu avec la conscience, en reallte se revele
plus exactement, si on l'examine plus a fond, comme un point de vue, selon
lequel Ie monde est considere dans ses reflets subjectifs, mais jamais elimine
dans son alterite effective.
L'autre voie de la reduction qui se developpe dans les analyses husserliennes
a partir de la Vorlesungen 1910/11, dans la Erste Philosophie, dans Zur
Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit I et II, dans Formale und Transzen-
a
dentale Logik pour arriver son comble dans la theorisation de la'Lebenswelt'
de la Krisis, semble depasser Ie probIeme de 1"'An/ang" dans la description
de la correlation transcendantale sujet-objet comme residu d'une epoche qui
n'est pas tellement une mise entre parentheses de l'existence, mais plutot
a
une tentative de recherche d'une dimension profonde qui est Ia base de
toutes les "theorisations.' Cette perspective, qui se concretise dans Ie de-
passement de ce que HusserI appelle objectivisme, concerne aussi Ie mode
d'entendre l'etre: "L'etre objectif (transcendant devant la conscience) n'est
 HUSSERL ET LE PROBLEME DE L'ETRE 43

pas mystique en-soi, mais un en-soi qui re~oit lui-meme son sens de fa~on
purement subjective, et comme "sens" est inseparable de la constitution de
sens; aussi est-il lui-meme un mode de la simple subjectivite. 1 Pour cette
raison, l'etre presuppose l'experience, tout contenu conceptuel presuppose
l'etre objet d'experience, tout l'etre presuppose l'etre individuel, tout etre
individual presuppose la subjectivite. 2
Voila pourquoi il est important de comprendre Ie sens de cette regression
a la subjectivite, car, si elle est entendue dans son aspect apodictique, elle
represente Ie terrain dernier et indubitable au sens cartesien, et la mise entre
parentheses de la dimension mondaine-existentielle a une signification defmi-
tive. Toutefois, Husserl lui-meme se rend compte de ce danger quand il
distingue sa position de la position cartesienne dans la Krisis et quand il se
demande comment il est possible de reconquerir Ie monde apres l'avoir mis
entre parentheses. Le Beilage XX de la Erste Philosophie II est significatif a
cet egard; d'une part, en effet, on y met de cote Ie theme de la subjectivite
comme residu, et de l'autre, dans la tentative de depasser Ie soIipsisme, on
extend Ie monde comme "indice" d'une variMe infinie d'experiences "possi-
bles." La double reduction a l'''Erlebnis'' et au contenu est alors centrale,
permettant de comprendre a fond la dimension temporelle - conscience non
seulement de ce qui est actuel, mais "representation" de ce qui a deja e16
donne (contenu) - et de comprendre que ce contenu renvoie a ce qui n'est
pas reductible a soi.
Cela est la seule voie, non seulement pour justifier l'intersubjectivite, mais
aussi pour indiquer une ouverture realiste de la phenomenologie. Toutefois,
ce que l'on gagne est Ie depassement ou l'ouverture de la subjectivi16 vers
l'objet; ce mouvement horizontal est possible dans la mesure ou un appro-
fondissement bien plus important a ete effectue; l'authentique correlation
transcendantale sujet-objet n'est recuperable qu'au niveau pre-categorial, ce
qui fait que nous reconnaissons au-dela des sedimentations culturelles "que
Ie monde - lequel est pour nous, lequel, dans son sens et dans sonetre-tel,
est notre monde - puise sa significance d'etre, uniquement a notre vie in-
tentionnelle au moyen d'un ensemble d'operations cafacteristiques qui
peuvent etre observees a priori et non construites a travers des raisonnements
discutables et imaginees au moyen de processus mythiques de pensee." 3
Le passage du "categorial" au"pre-categorial" est ainsi realise; c'est la Ie
resultat Ie plus evident et Ie plus important d'une telle reduction. Tentative
de decouvrir comment on donne ce que l'on donne, et qu'est-ce que l'on
donne. Si Ie but de Ia connaissance est l'etre lui-meme, ce don est Ie don de
l'etre. Husserl ecrit: "Quel est Ie but de l'effort gnoseologique - sous Ie titre
44 ANGELA ALES BELLO

"verite" et "etre vrai"? La connaissance tend vers l'etre, c'est-a-dire vers

l'obtention de l'etre meme."4 Plus particulierement, on voit appara"itre la
thematique de 1"'Erfahrungswelt", Ie don de l'etre du monde qui se donne
toujours dans une mQdalite de conscience. Les degres de l'etre correspondent
au fond aux degres d'approfondissement de la conscience du monde. Et Ie
premier degre, celui qui est fondamental, est decouvert au niveau de la sphere
pre-categoriale. Evidence et association sont les deux sews modes primaires
de connaissance lies a la dimension temporelle. II s'agit, donc, de mettre en
evidence la "Wesenstruktur", - comrne Hussed la met en relief a plusieurs
reprises - de la correlation transcendantale. Et cela, parce que Ie sew instru-
ment que possede l'homrne est celui d'une rMlexion radicale sur soi-meme
et sur Ie monde en correlation a soL On distingue ainsi les deux degres de la
doxa passive et de la prise de position active. La "constitution" n'est pas alors
"construction", mais analyse ou mise a nu ("Enthilllung" ou "Erklarting"),
operation qui reveJe la validite de ce qui est deja present, mais implicitement.
Et encore, la presence de termes comme "Bewahnmg" et "Bewahrheitung"
dans l'Analysen sur Passiven Synthesis demontre que l'adequatio intellectus
et rei n'est pas l'adaptation de deux realites etrangeres - ce qui maintiendrait
Ie dualisme que l'on veut combattre - mais la mise en evidence de ce qui est
deja present et indique un processus de clarification: rendre evidente une
representation signifie la porter a une verification originairement remplissante
(urspriinglich erfiillende Bewahrheitung). 5
C'est ainsi qu'emerge Ie motif de la "Selbstgegebenheit", qui semble en
contradiction avec Ie theme de la subjectivite transcendantale en ce sens que
l'on se demande si Ie primum est cette donation de la chose elle-meme ou la
subjectivite meme; Ie probleme se pose de fa~on aigue si Ie moment con-
scientiel est entendu comme absolu, mais ce qui compte est la corn~lation
transcendantale, Ie "Selbstgeben" a comrne correlation Ie "Selbsthabe."
On peut, done, dire que l'etre de soi et l'etre du monde sont mis entre
parentheses dans leur moment existentiel precisement pour pouvoir saisir la
dynamique de la correlation essentielle; en effet, Ie "Sein" du monde coincide
avec la constitution meme, et donc, en derniere analyse, avec sa "Wesenstruk-
tur." Dans ce sens, l'idealisme transcendantal se presente comme depassement
de l'idealisme tout court, etant donne qu'il met en evidence la correlation
profonde et originaire entre moment subjectif et moment objectif. L'etre,
donc, est compris dans la dimension profonde de sa constitution pour une
subjectivite qui Ie revele a travers certaines modalites, mais qui ne represente
pas un moment apodictique.
La "description des choses" a lieu au moyen de la decouverte d'une
 HUSSERL ET LE PROBLEME DE L'ETRE 45

"Wesenstruktur" dans laquelle est mise en evidence la signification de la

modalite de se donner. C'est pourquoi Ie depassement de la "Naivitiit" en
une "reine, echte Wissenschaft" s'identifie avec l'ontologie: "Une ontologie,
examinee avec precision n'est autre que la construction systematique d'une
idee, pleinement developpee, d'une science du monde dans toutes ses ramifi-
cations. Elle evoque en soi l'idee d'un monde possible et vraiment accompli
dans to us ses aspects, selon toutes les articulations et les formes qui appartien-
nent a ce mondeen tant que monde; et il faut encore ajouter "selon tous
les degres de developpement qui appartiennent a un monde en tant que
monde".6
Les articulations de cette ontologie - qui est d'ailleurs l'ontologie de la
"Lebenswelt" - se manifestent dans Ie relief de la structure de la temporalite,
comme dimension portante, qui justifie Ie caractere non-absolu du moment
de la subjectivite, etant donne qu'il ouvre la possibilite al'erreur et au doute.
On peut se demander, en seconde instance, s'il existe un moment "dernier"
qui fond au-dela de la correlation transcendantale, ou bien si l'on s'enferme
dans la description d'une telle correlation. En fait, l'etre du monde et l'etre
du moi n'epuisent pas Ie developpement du theme de l'etre.
II est evident que, ayant elimine la dimension existentielle dans son carac-
tere etranger, sinon dans la necessite de sa determination, Ie theme de l'Etre
absolu semble devenir inconsistant, et c'est pourquoi l'on ne saurait traiter de
l'absolu en termes d'etre. Cela ne veut pas dire toutefois qu'il n'y ait pas Ie
probleme du fondement "supreme" et "absolu"; fondement qui ne s'identifie
pas avec la conscience, meme quand la "voie cartesienne" l'emporte. On
pourrait dire que la tension existante dans les analyses husserliennes entre
l'identification de la conscience avec l'''Anfang'' et la recherche de l'originaire
qui va plus a fond comme "Ursprung" se manifeste meme a l' egard a ce
probleme, ce qui fait qu'a chaque type de reduction correspond un mode
different d'affronter Ie theme. Toutefois, que la conscience "absolute" re-
presente seulement un point de vue et non un "absolu" est demontre precise-
ment par la recherche, a l'interieur de la conscience meme, de "courants" qui
permettent de remonter a un absolu different.
Comme on Ie sait, l'une des references les plus interessantes est contenue
dans les Ideen et est liee a la necessite de distinguer, toujours en partant de
la conscience, la transcendance de Dieu de la transcendance du monde, qui
d'un certain point de vue sont liees, vu que la th6ologie meme repn\sente un
indice pour la recherche du fondement de l'ordre, mais d'un autre point de
vue sont profondement diverses, en raison precisement de l'incompatibilite
entre Dieu et Ie monde ("un Dieu mondain est evidemment impossible").7
46 ANGELA ALES BELLO

Les manuscrits qui ont ete publies recemment 8 permettent de suivre Ie

developpement de ce theme dans les differents moments de son elaboration.
1) A propos de l'Einfuhlung, dans un texte de 1908, Hussed etablit une
comparaison interessante entre la connaissance humaine et la connaissance
divine. II considere Dieu comme "Allbewusstssein" parce qu'il soutient que
"Gottes Sein alles andere absolute Sein in sicht fasst" 9 et que, donc, alors
que la connaissance de l'homme est toujours approximative aussi bien a
l'egard des choses (saisies a travers les Abschattungen) que des autres sujets,
la connaissance propre de Dieu permet de saisir tous les aspects de la realite.
2) Un autre texte, de 1922 10 se termine par une question sur la possibilite
de l'existence d'une "Vbermonade"; dans ce texte, Husserl approfondit a
nouveau Ie concept leibnizien de monade, mettant en relief une fusion, plutot
qu'une separation, entre les monades. II se demande s'il est "denkbar" (et ce
terme se trouve egalement dans text de 1908, examine plus haut) qu'il yait
un Moi qui "ubergreift aile Ich", qui comprenne en une seule vie tout moi
constitute temporellement, qui experimente Ie monde et la nature au moyen
des yeux de chaque moi particulier, qui contienne en soi ses pensees, "qui
cree' la nature et Ie monde dans Ie sens de l'''idee du bien."
3) Une autre voie pour remonter a Dieu est decouverte a travers la retlexion
sur Ie "but" qui doit etre atteint par l'homme et par l'humanite en general;
ce but est de type essentiellement moral, comme il resulte d'un texte publie
dans la Erste Philosoph ie, 11 dans lequel il est souligne que la tendance du
monde vers un but absolu, vers la realisation des valeurs, doit etre liee etroite-
ment au fait que c'est Dieu, et non un hasard aveugle qui regit Ie monde; ou
mieux, "les hommes pourraient certainement realiser aussi un monde divin
dans leur liberte a l'aide de la grace de Dieu, par laquelle ils doivent etre
motives et orientes pour aspirer a cela dans une pleine conscience et avec la
plus grande force de volonte."12
4) Une dernit~re indication interessante est celle qui se refere a la recherche
de l'''originaire'' au moyen de la reflexion sur la teleologie, contenue dans Ie
texte n° 22 (1931) du III Volume de "Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersub-
jektivitiit." 13 En effet, a cote de la reprise du motif moral par lequel la
volonte de Dieu est entendue comme "la volonte absolue universelle qui vit
dans tous les sujets transcendantaux", on trouve un nouveau point de depart:
en recherchant a travers la Ruckfrage la Urstruktur de la realite, Husserl
souligne, comme on l'a deja vu, Ie moment teIeologique present dans la realite
a partir de la "Faktizitat": "Also in Faktum liegt es dass im voraus eine
Teleologie statthat" ,14 ou mieux, la constatation de la presence de la teIeologie
dans la Urfaktizitiit fait que l'on se demande si elle a sa raison en Dieu. "Wir
 HUSSERL ET LE PROBLEME DE L'E TRE 47

kommen auf letze 'Tatsachen' - Urtatsachen auf letze Notwendigkeiten, die

Urnotwendigkeiten." 15
Si l'on arrete son attention sur la recherche du pre-categorial, on observe
qu'it celle-ci correspond la necessite d'une Umotwendigkeit. II n'y a pas une
recherche de l'''etre'' absolu, mais la recherche d'un absolu comme fondement.
L'ontologie de la Lebenswelt ouvre la voie dans cette direction. Toutefois, la
"reduction" s'etend it ce type de problemes, si Ie champ de recherche doit
etre la subjectivite transcendantale.
A quoi correspond cette fa<;:on de dire et de ne pas dire, de presenter Ie
probleme, mais pour Ie mettre entre parentheses? De Ie considerer comme Ie
developpement necessaire de certaines analyses, mais pour Ie faire tomber de
nouveau sous la reduction? Cela ne signifie pas reduire l'alterite it la subjec-
tivite, mais plut6t voir quels sont les moments subjectifs en lesquels l'absolu
se presente; sans aucun doute, la double necessite de considerer la subjectivite
comme cadre de ce qui est indubitable, ou comme lieu de mise it nu, se reflete
sur Ie developpement de ce theme: dans Ie premier cas, on a une reduction
etendue au fondement absolu (Ideen); dans Ie second, la reduction elle-meme
est celle qui conduit aux Umotwendigkeit, et s'il est vrai que l'Urfaktum
semble etre la subjectivite ("Ich bin das Urfaktum in diesem Gang"),16
d'autre part Ie moi ne peut eliminer la "realite absolue"; "L'absolu a son
fondement en soi-meme, et a dans son etre, sans autre justification, sanecessite
absolue comme une 'substance absolue." 17 Toutefois, ces indications ne sont
pas approfondies.
Sans aucun doute, ce procede, si on Ie compare it celui de la metaphysique,
est extremement "reductif" en ce sens que, plut6t qu'il ne demontre la
necessite d'une ouverture, il semble fermer et circonscrire l'horizon, au
moyen d'un type de recherche qui s'autodefinit "mMhodologique."
Certes, l"'ontologie" husserlienne ne presente pas les memes caracteres
que l'ontologie classique. Alors, quel est Ie rapport dans ces analyses entre
l'ontologie, la mMaphysique et l'exigence methodologique?
La necessite de la methode qui se concre tise dans la reduction transcendan-
tale ne me semble pas enfermer la phenomenologie dans un cadre purement
"descriptif." La description est au contraire un bouleversement profond, qui
permet de passer d'une philo sophie comme pur fait culturel, it une dimension
systematique qui met vraiment en evidence Ie sens de la realite, et Ia realite
est suivie dans ses dernieres racines comme connaissance de l'etre, et donc
ontologie, mais de l'etre dans Ia correlation transcendentale. Quel est Ie rap-
port avec la metaphysique? Dans les Cartesianische Meditationem, 18 Hussed
soutient n'etre pas contre toute metaphysique, mais seulement contre les
48 ANGELA ALES BELLO

metaphysiques dogmatiques, c'est-a-dire contre les constructions culturelles

qui doivent faire l'objet de recherches phenomenologiques pour donner lieu
a une metaphysique que ron defmit "concrete", etant donne quelle foumit
une "evaluation metaphysique" de toutes les sciences naturelles et de
"Faktizitiit" en general, remontant aux dernieres racines. 19 Par rapport a la
metaphysique classique, on peut dire que, plutot que de transformer la realite
en concept, on effectue 1'0peration opposee de mise a nu, dans la conviction
que la realite depasse la conceptualisation; on peut objecter qu'au fond,
telle etait deja la necessite speculative que 1'0n peut trol.lver a la base de la
metaphysique thomiste, par exemple, et cela est exact. Toutefois, la phe-
nomenologie husserlienne se pose, a la fm d'un processus de rationalisation,
comme une tentative d'explication de ce qui se trouve so us la rationalisation
elle-meme, en ce moment de la culture occidentale qui voit se preciser de
faeon de plus en plus nette l'affirmation de la construction theorique (voila
Ie rapport de la phenomenologie avec la science) ou la chute opposee dans
l'irrationalisme, resultats rune et l'autre de l"'absolutisation" du moment
rationnel. II ne s'agit done pas de comprendre en rationalisant, mais de mettre
a nu ou d'observer atravers la raison. Heritier de la base egocentrique de la
philosophie moderne, Husserl effectue cette operation en part ant de la
subjectivite, et cela agit dans une double direction: dans l'impossibilite de
parler en termes "objectifs", dans les termes de l'''etre'', sinon en Ie voyant
par rapport a la subjectivite, au meme en 'absolutisant' la subjectivite.
En considerant ce dernier aspect comme negatif et devant etre depasse, et
en reevaluant plutot l'autre, on pourrait dire paradoxalement (et de faeon
provocatrice) que la phenomenologie se presente comme un realisme authen-
tique et une metaphysique authentique, non parce qU'elle s'adapte a la
metaphysique ou au realisme "classique" - et donc, parce qu'une lecture
de la phenomenologie est possible sur la base de certains parametres - mais
bien parce qu'elle realise (peut..etre sous une forme plus pleine), ce qui peut
etre considere comme la necessite la plus profonde de la metaphysique ou
du realisme.
Je voudrais ajouter que, dans cette comparaison avec la metaphysique
medievale, on ne saurait ignorer la position de E. Stein qui est souvent citee
comme example de l'insuffisance de la phenomenologie et comme temoignage
de la necessite d'un retour a une conception metaphysique. L'accusation
formuIee contre Husser! par E. Stein en particulier, et par les autres repre-
sentants du cercle de Gbttingen est precisement celle d'une chute dans
l'idealisme. L'aspect interessant de la position de E. Stein est que, apres
avoir effectue toute une serie d'analyses de type phenomenologique, et avoir,
 HUSSERL ET LE PROBLEME DE L'ETRE 49

donc, applique la methode avec succes, a l'analyse de la personne, a l'inter-

subjectivite et au theme de l'etat, elle abandonne cette recherche et s'oriente
vers l'etude et la lecture de la philo sophie medievale.
Au-dela de la discussion qui peut naitre sur la priorite de la conversion
religieuse, et donc, de sa repercussion sur la nouvelle perspective philosophi-
que choisie par E. Stein, la chose la plus interessante, a mon avis, est que
Ie m conducteur qui mene E. Stein de Husser! a st. Thomas est celui de la
reduction eidetique. Dans la pMnomenologie husserlienne, Ie lien entre
reduction eidetique et reduction transcendantale est determinant; on peut
discuter si Ie motif eidetique est un residu categorial, mais nous avons vu
que, lorsque Hussed parle de "Wesenstruktur", il montre indubitablement
la necessite d'une description essentielle qui ne s'oppose pas a celie tran-
scendantale.
Bien qu'ayant utilise la pMnomenologie dans Ie sens transcendantal, E.
Stein, ne voyant plus de fecondite a cette perspective, l'abandonne en faveur
d'un approfondissement du moment eidetique. Cela la pousse vers une
interpretation de la realite dans son aspect non seulement essen tiel, mais
existentiel; voici apparaitre de nouveau Ie probleme de l'''etre'' dans ses
articulations d"'etre essen tiel" et d'''etre reeL" 11 est interessant de noter,
toutefois, que dans l'article ou elle confronte Hussed et Thomas,2° elle
indique entre les deux une communaute du point de vue philosophique
(to us deux font partir leur recherche de l'examen de l'experience, tous deux
soulignent l'existence d'un moment essen tiel, considerent la philo sophie
comme l'instrument theoretique par excellenceo), admettant implicitement Ie
moment "realiste" de la recherche pMnomenologique elle-meme.
Sa polemique, en fait, se rapporte moins au procede pMnomenologique
qu'a la pretention commune a Husser! et aux philosophes "modernes" de
pouvoir faire abstraction, dans la recherche de la verite, de la revelation et de
Dieu. Elle soutient que, dans la pensee medievale seulement, il existe ce lien
continu entre foi et raison, sur la validite duquel to ute recherche doit se
baser; mais elle procede ensuite a une description de l'etre et de ses "degres"
(ce theme est traite avec beaucoup d'insistance), comme approfondissement
purement "rationnel" faisant emerger sa necessite de fond qui est la necessite
speculative.
De la retlexion de E. Stein, on peut mettre en evidence certains noeuds
problematiques: la description de l'etre en termes "objectifs" est-elle la plus
valide du point de vue philosophique, ou celie qui garantit Ie mieux Ie lien
foi-raison? Et encore: que signifie "description en termes objectifs" si la
description est l'oeuvre du sujet?
50 ANGELA ALES BELLO

E. Stein n'a pas suivi Husserl dans l'elaboration du theme de la "Lebens-

welt"; bien que Ie connaissant,21 elle ne l'a pas approfondi, car desormais sa
speculation etait orientee de fa90n differente, mais il est interessant qu'elle
ait ecrit en 1930 que les "cogitations" dont parle Husser! sont "objets comme
unite de sens", qui permettent de connaitre la nature, Ie propre moi psycho-
physique, les autres sujets, Ie monde objectif comme monde intersubjectif, les
elaborations theoretiques, les theories, les sciences, Ie monde des valeurs. Ce
n'est pas tout; "sur ce terrain, il est aussi possible d'affronter les plus impor-
tantes questions de la metaphysique, de l't\thique, de la philo sophie de la
religion",22 et elle conclut en se posant cette question: "Est-il possible, du
point de vue de la philosophia perennis, de s'approprier la probIematique de
la constitution, sans accepter en me me temps ce qui est denomme l'idealisme
transcendantal de la phenomenologie?". 2 3

NOTES

1 E. Husser!, Erste Philosophie II, Husserliana Bd. VIII, p. 441.

2 Ibid., Beilage XV.
3 E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phiino·
menologie; Husserliana Bd. VI, par. 53.
4 Erste Philosophie II, p. 398.
5 E. Husser!, Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis, Husserliana Bd. XI, p. 66.
6 Erste Philosophie II, p. 218.
7 E. Husser!,Ideen zur Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie I, Husser-
liana Bd. III, par. 51.
8 E. Husser!, Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit, Husserliana Bd. XIII-XIV-
XV.
9 Ibid., Bd. XIII, p. 9.
10 Ibid., Bd. XIV, Beilage XLI.
11 Erste Philosophie II, p. 258.
12 Ibid.
13 Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit Bd. XV.
14 /bid., p. 385.
15 Ibid., p. 385.
16 Ibid., p. 386.
17 Ibid., p. 386.
18 Husserliana Bd. I.
19 Erste Philosophie II, p. 429.
20 E. Stein, Husserls Phiinomenologie und die Philosophie des heiligen Thomas von
Aquino. Versuch einer Gegenuberstellung in 'Husserl zum 70. Geburtstag' M. Niemeyer
Verlag, Tiibingen 1929, pp. 315-338.
21 E. Stein, Welt und Person, Werke VI, p. 35.
22 Ibid., p. 34.
23 Ibid., p. 35.
 1. DE FINANCE

LES DEGRES DE L'ETRE CHEZ SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN

La notion de "degres de l'etre", chez saint Thomas et les scolastiques, doit

etre soigneusement distinguee de celle de "genres d'etre." Ces derniers sont
les "categories", deja distinguees par Aristote et correspondant aux divers
"predicaments", c'est-a-dire aux diverses manieres dont l'etre peut s'attribuer.
On a souvent, depuis Trendelenburg, souligne Ie rapport de la table aristoteli-
cienne avec les structures liguistigues indo-europeennes: ce qui n'est pas une
preuve de faussete, mais une invitation a la critique. II semble, du reste,
que, pour saint Thomas, les six derniers predicaments se ramenent a des
denominations extrinseques. 1 II est certain, en tout cas, que, pour lui comme
pour Aristote, c'est a la substance que l'esse est attribue simpliciter. 2 L'etre
vrai, c'est la substance et partantla vraie division del'etre est cellequiordonne
et distribue les substances selon leur degre d'etre. Ces degres, a leur tour
peuvent etre considen~s de deux fa(:ons:
(a) en extension: comme autant de classes d'etres ou bien
(b) comme des niveaux d'etre pouvant coexister chez un meme existant
concret.

(a) LES CLASSES D'ETRES

Selon saint Thomas, les degres d'etre se deterrninent diversement selon

qu'il s'agit d'etres corporels et d'etres spirituels,3 l'homme occupant une
position mediane., a la limite, a ['horizon des deux mondes, bien que notre
connaissance, qui part du sensible, l'atteigne d'abord du dehors, comme
corps anime, comme animal pourvu de raison.

1. Dans Ie monde des corps, les degres d'etre vont de bas en haut, selon un
ordre de determinations enrichissantes. Les degres inferieurs sont conserves
dans les degres superieurs, comme, selon Aristote, Ie triangle dans Ie qua-
drilatere (saint Thomas dit: comme Ie carre dans Ie pentagone, ce qui est
geometriquement bien dis cut able ... ). La base a partir de laquelle s'evaluent
les degres, c'est la matiere. Les degres s'eIevent, selon que cette "puissance"
re(:oit une "forme" qui l'actue plus compIetement. On aura ainsi, successive-
ment: les elements, les "mixtes" (parmi lesquels figurent les mineraux), les
51

A. Ales Bello (ed), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 51-57.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
52 J. DE FINANCE

plantes, les animaux et enfm l'homme "fin de toute generation"4 - de tout

Ie processus cosmique. Texte magnifique, qu'il faut se garder de lire dans une
perspective evolutionniste dont saint Thomas ne pouvait avoir la moindre
idee, mais qui s'y adapterait fort bien. - Chaque degre se caracterise par des
proprietes nouvelles, irreductibles a celles du degre inferieur. Ainsi Ie pouvoir
qu'a l'aimant d'attirer Ie fer, celui qu'a Ie saphir de guerir les u1ceres ne se
ramenent pas a des combinaisons de "qualites eIementaires", actives ou
passives, ne s'expliquent pas par elles. 5 II y a donc, d'un degre a un autre, un
saul qualilati/, une discontinuite, comme deja d'ailleurs entre les especes, qui,
ainsi que l'enseignait Aristote et Ie repete saint Thomas, sont entre elles
"comme les nombres" (entiers, bien entendu). - Pourtant, cette discontinuite
va de pair avec une certaine contiguite, dont saint Thomas a trouve Ie principe
chez Ie pseudo-Areopagite: Ie sommet de 1'0rdre inferieur touche la base de
l'ordre superieur. 6 En interpretant ce principe ala lettre, et en extension, on
devrait dire, par exemple, que les plantes les plus perfectionnees sont aussi les
plus voisines des animaux les plus rudimentaires ... De fait, saint Thomas
voit quelque chose comme une annonce du regne animal chez les pI antes ou
les sexes sont separes. Pourtant il savait bien, par Aristote, que la ligne de
partage des deux regnes se situe au contraire au niveau Ie plus bas, la ou il
est souvent difficile de discerner si 1'0n a affaire a un vegetal ou a un animal.
Un texte no us met sur la voie d'une interpretation plus satisfaisante. La
fonction la plus haute de l' "arne vegetative" - la generation - presente une
certaine affinite avec l'ordre de la connaissance, parce que, comme celle-ci,
elle vise l'autre - l'engendre - tandis que les autres fonctions ont pour terme
Ie corps propre: la "nutritive", par exemple, ne vise l'aliment que pour lui
enlever son alterite en l'assimilant. 7 lci, on Ie voit, Ie principe de contiguite
est entendu, si l'on peut dire, "en comprehension." Ce sont les proprietes,
les fonctions les plus hautes de l'ordre inferieur, qui "touchent" 1'0rdre
superieur.
Saint Thomas admet ainsi une certaine "participation" horizontale des
degres superieurs par les degres inferieurs.
- Certains animaux participent de la prudence, en ce sens que leur agir a
quelque ressemblance avec celui que la prudence dicterait. 8
- Tous les connaissants, meme les plus infnnes (tous "ces vivants dont
l'acte est une arne") "communient" (dans la connaissance) avec les "sub-
stances superieures". 9
- Bien plus, tous les corps participent des substances superieures dans
l' emission des species. 10
On trouve chez saint Thomas divers tableaux hierarchiques, ordonnant les
 LES DEGRES DE L'ETRE CHEZ SAINT THOMAS 53

etres selon la maniere dont ils realisent certaines formes ou certains aspects de
l'agir: hierarchie des spontaneites,l1 hierarchie des app6tits; 12 hierarchie des
modes de connaissance. 13 Mais, dans ce dernier cas, saint Thomas suit l'ordre
descendant, propre it l'etude du monde des esprits.

2. Dans Ie monde spirituel, en effet, les degres se mesurent 11 partir d'un

Principe plus ou moins parfaitement participe. Alors que, dans Ie monde
materiel, la complexite croit it mesure que l'on s'eieve, elle croit, dans Ie
monde spirituel 11 mesure que l'on descend. Chez ces purs esprits -dont
chacun, selon saint Thomas, constitue it lui seul une especes distincte, les plus
eleves ont besoin, pour explorer Ie champ de l'etre, d'un moins grand nombre
d' "idees", parce que leurs idees sont plus riches, plus fortes, couvrent un
champ plus vaste que celles des esprits inferieurs. 14 L'etre, comme chez les
neoplatoniciens, descend vers Ie multiple en s'eloignant de l'Un.
L'ame humaine occupe Ie dernier degre de cette echelle descendante.
Ses idees ou ce qui en tient lieu n'ont pas de contenu inne: ce qui est inne
en elle, c'est seulement la lumiere qui lui permettra de former ses concepts
et de prononcer ses jugements it partir du sensible: d'ou la necessite du corps.
II semble que pour saint Thomas la faiblesse de l'esprit humain n'est pas
la suite de sa condition incarnee: c'est plutot celle-ci qui est appelee par
celie-Ill? IS
En termes plus strictement m6taphysiques, ou du moins plus strictement
aristoteliciens, la descente, dans Ie monde spirituel, correspond a une penetra-
tion croissante de la puissance dans l'acte, tandis que l'ordre ascendant
du monde materiel correspond a une actuation croissante de la puissance.
Determination enrichissante d'un cote, limitante de l'autre - En realite,
comme nous allons Ie voir, Ie principe d'ordre que saint Thomas propose
pour Ie monde spirituel vaut pour l'ensemble de l'etre et donc aussi pour Ie
monde des corps, a un niveau plus pro fond que celui ou joue Ie principe de
determination enrichissan te.
Dans cette hierarchie des etres, Dieu occupe Ie sommet. C'est meme la ce
qui fournit a saint Thomas l'une de ses preuves de l'existence de Dieu: la
celebre quarta via, l'argument "des degres" .16 Ici la gradation ontologique,
impliquee dans la gradation axiologique (selon Ie bien, Ie vrai, Ie noble, etc.)
est referee, quel que soit Ie type d'etre considere, a un Premier, qui est Ie plus
parfait, et a partir duquelles etres, litteralement, se db-gradent. Et il est bien
evident que saint Thomas decouvre cette hierarchie a l'interieur du monde de
notre experience. C'est dire que Ie principe qui, dans la question De anima,
etait enonce a propos des etres spirituels, est etendu ici a l'ensemble des
54 1. DE. FINANCE

etres finis. Et c'est dire encore, comme nous l'annon9ions, que Ie processus
descendant que l'argument decouvre en remontant la pente, se situe a un
niveau plus profond que Ie processus ascendant, qu'il ne vaut pas seulement
pour les hautes regions de l'etre, qu'il enveloppe Ie processus mis en oeuvre
dans les regions inferieures. C'est qu'en effet les determinations enrichissantes
qui marquent les degres du monde materiel ne sont pas une surcharge mais un
progres vers l'unite.
Cependant, en posant Dieu comme Ie premier, saint Thomas n'oublie pas
que l'Ipsum Esse subsistens ne fait point partie de la serie des entia. 11 n'y a
pas de continuite entre eux et Lui. Les perfections dont les creatures nous
suggerent l'idee, non seulement se trouvent en Dieu sans limitation, mais
encore -et ceci explique cela- selon un tout autre mode d'etre. - identiques a
leur sujet et it son esse. 17 - 11 ne faut pas se laisser tromper par Ie schema
lineaire que semble parfois adopter saint Thomas: Dieu - les anges - les
hommes, etc. (la ou, par exemple, il expose la hierarchie des intelligences).18
Dieu est hors serie, puisqu'il cree la serie tout entiere et est present a chacun
de ses elements comme son eternite est presente a chaque moment du temps.
- Cette serie, du reste, n'est ni continue ni infmie. Le monde des existants
fmis est fmi et comporte des sauts. Saint Thomas, i1 est vrai, ne croit pas
pouvoir exclure a priori l'hypothese d'un monde cree ab aeterno et semble
avoir doute au moins une fois (dans Ie Contra munnurantes de aeternitate
mundi) que l'on puisse exclure absolument par la simple raison l'hypothese
d'un monde infini, c'est-a-dire compose d'une multitude infinie d'existants.
- Quant aux possibles, ils sont sans doute une multitude infmie, comme est
infmie la puissance creatrice qui les fonde et les contient. Vetre divin peut
etre participe par une infinite d'etants et une infinite de manieres. 19 Mais
la non plus on ne peut parler d'une vraie continuite. II y aura toujours un
ab1me entre l'etre sentant Ie plus parfait et l'etre pensant Ie plus fruste. A plus
forte raison ne saurait-il y avoir de continuite entre la creature, si elevee qu'on
la suppose, et Ie Createur. Encore une fois, les essences sont comme les
nombres ... La distinction entre existants et possibles est liee a l'affirmation
de la Liberte creatrice, fondamentalechez saint Thomas comme chez tout
penseur chretien. Pourtant Ie Docteur angelique semble admettre une certaine
necessite hypothetique. Si Dieu decide de creer, il faut que dans la creation
to us les degres d'etres soient representes. Non pas evidemment tous les
individus ni meme toutes les especes possibles, mais ces degres ou se manifeste
une difference fondamentale et irreductible: elements, mixtes, vegetaux
animaux, monde spirituel et, au milieu, l'homme. La perfection de l'univers
exige qu'il contienne des "substances intellectuelles".20 Un monde sans
 LES DEGRES DE L'ETRE CHEZ SAINT THOMAS 55

pen see serait impensable et, pour saint Thomas, les "substances separees"
-les purs esprits- sont une piece essentielle de l'ensemble cosmique.
Insistons sur ce fait que, dans les degres ainsi entendus, les differences ne
sont pas simplement des variations sur un theme commun, mais apportent
quelque chose de nouveau, qui n'etait pas contenu, meme implieitement, dans
un genre superieur. "Raisonnable" n'est pas une determination intrinseque d'
"animal", comme rest "ruminant." De meme les differences des purs esprits
sont intrinseques it la "nature spirituelle", mais Ie fait d'etre "forme d'un
corps" ne rest pas: il y a lit du nouveau. 21 Ces remarques valent egalement
pour l'autre fayon de concevoir les degres d'etre, dont nous allons nous
occuper it present.

(b) LES NIVEAUX D'ETRE DANS L'EXIST ANT

lei surtout la position de saint Thomas differe de celle de plusieurs scolasti-

ques, des scotistes en particulier. Pour Ie Docteur Angelique, en effet, les
degres d'etre, it l'interieur de l'individu, ne se distinguent que d'une distinc-
tion de raison. Saint Thomas ignore ce que Scot nommera une "distinction
formelle", intermediaire entre une distinction "reelle" et une simple distinc-
tion de concepts: distinction de "formalites" qui, au sein de la realite ou
elles sont prises et ne forment plus qu'un sew etre, conservent cependant
l'opposition qu'elles ont "en soi", selon leur "nature absolue." Ainsi en serait-
il, chez l'homme, de l':ll1imalite et de la rationalite. Pour saint Thomas, au
contraire, il y a bien iei deux notions distinctes, mais chacune convient it
l'homme tout entier: tout entier animal et tout entier raisonnable. Cette
double attribution se fonde sans doute sur la structure de l'homme, mais
ne l'exprime pas directement. L'homme n'est pas un animal coiffe d'une
forme a laquelle seule appartiendrait Ie caractere "raisonnabIe"; pas davantage
une mosaique de "formalites" distinctes independamment de la pensee. - 11
est it peine besoin de souligner combien ces considerations, purement logiques
en apparence, accentuent l'unite concrete de l'individu.

APPENDICE: PEUT-ON PARLER D'ANALOGIE A PROPOS DES

DEGRES D'ETRE COMME ON LE FAIT POUR LES CATEGORIES?

11 y a analogie entre les categories - les "grands genres" - parce que l'etre
-qui n'est pas un genre- s'attribue diversement it chacune d'elles. A parler
strictement, en donnqnt aux mots leur pleine portee metaphysique-mais
saint Thomas, it rna connaissance, ne dit rien sur ce point-, l'etre, avec ses
56 J. DE FINANCE

transcendentaux, ne devrait pas pouvoir etre attribue univoquement it deux

etants, si proches qu'ils soient par leurs caracteres essentiels. Ce cas mis it
part, les autres perfections s'attribuent univoquement a l'interieur d'un meme
genre: c'est lit justement un caractere de l'unite generique. 22 Cela vaut aussi,
apparemment, des "genres supremes", done du genre "substance." Or les
degres d'etre se situent justement, nous l'avons vu, a l'interieur de ce genre:
de ce chef, il y aurait entre eux univocite on pourrait degager des concepts
communs, valant univoquement pour les corps et les esprits. C'est ainsi
que par la connaissance reflexive que nous acquerons de notre arne nous
pouvons former Ie concept d'un certain "genre eloigne" - aliquod genus
retum - des substances spirituelies,23 ce qui n'est pas Ie cas pour Dieu, car
Dieu ne rentre pas dans un genre. 24
Cependant saint Thomas - dans un texte du debut, il est vrai 25 - parle
d'une analogia secundum esse et non secundum intentionem, qu'il distingue it
la fois de l'analogia secundum esse et intentionem (entre Dieu et les creatures
ou entre les "grands genres") et de l'analogia secundum intentionem tantum
(pure figure de langage). Or cette analogie a sa place la ou un concept s'appli-
que de la meme maniere a des realites foncierement diverses. Ainsi la matiere
des corps terrestres et celie des corps celestes ne different pas pour Ie logicien,
mais different pour Ie metaphysicien (qui s'inspire de la physique aristoteli-
cienne). D'apres Aristotle, de fait, la predication, ici, serait "equivoque." Ne
serait'il pas conforme a l'esprit de saint Thomas d'appliquer cette analogie
aux "grands degres"?
Remarquons toutefois que, dans les oeuvres posterieures, cette forme
d'analogie n'est plus mentionnee. Plus tard, chez d'autres scolastiques, ap-
paraltra l'ana/ogia inaequalitatis. Certains, comme Ie Pere Marechal, n'ad-
mettent l'univocite qu'it l'interieur de l'espece: Ie genre serait attribue analogi-
quement. Le Pere Rousselot, lui, introduisait l'analogie a l'interieur meme de
l'espece (comme Ie font des auteurs plus recents s'inspirant de Wittgenstein).

NOTES

1 In III Physicarum, leet. 5; ed. Maggiolo, 322.

2 S. theal., I, q. 5, a. 1, ad lum. Les determinations qui lui surviennent -les "accidents"
- n'ont, au eontraire, qu'un etre "secundum quid".
3 Cf. notamment Q. de anima, a. 7.
4 Cant. gent., III, 22.
5 Q. de spiritualibus creaturis, a. 2.
6 Cf. S. tMal., I, q. 78, a. 2; q. 108, a. 6.
7 S. theal., I, q. 78, a. 2.
 LES DEGRES DE L'ETRE CHEZ SAINT THOMAS 57

8 In III de anima, lect. 5; S. theol., I. q. 55, a. 3, ad 3um ; I-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3um .

9 In II de anima, lect. 5.
10 De Potentia, q. 5, a. 8.
11 Par ex. S. theol., I. q. 18, a. 3.
12 Cf. De Veritate, q. 25, a. 1; S. theol., I-II, q. 26, a. 1, etc. L'ordre suivi n'est pas
toujours Ie meme.
13 Par ex., S. theol., I, q. 87, a. 1.
14 S. theol., I, q. 55, a. 3; Cant. gnet., II, 98;De Veritate, q. 8, a. 10.
15 On peut comparer la hierarchie thomiste des intelligences avec la hierarchie bergson-
a
nienne des consciences-durees dans 11ntroduction la metaphysique (Oeuvres, Paris,
1959, p. 1418 s.). Les conscience se hierarchisent selon qu'elles condensent dans un
instant une tranche plus ou moins longue de duree. II y a, par rapport it saint Thomas,
transposition du registre de I'etre dans celui de la duree. Mais cela entraine des differences
considerables.
16 S. theol., I, q. 2, a. 3.
17 lb., I, q. 13, a. 5.
18 Cf. S. theol., I, q. 87, a. 1.
19 Cant. gent., 1,43.
20 Cant. gent., 11,46.
21 Cf. Cant. gent., II, 98.
22 De Potentia, q. 7, a. 3, ad 6 um .
23 Cant. gent., III, 46.
24 De Potentia, q. 7, a. 3; Cant. gent., I, 25.
25 In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1um .
 YVON BELA V AL

LEIBNIZ ET LA CHAiNE DES ETRES

Le but de cette note n'est pas d'aborder Ie probleme en toute son ampleur, it
supposer que "toute son ampleur" ait un sens assignable.! 11 n'est meme pas
de l'aborder dans "toute son ampleur" chez Leibniz, car comment l'isoler
dans un systeme ou tout s'entr'exprime? On serait entraIne it reprendre tout
Ie systeme (it supposer, ici encore, que ce tout ait un sens assignable). On se
bomera donc it quelques marques (notae) caracteristiques.
Un maillon ne constitue pas une chaIne. L'idee de chaine implique une
pluralite, denombrable ou non-denombrable, de maillons engages, sans
discontinuite, les uns dans les autres: une concatenatio physique ou ideale.
Insistons. Une telle pluralite se compose d'individus, dans la mesure ou les
maillons, detachables les uns des autres, peuvent chacun, it ce qu'il semble,
etre consideres isolement. Rien de plus aise en pratique. Mais logiquement un
maillon ne peut etre con~u que comme "maillon d'une chaIne." 11 faut done
que dans un univers preetabli selon une logique divine analogue a la notre
(Leibniz Ie professe), iI y ait des individus ou substances; que chacun de ces
individus ou substances n'y soit, en principe, pensable que comme "individu
ou substance de ce monde"; et qu'ils soient tous lies l'un it l'autre: «avjJ.1Tvoux
1TCxvroi», comme disait Hippocrate. 2 Mais nous voici bien loin d'avoir justifie,
et dans sa linearite et dans sa consistance. l'image de la chaIne.
Cette image ne nous interdit-elle pas de parler de la chaIne de l'Etre? Sans
doute. Si l'on voit dans cet etre un universel gene rique auquel, par extension
ou par comprehension, on rattacherait un multiple, serait-il autre chose
qu'une abstraction? En tout cas, ce ne serait pas l'Etre veritablement un, la
substance, ni, moins encore, fens realissimum, unique dans sa transcendance.
Prise en soi, la substance divine n'est enchaInee it rien; la trinite - Leibniz
emploie ici Ie terme 3 - de ses trois attributs, posse, scire, velte - ne se
confond pas avec la sainte trinite; la premiere s'exprime en notre conscience
retlexive ou Ie retlechi se distingue de l'acte meme de la retlexion;4 la se-
conde, qui renvoie, non it des attributs, mais it des substances - les trois
personnes en une - demeure un mystere, l'experience de la reflexion se
bomant, par comparaison, it montrer que ce mystere n'est pas contradictoire.
Quand bien meme on assujettirait it un ordre necessaire que Ie Pere engendre
Ie Fils, et, Ie Pere et Ie Fils ensemble, Ie saint Esprit, notre incapacite it
59

A. Ales Bello (ed..), Analecta Husse,liaM, Vol. XI, 59-68.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
60 YVON BELA V AL

rationaliser Ie Mystere completement ne nous autoriserait pas a identifier cet

ordre a une chalne, mira rerum penitius cognitarum concatenatio. 5
Du moins, l'Etre supreme n'est-il pas Ie premier maillon de la chaine des
creatures? Cette fois, l'image est famiW:re. On evoquait la chaine d'or. A
propos de l'inspiration, Socrate deja la suggere: l'inspiration est comparable
- est-il dit dans Ion, 533d - a la pierre d'aimant: "Cette pierre n'attire pas
seulement les anneaux de fer eux-memes; elle communique aux anneaux une
force qui leur donne Ie meme pouvoir qu'a la pierre, celui d'attirer d'autres
anneaux, de sorte que l'on voit parfois une tres longue chaine d'anneaux du
fer suspendus les uns aux autres." 6 Et dans Ie Magneticum Natura Regnum de
P. A. Kircher, Leibniz a copie la Figura Catenae Aureae, un cuivre der eine
Kette in der Hand Gottes darstellt und des Spruch triigt: "Arcanis nodis
ligatur mundus." 7 Plus loin, dans un projet pour l'Hypothesis Physicae
Novae, Leibniz rappellera qu'il nous manque l'omniscience promise par les
Roses-Croix, pour decouvrir Ie nombre, les distances, les grandeurs des Moiles
a catenae aureae seu Rotae Mundi cognitione. 8 Image familiere done. Voltaire
la versifiera dans son Poeme sur Ie desastre de Lisbonne:
o reyes des savants! 0 chimeres profondes!
Dieu tient en main la chaine et n'est point enchalne ...
Ou, en prose, dans l'article "Providence" de son Dictionnaire Philosophique:
" ... tout est lie a son tr6ne par une chaine infmie dont aucun anneau ne
peut jamais etre hors de sa place." Image pour image, afm de designer la
verticalite de cette chaine, on pourrait l'appeler echelle. Encore Voltaire:
"Cette gradation d'etres qui s'elevent depuis Ie plus leger atome jusqu'a l'Etre
Supreme; cette echelle de l'infini frappe d'admiration"; ainsi debute, dans Ie
Dictionnaire, l'article "Chaine des etres crees" qui, comme Ie suivant", Chaine
ou generation des evenements" est une attaque resolue contre Leibniz. Bien
entendu, on trouve Scala chez Leibniz, par exemple dans ce passage, visible-
ment inspire d'Aristote, de l'Hypothesis Physica Nova: "Caeterum Regna
sibi alimenta praebent per scalam, mineralia vegetabilibus, haec animalibus
et retro ... "9 Mais si Ie terme est rare, !'idee en est frequente. Pour parler
philosophiquement, et non plus par images, elle renvoie, en meme temps, a
la causalite rectrice du monde et a la hierarchie des etres crees, selon leur
quantite d'essence, c'est-a-dire de realite: " ... pro quantitate essentiae seu
realitatis, vel pro gradu per/ectionis quem involvunt; est enim per/ectio
nihil aliud quam essentiae quantitas"; elle est Ie nerf de l'argument cosmo-
logique du De Rerum Originatione radicali. 10 Chaine ou echelle, peu importe!
Nous demandions: "l'Etre supreme peut-il etre Ie premier maillon de Ia chaine
 LEIBNIZ ET LA CHAiNE DES ETRES 61

des etres?" Nous ne Ie croyons pas. 11 n'y a de .premier maillon qu'enchaine a

ceux qui Ie suivent, et Dieu ne peut etre enchaine. Leibniz indique bien la
difference: "Rationes igitur Mundi latent in aliquo extramundano, differente
a catena statuum seu sene rerum, quarum aggregatum mundum constituit." 11
La Substance divine ne peut etre it la fois transcendante -la religion l'exige -
et immanente au monde, comme la continuite de la chaine no us contraindrait
de l'admettre. Ce qui trompe, c'est que Leibniz defend de pair, mais sans
confusion, un monisme de l'expression ou la clarte des perfections s'eHNe en
continuite de la mens momentanea it la mens extra mundana, aeternalis, -
ou se degrade en sens inverse - et, d'autre part, un pluralisme de Nature
pour les substances. A respecter les termes dans leur exactitude, Dieu ne
peut pas etre Ie premier maillon de la chaine des etres, parce que, dans Ie
contexte du pluralisme des substances, la chaine est rompue deux fois: entre
la transcendance et l'immanence, et, dans !'immanence de la Creation, entre
les monades spirituelles et les simples monades.
Conformement a l'usage comrnun, nous avons donc a reflechir sur la
chaine des etres. Le monde est un ensemble d'Ctres. 11 a un modele dans
l'entendement souverain ou les modeles de ces etres - leurs notions com-
pletes - defmissent l'espace et Ie temps ideaux. II n'y a rien de plus dans Ie
monde cree que l'existence meme, qui change l'espace en etendue et Ie
temps en duree. Lorsque Leibniz traite du monde, il peut penser it son modele
dans l'entendement souverain ou it ce modele existentialise; et ici, derechef,
existentialise comme monades ou comme phenomenes. Le monde a ainsi un
double fondement: son modele existentiable dans l'entendement du Createur;
les monades creees, source des phenomenes. On ne soulignera jamais assez que
la cause premiere en est ideale et reelle, car les idees et leurs relations en Dieu
sont it la fois ideales et reelles comme tout ce qui est en Dieu. Au niveau
monadique, entre Dieu et les phenomenes, Ie monde participe du Createur
et de la creature. II est infini et fini ou, plus exactement, une finitude infmie.
Infini par sa ressemblance it l'Immensum divin, car, comrne Ie rappelle Leibniz
au P. des Bosses, Ie 16 Juin, 1712, "nec ulla est monadum propinquitas, aut
distantia spatialis, vel absoluta, dicereque esse in puncto conglobatas, aut in
spatio disseminatas, est quibusdam fictionibus animi nostri uti;" 12 fini, en
tant que creation determinee (Dieu ne saurait subir de determination), et
determinee comme un optimum ou, pour Ie dire en mathematicien, un
maximum qui decide de la receptivitas vel capacitas mundi; 13 fmitude infmie,
puisque cette capacitas delimite un ensemble non-denombrable de monades
(on denombre les mots d'un dictionnaire, on ne denombre pas les idees
qu'il renferme). Le monde est un tout. Mais ce tout n'est pas substantiel ni
62 YVON BELA V AL

organique, car il n'est pas une substance ni un animal. C'est un agregat de

substances. Cet optimum n'en est pas moins lie par la causalite ideale, et
pourtant reelle (venant de Dieu) de l'ordre et de l'entr'expression. Leibniz
peut reprendre les notes qu'encore etudiant (1663-1666) il retenait de J. M.
Bisterfeld, de Consistentia: aucun etre n'est isole dans l'univers, tout etre vit-
avec (est Symbioticum) P.t tend a l'association; de la l'ordre et l'harmonie
universelle (panharmoniJ) et que dans la Nature, spirituelle ou corporelle, il
n'y ait pas de vide; de la la chaine d'or de la Nature, unde aurea naturae
Catena oritur. 14 Voila une premiere justification de la consistance du monde.
Son enchafnement inflexible depend de la Toute-Puissance jointe ala Sage sse
qui l'ont preetabli ou predetermine. La chaine des etres n'equivaut-elle pas
ici a un tatum leibnitianum aussi contraire a la liberte que Ie tatum stoicum,
spinozanum, ou mahometanum? Contre une telle consequence, l'auteur de
la Theodicee ne cessera de protester. Ce n'est pas moins la consequence qu'en
ont tiree ses adversaires, Voltaire en particulier qui la caricature dans Candide.
Voltaire ala mauvaise excuse de n'avoir pas approfondi la theorie leibnizienne
de la liberte - et alors comment distinguer, une fois repris par l'image? La
meme image de la chaine intervient en faveur de la verite chretienne dans
la question du peche originel - " ... die ganze Kette der umbstiinde von
der erscha[fung an mit sich gebracht, dass Eva der Schlangen, Adam der Eva
zu wiederstehen nicht bastant gewesen ... "15 - et contre l'exploitation par
les Turcs, pour obtenir de leurs milices une temerite aveugle, de la croyance
en un enchainement inevitable - " ... der eingebildeten Kette einer un-
vermejndlichen nothvendigkeit ... ." 16 Mais ces disputes sont connues et
n'apporteraient pas grand chose a notre sujet.
On se demandera plutot: "la plenitude du monde favorise-t-elle, ou non
l'hypotMse de la chaine des titres?" Elle la favorise. En effet si la creation -
et, avant elle, son modele - est un tissu compact de relations, chaque monade
devant exprimer toutes les autres, cette compacite est deja un materiau pour
la consistance des chaines. On en cherchera la nature. Que Ie monde soit plein
signifie qu'il n'y a ni vide ni manque de formes dans la continuite de l'espace
et du temps. Leibniz n'exc1ut pas dogmatiquement la possibilite du vide; il
la trouve contraire a l'infmie perfection de Dieu: ce serait un manque it creer
(comme on dit: un manque a gagner). nest vrai, Leibniz nous invite parfois it
inverser cet argument pour expliquer la creation ex nihilo. En mathematicien,
il compare ce nihil au zero qui se combine avec Ie I dans la numeration
dyadique pour engendrer la chaine indefmie des nombres.17 De toute fa~on,
en metaphysique ou en mathematiques, Ie neant ou zero, est Ie plus simple,
"car Ie rien est plus simple et plus facile, que quelque chose", 18 il peut nous
 LEIBNIZ ET LA CHAiNE DES ETRES 63

aider 11 comprendre l'origine de la limite et de la negation. 19 Du meme coup,

il entrerait parmi les conditions de la chaine des etres. En l'absence d'argu-
mentation decisive, il serait encore loisible de dMendre la possibilite d'un vide
ontologique sans effet sur l'experience; il suffirait d'admettre que Dieu, sur-
naturellement a-neantise une substance, sans rien changer aux phenomenes: 20
" ... si Dieu changeait extraordinairement l'identite rt~elle, la personelle
demeurerait, pourvu que l'homme conserviit les apparences d'identite, tant
les internes (c'est-11-dire de la conscience) que les externes, comme celles qui
consistent dans ce qui parait aux autres" - pourvu, autrement dit, que Dieu
conserviit la chaine des phenomenes. Mais Leibniz "n'adopte pas cette suppo-
sition, il vient de dire: "Je croirais que cela se pourrait etre par Ia puissance
absolue de Dieu, mais suivant l'ordre des choses, l'identite apparente 11 la
personne meme, qui se sent la meme, suppose l'identite reelle."21 Par con-
sequent, contentons-nous de rejeter Ie vide. A dMaut y aurait-il un manque
de formes? Au livre III, chap. VI, des Nouveaux Essais, 11 propos des especes,
on revient sur la correspondance de l'interne et de l'externe et l'on avoue
que "quoiqu'il n'y ait point d'apparence externe qui ne soit fondee dans la
constitution interne, il est vrai neanmoins qu'une meme apparence pourrait
resulter quelquefois de deux differentes constitutions ... ";22 ici encore on
se tirera d'embarras en approfondissant l'enchainement, "la generation des
especes." 23 Quant 11 la question utrnm detur vacuum fonnarum, 11 savoir
"s'il y a des especes possibles qui pourtant n'existent point, et qu'il semble
que la Nature elit oubliees ... J'ai des raisons pour croire que toutes les
especes possibles ne sont point compossibles dans l'univers ... ," et, d'un
mot, "La loi de continuite porte que la nature ne laisse point de vide dans
l'ordre qu'elle suit; mais toute forme ou espece n'est pas de tout ordre." 24
La conclusion de Leibniz est donc claire: ni vide, ni manque de formes. Tout
est plein. Rien d'inerte, rien de torpide dans la matiere, de depourvu de vie,
neque in materia torpidum atque ut dicam expers vitae. 25 Etre et agir sont
synonymes, de la Toute-Puissance du Createur 11 Ia force, par laquelle il
faudrait dermir la substance pour rMormer la metaphysique,26 et qui fonde
les mouvements dan.s Ie monde des phenomenes. Nous nous interrogeons sur
la chaIne des etres et la nature de sa consistance. Nous avons insiste sur la
plenitude d'etre du monde. Or cet etre est part::mt actif. La reponse 11 notre
question, maintenant, serait que cette consistance est de I'ordre de la force,
fondatrice des phenomenes, ou, pour parler plus metaphysiquement, de
l'ordre de la pretention 11 l'existence - praetensio ad existendum 27 - des
essences, fondatrices des substances elle-memes, qui sont les veritables etres.
Sans l'activite des essences dont Ie mecanisme spirituel etablit Ie modele
64 YVON BELA V AL

optimum de tous les mondes possibles, et, par suite, apres la Creation, sans la
force substantielle des monades ou, si l'on prefere, sans leur Appetio, dont
l'envers est la Perceptio, la chaine des etres manquerait de consistance. Avec
la force de l'appetitio perceptive nous revenons au principe me me de la
catena aurea, la pretention it l'existence it proportion de la quantite d'essence,
c'est-it-dire de realite, en d'autres termes a proportion de la perfection d'etre,
possible." 28
Mais sans doute allons-nous ici nous heurter a une des difficultes les plus
grandes que rencontre la philosophie. Nous traitons de la chaines des etres.
Or, Ie mot "etre" est plurivoque. Par excellence, il designe la substance et,
meme, faut-il preciser, la substance premiere, ovam npWTT/, l'individu, et non
Ie genre ou l'espece, ovallX oEvTEPex. C'est pourquoi Ie nominalisme ne recon-
naissait d'autre existence que l'individu; c'est pourquoi chez Leibniz - il
n'existe que des monades - Ie degre d'etre (ou de perfection) se me sure a
la quantite d'essence, c'est-a-dire au nombre de ses attributs, et cela parce que
semble-toil, ce nombre s'accroit jusqu'a devenir infmi, quand on procede de
l'universel it l'individuel. Spontanement nous croyons que seule la substance
existe (ou est) en soi, hors de nous, tandis que la relation est pensee. Kant en
temoigne, qui fait de la substance un noumime inconnaissable: la substance
pensee n'est pas chez lui une substance, elle est une categorie. Ainsi s'opere
une coupure radicale entre l'etre et son apparence, ou phenomene. Cette
coupure donne un sens nouveau aux categories d'Aristote, dont la premiere,
parce que les autres n'auraient pas lieu d'etre sans elle, est la substance et,
a n'en pas douter, la substance premiere (par exemple, Socrate). En Leibniz
intervient un Dieu createur, inconnu d' Aristote, et inaccessible it la raison
pure pour Kant. Createur par sa volonte qui n'a de signification de volonte,
et pas, seulement, de puissance, fut-elle la Toute-Puissance, qu'en se deter-
minant selon les motifs de son Entendement. Quels motifs? Ceux qui se
resument dans Ie principe: obtenir Ie maximum d'etre pour Ie minimum de
depense. II faut (moralement) choisir la meilleure entre toutes les combi-
naisons (necessaires d'une necessite brute celles-ci) des essences et, plus
exactement, puisqu'il ne peut y avoir rien de vague pour l'omniscience divine,
des notions completes. Ces notions completes, determinant, et pre determinant
si elles figurent dans un contexte de compossibles existentifiables, les notions
des individus, la primaute de la substance premiere se trouve respectee. Mais
la notion premiere n'est elle-meme determinable que par predication: "la
notion individuelle de chaque personne renferme une fois pour toutes ce qui
lui arrivera it jamais ... "29 Ainsi, Ie predicat est bien un etre, Ie constitutif de
l'essence qui consituera la substance. Sans cesser d'etre, il se distingue de
 LEIBNIZ ET LA CHAINE DES ETRES 65

l'essence comme Ie constitutif du constitue, Ie pluriel du singulier, et de la

substance, en outre, comme l'incree du cree. On n'imagine pas une substance
qui n'aurait qu'un seul predicat: elles s'identifieraient l'une a l'autre. L'essence
n'est complete et, par la, existentifiable, qu'en faisant l'unite d'une pluralite
indefinie de predicats. Si elle n'appartenait pas a l'etre, elle ne tendrait pas a
l'existence a laquelle elle ne saurait parvenir d'elle-meme (en un systeme
non-moniste). Dieu l'existentifie. Predicat-essence-existence, voila la gradation.
Isole, un predicat serait contradictoire, il ne serait Ie predicat de rien. II ne
devient cn\able que concreable dans la compossibilite de la notion complete.
Des lors, il ne s'agit plus d'aligner l'Ens realissimum dans une suite de sub-
stances. II est Ie Createur. II exprime de soi Ie monde dont il voit Ie modele
en son entendement. II institue une chaine d'entr'expressions entre un modele
de possibles, ces possibles realises, et les phenomenes qui durent dans l'eten-
due. On peut parler, au singulier, de la chaine des etres ("echelle" serait
preferable) pour designer cette extr' expression vertic ale (par metaphore) -
sans oublier que les maillons de cette chaine ne sont pas d'un etre homogene.
Mieux vaut se souvenir que Ie pluriel regne partout et qu'a chaque niveau -
possibles, substances, apparences - s'entrecroisent a l'infmi des chaines
d'etres de chaque niveau.
Insistons sur la notion complete. Elle est formee d'entr' expressions, c'est-
a-dire des relations que chaque essence - qui s'en trouve par la situee, donc
individuee - entretient avec toutes les autres essences. La relation se defmit:
quaedam unitas in mUltis,30 comme l'espece, Ie genre, l'universel, l'harmonie,
voire Ie vinculum substantiale - definition reciproque de celle de laperception
ou de la monade 31. Elle n'est pas un abstrait, elle permet d'abstraitre; elle est,
comme Ie 1fp6~ Tt d'Aristote, une categorie de l'etre. Elle est interne. A ce
titre elle donne lieu a des propositions predicatives, sous la forme canonique
S E P. Ainsi, a propos de la relation, revenons-nous au predicat, dont nous
venons de rappeler qu'il est de l'etre, Ie constitutif de l'essence qui constituera
la substance. Et la copule de la proposition predicative a, elle aussi, une valeur
ontologique. 32 La notion complete - essence existentifiable d'un individu -
se forme comme un point d'accumulation de pn\dicats: de la notion generale
a la notion individuelle une densification de l'Hre semble se produire. La
relation s'interiorise dans l'essence, comme Ie predicat. Si "la notion in-
dividuelle de chaque personne renferme une fois pour toutes ce qui lui arrivera
a jamais ... ", c'est que la serie de ses predicats, figee dans Ie temps immobile
de l'entendement souverain, se deroule dans la duree de l'existence, quand
l'individu est cree. Cette serie et elle seule. Cette contrainte est necessaire
- et peu importe ici que cette necessite soit hypo the tique a cause de la
66 YVON BELA V AL

contingence de la creation. Cette contrainte fait la solidite d'une chaine

d'evenements. Elle suggere aussi la linearite de la duree, dont nous avions
besoin pour invoquer une chaine. Et comme toutes les essences, puis toutes
les monades s'entr'expriment, il faut que la serie par laquelle se dMinissent la
nature et Ie destin d'un etre symbolise avec la serie de rout autre etre: Ale-
xandre doit battre Darius et epouser sa fiUe parce que la convergence de ces
trois series etait comprise dans la notion complete de chacun. Et la chaine
de l'etre collectif du monde - Dieu n'etait pas un etre collectif et c'est
pourquoi il nous etait difficile tout a l'heure de parler de chaine de l'etre -
est faite de l'ensemble infini de telles convergences.
Lorsque l'on considere distributivement chaque monade, chacune tire de
son propre fonds comme si elle etait seule au monde, la serie predeterminee de
ses predicats; considerees ensemble, tanquam unum, elles composent, par leur
harmonie, une totalite dont on peut se demander, pas toujours avec optimisme,
si elle stagne, progresse, ou regresse en perfection; de toute maniere, la chaine
de ses perfections est, elle aussi preetablie. Soit une substance: chacune a Ie
destin conforme li sa nature (et c'est celli sa liberte), c'est-li-dire a son situs
dans Ie contexte universel et, du meme coup, ala loi de sa serie. Le Situs est Ie
premier terme de cette serie, la raison de cette serie est fixee par sa concor-
dance avec toutes les autres. Voila une chaine: elle a Ie Situs pour attache, sa
courbe ne saurait devier et seule une action surnaturelle de Dieu pourrait en
interrompre la continuite; sa contrainte fait sa consistance, sa loi en fait la
linearite ou, si l'on prMere, sa parfaite autonornie. lei encore, une totalite
s'integre a la totalite du. monde. Les deux totalites s'entr'expriment. Or.
qU'est-ce qu'une totalite sinon une fmalite? Chaque monade a sa destinee, sa
fmalite interne et il semble qu'elle obeisse a une intention particuliere: n'est-il
pas ecrit dans la lettre de saint Paul a Timothee (2, 3-4) que notre Sauveur
omnes homines vult salvos fieri, donc chacun? Pourtant, Leibniz ne cesse de
Ie repeter: Dieu n'a pas cree Ie monde pour Adam, ni pour aucun particulier;
peut-etre meme prMere-t-il l'espece des lions a la vie d'un seul homme. eet
Adam, eet individu n'a e16 choisi qu'en fonction de la totalite de la Creation
par laquelle il est d'ailleurs defmi. Le peintre ne s'arrete pas a une touche, il
choisit Ie tableau. La fmalite devient circulaire, globale. C'est pourquoi, com-
me, dans un mouvement eirculaire,l'avenir d'un point sur Ie cercle ne sera que
la trace de son passe au passage prochain, ainsi, dans l'harmonie preetablie de
causalite ide ale qu'est Ie systeme de Leibniz, la cause effieiente n'est que
l'aspect apparent, mecanique (au sens cartesien) d'une cause finale qui, en
general, echappe au savant. II n'y a de chaine - ou chaines - des etres que par
l'accord finalisant, en Dieu, de la volonte generale et de la volonte particuliere.
 LEIBNIZ ET LA CHAiNE DES ETRES 67

Terminons par une remarque. Nous venons de parler de causalite ideale et

l'on n'aura pas oublie que l'originatio de notre monde est Ie monde possible,
ideal de l'entendement souverain. On ne s'etonnera donc pas de retrouver
dans la logique Ie langage de la metaphysique et de l'ontologie. L'etre du
discours rationnel exprime l'etre: d'ou Ie Dialogus de connexione inter res et
verba et veritatis realitate, 1677. 33 D'ailleurs, dans la diction de ce discours Ie
principe de contradiction enonce Ie principe de l'etre, qui fait dependre du
possible Ie reel. "La raison est l'enchainement des verites", et, ajoute, au
paragraphe 1, Ie Discours pri!liminaire de la Theodicee, "cette definition de la
raison (c'est-it-dire de la droite et veritable raison) a surpris quelquespersonnes
accoutumees it declamer contre la raison prise en un sens vague." Le raisQlllle-
ment est une chaine d'idees, catena idearum; la demonstration, une chaine de
definitions, catena definitionum. 34 S'il surgit une difficulte dans Ie raisonne-
ment,- c'est qu'une difficulte anterieure n'a pas Me encore resolue: Intricatum
est catena difficultatum, seu cum nova difficultas incipit, antequam altera
desinat. Id enim est (Catena).35 On comprend que l'auteur de la Theodicee
ait reve, depuis les Demonstrationes Catholicae, d'une chaine de demon-
strations admirables concernant les choses supremes, Catena mirabilium
demonstrationum de summa rerum. 36

Universite de Paris

NOTES

P = I'edition Gerhardt desPhilosophischen Schriften.

T = Textes inMits, publies par Gaston Grua, 2 vol., Paris, 1948.
Ak = Siimtliche Schriften und Briefe, Akademie-Verlag.

1 En son temps, Arthur O. Lovejoy a essaye d'en dire quelque chose avec The Great
Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea, Harvard University Press, 1936.
Reprinted Harper Torchbook, N. Y. 1960.
2 P. V, p. 48.
3 T.139.
4 Ibid., 179.
5 Ak. VI, i, 402.
6 Trad. L. Meridier, les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1964.
7 Ak. I, ii, 295 n.
8 Ibid., p. 343.
9 Ibid., VI, ii, 246.
10 P. VII, 303.
11 Ibid., p. 303.
12 Ibid., II, 451.
68 YVON BELAV AL

13 P. VII, 303.
14 Ak. VI, i. 153.
15 Ibid., p. 543.
16 Ibid., p. 537.
17 T., 371,364; Couturat, Op. 430.
18 P. VI, 602.
19 Cf. Nos Etudes Leibniziennes, Paris, 1976, pp. 178-179.
20 P. V, 220. (Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais II, xxvii, § 9).
21 Ibid. p. 218-19.
22 P. V, 288.
23 Ibid., p. 289.
24 Ibid., p. 286.
25 Couturat, Op. 623.
26 P. IV, 469.
27 P. VII, 303.
28 P. VII, 303.
29 Disc. Met. § xiii.
30 T.,13.
31 Cf. Etudes Leibniziennes, p. 88.
32 Sur l'etre eategoriel et la valeur ontologique de la eopule, on eonsultera Pierre Auben
que, Le probteme de l'etre chez Aristote, Paris, 1972, en partie. p. 163, 170-172.
33 P. VII, 190 sq.
34 Ak.VI,ii,479.
35 Ibid., p. 496.
36 T. p. 263.
 W. H. WERKMEISTER

KANT, NICOLAI HARTMANN, AND THE GREAT CHAIN

OF BEING

At first glance it may seem that relating the philosophies of Immanuel Kant
and Nicolai Hartmann to Alexander Pope's conception of the Great Chain of
Being is arbitrary to the point of absurdity. However, a closer book at the
facts will soon show that it is by no means absurd or even arbitrary, for both
Kant and Hartmann are concerned with an interpretation of the Great Chain
of Being - albeit from radically different points of view. This difference
Nicolai Hartmann has stressed in his formidable Grundzuge einer Metaphysik
der Erkenntnis. 1 There he quotes Kant's "highest principle of all synthetic
judgments": "The conditions of the possibility of experience as such are at
the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and
therefore have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori." 2
Kant had argued, quite correctly, that synthetic judgments a priori could
not validly apply to objects if the conditions of the possibility of experience
were imposed upon the subject by the objects of experience. The failure of
empiricism in all its forms is proof of this fact. Not one of them can justify
the a priori employment of synthetic propositions. Kant had therefore
assigned to the subject the role of imposing the conditions of possible experi-
ence upon the object. But in doing so,he had overlooked a "third possibility",
namely, that the conditions of the possibility of experience are imposed
neither by the subject nor by the object; that they are simply metaphysical
conditions "this side of idealism and realism" which are equally binding for
subject and object.
It is Hartmann's contention that this "highest principle" is obvious to all
who understand it, and that it finds its validation in the actual analysis of
experience. In what sense, then, does it help us to understand Hartmann's
conception of the Great Chain of Being? And how does this differ from
Kant's commitment to Pope's idea?

On the title page to part 1 of Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des

Himmels Kant gives us as a motto a quotation from Alexander Pope's Essay
on Man: "Is the great chain that draws all to agree, and drawn supports,
69

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI,69-97.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
70 W. H. WERKMEISTER

upheld by God, or thee?" 3 - a motto that clearly foreshadows the theme of

Kant's book. In the preface to the book Kant defmes his task more specifi-
cally as an attempt to discover "the system which binds together the great
bodies of creation" and "to derive the formation of the heavenly bodies
themselves, as well as the origin of their movements, from the first [Le., the
most elementary] state of nature of mechanicallaws."4 As he puts it rather
emphatically: "Give me matter and I will build a world out of it!" That is, he
adds, "I will show you how a world Shall arise out of it." S
In carrying out his project, Kant assumed (1) that, in the beginning, matter
is in a state of general dispersion, and (2) that this matter is subject to the
laws of Newtonian mechanics, and especially the law of causality, and that in
itself it has no freedom. 6
Kant then "deduced" the structure and the dynamics not only of our
solar system but of the universe as a whole. 7 Enamored, as he says, by the
"charm of a sublime idea" involving the "plan of creation" , he interprets the
"nebulous stars" or "luminous patches" as stellar systems comparable to the
one in which we fmd ourselves, arguing that they are "universes and, so to
say, Milky Ways, like the one whose construction we have just unfolded." 8
And even these universes "are not without relation to one another, and
because of this mutual relationship they constitute again a still more immense
system."9 Moreover,

If the grandeur of a planetary world in which the earth, as a grain of sand which is
scarcely perceived, fill the understanding with wonder, with what astonishment are we
transported when we behold the infinite multitude of worlds and systems which fill the
extension of the Milky Way! But how is this astonishment increased when we become
aware of the fact that all these immense orders of star-worlds again form but one of a
number whose boundary we do not know; ... when we become aware of the fact that
we live in a world of worlds; ... that our solar system is but the first member of a
progressive relationship of worlds and systems of worlds. 10

When, in the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant said that "two things fill
the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and
more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heaven above and the moral
law within me", 11 he no doubt had this system of worlds in mind. It is but
proof of the continuity of Kant's thinking.
But Kant now asked: Are we in a position to say, "give me matter, and I
will show you how a caterpillar can be produced?" And his answer is an
emphatic No! He adds:

It should not be regarded as strange if I dare to say that the formation of all heavenly
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 71

bodies, the causes of their movements and, in short, the origin of the whole present
structure of the universe will become intelligible before the production, by mechanical
causes, of a single plant or a caterpillar is clearly and completely understood. 12

What troubled Kant in this perspective is man's place within a universe

whose formation by mechanical means he had just described.
"In his vanity", Kant tells us, man believes that his existence is of infmite
value to the universe; that everything in nature is in vain which is not specifi·
cally related to him as the center of creation. 13 Actually, however,

among all creatures man is the one who attains least the purpose of his existence because
he exhausts his excellent abilities in the pursuit of such ends as all other creatures with
less ability attain much more surely and properly. And he would be the most despicable
among all, at least in the eyes of true wisdom, if not hope of the future elevated him,
and if he had not ahead of himself a period in which all powers latent within him could
be fully developed. 14

In the scale of Being, therefore, man occupies a middle position between

two extremes. "On the one hand, we see thinking beings among whom ... a
Hottentot would be a Newton; and on the other hand, we see beings who
would admire Newton as merely an ape" - Kant quoting Pope: " ... and
showed a Newton as we show an ape." IS
It is significant for an understanding of Kant's overall view as developed in
the philosophical part of his Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, that
it is in all essentials but a prose version of major parts of Pope's Essay on Man.
Kant thus argues that, in its simplest State, matter strives, through natural
development, to form itself into a perfect structure; 16 and he quotes Pope:
See plastic nature working to this end,
The single atoms each to other tend,
Attract, attracted to, the next in place
Formed and impelled its neighbor to embrace,
See matter next with various life endued,
Press to one center still, the general good. 17
And again:
He who through vast immensity can pierce,
See worlds on worlds compose one universe,
Observe how system into system runs,
What other planets circle other suns,
What varied being peoples every star,
May tell why Heaven made us as we are." 18
72 W. H. WERKMEISTER

"The conclusion is quite correct", Kant points out:

If in the composition of the world order and beauty shine forth, then there is a God.
But the other [conclusion] is not less justified: If this order could flow from universal
laws of nature, then the whole of nature is necessarily an effect of the highest wisdom. 19

And so, Kant continues,

everything within the whole compass of nature hangs together in an uninterrupted
sequence of degrees through the eternal harmony, which makes all links relative to one
another. The perfections of God have revealed themselves in stages and are not less
magnificant in the lowest classes then in the most sublime. 2o

And now Kant specifically quotes:

Vast chain of being! which from God began,
Nature's ethereal, human, angel, man,
Beast, bird, fish, insect, what no eye can see,
No glass can reach; from infmite to thee,
From thee to nothing. 21
It is Kant's contention that "creation is never fmished." "It started once
but will never cease. It is always active to produce more occurrences in nature,
new things and new worlds." 22
The inevitable tendency of every world structure which has reached perfection, and now
gradually declines, can be counted among the reasons which bring it about that, against
this decline, the universe will in other places be fruitful of other worlds in order to
compensate for the deflciency it has suffered in another place. 23

In this connection Kant might have quoted Pope again, for their thoughts
are essentially the same:
All forms that perish other forms supply,
(By turns we catch the vital breath, and die)
Like bubbles on a sea of matter born,
They rise, they break, and to the sea return. 24
And Kant did quote:
Who sees with equal eye, as God of all,
A hero perish, or a sparrow fall,
Atoms or systems into ruin hurled,
And now a bubble burst, and now a world. 25
Kant's A llgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theone desHimmels was published
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 73

in 1755. In 1762, Rousseau's Social Contract became available in Konigsberg.

One year later Emile was also published in German translation. Kant read
both works, and what he read made a de.ep and lasting impression upon him.
As he himself put it: "Newton was the first to discem order and regularity in
combination with great simplicity where before him men had encountered
disorder and unrelated diversities .... Rousseau was the first to discover,
beneath the varying forms human nature assumes, the deeply concealed
essence of man .... After Newton and Rousseau, the ways of God are justified
- and Pope's thesis is henceforth true."26
Here we have in capsule form the framework of ideas which is the basis for
all further development of Kant's philosophy. And let us note in particular
his reference to Alexander Pope.
That Kant's interest in Pope's Essay on Man was not just a passing fancy
may be seen from his repeated references to it in his letters. Thus, in a letter
to Johann Gottfried Herder, dated 9 May 1768, he spoke of "that type of
poetry which is the gracefulness of wisdom in which, as yet, Pope alone
shines forth."27 And as late as 3 January 1791, in a letter to Christoph
Friedrich Hellwag, Kant deplored the fact that his friend, the English mer-
chant Green, who had died four years earlier, had no appreciation of poetry
and that, "although he liked to read Pope's Essay on Man, he found it un-
pleasant that it was written in verse." 28
The fact that as late as 1791 Kant still showed some interest in Pope's
Essay does not prove very much in itself. But the role which the idea of the
Great Chain of Being played in Kant's own philosophy is rather important.
Let us consider the facts.
In order to appreciate what is involved, it is necessary, first of all, to
look at the well-constructed architectonic of Kant's philosophical system. 29
We then fmd the following: The Critique of Pure Reason provides the broad
categorial basis for cognition and, in particular, for the Metaphysical Founda-
tions of Natural Science. This work, in turn, is foundational to physics proper.
Although Kant never developed physics itself as a rational system, the projec-
tion of such a work, and fragments related to it, fill almost half of the Opus
postumum. 30 In this development of Kant's philosophy Newtonian mechanics
played the decisive role and the result was the conception of a "realm of
nature under law" in which the principle of mechanical causation is the
determining factor.
In a similar way, the Critique of Practical Reason provided the basis for
the Metaphysical Foundations of Morals which, in turn, provided fundamental
principles for the much misunderstood and often neglected Metaphysics of
74 W. H. WERKMEISTER

Morals. The result was the conception of a realm of freedom under law where
man's autonomous will is the determining factor.
Although both realms are projections of reason - one of the "pure theore-
tical reason", the other of the "pure practical reason" - there is no viable
connection between them. As Kant put it: "No transition is possible from the
first to the second (by means of theoretical reason); ... still, the second is
meant to have an influence upon the first. ... There must, therefore, be a
ground of the unity" which makes possible the transition from one realm to
the other. 31
Kant provided the transition in the third Critique; and he did so in a
manner that clearly reflects Pope's influence. He centered his whole argument
on "the concept of nature as art" 32 - which is but Pope's thesis that "all
nature is but art, unknown to thee." 33 And Kant makes it clear that Pope's
phrase, "unknown to thee", is especially important. As he puts iti "We say of
nature and its power as this is manifest in organized products far too little
when we call it an analogon of art, for this suggests an artist (a rational being)
external to it, when actually nature organizes itself." 34 It has its own mode
of determination which can be identified neither with mechanical causation
nor with the causal efficacy of an autonomous will. The difficulty arises from
the apparent purposiveness in nature where there is no agent that projects
and pursues the purpose.
The problem is actually twofold. On the one hand, there is the prob-
lem of the development of the structurally and functionally integrated
individual organism. On the other hand, there is the problem of the individual
organism as a "purpose of nature." Both aspects involve "a kind of causality
for which we have absolutely no basis in the universal concept of nature in its
totality."3S That is to say, "the organization of nature has in it nothing
analogous to any causality we know." 36
Kant elaborates: "It is quite certain that, from mechanistic principles
alone, we cannot obtain an adequate knowledge of organisms and their
intrinsic possibility." We are also not helped in this respect if we assume that
"a highest architect has directly created the forms of nature", for "we know
nothing about the mode of action of such a Being." Finally, if we wish to
explain the apparent purposiveness in nature by appealing to "a cause working
in accordance with purposes" , we only "deceive reason with words" , for such
an "explanation" is but a tautology.37
There is nothing left for us to do but carry the mechanistic explanation
of events in nature as far as possible and use the idea of purposiveness as a
subjective principle that gives direction and guidance to our investigations. 38
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 75

When we follow this course of action, we find that comparative anatomy

reveals "an admirable simplicity of a blueprint from which a great variety of
species has been produced by shortening one and lenthening another part,
and by the unfolding and evolution of still other." 39 And the analogies of the
forms readily strengthen the supposition that there is an actual relationship,

as from a common Ancestral Mother", in the gradual approximation of one species to

another. "The whole technique of nature, so incomprehensible to us in organized beings,
... seems here to depend only on matter and its forces acting according to mechanical
laws. 40

Add to this the fact that the archaeologist can "trace the genesis of that
great family of living things" which now inhabits our earth, and can show
that living creatures "of less purposive form" "gave birth to others which
formed themselves with greater adaptation to their place of birth and their
relations to each other" until, "torpid and ossified", "Mother Earth" failed to
produce new forms.41
All the empirical evidence thus supports the conception of a development
that is susceptible to a teleological interpretation, and the Great Chain of
Being seems to be a fact. Still, neither "the mechanism of nature" by itself
nor the "merely teleological ground" by itself fully accounts for it all. What is
needed is a combination of the two such that the mechanism serves as a tool
for the teleological principle; but "the possibility of such unification of two
quite different kinds of causality ... our reason does not comprehend. It lies
in the supersensible ground of nature." 42 That is to say, the whole of nature
can be understood only as the effect of an "intelligent efficient cause." That
cause itself, however, we do not understand.
But since man is in obvious respects a part of nature, and in part also a
member of the moral realm, Kant now argues that "in man must be found
that which is to be furthered as a purpose by virtue of his connection with
nature", that he is actually the "fmal end of nature." 43
In Mutmasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte of 1786, Kant put it this
way: As a creature of nature man must at first have been "guided by instinct
alone."44 Or, as Alexander Pope put it: "To copy instinct then was reason's
part."45 However, in man's refusal to follow instinct blindly came "a first
hint at his development as a moral being."46 And as the fmal step in his
development, he "came to understand, however dimly, that he is the true
end and goal of nature." 47 This progress from "the tutelage of nature to the
state of freedom" is "nothing less than progress toward perfection"48 - a
perfection that can culminate only in the cultural development of a "civil
76 W. H. WERKMEISTER

community" encompassing all nations. 49 Only when this state is reached "can
the greatest development of man's natural capacities take place." 50 And only
then is the Great Chain of Being complete. "Moral teleology then augments
the deficiency of physical teleology." 51
We can now at least conceive "the supreme ground in the realm of ends."
That is to say, in order to be able to project a fmal purpose that is intrinsic
to the whole chain of being and is consistent with the moral law , "we must
assume a moral world cause, Le., we must admit that there is a God." 52 This
admission, however, is simply "a subjective point of view" for "the practical
or moral use of our reason." "It is not needed for the extension or correction
of our cognition of nature." S3 For the latter it is sufficient to recognize the
empirically determinable fact of the Great Chain of Being as subsumable
under the purely subjective principle of teleology.
The idea of the Great Chain of Being was in Kant's mind even when
he jotted down some of the fragments which we now know as his Opus
postumum. Thus he wrote:

Nature organizes matter in manifold ways not only as to species but also according to
levels. We need not consider the fact that in strata of the earth and rocky mountain
ranges specimens of animal and plant species, now extinct, are evidence of former and
now foreign products of our life-giving globe, but that the organizing force of them has
also organized the whole of the plant and animal species, which are created for one
another in such a way that they, man not excluded, form a circle as links of a chain not
only as far as their nominal character (of similarity) is concerned but also as far as
through their real character (as causality) they are in need of one another for their
existence, which points to a world organization (for unknown purposes) including even
the system of stars. 54

Enough has now been said about Kant's commitment to the conception of
the Great Chain of Being.

II

When we now examine Nicolai Hartmann's interpretation of the Great Chain

of Being we encounter a radically different conception of the problem - but
one which in its way is a supplement to Kant's version and supports it in
crucial respects.
like Kant, Hartmann was a system thinker who projected his ultimate aim
and then pursued it relentlessly. And again like Kant, Hartmann attempted to
cover every phase or aspect of the problem with which he was concerned. The
result is that his interpretation of the Great Chain of Being runs through five
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 77

large volumes: Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie (322 pages), Moglichkeit

und Wirklichkeit (481 pages), Der Aufbau der Realen Welt (616 pages),
Philosophie der Natur (709 pages), and Das Problem des Geistigen Seins (482
pages). Of these five, Der Aufbau der Realen Welt is for our purposes the
most important work; the other volumes are, in one way or another, specific
extensions of its argument.
The key to the whole argument is, of course, Hartmann's conception of
"the highest principle" according to which the conditions of the possibility
of experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of the
objects of experience - a principle which Hartmann takes to be "this side
of idealism and realism." When this principle and Hartmann's interpretation
of it are accepted, then an analysis of categories need not be tied to the
judgmental function of the understanding and the mere forms of cognition
(as Kant insisted that it be) but can be pursued in direct connection with the
empirically given content of experience. Categorial analysis becomes an
analysis of the intrinsic structure of the objects of experience themselves, and
of their interrelations. As Hartmann put it: "It is the purpose of an analysis
of categories to disclose the manifoldness of the forms of being and of the
interpenetration of dependence and independence." 55
The manifoldness to be examined discloses a "realm of levels the order
of rank of which is in a general sense well known: thing, plant, animal,
man, community." Each one of these levels has its own specific categories
which distinguish it from all other levels. In addition, there are categorial
distinctions within each level, and in the highest form of being, in man, the
whole structure of levels "recurs in miniature" - a fact which in itself proves
that "even the greatest heterogeneity does not preclude the unity of inner
connectedness." 56
The task we now face is twofold: (1) to clarify the categories that are
specific to each level, and (2) to determine the relations of these cat.egories
with respect to each other. It would be easy, Hartmann points out, to con-
struct a system of categories; but "to discern the categorial system intrinsic
to the world, as that system actually is, is something quite different. 57 It is,
however, the task which Hartmann has set for himself.
In this undertaking Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie 58 is, as it were, "the
curtain raiser." Hartmann makes it clear that his "new ontology" is forever
separated by Kant's critique of our faculties of knowledge from the "old
ontology" of historical tradition. But what is lacking in Kant's own approach
is the structure of a new, i.e., of a critically conceived ontology; and this
Hartmann intends to supply.
78 W. H. WERKMEISTER

The crux of the matter is that, as far as Hartmann is concerned, the

cognitive act is a transcendent rather than a transcendental act: it is an act
which transcends consciousness and connects us directly with that which,
independent of the act, exists in itself irrespective of whether it is material,
mental, or spiritual. 59
Since in Hartmann's view "Hussed's law of intentionality is a universal law
for all acts of consciousness", and since "transcendent acts are also acts of
consciousness", Hartmann insists that Husserl's law is not violated and that
transcendent acts "also have their intentional object", and that "the law of
the in-itselfness" of the objects as the special law of transcendent acts is "the
exact counterpart of the law of intentionality." Even as known, the object
does not enter consciousness. "Its opposition cannot be abrogated." 60
It is this epistemological position that makes possible Hartmann's analysis
of the categories of the empirically given. With this in mind let us now tum
to that analysis itself.
As previously noted, for our purpose Hartmann's most important analysis
of the categories is found in Der Aufbau der Realen Welt which, as the title
implies, deals with the structural foundations of the real world. Hartmann's
analysis of those foundations, and hence his conception of the Great Chain
of Being, assumes that

categories are predicates but, at the same time, they are also more than predicates. They
are principles but, at the same time, they are also less than principles. In them we seek to
apprehend the principles insofar as these are apprehensible. 61

The categories are inherent in the given and are independent of our opinion.
They are intrinsic to reality itself and occur in groups corresponding to the
levels of that reality, i.e., they correspond to the mechanical, the organismic,
the mental, the communal, the moral, and other strata. 62
Since the categores are "the constitutive principles of being" ,63 a system
of categories of the real world cannot be a system of forms only. It must also
account for the material or content side of the real. Where the various phi-
losophical "isms" - materialism, vitalism, idealism, etc. - go wrong is in their
selecting a single group of categories as the dominating one and then extending
it to encompass the whole of reality. 64 What we must avoid is metaphysics
"from above" as well as "from below." The one is as bad as is the other. The
real task is to determine the categories that are characteristic of each level of
the real, and then to clarify their interrelations. 65
It is evident from what has already been said that, for Hartmann, cate-
gories are not concepts - pure or otherwise. The concepts of categories
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 79

are but attempts to apprehend the categories defmitionally. The categories

themselves, I repeat, are the structural aspects intrinsic to the real world and
can be apprehended only as present in the given. However, in conformity
with the "highest principle" stated earlier there must exist a certain identity
between the categories of cognition and those of the world around us. "Every
object is knowable a priori only to the extent to which its categories are at
the same time categories of cognition." 66 Every stratification of the cate-
gories will then reflect a stratification of reality itself.

III

After these preliminary matters are understood, let us now tum to Hartmann's
categorial analysis itself.
The first fact which we must note is that the world has at least four dis-
tinct levels: the inorganic, the organic, the mental, and that of the common
spiritual life. To apprehend the unity of this world can mean only to com-
prehend the interrelations and interdependencies of the levels.
As we pass from level to level, we discover that a reciprocal relationship of
"supporting and resting upon" bridges the notable gaps between levels. That
is to say, the lower levels support the higher, and the higher "rest upon" the
lower, each level preserving its own categorial structure and its own laws; and
"this relationship constitutes the unity proper of the real world" - the unity
of an intrinsic stratification, a structure oflevels (ein Schichtenbau).67
Within this structure, each level is characterized by its own specific cate-
gories which differ from the specific categories of every other level. Each level
has a certain categorial independence but is also always dependent upon the
supporting lower level.
Seen in this perspective, the most fundamental categories - the common
foundation of all categorially distinct levels - are obviously those through
which the unity of the stratified structure of the world is determined. And
what is of significance here is that, although the strata of the real are dis-
continued downward at the level of the physico-material realm, the categories
as such extend further downward. 68
Most fundamental are the categories of mcdality; but they also extend
into the highest levels of spiritual being, pertaining to the ought, to cognitive
relations, and to the mysterious form of being of a work of art. Hartmann
deals with them in Mdglichkeit und Wirklichheit. 69
His basic theme is that each level of reality demands its own modal analysis
- as do the intermodal relations between the modi of one level and those of
80 W. H. WERKMEISTER

another. But we must realize that there is a crucial distinction between logical
possibility and real possibility, the former being but noncontradictoriness,
whereas the latter means that all the conditions have been fulfilled that make
the existence of a real thing or the occurrence of an event actually possible.
This entails, however, that all positive real modes involve one another so that
what is really possible is also actual, and what is actual is also necessary. 70
"In the realm of the real there is found no 'merely possible. '" 71 "Everything
real is completely determined through some other real." 72 But this "law"
of real determination must not be hastily identified with the principle of
causality; for every level has its own specific form of determination and its
own possibilities.
In addition to the categories of modality there are certain "elementary
categories" which also are encountered at every level of reality. They always
come in pairs and are specifically different at every level.
Lastly, there are "categoriallaws" which determine the coherence of the
categories within any particular level as well as the superposition of the strata
in the structure of the real world as a whole. 73
Of the structural elements of the real world the elementary categories are
the best known. Yet there is something mysterious even about them; for
there is at least the suspicion that behind them there may be still simpler
categories which we cannot discern. The known categories, for example,
always come in pairs and are inseparable. Their specific connections, however,
escape conceptual formulation. 74
Hartmann distinguished twelve pairs of elementary categories, including
(among others) form-matter, inner-outer, determination-dependence, quality-
quantity, unity-manifold, harmony-conflict, element-structure. 75
One member of the pair is always correlated with, and presupposes, the
other. Thus, there is no form without matter, and matter is only what it
is because of its form.76 But in addition to this correlation there is also a
transition from one member of the pair to the other. Actually, the transition
is of two types: (1) the simple relativization of the opposites with respect
to each other, and (2) one of the opposites remains stable while the other
changes in degrees.
An example of the first type is the relation of matter and form. Obviously,
all form can itself be matter of a higher form, and all matter can itself be
form of lower matter. The living cell is thus form with respect to the chemical
compounds that are its constituent parts; but, in turn, the cell is merely
matter relative to the form of the organism as a whole.
Other examples of the first type of transition are the relation of inner and
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 81

outer, and of structure and element. Every structure can obviously be an

element in a higher structure, and every element can be a structure of a
simpler element. 77
An example of the second type of transition is the relation of substrate
and relation. Generally speaking, substrates are the relata of the relations. But
in a narrow and limiting sense the substrate is only the relatum of possible
relations - a stable base - and not itself a relation.
The important point is that only together do categories determine concrete
reality. It is impossible to apprehend one of them without bringing all of
them into the picture. Nothing exists, for example, that is only unity or only
manifoldness, only matter or only form, and only unity and manifoldness
without being also matter and form.78 And the fundamental fact is that all
of the categories permeate all levels of the real or, what amounts to the same
thing, they recur from level to level - although always in somewhat modified
form. 79
As an example of this fact consider the determination-dependency rela-
tion. 80 In its Simplest form it occurs at the physical level of occurrences. Here
the relation is the purely mechanical causal nexus - the later occurrence
being determined by what precedes it in a sequence of determinations that
comes out of the unlimited past and moves on into an unlimited and open
future. But at this same level of reality there occur also reciprocal determina-
tions of what exists simultaneously. These determinations are essential to the
unity of the world process as a whole insofar as the totality of all constituent
effects is co-determined by all actual occurrences in their interactions.
At the organic level, we find a subtle suitableness of the partial functions
with respect to each other, and marked self-regulations within the living
whole. All this looks strikingly like purposiveness; but the purpose-setting
consciousness is lacking.
The form of determination at the mental level is again quite different; for
wherever the inner tendencies proper to mental life rise into consciousness
they take on the form of purposive actions, and at the level of personal spirit
we encounter the final nexus in complete reality. It begins with the positing
of a purpose; moves on to the selection of means; and ends in the realization
of the intended goal. This form of determination, obviously, can be found
only where there is a consciousness that sets goals and selects means. It is
therefore not found at the organic and the physical levels of reality.
And there is still another form of determination - the highly complex
form characteristic of communal action and of history, where the intensions
and purposive actions of individuals affect the actions of other individuals.
82 W. H. WERKMEISTER

It is simply impossible to reduce all of these specific forms of determination

to a single one - say, to mechanical causation or to purposiveness. Reality
is more complex than that. It is true, of course, that the higher forms presup-
pose and include the lower ones; but their dependence upon the lower is only
partial. It leaves full scope to the specifically characteristic aspects of the
higher forms. 81
All categories determine specific aspects of the real; and in this sense they
may be said to be principles of the real. Although completely determinative
within a given level of reality, categories are determinative only for whatever
belongs to that particular level. But, let me repeat, they determine the real
at whatever level not individually but only together in their own inner con-
nectedness. In this sense they form an indissoluble unity, each implying all
others 82 and all together determining the Great Chain of Being.
What is of special significance, however, is the interrelation of the levels
that ranges from the lowest to the highest. This interrelation is given in two
parellel series of phenomena: one is the series of the concretely given; the
other is the sequence of the categorial structures as such. 83 It is on this latter
sequence that the Great Chain of Being depends. How does Hartmann deal
with the problem?
Since the categories are determinative of the real, all we need to consider
now is the sequence of the categorial structures. And this is what we find
here:
{l) The lower categories recur at the highest levels as constituent elements
of the highest categories. This relation is not reversible. The higher cannot
be constituent of the lower.
(2) At their recurrence at the higher levels, the lower categories are modi-
fied in many ways.
(3) Because of the recurrence of the lower categories, every higher cate-
gory consists of many lower elements but is not simply their summation. It
has its own specific and new aspects which determine the modifications of
the lower categories and their prominence (or lack of it) at any given level.
(4) Recurrence and modification of the lower categories do not take place
in continuous sequences but in leaps or abrupt transformations which create
breaks in the sequence. The result is one single vertical stratification of the
superpositioned levels, each higher level being a unified novum compared
with the levels below it. What we thus fmd is a broad chain of superposed
levels of the real whose sequence or direction cannot be reversed. 84 The living
organism, for example, is much more than a mere mechanism, but in its
functions it includes processes which conform to the laws of mechanics.
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 83

The mental is quite other than the organic but never occurs without it and
presupposes the validity of its laws. Still, "the law of the recurrence of cate-
gories does not assert that all lower categories recur in the higher levels, but
only that some of them do." 85
It is true, of course, that a minded being does not exist without organic
life; but from this fact it does not follow that the structure and laws of organ-
ismic existence must also determine the nature and function of mind. It is
also true that a spiritual being cannot exist without mental life. But this fact
does not entail that mental processes must recur in the context of what is
content of the spiritual life. The laws of logic are not reducible to laws of
mental processes.
But there are categories which recur in all levels of existence. They are the
"fundamental categories." 86 In order to understand what is here involved, it
will be necessary, first, to distinguish between Uberbau and Uberformung. 87
There are no strictly equivalent terms in English; but let me illustrate what is
meant.
Mental life is obviously a level of existence above the merely biological,
transcending the latter but remaining dependent upon it. In Hartmann's
terminology it is an Uberbau. The organic structure, however, contains many
substructures - such as cells, molecules, and atoms. Being built up out of
them, it imposes its own form upon them. Hartmann calls this Uberformung.
The distinction between Uberbau and Uberformung is crucial for Hartmann's
interpretation of the structure of the world and therefore for his conception
of the Great Chain of Being.
The importance of the distinction is at once clear when we see that above
the mental level there is Uberbau but no Uberformung. The mental acts, as
acts, are "bearers" of the spiritual level but are not elements of the content
of that level. The spiritual content is Uberbau but not lJberformung of the
level that supports it.
Even more striking within the spiritual level itself is the relation of objec-
tive spirit to subjective spirit. The basic elements of the latter are conscious-
ness, will, anticipation, freedom, purposive action. But these categories are
not carried over into objective spirit. There exists no general consciousness
beyond the consciousness of individuals; and decisions, initiatives, and purpo-
sive actions are manifestations of personal spirit only. 88
It is true, nevertheless, that the recurrence of categories at higher levels
plays a decisive role in the structure of the real world. Upon it depends noth-
ing less than the unity and the inner connectedness of the manifold that
constitutes the world.
84 W. H. WERKMEISTER

But even the categories unity and manifold are modified from level to
level. The unity of a thing is other than the unity of a process; and quite
different again is the unity of an organism within the particular manifold of
its forms and processes. Incomparable to all this is the unity of consciousness
within the manifold ness of its acts and experiences. And there are, of course,
the distinctive unities of the person, of a people, of a state, of science, of
positive law, of a work of art. The modifications of the category are astonish-
ingly manifold and are different for each category.
Consider, for example, the sequence and the modifications of dependen-
cies. In the purely physical realm, causality is the external determination of
what comes later by what precedes it. In the realm of organic realities, how-
ever, determination takes on a radically different form. It now is an unfolding,
a form-building and development. And again quite different is determination
within the mental realm. At the organismic level, the life of an organism is
passed on to the next generation through the continuity of DNA. But no one
can pass on his consciousness to the next generation.
Even more remarkable and certainly more complex is the aspect of con-
tinuity in history. It is a process involving many levels and one that is deter-
mined by the interaction of many different forms of determination.
Quite clearly, without the occurrence at every new level of a categorial
novum the richness of forms of the modifications can simply not be under-
stood. Hartmann expresses this in the form of a "law" - the "law of the
novum": "Because of recurrence, the higher categories contain a manifold
of lower elements but are not simply an aggregate of those elements but, in
their composition, are always conditioned by the occurrence of a cat ego rial
novum."89
This "law" does not imply a limitation of the recurrence of categories but
is a positive supplement to that recurrence. Without the occurrence of the
novum there would be no difference in the height of levels of the real world.
But be that as it may, the most important fact is that there exists a rela-
tionship of conditioning and being conditioned between the strata or levels
such that in their existence all the higher levels are dependent upon the lower
levels, but that, nevertheless, the higher levels reveal an undiminished inde-
pendence. They have freedom, not within, but above the lower levels. 90
This does not mean that the lower levels find their fulfillment in a higher
one. It is not true, for example, that all physico-material reality has a tendency
to become living organisms; or that everything living has a tendency to attain
consciousness; or that all consciousness pushes on toward spiritual reality.
The actual process linking all levels in a Great Chain of Being has no analogy
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 85

anywhere. The conception of a creative evolution is self-contradictory, and

the notions of preformation and epigenesis are but crudely formed schemata
of one-sided points of view. If there were inherent in the lower strata ae
ascending "development", then all the lower forms of existence would have
to be imbued with the teleological compulsion to move into higher forms;
and no such compulsion can be discerned. 91
For Hartmann the most important fact is that at every level of existence
there is categorial independence and a "lawful" structure proper to it in two
respects: (1) there is strength and indifference toward the higher levels, and
(2) there is a novum and a freedom relative to the lower. The causal nexus
exemplifies the situation well, for it is so constituted intrinsically that a
higher form of determination may be imposed upon it without disrupting it
or altering its specific character; for it may well be related to a higher nexus
of determination as matter is to form. The fact that causal processes may
be guided by us toward predetermined goals convincingly shows that the
categorial nature of causality itself offers no resistance to the superposition of
noncausal forms of determination so long as these do not break up or destroy
the causal nexus itself.92 All voluntary actions, for example, have the form
of purposive determination. The fmal state to which the actions lead is
anticipated as a goal, and the means to its realization are deliberately chosen.
Nevertheless, there is even in this form of determination a purely causal
sequence. Each step taken toward the goal brings forth the next step until
the goal is reached. What distinguishes this process from ordinary causal
determination is only its being bound to the anticipatorily selected sequence
of means. It is not "free-running" but is "goal-directed." It is teleologically
guided causality. The causal nexus has been modified but has not been
disrupted. The possibility of this particular modification of the causal nexus
within purposive action is one of the preconditions of moral freedom and
responsibility; and as such it is indispensable as part of the categorial basis of
the Great Chain of Being. 93

IV

Having analyzed the braod outlines of the categorial structure of the real
world as a whole, Hartmann now examines in detail two of the most im-
portant realms within that structure: the realm of nature and the realm of
spiritual Being. I tum first to his "philosophy of nature";94 but I shall be
brief.
The epistemological orientation is, of course, the very same which deter-
86 W. H. WERKMEISTER

mined Hartmann's approach to the categorial structure of the world as a

whole. His connections with Kant is also once more in evidence. He specifi-
cally quotes Kant's general Principle of the Analogies: "As to their existence,
all appearances stand under rules a priori which determine their relations one
to another in one time." 95
The specific relations here referred to are relations in space and time: The
events in nature are all spatiotemporal. As this, the lowest level of the real
world, the common categorial element is that of dimensionality. That is to
say, the four space-time dimensions constitute the basic categories of the
world of nature and make possible the application of mathematically for-
mulated laws to the facts and events in nature. What the specific laws are
must, of course, be determined empirically.
Since a dimension is that within which something has magnitude and is
measurable, space and time provide the framework for everything that can
and does exist in nature - space being the categorial condition of magnitude
and time the condition of duration. But what has magnitude is not space but
something in space. And duration is not an attribute of time but of something
in time.
Although Hartmann's categorial analysis of space and time runs to 146
pages, we need not consider his discussion in detail here. What he says is
important but not particularly relevant to the problem of the Great Chain of
Being. Let it suffice, therefore, to say that space and time together - real
space and real time - constitute a unique system of dimensions within which
the real relationships of real entities exist, and that without these relations
and entities space and time themselves have no being. They exist - if that
term be permitted - only as universal preconditions of the real world. 96
Hartmann analyzes next the categories of inanimate nature, and he does
so under the general heading "cosmological categories." 97
The principle underlying this analysis Hartmann states in this way: "All
structures in nature are in themselves 'relational'."98 That is, relations are
primary to, and constitutive of, things. They are what determines form, inner
structure, and the dynamic aspects of things. The conception of unchanging
substances must be abandoned in favor of "processes under laws." Process is
thus the preeminent category of reality. Its scope is the space-time world as a
whole. In and through it "things are brought into the flux of time." It is
indeed the universal formal being of all that is real,99 and in this sense it is
the basic category of the Great Chain of Being.
But process is not simply a one-after-another in time. Only when the states
of things are so connected with one another that they form a unit - i.e.,
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 87

when there is a connection between them which is a transition from one to

the other - is there process. The transition must always be the realization of
one possibility and must entail the "unreality" of all other possibilities. 100
The natural contrast to process is, of course, the stable state understood as
a modus of being. But in this sense state is also in contrast to substance, for
substance is that of which the state is a modus. Any alteration of something is
a change of its state while it itself remains relatively stable. The process has
unity when the subject of the alterations persists identifiably throughout the
changes, and thus functions as the "bearer" of genuine alterations. But there
is no valid argument in favor of something absolutely permanent; and the
very essence of substance consists simply in a temporal identity within the
process. 101
There is no reason for identifying substance with matter. What, after all,
do we know about matter? Its manifestations are "resistance, inertia, and
gravity"; and the concept of force is not entirely adequate as a replacement
of the concept of matter. 102 As Hartmann sees it, the substratelike element
in the interplay of forces which maintains itself in all changes is energy -
energy understood as dynamic substance. Its very essence is transformation,
transition, and process - the dynamic substrate of them all.
But even energy is not in every respect adequate to the conception of an
absolute substance; for substance which, in the categorial sense, is intrinsic
to inorganic nature does not recur as a category at any higher level. And even
at the lowest level it is but the simultaneously occurring manifoldness of
real relations concentrated in a specific state here and now - in contrast to
process, alteration, and becoming. This very fact implies that a state is but a
fleeting moment in the process, whereas the process itself endures and goes
on, maintaining itself in the coming and going of states. 103
Within the process a linear form of determination prevails: causality in the
strict sense. It is a nexus within which each cause is already the effect of an
antecedent cause - and so on into the nonterminated past; and each effect is,
in turn, the cause of still another effect - on into the infmite future. The
crucial point is that in this process the sequence of states is determined in
rigid order. However, we must not confuse cause and effect with ground and
consequence or with the general categorial determination-dependency relation
of which there are many forms. The relation of cause and effect is but one of
them.
Causes and effects are neither things nor substances but actual relation-
ships, collocations, states - factors within a process. That is to say, causes
consist of a manifoldness of factors which, in a simultaneous collocation, are
88 W. H. WERKMEISTER

combined into a structure. The same is true of effects. What is essential here
is that in every concrete situation there corresponds to every aspect of the
cause an aspect of the effect, and vice versa. Even a minimal change in the
status of the cause as a whole entails a corresponding change in the status of
the effect - either in its existence or in its character. This total determination
is what the law of causality expresses.
The merging of the cause into the effect and the emergence of the effect
out of the cause are one and the same ultimate and no further analyzable
aspect of nature. It is nature's eminently creative process.
Events which are not part of the causal process do not occur in nature. Nor
are there events which disrupt the causal sequence. Freedom, as this is involved
in moral decisions and actions, is not a disruption but an Uberformung of the
causal nexus. It is the addition of higher determining factors to the process of
causal determination.
However, despite such Uberformung of the causal nexus, the world-process
as a whole is but one; and everything that happens in it is unique. Many
partial processes may resemble one another, but all of them are unique and
are unique constituents of the one and only world-process as such. This fact
is basic to the very conception of the Great Chain of Being. 104
Since time and causal processes are closely interrelated, and since time
- real time - is encountered at all levels of nature, causally determined
processes are also encountered at all of them. But while the higher levels
depend for their existence upon the lower ones, they contain a categorial
novum that is superposed upon the lower (simpler) categorial textures and
modifies them.
At the organismic level the new form of determination - going from
the whole to its parts, determining the parts in their development, in their
structure and their function - reveals "an eminently constructive power in
the stratification of nature." It shows that, in its stratified levels, nature is
determined "from above" as well as "from below." lOS But let us note at once
also what Kant clearly understood: that the particular form of determination
which accounts for the development and functional unity of an organism
does not yet account for the existence of organisms in nature.
The organism is quite obviously a structure which in its form is a closed
unity of interrelated processes such that in the whole as well as in each
constituent part the form develops along with the function, and the function
with the form. And just as functions and form are inseparable, so also are the
functions inseparable from one another. In this sense, the life of an organism
is a specific form of process which cannot be understood in terms of the
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 89

dynamics of physical processes alone. The categorial novum is that of a closed

temporal whole of a self-limiting and self-articulating process that exists
between a determinable beginning and a determinable end. A wholeness of
process in this sense is encountered nowhere below the level of organismic
existence.
The organism is a functionally integrated structure that builds itself in the
course of its development. But this "self-building" is actually a rebuilding,
for, from its very beginning, the process is directed toward the fmal form.
And the great riddle is: What precisely does this predisposition toward form
mean? Here we are face to face with the fundamental problem of the specifi-
cally organismic form of determination. What is involved in the process is, in
one sense, simply a chemical synthesis. But it is a synthesis of a type which,
in nature, only the organism can bring about. The organism not only absorbs
various materials from its environment, but in metabolism it transforms them
into its own tissues and structures, and thus draws them into the complex
process of its own organismic existence and development. In other words,
the living organism is "a reactive system of a special kind." Its form of inner
determination is an Uberj'onnung but not a disruption of the causal nexus. 106
And then there is the continuity of plant and animal species in ever new
generations despite the fact that, sooner or later, the individuals all die. The
individuals are quite obviously only temporary "bearers" of the life of the
species; and, in principle, the species is just as much bound up with the
individual as the individual is with the species. The individual is a limited
stage of transition, but it is "as necessary a link in the chain" as it is necessary
in the actual existence of the species. 107
Relative to the unity of all life on earth, the various species are, in a sense,
like the individuals -- and yet again not like them. They form no simple
continuum. Descent is not a matter of lineal transformations alone, but an
elevation, a process of ascending and of bringing forth new and higher forms.
It is a form-creating process in the original sense of that term - not an
unfolding of pregiven forms but genuine morphogenesis, a "pure production
of new forms."
The fully developed forms of the various species are to a remarkable
degree adjusted to certain specific conditions of existence. We observe here
an obvious fitness of the organisms relative to the world they live in. The
question is: What is the ground of this fitness? Is there a possibility of its being
grounded in what is intrinsically without purpose? Life can maintain itself
only when all forms and functions are suited for its survival. The remarkable
fact is that processes at lower levels are always useful for the processes at
90 W. H. WERKMEISTER

some higher level; and the question is: Does there correspond to this useful-
ness a real purposive action?
Usefulness transcends the greatest heterogeneity of the species: plants
depend upon insects for the fertilization of their flowers, and insects depend
upon plants for their nourishment. Here we face the strongest temptation to
indulge in a teleological interpretation. Is this actual and mutual usefulness
the realization of a preconceived plan that gradually unfolded in evolutionary
development? 108
Kant had raised this question and had answered it in the negative. He had
argued that purposiveness is a "regulative principle" only - a principle which
aids our investigation of nature, but which must not be taken to be constitu-
tive of nature itslef. He had cut the ground from under any identification of
Zweckmiissigkeit and Zwecktiitigkeit, of suitableness and purposive action. 109
However, this did not prevent him from interpreting the "special laws" of
organic nature as the determinative element in all forms of life - of the life
and development of every species no less than that of the individual organisms.
This does not mean that in the Kantian perspective everything in organic
nature is or can be understood. In fact, so Hartmann points out, very little
is understood in the process of the ascension of life to ever higher levels. The
continuous appearance of new forms defies any explanation just as much as
does the original formation of living organisms on earth; and the conception
of the Great Chain of Being is descriptive rather than explanatory.
Within the highly complex process of morphogenesis purely causal deter-
minations occur, of course. But there occur also forms of determination
which look strikingly like purposive actions in the strict sense. It is therefore
impossible to insist upon the simple alternative of causal versus purposive
interpretation. The disjunction is complete.
To be sure, causal determinations are encountered everywhere; but they
are not the only type of determination in nature. However, purposive deter-
mination presupposes an agent who deliberately sets goals and selects means
for their realization; and despite all apparent purposiveness, no such agent is
found in nature. This means that the form of determination specific to the
organismic level of reality - the nexus organicus - is sui generis, a form
of determination all its own; and it must be recognized as such. We do not
understand it expect as Vberformung of the causal nexus which, rooted in
the DNA molecule, continuously superposes upon the merely causal processes
a form of determination that guides them in the development of the various
phases and stages of organismic existence and development, and is the deter-
mining factor within the Great Chain of Being. 110
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 91

However, the Great Chain of Being does not fmd its completion in the levels
of organismic existence but transcends the realm of nature at the level of
spiritual Being. Hartmann deals with it in a separate volume. 111
In the stratification of the world, this highest level is superposed upon the
lower levels, is supported by them, but has its own distinctive categorial
novum. And there is a notable stratification even within the level of the spirit.
Actually, there are three basic forms of spirit: (1) Personal spirit, which alone
has consciousness, can project goals and work toward their realization. It
alone can love and hate, is responsible for its actions, is subject to imputation,
and may be guilty or deserve praise. (2) Objective spirit, which alone is in the
strict and primary sense the agent of history. It encompasses individuals but
is above them as something they share, something they have in common. (3)
Objectified spirit, which alone has an aspect of timelessness, of the trans-
historical, the ideal. Its fate is that of ideas and of what is timeless within the
temporal process of history.
What Hartmann now gives us is a categorial analysis of all three forms of
spirit. I shall be brief in reporting his fmdings, concentrating exclusively on
their relevance to the conception of the Great Chain of Being.
At the level of personal existence, spirit can and does confront itself in
the form of self-awareness, of consciousness of himself. This awareness is not
hereditary - as organismic characteristics are - but is a categorial novum
for every individual; and every individual must make himself into what he
ultimately is.ll2 Only when consciousness constitutes itself as the subject
with respect to objects of experience does it separate itself inwardly from the
world and is no longer just another factor in that world. In this emergence of
personal spirit, the world itself is being transformed. It is no longer the world
to which nonspiritual consciousness directly responds - as is the case in
animal behavior - but is a world disclosed to man's efforts to understand and
to explain conceptually. It now is a world of a projected Weltanschauung.
To be sure, man never fully escapes his animality and his nonspiritual
consciousness; but in his mature attitudes toward the world he transcends
his own more primitive relationships to the world and his own lower levels of
existence. He is no longer merely a subject but is a person as well. In fact,
personality is the very essence, the categorially fundamental character of the
spiritual individual. And, as person, man is co-creator of the world. He is "a
being constantly forced into free decisions by every new situation" which
confronts him. And the world is modified in countless ways by his efforts.113
92 W. H. WERKMEISTER

In his transcendent acts the person enters into relation with the world in
ways which reveal a new dimension of his existence. He is no longer merely
a conscious being, nor merely the subject in a cognitive relation. He interacts
with other persons and, without losing his own identity, joins them in a larger
unit of spiritual existence. At this level he reaches his own existence as a
spiritual being. "Consciousness separates human beings, spirit binds them
together." 114
At the level of mere consciousness, actions are always reactions to stimuli
which are present in any given situation. Animal behavior illustrates this fact.
But at the level of spiritual existence, a person anticipates and projects goals,
and takes the initiative in actions that lead to the realization of those goals.
In all this, specific valuations and references to values and value scales are
involved; and the freedom and the valuations are basic to man's existence as a
moral being. liS
But this already implies that there is at the level of personal existence a
relationship of individuals in a spiritual community whose categorial structure
is superposed upon the level of personal spirit and surpasses it in its own
mode of being. Such superposition is possible because the spiritual contents
"of human experience are separable from persons, opinions, and individual
points of view." They can be transmitted from person to person and can
be shared as a kind of "common property" by an unlimited number of
individuals.
Concepts and judgments are perhaps the best known embodiments of
spiritual content and have the best claim to objectivity, the greatest stability
in being passed on from individual to individual. Their intersubjective signi-
ficance and validity is subject to laws - preeminently the laws of logic -
which transcend all subjectivity. There is no "private logic" of the individual.
Of equal intersubjective validity are the categories in terms of which we
understand reality - causality, process, magnitude, and so on.
It must be noted, however, that the phenomena of intersubjectivity at the
level of spiritual existence do not destroy individuality. Even in the midst
of all intersubjective relations each individual's own consciousness and
therefore his "private world" remains undiminished. But, then, spirit is not
the same as consciousness. It transcends the latter, and while "consciousness
separates, spirit unites." 116
Objective spirit is neither substance underlying the spiritual life of a human
community, nor is it a mere summation of the individuals. It is, rather,
"spiritual life in its totality" as it manifests itself at any given time in the
communal activities of interrelated human groupings, and as it develops
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 93

historically to ever greater heights or deteriorates and decays. It is an Uber-

formung of the level of personal spirit and includes that level as its found-
ation. As a creature of nature man is completely subject to the laws of
biological existence; but as a spiritual being he is subject also to the laws of
communal living, which are the determinative novum at the level of objective
spirit.
Language, science, morality, art, religion, and a "style of life" are em-
bodiments of that spirit. Despite their diversity, they all show an inner
relation such that they constitute a unity of the objective spirit in historical
development. 117
This is not the place to examine Hartmann's categorial analysis of objective
spirit in detail. It runs to over 100 pages. But we must refer briefly to his
conception of "objectified spirit." 118
It is Hartmann's thesis that "the living historical spirit objectifies itself
everywhere" in manifold results of its cre·ative activities. As "objectified
spirit" these results enter into history and are preserved. And being preserved,
they can become important factors in the spiritual development of ever new
generations of individuals or historical movements. Living spirit, be it that
of an individual or of a community, is subject to the law of all life - it dies.
But the objectified products of the spirit, because they are not living, are not
subject to that law. To be sure, a priceless work of art may be destroyed
- and there is no scarcity of such happenings - but that is not the same
as the natural death of a living being. Once created, the products attain an
independence from the creative spirit such that they have their own mode of
being and their own history. Literature is an obvious case in point. But so are
science, philosophy, and works of art generally.
What is Significant in all of these cases, and what constitutes the special
level of the objectified spirit, is the spiritual content of these products of
man's creativity. That content cannot be separated from the specific forms of
living spirit. It depends upon that spirit for its existence; but it also transcends
the level of living spirit in its own mode of being. The ontological question
arises here in a new form. Is nothing of a literary work preserved but the
written or printed text? Or are the personalities and their conflicts preserved
as well.u 9 Hartmann deals with this problem in his Aesthetik; 120 but we
need not consider that here. Suffice it to point out that, on the one hand,
the objectified spirit remains bound to its physically real basis, and, on the
other hand, it remains equally bound to living spirit for its meaning and
lasting significance. In this respect, objectified spirit differs radically from
ideal being and has its own mode of being, its own categorial novum. In
94 W. H. WERKMEISTER

Hartmann's philosophy it completes the levels of being in the Great Chain of

Being.

VI

The summing up will be brief. Although Kant stood firmly committed to

Alexander Pope's conception of the Great Chain of Being, his transcendentally
idealistic interpretation of "the highest principle" prevented him from a
categorial analysis of that Great Chain itself. Instead of giving us such an
analysis, he developed his metaphysical foundations of a realm of nature
under law, and parallel to it the metaphysical foundations of a realm of
morality under its own laws. Within the framework of the Critique of Pure
Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason there was no bridge between
those two realms. Kant attempted to provide one in his Critique of the Faculty
of Judgment; but this attempt reduced Kant's "aesthetics" to a mere means
to a speculative end and even then never yielded more than an "as if" solution
- a solution which did not satisfy even Kant and which he tried to overcome
in the projected work, The Highest Fonn of Transcendental Philosophy,
fragments of which make up a major part of the Opus postumum. 121
Nicolai Hartmann, on the other hand, could and did provide a categorial
analysis which accounts for the sequence of levels of existence characteristic
of the Great Chain of Being as a whole and which, at the same time, recognizes
the complex relationships of determination-dependence manifest in the
creative movement from lower to higher levels. Aesthetics is no longer a
means to a speculative end but pertains to a realm of being that typifies in
many respects the highest level of objectified spirit. The Great Chain of Being
has here been given its most comprehensive integrative interpretation.

NOTES

1 2d. ed. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1925), p. 340.

2 AI58/B197.
3 Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theone des Himmeis, 1755; Akademie-Ausgabe, I,
241 (hereafter cited as AA). The quotation from Pope is from Epistle I, lines 33-34.
Kant quotes Pope in the translation by Brockes.
4 AA, 1,221.
5 AA, I, 230.
6 AA, 1,247 ff.
7 AA, 1,247-306.
8 AA, I, 254 f.
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 95

9 AA, I, 255.
10 AA, I, 256;
11 Translated by Lewis Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 258.
12 AA, I, 230.
13 AA, 1,353.
14 AA, I, 356.
15 AA, I, 359 f.
16 AA, I, 263.
17 AA, I, 259. Epistle lll, lines 9-13.
18 AA, I, 349. Epistle I, lines 23-28.
19 AA, 1,346.
20 AA, I, 365.
21 Epistle I, lines 237-41.
22 AA, I, 314.
23 AA, 1,316 f.
24 Epistle lll, lines 17 -20.
25 Epistle I, lines 87 -90.
26 Kant, Fragmente, in Hartenstein's edition of Kants siimtliche Werke in Chronologi·
scher Reihenfolge, Vlll, 630.
27 Immanuel Kant, Briefwechsel, edited by Otto Schtindtirfer (Hamburg: Felix Meiner,
1972), p. 55.
28 Op. cit., p. 504.
29 See W. H. Werkmeister, Immanuel Kant: The Architectonic and Development of his
Philosophy (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1980).
30 W. H. Werkmeister, 'The Oitique of Pure Reason and Physics,' in Kant-Studien 69
(1977),33-45.
31 Kant, Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, AA, V, 176. Kant's title makes it emi-
nently clear that he is concerned here with a faculty of the mind, not with propositional
statements.
32 Kant's first draft of the Introduction to the third Critique, AA, XX, 204.
33 Epistle I, line 288.
34 AA, V, 374.
35 AA, V, 359 f.
36 AA, V, 375.
37 AA, V, 410.
38 AA, V,415.
39 AA, V, 418. This "common blueprint" or "common schema" (as Kant also calls it)
is, of course, well known from the skeletal structure of vertebrates but has found new
support in the findings of modem molecular biology.
40 AA, V, 418 f.
41 AA, V, 419.
42 AA, V, 412 f.
43 AA, V, 429.
44 AA, VIII, 111.
45 Epistle lll, line 170.
46 AA, Vlll, 113.
47 AA, VIII, 114.
96 W. H. WERKMEISTER

48 AA, VIII, 115.

49 See Kant's Ideen zu einer Allgemeinen Geschichte in Weltburgerlicher Absicht and
also Zum Ewigen Frieden (AA, VIII).
50 AA, V, 432.
51 AA, V, 444.
52 AA, V, 450.
53 AA, V, 483.
54 Opus postumum, I, 570, lines 13-23. A verbatim repetition of this statement may be
found in II, 549, lines 18-30.
55 Nicolai Hartmann, Neue Wege der Ontologie, 3d ed. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlham-
mer, 1949), p. 36.
56 Neue Wege, p. 41.
57 Der Aufbau der Realen Welt, 2d ed. (Meisenheim: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain,
1949), p. 575.
58 Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1935).
59 Grundlegung, p. 159. Hartmann's detailed justification of this transcendent reach of
the cognitive act is given in his Grundzuge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 2d ed.
(Berlin: Walter de Guyter, 1925), pp. 43-121.
60 Grundzuge, pp. 160 ff.
61 Aufbau, p. 14.
62 Ibid., p. 30.
63 Ibid., p. 41.
64 Ibid., p. 86.
65 Ibid., p. 92.
66 Ibid., p. 137.
67 Ibid., pp. 198 f.
68 Ibid., pp. 202 ff.
69 Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1938.
70 Moglichkeit, pp. 125 f.
71 Ibid., p. 151.
72 Ibid., p. 207.
73 Ibid., p. 205.
74 Ibid., p. 220.
75 Ibid., pp. 230 f.
76 Ibid., p. 245.
77 Ibid., pp. 248 f.
78 Ibid., pp. 261 f.
79 Ibid., p. 267.
80 Ibid., pp. 314 ff.
81 Ibid., p.419.
82 Ibid., p. 433.
83 Ibid., p. 474.
84 Ibid., p. 480.
85 Ibid., pp. 481 f.
86 Ibid., p. 485.
87 Ibid., p. 486.
88 Ibid., p. 488.
 ON KANT AND NICOLAI HARTMANN 97

89 Ibid., p. 504.
90 Ibid., p. 520.
91 Ibid., p. 53!.
92 Ibid., p. 562.
93 Ibid., p. 569.
94 Nicolai Hartmann, Philosophie der Natur (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1950).
95 Ibid., p. 12. Kant, A, 177.
96 Ibid., p. 25I.
97 Ibid., p. 251-51!.
98 Ibid., p. 254.
99 Ibid., pp. 259 ff.
100 Ibid., pp. 265 ff.
101 Ibid., pp. 180-294.
102 Ibid., p. 296. It may be remembered that Kant reduced matter to the interaction of
two forces: attraction and repulsion. See W. H. Werkmeister, 'Kant's Philosophy and
Modern Physics,' in Reflections on Kant's Philosophy, edited by W. H. Werkmeister,
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1975), pp. 109-33.
103 Hartmann,op. cit., pp. 297-314.
104 Ibid., pp. 319-52.
lOS Ibid., pp. 476-9I.
106 Ibid., pp. 517-50.
107 Ibid., p. 567.
108 Ibid., pp. 613-29.
109 Kant, Critique of the Faculty of Judgment, AA, pp. 359-6I.
110 Hartmann,op. cit., pp. 687 -704.
III Das Problem des Geistigen Seins (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1933).
112 Ibid., pp. 39-87.
113 Ibid., pp. 93-116.
114 Ibid., pp. 121-23.
115 Ibid., pp. 129-40.
116 Ibid., pp. 151-59.
117 Ibid., pp. 177-234.
118 Ibid., pp. 348-490.
119 Ibid., p. 391.
120 Posthumously published by Frida Hartmann (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1953).
121 See chapter 9 in Werkmeister, Immanuel Kant: The Architectonic and Development
of His Philosophy.
 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

THE "GREAT CHAIN OF BEING" IN SCHELER'S

PHILOSOPHY

Any attempt to conflate phenomenology and the speculative metaphysics

with its "Great Chain of Being", so aptly labeled by Kant and so admirably
pursued through history by Lovejoy, is bound to be a risky venture. Husserl's
critique of Weltanschauung theory has been rightly interpreted as an attack
on much of what was traditionally taken as speculative metaphysics. But
when the phenomenologist involved is Max Scheler, the difficulties might
appear to be more serious, since he seems to combine, with a considerable
degree of intention, both propensities: the methodical, analytical style of
experience-based phenomenology, and the imaginative, constructive system-
building of classical rationalistic thought. This is not even to consider the
question of whether Scheler's use of phenomenology, clearly deviant from
Husserl's prescriptions, warrants that formal designation. Suffice it to say that
Scheler was an active participant in the phenomenological movement and was
markedly influential in its development. His initially transient, and then, in
his later years, rather explicit involvement in metaphysics, makes him indeed
a rather interesting test case as to the possibility of combining phenomenology
and metaphysics, although hardly the last word. 1
If we follow the lead of Lovejoy's historical survey and focus on central
specifics, we find that the key principle behind the "great chain of being"
(henceforth occasionally abbreviated "GCB") is that of "plenitude" which
emerges as a counterweight to Plato's original concern with "otherworldli-
ness." In this complementary role, "plentitude" moderates the abolutism of
"otherworldliness" (as it is found in other traditions, e.g., the vedic) and
creates the framework for a continuity, a "plenum fonnarnm", in which
"the range of conceivable diversity of kinds of living things is exhaustively
exemplified ... so that the world is better, the more things it contains." 2
According to Lovejoy, the principle of continuity implied here is expressed
thus: "If there is between two given natural species a theoretically possible
intermediate type, that type must be realized; otherwise there are gaps in the
universe ... " To this continuity there is added a metaphysical ranking, that
is, a scale of essences "hierarchically ordered.", This is actually only suggested
in Aristotle but taken up by later naturalists and philosophers in the idea of
"arranging all animals in a single graded scala naturae according to their
99

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husseriiana, Vol. XI,99-112.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
100 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

degree of perfection." 3 But Aristotle's metaphysics, for instance, also con-

tained a concept of privation or potentiality that could be "so applied as to
permit an arrangement of all things in a single order of excellence." This
"vague notion" of an "ontological scale" was combined with the zoological
and other hierarchies to produce "the principle of unilinear gradation."4 This
series of concepts does not represent a seamless logical whole, as Lovejoy
points out, nor is it particularly stable: with Augustine and the Middle Ages,
e.g., there develops a clear cut tension between the "way up" and the "way
down" - between the "ladder of salvation", and good as "diffusivum sui."
Yet both directions were needed to establish the continuity of gradations as
well as their differences. s
While prescinding from any claims of historical influence (although they
would be quite plausible, since Scheler made no secret of his attraction to,
e.g., Augustinianism), in this context of "gradation", I believe a certain
affinity can be discerned between the GCB "and Scheler's phenomenology,
especially in his early period, viz., his proclivity for "stratification." The
most salient example, of course, is the "hierarchy" of "value-modalities"
or the "order of ranks" among value modalities understood as "a priori
relations." The ranking here goes from the level of the "agreeable" and
the "disagreeable" as lowest, up through the "vital", through the realm of
"spiritual" values to the "holy" (and "unholy"). The individual values within
the modalities are "given" by way of intuitive acts (or "functions" for the
lower two levels) or "feelings of" that are cognitive but not a matter of
intellection or rational deduction. 6 The ranks of the values are given by
distinct emotional and intuitive acts of "preference" and "subordination." 7
This intuitive "givenness" is of central importance and will be considered
further below.
What should be noted here is that the importance of this "order of rank"
in Scheler's whole system derives first from its role in the ethics. Moral values,
Scheler insists, are not themselves on the scale but are aspects of worth (with
their corresponding obligations) that are to be achieved in realizing higher
values over lower. s (Ceteris paribus, Scheler occasionally adds, but without
expanding on the potential modifying circumstances. Another problem for
Scheler is to account for the "content" of distinct moral values despite their
somewhat "formal" delineation, even though Scheler begins his ethics with a
sharp critique of Kant's formalism.)
But in addition to its role in the ethics, the importance of this scale is
found in the fact that it represents a model or pattern for a number of other
similar hierarchies. For example, in discussing the "law of moral growth" in
 THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND SCHELER 101

the Formalism, he distinguishes five levels of "types of value-persons" whose

exemplary lives inspire changes in moral behavior: these are, in ascending
order, the bon vivant, the leader, the hero, the genius and the saint. 9 The
discrepancy between four and five levels is corrected in Models and Leaders,
published in the same period (where "producers" represents the first [lowest
level]); the same point is clear in either listing however: these levels are
basically derived from the value-scale, even though they also have their own
descriptive support. 10
In a more explicitly sociological context, a similar scale of forms of social
life is delineated: Herd or Mass, Life-community, Society and Person-com-
munity (Gesammt Person)Y Analogous to this schema, but less immediately
derived from the value-scale, are the levels of "variability" of social structures
in relation to the unchanging hierarchy of values: (again, starting with the
lowest level) mores and customs (most variable), practical morality, insti-
tutions, ethics and ethos, i.e., the most stable level, that of value-feelings
and knowledge that give structure to a culture. Each ethos (along with its
concomitant lower levels) represents a distinct perspective on the unchanging
"world" of values; hence Scheler will call his approach a "perspectivism"
although without reference to Nietzsche's usage and with evidently different,
i.e., anti-relativistic, intent. 12
Now these examples (including the value-scale) are in the order of "noema-
tic" correlates of value-intending acts; on the "noetic" side of these correla-
tions, Scheler's stratifications are also explicitly comparable to the value-scale.
Central here are the levels of feelings in the "stratification of the emotional
life", levels that vary with "depth" understood as "closeness to the core of
the person." The strata here run from sensible feelings, through feelings of
the lived body, pure psychic feelings, and spiritual feelings. The depth of
these feelings varies with localization (sensible feelings are localized in fmger,
palate, etc., happiness or bliss are not), division, punctuality (temporal dis-
continuity) etc. - all of which reveal a "distance" or "closeness" to the self,
i.e., their "superficiality" or lack of it. But the basic "criterion" of depth
involves the intentionality of the deeper feelings as distinguished from the
shallower: vital feelings are intentional (unlike the sensible - pain has no
reference) in the minimal sense of indicating vitality (or lack of it); psychic
feelings reveal the condition of the ego (e.g., sadness) and the spiritual, the
full situation of the person in relation to being. 13 Analogous stratifications
are likewise found in Scheler's essay on "Sympathy" and "Shame": while
there is no genuine "love" of the pleasant, there.is feeling or interest; then
there is vital or passionate love (sexual love, love of friends, family, etc.),
102 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

mental love (intellectual) and spiritual love of persons. 14 Or again there is no

shame at the organic level, but there is bodily shame, intellectual shame, and
personal or spiritual shame - awe, reverence and humility before values,
being, God and other persons. IS
This quite sketchy panorama is enough to indicate that Scheler is attempt-
ing to unify reality along the lines of a stratification model that resembles
a chain model, but evidently without a full complement of links, a plenum
formarum. Each stratification has its own argumentation or phenomenological
justification supporting it, but taken together as a pattern, there would seem
to be two fundamental and closely connected concepts involved in all of
them- the person and intentionality. This is not the context for an in-depth
study of either, but their role together in establishing stratification should
be examined. Since the meaning of "person" in Scheler depends on inten-
tionality, I shall begin with the latter concept and its main manifestation in
the theory of intuition.
The theme of intentionality is borrowed, of course, from Hussed and
utilized in both similar and novel fashions. Scheler's general application of
intentionality to all areas of consciousness would seem to be close enough
to the Husserlian program, but his utilization of it for "affective perception"
- the "feelings of" mentioned above - and specifically perception of values,
would seem to have been a surprising innovation (although one which Hussed
himself later seems to have endorsed). Scheler makes the claim that such
value-perceptions are intuitions in a sense that meets the Husserlian defmition:
a "coinciding of the meant and the given" (Gemeintem and Gegebenem ).16
Both the empty intention and the "fulfilling one" (intuition proper) are
intentional, but in a way appropriate to affective acts; however, we are given
no real explication or even exemplification of the specific features of such
acts; instead, because they are acts of the person (at least the higher level
"feelings of"; on the lower level they are "functions"), they are declared to
be "non-objectifiable." They "objectivate" values and thus cannot themselves
be objects of such acts. One gets the impression indeed that such cognitive
feelings are being inferred, much as founding acts of cognition are required
for the founded acts of feeling in Hussed's Logical Investigations. For Scheler,
such "feeling-cognitions" are the founding acts for "response-reactions."
"Response-reactions" (Antwortsreaktionen) are secondary and derivative
of the "feelings of", but only they can be actually described; e.g., "anger"
or "being glad" presuppose an intentional act (or function) of "feeling
of" the value-events involved, but only they have a name because they are
objectivated. 17
 THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND SCHELER 103

A similar situation obtains with respect to the acts of "preferring" and

"placing after" which specifically deliver the order of values in terms of
"higher" and "lower." These acts also are intentional and they are described
as forms of "intuition" that are presupposed for the intuitive "feelings of":
"the structure of preferring and placing after circumscribes the value qualities
we feel." Scheler does elaborate slightly on these acts: for one thing, they
must be distinguished from their kinds of realization, which may be either a
matter of conscious deliberation or quite automatic, as in the case of one's
"enthusiastically" devoting oneself to a higher value. In addition, they are not
a matter of choice; choice applies only to actions,not values. The most crucial
point is framed "noematically", however, viz., the claim that values are never
given without a kind of index of their value-height; consequently, the two
acts - value "feeling of" and value "preferring" - must always take place in
tandem.
Now since preferring and placing-after are critical to Scheler's "strati-
ficationism", these two acts bear further scrutiny in the light of broader
phenomenological trends and perspectives. The concept of intuition itself,
although central to the eady Hussed, becomes rather peripheral, if not labile,
in his later works. Levin has described this shift and interpreted it as a move-
ment away from "apodictic self-evidence";18 indeed, Levin sees "intuition" as
coming to mean merely a kind of "rough-and-ready" preliminary awareness. 19
Scheler, it is true, does not actually reject the notion of intuition but it does
become less common in his later works. More important, if, as Landgrebe
has indicated, there developed a certain confluence between Scheler's thought
and that of the later Husserl in terms of interest in history, intersubjectivity,
etc., then we might well expect similarities in other aspects of their thought.
One area where this might be the case is with respect to the emergence of the
theme of "horizon" in Hussed's thought. In the Crisis this theme becomes
very explicit in a section dealing with "sense-intuition." "In seeing I always
'mean' it [the object] with all the sides which are in no way given to me ... ",20
Husserl writes in regard to sense perception, giving "horizon" a role analogous
to that of the "empty intention" of the Logical Investigations. And further
on in the Crisis this horizon theme is identified with the role of "empathy" as
the source of "a transcendental community of subjects as one which ... has
in itself and continues to create the world as intentional validity-correlate,
in ever new forms and strata of a cultural world."21 Elsewhere in the Crisis
another level of the life-world, the "vital," is interpreted in "horizontal" terms
- "an atmosphere of mute, concealed but cofunctioning validities, a vital
horizon into which the active ego can also direct itself voluntarily."22
104 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

With due allowance made for the still considerable differences between
Husserl and Scheler in content and style, there is a clue in these quotations
to a horizontal component in Scheler's stratification, and even in a sense
that is not cognitive as usually understood (e.g., is "empathic"). This, if
applicable, would allow us to look beyond Scheler's claims of exclusively
intuitive grounding for his hierarchies. Or better, it would enable us to fmd a
more phenomenologically operative meaning of his claims of intuitions of
higher and lower if we extend the empty intention of his intuition to the
open-endedness and evidential richness of the horizon model. A passage that
seems to fit this suggestion is a crucial one in On the Eternal in Man in which
Scheler undertakes to specify the object of the religious act:

not only the things and facts experienced by the person, but also all things of a finite
and contingent kind, are gathered together in a single whole, which includes the subject's
own person, and are joined in the idea of "the world." ... The second thing proper to
the religious act is that in its intention this ''world'' is overlapped and transcended. 23

We are presented here with a process, it would seem, in which the summing
up and closing of one horizon - the world - permits the opening up - a
transcending to - another horizon. The scope of the new horizon is greater;
therefore, it is a "higher" level, we can infer; but is there a difference in
quality as well? It would seem that this higher level is oriented and colored
by the aspirations of the subject, but not arbitrarily. Another passage might
bring this out. In discussing types of love (another hierarchy) in Orda Amaris,
Scheler examines the difference between love and infatuation and fmds that
underlying love is "the infmite form of being" and that its "metaphysical
perspective" is an "empty field" or "outlook" toward "hope, presentiment
and faith ...." Infatuation, by contrast, involves a man's being "carried away
and enraptured by some finite good" and his being deluded as to the limita-
tions of the "concrete goods which exemplify the value-region to which that
subject has access."24 In effect, the infatuated subject has missed the "closure"
of horizon appropriate to one type of love (therefore lower) and has instead
invested in that same horizon - but inappropriately - his capacity for a love
with an unlimited horizon (therefore "higher").
Such passages, which are admittedly meager in detail and rare in occurrence,
only of course hint at what Scheler might have done with the horizontal
model as supplementing his intuitional claims. But that his general intention
was to give some such internal or intrinsic evidence for his stratifications is
indicated by the fact that when he gives "confirmatory data" for his hierarchy
of values, he uses the word "criteria" but puts it in warning quotes. 25 The
 THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND SCHELER 105

"criteria" he utilizes are: durability (but not sheer length of time), indivisi-
bility (e.g., material goods must be divided to be shared; not so with spiritual
values); relative independence of one value from another (e.g., the useful
depends on the agreeable, the vital on the spiritual); depth of satisfaction in
the sense of inner fulfillment (satisfaction on the level of sensory pleasure is
possible only if we are also satisfied on a higher level); the fifth, and most
important for Scheler, is the degeee of relativity a value has with regard to an
absolute value (the third and fourth, or higher, modalities, plus moral values.)
But Scheler reiterates that none of these "criteria" substitute for intuitive
evidence; there is no deduction or induction of the hierarchy of values any
more than there is dependence of this hierarchy on individual acts of pre-
ferring or subordinating. 26
If these "stratification strategies" built around the concept of intentionality
are not self-evidently adequate to the claims made for their results, then the
presence of another explanatory principle is that much more important. This
principle - really a cluster of concepts - is "person" in Scheler's philosophy.
It is significant to note that the key defming characteristic of person is
derived from the concept of intentionality - viz., its "non-objectifiability."
It is this characteristic that enables us to distinguish the personal sphere of
being from the psychic, Le., whatever can be investigated or explored through
the objectifications of psychology, as well as the other sciences that deal with
life, since the psychic is basically a higher form of life. The person is found
not simply in this non-objectifiability of acts but in their unity: "Person is
the concrete self-essential unity of the being of acts of different nature,
which in itself preced,es all essential differences of acts."27 The unity involved
here is not that of an underlying unchangeable substance, nor even an inter-
penetration of acts, but a Sammiung, an "ingatheredness" that contrasts with
the dissociations of the lower orders. This unity is involved with and varies
in every act; in this way it is the correlate of world, just as every act correlates
with an object. 28
The concept of spirit, under which person is subsumed, reveals another
dimension of person which would seem to be properly metaphysical, even
though Scheler tries to handle it phenomenologically. The ultimate meta-
physical ground of the person is spirit, but in many uses it is coextensive with
the personal and the intentional: "[it includes] ... all things that possess the
nature of act, intentionality and fulfillment of meaning, wherever we may
fmd them. The person - not the ego, which belongs to the "outer world" -
is the "single and necessary existential form of mind (Geist) [spirit] insofar as
we are concerned with concrete mind [spirit] ."29 This necessarily includes,
106 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

for Scheler, the idea of God as personal (at least in his early writings), Le.,
as the correlate of '''the' concrete absolute world"; "although in thinking
simply about the essence of man, God is not presupposed as an extant and
positively determined reality", 30 but only'the quality of the divine or holy
is presupposed. The relation between human acts and divine acts is generally
described as one of participation: human intentionality is a participation
which is fmite, created and really distinct from God's acts, although the basis
for the difference is never clearly established. 31
In these concepts of person, spirit, God, etc., we have the framework for
the "higher" levels of value which are correlated generally with the holy, the
spiritual, etc. Correlated directly with the value modalities are a whole set
of further hierarchies (most of them just adumbrated by Scheler - not
developed): "person values" over "thing values"; "self-values" in relation to
"values of the other - although they have equal "height", the act of realizing
of a value of the other, Scheler claims, is superior to the act of realizing a
value of oneself; the values of acts, functions and reactions (in descending
order); the relative values of basic "moral tenor" (Gesinnungswerte), of deeds
and of success; values of intentions as superior to those of states; values of
terms of relations, forms of relations and relations themselves; self-values
(inherent) over "consecutive" values (instrumental, technical, etc.).32
It will have been readily noticed, however, that these correlations are not
always very strict, that the levels in one hierarchy do not always parallel
neatly those in another. Such "discrepancy" is particularly noticeable in the
"stratification of the emotion life", a very important hierarchy for Scheler
because it is the basis for his argument (substantially in agreement with Kant)
that eudaemonism ultimately reduces to hedonism: to pursue satisfication on
a "deeper" (Le., "higher") level of emotions, as in bliss, is to attempt to
manipulate what is non-manipulable and therefore is self-defeating. The
highest level here (on which bliss and despair are found) is referred to as
"spiritual" while the next level is called "psychical." In contrast to the lowest
level, the sensible feelings (pleasure and pain), the psychical feeling is properly
intentional (unlike the second level, the vital, which is only intentional in a
general sense of "indicating" vital concerns, as in shame, disgust, aversion,
etc.) as referring to value-qualities, as in joy and sadness. But it is experienced
essentially as an "ego-quality" as, e.g., in deep sorrow. In "spiritual feelings,
however, all ego-states are surrendered; they seem to "stream forth, as it
were, from the very source of spiritual acts." 33 Within this level, Scheler will
fmd examples that are spiritual in this sense and those that are related more
to "religious" experience; the religious act that is described in Vom Ewigen
 THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND SCHELER 107

im Menschen is analogous to cognitive "feelings of" as well as to "spiritual

feelings. "
The useful point, however, is not simply to display or belabor such discrep-
ancies (if such they actually are, since Scheler never claimed precise parallels
between his stratifications) but to investigate their underlying dynamics and
meaning. On a preliminary basis, we might notice that "person" and "inten-
tionality", while they are co-principles and roughly co-extensive, have a
divergent impact in their effects on the "Great Chain of Being." Using the
terms Lovejoy adopts to describe the tension in this tradition, we can say that
"person" corresponds to the principle of continuity and "intentionality" to
that of discontinuity. In the passages we have examined it is seen that person
is used for both the spiritual and the holy; in Lovejoy's terms, it would be
the "ascending process", the "way-up", because of the unitary thrust of the
notion of "participation." Intentionality, on the other hand, is used by
Scheler to discriminate between levels in the hierarchy; it becomes a tool for
dissecting the various modes of intentional structure and correlation, thus
opening up the diversification in the links of the chain.
But such conjectures lead us into the more metaphysical dimension of
Scheler's thought, a dimension that was never suppressed but was somewhat
muted early on in the name of the phenomenological dedication to concrete,
first-hand, evidential experience. But the metaphysical tendencies in Scheler's
thought were given much freer rein and explicit commitment in his last
period, particularly in his sketch of a philosophical anthropology in Man:S
Place in Nature. This period also represents a profound shift in metaphysical
orientation for Scheler, so drastic indeed that some critics have seen in
it a repudiation of his earlier work. Certainly there are some fundamental
changes, particularly the shift away from a metaphysics of a personal God
to an evolutionary "pan-en-theism." But recent studies have stressed the
considerable continuities in his thought that underlie the changes, so that it is
not necessary to jettison his earlier philosophy to make sense of the later,
especially since Scheler himself maintained that certain theses, such as the
ultimacy of the value ranking, were unchanging. 34
Scheler's later period might also be said to correspond "in microcosm"
to the historical shift that Lovejoy describes as "The Temporalizing of the
Chain of Being" (Chapter IX), in which, he explains, "the plenum formarum
came to be conceived by some, not as the inventory but as the program of
nature ...."35 Scheler there develops an increasing emphasis on develop-
mental process. To be sure, the same emphasis on phenomenological method
to reach essential distinctions that in turn yield levels of being and value, is
108 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

still in evidence. Thus, in Man's Place in Nature, Scheler speculates on man's

situation in the cosmos by analyzing the stages of psychophysical life in plant,
animal and man. Whereas the plant's activity is dominated by GejUhlsdrang,
vital impulse that is blind, passive, and exclusively "ecstatic", the animal's
behavior is instinctive in the sense of being ordered to meeting needs, of
following bodily rhythms, and of serving the species, as well as of screening
sense-data, so that it is active in relation to its environment. 36 On the higher
levels, animals possess a "practical intelligence" which they share, at least in
rudimentary form, with humans. While sharing the psychic - essentially a
form of the vital - principle with lower froms of life, man also manifests
another principle that distinguishes him from all other forms of life, viz.,
"spirit", here described again in terms of its non-objectifiability, but also as
transcending actual existence as man objectifies the world (he can "step-
back" from the world), as constructing universal, a priori knowledge of
essences, and as participating thus in the "highest Ground of Being itself." 37
These discriminations (and others not reported here) all involve (again) the
use of the principle of intentionality in such a way as to lead to a new and
more radical discontinuity - a dualism of spirit and drive that replaces the
traditional dualism of body and soul. Scheler explicates this dualism in terms
of the aspect of "powerlessness" that he now sees as most distinctive of spirit.
Only drives have potency and energy; spirit must, as it were, "borrow" from
this energy to achieve its own devices - it "sublimates" drive but in a way
that avoids the inconsistencies of Freudian theories, in which drives repress
themselves. The principle involved here is one formulated by N. Hartmann
(but suggested in his own Ethics, Scheler adds) in terms of values: "The
higher categories of being of value are inherently the weaker ones." Scheler
explains: "every higher form of being is relatively impotent with respect to
the lower: it is realized, not through its own power, but through the energy
of the lower forms."38 Marx was right against Hegel here, Scheler avers: "ideas
which do not have interests and passions behind them, that is, energies
derived from the vital and instinctual sphere of man, invariably tend to make
fools of themselves in history." Thus spirit simply means direction. 39
We may, Scheler explains, call the spiritual attributes of "the highest
Ground of Being deitas", but we cannot impute any positive, creative power
to spirit or Godhead here. This means that there cannot be any creation ex
nihilo; rather, Scheler insists,
in order to realize its deitas, or its inherent plenitude of ideas and values, the Ground of
Being was compelled to release the world-creative drive ... to pay the price of this world
process in order to realize its own essence in and through this temporal process.
 THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND SCHELER 109

This process - "essentially timeless but manifesting itself in time" - re-

presents such a profound thrust toward unity, however, that "there may
even occur a gradual reversal in the original relationship according to which
the higher forms of being are the weaker, the lower forms the stronger":
"Spirit, originally impotent, and the demonic drive, originally blind to all
spiritual ideas and values, may fuse in the growing process of ideation, or
spiritualization ...." 40
Thus it would seem, from these very tentative speculations in the Stellung,
that the radical dualism of spirit and drive is not the last word, that "con-
vergence", and unification are more fundamental. Something along these
same lines is suggested by the metaphor of "spheres" that Scheler sometimes
utilizes in his last writings in place of "levels" and "stages"; "spheres" suggest
an overlapping, a "con-centering" of opposed principles. Luther has argued
that, instead of conflict, the real relation of these spheres is one of "com-
plementarity." He explains this by emphasizing the notion of "Lov-ing" as
the primary concept in Scheler's metaphysics that spans the different periods:
There is no incompatibility in diverse irreducible spheres appearing within a unified
totality because the ultimate Ground of Being (Primordial Loving, Person, Spirit) is
essentially a boundless source, hence encompasses all that is as it is .... 41

Man, then, is the place, for Scheler, where spirit and drive come together
and come gradually to interpenetrate, but only if man accepts his place, "the
only place where deification is accessible to us." Such acceptance requires
courage and self-transcendence:
I have heard it said that it is not possible for man to endure the idea of an unfmished
God, or a God in the process of becoming. My answer is that metaphysics is not an
insurance policy for those who are weak and in need of protection .... [The traditional)
relationship is both childlike and weak. It has detached man from God and it is expressed
in the objectifying and evasive relations of contemplation, worship and prayer. In place
of this relationship we put the elementary act of a personal commitment to the deity,
the self-identification of man with the active spiritual movement of the deity ....

It would not be to our purpose to attempt to clarify these resounding but

sketchy conclusions to the Stellung, with their startling combination of
religious inspiration and cosmic prometheanism, especially in the light of
the unfmished and posthumous character of their publication, as well as of
the prospect of the appearance of more complete posthumous statements
on metaphysical questions. What can simply be noted here is their echoic
sound with respect to grand themes of GCB history. They - along with
earlier passages - evoke Platonic forms, Plotinian emanationism, Leibnizian
110 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

optimism, Spinozist necessity, as well as Romanticist dynamism and Darwinian

struggle.
But does the "deja vu" character of such speculative passages in Scheler
render his work a mere anachronism - thus a double failure, because he first
failed to see the problems discernible in earlier attempts at forging "The great
chain of being"? One basis for the failure of "The great chain of being" at
the end of its extensive and complex history is an overdose of "rationalism":
"rationality, when conceived as complete, as excluding all arbitrariness,
becomes itself a kind of irrationality." To some extent Scheler would cer-
tainly fit as a target of Lovejoy's critical complaints against rationalism.
But Scheler, it should be recalled, had his own very trenchant complaints
about rationalism; his attack on Kantian formalism is at the same time a
critique of all the ethical theories that rely on legalism and logicism to com-
pensate for their lack of experiential-phenomenological grounding. His
endorsement of Pascal's logique du coeur is part of an attempt to reinstate
emotion and feeling and associated structures into ethics whence it had been
exiled by the dominant western traditions.
Again, Scheler can be faulted for the fact that, as already mentioned, his
hierarchies are not obviously complete; as compared with the great traditional
systems, they do not correlate neatly with each other - as "chains" they
would be "open-linked" and rather insecurely anchored. Moreover, as men-
tioned already, their crucial grounding principle, the "person", is not analyzed
thoroughly enough to justify the critical distinction between infinite and
fmite person. Without that distinction clearly established, the differentiation
between the levels of the "holy" and the "spiritual" becomes clouded. Such
"discrepancies" may simply be due to Scheler's style and his somewhat
inconsistent and hasty application of the phenomenological method. Or
they may (and this is more likely, I believe) reflect a unique emphasis or
orientation in which value - the good - takes on a radical priority, a pre-
dominance over "neutral" being more fundamental than that found in Plato.
If this axiological priority takes on some divergent exemplifications in diverse
hierarchies, it may be due to the specific requirements of that region, rather
than not having the strict consistency necessary to fit some visual structural
model. The various "inconsistencies" between the diverse kinds of love, e.g.
- "mother-love", "brother-love", etc., with their differences in reciprocity
and equality - may derive from the nature of value-systems as distinguished
from other kinds of systems.
Despite the problems in Scheler's thought, therefore, I think it represents
a new expression of the ancient aspiration animating it - the recurrent need
 THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING AND SCHELER 111

for Heilswissen, for a metaphysical knowledge that will provide hope and
direction for life. With the analytic emphasis of contemporary philosophy,
we might think that the history of "The great chain of being" and therefore
of such knowledge is over. But the dialectical character of the alternating
positions that seem to succeed each other in that history might also suggest
a further extension of it - in different form - into the future, e.g., in some
form of convergence or synthesis of the levels of being and value along
Hegelian, Teilhardian, or even modified Marxist lines. Similarly, this dialectical
character might suggest the need to reach further back in history, back into
those pre-historical and non-western religious traditions that have, Scheler
occasionally reminds us, influenced our thinking about Being in unsuspected
ways. Such reminders might seem to subvert the putatively intuitive nature
of our knowledge of hierarchies, stratifications, etc. But we might see them
instead as indications that the "empty" intentions or meanings that initiate
our intuitions are in fact oriented horizons that are "fulfilled" by the "givens"
of present-day experience. This would mean, then, that what we are really
doing in reexamining Scheler's philosophizing in the light of "The great chain
of being" is not to reach a fmal intuition, but looking for the kind of under-
standing of world and self that produces a merging of present experience with
past traditions and future possibilities.

NOTES

1 For helpful discussions of Scheler's philosophical orientation see Herbert Spiegelberg,

The Phenomenological Movement, Vol. I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960) pp. 220-270.
Also: Eugene Kelly, Max Scheler (Boston: Twayne, 1977).
2 Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960),
p.52.
3 Ibid., p. 58.
4 Ibid., p. 59.
5 Ibid., pp. 53-58.
6 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, North-
western University Press, 1973), pp. 86-99.
7 Ibid., p. 100.
8 Ibid., p. 27.
9 Ibid., pp. 572-583.
10 Max Scheler, 'Vorbilder und Fiihrer,' Schriften aus dem Nachlass, (Gesammeite
Werke, Vol. X) (ed. by M. Scheler) (Bern: Francke, 1957), pp. 255-343.
11 Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy (New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1954), cht. 3:
also, Formalism, pp. 526-532.
12 Formalism, pp. 299-309.
13 Ibid., pp. 328-343.
112 ROBERT D. SWEENEY

14 Nature of Sympathy, pp. 142-161.

15 'Zur Funktion des Geschlechtlichen Schamgeflihles; Nachlass, 65-147.
16 Formalism, p. 51.
17 Formalism,pp. 87-90.
18 David M. Levin, Reason & Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology (Evanston: North-
western U. Press, 1970), pp.
19 David M. Levin, 'Husserl's Notion of Self-Evidence,' in Pivcevie, E. (ed.) Phenome-
nology and Philosophical Understanding (New York: Cambridge U. Press, 1975), p. 71.
20 Edmund Husser!, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-
nology (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1973), p_ 158.
2! Ibid., p_ 358.
22 Ibid., p. 149.
23 Max Scheler, 'Problems of Religion,' On the Eternal in Man (New York: Harper,
1960), p. 250.
24 Max Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1970),
p.115.
25 Formalism.
26 In his recent, and admirably balanced, book on Scheler, Eugene Kelly argues that the
ranking of value-modalities is an example of the use of Fundierungsordnung by Scheler,
even though they doesn't say so specifically. The Fundierungsordnung represents not a
genetic order by a relation of priority of essences. The point is well taken but it runs up
against, not just the textual problem, but a justification of the necessity of the order that
is not a deduction.
27 Formalism, pp. 393-394.
28 Ibid., p. 420.
29 Ibid., p. 389.
30 Ibid., p. 292.
31 Ibid., pp. 292-295.
32 Ibid., pp. 100-104.
33 Ibid., pp. 328-343.
34 Cf. Kelly, op. cit.; Arthur R. Luther, 'The Articulated Unity of Being in Scheler's
Phenomenology. Basic Drive and Spirit,' and Parvis Emad, 'Person, Death and World,'
in Manfred Frings (ed.), Max Scheler 1874-1928, Centennial Essays (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1974).
35 Lovejoy,op. cit., p. 244.
36 Max Scheler, Man:S- Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon, 1961), pp. 8-34.
37 Ibid., p. 47.
38 Ibid., p. 65.
39 Ibid., p. 68.
40 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
4! Luther,op. cit., p. 39.
 PHILIBERT SECRET AN

EDITH STEIN ON THE "ORDER AND CHAIN OF BEING"

A consideration of the "chain of being" in the thought of Edith Stein falls

within the legitimate interests of phenomenology. For Edith Stein explicitly
situated herself at the crossroads of phenomenology and Scholasticism (the
school of thought traditionally concerned with the hierarchy of beings and
continually driven by the conviction that the created order is in principle
accessible in its admirable coherence). Hierarchy and coherence are certainly
philosophical themes inherited from Greek thought, especially from neo-
Platonism and Stoicism, and absorbed into the Christian philosophical ap-
proach. This historical continuity leaves room for an interrogation which
in its way phenomenology makes its own. It seems indeed that human in-
telligence, perpetually in search, comes to its own only at the moment when
this coherence appears to it and when an order presents itself to it which
implies, in one form or another, a hierarchy of beings and values. Is not the
intelligence "at home" (chez eUe) only when it has defInitely vanquished the
extraordinary temptation that Buchner puts into Danton's mouth: "The world
is chaos. Nothingness is the God-universe to which birth must be given"l?
We confront this nihilism by a philosophy of being be it only in the form
of the assertion that "something exists." Is it not in fact against the destruc-
tive evocative of chaos, fascinating though it may be, that we search for an
established order, or of one still to be discovered or even fabricated?
There is no longer any reason to demonstrate that phenomenology has
greatly contributed to reestablishing, with its own philosophical means drawn
from the depths of subjectivity, the sense of order and harmony. Let us here
recall the words of Husserl:

The constitution of the objective world essentially involves a harmony of monads, in

particular, a harmonious constitution of each monad and, therefore, a genesis realizing
itself harmoniously in particular monads. This harmony belongs to the explication of
intentional contents included in the very fact that a world of experience exists in us. 2

What it [pure psychology) calls cognition of the world's cognition of the things of the
world, their genera and species, associations and disassociations, changes and perdurance,
the law of their ontological invariance in the flux of their transformations, their structure
and their all-embracing forms in the regularity of the latter, to which the "overall being
of things" [alles Sein von Dingen) is connected. 3

113

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 113-123.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
114 PHILIBERT SECRET AN

But to elaborate such a philosophy of the order of forms and structures

which could likewise be a philosophy of being is Edith Stein's particular
undertaking. To her master work Endliches und ewiges Sein, Versuch eines
Aufstiegs zum Sinn des Seins, 4 we will tum to investigate it.

1. THE ONTOLOGICAL ORDER

Finite Being and Eternal Being is the wide-ranging development of an un-

published study on act and potency.5 Despite the clarity of expression of
her own work, much patience and effort is required to perceive not only its
structure, but what is at stake. If we concentrate on the issue of the order of
being, of the "chain of being", it can be said that Finite and Eternal Being
considers three problems.
1) First Stein establishes, from both a phenomenological and an Augustin-
ian perspective, the status of a region of being between "eternal" Being and
"finite" or real being. Stein calls this intermediary region wesentliches Sein,
"essential" being, and undertakes its analysis from a double point of view:
a) from the point of view of the relation of the "essential world" to real,
finite being, as well as to eternal being; and
b) from the point of view of the separated world's archetectonic.
It is from these two points of view that we must analyze the following
text:

The world of essential being [wesenhaftes Sein] must be conceived as a stratified world
[Stufenreich]. The simple and the archetypal of the highest level are its essentialities. It
is to the latter that the essential traits of composed "formations" [Gebilde] , called by us
the essential quid [Wesenwas], conform [nachgebildet]. 6

Taken as an example this text asserts not only that the order of the time-
less world of essences is hierarchical, that it includes more or less universal
elements, but that the essences - understood in the most general sense of
"ideal forms" - are complex (Gebi/de) or simple. Furthermore, we perceive
that insofar as they are exemplified in things they involve a quid (Wesenwas)
distinct from the thing's (voiles Was), as well as an ideal determination called
Wesenheit (essenceness or essentiality).
The Wesen (Wesenwas and Wesenheit) is fundamentally characterized as
being-at-rest (ruhig, ruhend) and timeless. Though potential in relation to the
real, essences have an "inert" but necessary actuality relative to the unstable
and fluctuating possible contingent being.
These indications are of great value, for already at the level of the Gebilde,
 STEIN AND THE CHAIN OF BEING 115

the complex formations, an archetectonic order can be distinguished whose

archetypal principles are simple, whereas the whole of this essential world and
what it prefigure~ are presented in and as an order called logos.
2) The second major cluster of problems Finite Being and Eternal Being
emerges from a long and difficult struggle with Aristotelian ontology. Stein
deliberately and critically attaches herself to the Scholastic tradition in which
Aristotle's ontology is reformulated as oriented by a creative realism. But by
giving preference to the theme of the ideal order, she does not intend to work
on the terrain of the analogy of being. Her ontology is first of all an ontology
of forms. In her hands the problem of the form of beings is turned around
to become that of the being of the forms. And it is in this context that the
distinction between the being of the essences and that of the essentialities,
that is, between the morphic essence and the eidetic essence called the sense
(Sinn), is carried out.
Adhering firmly to the distinction between the essence, understood as the
quidditative form (Wesensform, morphe) and the essentiality, or pure form
(reine Form, eidos), the author elicits a theory according to which real beings
correspond to the morphe in their composition and to the eidos in their
teleological dynamism. In other words, the morphe is the form in which a
hyte is structured; the eidos is the form through which a being forms itself, to
which it conforms and realizes itself according to its own dynamism.
It is in this context that the concept of sense is specified, first by its
equivalency to the concept of essence, and then by determining more partic·
ularly the law of unity which governs the realization of a subsisting being, and
the order which assures it intelligibility in the whole of being.
3) The full significance of this philosophy of sense will appear only in the
third area of issues inspired by the theology of creation. The "ideal" world,
which is essential and archetypal, is only a possible world. Actualized in the
world of things, it does not bear its own power of actualization. A force or
creative act is necessary, an act recognized as the sens bestower. But if being
is given to every entity, sense is bestowed on spirits only. Knowledge of
the order of the logos, of the concatenation of all things, is the properly
philosophical mode of ascent toward the sense of being and the Being of sense.
Throughout these textual annotations we are consciously neglecting
everything which pertains to the analysis of the spirit and the person. It is no
longer a question of the order of the world, but of the stamp of the Creator
on the creature as spiritual and personal. In this regard Stein develops a
theory of analogy which does not follow directly from the theory of logos
with which we are here concerned.
116 PHILIBERT SECRETAN

Although this presentation of the problematic of Finite Being and Eternal

Being has been somewhat cursory, it has nevertheless brought to light the
fundamental inspiration of this work.
Stein's ontology is simultaneously a theory of forms and a theory of
beings. Essence signifies both being and form, but it is only through form that
being is accessible. Thus she judges the two giants of philosophia perennis,
Plato and Aristotle, on the basis of their conception of form: "What is dis-
satisfactory in the Aristotelian and Platonic theories of form seems to me to
reside in the fact that they take into account only one aspect." If I understand
Stein correctly on this point, Aristotle holds to the essential form while Plato
maintains the exemplary or archetypal form. She continues: "And I see
the reason for this partiality in the fact that the idea of creation and its
continuation, the conservation and the providential government of the
created world, is alien to them." 7
Stein's problem is to take account of the created order as a subsisting
and not just substantial order, and to seek its permanence and sense in the
originary (Urbild) and not only exemplary (Vorbild) forms, in the timeless
possibles which are irreducible to their ideality alone. In other words, Stein's
essences are creatures, but their intelligible order is the manifestation of
the divine Logos. They display themselves between the eternal and the
finite orders; their potentiality is dominated by the pure act and awaits
actualization in the world of things and in the flux of real Erlebnisse. Their
status as possibles does not tear them out of being; this is an ontological
status descending stepwise down to the particular which thereby ordered in
their forms of fmite creations, just as their ideal and universal status orders
them to divine ideas which alone deserve the title of originary archetypes
(Urbilder). It is this double status which justifies comparison with the Scotist
conception of ens commune. Stein drew inspiration from Husserl's doctrine
and was led to conceive of the eidos through an analysis of the invariant
correlates of Erlebnis. But she opposes Husserl in her own development
and together with other members of the Gottingen School denounces the
idealistic inflection of transcendental phenomenology. 8
It is by no means unimportant that she confronted both Aristotle and
Acquinas. She owed it to herself to go to the limit in her investigations of
ousia in order to carry out this inversion that we have called the passage
from the form of being to the being of form. Likewise she was obliged to
reconstitute Acquinas' theory of the transcendentals in order to elaborate her
philosophy of the sense of being.
Thus, beyond Aristotelian realism and Platonic-Husserlian idealism, Stein's
 STEIN AND THE CHAIN OF BEING 117

philosophy of sense eventually led to a resolutely theocentric cosmology and

anthropology.

II. FROM THE ORDER OF FORMS TO THE ORDER OF SENSE

1) The image of the chain and chaining is just as applicable to the elements
of things or numbers as to a succession of events or to the order of logical
conclusions. Thus, for instance, Descartes' "long chains of reasoning." But,
more profoundly, that which is chained as opposed to that which is un-
chained brings to mind a necessary order, for instance, the Stoic logos.
Finally, this image recalls that of the ladder or the scale whose degrees make
it possible to return to the first step and to follow the course of its descending
effects.
Not every order, however, is a chain of connected elements. We know
Pascal's insistence on the discontinuity between the orders of the body,
the spirit, and the heart. Now, in certain respects Stein's conception of the
domains of being recalls Pascal's vision of the discontinuity of orders. Not
only is there an incommensurability between fmite and eternal being, but
the domain of forms, by its immutability and by the coherence of their
correlations, is properly distinct from the temporality and contingency of the
empirical real.
This discontinuity is not incompatible with a continuity that Stein willing-
ly expresses in terms of 'exemplarity' or 'conformity' (Vorbild, Nachbild)
a continuity that definitely assures the unity of sense which fmalizes all
existence. This contrasted rhythm of continuity and discontinuity is found at
the basis of the forms. Whereas, for example, things are inserted, incorporated
(eingegliedert) in the structured network of the real world, we read in Stein
about the ideal forms: "According to their essential being, the formations
[Gebilde] of different levels are separated [voneinander getrennt] and are
relative to one another only in the mode of supraposition [Uberordnung] ,
infraposition [Unterordnung] , and juxtaposition [Nebenordnung] ."9 But
considered as the possibles of real beings, these "formations" are staggered at
levels of decreaSing generality, the most general fmding their concretization
in the more particular, down to their fulfillment in singular things.
In this way the concept of "order" is diversified on a wide scale, even
though we are temporarily unable to perceive more than a quasi-spatial
distributive order - a quantitative order in the Kantian sense - proceeding
from the universal to the particular, the singular essence being the closest to
realization in a particular being. We then discover an order of the exemplary
118 PHILIBERT SECRET AN

which implies an ontological anteriority of the universal form (eidos) to the

"morphic" form and to its concrete realization.
What we can say here about the structural order of essences provides only
a faint idea of the complexity of Stein's analysis, as well as of a subtlety remi-
niscent of Duns Scotus. But we must confme our attention to the main lines.
The "essential" order refers simultaneously to the "real" order of which it
is the possible, to the movement of which it is the invariant, to the contingent
of which it is the necessary, and detaches itself as an autonomous region of
being, as being insofar as it is order.
The passage from the consideration of order as "form" to the consideration
of order as "being" that justifies this formula. Being, insofar as it is order, or
the "being of order", is what in the fmal analysis makes possible the com-
prehension of the term "sense." Whence our question: Does not Stein's
doctrine of sense require the reconsideration of a theory of order in which we
have perceived only the aspect of structuration and where a static conception
of a timeless model is predominant?
2) The term "sense" is not fixed once and for all in Finite Being and
Eternal Being. One of its possible meanings is properly Husserlian: the sense
(noematic, noetic, and semantical) is what subsists after existence has been
bracketed. (Is this not the Stoic lekton which stands in the background?) The
second, in a more Platonic perspective, is that of the exemplarity of sense.
This meaning comes to the fore in the confrontation between essence and
essentiality, between Wesenwas and Wesenheit, and in the distinction between
morphic and eidetic structure.
A last meaning brings the sense into "contact" with reality, understood no
longer from the point of view of compositional or structural modes, but from
the point of view of the dynamism in which a being actualizes itself according
to the law of its sense, and is thereby opened to the intelligence which grasps
it in spirit and in truth.
Here the term "sense" indicates in the thing a more fundamental onto-
logical level, closer to its substance and its being-itself [Selbstand] than to
its quid (Was); and it designates in the essence (Wesen) an actuality with
regard to which the form (Wesensform, Wesenswas) is only potential. "Sense"
thus means both the exemplary actuality of simple essences, the actuality of
the order in which the complex forms (Sinngebilde) involved in the structuring
of the concrete are included, and the ontological level of beings grasped in
their sense capacity. Here is the key proposition:

Just as every "something" has a sense, there is in every being the being corresponding to
 STEIN AND THE CHAIN OF BEING 119

the sense. IO In other words in every being (ens) which is something (a/iquid) there is
manifest a capacity for sense: either a capacity for becoming a part of 'the unified whole
of being, or an unfolding of what is contained in the unity of sense. 1,1

And when we read "every something", we are obliged to admit that

even the most formal or empty forms (e.g. mathematical forms) have a
being corresponding to their sense, that is, to their insertion in the whole
(Sinnganzes). But do they have this dynamic of unfolding through which
there is manifested in beings the act of being and being-the-self signified by
ousia?
If the theme of sense introduces this vitality into ontological analysis, it is
also a reflection on the becoming of things and beings which will bring to
light the distance separating "transformation" and "actualization." To be
transformed is to take on successive forms; to be actualized is to unfold, to
develop in and according to the unity of sense. Properly speaking, it is to
"take on sense."
The static character of the archetypal sense is thus overcome by a dynamic
or energetic conception of t1}.e Aristotelian ousia. But this teleological ener-
getks, where the sense is the act in relation to the potentiality of a being's
realization, is broached from the angle of an analysis of the transcendentals.
The formal aspect of sense will be surpassed in a transcendental analysis in
which Stein's philosophical genius stands out in a particularly impressive way.
In Finite Being and Eternal Being considerations about the transcendentals
mediate between the theory of the formal order and the theory of sense.
Stein commits herself to this detour because an ascent toward the sense of
being requires that the transition from the consideration of the being of the
form to the consideration of the sense of being be justified in the universal
determinations of the being as such. This transition is clearly indicated in the
analysis of the transcendental a/iquid.

Let us take a retrospective glance at the transcendentals as they have been considered
up to this point. It will be seen that ens designates the being as a whole: "What is"
accentuates the being; res brings out the "what" [Was, quid), aliquid the "that" [Das) ;
unum is a formal property of the "that" [= object) as well as of the "what" and being.
If we prescind from the sense of being [italics mine P. S.), what is at question are the
formal elements of being as such and as it is in itself. Only then do we interpret aliquid
no longer as something [= object), but as "other something" [anderes Etwas) , and bring
it into relation with other beings: we posit it in the relation of non coincidence as an
object and according to being. "Another object" - this is now an empty form. Can a
purely formal sense be ascribed to "Objects such that each has a different being"? It is
only by starting from sense that an answer is at all possible. 12
120 PHILIBERT SECRETAN

Let us retain for the moment two decisive elements. So long as we prescind
from the sense of being, it is impossible to bring out in aliquid the relational
dimension which is constituted among beings as being irreducibly different.
This is the very foundation of the distinction between form and sense. But
this relation is not alien to the transcendentals. On the contrary, it is the
true, the good, and the beautiful which appeal as the fartheset reaching
determinations of being itself. It is worth meditating on the admirable analysis
of transcendental truth which, in a being, is its own relation to "eidos." 13
Being, relation, sense are henceforth solidary, as the following text makes
explicit.

Being as the unfolding of a quid [Was) does not signify only the externality and the
internality of what is contained in this quid, but also its open being - or its becoming,
respectively - or its intelligible being for a knowing spirit [i.e. every being is as such a
true being) ; to be signifies "to occupy a place in the universality of all being and to
thereby contribute to the perfection of this whole" [i.e. to be good); to be signifies
"to be ordered according to a certain law of construction and thus to be in harmony
[Einklang) with the spirit both as orderer and as knower in a corresponding order"
[i.e. to be both beautiful and reasonable). When it is a matter of the compenetration
and order of the parts in the whole, it is implied that unity is a property of being.
Unity, truth, goodness, beauty all belong to the state of sense [Sinnbestand) of being
itself. 14

It is possible to distinguish on the basis of this text a moment of formal

structuration where the internal-external relation is outstanding and which
is brought forth by the relation to the other as an "other thing." I will relate
it again to the theme of "construction" (Aufbau). Openness (patence) then
appears; in the being "open" and "revealed" (Offenbarsein) the "adordina-
tion" (Zuordnung) becoming perfectly distinguishable from "coordination"
(Anordnung). Openness and adordination are categories of sense in its on-
tological density: "To be manifest, to be ordered to is wherein being itself
resides." 15
This text orients reflection in two directions: toward the established order
in its objective, noematic totality, and toward order as intelligible by a spirit
which is itself endowed with the power of intentional unification. And when
man's finite spirit is in question, the infmite task of knowledge is to grasp
progressively this whole.
Our intending is then oriented by the semantical sense of the term "being
in plenitude."
This ordered whole is, however, not the last word about either order or
being. The order of nature, like that of the world for the spirit - indeed their
 STEIN AND THE CHAIN OF BEING 121

very adequacy - are only parts of the entire Order that the divine Logos
embraces and unifies.
Here we should return to those considerations which complete what E.
Stein herself calls her Augustinian way, which is also the phenomenological
way. In discovering sense as Sinnzusammenhang, as the concatenation of
ideas or essences, she has no fear of clarifying it by recourse to the Christian
doctrine of divine Logos. 16
By insisting on the analogy - i.e. on resemblance in disemblance - between
logos and Logos, the essential order and the full order, she brings out together
with the Word of God the Stoic logic and Plato's "exemplary order."
The concatenation through which everything, (even the unreal objects of
reason) is contained in this logos is to be understood as the unity of a "totality
of sense." The logos sense is the One-Whole. But - and this is a point of
capital importance which precludes any similarity with an Hegelian type
philosophy - the Whole-One of sense draws its being neither from itself nor
from any of its parts. Only Creative Being whose eternal source it is, gives
being. It gives it in and through its logos (Urbild) the originary preform of
this total order of being.
In short, the world in its order and intelligibility, in its transcendental
determinations and essential forms, is open to the human spirit which is itself
created. But none of these aspects of being nor their ensemble exhaust the
totality of being: "The whole of the created world refers to the originary
eternal and uncreated archetypes of everything created, to the essentialities
or forms that we have conceived as the divine Ideas."17 Not only does the
entire formal and transcendental order have its Principle therein, but so any
essential possibility owes its real becoming to this primary Being, prate ousia,
Master of the being and sense: "The realization of the world is conceivable
starting from neither essential being [as the being of the fmite Sinngebilde]
nor real being [as the being of a fmite reality] ." 18 Act and Person call for
consideration in a perspective of analogy which transcends that of Logos.

III. CONCLUSION

We have tried to summarize the Steinian theory of the formal and transcen-
dental order in its dominant perspectives as unfolded in chapters 3 and 6 of
Finite Being and Eternal Being. Beyond this, the problematic is not properly
speaking that of order but of life, especially the life of spirit. Unconscious
in sub-human life, life attains a spiritual quality in the human person, who
is conscious and free, willing and loving, and discovering in his innermost
122 PHILIBERT SECRETAN

self-being that which grounds and transcends him. These investigations lead
to the problem of individuality, and the issues at stake are no longer those
of the one and the many, of the parts and the whole, but of the uniqueness of
man's relations to the Unique, relation of the living human I and the living
divine I. 19
It is also to be noted that order is not the last word in Stein's philosophy.
"To think", is to be lifted to the level of the spirit in Pascal's sense; it is to
pass from contingency toward necessity. But, if we adhere also to the formal
order, it is also to indulge in abstractions. And to accede to the transcendental
order would only come down to carrying the abstraction further, if the order
of sense which structures the living and the lived, real thought and the real
object which is thought, is not manifest therein.
As to the ultimate foundation of this order, Stein brings in inspirations
coming from a theology of creation which had already directed her attention
to act and potency. Ordered possibilities are realized only under the motion
of divine Ideas where pure formality and the richest activity come together
beyond the possible and the real. The pure formality is the terminus ad quem
of philosophical reflection; whereas this eternal activity is the terminus a quo
of the entire life process which reaches its conclusion only in the dazzling
dialogue of the creature and the Creator, the person and the Person.

TRANSLATED BY E. M. SWIDERSKI

NOTES

1 Georg Biichner, Dan tons Tod, act 4.

2 Hussed, Cartesianische Meditationen, sect. 49.
3 Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften, Husserliana, VI, 264.
4 Endliches und ewiges Sein in Werke vol 2 (Herder, 1962).
5 It is striking to notice the degree to which Stein profited from her arduous task of
translating Aquinas' De Veritate (1931; reprinted Herder, 1952). The classic study of
the ideal realm of entities from which stem both, Roman Ingarden's and Edith Stein's
analysis, by Jean Herring, "Das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee", Jahrbuch jur
Philosophie und phiinomenoiogische Forschung, E. Husser!, Halle (Editor.)
6 Endliches und ewiges Sein, pp. 81-82.
7 Ibid., pp. 217 -218.
8 See "Die Phiinomeno!ogie Husserls und die Philosophie des HI. Thomas von Aguin,"
in JUbiliiumsausgabe fur Husseri (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929) and "Zwei Betrachtungen zu
Edmund Hussed," in Werke, vol. 6 (Herder, 1962).
9 Endliches und ewiges Sein, p. 82.
10 Ibid., p. 303.
 STEIN AND THE CHAIN OF BEING 123

11 Ibid., VI, Der Sinn des Seins, sect. 1.

12 Ibid., p. 270.
13 Ibid., V, Seiendes als solches, sect. 10, pp. 276-278.
14 Ibid., p. 308.
15 Ibid., p. 277.
16 Ibid., III, Wesenhaftes und wirkliches Sein, Sect. 12.
17 Ibid., p. 311.
18. Ibid.,
19 Ibid., pp. 317-320.
 CARDINAL KAROL WOJTYLA

THE DEGREES OF BEING FROM THE POINT OF VIEW

OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ACTION*

I. THE HUMAN ACT

It is necessary to inquire to what extent human action has something in

common with the problem of the degree (or degrees) of being. In beginning
with this question I wish to consider the relation between anthropology and
metaphysics, for it is in that context that the problem is situated, at least
from the point of view of traditional philosophy, and especially Thomism.
It is well known that Thomist anthropology is of a metaphysical character,
which means that it considers man as being, as someone really existing; from
this it derives the whole conceptual apparatus through which man, and also
his action, are philosophically defmed.
It is difficult to enter here into all the details of this construction. It is,
however, necessary to state that the approach to human activity with the help
of the category actus is irreplaceable if we wish to express the dynamics
essential to that action. There exists in philosophy no other category which
could essentially express and adequately render dynamics as such: both the
dynamic character of being in general, and the dynamics inherent in each
concrete action in particular, as it is given in experience. Actus humanus is
a concept used in the language of Thomist philosophy to defme an act, or
conscious human action; its force consists precisely in rendering dynamics,
that is, the factor essential to all activity in general, and to human action in
particular.
II. OPERARI SEQUITUR ESSE

This is the meaning of Thomism, and especially of its "existential" version

(Gilson, Swiezawski, Kr~piec), for the philosophy of action and the analysis
of human praxis. This philosophy and all the analyses undertaken on its
foundation begin with the statement that operari sequitur esse. This adage
contains a fundamental statement concerning the experience of acting, and
especially the fundamental understanding, born of experiencing human action.

* The present paper is a brief outline of the key concepts and ideas contained in my
more extensive study, The Acting Person, recently published in English in Analecta
Husserliana Vol. X).

125
A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 125-130.
Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
126 CARDINAL KAROL WOJTYLA

This experience enables us to state the fact that "man acts"; its particular
shape and starting point is the fact that "I act." It is quite a separate problem
how the facts of "I act" and "man acts" are given to us in experience. I
do not intend to treat it here (I have done so in my work The Acting Person.
The further thoughts which I intend to develop below refer in part to that
study).
The very fact that while verifying the concept of actus humanus as the
one that fully expresses what is most essential in human action we refer to
experience, proves that we do not intend to consider the problem on purely
systematic grounds. The whole force of a system (in this case, of Thomism,
and especially its conception of praxis in general and of actus in particular), is
this essential conformity to experience. This in tum permits us to see and
approach the whole specificity of human action, based on experience as the
proper source of cognition, in quite a new light.
It is not, of course, a question of merely exchanging old terminological
elements for new ones, but of essentially new perceptions (intuitions) of the
same object, considered not so much as "man's action" (perceived as it were
in a certain isolation), but as the "acting man" within the specificity of the
human operari sequitur esse proper to this dynamic whole.

III. THE ESSENTIAL MOMENTS OF THE ACT

I am convinced, and have expressed my conviction in the work cited above,

that it is precisely here that phenomenology may and should enter the whole
analysis of human action, phenomenology being so fundamentally realistic.
The experience of man, as every other experience, is closely connected with
revealing the moments through which the fact "I act - man acts" is essentially
constituted. "Essentially" means that beyond that moment, without it, the
action of man as person is not given in reality. It is necessary to discern the
action of man from what only "occurs" within him in many ways. It is
precisely owing to this delimitation that the moments essentially constituting
the human act in our consciousness and also in our experience are of funda-
mental importance.

IV. INTENTIONALITY AND TRANSCENDENCE

The human act (or the action of man in its proper meaning) is constituted by
means of the specific transcendence of the person. We are not speaking here
of the transcendence proper to acts of cognition (consciousness), nor of
 THE DEGREES OF BEING 127

the transcendence that may be identified with the intentional character

(intentionality) of these acts. This cognitive intentionality is doubtless at the
basis of the act and of the transcendence of the person connected with it, but
in itself it does not constitute it. The cognition of values through intentional
acts influenced by various emotions conditions the act, in which man turns
-- also intentionally - to cognitive values. He desires these values, chooses
them or rejects them, and sometimes has difficulties in undertaking decisions
with regard to them. The very intentionality of volition as it is revealed in the
act of choice does not create the essential dimension of the transcendence
which is so marked in the human act, since it is its constitutive factor. That is
why even the analysis of intentional acts alone fails here. The transcendence
of the person in action (act) is not reducible to the intentionality of cognitive
acts or even to the intentionality of volition itself.

v. SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRANSCENDENCE

The moment of transcendence of a person in action emerges from self-

determination or from the will through which man is the subject and agent
of his action. Self-determination, as a fact which constitutes the experiential
core of the fact, "I act - man acts", reveals the will as the true source of
the liberty of the person. The essential function of acts of will, whether of
simple willing or of that more complex choice resulting from counteracting
motives, is not the tending itself to the object (to the value as object), but the
determining of the subject. The term "self-determination" means that man as
subject of his action not only determines this action as its agent (or "efficient
cause"), but through this very act at the same time determines his own self.
The moment of transcendence of the person by an act is based on self-
determination. Through self-determination man fulfills an act, i.e., endows his
action with the proper human quality and contents. Thus human action not
only transcends its subject, but at the same time remains in it, keeping its
intransitivity in its subject "man." Owing to the structure of self-determina-
tion, man takes his position above his acts while simultaneously remaining
in them as their agent. While determining them he is at the same time fully
aware that owing to their personal quality, owing to their moral value,
whether positive or negative, they in tum determine him; moreover, they
continue to determine him even when they have passed.
As can be seen from this analysis, the transcendence of man in action
is constituted by moral consciousness, by conscience, by experiencing value,
and above all by duty and responsibility.
128 CARDINAL KAROL WOJTYLA

This is revealed to us as our analysis penetrates human action and enters

into each instance of the fact that "man acts"; it especially takes place when
we enter into it through our own experience, through the fact "I act."

VI. INTEGRATION OF THE PERSON IN AN ACT

The discovery of the experiential revealing of the transcendence of a person

in an act is accompanied by its complementary, experiential aspect which we
shall defme as the integration of the person in action. It is evident that the act
(actus humanus) is in each instance a specific synthesis of man's dynamics. If
it is essentially constituted by the moment of transcendence, which reveals
principally the dynamics of the human spirit, it is also evident that man's
multiple activity is neither confined to that moment nor exhausted by it. The
whole sphere of activity traditionally defmed as "acting internally" (actus
interni) is accomplished by engaging man as a whole. His bodily structure,
comprising his senses and emotions, united in one subjective whole, participate
in various ways in performing those actions which are traditionally termed
actus interni.
In addition, a large number of human acts are of an external character: in
a visible way, externally experiential, they are fulfilled in the dimension of
human corporeity, sensuality, emotionality. Man's corporeity, as well as
his experiencing and emotionality, have their own corresponding forms of
dynamics, externally differentiated; it is a matter of spontaneous dynamics,
flowing from nature itself, i.e., from man's innate organization, both somatic
and psychological. The somatic sphere may be characterized as chiefly
reactive, while the psychological one is above all emotion. (I am not here
undertaking to prove this statement; I have tried to do it in my book, The
Acting Person.) In any case, our experience of action reveals that together
with the moment of transcendence there must take place a moment of
integration of the person in action, since the dynamics proper to the human
psyche and somatic sphere enter by essentially human action into one dynamic
"whole", which is revealed in experience as an act of the person.
The integration of the person in an act ,however ,may be understood either
as the function of integrating, that is, of creating out of various dynamics one
totality (the act), or as the revealing of that unity within the multiplicity
and variety of dynamics, which is closer to the phenomenological approach.
Although phenomenology is not concerned with explaining causes, yet the
essential differentiation of dynamics which enter the structure of human
action surely lies within the sphere of its inquiries; perhaps, therefore, the
 THE DEGREES OF BEING 129

defining and differentiation of potentiality as the constant source of various

dynamics in the subject "man", is not quite foreign to phenomenological
research.
VII. THE DEGREES OF BEING

Does this necessarily cursory analysis allow us to infer any conclusions

pertaining to the gradualization of being itself and to the differentiation of
degrees of being? The answer seems to be in the affirmative. What is more,
the above analysis leads to the conclusions, first, that man is a peculiar subject,
in whom the gradualization of being takes place in the strictest connection and
unity; and second, that this gradualization appears distinctly in the phenome-
nological analysis itself, or (if we start out from a metaphysical analysis)
becomes especially expressive owing to it.
Thus man's experience outlines the superiority of what determines the
transcendence of man in action in relation to what the structure of integra-
tion consists of. It is in action and through action that this superiority is
expressively revealed. It is superiority within one and the same man. Man's
transcendence reveals the means by which he determines his own self, and
therefore dominates and possesses himself, while integration of the person
in action shows what must in some way be "integrated" or subjected and
dominated in man when he fulfills an act. (We are not speaking here of the
virtue of self-possession or ethical effectiveness, but of a purely praxiological
dimension.) Distinct subordination is therefore what is here outlined. The
phenomenological analysis of human activity permits us to speak of an
"inferior" and "superior" man, as do both traditional anthropology and the
theology of spiritual Hfe.
It is altogether another matter whether, as a result of this analysis, and
notwithstanding its expressiveness in revealing all that is spiritual in man in
relation to what is not spiritual, we may discriminate on its basis between
soul and body, i.e., matter. It is self-evident that this discrimination belongs
to metaphysics. Phenomenology does not "reach", as it were, to that com-
plexity of man which is expressed in the categories of body as prime matter
and of soul as substantial form. It seems, nevertheless, that phenomenological
analysis may in its way clarify the mystery of this complexity. There is of
course the question whether phenomenological analysis, without transgressing
the boundaries of its competence, may opt in some way for the hylomorphic
solution insofar as the conception of man is concerned. The answer is difficult.
In any case, phenomenological analysis does not seem to oppose the hylomor-
phic solution definitely, while it distinctly reveals both the complexity of
130 CARDINAL KAROL WOJTYI.A

man and the gradualization with this complexity.

We have already stated that this gradualization consists in the superiority
of that which determines the transcendence of the person in action, in relation
to what must be personally "integrated" in action to make it a true act of the
person. It seems that within integration itself it is possible to ascertain the
superiority of the psyche to that which is purely somatic, and in particular
the superiority of the emotivity peculiar to the human psyche to the reactivity
proper to the somatic sphere. It is enough to state that most somatic reactions
which contribute to the whole functioning of the human organism take place
("occur") in man without his being aware of them; they are unconscious and
cannot be made conscious. All that is emotional in man, however, regardless
to what extent it proceeds from the reactive somatic substratum, always
"occurs" simultaneously in consciousness. Owing to their nature, emotions
may be made conscious and thus emerge above the threshold of the human
somatic sphere. From the phenomenological point of view they belong to the
phenomena of the "soul" and not to those of the "body", although they are
not "spiritual" and do not in themselves constitute the transcendence of the
person in action.
This insight into the problem of the gradualization of the human being by
means of an analysis of human action - to a large extent phenomenological
- reveals the differentiation of the "degrees of being" within the bounds of
the metaphysical unity of man. Insight based on such an analysis must exclude
all materialistic interpretations of man, according to which his spiritual
structure would only be an epiphenomenon of the structure of matter. It is
self-evident that if such were the case it would be necessary to give up all
attempts to establish the gradualization of being, as developed above. How-
ever, the experience to which we refer, the experience of human action, does
not permit us to do so. This experience distinctly enhances the moment of
transcendence of the person as an essential and constitutive factor of the
human act. Although undoubtedly the act is also conditioned by integration,
the integration of both the human somatic sphere and the psyche is dependent
on self-determination. Thus the moment of transcendence of the person is
not only constitutive for the act, but is really superior to it, and superior even
in all its conditioning.
It is not possible to demonstrate by the phenomenological analysis of the
human act that the spiritual structure, or more precisely, the moment of
transcendence, is only a reflex, an epiphenomenon of material structures.
This impossibility also confirms, at least indirectly, the present thesis on
the gradualization ( degrees) of the human being.
ANNEX
THE PROGRAM ORGANIZED by The International Husserl
and Phenomenological Research Society
on the theme:
THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING
IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND CLASSICAL METAPHYSICS
held at the Gregorian University,
Rome
 I GRAD! DELL'ESSERE NELLA FENOMENOLOGIA
E NELLA MET AFISICA CLASSICA

Colloquio tra professori delle Universita Romane, promosso dalla Societe

Intemationale pour l'etude de Husserl et de la Phenomenologie. Sabato-
Domenica, 27/28 marzo 1976, presso l'Universita Gregoriana (Piazza della
Pilotta, 4)

PROGRAMMA

Sabato, 27 marzo:
ore 17.00 Conference de Mme. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Secretaire
Generale de la Societe Intemationale pour l'etude de Husserl
et de la Phenomenologie, sur: "Roman Ingarden. L'Ontologie
ou la metaphysique de la chaine de l'Etre?"

Domenica, 28 marzo:
ore 9.00 Discussione.
Introdurranno la discussione:
R. P. J. de Finance: "dal punto di vista della metafisica
tomista';
Prof. A. Ales Bello: "dal punto di vista della fenomenologia
husserliana."
Discussione fmo elle ore 12.00.

ore 16.00 Discussione.

Introdurra la discussione:
S. Em. il Card. K. Wojtyla: "dal punto di vista di una fenome-
nologia dell'azione."

ore 18.30 Conclusioni.

e
La conferenza di Sabato sera pubblica.
Alle discussioni di Domenica sono cordialrnente invitati tutti i professori delle
Universita e Facolta Romane, interessati al tema.
 PART II

ITALIAN PHENOMENOLOGY
A. PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES
 ANGELA ALES BELLO

PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE: AN ANNOTATED

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORK IN ITALY

It was primarily the appeal of Husseri's "scientific" approach to the founda-

tion of knowledge that brought about the diffusion of his phenomenology in
Italy in the 1920s. A large part of the interest consisted in a reaction against
the idealism which had dominated Italian philosophy from the early years
of the twentieth century. This was the case with such thinkers as Bobbio
and Banfi, who opposed idealism as well as the spiritualist or neo-Thomist
philosophy then cultivated in certain academic quarters, and who, in their
dedication to "rational" and "antimetaphysical" knowledge, can be con-
sidered as having provided the original inspiration for positivism.
Bobbio, who had discerned what seemed to be an antimetaphysical attitude
in Husseri's Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, sought to locate this attitude
in the Husserlian methodology. And Banfi, as is evident in his essays of 1923 1
and 1939,2 regarded phenomenology as a theoretical proposal far removed
from the pragmatic ideologies and from irrationalism. To him, phenomenology
was a method designed to grasp every form of objectivity by discovering the
eidetic moment and thus the universal significance of each individual deter-
mination. 3 Banfi held that Husserl's phenomenology, in continuity with the
original ideal of positivism, marked the introduction of a rational and anti-
metaphysical theory of experience grounded not in an hypothesized ideal
order, but rather in the dynamic structure of life itself. 4
One of the most important moments for the dissemination of phenome-
nology in postwar Italy came with the publication of the anthology Omaggio
a Husserl in 1960. 5 By now phenomenology had aroused thinkers of widely
differing philosophical orientations, ranging from historicists to neo-Thomists.
Some of them, particularly adherents of the Marxists schools, showed interest
in Husserl's phenomenology precisely because, in its latest developments, it
had explored the theme of the crisis of Western civilization. All were drawn
by phenomenology'S promise of "scientificity", a methodology grounded in
concrete experience.
Paci and Semerari 6 not only shared the interpretation of phenomenology as
a new rationalism that had been proposed by Neri, Lugarini, and Filippini,7
but believed that phenomenology would in some way fmd a meeting point
with Marxism, at least inasmuch as both shared the goal of being regarded as
137

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 137 -146.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
138 ANGELA ALES BELLO

"rigorous science." Semerari, in fact, held that the antidogmatic attitude of

phenomenology, in challenging the uncritical acceptance of even social and
cultural norms, is nevertheless properly identified with the pursuit of science
in its most perfect, rigorous, and apodictic form.
This idea had already been abandoned by both the naturalists and the
historicists. It was, therefore, essential to realize that Husserl's antihistoricist
criticism was a rejection, not of history per se, but rather of history conceived
of merely as a succession of observed facts. Semerari saw in phenomenology
a proposal to understand history with a critical control that evaluated the de
facto historical "situation" against an ideal of truth approached via a scientific
method which, in its impersonality, rendered maximum intersubjective under-
standing. But by virtue of the fact that scientificity puts itself forward as an
ideal to be realized, it is necessarily infinitely far removed and the search
never comes to an end. For this reason Semerari, Neri, and Paci emphasized
the aspect of teleology .
Paci occupies an important position among the aforementioned thinkers.
In fact, in his interpretation of phenomenology we fmd not only all the
motives characteristic of Italian "lay" culture (and particularly the ones
regarding scientificity that have as their consequence the further examination
of the validity of phenomenological analysis in the various fields of research),
but also the awareness of the inexhaustibility of knowledge, an awareness
that implies the duty of continuing the search for an historical and social
fmality. The program of Aut-Aut, 8 a journal that Paci edited and which for
fifteen years represented the most significant testimony of phenomenology
in Italy, stated that, in contrast with the analytic, neo-positivist, scientific,
and methodological pretense of condemning philosophy once and for all in
the name of technicism and the absolutization of particular problems, it
proposed an attitude that would revalue rationalism, not the rationalism of
science and technology, but rather an implicit rationalism that tends toward
a rational objective, even though this end can never be attained. In fact,
according to the program, truth is an ideal teleological horizon of history. On
the other hand, Paci's sympathy for the speculation of Sartre and Merleau-
Ponty, who had already provided a synthesis of phenomenology and the
analysis of history from the Marxist point of view, led him to theorize an
"open dialectic." Indeed, relationalism (paci's original position) consists in
establishing a connection between dialectics and teleology, the latter con-
sidered as the most valid utilization of intentionality at the level of scientific
research and at that of practical and social relations among men.
According to Paci, phenomenology made it possible to show that the
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE 139

foundation of the sciences - whether of nature or of the spirit - is situated

in the transcendental subjectivity that unites matter and spirit, outside and
inside. Their diversity was justified by the regional ontologies, but their
accord was to be found in the fact that every scientist is a human and tran-
scendental subject: an integral man! And since phenomenology had this
function of foundation, Paci established a link between it and the various
disciplines, even those that at first sight seem to be irreconcilable to the
phenomenological approach (including structural anthropology, sociology,
and psychology). He saw the need for a "precategorial" pointer common to
these inquiries as a further confirmation of the clarifying role phenomenology
can play in connection with such researches.
As regards the natural sciences, Paci - as heir to the mentality that is
aware of the new without abandoning the old - interpreted the solution
proposed by Husserl on the genesis of scientific research as a "liberalizing
empiricism", in which the relationship between theory and experience was
such as not to forego either the one or the other. In this sense, then, he held
that Hussed's thought was close to that of C. G. Hempel or I. Scheffler,
especially as the expression of an experience that permits both explanation
(Le., causal effectiveness) and forecast.9
The conviction that phenomenology can justify a "scientific" interpreta-
tion of the real world is brought out of the Husserlian texts by A. Masullo
and E. Melandri. The former 10 dwelled at length on Husserl's program for a
philosophy von unten, inductive and therefore rigorously scientific, that
understands the a priori as the indeclinable structures of concrete experience.
Consequently, and in contrast to Kantian philosophy, he recognized that
Hussed held the categories to be the explication of the forms peculiar to
experience and founded in experience itself. Melandri 11 also noted the
important part that the empirical moment played in Hussed's outlook,
even though he made a distinction between phenomenology and classical
empiricism. Establishing a connection between science, the empirical, the
antepredicative and teleology, he held that, as far as Hussed is concerned,
science has an empiricist character rather than a rationalist one. It therefore
must not be likened to mathematics or logic, disciplines that, in tum, must
base themselves on the eidetico-material science represented by phenome-
nology, which is a "rigorous" science even though it is not an "exact" one.
Second, he held that individual sensitivity will always determine the founda-
tion and range of experience and of the capacity to recognize individual
things, even though an adequate explanation for such differential capacities
may never be forthcoming. This is because the identification of differentiated
140 ANGELA ALES BELLO

things is the result of a constitutive genesis of sense (meaning) that points to

a preconstitutive and, consequently, to an antepredicative level. Third, he
went on, the analysis of the antepredicative leads us to examine the range of
evident cognition: the intentional experience in actual practice. The more
perfect the evidence, the more actual is the experience, although there will
never be either a completely actual experience or evidence that is fully
adequate, and this implies a teleological notion.
Teleology, in Melandri's view, served also to interpret history. The crisis
pinpointed by Hussed arises from the vain attempt to advance a static science
of history, a goal incompatible with the notion of the horizon of certainty
in historical explanation. Melandri says Hussed's teleological notion of the
ideal of certainty is merely descriptive, not prescriptive. It should be said
that Melandri himself believed that adequate historical explanation can be
supplied only by materialism.
Like Melandri, Sini and Pedroli held that the application of phenomeno-
logical "scientificity" is strictly correlative with the nature of the field in
which research is being carried out. Thus there is an intrinsic difference
between the principle of scientificity and the particular sciences as such,
although they are mutually implicative. Sini 12 maintained that phenome-
noloy, being a radical science, does not invent anything, does not formulate
either hypotheses or statements, but simply notes. Pedroli's position 13 was
somewhat more critical. For him the need for rigor remains only a need,
because there exists an intrinsic difficulty in founding a philosophy that is
understood as essential knowledge, as a rigorous science, but that is based
on merely a descriptive rather than an experimental procedure. Indeed, he
regarded the fact that Hussed fell back into idealism and rationalism as
witness to this difficulty. In Pedroli's attempt to endow phenomenological
research with its own specificity there thus emerged an antirationalist aspect.
One may conclude by noting first that, as far as the aforementioned
thinkers are concerned, phenomenological philosophy (understood as a
rigorous science enter in actuality or only in its possibility of realization)
has as its more or less remote image the historical elaboration of science
itself. This science is identified with an attitude that greatly priveleges the
empirical aspect and inductivity, so much so that it appears coincident with
the "descriptivity" proposed by phenomenological analysis. Second, these
above-mentioned philosophers are grouped by their common insistence on
the link they seem to have discovered between the ideal of rigorous science
and its application to a reflection on history. But it should be added that
history for them is often examined on the basis of philosophical formulations
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE 141

that derive from points of view different from the phenomenological ones.
A third way of facing up to the theme of science within the framework of
phenomenological research in Italy is the one that was proposed, in the 1960s,
by such scholars as Scrimieri, Voltaggio, Bosio, and Raggiunti. Concerned to
a large extent with problems of logic within phenomenology, they made a
contribution toward clarifying Hussed's position vis-a.-vis scientific research
and, consequently, also toward tackling epistemological themes in a more
specific manner.
The researches carried out by Voltaggio and Scrimieri threw into clear
relief the historical aspects of the links between Hussed and the mathematical
and physical sciences of his day, and thus overcame the generic nature of the
concept of scientificity. In truth, Melandri had already highlighted 14 the
importance of the mathematical studies undertaken by Hussed in his later
work and in connection with a fundamental problem regarding the relation-
ship between the fmite and the infinite_ Very acutely indeed, Melandri had
pointed out that the discovery of the "figural moments", which Hussed
reports in Philosophie der Arithmetik, makes it possible to overcome the
radical polarity of these two mathematical terms by means of the joint
presence of the finite and the infinite that represents its horizon. Continuing
in this direction, Scrimieri 15 analyzed Hussed's research work carried out
under the guidance of Weierstrasse, and emphasized that the calculus of
variations, to which Hussed dedicated the thesis of his doctorate, has impor-
tant consequences not only because, through Weierstrasse, he traced matters
back to Riemann and his concept of an n-dimensional space, but also because
he extended the calculus of variations as a tool for the understanding of real-
ity in an eidetic sense_
Scrimieri characterized the fundamental stages of Hussed's formation in
the following manner: (1) study of the calculus of infinitesimal variations
(Beitriige zur Theorie der Variationsrechnung); (2) logical and psychological
analysis of the variations of the structural procedures of the consciousness
of number, of object, and of mathematical quantities (Philosophie der
Arithmetik); (3) space-time scheme of "the thing" as it appears in its varia-
tions. The "thing" is a space-time scheme whose variations become integrated
in the figural moments of the representation, in accordance with an analytical
rhythm that the integral and differential functions determine from the very
beginning of the inquiry _This is what justifies the Ding und Raum Vorlesungen
of 1907. 16 Hence, even though Scrimieri stressed the important effects that
derive for Hussed from his psychological studies, he was of the opinion that
the solution proposed by Hussed for the origin of numbers was not of the
142 ANGELA ALES BELLO

psychological type and, indeed, that it was Husserl's discovery of the figural
moments that paved the way to phenomenological inquiry.
Voltaggio,17 even though he makes no reference to the quasi-qualitative
moments, also did not think that Husserl's first work had been molded by
psychologism, and rather connected it with the thematics of the Logische
Untersuchungen. The collective Verbindung, which underlies the concept of
number, is founded on an operativity of the logico-mathematical type that
conditions the whole of Husserl's theory on intentionality. Voltaggio's objec-
tive, in fact, was that of gaining greater insight into the value of Husserl's
speculations about logic as the foundation for an epistemology. In this way
he explicitly faced up to the problem of Husserl's epistemology and identified
it with the ideal of formalization and of absolute completeness that is peculiar
to formal mathematics. At the foundation of Voltaggio's research we fmd
a shrewd and updated analysis of science that paves the way for a clearer
distinction between science and scientificity in phenomenological research.
With regard to those problems bearing on the justification of logic, Bosio, 18
following the interpretation proposed by Paci, sought to connect the logical,
categorial moment with the precategorial one. Raggiunti,19 even though he
noted the difficulty of obtaining strict accord between the level of the object
of sensitive perception and the level that represents the object of idealizing
abstraction, observed that Hussed's last analysis of this matter (contained
in Erfahrung und Urteil) show a greater continuity between the perceptive
determinations and the categorial ones. Zecchi,20 facing up to the theme of
science, examined a very important aspect of phenomenological research,
namely, the aspect of the Lebenswelt that can be found, with its structures and
peculiar categories, through the epoch/! of the objective sciences. D'Ippolito,21
on the other hand, noted a tension in the analysis of the Lebenswelt specifi-
cally with reference to the precategorial dimension. This tensiori consists in the
fact that whenever the Lebenswelt manifests itself as a system of fixed forms,
the historical self-foundation and the freedom of man is limited. On the
other hand, however, the precategorial cannot be eliminated, because in its
absence scientific constructions would rigidify and posit themselves as the
only reality.
A recently deceased philosopher, Filiasi Carcano, discussed the problem
of the relation between science and metaphysics and investigated their inter-
relations. He represented one of the few voices (subsequently to become
ever more numerous) that dissented from the unlimited confidence placed in
science. In his view, modem science, edified on teleological certainty, had
lost this erstwhile foundation and had proclaimed itself as the only valid
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE 143

knowledge. The realization that science was unable to clarify the problems
of man led to a profound crisis to which Husserl had earlier drawn attention.
Metaphysics, on the other hand, had the pretense of giving rational support
to human problems but, as Filiasi Carcano went on to say, there are many
doubts that one can harbor regarding this pretense. Phenomenology has the
merit, he held, of rendering problematical our relationship with the world by
the suspension of our natural belief in that world, and thus explicating a
whole series of very grave and latent problems that are inherent in the human
condition. 22
In the positions of Pedroli, Filiasi Carcano, and D'Ippolito one can note an
element of revision of the relationship between phenomenology and science
that foreshadows with new sensitivity a turning point that is even now being
approached, but which has not yet been fully dermed. In these thinkers there
emerges the idea that phenomenology is a search that, in certain ways, is anti-
scientific. Paci, by insisting on the precategorial moment of the Lebenswelt,
had already opened an inquiry of this type, but he had still maintained the
identification of the precategorial moment with rationality.
The struggle against naturalism and objectivism undertaken by HusserI
is underscored and interpreted in our own day with overtones that are anti-
rationalist, but which are not for that reason necessarily irrationalistic.
Representative of this position is the insistence with which Neri 23 dwells on
the theme of HusserI's antiobjectivism, which presents itself as a philosophy
of the "rational", but not identified with reason in the techno-scientific
sense of the term. And it is interesting to note the distinction between the
rationality that is practiced in the objective sciences and the more profound
dimension (which is HusserI's concern) that is delineating itself with ever
increasing clarity. This appears from the attempt to give an authentic mean-
ing to the term "scientificity", and reflects a need that permeates Conci's
inquiry 24 about the precategorial and the Erlebnisse as the forgotten founda-
tion of the categorization peculiar to both science and traditional philosophy.
It is therefore an urgent task to make a distinction that also represents an
overturning of certain acquired positions: the "scientificity" that HusserI
talks about cannot be identified with science in its historical perspective. The
equivocation arises, at least in part, from the ambiguity that is present in
HusserI's research. In fact, it it quite essential to recognize hls "double soul."
Educated in and for science, HusserI saw science both as a model and as an
enigma to be solved. The assumption of the validity of scientific knowledge
that represented HusserI's starting point, becomes gradually decanted in the
course of his inquiries, which make it increasingly clear that the only valid
144 ANGELA ALES BELLO

knowledge is phenomenology itself, conceived of as comprehension of the

predicative and antepredicative dimension. He thus comes to find himself on
the watershed between Western rationalism - expressed in the objectivism of
science, in the correspondence between thought and reality in the Cartesian
sense, and in the identification between thought and reality in the idealist
sense - and antirationalism, which proved to be unable to fmd a positive
connotation of its own, and invariably fell into irrationalism, or into a new
type of existential metaphysics, or into an alternative (but not well defmed)
project like that of Nietzsche's superman. The meaning of the First Philosophy
proposed by Husser! is to be found not only in its continuity with the past
(here, in fact, we are concerned with a rational research, with an ontology,
with a science), but also in a new motive in which the object is the analysis
of the Erlebnis. This study drives phenomenological research toward an
originary dimension, a pregiven dimension: the ultimate foundation to be
examined.
The misunderstanding mentioned above persists in a number of the inter-
pretations here discussed and is due to the powerful conditioning effect of a
substantially positivist mentality that, in the name of antimetaphysics, has
driven thinkers toward a rationalism characterized by the construction of a
knowledge that puts itself forward as valid because it is "rigorous", but at
the same time is difficult to defme on account of the fact that, in the fmal
analysis, it can assume either a rational or an empirical configuration.
I believe that by following two roads, namely, of further epistemological
analysis performed in a phenomenological perspective and by highlighting
of the "specificity" of phenomenology, it will prove possible to understand
the significance of phenomenology as a "rigorous science." In this latter
direction, indeed, a careful reading of Husserl's works suggests to us the
manner in which we have to understand the scientific rigor of his researches.
One has to do no more than analyze the last few pages of his Das Unzureich-
ende der positiven Wissenschaften und die Erste Philosophie 25 published
in 1921 to show that phenomenology, as "new" mathematics and "new"
logic and therefore Mathesis Universalissima, detaches itself not only from
mathematics and from logic, but even from Leibniz' Mathesis Universalis, and
thus performs a qualitative jump (but not by virtue of a mere extension of
the concept of mathesis).
It is this qualitative jump pinpointed by Husser! that has to be performed
in its entirety and in such a way as to permit the scientificity peculiar to
phenomenology to be identified and to become the valid interpretative
instrument of reality and of the selfsame scientific elaborations. The insistence
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE 145

on the precategorial moment, although present in the speculations of Paci

and others, must not mean the proposal of a "new" rationalism, but must
rather open out into an authentic survey of the Lebenswelt.
In light of the preceding considerations, the analysis of the interpretations
of the relationship between phenomenology and science has a significance, a
meaning of its own, because it makes it possible, by virtue of the fact that it
highlights the difficulties, the uncertainties, and the cultural conditionings, to
bring the basic problematic into focus and thus represents a useful preliminary
labor, something that Husserl would undoubtedly have called a Schmu tz-
arbeit, but still in keeping with his intentions.

NOTES

1 M. Bobbio, 'La mosofia di Hussed e la tendenza fenomenologica' ('Hussed's Phi-

losophy and the Phenomenological Trend'), Rivista di Filosofia 26 (1935), 47-65.
2 A. Banfi, 'La fenomenologia pura di Edmund Hussed e l'autonomia ideale della sfera
teoretica' (,Edmund Husserl's Pure Phenomenology and the Ideal Autonomy of the
Theoretical Sphere'), in Filosofi Contemporanei, ed., R. Cantoni, Parenti, Milan-
Florence, 1951, pp. 88-106.
3 A. "Banfi, 'Edmund Hussed e il razionalismo umanistico' (,Edmund Husserl and
Humanist Rationalism'), in ibid., pp. 107-24.
4 Ibid.
5 Omaggio a Husserl (Homage to Husser/), 11 Saggiatore, Milan, 1960.
6 E. Paci, 'Hussed sempre di nuovo' (Hussed Immer-Wieder), in Omaggio a Husserl, pp.
7 -27, and G. Semerari, 'La ("mosofia come scienza rigorosa" e la critica fenomenologica
de dogmatismo' (,Philosophy as a Rigorous Science and Phenomenological Critique of
Dogmatism'), in ibid., pp. 121-61.
7 G. D. Neri, 'La mosofia come ontologia universale e Ie obiezioni del relativismo
scettico in Husserl' (,Philosophy as a Universal Ontology and the Objections of Skeptical
Relativism in Husserl,), in ibid., pp. 67 -79; L. Lugarini, 'La fondazione transcendentale
delle logica in Husserl' ('The Transcendental Foundation of Logics in Hussed'), in ibid.,
pp. 163-93; E. Filippini, 'Ego ed alter-ego nella Krisis di Husserl' ('Ego and Alter Ego
in Husserl's Crisis'), in ibid., pp. 213-25.
8 In E. Paci, Filosofia e fenomenologia (Philosophy and Phenomenology), vol. 1,
Lampugnani Nigri, Milan, 1966.
9 E. Paci, 'Sulla Struttura della scienza' ('About the Structure of Science'), in Aut-Aut,
no. 86 (1965).
10 A. Masullo, Logica, psicologia, filosofia. Un 'introduzione alla fenomenologia (Logics,
psychology, philosophy - On Introduction to Phenomenology), II Tripode, Naples,
1961.
11 E. Melandri, Logica e esperienza in Husserl (Logic and Experience in Husser/), II
Mulino, Bologna, 1960.
12 C. Sini, Introduzione alia fenomenologia come scienza (Introduction to Phenome-
nology as a Science), Milan, 1965.
146 ANGELA ALES BELLO

13 G. Pedroli, La fenomenologia di Husserl (Husserl's Phenomenology), Taylor, Turin,

1958.
14 E. Melandri, 'I paradossi dell'infmito nell'orizzonte fenomenologico' ('The Paradoxes
of the Infinite in the Phenomenological Horizon ,), in Omaggio a Husserl, pp. 81-120.
15 G. Scrimieri, Algoritmo e calcolo in Edmund Husserl (Algorithm and Calculus in
Edmund Husserl) , Edizioni Levante Bari, 1974.
There exist few studies concerning the first phase of Husserl's speculations. Among
these is E. Baccarini's doctorate thesis entitled E. Husserl - Dalla scienza alle fIlosofia
come scienza' ('E. Husserl - From Science to Philosophy as a Science'), which was
discussed at the University of Rome in 1972 and which examines the development of
Husserl's analyses from Philosophie der Arithmetik to the critique-auto critique of
psychologism in Logische Untersuchungen. See also F. Dentoni's La formazione e la
problematica del primo Husserl (The Formation and the Problematics of the Early
Husserl), recently published by Lucarini Editore, Rome, 1976. Through an inquiry about
the situation of the studies in mathematics, psychology, and logic in Germany at the end
of the nineteenth century, this study provides the reader with an understanding of the
cultural environment in which Husserl wrote Philosophie der Arithmetik.
16 G. Scrimieri, La formazione dello fenomenologio di E. Husserl: La "Dingvorlesung"
del 1907, (The Formation of E. Husserl's Phenomenology: The "Dingvorlesung" of
1907), Edizioni Levante, Bari, 1967.
17 F. Voitaggio, Fondamenti dello logica di Husserl (Foundation of Husser/'s Logic),
Eidzioni Comunita, Milan, 1965.
18 F. Bosio, Fondazione della logica in Husserl (Foundation of Logic in Husser!),
Lampugnani Nigri, Milan, 1966.
19 R. Raggiunti, Husserl: Dalla logica allo fenomenologia (Husserl: From Logic to
Phenomenology), Le Monnier, Florence, 1967.
20 S. Zecchi, Fenomenologia dell 'esperienza: Saggio su Husserl (The Phenomenology of
Experience: An Essay about Husser!), La Nuova Italia, Florence, 1972.
21 B. M. D'Ippolito, Ontologia e storia in Husserl (Ontology and History in Husser!),
Rumma Editore, Salerno, 1968.
22 P. Filiasi Carcano, La metodologio nel rinnovarsi del pensiero contemporaneo
(Methodology of the Renewal of Contemporary Thought), Libreria Scientifica, Naples,
1957.
23 G. D. Neri, L 'obiettivism moderno - Riflessioni storico-critiche sui pensiero europeo
dall'eta di Galileo (Modern Objectivism - Historical and Critical Reflections about
European Thought from Galileo's Time Onward), Il Saggiatore, Milan, 1977.
24 D. Conci, La conclusione della filosofia categoriale (The Conclusion of Categorial
Philosophy), Abete, Rome, 1967; and also Prolegomeni ad una fenomenologia del
profondo (Prolegomena to a Phenomenology of the Profound), Rome, 1970.
25 E. Husserl, First Philosophy II, Husserliana, vol. 8, pp. 229-50.
 AURELIO RIZZACASA

EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

CONSIDERA TIONS ABOUT THE NATURAL SCIENCES
IN THE THOUGHT OF E. HUSSERL

I THE HISTORICAL GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of science in phenomenological philosophy unfolds in two
distinct directions: on the one hand, we are concerned with providing a
theoretical foundation for philosophy as a rigorous science, thereby aiming at
recovering the validity of science in universal terms (but with an obvious
imprint of a metaphYSical nature), while on the other hand, we are concerned
with the analysis, at times philosophical and at times epistemological, of
particular sciences with a view to identifying the limits and the advantages
se
that these sciences possess in and in the perspective of a unified knowledge.
As regards this second order of problems, Hussed suggests a number of
interesting considerations from the epistemological point of view. In fact,
one has to bear in mind that the culture of the founder of phenomenology
draws its most significant examples from the philosophical and scientific
thought of the period that ranges from the Renaissance to the end of the
nineteenth century, even though a careful examination of his library shows
that he possessed a knowledge of twentieth~entury developments in scientific
thought. 1 Nevertheless, having regard to Hussed's works, we fmd that from
the historical point of view we have to take into account - conSidering the
foundations of mathematics and also logic itself - not only the relations
between Hussed, Weierstrass, and Frege, but also those between Hussed,
Bolzano, and Brentano. As regards the epistemological problem, on the other
hand, in considering the foundation of the type of knowledge that can be
obtained by means of an inquiry into the natural sciences, it is desirable to
bear in mind the relations between Hussed, Mach, and Avenarius. 2
These summary remarks highlight what we shall endeavor to develop in
this note, namely, that it will be desirable to gain greater insight into the
conception of the natural sciences produced by Husser! if we want to examine
from an epistemological perspective his propositions about science in general.

II THE PARTICULAR NATURAL SCIENCES IN RELATION TO THE

IDEA OF UNIVERSAL SCIENCE

In fact, if we bear in mind the two-fold order of problems that Husser!

147

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 147 -156.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
148 AURELIO RIZZACASA

proposes in connection with science, we realize that there is established

teleological scale with many steps that makes it possible to pass from the
particular natural sciences (and their provisional character) to the universality
of science, which generally possesses an eminently philosophical role. What
we have just affirmed can be better understood by means of an overall
reference to some of the more significant positions that Hussed assumes in
the development of his thought.
In the Logische Untersuchungen the particular sciences are held to be
incomplete from the theoretical point of view on account of the fact that
they do not concern themselves with the ultimate foundation of their knowl-
edge. The theoretical incompleteness of the particular sciences gives rise
to a doctrine of science that is characterized as "the science of science."
However, this must not be confused with the Aristotelian type of meta-
physical assumption underlying all the sciences, that is to say, with the fact
that "there exists an external world that extends in both space and time,
that space has the character of a Euclidean three-dimensional variety, that
time is an orthoid one-dimensional variety, that the whole of becoming is
subject to the law of causality, etc."
The sciences tend toward knowledge and, theoretically at least, knowledge
tends toward reality or, better, the possession of truth. This truth should be
attained in an immediate manner from the intuitive and primitive evidence;
however, since this is possible only to a limited extent and for a few princi-
ples, the sciences stand in need of being founded on a doctrine of science
that, in the specific case, is constituted by logic.
While logic (in the widest possible sense) founds every science, the principle
of probability (in the specific sense) founds the theories produced by the
empirical sciences. These latter, then, have a provisional character and, at the
same time, also the character of adequacy with respect to the experiences
(experiments) possible at the historical moment in they have been produced. 3
In Husserl's thought, in any case, the supreme ideal of knowledge is
exemplified in the theoresis - i.e., specific object of philosophy - that
nevertheless requires our phenomenology to be thoroughly founded in both
contents and methods. This supreme ideal of philosophical theoresis is well
characterized, for example, in Husserl's Die Philosophie als strenge Wissen-
schaft, where he holds, among other things, that theoretically philosophy
puts itself forward, by right, as the only rigorous science, even though in
actual fact philosophy as a rigorous science has yet to be founded. This
foundation, indeed, is the teleological purpose (objective) of phenomeno-
logical inquiry.4
 HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE 149

However, the particular sciences do not always succeed in performing a

preparatory function with respect to the universal ideal that is possessed by
philosophy as a rigorous science, due to the fact that the positivistic risk of
supplying theoretically inadequate totalizations is always inherent in the
sciences themselves. In this general perspective the risks of distorting human
knowledge that are produced by naturalism are overcome.
In Die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft HusserI describes this latter
concept, among others, as a philosophical deviation that derives from the fact
that the significance of the natural sciences has been extended well beyond
their specific field of competence. In this respect, therefore, it behaves in a
manner similar to idealism and, quite naturally, does not succeed in founding
philosophy as a rigorous science, notwithstanding the prestige that derives to
it from the fact that it makes use in the philosophical field of the credit that
is accorded to the natural sciences, which in our day enjoy an incomparable
success.

III THE COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES

In an epistemological analysis of HusserI's proposals concerning the natural

sciences, we must, above all, take notice of the classification and the distinc-
tions that he introduced. When we do this, there emerges first and foremost
the noncoincidence of the empirical sciences of nature with the theoretical
natural sciences, these latter supported by the logical consistency of the
mathematical conceptualizations on which they are founded.
In this connection, for example, HusserI makes it clear in Ideen zu einer
reinen Phiinomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie that the sciences
that adopt the natural attitude qualify themselves as empirical sciences;
the foundation of the legitimacy of the knowledge that they are capable of
supplying lies in perceptive activity; the ambit of these empirical sciences
includes the natural sciences, but is not limited to them.
The natural sciences of the theoretical type, on the other hand, found
their theorizations on mathematical models and not on empirical assumptions;
in view of all this, the interest in the historical or psychologico-hereditary
genesis of these mathematical models becomes something that is altogether
secondary.
Given their dogmatic attitude, then, the natural sciences are concerned
exclusively with the contents of their inquiries. In doing this, therefore,
they completely ignore every argument regarding the possibility of obtaining
knowledge of nature and the legitimacy of such knowledge. This latter series
150 AURELIO RIZZACASA

of problems falls within the competence of a philosophical science that

presents itself as a theory of knowledge. 5
If we want to further specify the concepts held by Husser!, we are obliged
to have recourse to examples and to consider certain models that express,
as it were, his conceptual technique. In Ideen, once again, we fmd a reference
to the traditional conception of primary and secondary qualities, although
this reference forms part of a new gnoseological perspective. In fact, Husser!
argues here that the traditional distinction between primary and secondary
qualities offers a basis for differentiating the physical, objective thing in
geometric space from the perceptive thing with its collocation in the subjective
ambit of appearance.
The fact that the thing of the imaginatio sensibilis is a mere appearance
and the thing of the intellectio fisica is constitutively provided with objec-
tivity must not induce one to draw the realistic conclusion that appearance is
the sign of reality or that apparent nature fmds its cause in the transcendence
of true nature. In fact, the experience of the appearance conveyed by the
senses is coordinated by the physicist, in the sense of deducing from it certain
empirically founded forecasts, predictions, and probabilities.
In the general framework of phenomenological knowledge, however, this
leads one to see the transcendence of the physical thing as a theoretical
product of consciousness rather than as the identification of a phYSical reality
that differs from the world of experience.
The intentionality inherent in the foundation of phenomenology implies,
among other things, the neutralization of all the categorial objectivations
inherent in the sciences that adopt the natural attitude, irrespective of whe-
ther these be natural sciences or sciences of the spirit.
The classification of the sciences into a complex theoretical system, there-
fore, corresponds to the regional framework of the various aspects of being.
The difference between the ideal concepts of geometry and the descriptive
concepts of natural science derives from the fact that while the former are
founded on essences (ideals in the Kantian sense), the latter derive solely
and exclusively from linguistic classifications of sense data. The different
theoretical approximations performed by the natural sciences therefore
assume a theoretical intentionality, according to which these approximations
have the configuration of an attempted ideal approach to reality. This latter
is to be understood in the Kantian perspective, so that in actual fact, at least
from the phenomenological point of view, reality itself is not external to
consciousness in the attempt of the exact sciences to provide knowledge;
reality, rather, assumes the character of ideal objectivity. 6
 HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE 151

IV THE NATURAL SCIENCES AND THE IDEA OF NATURE

The distinction between the empirical sciences of nature and the theoretical
natural sciences discussed in the preceding section leads Husserl to highlight
the significance of the idea of nature, which we fmd characterized as follows
in the second volume of Ideen: the world of the natural sciences is the world
of possible experience (the world of the experiences that can be made); in
any case, the idea of nature, as far as the sciences that endeavor to ascertain
it are concerned, is a reality that is determined in space and in time. But this
reality is not the object of experience (experiment), being rather inherent in
consciousness itself.
From the point of view of consciousness, then, the attitude of the natural
scientist is to be understood as a doxic attitude of a theoretical nature.
The idea of nature, conceived of as the object of modern natural science,
is a set of things that have been determined on the basis of certain spatial
and temporal references. From the theoretical point of view, however, this
idea goes beyond merely empirical appearance; in the naturalist attitude it
becomes specified in a doxic orientation in which the sole evaluative intention
of the consciousness is polarized exclusively on knowledge.
The specific character of both material and animate nature derives from
the reference to spatial and temporal parameters that, first and foremost,
qualify the "thingliness" of the objects that belong to the so-called "first
level" of the natural world. The world of nature and the world of the spirit,
even though in some respects radically different, in certain other respects,
and specifically in those that concern the theoretical inquiry, bring out a
fundamental continuity of the cognitive process; from a phenomenological
point of view, this process orientates itself in a passage from one thematization
to another, eventually arriving at a series of truths forming part of a teleo-
logical hierarchy. 7
The reference achieved already highlight the phenomenological importance
of cognitive activity which, in any case, prevails over the cognitive content
itself. This is not only explained by characteristic care and attention that in
the Husserlian renewal is paid to methodology, but also throws into sharp
relief the phenomenological importance of subjective activity that involves,
above all, the transcendental world of consciousness.
Nevertheless, following the third volume of Ideen, we can trace the gnoseo-
logical itinerary, as it were, peculiar to physics as the exemplar of a natural
science, an exemplar in terms of which other sciences are modeled.
Thus Husserl holds that natural science (Le., physics) identifies its object
152 AURELIO RIZZACASA

in material things that are spatially and temporally determined and interrelated
by causal connections. This science is found on the material perception of the
objects and this perception, in turn - which derives from the perception of
one's own body - produces the intersubjectivity of knowledge. However,
such a natural science must not be confused with the pure and simple material
perception that constitutes its empirical foundation because, theoretically at
least, it is situated on a different plane. In any case, it is precisely on the basis
of the relationship between material perception and material natural science
that it becomes possible to make a distinction between empirico-descriptive
sciences of nature and exact natural sciences.
Considered in relation to psychology, physics (as a natural science) is
orientated toward the primary qualities of the objects and neglects their
secondary qualities; these latter, rather, are to be understood as apparitions
- inasmuch as physics proposes to go beyond a merely empirical description
and aims a model of theoretical objectivation founded on relationships of a
geometric and mathematical nature.
The realism of intuition orientates science toward the truth of things as
phenomenologically recovered, giving this truth precedence over that of the
essences. But scientific knowledge proceeds (through successive symboliza-
tions that tend to highlight the techniques of thought) toward a gradual or
step-by -step estrangement from a theoretical intention of knowledge. 8
From the point of view of the theory of knowledge, then, HusserI's
framework becomes enclosed in an apparatus of conceptualizations that
remains fundamentally similar throughout the period of development of
his thought; the problems change only by virtue of the introduction of
new questions, of new problems. Among the latter it may be useful for the
moment to recall the relationship between scientific objectivations and the
life-world.

V UNIVERSAL SCIENCE AND THE CRISIS OF THE PARTICULAR

SCIENCES

Faced with the contemporary crisis of identity of the sciences traced back
to foundation of scientific knowledge, HusserI moves away from technical
reflections on epistemology toward a direct philosophical treatment of basic
issues. In this general framework there emerges the sense and the significance
of logic as the element that founds knowledge and makes it consistent.
At this level, then, we fmd HusserI's Formal and Transzendental Logic
particularly significant. Here Husserl notes that logic - when taken in a
 HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE 153

Platonic interpretation - loses its significance in the context of modern

civilization; in this civilization, in fact, the specialized sciences have acquired
a technical value.
However, the crisis of contemporary science gives new significance and
topicality, at least from the phenomenological point of view, to the need for a
science that has a philosophical (and not just an epistemological) foundation.
The positive sciences bring into relief the coherent structure of theory,
although they neglect the problem of knowledge as such. It is therefore
necessary to replace this procedure by the more correct one that recognizes,
even in the ambit of these sciences, the bilaterality that distinguishes the
objective element from the subjective, a bilaterality that is present in each
and every act ofknowledge. 9
However, the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, activity
and content of knowledge, noesis and noema, leads HusserI to clarify the
importance of the knowledge supplied by the universal science of the phi-
losophical type. Consequently, in his Cartesian Meditations, he stresses
once again that the idea of a "universal science" comes to coincide with the
intentionality of philosophy and goes beyond the claimed autonomy of the
positive sciences with all their particularism deriving from the differenct
specializations. In the philosophical perspective, indeed, the ultimate idea
of philosophy (or, better, oftrue and authentic science) is the truth possessed
in the evidence. Nevertheless, knowledge is destined to do no more than
set itself this ideal objective, approaching it via an infinite series of successive
approximations. 10 Here one can clearIy note that HusserI passes from a
hierarchical type of teleological classification of the various branches of
knowledge to a philosophical analysis of the cognitive intentionality of human
consciousness bent on its drive toward the possession of an ever-more pro-
found and ideal truth.

VI THE SCIENTIFIC THOUGHT OF THE LATER HUSSERL

Although the later HusserI underscores the philosophical continuity between

the particular sciences and the universal science, he tends to deemphasize the
value of the scientific objectivations that lead to the naturalistic error, and to
emphasize an instrumental conception of scientific knowledge. This becomes
clear in his discussion of physics. In that case, in fact, HusserI seems to re-
produce problems that are already inherent in the Kantian treatment, an
approach in which knowledge finds itself suspended between the conceptual
constructions of the human mind and the gnoseological instances that derive
154 AURELIO RIZZACASA

from an anchorage to the external objective reality represented by the nou-

menal world as a whole.
In the fmal developments of his thought, moreover, Husserlleaves an ever
greater margin for the unbridgeable fracture that separates the objective
world of the scientific systematizations from the life-world, which represent,
on the one hand, the obviousness of the already given everyday things, on the
other hand, the more elevated intentionality of an as yet unexplored world
that has to be phenomenologically thematicized.
Nevertheless, if we want to gain a better understanding of the variety and
complexity of the epistemological and philosophical problems of scientific
knowledge in the later Husserl, we may make reference, albeit merely as an
example, to a scheme of arguments (constituting an equal number of new
interrogatives) proposed in Husserl's The Crisis, where he underscores, among
others, the following: the Platonic ideal that constituted the substrate of
geometry assumed a methexis between the real and the ideal. The Galilean
position, on the other hand, moves from the appearance conveyed by the
senses and, passing to the mathematical ideality, assumes that in the latter
we have the rational presence of those cognitive elements that are confusedly
inherent in the world of experience.
(1) Geometry is the foundation and the model of the exact physics in-
augurated by Galileo. This means that, just as in geometry, the idealities must
not be confused with the world of experience; in physics, likewise, the spatial
and temporal references of the bodies are rational idealities that must not be
confused with the objects of everyday experience.
(2) Galileo, in his attempted mathematization of nature, draws his inspira-
tion from geometry, which had already found important applications in
both terrestrial and astronomical researches. Consequently, in neglecting the
practical foundation of geometry, he makes reference, above all, to its ideal
value. For us, on the other hand, there eme~ges the importance of the genesis
of geometry inherent in day-to-day practice, because this makes it possible
for us to realize the theoretical misunderstandings th,at were first introduced
by Galilean physics.
(3) The mathematization of the world of nature is only of an indirect
type, due to the fact that here, rather than with relationships between
the idealities (as happens in mathematical researches), we are concerned
with observations and measurements of physical bodies. The mathemati-
cal determinations, on the other hand, are referred to idealized bodies in
geometric forms. Consequently, the significance of the approximations of the
scientific type is not inherent in the natural world that can be experienced,
 HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE 155

but rather in the world of an exact and mathematically idealized nature.

(4) Some correspondences between the world of the plena and the world
of forms had already been intuitively grasped in the thought of classical
antiguity, but the hypothesis of a general inductivism was introduced only
during the Rennaissance and, more particularly, by Galileo; this announces
the presence in experience of fixed and constant relationships that can be
translated into mathematical idealities. In this way a world of mathematical
idealities becomes superimposed on the world of the plena. From this there
immediately follows the birth of modem mathematical physics.
(5) The Galilean idea of natural science is a hypothesis and, what is more,
is destined to remain such, notwithstanding the fact that it is possible to
make an infmite number of checks and verifications; these latter, in fact,
simply maintain the hypothetical value of the theories of physics.
(6) The mathematized world of nature constitutes a substructure as
compared with the already pre-given life-world. However, the mathematical
formulas enable forecasts to be made in the life-world; and this is precisely
what constitutes their fascination and their value. But in this way we displace
our considerations into the ambit of everyday practice.
(7) The more powerful calculation techniques obtained as a result of
the introduction of algebraic arithmetic leads science into a practical field;
although this is entirely legitimate, it frequently involves a philosophical
misunderstanding that takes the form of a failure to acknowledge the scientific
nature of the inquiry.
(8) Even in Galileo the mathematization of nature already represents a
substructure with respect to the life-world; rather than being concerned
with reality, therefore, science is concerned with ideality; however, this had
already happened in the case of classical geometry.
(9) Modem physics led to two misunderstandings: first, the tangible
intuitions of the life-world are considered to be subjective, while the mathe-
matized version of true nature is taken as objective; second, while the mathe-
matics of space and time are considered a priori, the mathematics of physical
nature are recovered via inductive channels.
(10) The mathematician and the natural scientist, for the purpose of their
ingenious discoveries, avail themselves of the method in a purely technical
sense and without being aware of the historical process that links and explains
the various sense possessed by scientific inquiry at various times. But this
awareness is a precondition to bringing out the effective philosophical sense
of research that aims at knowledge of the world of nature.
(11) The crisis of the modem positive sciences brings in its wake a need to
156 AURELIO RIZZACASA

become aware of the historical genesis of mathematics and of the natural

sciences, because only as the result of such an awareness will it become
possible to pinpoint the misunderstandings and the concealments of meaning
to which scientific developments have given rise. This can be done byfocusing
the inquiry first on the thought of Galileo, and then on that of Descartes.
These thinkers in fact, represent the most significant moments of the for-
mulation of modern scientific methods.
The considerations systematically outlined in the preceding paragraphs and
problematically enriched (as well as completed) in relation to the crisis of the
European sciences, suggest a new itinerary of research, an itinerary that has
not yet been adequately studied in the present-day philosophical literature
concerned with Husserlian phenomenology.
The considerations made in this note, therefore, aim neither at being
systematic nor exhaustive, but endeavor only to record, as it were, the present
state of an open problem and to suggest a road for further reflection that
might be taken into consideration. And this all the more so because to us it
seems to be particularly useful and desirable to compare the methodological
renewal proposed by Husserlian phenomenology with the critical analyses and
the conceptual models proposed in recent epistemological studies.

University of Siena

NOTES

I It may be mentioned that it contains works l>y Niels Bohr, Albert Einstein, and
Werner Heisenberg.
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, I, par. 53; and also Formale und Transzendentale
Logik, par. 62.
3 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, I, pars. 41, 45, 46,72.
4 E. Husserl, Die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, pp. 1-10.
S E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer rein en Phdnomenologie und phiinomenologischen Philos·
ophie, I, pars. 1, 25-26.
6 Ibid., pars. 40, 52, 56, 72, 74.
7 Ibid., II, pars. 1,2,11-12.53.
8 Ibid., III, pars.
9 E. Husserl, Formale und Transzendentale Logik, pp. 1-7, 31-33.
IDE. Husser!, Cartesianische Meditationen, I, pars. 3-5.
11 E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phiinomenologie. par. 9.
 PAOLO VALORI

MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES

I INTRODUCTION

The general subject of the relationship between the sciences, in particular

those designated as the "human sciences", and moral philosophy has by no
means been wholly clarified and, accordingly, remains open to extensive
discussion. It is part and parcel of the more general problem of the relation-
ship between morals and culture.
If by "culture" we refer, as is ordinarily the case at present, to those "life
forms" whereby man expresses himself in a given historical period and within
a specific geographical environment (e.g., customs, language, traditions, oral
and written literature, art, myths, rites, ideologies, etc.) it is quite clear that
the "human sciences" (e.g., linguistic analysis, psychoanalysis, cultural and
structural anthropology, sociology, ethnology, etc.) represent an essential
dimension for the full understanding of a given human phenomenon.
In my opinion, however, they do not represent the only dimension at
work in fostering such understanding. In the widest sense of the word,
"culture" implies not only facts, events, and behavioral manifestations, but
also concepts and values, not only myths, rites, and habits, but also the
conscious consideration thereof and, in particular, a moral philosophy which
embodies a value judgment of "mores." In this sense, moral philosophy or
"the moral philosophies" - this distinction will be explained in due course -
constitutes a vital component of what we refer to as "culture."
This leads us to the following question. What is the relationship between
the "human sciences" based on actual fact and direct experience, and moral
philosophy - axiological theory?
I would like it to be clear from the outset that I do not give the term
"moral philosophy" the same sense W. H. Hudson does in Modern Moral
Philosophy. 1 When using the term "moral philosophy" he indicates a "second
order" referring to the language or expression of morals, while the "first
order" is morals as such and refers to value judgments on human behavior.
The latter is essentially distinguished from the former which refrains from
expressing value judgments and limits its scope to an analysis of the logical
and formal developments of the moral reality.
157

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Hussef'liana, Vol. XI, 157-171.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
158 PAOLO VALORI

I prefer the classical sense of the term "moral philosophy", understood as

the nonempirical, philosophical, evaluative, and normative knowledge of
human acts. It therefore expresses ethical value judgments and provides the
criteria for such judgments.
In brief, I would consider the "human sciences" to be those disciplines
which concern the factual, even though "unnatural" aspect of culture. I
would deftne "moral philosophy" as that type of theoretical reflection which
attempts to both "judge" and indicate norms for human behavior.
What I will try to do will be to see just how these two aspects - the
scientiftc and the philosophical - cross paths in the realm of man's moral
experience. There is, however, a further methodological question which
comes to mind. If moral philosophies (or ideologies) are likewise part of
culture together with what I have referred to as the "human science", how
do they generate a dialectical relationship with morals as such, i.e., with
Morals with a capital M? What gives rise to the dialectical relationship with the
ontological norms of human behavior which are somehow presupposed to be
natural, objective, unchangeable, a priori, and therefore independent with
respect to individual scientiftc or philosophical cultures?
The problem of the relationship between morals and culture generally
assumes for most people the following form, colored with undertones of
misapprehension and perplexity: can something which is considered absolute
and sacred (morals) be considered as applicable or viable in cultures (scientiftc
or philosophical) which, as we know very well, are subject to constant change?
And if this is possible, in what way is it possible?
In an attempt to shed some light on this problem distinction should be
made between the level of what is lived or experienced and the level of
reflection.
In my view, the individual lives a given moral experience which is neutral
in terms of exact defmition or categorization but, as we will see shortly, is
endowed with those characteristics which mark what is universal, unchange-
able, transcendental, and aprioristic in the pregnant essence of the formal
sense advocated by Kant. This is the major lesson offered by phenomenology,
especially by Husserl and Scheler, which cannot be overlooked no matter
what may be our ontological interpretation of these authors. Such a funda-
mental moral experience, however, is constantly mediated in and through
cultures, whether they be scientiftc or philosophical. This phenomenon of
mediation by no means detracts from the ontological foundation of the moral
life as a participated experience - this in my opinion is the profound meaning
of the expression lex naturalis - but brings it into sharper focus. The moral
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 159

ideal remains something perfectly indefinable and intangible, and in order

to better grasp this ideal it is both useful and opportune to examine past
evaluations and behavioral manifestations. Therefore, to ensure a fuller
implementation of the ideal in order to instill a greater awareness of the
moral value in the individual and in society, the approach adopted by the
human sciences and philosophical evaluation is extremely important. Only
this type of analysis is able, in my opinion, to resolve in some way the burning
ethical questions which haunt and traumatize mankind today.
At a time of profound spiritual crisis, a deeply pondered moral theory
which is rigorously developed on the scientific and philosophical level can be
extremely helpful in an effort to dissipate problems, eliminate dangerous
tabus and baises, avoids hypocritical positions, and offset laxity and permis-
siveness. Only this type of effort will endow morals as such with renewed
credibility - God alone knows to what extent that is needed today - and
promote, not hamper, the real good of man.
There is a very real danger today that relativism and total nihilism will take
the place of the rigid and inflexible dogmatism of the past. Then again, such
a shift from one extreme to another is a constant feature of the human spirit
which only a correct gnoseological and anthropological basis can help us to
overcome. There is further important point. The fact of not referring to
Christian Revelation undoubtedly constitutes a limit for the analysis under-
way. Who can possibly deny the light which the news of Jesus Christ sheds
upon the moral life of man? This clarification, which is not meant to be an
exclusion, does nevertheless present certain advantages. Keeping one's distance
from confessional considerations helps to better stress the fact that moral
experience is not the monopoly of the Christian tradition which historically
and geographically represents only a part of human culture, but unites
humanity as such in a joint ecumenical effort which necessarily implies both
Christians and non-Christians.

II THE CONTROVERSY ON THE CULTURAL ASSUMPTION OF

MORAL NORMS

The basic question presented in the aforementioned terms, the relationship

between the human sciences, moral philosophies, and ontological morals,
places us in the very eye of the hurricane. In fact, no one would try to deny
the conditioning process which morals undergo in the scientific or philo-
sophical cultures in which they fmd their expression. The open debate arises,
however, whenever an attempt is made to synthesize the two elements.
160 PAOLO VALOR I

Were we to try to outline the main point we could advance two fundamen-
tal positions: (1) The first tends to stress the scientific ethics: for example,
some linguistic analyists reduce morals to their mere expression; some psy-
choanalysts reduce morals to the impulses of the individual or collective
unconsciousness; while some sociologists consider any moral attribute or
reality as a mere function of society, etc.
There are even some Catholic thinkers who tend to play down the impor-
tance of ethics and even theology.2 The serious and forthright professional,
whether doctor, lawyer, judge, etc., would not need well-pondered and
developed morals to adequately do his job. The fundamental moral values
would be easy to understand and accept for all, and the surfacing or solving
of problems would be due to the lesser or greater technical-scientific knowl-
edge available.
If they are truly Christians, these scholars do not deny the important
contribution of the faith. For them, however, this contribution remains
outside the sphere of the experimental sciences in a sort of fideism. In any
case, they would tend to see the professional moralist as tending to disappear
and to be replaced by the homo tecnicus and the man of faith in their own
separate compartments. Moral philosophy in the sense of the prime moment
of mediation between science and faith is overlooked and practically dis-
regarded.
In perfect coherence with their basic affirmations, the aforementioned
scholars generally consider the origin and development of moral ideas, as they
have surfaced in time, as the consequence or effect of given empirical factors:
sociological, psychological, psychoanalytic, economic, political, etc. The
value judgments as such are therefore submerged under the tidal wave of
empirical data.
In brief, according to this viewpoint culture suffocates morality, and moral
philosophies are considered merely as the expression of individual cultures.
(2) By way of reaction to this fundamental ethical relativism, others exalt
absolute and unchangeable values and steadfastly refuse to "accept success
as the prime criteria of value." 3 In much the same sense, they are afraid that
the expression "cultural assimilation" so often used today in a very ambiguous
way will pave the way for the adaptation and subsequent surrender of absolute
morals to culture or to transitory historical trends.
I feel that it is not at all a question of "accepting success as the criteria of
value" but rather of ascertaining whether certain "occurrences" or "events"
change not the value criteria as such but its concrete application. In substance,
we will try to demonstrate that the controversy, as is often the case, stresses
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 161

the two terms of the contrast which should harmoniously work together in an
interdisciplinary effort. The human sciences, moral philosophies (ideologies),
and moral ontology cannot be separated and compartmentalized. Each
contributes to the constitution and formation of a moral judgment, fIrst
on the level of spontaneous appreciation, and then on the level of studied
reflection.
We would first like to demonstrate that the "sciences of nature", the human
sciences, and philosophical ideologies collaborate both in the comprehension
of the ethical judgment as to the act performed and in the propensity of the
ethical judgment with respect to an act to be performed, with respect to the
"should be" or "ought to be" in the future.
This initial analysis clearly demonstrates that similar afftrmations not only
do not compromise the existence of an absolute moral law, but actually
reafftrm its existence and inevitability.
In order that the distinction between "moral philosophies" and "moral
philosophy" not strike the reader as something strange or uncommon, it is to
be noted that mention has been made more than once of a "philosophy of
the history of philosophy" or of the philosophical problem which inevitably
arises due to the existence of differing philosophical theories which succeed
one another through the course of history. In much the same fashion we
could speak about a philosophy of the various moral philosophies or of the
fundamental philosophical problem which discovers a moral experience which
is at the foundation of the various moral theories.

III THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SCIENCES, IN PARTICULAR THE

HUMAN SCIENCES, IN THE ETHICAL EVALUATION OF ACTS
PERFORMED; THE COMPREHENSION OF MORAL JUDGMENTS
IN HISTORY

The question that arises here and with which we will begin may be stated as
follows: How can we pass from factual judgments to value judgments? Can
success be assumed as a norm of morality? From a moral point of view, what
is the importance of the past or present existence of murderers, thieves,
adulterers, etc? And what could be considered the economic, cultural, or
psychological causes for their condition or guilt?
With respect to the ethical judgment of historical events - wars, crimes,
revolutions, oppression, exploitation of the weak, abuses of power, etc. -
they can obviously be explained by the circumstances (political, social,
economic, psychological), but if they are free human acts can they always be
162 PAOLO VALORI

justified? Would not this lead us into a Crocian type of historicism whereby
"history is never the avenger, but always the justifier?"
We agree that morality has to do not with the "is" but with the "ought
to be", not with the Sein but with the Sol/en. The task of morals is not to
ascertain the facts but to assess them and often condemn them. This would
seem to receive further confirmation in contemporary philosophy and in
Moore's famous observation. For Moore, each and every passage from "is"
to "ought" implies a "naturalistic fallacy", in the sense that the improper
passage from a form of nonscientific consideration is explained by Anglo-
Saxon analytical philosophy in different ways - theories based on intuition,
emotiveness, prescripts, deSCriptions, etc. 4
In truth, things are not that simple. In order to fully understand the
profound complexity of the dialectic between fact and value, unchangeable
norms, and historical conditioning factors it is necessary to understand what
is meant by "moral act" and moral experience. Were this important element
to be absent even the pointed and refmed analysis of the language of morals
would remain circumscribed within formal and logical limits and would miss
the very heart of the question.
As we see it, a moral act can be defmed as the free and conscious act of
an individual which tends toward an ethical value or the opposite thereof,
toward the fulfillment or nonfulfillment of one's own personal dignity or that
of others.
I have previously stated and explained this defmition, s and if it is accepted,
it becomes quite clear that the cognitive aspect is essential in the moral life.
The value judgment therefore depends on the knowledge, scientific as well,
which the individual or society possess of the formal object toward which the
act of free will is directed. 6
There is certainly no passage from the fact to the value in the sense that
the scientific-empirical realm never provides me with criteria to distinguish
between moral good and evil. The two realms remain distinct even though
joined by certain links. In other words, the meaning or the value imply some
sort of experience which is different from what is normally considered
empirical, but is experience nonetheless.
The phenomenology advanced by Husser! and Scheler has had the merit
of trying to surpass the hiatus between empiricism and rationalism which is
the real drama of all modern and contemporary philosophy and which still
characterizes the majority of today's language analysts. Rather interesting
attempts have been made by some scholars who represent this school of
thought (e.g., F. Foot) to resolve that difference through descriptivism, which
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 163

holds that moral considerations 7 are not merely emotional or prescriptive but
describe the enrichment and the flourishing of man as such. 8 In referring to
Foot's expressed thought, Hudson writes: "a man who treats others as if they
were mere objects, to that same degree, ceases to be a man himself."9 It
follows, according to the same author, that "the criteria for the goodness
of any type of thing ... are always determining and are not the object of
decisions." 10
These affirmations would seem to qualify moral considerations on the
same objective level as anthropological considerations. Man is moral when he
acts according to his authentic personhood.
In my opinion, however, even these interesting efforts on the part of
analysts remain methodologically incomplete if they do not go beyond
the level of formal analysis and do not reach the dynamic substratum of all
language, the lived experience. In contrast, the phenomenological method is
the best way to integrate the value in the fact, even while it keeps fact and
value distinct.
A few examples could help to clarify the concept that the ethical evaluation
judgment may depend on diverse factual information. As Scheler points out,
a population may consider tobacco such a harmful poison that to smoke,
distribute, and sell tobacco are considered serious crimes and are severly
punished. Our own moral evaluation of the same reality is quite different due
to the chemical and pharmaceutical data at our disposal.
A civilization which thinks that certain women are witches who cast spells
on society may feel it both right and just to execute them as a mean of self-
protection. Those moralists of the past who were led by primitive biology to
consider spermatozoa as germs in potenza prossima of a new human being
held the dispersio seminis in masturbation to be a quasi homicidium. 11
In these case, it is quite evident that moral values do not change, but only
the scientific knowledge which conditions their direct perception. It still
holds true that society has the responsibility to defend itself from poisoners,
criminals, murderers, etc. and to condemn their actions, but the context of
the evaluation has changed. It would be of little help to add further examples
to confirm a thesis which is rather self-evident.
Much more important to recognize is the fact that moral knowledge does
not only concern notions of a scientific or objective nature which are the
direct realm of the sciences of nature, but also and above all an emotive and
perceptible intuition of values. By way of example, the value "fatherland" or
"family" or "religion" is known in all cultures even though in different ways.
In this case the act of knowing no longer has to do with the sciences of nature
164 PAOLO VALORI

(e.g., chemistry, biology, physiology, etc.) but with the human sciences (in
particular, sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, etc.). In much the
same sense patriarchial societies tend to consider the slave (the serf in the
feudal period), the woman, the child, the adolescent, the foreigner, as inferior
beings who were not considered worthy of the full dignity of "person." The
situation is quite different in our industrial and democratic societies, at least
in theory.
In conclusion, the ethical assessment or evaluation of an act must take into
consideration the objective situation in which the act took place and the
knowledge of the act which can only be provided by the sciences, whether
they be natural or human. Further, if this is true for the objective value of the
act, a fortiori does it hold true for the subjective situation of the agent.
It is quite clear that before expressing a judgment with regard to a given
human act, I must understand what has taken place not only on the outside
- cultural, social, community conditioning factors, etc. - but also on the
inside, as it were - conditioning factors under the form of hereditary in-
fluences, impulses, educational background, psychic state, etc.
The above holds true for individual as well as social morality. Despite its
philosophical limits, psychoanalysis has helped us to understand better how
certain moral forms were merely pseudomorals, certain forms of asceticism
pseudoasceticism, and certain forms of mysticism merely pseudomysticism.
I feel, therefore, that it has been clearly demonstrated how the sociological
sciences on the external and objective level and the psychological disciplines
on the internal and subjective level do not methodologically interfere with
moral research.
Something similar could be said about present linguistic analysis which,
when applied to ethics, is in my opinion much closer to the sciences than
to philosophy. As we have already seen, it examines the logical and formal
development of ethical considerations.
Insofar as it is a human science, however, semantics does have an influence
on ethical evaluation. This evaluation is quite different according to whether
the expressive vehicle is only emotive, descriptive (i.e., sociology), exhortative,
parenthetical, politico-juridical, teleological, or de ontological in form. We are
well aware of the extent to which authentic moral considerations are often
confused with considerations of the aforementioned nature. In common
language the various types of considerations are often intertwined, confused,
contaminated, and therefore ambiguous, and in this area linguistic analysis
has accomplished a good deal. As recent controversies in the Christian and
non-Christian world would tend to confirm, it is of the utmost importance
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 165

to distinguish between moral and legal considerations in certain problem

areas. 12
It is also clear that our judgment on a certain typology of behavior, e.g.,
homicide, is quite different if the act as such is considered manslaughter,
murder, accidental death, ritual execution, legitimate defense, act of war, or
capital punishment. There is nothing new in this. Moralists, theologians,
and philosophers in the past encountered serious difficulties in trying to
come up with an exact definition of "theft", "homicide", "lie", "curse",
"suicide" , etc.
In conclusion, the aforementioned natural and human sciences have a part
to play in the methodology of moral research, not in order to alter essential
values, but to apply or implement the content thereof. Circumstantiae or
situations have always been conditioned by concrete ethical judgment.

IV THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES IN THE

ETHICAL EVALUATION OF ACTS TO BE PERFORMED

What we have seen thus far with regard to acts performed (static morality) is
likewise true in my opinion in the case of acts to be performed (dynamic
morality).
It is important to stress the point that while many people accept the fact
that an historical judgment is conditioned by the external circumstances
examined by the sciences, when it is a question of planning a future action
they immediately envisage an implicit surrender to "fashionable ideas" or to
"the culture of the present." Here too, however, it appears quite clear that
our scientific knowledge defmitely modifies our evaluation of the planned or
proposed act.
A few examples will help to clarify our basic assumption. Let us imagine
that a new form of advanced scientific knowledge in the field of psycho-
analysis helps us to realize that certain ascetical practices which we earlier
considered as licit and even virtuous are actually dictated by the libido and
are to be rejected. What was considered a "good" motivation can become, as
a result of an increased awareness, a "bad" and therefore illicit motivation.
A second example: if, on the level of applied sociology, an accurate analysis
demonstrates that the process of plus-value capital accumulation implies, in
the case of labor contracts determined solely on the basis of the law of supply
and demand, heretofore inadvertent moral reservations, we are bound to
try and correct the situation. In other words, the circumstantiae can shed a
different light not only on acts performed but also on those to be performed;
166 PAOLO VALORI

and this holds true, since the moral ideal is something which each and every
one of us must pursue in the most perfect way possible, correcting whenever
possible defects, mistakes, deviations, mystifications, etc. whether they be
conscious or unconscious.
I do not feel that the aggiomamento of moral doctrine is by any means a
"giving in" to the passing trends of a given present. On the contrary, it must
be revived and renewed in a constant and continuing effort.
We are not trying to deny the fact that the discovery of new values, e.g.,
those of the authentic sexual life implied by love, can lead and has led to the
loss of other important values like common decency which is so slighted and
belittled today. On the contrary, an increased awareness of certain "social
sins", e.g., slavery, exploitation, segregation, etc., which were neglected in the
past for reasons of ignorance or egoism, helps us to bolster and sharpen our
respect for justice vis-it-vis individuals and society at large.

V THE CONTRIBUTION OF "MORAL PHILOSOPHIES" TO

THE ETHICAL EVALUATION OF ACTS PERFORMED (STATIC
MORALITY) AND ACTS TO BE PERFORMED (DYNAMIC MORALITY)

Together with the sciences, we have already seen how philosophies (or
ideologies) are to be included in the general understanding of "culture." In
effect, in the comprehension and evaluation of human acts, man have never
limited himself to the factual aspect of the events which are the object of
analysis on the part of history, social sciences, psychology, ethnology, etc.,
but has always given due regard to the axiological criteria which go beyond
the acts themselves. Whether as an individual or as part of the community,
man has always tried to give a meaning to his own existence and therefore to
the distinct actions which constitute the expression or manifestation of that
existence.
This has led to the birth of "ideologies" - conceptual structures destined
to guide a certain concrete praxis - and "moral philosophies" in the strict
sense, that is, ethics or theoretical systems of pondered judgment upon
human acts. These philosophical doctrines have developed down through
history and are an integral part of "culture", since they are at one and the
same time both the cause and the effect.
In the moral realm, it suffices to reflect briefly on the influence exercised
in culture and in practical ethos by the major philosophical currents such as
Platonism, Manichaeism, Aristotelism, Stoicism, Thomism, English empiricism,
illuminism, Kantianism, pragmatism, Freudian psychoanalysis, Marxism,
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 167

existentialism, etc. Further, we may recall that many of the sins cited by st.
Paul are inferred from Stoic authors. Again, in social ethics it is well known
that the concept of religious tolerance which was practically ignored prior
to illuminism has now become the common heritage of all mankind - at
least legally and theoretically - and has been sanctioned, even though with
excessive delay, by Vatican II. Much the same is true of the idea and reality
of "social justice" which ancient writers expanded upon and which has
become, also through the contribution of Marxism, a pillar in all societies
without distinction in political or religious hue.
I would consider this the proper framework to correctly position the
aforementioned problem of cultural assimilation and the controversies it has
generated.
The basic issue here can be expressed in the following fashion. If past
philosophical systems have had an effect, not always negative, on moral
evaluations, perhaps similar repercussions and effects should not be precluded
a priori for the positive features of present systems. In effect, with due regard
for the proper dose of prudence and caution, they should be taken into
consideration also in the planning of acts to be performed.
In much the same way as gold is purified of scum, it would be a ques-
tion of purifying or freeing the positive moments in these systems from
the frequently misleading metaphysical shell - immanenistic, positivistic,
pantheistic, skeptical, naturalistic Weltanschauungen - in which they are
concealed.
An example which clarifies this thought can be found in the distinction
in classical liberalism between two components or two "spirits" as it were.
The first is the illuminist-inspired secularized indifference which includes
the idolatry of divinized human reason and which is theologically and phi-
losophically unacceptable. The second is the respect for civil rights and
democratic freedoms by the state: freedom of thought, press, religion,
opinion, etc. The first is unacceptable, while the second is not only acceptable
but heartily pursued.
It is quite clear that this exercise of distinguishing the wheat from the
chaff, the true from the false, and the cultural from the metaphYSical is both
delicate and difficult. When working in the realm of ideologies which are
either momentarily fashionable or socially incumbent, there is always the
danger of accepting or rejecting everything as a whole.
This sorting operation is also indispensable if we want morals to remain
free of anachronistic immobilism and to avoid adoption of facile com-
promises.
168 PAOLO VALORI

VI ONTOLOGICAL MORAL PHILOSOPHY, MORAL PHILOSOPHIES,

HUMAN SCIENCES

What has been said thus far brings us back to the question which we posed
at the beginning. If the sciences and historical philosophies, as necessary
components in the expression of culture, condition ethical judgment to
such a great extent, what will be the destiny of moral philosophy as such -
classically defined as "scientia recti ordinis actuum humanorum secundum
ultima principia rationis" - that philosophy which is able to furnish an
absolute value criteria for judging the factual sciences and historical phi-
losophies? And if this normative reference does not exist, do we necessarily
fall into relativism and historicism?
In light of the gravity and complexity of the answer I will limit my con-
siderations to a few brief remarks.
(1) The very fact of being aware of the cultural conditioning factors
of ethics represents gnoseological and anthropological progress and not
regression. The man who is aware of the diversity between cultures and
consequently the diversity of ethos is less bound to his own specific culture
and therefore better able to discern its merits and defects.
The man, on the contrary, who is blocked within restricted cultural para-
meters possesses a critical sense which is much less perceptive and attentive.
In the case of today's society the increased awareness of that diversity has
undoubtedly led to the crisis of many traditional values, but could also
provide the occasion to make them more dynamic and authentic. At the
same time, a profound and critical knowledge of the history of philosophy
does not hinder but helps in any attempt to philosophize independently.
Moving from the theoretical to the ethical level, the awareness of condi-
tioning factors may, if properly utilized, provide a valid contribution to our
own spiritual liberty.
(2) The cultural conditioning factors of morals discovered by the human
sciences and by the history of moral philosophy not only do not exclude but
go so far as to imply, in my opinion, an absolute objective norm of morality.
As we have already seen, the human sciences pursue a moral value which
is the object of an axiological theory. In the same fashion the moral values
proposed by the various historical philosophies, no matter what concrete
formulation they may assume - nature, liberty, society, reason, humanity,
progress - presuppose, as a condition of possible viability, an a priori funda-
mental ethic. If we did not have a certain idea of morals we would be unable
to even speak about moral philosophies, moral ideas, or moral ideologies.
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 169

Were this absolute criteria to be absent, we would be unable to appreciate not

only behavioral manifestations but also moral theories.
How could we afftrm, for example, that slavery understood not only as an
institution but also as an ideology which underlies the institution - in this
case, e.g., Aristotelism - is morally abhorent? In other words, the ethical
evaluation which in a certain sense constitutes the essential constituent of
moral experience would be inconceivable without a yardstick of judgment
which would transcend individual and circumscribed historical facts and
values.
In my opinion, it is the role of phenomenological and ontological analysis
to examine such a transcendental ethical experience - material, not formal
according to Scheler's classical conception - which lays the foundation for
any categorial value judgment.
(3) This absolute criteria of value can only by the humanum, the dignity
of man as person and nature, as concrete person open to the intersubjectivity
of other persons, as an individual, and as collectivity, in substance as a person
who freely acts according to his personhood.
This constitutes an ideal horizon, since it will never be totally achievable,
but also a reality, since it indicates a totally real object-subject to value and to
love, namely, the person.
Historically applications which are conditioned in various ways are possible
within the realm of this fundamental experience which is not restricted to a
mere logical-formal reality but is characterized by a specific vital content and
which is initially experienced and implicit but can be rendered conscious and
explicit on the level of direct reflection and philosophical assumption.
All those particular "moral philosophies" which focus on a partial aspect
of the humanum - nature, liberty, progress, society, etc. - are all the more
true to the extent to which they approach an "anthropology of integrality"
which considers man as a whole. Otherwise these philosophies would remain
defective and incomplete, since they would stress individual categorical
moments in the "man-experience."
In truth, the openness of the moral consciousness to the value of the
person as such is absolute and transcendental. It can therefore only discern its
full and complete ontological justification in the experience of an Absolute,
in a religious experience which is the inevitable conclusion of a moral experi-
ence fully aware of all its various implications. Through a mediate inference
both moral and religious experience discover their fmal metaphysical founda-
tion in the existence of God, the only true Absolute.
Since in its very essence the moral life is bound to the concept of the
170 PAOLO VALORI

person, I feel that it indicates, from a philosophical point of view without

recourse to Christian Revelation and through the aforementioned ontological
foundation, a Personal Absolute, not merely an anonymous object. This
Personal Absolute would, however, remain clothed in darkness and a myste-
rious mist ridden with unsolvable queries without the direct "encounter"
between my interior conscience and supernatural Revelation which invests
me and helps me to understand and to love.

VII CONCLUSION: MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCES

In summarizing the results of the preceeding discussion, I think we can

conclude that the "ethical personalism" which has been outlined above
does not lapse into relativism, historicism, or individualism. It preserves the
absolute nature of the value even while taking into account all the cultural
situations to which we have repeatedly referred - historical, psychological,
psychoanalytical, social, economic, philosophical, ideological, etc. - where-
in the act takes place and by which the experience of the moral value is
conditioned.
This value which is first the object of phenomenological and then ontologi-
cal analysis - moral philosophy - is conceived of as an ideal horizon which
we must seek to reach to the best of our cognitive and volitive capabilities.
With respect to the Absolute Ideal, our efforts will always remain asymptotic
or short of the mark. And this is where attention turns not to the relative
nature of the value as such, but to the way in which it is perceived and sought.
Insofar as the "primitive", the "savage" of past civilizations, the "uncivil",
or the "uneducated" person of our present day and age attempts to realize
this ideal value in the best way possible, and is motivated not only by social
or educational conformity or egocentric interest but by the total fidelity
of the human person, he is an honest individual. And that is so even if the
external acts which be performs, conditioned as they are by society and the
situations in which he lives, appear to our more discerning eye as strange,
abnormal, or even abominable and illicit.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that, from a cognitive and volitive point
of view, he, like all of us, is morally bound to ponder that behavioral norm
and consequently correct any errors in its appli ~ation when and if he becomes
aware of them. In brief, he is morally bound to realize the value of humanum
within the limits of his capabilities.
On the level of reflection, moral philosophy or moral metaphysics, the
theory of the absolute norms of human behavior, must include the cultures of
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN SCIENCE 171

the past, judge them, and in planning the future try to improve them and
adapt them to the axiological Ideal which must never be neglected.
The human sciences, whether scientific or philosophical, cannot limit
themselves to the mere annotation of facts or ideologies and lose sight of
their realization of the humanum which is the very essence of their fmal and
essential meaning.
Between the two poles which we have examined - moral philosophy and
the human sciences - there is neither a permanent and inevitable state of
conflict nor a situation of conceptual identity, but a dynamic dialectic in an
attempt to achieve a harmonious synthesis destined to perennial renewal in
changing situations and in the ceaseless unfolding of the life and history of
man.

NOTES

I W. D. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1970), pp. 1-12.
2 This position takes into account the work of J. G. Milhaven quoted by P. Valori,
'Significato e metodologia della ricerca morale oggi,' Gregorianum S8 (1977).
3 Cf. Augusto del Noce, 'Gramsci e la Religione,' Rassegna di Teologio, March-April
1977, p. 106.
4 Cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, for these distinctions.
5 Cf. P. Valori, L 'esperienza morale, 2d ed. (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1976), pp. 165-95.
6 Cf. P. Valori, Significato e metodologio della ricerca morale, p. 73.
7 On this development, cf. Hussed, Ethische Untersuchungen, ed. A. Roth (The Hague,
1960), pp. 36-50.
8 On this theory, cf. Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, pp. 281 ff.
9 Ibid., pp. 281, 301.
10 Cf. ibid.
II For documentation on this affirmation, cf. Valori, L 'esperienza morale.
12 On this question, cf. Valori, 'De ordine morali ut fundamento iuris positivi,' Periodica
de re morali (Pontifical Gregorian University), 59 (1970), 355-70.
 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

ON THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD

Phenomenological description is an attempt at going "toward things them-

selves", that is to say, toward the world as it is encountered in lived experi-
ence; it overcomes both extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism, but
does so without radically repudiating the results that it has been possible to
attain by means of a critical adoption of these methods.
It seems desirable to point out that the description of the life-world
includes not only the modes of what is given, but also the acts with which
this life-world gives itself (the individual's concrete acts, his performances,
his situation, his unique awareness, his reality). Our reflection here, however,
will not be based on this distinction (whose second term would bring us face
to face with problems of genetic phenomenology), but rather on the distinc-
tion between the configurations of the object horizon in the absence of the
individual and the modes of appearance of this object horizon when there is
the presence of the individual.
Before we approach this task, however, we must recall the effect of the
work of one of HusserI's disciples, Alfred Schlitz, has had on the analysis
of the life-world in sociology and psychology.1
These problems are still open. However, no matter what the answer may
be, they draw our attention to the still very topical significance of the
work of Schlitz. Let us therefore briefly summarize his propositions. 2 The
behavior of the individual in the social life-world cannot be classified into
types.
The knowledge of the common sense of everyday life is the foundation
for the clarification of the rational and logical horizons of the sciences. 3 The
concept of nature with which the natural sciences have to concern themselves
is an idealized abstraction of the life-world, an abstraction that excludes the
objects of culture. But the basis of meaning in every science is the life-world.
If this life-world as it is seen in the natural attitude, the world of everyday
life, remains the basis of the significance of transcendental phenomenology,
then I am interrelated and interact in manifold ways with my fellowmen
known to me in varying degrees of intimacy and anonymity. This life-world
comprises all the phenomena of social life, ranging from the simple relation
with the thou, the other, to all the diverse types of social communities. The
173

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 173 -202.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
174 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

life-world can only be constituted by the activity of my transcendental

subjectivity; it certainly is not my private world, because there are clearly
others who form part of it as alter egos, that is to say, as subjectivities that are
endowed with the same activities of consciousness as the ego. A world of this
type is an intersubjective world, and this means that it is accessible to all.
Following Husserl's thinking (as expressed especially in section 6 of Logical
Investigations and in Crisis),4 one can say that as far as its complete and
central significance is concerned, the concept of the life-world reveals itself
as the basis of meaning of every science, including the natural sciences.
Every reflection can fmd its evidence only by having recourse to its original
founding experience in the life-world: "The endless task of thought is to
make intelligible the intentional constitution of the contributive subjectivity
in reference to its basis of meaning." 5 But we encounter this life-world as
something that is already constituted. We live in it, and the living intentionality
of our stream of consciousness acts as a support for our thinking and our
action. (1) The life-world is given - to me as also to everybody else who
maintains the same natural attitude - primarily as a cultural world, that is
to say, as a world of significance in whose formation, historically speaking,
the individual in question participates. (2) All the cultural objects (books,
tools, etc.) are pointers to other subjects and their constituent and active
intentionalities.
In this way, then, my social world of mundane intersubjectivity, with all
its continuous social and cultural pointers or references, is constructed on
and by these mutual acts of position of significance and of interpretation of
significance: 6 "The world as the sense that is brought out by the intersection
of my experiences and the experiences of others." 7
At this point, however, at least in our opinion and in agreement with T. J.
Owens,s one has to face once again the dilemma that is posed by Scheler's
theory of intersubjectivity, on the one hand, and by Husserl'sPaarung ("pas-
sive synthesis") and the general thesis of the alter ego. 9
It does not seem to us that it has yet been established whether the existence
of the other is a problem of the transcendental sphere, that is to say, whether
intersubjectivity exists among the transcendental egos (Husserl), or whether
intersubjectivity (and therefore also sociality) does not belong exclusively to
the sphere of our life-world. 10
In our opinion, as long as there are mothers, the sphere of the we will
be given before the sphere of the ego (even though, as far as Carnap [1928]
is concerned, this represents a pseudoproblem of philosophy), and this
even if the ego will appear as soon as the attitude of reflection makes its
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 175

appearanceY Zaner 12 refers to the infantile experience "I-am-me" of H.

Spiegelberg: 13 it is the existential moment when the self meets itself as
something that exists, as something that is responsible for itself; it is the
becoming aware of one's own presence in the world as a person. 14 In this
connection Zaner speaks of a self-awakening; and to us this seems to be
extremely pertinent to seeing intersubjectivity as a constitutive element of the
transcendental ego 15 and, at the same time, as a constitutive moment of the
life-world (Crisis, par. 34). In this connection see also ZaneT's views expressed
in "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schlitz." 16
In this way the "We-relation", 17 both as intentio unitiva 18 and as intentio
conflictualis,19 permits us to understand all the subtle nuances of the social
world, with its peculiar dimensions of closeness and distance, of intimacy and
anonymity: every one of these dimensions has a particular experiential style.

The purposes of an analysis of the life-world - to which we have the op-

portunity of gaining access during the encounter with our patients - can
be summarized as follows: (1) It is possible to obtain a recovery of per-
sonality and to prevail over the reification attitude characteristic of clinical
nosography.20 (2) In such an analysis the psychopathological phenomena
present themselves to us in a direct manner, without apories of any kind, and
reveal themselves as expressive modalities of the human, as modalities that
have a specific value of their own and are no longer of a purely semiological
value. (3) It is necessary to reconsider these phenomena in the light of the
elements that indicate them and show them to be objective correlates of
subjectivity. Rather than remaining obsolete facts that one takes for granted,
they thus acquire once more a forgotten freshness and the significance of
living reality.
As far as practical application is concerned, it seems to us that one of the
most accessible modes of the life-world is constituted by the world of the
child; but this particular topic will be discussed later, and with particular
competence, by Professor De Negri. Here we shall rather endeavor to gain
access to the mundanization of the old and their life-world.
When clarifying the senile life-world, we note a complete preclUSion or
refusal of caprice and chance, the absence of all poetry, that is to say, the
lack of any possibility of searching; the parsimony, the avarice, and the
egoism of the old here fmd a more faithful collocation and therefore offer us
the possibility of reconsidering them on the level of their Significances.
The style of life that is suggested by the objects, although being anything
but transparent, appears to be extremely rigidified in a syntax that has long
176 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

since become definitively fixed and univocally determined, so much so as to

present itself in a manner that is emblematic and quite easy to decipher. As
far as the old are concerned, the object is extremely obvious and taken for
granted; it no longer succeeds in escaping from the order to which it has
been consigned by use; and it subsists in a defmitive manner in which every
conversion toward the unusual has become completely blocked. Rather than
being perceived the object becomes idealized, but it suffers from an ideal-
ization that in the last resort is pure constriction, the result of a gradual
exclusion of all other possibilities. The horizon of objects undergoes a leveling
down and suffers a loss of contents.
From what has just been said, then, the life-world of the old emerges
as particularly static, impoverished, colorless, faded; the very color of the
objects of more immediate use, almost invariably tonalities of grey and in
any case dark, brings out an existence that is flattening, an existence whose
resources for looking forward, for planning, are becoming exhausted. The
life-world of the old has continuous references to the past and reveals itself
to be almost wholly alienated from every possibility of rational integration or
social functionality.
The exploitation of the object is only a potential and can never be realized,
because the capacity for planning has come to an end and with it the capacity
for utilizing the object in accordance with modalities and prospects that are
consonant with its being-there (So-sein). The life-world of the old lends itself
more readily to being described as a type: it is easier to specify once and for
all the situation in which objects (and persons) can be put, their manner of
being placed and exposed, their constituting themselves into a fixed web of
references, a familiar network of pointers that is always bound up with the
past.
The object world of the old undoubtedly suffers from the prolonged
contact with things and the successive manipulations that they have under-
gone: this is brought out not only by the things as such, but also by the
formal order that they have assumed in the situational context. Here we have
a continuous deferment to the past, and this perhaps because of the very
fact that the "futurization" of the old has become so greatly reduced and,
indeed, is possible only in the context of a perpetuation of the past. (It is in
this connection that, most appropriately, use has been made of the phrase
"memory of the future.") This progressive lack of unforeseeability makes
itself felt in the life-world of the old, reducing it right down to its essentials
and depriving it of the enrichment in amplitude, in extent, that should really
be the peculiar feature of every lived experience. The incapacity of the old to
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 177

project themselves into a spatiotemporal continuum has its precise reflec-

tion in the discontinuity with which the various objects are collocated and
arranged, always with a halo of significant references that is particularly
difficult to decipher on account of the fact that it is not bound up with the
norm peculiar to the object itself, but rather with its experiential associations
deriving from lived history. On a writing desk, for example, one may thus
fmd side by side, and not by chance either, an old souvenir medallion and an
object of daily use; here one cannot even speak of disorder, because what we
are concerned with is rather a codified and almost crystallized order that the
old are always very 10th to forego.

Quite apart from the configurations of the object world bound up with the
particular ages of man, as psychiatrists and in our encounters with our patients
we come face to face with a whole range of worlds that have been manipulated
by single presences, have already been prepared for a perceptive relationship,
and which - in a certain way - point to the quality of their psychopatholog-
ical degradation or, at least, provide a summary indication thereof. There
exist various ways in which the objects that constitute the background of the
being-in-the-world of particular presences disturbed in a psychopathological
sense may appear, ways or modes that make possible a first (but necessarily
peripheral) approach; this superficial approach, all the same, constitutes a
valuable aid in the attempt to penetrate and illumine the phenomenic in se
of these presences. Quite obviously, we are here concerned with nothing but a
stage that in itself may be of little or no pathognomonic value, but a stage
that, in the true Husserlian sense, endeavors to be a genuine return to things
and their possibility of providing faithful testimony about man.
In this sense, then, man is also in things, and not just behind them or after
them or before them.
We shall subdivide the analysis of the various psychopathologic modalities
of the life-world into two levels, i.e., a first level that limits itself to surveying
the configuration of the objects within the ambit of that particular mundane
horizon, and a second level that concentrates on the manner in which each
individual presence points back to the particular world that is and remains his
world.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFIGURATION OF OBJECTS THAT CAN

FORM PART OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHOBIC WORLD

The absence of sharp (pointed) objects in the home environment may already
178 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

provide us with an indication of a preclu,sive choice as regards the utilization

of objects (intramundane in Heidegger's sense), this with the clear intention
of excluding and removing forms toward which the person in question is
sensitized. The grouping in a well-defmed space either in a comer or near a
wall of objects that presumably convey factors of disturbance or hide dangers,
a series of slippers carefully placed side by side in an antichamber, a bathroom
with a marked lack of objects of personal use and extremely clean or in any
case devoid of objects that can be used in an ambiguous or promiscuous
manner, the laying out of personal clothing in a manner that rigorously
respects the distances at which these articles would fmd themselves when
worn by their owner, all these and many other configurations characterized
by orderliness, by precision, and by neatness of line and pattern may, not-
withstanding their marginality, point to a more defmite presence of the
phobic-compulsive type. In such a presence, indeed, the fundamental con-
stitution of the life-world iinposes the rigid observation of certain dispositions
to keep at bay the danger of the ever-feared and inexorably polluting en·
counter with the phobic object. The discovery of large quantities of medicines
and disinfectants, as also the finding of newspaper coverings in the most
unlikely places, suggests a particular system of protection and safety devices
that aims at infallibly excluding the unforeseen and the ever encumbent
menace of contagion and contamination.
The working environment often reflects in a very faithful manner a certain
type of presence and may provide almost peremtory pointers to its nature.
For example, a desk on which the objects are arranged with absolute order
and precision, with pencils carefully aligned and sharpened, with strictly
regular distances between stacks of papers and not even the slightest suggestion
of an object in a haphazard position, points to a world project that foresees
and orders all things in a scrupulous and obsessive manner. Certain habits and
usages are reflected in the environment and impose a narrow and rigorous
syntax on it, thereby ensuring that this environment, without ever becoming
a univocal message, will emanate an unmistakable atmosphere of constriction
or of magic impregnation of the objects and thus become the vehicle of an
insistent suggestion in the interplay with the obscurity of the contents.
From the configuration of the objects that may form part of the con-
stitution of the phobic world there issues forth a very essential, bare, and
foreseeable language in which the object as such assumes the function of a
symbol; and "deciphering instructions" are of little use in understanding,
because it is the symbol itself, or rather its particular collocation, that suggests
the possible and well defmed meanings. In this context, then, the object
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 179

loses its most typical connotation as an instrument and asswnes a dimension

that one may describe as "alter egoic" in nature, a dimension that does not
admit of revocation and becomes altogether unfathomable in its autarkic
symbolism. At this point, indeed, one should no longer speak: of objects but
rather of things, things that show themselves to be concretely present for
what they are, show themselves in all their massive "thingliness."

ANALYSIS OF THE LIFE-WORLD EXPRESSED AND WITNESSED BY

THE PHOBIC-COMPULSIVE PATIENT

If we now come back to our inquiry into the life-world of the phobic patient
such as he offers it to us, i.e., the world indicated and initialed by his own
presence, we have to stress the constitutive intentionality that led to its
foundation. At this level of our inquiry, indeed, the objects that we have
hitherto taken into consideration as mere elements of the constitutional plan
of the phobic world must be inserted into the ambit of the life-world as it is
offered to us and evidenced, both verbally and from the point of view of the
general attitude, by the being-in-the-world of the phobic patient.
First of all, we have to stress that the object significances of his world
become strongly and ubiquitously laden with physiognomic valences. This
process of physiognomization, i.e., a particular tendency to fmd some es-
sential qualities of the perceptwn, leads to a mundane configuration that
endeavors to promote a systematic movement of repulsion of objects or of
keeping oneself far away from the objects and from the specific situations that
unleash anxiety. This movement of repulsion is structured predominantly on
spatial parameters. We are here concerned with a spatialization that expresses
itself through the adoption of magico-ritualistic values that aim at avoiding
the encounter with the phobic object, or at least rendering it inoperative and
inoffensive (cf. Calvi). We thus have a defensive spatiaiization that either
withdraws and locks in or avoids and pushes away. From this there derives
a whole series of perspectives that are very different from the usual ones,
so that the proto-significances of far and near (for the sufferer from con-
tamination phobia), of wide and narrow, of high and low (for a space-phobic
patient), of light and dark, etc. (for the victims of corporeity phobia) asswne
qualities and specifications that are far removed from those attributed to
them in common denotative language. One may therefore maintain that in
the phobic patient there is a pregnant prevalence of connotative signification,
especially at the moment of the decodification, even though there may subsist
a considerable variety as regards the degree of "phobicity" of the object to
180 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

which this signification is attributed. little by little, as one passes from the
victims of space phobia to those that suffer from corporeity phobia and
eventually arrives at contamination-phobic patients, one can note a thematic
specification of the object that becomes more and more rigid and also more
and more compulsive, a specification, indeed, that makes the phobic thing
appear in all its rigidity. The object horizon of the phobic patient therefore
loses in obviousness, in simplicity, in naturalness, in availability, and becomes
enriched with perspectives that are not easy to defme and which can hide
dangers, menaces, contamination. And from this there springs the ever
compulsive urgency of seeing beyond the things themselves, of refming the
symbolic-metaphoric sensitivity for forcibly discovering the iconicity of
things, of never assuming them as they are in their phenomenal givenness or
in acceptations of empirico-pragmatic significance.
These considerations enable us to realize that the multiformity of the life-
worlds of phobic patients constitutes one of the most fertile fields for a
phenomenological survey. One need only think, for example, of the value
distortion that may occur in a rupophobic patient when some object, even
one that would otherwise be dear to him, falls to the ground; at that moment
it becomes completely refused, removed, rejected, and this to the point not
only of completely spoiling its personal value, but even of compromising
its very structure and its phenomenal properties. Such an object, indeed,
will not only cease to be dear and become estranged, but in this process of
negativization it may instantly assume evil properties, may become the vehicle
and the carrier of fearful "dirt." Thus, a ball of white wool, once it has fallen
to the ground, immediately loses its whiteness and even its spherical perfec-
tion, becomes permeable to dirt, impregnated by it or rather overwhelmed by
it, so much so that it can never be redeemed and has to be rejected with
horror. The tiny little city square, so intimate and protective, with its spaces
that almost invite you to walk, will suddenly assume terrifying and evanescent
proportions; these few square yards now hide insurmountable and mysterious
abysses of distance that are ready to destroy even the outer protective limits
of the body.
There exists a tendency toward the boundless extension of these negative
physiognomic qualities to environments of objects that were originally
excluded, their subsequent invasion resembling an ever-tightening circle that
deprives the patient of all possibility of standing at ease in front of the object.
The intention-filled life-world of the phobic becomes transformed into an
antiworld that chases and persecutes him, not because it is moved by the
hostile intentions of his fellows (as in the world of the paranoid) but rather
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 181

because the things themselves, anthropomorphized as they are, assume clear

valences of menace that are peculiar not of anodyne objects but of animated
things.
This physiognomic endowment of the world leads to the setting up of
innumerable defensive ceremonials that, inasmuch as they perpetuate them-
selves and become repeated in a rigidly identical manner, will eventually
modify even the temporal flow of life, in the sense that they carry within
themselves the rigid and unmodifiable structure of the past and project it
univocally into the future.
The corporeity of the phobic patient seems to us to be extremely liable
to become permeated by the phobic object, which can menace it with an
intrusion that seeks to destroy it (but compare this with the remarks made
further on about the delusional patient).

ANALYSIS OF THE OBJECTS THAT CAN FORM PART OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE DYSTHYMIC WORLD (DEPRESSIVE
AND MANIACAL)

One of the aspects that a careful observer cannot but note almost before all
the others is constituted by the grey and subdued tonality with which the
patient dresses. Lively and contrasting colors are for the most part ignored or
avoided. Everything that is shrill or loud, rich in sensorial associations, is
carefully banished, almost as if its resonance, duly become monotonous,
could conform only to the tonalities of the flat and the faded.
Here one could truly say that it is the dress that gives the man away, in
the sense that all possibility of camouflage has been lost. The outer trappings
become wholly transparent and reveal what is inside, the patient is obliged
to show himself for what he is. Perhaps these are the very reasons why it has
been said that in melancholy there come to the fore those originary anxieties
that in the nonmelancholic, by striking contrast, are firmly cast over, the
surface covering being the more firm and successful the further the man is
removed from this tragic pole of existence. This existential quality manifests
itself not only in dressing, here understood as choice of clothes or preference
given to certain types of clothing, but rather in the manner in which clothes
are worn.
From the patient's clothing there transpires a carelessness that is far more
than mere neglect and ends up by pervading his entire style and bearing. A
depressed patient may be sober in the way he dresses, but he will never be
elegant, refmed, or affected, for the very reason that these characteristics
182 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

presuppose an appreciation of oneself, be it superficial or profound, that

strives to be highlighted. Similarly, eccentricity is not a characteristic of the
depressed; rather, he endeavors to hide himself, to pass wholly unobserved.
The world of things of the depressed is characterized by the more or less
constant absence of certain things and by the presence of others. Thus, for
example, we have the reemergence and "representification" of snatches of
past life through the continuous viewing, and we would almost say devout
viewing, of old photographs of his dear ones; these are moments of life that
have been lived; moments that have passed once and for all, but which in
the anaffective depressive run the risk of losing even their connotation of
pictures, becoming images that are no longer alive in the fantasy or in the
memory, and are therefore continuously and almost forcibly sought in an
attempted recovery that is possible only through the repeated encounter with
the object. Side by side with this, one notes in certain cases, and sometimes
in an even more peremptory manner, an almost systematic rejection of all
those objects that could constitute a source of memories, be they pleasant
or unpleasant. The horizon is made bare or in any case constellated solely
with anodyne objects that provide no indication whatsoever of an affective
presence. In this way it becomes possible for the patient to produce the most
disparate pairings that may be as strange as they are due to mere chance.
Thus, for example, a book abandoned on a radiator or some item of clothing
left in an altogether unlikely place simply indicate the absence of any scheme
of order or coordination. In marked contrast with what one can note in the
case of the maniacal patient, in whose environment one fmds a similar and
equally disorderly medley, the topsy-turvy world of the depressed lacks all
signs of movement and everything remains still and fixed, characterized by
a staticity that is wholly idle and sterile. Lastly, we note a repetitive and
nostalgic return to objects that in the past had some determinant significance
in the existential history of the depressed, and this proposes again a restricted
horizon of things, all irremediably lost, that the patient desperately tries to
bring back to life because it is in that past that he is himself. Here we find the
inexhaustible multiformity of the objects that belonged to the patient's dear
ones, now deceased, objects that, after long remaining hidden or forgotten
at the back of some drawer, are now brought back into the light of day and
constitute a last attempt to remain in touch with the world of objects.
Here it may also be appropriate to mention the observation, well known
to all who work in this field, that contact with the world of objects is often
resumed toward evening; the half-light, enveloping and confusing the objects,
somehow brings them nearer, even though it removes them and leaves them in
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 183

a vague state of indeterminacy, an effect that is not possible in the clear light
of day, which defines all things, delimiting them and making them stand out
sharply.
The things that animate the maniacal world show themselves to us with
a particular wealth of movement, and yet characterized by the complete
absence of perspective. It almost seems as if these objects were incapable
of arranging themselves at different levels and standing out in a univocally
defmed manner against the given background, which simply becomes their
uniform supporting structure. Here one can no longer discover a relationship,
always and necessarily dynamic, between the figure and the background;
there is a complete lack of points of collocation that could permit clear and
distinct references. Thus, for example, some old family trinket comes out of
a long-forgotten hiding place and fmds itself in the midst of banal things
of everyday use; or some old love letter may be placed side by side with a
reminder that the rent is overdue, thereby realizing, as it were, the dissolution
of a personal history into news items or reportage, the breakdown of a
sequence into merely contiguous snapshots that are wholly devoid of any
guiding thread. In the environment of the maniacal patient we can grasp,
exteriorized as it were, the whole of his self; and what is more, this self
consists of nothing other than this dissolving exteriorization.
Another characteristic that emerges from the observation of the world of
objects of the maniacal patient is provided by the theatrical, almost playful
aspect that pervades every manipulation of these objects. In other words, the
object is not used in a purposeful way and for pragmatic ends, but rather
appears in its most unequivocable connotation of a game. But here, very
differently from what happens in a child, one will fmd not so much a pro-
jection of the patient into the object of the game, as rather an incorporation
of the object, in which the patient exhausts himself. A world of objects of
this type is brought to life only as a result of the maniacal presence; but in
its absence it simply resolves itself into a disorder that is wholly devoid of
significance or points of reference.
The whole of this world is pervaded by color, but a color that is essentially
atmospheric and merges with the sound that fills the environment; the former
is as gaudy and showy as the latter is deafening, and both are superimposed
on the things rather than emanating from them, alive by virtue of an auton-
omous life of dissolving views that are devoid of any orderly form of sequence
and have neither precedents nor sequels.
This particular sensorial disorder can be found also, and perhaps in an even
more pregnant manner, in the way the patient dresses. In this context there
184 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

prevails a radical impoverishment as far as intentionality is concerned, and

even when one notes some eccentricity, it will be far removed from any
significant recall or pointer, not even a suggestion of one. Everything resolves
itself into things thrown together in a disorderly and higgledy-piggledy
manner, produced by chance and, in the long run, both disappointing and
dispersive. The tonalities that predominate are loud and gaudy in the extreme,
wholly devoid of shadings or subtle gradations and characterized by violent
contrasts and lacerations that often spell out kitsch. In all this phantasma-
goria, however, there remains a fundamental impression of monotony, of a
"continuous present" and an incessant repetition of atemporal situations.
There lack the traces of an intentionality that has taken pains, be it brutally
authoritarian or lovingly possessive or full of devotion for the instrument it
has in hand, for the object no matter what it may be. The thing may be taken
or left, but it is never taken a second time, because the movement toward
things, toward objects, has become deprived of all directionality.

ANALYSIS OF THE LIFE-WORLD EXPRESSED AND WITNESSED

BY THE PATIENT

The first testimony that every depressed patient succeeds in conveying to us

is that of a coarctation of his own life-world, in both a spatial and a temporal
sense. He shows us his body as something that has become heavy, an obstacle,
an impediment, something that has become deprived of all dash and energy
(elan). One must not confuse this with the kind of heaviness of the body
that may be experienced, for example, by a paralytic patient who suffers
from the lack of a bodily function, which may be as important as you like,
but will always remain peripheral as far as the patient's ego is concerned.
In the case of the depressed patient, be it clear, the heaviness is not of the
"body-that-I-have" but rather of the "body-that-I-am". The movement of
the objectivization of a part or the whole of the body, objectivization that
must always be considered as an intentional term that is never attained in
all its radicality, is nonexistant in the lived experience of the heaviness of the
patient's own body.
Even the depressed in a state of hypochondriac delusion does not succeed
in detaching himself from the radicality of his experience of his bodily
presence; no matter how narrowly his hypochondriac theme may be cir-
cumscribed, it will always call the whole of his ego into discussion and will
never succeed in situating the disturbed function into the context of a soma-
tic objective experience. The interior slope (as it were) of the patient's
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 185

corporeity resolves itself into nothing but what is lived exteriorly, so that
being depressed and seeming depressed become one and the same thing. In
other words, the primary object of the world of the depressed, which is always
and precisely his own body, shows itself to be thoroughly compenetrated by
the depression and no longer permits even the slightest margin for camouflage.
The identification of the depressed patient with his own heavy body is abso-
lute and complete and does not permit him the expedients and subterfuges
that one can very often observe in the neurotic.
Side by side with this heaviness, we also have slowness as a phenomenal
characteristic; it is not the result of being prudent or of a cautions way of
doing things, but rather something that cannot be eliminated; it derives from
this selfsame heaviness, the feeling of being on one's last legs, the expression
of the fatigue and effort that accompany every movement and exude from
every gesture. But here we are not merely concerned with an overwhelming
weight that slows down each and every motion; there is also, very obviously,
a complete lack of drive to establish some relationship with the things around,
which in the last resort is equivalent to the incapacity for projecting oneself
into a spatial and temporal tissue that connects the ego with the surrounding
objects. When a young depressed patient fails to telephone a person that is
dear to him, for example, he deprives himself of this means of communica-
tion, and an important one at that, not because he is physically unable to use
it (as would be the case of a paralytic) or because his will is blocked (like a
catatonic), but rather for the simple reason that there is a perfect, absolute,
and radical collage or syntony between his hand that should reach for the
telephone and his frame of mind that should go out toward the other person.
It is as if the telephone had suddenly lost its character of an invitation, of
an object that is close at hand, something that can smooth his way to an
encounter. His own forthcomingness is no longer capable of evoking an
analogous property in the telephone in question, which thus becomes in-
accessible and dumb; what we are here witnessing is an authentic freezing
of the patient into his own body, which ever more compactly assumes the
characteristics of heaviness and slowness. These, in turn, prostrate it into a
static state from which there is no escape and which, in the fmal analysis,
reveals itself as the loss of one's own embodiment projected into the world.
Through these missed encounters with the objects around him (and we say
missed rather than refused, because this latter term implies a negative will
that always suggests a design or a project) the depressed patient provides us
with clear and unmistakeable testimony about what we called his coarctation.
Indeed, everything that may be recalled into the world by a suggestion of
186 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

movement, be it ever so impalpable, will become subject to this silent abandon

and renunciation.
Ibis staticity of the body not only enchains the present moment, not
only involves the patient's protension toward the future, but affects also his
retention of the past. Even though it may be thematically reevoked, the
past always remains something that has become obsolete and outlived; its
presentification (projection into the present) is made altogether impossible
by that lack of movement, which in the last resort is also corporeal, the
movement that would confer upon the emerging remembrance the freshness
and the adequateness that it needs in order to be relived.
Thus, to give an example, the monotonous and stereotyped reemergence
or representation of a past event that gives rise to an inherent sense of guilt,
inasmuch as it becomes isolated from the situational context in which it
was originally lived, will lose the connotations of historicity and become an
ideology of the present, deformed just like an ancient inscription discovered
by an archeologist that always remains in front of our eyes, but whose
meaning has long since been lost and forgotten. The patient's capacity of
projecting himself in time thus remains frozen to the present moment just
like his body.
If in a healthy person the stretching out (protension) toward the future
and the retention of the past indicate, first and foremost, the person's cor·
poreal capacity of summarizing these situations, i.e., of living them in flesh
and blood, then the dialectics of these temporal ecstasies remain riveted in a
series of moments that follow each other in a succession but remain devoid
of all interconnection and movement.
In the depressed, therefore, temporality is outside and beyond all duration
and as such remains to all intents and purposes absent. The manner in which
the depressed establish a relationship between themselves and others suffers
from this profound lack of temporality. As a general rule, it seems as if his
fellows and associates do not have any particular impact on the relational life
of the depressed patient, while the people more intimately related to him
seem to become very specially involved, but in spite of this they never really
come to constitute a valid and fully achieved alteregoic reality. As far as he
is concerned, the members of his own family are the first to bear witness to
his diminished relational capacity, his impaired validity in the dialogue with
others; they act as simulacra of his anxieties and become invested by them in
a really radical and complete manner.
The primordial anxieties transcend the bounds of the existence of the
patient and become diffused in his immediate circle, involving this environ·
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 187

ment in their fatal career and in the significance of the ineluctible end that
they bring in their wake. As regards the manner in which the other is lived
by the depressed, it seems to us that he is lived and experienced in the ambit
of death, here understood not only as death that brings about the death of
the other (enlarged suicide), but also as death of the other in which I am
inevitably involved.

The maniacal world shows itself to us in a manner that is apparently the

diametrical opposite of what we have just seen. Indeed, the embodiment of
the maniacal seems to constitute itself in an altogether antithetic position.
The lightness of his being-in-the-body shows itself to us not only in the
exterior attitudes that he assumes vis-a-vis things and the world, but also in
his bearing, in his gestures, in the way he moves, and in the manner in which
he occupies space. This lightness does not have an ubi consistam and is
therefore indicative of an existential fragility that is truly radical and, when
all is said and done, lacking in consistency. All this is permeated by a peculiar
acceleration in word, mimicry, and movement that is not just simple fuss and
bustle, but rather the patient's peculiar manner of being-in-the-world; the
world is hard put to it to keep up with him, indeed, it is, in the truest sense
of the word, left irremediably behind, therefore, it constitutes an obstacle to
his ever-renewed rush and vigor and his fragmentary unfolding of himself to
the world. Unlike what happens in the mundanization of the schizophrenic
maniform, where one observes a gradual detachment from the natural dimen-
sion as the result of a series of refusals that follow each other close at heel (a
feature that, in the'last resort, constitutes the most characteristic connotation
of a psychomotricity that has become rigidified in its exalted unidirection-
ality), what really strikes us in the mundanization of the maniac is the fact
that he seems to be incessantly played upon by an indefmite range of calls
and attractions, each one of which is as urgent and compelling as it is fleeting,
and all are far too readily interchangeable. As we have already said, in this
type of mundanization the patient's "being-body" no longer maintains a
definite position vis-a-vis the object, it has neither a here nor a there and
loses in intentionality as far as order is concerned.
The approaches and the subsequent withdrawals are wholly random and
disorderly. One may even say that the maniac ;las become dispossessed of his
body, which remains at the complete disposal of the things that attract it.
Once again, therefore, but in this case for opposite reasons, we arrive at the
loss of embodiment that projects itself into the world. While the depressed
closes himself and avoids the encounter, the maniac, conceding himself
188 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

excessively and in too many directions, once again ends up by not acceding
to any real encounter. Just as in the case of the depressed, however, his
temporality situates itself beyond all duration and is therefore, once again,
basically absent.
The temporalization in this case displays obvious analogies with a child's
absorption in his games. Just like a child, the maniac seems to achieve a
complete collage between time and momentaneous existence; but when one
really thinks about it, one realizes that in the case of the child this collage
between time and existence takes place in a dimension that, although ad-
mittedly fairytalelike, becomes increasingly impregnated with pragmatic
consistency, whereas the maniac really remains as precluded from access to
the world of phantasy as he is from that of the pragmatic manipulation of the
object; and his entire manner of establishing relations between himself and
others derives directly from this. There is no past experience that can resist
the impact of this temporal dissolution, and everything resolves itself into an
absolute momentization. The objects and the others (and here we cannot
speak of "fellows") do not constitute the terms of a dialogic constitution of
the presence, but assume the function of mere pretexts for the coming into
being of this radical excentrification.
The lack of alter-ego reality has its counterpart in another deficiency of
the ego pole. This is the very thing that leads to the disconcerting leveling of
the significances and the values of the world that reflects itself in the absolute
lack of regard, of distance. What one notes here is not so much a polyvalence
of significances, as we shall see to be the case of schizophrenics, but rather
their complete vanishing, without any alternative or substitutions. The fact
that everything seems "possible" (maniacal omnipotence) is precisely the
consequence of this vanishing of the other and of the world, a vanishing in
which the disappearance of the limits and the perspectives makes everything
seem to be within reach, while in reality everything slips away no matter how
frantically it may be gripped. The monotony and the aridity that undeniably
underlie the phantasmagoric joyfulness and the overrunning lucidity of the
maniac's manner of being constitute, at least in our opinion, the premise and
the condition for the distressing emergence of the depressive anxieties. The
maniac, even though he does not experience the dark brooding associated
with the anxiety of death or the all-pervading feeling of guilt, lives in a
dimension that is as radically estranged from being as it estranges the maniac's
experience. For him, therefore, there is no possibility whatsoever of recovering
a sense of having to be "something other" than whatever his immediate
instincts may happen to suggest to him. Many other connotations of the
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 189

maniacal life-world have been treated in a masterful manner in the works of

Cargnell0, to which we expressly refer those who desire further details.

ANALYSIS OF THE CONFIGURATION OF THE OBJECTS THAT MAY

FORM PART OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC
WORLD

One of the life-worlds that sets up more substantial obstacles as regards the
gaining of greater insight into its mundane configurations, both as they are
perceived by us and as they are intended by the presence, is the one that is
expressed by the vast area of psychopathology made up by the various forms
of schizophrenia.
Here we shall use the term "schizophrenic" because it is convenient
and notwithstanding our awareness of the doubts and difficulties that are
inherent in it and the misunderstandings to which it can give rise. If we here
make use of a distinction between lucid delusional forms and rigidified and
extremely autistic schizophrenic forms, it is not because we want to propose
again (albeit in other terms and with an even more pronounced taxonomic
confusion) a nosographic distinction, but only because it facilitates the
exposition of our subject matter and, above all, because it seems essential to
make a clear distinction between mundane configurations and modes of being
in the world that are seemingly unrelated to each other (and here, obviously,
we are thinking of the configurations and modes characteristic of these two
categories).
Just as we saw when considering the maniac-depressive patient, the manner
of dressing can once again acquire an altogether particular value on the level
of signs and also on the level of symptoms. It is not possible to discover a
uniform factor in the way these presences dress; the possibilities are so
incredibly multiform that one can even arrive at defming complete unforesee-
ability as the common characteristic.
The styles and fashions that may be brandished are extremely bizarre and
eye-catching, to the point where they manifest the patient's intention to hide
himself. By virtue of the fact that this hiding tends to be put into practice
with a truly singular constancy and rigidity, it can assume the unmistakable
significance of a message that will not fail to be received. Perhaps it is precisely
when the patient endeavors more strongly to eclipse himself that he becomes
most readily discovered and understood. In this connection, choosing from
numerous examples, we may mention the very typical wearing of a heavy
overcoat at the height of summer and retiring to a bench in a public park,
190 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

which - of course - obtains no other result than that of being observed with
curiosity and even pointed to. And also certain discrepancies between an
extreme neglect as regards the dress from the belt downward and the careful
check and adjustment of the tie, the collar, and the cuffs, such checks being
carried to the point where they become repetitive and often very complicated
rituals.
In these ambits we can fmd the taste for nakedness and the essential, as
also that for the baroque, the superabundant, and the exaggerated, and yet
without being able to deduce any consequences therefrom. Such tastes can
be expressions of both the unusual and the enigmatic, two aspects that can
interfere with and mutually falsify each other, the observer deriving at times
a feeling of surprise and at others a sense of perplexed astonishment. We feel
that we ought not to attempt a further analysis and diembowelment of this
compact overall appearance, which may be undecipherable by itself, but for
this very reason is also highly expressive of a style of existence; although this
style cannot be correlated on the psychological level, it can be illuminated on
the anthropological one as a normativity sui generis that pervades everything
and spares nothing.
Certain characterizations of the somatic attributes appear to be particularly
relevant for the very reason that they are in contrast with the usages of the
majority. For example, certain beards (at least until a few years ago) or
particular hair styles, refmed and strange at the same time, suggested a rigid
and bizarre manner of opposition and of being in the world. The same was
true as regards the two opposite poles "cleanliness" and "dirtiness", with
passages from one extreme to the other that are never uniform or foreseeable,
although a brusque turnaround is liable to occur at any moment.
In the ambit of the (intramundane) objects that are used by the patient we
witness an extreme quantitative and typological impoverishment, so much so
that the horizon of familiar "things" becomes restricted to the point where it
can be described as arid or even as a desert. Here we enter the reign of the
squalid, the monotonous, the uniform, the arid, the bleak, and the desolate.
When one looks more closely at the manner in which the residual objects are
exploited, however, one becomes aware of the fact that they are manipulated
and utilized more intensely, to the point where they come to bear the indelible
signs of a presence that has ruminated them, as it were, for the very reason
that it is precisely from and through these objects that the patient receives a
substantial integration at the level of satisfaction and realization. Side by side
with this, moreover, there also emerge aspects that reveal to us a diversity of
use, and a diversity that is put into practice with surprising modalities. Here
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 191

one notes completely new manipulations of the object that submerge it

in a repetitive and stereotyped manner or, alternately, identify it in an
unrepeatable way. Not by any means rarely, above all in the case of certain
psychological formulations, it is here that one has the chance of decodifying
the situation in a symbolic key.
Certain stereotyped forms of manipulation represent the last vestiges of a
relationship with the object that is gradually vanishing. The object is no longer
the term of the manipulation, but becomes reduced to a simple pretext for
this manipulation; in the rooms of these old schizophrenics, indeed, one is
quite often brought face to face with this outright vanishing of the relation-
ship with the object by the arrangement, the order, and the matching of the
objects and, above all, by the type of utilization that they have undergone;
in the last resort one will always note the disappearance of that aspect of
being-at-the-user's-disposal that is conveyed by the objects. One may even
say that the objects utilized in a certain manner become the signs of a new
semantic syntax; in other words, they constitute themselves as revealers or
indicators of other senses, as neomorphisms in the true sense of the word. A
certain way of manipulating the object can become a manner; more precisely,
this will be the case when the manipulation is repeated in a stereotyped way
and proposed again in a sequence that is always analogous and easily fore-
seeable, when it introduces a whole series of those predetermined passages
that one can readily note in several subjects that manifest the same charac-
teristics in the utilization of the object, so that the manipulation becomes
transformed into a style that is not codified but nevertheless extremely
uniform and is therefore known by the name of "mannerism."
This type of observation enables us to widen the ambit in which the
concept of mannerism can be used, applying it also to the object and not
limiting it to the mere qualification of a form of behavior. One has to add,
however, that here we are not concerned with a codification that is uniformly
valid as such; every time the object is manipulated in accordance with this
neopragmatic usage, it receives the unmistakeable manneristic imprint and is
thus elevated into a true emblem of a reality that transcends it. For further
details reference should be made to the works of Barison which, at least in
Haly, have paved the way to gaining access to the schizophrenic from this
point of view. Likewise, the object that has undergone this manneristic manip-
ulation also reveals the continuous, monotonous, and identical repetition
of the manipulation that represents the configuration of the essence of the
sterotype. A completely different series of messages from the object world of
the schizophrenic is sent to us by the most unimaginable pairings that one can
192 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

observe among these objects, pairings that suggest horizons of significances

that for us are incapable of being related and yet preserve an original and
surprising expressive vigor of their own. In this way one becomes aware of
hidden and almost unthinkable things in common that, had we considered the
objects on a purely pragmatic level, would have been inevitably overlooked.
These pairings can charge the object with a particular emotional intensity,
and one can see this very clearly in the plastic and literary activities. The use
of a form of language that has completely lost the descriptive-denotative
aspect and has become exclusively connotative, precisely on account of
having lost its association with the pragmatic relationship, has somehow
gained in incisiveness and essentiality of the single parts, certainly not the
whole, and this at time permits true revelations and flashes of originality that
even the most unbridled fantasy would fmd it difficult to achieve. Although
it is extremely easy to give examples, the attempt to do so would run the risk
of becoming anecdotal and even banal. But there may also be the baroque
configuration of superabundant tortuosity, of "horror vacui", and of the
most abysmal taste. In other words, then, in the object world of the schizo-
phrenic, notwithstanding its extreme phenomenal variety, it is possible to
discover an unmistakable style that in some way is unitary even though it is
not uniform.
When in the configuration of the object world of a compactly and lucidly
delusional patient we try to discover the traces of the manifestation of that
delusion, we come face to face with a radical impossibility. First of all, it
seems rather surprising that such a compact and unidirectionally determined
mode of life should leave such scarce signs of its existence in the external
world. Indeed, at times the signs of this presence are so reduced, and its
manner of being and acting is so carefully veiled and anodynized, that one
can perhaps grasp it only by means of a backward analogy and certainly only
in an indirect way. Only the preliminary information that we are concerned
with the existence of a delusional patient can make it possible for us - by
means of an effort aimed at reelaborating the data conveyed by the objects
- to grasp, at least orientatively, the signs of its presence in that object world.
But there remains the fact that there is no collocation or manipulation of
objects that eo ipso reveals the delusional patient. In some rare cases an
accumulation of petitions on a desk or the hermetic closure of certain shelves
may suggest to us the world of the querulomaniac or that of the persecuted
paranoid.
Perhaps the desire to escape into an anonymity that does not permit any
revelation whatsoever may constitute the reason for this lack of imprinting on
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 193

the patient's belongings. It is also probable that the fact that the patient no
longer succeeds in living the object prereflexively prevents this selfsame object
from becoming the center of those creative and inventive enjoyments of the
moment that, in the last resort, confer upon it a personal characteristic.
Vis-a-vis his fellows, on the other hand, the patient never succeeds in
avoiding a peculiar ambiguity of relations, so that the world of the objects
remains extraneous and impermeable to every relational position and thus
keeps its outer facade intact, a facade that is made up of altogether usual
significances and pointers. The world of the delusional patient comes into
being at the level of interhuman relationships and therefore ends up by leaving
the world of things lying by the wayside. On the other hand, however, things
may enter into the delusion not in the erstwhile and mundane manner in which
they offer themselves, but rather by virtue of the categorial significances that
the patient espies in them and which, in any case, leave completely intact
the mundane network with which they give themselves. It is the logico-
significative syntax that undergoes a radical transposition here and not the
pragmatic and ostensive semantics. It follows from this that it is practically
impossible for the lucid delusional patient to have any direct impact on the
world of things or, better, on the way in which these things are arranged,
collocated, and ordered; this remark seems to us to be fundamental as regards
a proper phenomenological appreciation of a life-world that cannot be
reduced to any of the others known to psychopathology.
The life-world of the lucid delusional patient is far more intimate than that
expressed by any other psychopathologic configuration. Here the things and
objects are no longer the spectrelike residues of a world that has crumbled,
but rather point and refer to an intimacy that will reveal itself to nothing and
nobody but itself.

ANALYSIS OF THE "LIFE-WORLD" AS EXPRESSED AND

WITNESSED BY THE SCHIZOPHRENIC

First orall, one here has to face up to the difficult problem of the modalities
of the autistic life-world. Inherent in this term is a multitude of concepts, not
all of which can readily be reconciled with each other, made homologous as
it were. Nevertheless, a common base seems to be provided by the double
quality of withdrawal and refusal, although in saying this it is decidedly not
our intention to examine autism in an alternative manner that is as suggestive
and enticing as it is likely to lead to erroneous generalizations. However, it
would not be correct to attribute to this term a negative connotation of
194 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

value, and this not least because we cannot be a priori certain that unexpected
and surprising resources may not emerge in this very context.
An attempt to defme in a univocal manner a general configuration of
autism seems to us to be extremely risky and perhaps also devoid of any real
usefulness. Indeed, it seems far more important and fruitful to follow the
same methodological approach that we used in the case of the other life-
worlds, a line of approach that endeavors to come to grips with the psy-
chopathologic problematics by illuminating them from within, but without
either reducing them or using them as mere examples. Certainly, in autism
we are not concerned with a linear world or with one that unfolds itself
regularly in accordance with certain given directives or, in any case, that can
be readily foreseen. Rather, we are here concerned with a very complex
and often contorted world, characterized by contradiction, ambiguity, and
unforeseeableness, and this quite independently of an intentionality that
either wants to express itself in this way or is obliged so to manifest itself.
Outside this environment there is no other place where we can observe
with equal clarity the diversity of the spatial modalities, and this right through
from the simple adumbration of a metric space that is about to become
menacing to the most complex modes of spatializing one's existence, when
either all limits are passed or these limits are set in a particularly narrow
and rigidly coarctive manner. The spatialization of this life-world radically
ignores the various levels of being in it or, otherwise stated, it realizes itself in
a unidirectional manner and in this realization, quite inevitably, the presence
comes to lose its anthropological proportions; in this way there comes into
being what has frequently been described by the term "contorted."
On the other hand, this anthropological unbalancing of the presence easily
leads to an ascensional rigidification (Verstiegenheit) in a decisional pattern
that is chosen once and for all and then maintained with blind tenaciousness;
blind in the very sense that there come to lack the various points of reference
that could defme a precise orientation and, in case of need, correct any
deviations therefrom. This deformation of the spatial modalities of existence
must, so it seems to us, necessarily lead to existentive crystallizations that
leave no further room for reconsiderations or corrections and, rather, constrain
the whole of existence into a rigidly defined space in which it is no longer
possible to change direction. It is this aspect that, in our opinion, constitutes
the foundation of the so-called ascensional rigidification, which is nothing
other than an existentive modality that can be evoked and suggested, without
undue difficulty and not by any means artificially, by an analysis of the
autistic world conducted in this manner. By this we do not want to say that
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 195

to each and every autistic situation there must sooner or later correspond a
Verstiegenheit either on the ideological level or on the pragmatic one. Indeed,
we only want to point out that the lack of an intentional breaking of the
bounds may condemn the presence to a particular type of impoverishment in
the spatialization of the being-in-the-world, especially as regards the possibility
of regaining a here from any kind of there. Such a movement of verticality,
however, does not assume either the quality of an enrichment in ascent nor
that of a sequence of rises and falls, for the simple reason that it derives from
a series of refusals of fmitude. This latter is not assumed as such in order
to lift oneself up as soon as one has gone beyond it, but is rather set aside,
refused, and shunned in a planned manner. The life-world is therefore dis-
harmonic and tortuously dishomogeneous, notwithstanding its outward
appearance of the most rigid homogeneity.
An autistic situation opposite to the one we have just described, or at least
incapable of being related to it, is shown to us by all those autistic derivations
that involve a condition of bewilderment and dismay that the patient cannot
overcome, by his acting underhandedly (as it were) through the impoverish-
ment and the catatonic arrests, in which every project of spatialization is
condemned to failure. As regards the spatial aspect, our encounter with the
autistic world may bring us face to face with numerous other modes of
distortion that are always characterized by a desultoriness that is wholly
unforeseeable (like that of the maniac) and always well off the beaten path.
But this aspect cannot be further understood without taking due account also
of temporality and the process of temporalization.
When we come to consider this temporal category, we have to begin by
drawing attention to its substantial permanence and the patient's possibility
of realizing all three of the temporal orders; this is in marked contrast with
what happens in the case of the depressed or the maniac, for example, where
the temporal progression comes to a halt in and at the present and everything
is lived in function of this present.
As far as the past is concerned, one should note that it places itself in the
present and is communicated to us directly in the form of fragments and
traces, of residual vestiges that, even though they may no longer be situated
in a significant context, persist and remain valid witnesses of that past, almost
as if they were archeological or paleographical documentations, vestiges that
point to a far more complex context with a slgnificance that is easily over-
looked. This past is normally hidden, even intentionally so, in segments of
action or of behavior, segments that are at times abbreviated or foreshortened,
and at others are extremely well camouflaged. The outcome is very clearly
196 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

something of the expressionist type, laden with sarcasm toward oneself

and also toward the others. These fragments emerge like innumerable tiny
elements of a mosaic that can no longer be reconstructed, where the historical
moment that once linked these elements and gave them significance no longer
gives any direct sign of itself and yet, in some obscure way, continues to
repeat itself; here one has to think of a type of significance that is announced
by the stereotypes and provides a pointer to a previous history that was once
alive and has now become radically mortified.
The temporal structure of the stereotypes is that of a past absorbed in a
unidirectional manner; but this past is not lived as an insurmountable obstacle
in the process of existential declination, but rather as a continuous imitative
model and as a pretext for escaping when faced with the checkmate of the
present. The possibility of mistaking this type of presence with that of the
anancastic patient must not be overlooked; but one should bear in mind that
in this latter case the past is mtered into the categories of the paralyzing,
the deforming and the ineluctability of the absurd, while in the impoverished
schizophrenic we are concerned with something that can permeate the whole
of the presence and this, paradoxically, without causing irritation. Certain
repetitions or apparent ruminations of past events, even substantially anodyne
events, reveal to us that these events have not become historicized but remain
simple objects of manipulation. Since the testimony of one's past life-world
inevitably becomes the testimony of a life-world of the actual moment, every
attempt to lift something from this "bottom", albeit with the most diverse
modal and thematic alterations, becomes contaminated with the present. The
reemergence of the past presentifies itself in the life-world of the moment;
while this also happens in a normal person, but always with the capacity of
taking one's distance and therefore the possibility of distinguishing the life-
world of the past from that of the present, in the schizophrenic this is not
possible, and the reevocation in the present of that lived past inevitably brings
that past into this present. What we are trying to say is that the attempt to
separate the life-world of the past from that of the present is unsuccessful on
account of the fact that the presentification of the past life-world is such as
to cancel the intrinsic characteristics that make it "past", and this even in a
really impassioned reevocation.
The past assumes the significance of the present, that is to say, it is attri-
buted a significance that is peculiar only of the present. One might deduce
from what has been said that the present is extremely rich in these mundane
configurations. In reality, however, these patients live as if they were on a
stage, they realize themselves in the temporality of a recital (performance)
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 197

that needs no audience (and in that respect differs from the show of a hys-
teric) and, nourished by a fiction of the imagination, is "pro-tended" toward
a future. But here we are not concerned with a true perspective; through the
fantasmic present, rather, this future slips back into the past in an incessant
variation and interchange of these three parameters. Every sounding in a
vertical direction is destined to return to the surface, accompanied by a
phenomenal variation that is as ceaseless as it is inane. The temporality of
these impoverished schizophrenic forms .has utopia as its background and
foundation.
If, among the various expressive parameters, we now pass on to considering
the one that is connected with corp orality , we must first of all point out that
here we understand this term as referring not so much to the body that I am,
but rather to the body that I possess, that is to say, the most intimate of all
the mundane things. In this sense, then, the body and its expressivity form
part of the life-world; rather, this life-world cannot do without the corporeity
that underlies every part of it and which constitutes its first epiphany.
It is evident that, starting from the corporeal appearance as the most
fecund moment for the purposes of the discovery of the manner in which the
patient constructs his life-world, the analysis has to be directed toward the
two poles constituted, on the one hand, by withdrawing into oneself, by the
attempt to hide oneself and, on the other, by shameless protestation and
declared ostentation.
In the first case we have a whole series of old and well known signs,
including Gust to give a few examples) the sign of the hood, hiding beneath
the blanket, raising the collar of one's coat, always wearing a pair of dark
glasses, all characteristic of a series of acts and modes of behavior that indicate
in a more or less obvious manner the patient's intention of not wanting
to communicate and therefore a closure vis-it-vis the world of the others.
Although no precise conclusions can be drawn from this as regards the
specific manner in which this world of the others is lived, the aspect of
extraneousness, if not actually of hostility, stands out as occupying a pre-
eminent place.
Vice versa, as regards the pole that assumes the configuration of unre-
strained ostentation, one may observe an attempted intrusion into the world
of others, either in order to derive a sense of security therefrom or for the
simple pleasure of creating astonishment around oneself.
Even though this may give rise to the semblance of a recovery of the life-
world of others and the enlargement of one's own, it is yet clear that this
recovery takes place only in the impersonal dimension of the recital, a recital
198 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

performed amid the settings of a utopian stage and before an audience that
consists of the reified larvae of people.
It is at this very point that one becomes fully aware of the usefulness of
reconsidering the psychopathological phenomena on the basis of the elements
that indicate them and bear witness to them as objective correlates of their
subjectivity. In this way there is no need to have recourse to interpretations
that can or have to be deduced from apriorisms, indeed, it is sufficient to
interrogate with care and attention the concrete manner in which the in-
dividual phenomenal configurations manifest themselves.
The recurrence of these two extreme poles of behaving inevitably implies
that their presence is unconditionally controlled by patterns that do not
derive from a free choice, patterns that cannot be repeated or modified
according to the particular moment or situation. Rather, this behavior sug-
gests phenomenal configurations that can be inferred or deduced from
public experience, that is to say, from imitative models that one fmds in the
anonymity of Heidegger's "publicness" of the "it is said" type.
These are patterns of appearing (behaving) that are heterologous with
respect to the peculiar and more authentic potential being of that presence
as perfectly expressed and realized, but consonant with an extremely im-
poverished and artificial presence, a presence that cannot express itself other
than in this "mannerist" way. When all is said and done, it is this manner
of expressing itself of an existence that cannot but conform in accordance
with lines of behavior - that are reflections of external models - lines that
are characterized by little or no spontaneity and, indeed, are all the poorer
in spontaneity, the more they seem to be endowed with affectation and
extravagance. In this connection we also have to recall the aspect, often
very open and ostentatious, of the aesthetization of the body, of certain
effeminate and affected attitudes that are characteristic of certain forms of
parakinesia.
What we have been saying brings out the fact that mannerism, whether in
the facial expressions or in the gestures, in the way the patient dresses or in
the whole of his attitude, constitutes one of the most fertile aspects for the
study of the disturbances of the transition of the ego to the world. Inasmuch
as it is a mannerism, this way of being in the world and of projecting oneself
into a correlated life-world is as univocal and obvious as anything that one
may fmd among the possible mundane projects.
Even the encounter, whether that of the daily pointers or the more privi-
leged one offered by an authentic dialogue and a possibility of coexistence,
becomes twisted and eventually arrives at a state where it can realize itself
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 199

only in and through these artificial modalities, whose true specificity is

constituted by the fact that they are wholly inauthentic.
We feel it possible to affirm that this type of access to the autistic world
permits us to identify its most intimate essence not so much in the simple
withdrawal from reality or in the categoric refusal of this reality, but rather
above ali in the fact that the patient is always constrained by a kind of rail,
that he always orientates himself in accordance with a particular stamp
(Priigung), which is precisely that of the adopted "manner." The matter
seems to us to be ali the more worthy of attention in view of the fact that
this way of gaining access to the autistic world would make it possible for us
to glimpse an intimate unity that links it with other aspects of the "schizo-
phrenic" that seem very far removed from autism, to the point of discovering
in this world also those stereotypes that would seem to be expressions of a
serious deterioration, no matter what might be the cause thereof.
Previously, when considering the subjective aspect of the person of the
schizophrenic, we placed the accent on his unforeseeability; but now we
feel that particular significance attaches to the fact that, starting from an
objective survey of his being-in-the-world, we should arrive (as we have tried
to outline above) at the possibility of grasping, with the help of nothing
other than a phenomenological analysis, a gestalt in the truest sense of the
term, a gestalt that univocally reproposes itself in the guise of the "mannered
style."

In the case of the lucid delusional patient, too, the constitutive aspects of the
life-world can be grasped only inasmuch as this world has significance for me
and through me, always with a noninterpretative attitude, and always on the
basis that it mayor may not evoke a community of objective instances.
Since the lucid delusional patient still moves very extensively in the world
of practice, the definition of a unitary and unmistakable gestalt, i.e., of a
univocaliy determined type, is almost impossible. In the situation of the
lucid delusional patient, indeed, the most important psychopathological
alteration affects the 10gico-categorial significances and those of a general
human importance (Mannheim would say that what is at stake here is not
a partial aspect of ideology, but rather its total aspect); consequently, the
expression of this life-world of the delusional patient is neither unitary nor
compact, by very virtue of the fact ·that the idea of a "life-world" implies
the overcoming of both extreme subjectivism and extreme objectivism and,
further, because our attempt at going toward the world encountered by
the delusional patient, toward his lived experience, comes up against the
200 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

difficulty of reconstructing in a truly genetic manner the constituent moments

of his world.
The conclusions that we may draw from the analysis of the spatialization
of the lucid delusional patient are only indirect conclusions, that is to say,
conclusions that have a bearing on the constitutive aspects of this world and
can be deduced from his manner of encountering the others, of facing up to
a given situation, of receding in the face of particular occurrences or avoiding
circumstances that he perceives as dangerous. In other words, we can say that
in the case of the lucid delusional patient we do not meet a complete spatial
incapacity, i.e., the inability to manipulate space that Cassirer has so lucidly
described and which occurs almost paradigmatically in the schizophrenic, but
we do fmd a spatialization that is extremely oriented and even polarized. As
regards the experience of lived space, indeed, one can say that the world
projection of the impoverished schizophrenic is reified, while that of the
delusional patient is reifying.
The manner of acting of the delusional patient is absorbed to such an
extent by the polarization of his lived spatiality that it becomes impossible for
this action to constitute itself on the basis of other spatial parameters: one
only has to think of his state-of-siege experience, of his fear of the things
that may be hidden behind a sales counter or in some side turning, to realize
that the origin of all this should perhaps be sought not so much in the pre-
existence of the persecutory thematics (as is normally and perhaps somewhat
ingenuously postulated), but rather in a spatial projection that is primarily
altered.
If we take our reflection a step further, we may assert that what in a
normal person is lived as a warning and therefore as a kind of being put on
one's guard, is lived by the delusional patient as a further rigidification in a
spatial direction that is already (and prejudicially) altogether preconstituted
and taken for granted. In other words, the attribute of being an oriented
world, which both Husserl and Heidegger had recognized as a characteristic
of the life-world, becomes intensified in the lucid delusional patient, raised to
the nth power as it were, leaving no margin for the unforeseen and thus, in
an altogether singular manner, coming close to the world of the phobic.
Reflecting about the life-world, we have endeavored to reconsider the
psychopathological facts and to translate them into terms of the recovery
of the phenomenal data provided by experience. It is evident that these facts
have to be reviewed, in a phenomenological sense, in the light of the elements
that indicate them and bear witness to them as objective correlates of their
subjectivity, that is to say, by surveying (or analyzing) the object not only
 PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIFE-WORLD 201

as an intramundane something capable of being used, but also as something

that directly involves and evokes the patient's presence in the world.
Only in this way, and of this we are convinced, will it be possible to
avoid the danger of reification (and therefore of false consciousness) in
psychiatry.

Translated from the Italian by

University of Rome Herbert Garrett

NOTES

1 In 1932, after some twelve years of research, Schlitz published his basic work entitled
Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie.
2d ed. (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1960); translated by G. Walsh and F. Lehnert as The
Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).
This work aimed at finding the origin of the categories peculiar to the social sciences
in the fundamental facts of the life of the consciousness; in this sense, therefore, it
provided a link between the comprehensive sociology of Weber and Husserl's tran-
scendental phenomenology.
Hussed, who had been sent a complimentary copy of the book, wrote the following
words to Schlitz on 3 May 1932:
"Ich bin begierig einen so ernsten und griindlichen Phenomenologen kennen zu lemen,
einen der ganz Wenigen, die bis zum tieftsen und leider so schwer zuganglichen Sinn
meiner Lebensarbeit vorgedrungen sind und die ich als hoffnungsvolle Fortsetzer der-
selben, als Reprasentanten der echten Philosophia perennis, der allein zukunftstrachtigen
Philosophie ansehen darf."
From 1939 onward, Schlitz continued his inquiries at the New School for Social
Research in New York, where he reencountered his ffiends and fellow disciples Dorin
Cairns and Aron Gurwitsch; even though the cultural horizon was now rather different,
he was still concerned with discovering the originary constitution of the fundamental
interconnections of the life·world, which are taken for granted in the natural attitude
but only very rarely thematicized by sociologists.
In the preface to Schlitz's Collected Papers (1962), van Breda says that Schlitz, after
having tried to derive intersubjectivity from the transcendental ego, seems to have
realized the limits of the egological approach while encountering intersubjectivity as a
kind of primordial facticity. L. Langrebe, a disciple and assistant of Husserl and author
of a number of works that are fundamental for modern phenomenology (Experience and
Judgment, for example, which was edited from Husserl's own manuscripts), was another
who insisted on the duplicity-identity of "absolute and mundane subjectivity"; in
Phiinomenologie und Metaphysik (Hamburg, 1948), p. 188, for example, he says: 'The
duplicity of absolute and mundane subjectivity must not be understood in the sense that
transcendence manifests itself in the 'empirical human ego,' that empirical and mundane
subjectivity is an 'apparition' beyond which there is the absolute, but rather in the sense
that the absolute is itself present."
202 B. CALLIERI AND A. CASTELLANI

R. Zaner, too, has touched upon this essential problem in The Problem of Em-
bodiment and, more recently, at the Vienna Philosophical Congress, where he spoke
about individuality and the private sphere (Eigensphiire) ("what belongs to me").
We may indeed ask ourselves, and in doing so put the question to the reader, whether
in this respect, too, Schiitz and Landgrebe may not, once again, come very close to
Hussed's latest thought.
2 Cf. The Phenomenology of the Social World.
3 Cf. L. Landgrebe, Phiinomenologie und Metaphysik.
4 Belgrade, 1936.
5 Alfred Schlitz, Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, in Collected Papers, vol. 1
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), p. 133.
6 Ibid., p. 135.
7 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. xv.
8 Phenomenology and Intersubjectivity (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970).
9 Cf. E. Husser!, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), par. 42.
10 Cf. E. Pad, Tempo e verita nella [enomenologia di Husser! (Bari: Laterza, 1961),
pp.140-47.
11 A. Gurwitsch, 'A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness,' Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (1941),325.
12 'Awakening: Towards a Phenomenology of the Self,' in Phenomenology in Perspec-
tive, ed. F. J. Smith (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970), p. 177.
13Cf. the article in Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry 5, no. 3 (1964).
14 Cf. C. E. Moustakas, ed., Existential Child Therapy (New York: Basic Books, 1966);
and V. C. Morris, Existentialism in Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).
15 Cf. Paci, 'Sui problema dell'intersoggettivita,' n Pensiero, 1960.
16 Social Research, 28, no. 1 (1961),71, and esp. 90-91.
17 Cf. Zaner, 'Awakening: Towards a Phenomenology of the Self,' p. 173.
18 D. von Hildebrand, Die Metaphysik ·der Gemeinschaft (Regensburg: Hebbel, 1954),
p.44.
19 J.-P. Sartre, 'Le conflit est Ie sens originel de l'etre-pour autrui,' in L -Etre et Ie
Neant (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 431.
20 Cf. Gabel, La [ausse coscience (paris: Editions de Minuit, 1962).
 MAURIZIO DE NEGRI

SOME INDICATIONS TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGICALLY

ORIENTED APPROACH TO CHILD NEUROPSYCHIATRY

In the clinical practice of child neuropsychiatry one observes from the day of
birth a process involving the development of the personality ,i.e., a progressive
integration and structuring of the ego in relation both to itself and to the
external world. In following this process and its possible distortions (con-
tingent and transitory or defmitive and irreversible, organic and/or psycho-
genetic) several different parameters are utilized. Among these are (1) neuro-
psychological studies which permit the understanding or, in some cases, the
relatively exact defmition of relations between the instrumental (gnostic-
praxis and relational) and the neurobiological substratum, with particular
attention to expressive functions (gesture, graphic, and verbal); (2) genetic
psychology (above all of Piaget) which defmes important deductive reference
points inherent in the progressive development of the appreciation of space
and time, the principle of causality, and the progressive modalities of the
development of thought in young children, under its representative and
symbolic aspects; (3) psychoanalytic approach with reference to the various
stages of emotional development, to the progressive topical and structural
organization of their needs and the dynamic modalities of their reciprocal
relations; (4) phenomenological analysis, which is certainly not the least
important but which has remained until now, the least explored.
It is precisely this last that I will try to synthesize even though, so far, this
synthesis can never be more than the demonstration of a precise modular
reference which is semiologically applicable. Systematic studies of child
psychiatry orientated according to the phenomenological approach are, in
fact, very rare, although one can already glimpse the potential for more
comprehensive (and even, perhaps, more comprehensible) analysis of the
process of the development of personality in its unfolding and opening or in
its distortion and contrariness.
It is useless to record here that general psychiatry is reasonably rich in
phenomenologically orientated studies which are already reference points
for further clinical analyses. But these are almost completely useless in
child psychiatry, in the same way that the nosographic patterns and psycho-
pathological analyses codified in general psychiatry are almost inapplicable to
child psychiatry. It is necessary, therefore, to gather our indications and
203

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI,203-211.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
204 MAURIZIO DE NEGRI

proposals directly from the basic works of phenomenology (or even better
perhaps, from phenomenological anthropology).
As far as I know, or, at least, as far as I can gather from my own personal
experience, until now ideas for proposals on phenomenologically orientated
clinical child psychiatry have had to be drawn principally from some essential
analyses contained in the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.
There are very few genuine clinical contributions.
One point should be made about the clinical field. Child psychiatry, by its
nature, is difficult to reduce to nosographic systems in that it is relatively
unsystematic. It can call upon certain syndromic patterns and determinate
psychodynamic configurations, but these represent satisfying patterns only
in a few cases. The general semiological forms set out in the above listed
parameters are, therefore, applied from one case to another and from one
moment to another, according to the psychodynamic modalities that meet
in the contingent, which may last a short or a long time dependent on the
different evolutional phases and different existential conditions.
Therefore, we will indicate in a very schematic way some general principles
which may serve as canons of approach to the child apart from his pathology,
and which could constitute the first foundations for a phenomenologically
orientated clinical child psychology.
Let us examine, one by one, some examples of their applicability in the
neuropsychiatric field. (1) We can begin with an assumption concerning the
modalities of appreciation of space or of inhabiting the surrounding world.
Living in the surrounding world can be articulated phenomenologically in
three ways, each different from the others but complementary and simul·
taneous, namely, the circumambient world (Umwe/t), the common world
(Mitwelt), and the private world (Eigenwe/t). But though these three are
simultaneous for the adult they are not so for the child.
We can, in fact, assume that the very young child is immersed in the
"naturalness" and "creatureness" of the circumambient world (Umwelt) in its
biological and drive connotations, in the world of feeding, of sleeping and
waking, of stress and calm, apart from every interpersonal relationship and
every form of cultural conditioning.
This is the monistic, unified world of incorporative receptive orality; and
in this context, neuropsychiatric pathology must remain a pathology of
deprivation: with reference to clinical patterns it is the modality of anaclitic
depression.
But this concept of "anaclitic depression" leads us to the second way of
living in the world, namely, the (Mitwelt) common world.
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND CHILD PSYCHIATRY 205

The pathology of deprivation of child anaclitic depression is not only a

deficiency of biological satisfactions and a passive deficiency of external
stimuli; in addition, it is also, clinically considered, a deficiency of inter-
personal relationships.
We can establish here, in the first months of life, that every being-in-the-
world is a being-in-the-world with others; every "existence" (Sein) is "co-
existence" (Mit-sein); and one acknowledges clinically that the process of
the development of personality, in this primordial space, can be strongly
conditioned by the modalities of coexistence.
In fact, there originate in this context those morbid personality develop-
ments (neurotic or depressive or even psychotic) which are mainly identifiable
in the discontinuous, ambiguous, ambivalent, frustrating, nonintegrative
relations between the twin poles of the mother-child couple who are still
symbiotic but already dialectic.
But, the weighty ontologicity of the coexistence (Mit-sein) is something
we acquire later, in the progressive development of subjectivity, and in its
constitutive articulation in intersubjectivity; in the arrival at consciousness of
oneself in coexistence.
Some facts of great clinical importance can be recorded at this moment in
the process of the development of personality. Many psychiatric conditions,
beginning from school age (so-called "period of latency" according to the
psychoanalytic parameter), become pathogenically more comprehensible
and more feasible therapeutically if they are related in the context of the
coexistence (Mit-sein) to some "fundamental existentials" that can be
deduced from Heidegger's analyses, namely, the situational auto sentiment
(or coexistive consciousness of oneself), emerging in the comparison with
the milieu of world opinion, in the dramatic dynamic of the "proportioning
contraposition."
Types of behavior that we defme as "reactive to frustration" or as depres-
sive or as related to an equivocal being, tossing and turning in contradictory
roles, fmd an intrinsic explicability if they are related to those ontological
modalities of the (Mit-sein) coexistence.
This is clear, for example, in those conditions of disadvantage that derive
from an insufficiency of primary instruments (as psychomotoric or psycho-
perceptive or praxic) which bring about precise clinical states; those that
today are included in the wide but defmite concept of "minimal brain dis-
function", the pathology of which is more in the subjective and relational
than in the objective and biological.
Other clinical conditions, subtler and more difficult to classify, brought to
206 MAURIZIO DE NEGRI

light by the modern trend which is based on the interpersonal theory of

psychiatry, emerge from distortions and limitations in the inter subjective
communication which lead to distortions and limitations of personality
development to the point of psychotic conditions.
Other clinical conditions, while consisting of purely somatic phenomena,
derive the most dramatic nucleus of their pathology not so much from their
physical aspects (which are often quite light) but from the "sense" and
from the "coexistence connotation" which hang over them. The example of
infantile convulsions or epilepsy will serve for all. These conditions represent
a kind of phenomenon, not uncommon in very young children, which has a
polymorphic clinical meaning and in which one sees clearly the disassociation
between the objective entity that they strive for on a strictly medicobiological
level and the existential "sense" by which they are surrounded, induced by
the term which defmes them and by the existentially negative connotations
that overhang that term; all of which conditions, in the epileptic, the co-
existensive consciousness of himself, his personality development, and his
existential planning.
Finally, other clinical conditions (or perhaps it would be better to say
determinate symptoms) often transitory and reversible in the child, most
often related to present situations and, up to a certain age, not particularly
significant psychiatrically, exhibit in a later stage of life the negative co-
existential connotations and the inevitable subjective and psychodynamic
repercussions which are the reasons for their "psychiatric aspect" (if by this
term we mainly mean, outside every scientific code, suffering and a decline
into a world experienced as dangerous or hostile).
As common examples we can cite certain symptoms such as enuresis,
encopresis, compulsive conduct, and perhaps more evidently, stammering.
The last example can be considered a "disturbance of the awakening of the
consciousness of the symptom" rather than a nosographic entity.
Imperfections or blockages of the verbal function, which are generally
transitory, are, in fact, quite frequent; and even if they are sometimes very
intense they have, up to a certain age, few emotional repercussions. They
become subjectively weighty and limiting with the possibility of decline and
of development in the relation after a certain age (orientatively after school
age), parallel with the awakening of consciousness of self and of one's own
role in the human world, in which the verbal function is the primary instru-
ment of communication.
Access to the private world (the world of being-for-oneself, for one's own
end, for one's own destiny; with the autoreflexive consciousness of oneself)
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND CHILD PSYCHIATRY 207

comes later. This appears at the dawn of adolescence, and this is one of the
reasons that make psychiatric pathology, from this point on, so different
from that at a younger age. The pathology changes in its objective and in
its psychodynamic structures in relation to the different level of maturity
reached by the egological function and in relation to the different balances
of the drives. But the connotations are profoundly different also in relation
to the diversity of the areas which open, at this age, in existential space.
The clinical conditions which could be used as examples are many. The
most expressive of all is the depressive condition which has already been the
object of important phenomenological analyses in adult psychiatry. But this
is perhaps one of the infantile psychiatric conditions for the understanding of
which patterns taken from the adult are less adaptable. This can be explained
by reference to several parameters derivable from phenomenological analyses.
For example, we can refer to the primary parameter of temporality in a
morbid structure such as that of depression, in which abnormal temporal
experience is a component of primary importance.
For the child, temporal experience has different connotations than it has
for the adult. The dimensions of future and past in his time are still uncertain
and subjective, not yet historicized. The position of the consciousness is
mainly in the present moment , and the "consciousness of the moment"
dominates; the emotional fluctuations are still for the greater part reactive
to external references.
But depression in the child is different (from the phenomenological point
of view) above all because he articulates, up till now, his life-world, i.e., his
experienced world, in different regions. He does not yet venture out and tum
back on to himself in his private world, so the depressive anguish which is
above all guilt anguish cannot yet have the points of reference, the intimate
sensitivity, the depth and the endurance that will be possible only later in the
future opening and deepening of existential space.

(2) A second important phenomenological reference point from which we

may start for the understanding of the process of personality development is
that of the development and the articulation of the "experienced" body in
opposition to the progressive acquisition of the "objective" body knowledge.
It is the well-known distinction between flesh (Leib) and body (Korper)
to which many contributions to psychiatric literature refer, and also some
among them (until recently very few) with regard to child psychiatry. The
modalities of corporal experience are an essential aspect in the process of the
development of personality.
208 MAURIZIO DE NEGRI

In the child, the acquisition of the body (Le., the representation and
objective knowledge of "the body I have" in its distinct and denominable
parts), comes later. It is preceded by the bodily experience (''the body that I
am") closely involved with moving, hearing, and knowing; subject and instru-
ment of existence and relation from a very tender age. It is an experience that
parallels the formation and the unrolling of the coexistence opening and
which is acted before being known. Some examples, such as the formation
of the corporal schema, the phenomenon of the "phantom" limb, and the
question of child drawing, demonstrate this quite clearly.
The phenomenon of the plantom limb - which occurs following amputa-
tion - is exhibited only after the ages of six or seven. It is not possible before
because the perceptive-cognitive representative integration of the corporal
schema is not yet defmed. On the other hand, in children born with infantile
cerebral paralysis, who from birth have not functionally "experienced" the
plegic part, the corporal scheme structures itself in conformation with the
experience, that is, lacking the hypofunctional part. This is shown in the
drawings which they do of the human figure, reproducing their own asymetric
or mutilated corporal scheme rather than "a body" in its objectivity.
The connections between experience and representation in relation to flesh
(Leib) can be clearly shown even in normal children in the progression in the
drawing of the human figure. In every child, this process follows relatively
stereotyped stages in relation to certain fixed ages, and this is well known in
the field of descriptive or objective psychology; but it assumes a precise
significance and comprehensibility when considered from a phenomenological
point of view. The child draws, in progression, the various human limbs as
they are assimilated in his experience. The knowledge and objective repre-
sentation of the body come only at a relatively late stage.
One has, therefore, a reference, even a representative one, to the flesh
(Leib), and only later one gains the objective connotations of the body. This
fact also explains "projection" in child drawing, Le., the graphic expression of
his emotional and relational experiences.
The drawing, for example, of several human figures in relationship to each
other (above all the picture of the family) is conditioned more by experience
than by the cognite. The corporal dimensions are subjective and emotional.
Even the use of space is subjective and emotional; the faraw.ay and the near,
the united and the disunited, the big and the small, objects hovering near or
set at a distance, what is included and what is excluded correspond, up to
a certain age, to the fluid and "proto-significant" laws of experience rather
than to the rigid laws of the cognite.
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND CHILD PSYCHIATRY 209

We must refer clinically to this "corporality", which is inseparable from

the process of personality development, also in fields until now considered
purely neurological, i.e., by defmition objectivistic. This is especially true
when the child is very young. It is precisely, for example, in the field of
neurology of the first year of life and in the problem of the early diagnosis of
infantile encephalopatio that we fmd it impossible to give up this perspective,
which is both neurobiological and phenomenological.
The neurology of the first year of life is a primary area from which emerges
the cultural and methodological perspective in which child neuropsychiatry
operates, as synthesized under the following headings: (1) the pure objective
and technical aspect (physicalistic) is reductive; (2) it can and must be taken
as an instrumental means but is not scientifically exhaustive; (3) the "neu-
rological" valuation makes sense only if considered as a "function" and not
as a "mechanism"; therefore, a strictly objective and quantitative clinical
neurology is out-of-date; (4) the "body" (and its neurology) is not only an
aggregate of "instruments" but it is the agent of expression and relation; it
is the agent of egological identity and all this is more evident in the very
young child; (5) in the small child the intersubjectivity of his existence is also
explicit and immediate and for this reason his neurology is always affected
in the functional viewpoint of the relation.
These headings do not only have an abstract and theoretical value; in the
field of child neurology they strongly condition, sometimes surprisingly, the
clinic in its diagnostic, prognostic, and above all therapeutic duties. And this
is much more evident, in the field of clinical neurology, in the first year of
life.
In the clinical neurology of the young child and especially in the new-
born child, one recognizes today that it is only possible to evaluate a motor
manifestation in terms of its kinetic and postural intension; we can only
evaluate the progression of the neurofunctional maturation in terms of the
teleology of adaptation, and can only evaluate an expressive and praxic
functionality through the dynamic of intersubjectivity.
In a mainly psychiatric context, it is still the theme of corporality above
all which has been taken up in the first attempts to arrive at a clinical her-
meneutic inspired by phenomenological analyses.
The phenomenology of the body has been closely analyzed especially in
the context of psychoses in very young children. There is, on the one band,
an inadequate differentiation of oneself in regard to the external world. In
the mediation of corporal experience, this relationship is still experienced in
a partially adualistic and fusional way: as a subject and as an object. On the
210 MAURIZIO DE NEGRI

other hand, the experience of the body is not unitary, but dismembered,
fragmented, incapable of harmonious spacialization, composed of zones
experienced separately and in a relatively independent way. This drastic
failure represented by psychosis, in the process of the development of per-
sonality, is mirrored in its two essential perspectives in corporal experience.
On the one hand, there is a blockage against opening and unfolding, and a
sense of remaining bound to existentive primordial modalities; while, on the
other hand, there is disarticulation, fragmentation, and loss of the unitary
synthesis of the existive senses.
It is perhaps most particularly the phenomenological analyses of corp orality
which can constitute a primary clinical instrument in the deciphering of these
enigmatic conditions which we call psychotic.
Corp orality , insofar as it is a range of attitudes and gestures which remain
expressive, in existences that limit themselves, regress and seem to de structure
themselves and shut themselves off from communication.

(3) Finally, there is a third important reference point to which one can refer,
namely, the genesis and the progressive structuring of cognitive activity.
In its theoretic premises this theme has been the object of one of my own
personal studies (see Analecta Husserliana, no. VII); a brief review here will
therefore suffice. This reference point refers to the development of the
modalities of thought from the antipredicative toward the predicative, from
subjectiveness toward categoricality in experience of time, from spaciality
experienced toward that objectively placed. It also refers to the progressive
extension and specification of the horizons of cognition, internal and external,
of objects of knowledge, and to the progression of the capacity to differentiate
the experiences of imagination (or Jicta) from effective reality.
By using Husserl's approach, we can express the particular characteristics
of child thought as they have been empirically deduced in research into
genetic psychology: the projectivity, the animism, the artificialism, the
transductility, the syncretism, the so-called "realism", the magical and
desiderative modalities that underlie the principle of causality before this
takes on the formula of categorical predication.
In the psychopathological field, it is this parameter which tells us about
"how" (not about "why", which is mainly psychodynamic) certain symp-
tomatological expressions take on different degrees of realizability, different
degrees of meaning, impregnate to different levels the "experience" of the
child in relation to the adult, and therefore why (correlated with the different
ages) they require a different method and a different degree of pathology.
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND CHILD PSYCHIATRY 211

The most typical and common examples of these expressions are repre-
sented by phobias and delusions in their psychodynamic affInity, but also in
the fact that they can be precisely differentiated phenomenologically as well
as conceptually and clinically.
This theme of phobias and delusions in their psychodynamic similarity,
as well as in their conceptual differentiation and their different degrees of
realizability and pathologicity in the different epochs of development, is one
that facilitates the documentation of the usefulness or indeed the indis-
pensability of this particular phenomenological parameter for the explanation
of many facts in psychopathology. I have made a personal study of this which
cannot be summarized here; it suffices, therefore, to have mentioned it as an
example; detailed treatment can be found in the original text in the Revue de
Neuropsychiatrie Infantile, 5, no. 2 (1974),333.

Istituto G. Gaslini,
University of Geneva
 EUGENIO BORGNA

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SPLIT

The psychotic experience (and especially the schizophrenic, which is an

emblematic form of existence different from the ordinary one) must not be
considered as an informal articulation of "symptoms" that, at the most, are
"signs" (in Kurt Schneider's sense) and therefore "significant", but rather as
a single form (Gestalt) with a sense, as one among the other human possi-
bilities of the life-world.
Clinical psychiatry, which adopts the same paradigmatic categories of
knowledge as the natural sciences, obviously cannot arrive at this phenome-
nological foundation of the psychotic experience. The attitude of clinical
psychiatry, in other worlds, does not know the "man-patient" and only
recognizes the "pathologic" (von Gebsattel), which it isolates from the
personal form and absolutizes as the epiphanic moment of a human reality
that, in truth, can never be reified and is as infmitely open as the reality of
psychotic experience itself. Following the "cold" and "exact" method of the
natural sciences, clinical psychiatry bases itself on the "obvious" (Cartesian)
premise that psychic life can be analyzed as the "natural object" of experience
in the context of a purely objectivizing knowledge. As Kuhn has stressed,
psychiatry in this way deprives itself of its intentional signification and thus
inexorably places itself outside the thematic area of the human sciences, even
though it cannot but form part of these latter.
In the context of such a "naturalistic" enquiry, then, psychic life is broken
down into "functions" that (in relation to purely conventional parameters)
are considered to be either "normal" or "pathological." Within each such
"pathological" psychic function, clinical psychiatry identifies a number of its
constitutive infrastructures that are referred to as "symptoms." And it then
uses these "symptoms" (which in the universe of clinical language suggest
something of a "biological" and "de-semanticized" nature) to found what is
considered to be a psychiatric "diagnosis."
The contestation (or, at least, the radical and critical calling into question)
of the cognitive and axiological categories of clinical psychiatry (and their
irrelevant inadequacy when it comes to grasping the confusingly infmite
otherworldliness of psychotic experience) has been pushed forward with
implacable and obstinate methodological rigor by Kurt Schneider. Over and
213

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Xl, 213-222.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
214 EUGENIO BORGNA

above his repeated and drastic assertion that, when all is said and done, the
whole of the naturalistic-scientific articulation of psychiatry is founded on a
hypothesis (Le., the assertion of its biological or somato-genetic raison d'etre)
that is, far removed from every possibility of demonstration, Kurt Schneider's
cutting and corrosive epistemological plane has completely overturned, and
deprived of significance, the semantic and conceptual connotation of what
constitutes a "symptom" in psychiatry, thus provoking dialectically the
shipwreck of all the commonplaces of clinical language and causing them to
sink out of sight.
The psychopathological manifestations with which psychiatry is concerned
are, in any case, nothing other than communications of lived experience
(Erlebnismitteilungen), and psychopathology, as Miiller-Suur has very acutely
pointed out, is nothing else than the interpretation, the decoding if you
will, of the experiences that are communicated to us. Let us not forget, and
this is yet another testimony of the infmite antinomies of psychiatry as a
science, that van Praag defines schizophrenia as "an impossible concept" (ein
unmoglicher Begri!f), because it is both unsurveyed and un surveyable in its
"impossible" raison d'etre; that is, an unattainable but infmitely sought
horizon, yet as Kisker has pointed out, it is in any case necessary to "live
with the impossible." The usual "symptoms" of a psychotic experience
cannot be defmed as such. As Kurt Schneider has insisted, the lived psycho-
pathological experiences (which include the delusional and hallucinatory
experiences as well as those of estrangement) not only cannot be "reduced"
to the unidimensional level of a "symptom" but, what is more, contain
nothing whatsoever that could constitute them as and on the level of an
abstract and reified clinical reality (as an "illness", that is to say, however
the term may be understood); they have rather to be understood in their
connotation as signs, as semantic allusions to the emergence of psychopatho-
logical forms (coherent and full of sense) that nevertheless cannot but be
defined as "aggregations" and "formations" (Bildungen) of lived experiences
with significations different from our own. The inexorable upheaval of the
epistemological and foundational approach of psychiatry is in the last resort
(and in all its radicality) represented by this dialectical movement that refuses
to recognize the existence of "symptoms" and, overturning this untenable
defmition, considers them as "signs." Consequently, a person who "is in the
world of schizophrenia" (the world of psychotic experience, that is to say)
must not be thought of as a carrier of "symptoms" (considered as expressions
of "illness") but rather as the bearer of "signs" that have to be anchored to a
hermeneutic and deciphering horizon. In other words, he has to be thought of
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 215

as the bearer of "significances" that become dilated into an infinite chain

of suggestions, pointers, or clues. Delusional and hallucinatory experiences
(like those of estrangement) are therefore signs of a human reality, albeit
dilemmatic, a reality torn by its antinomies, but always anchored to sense
and meaning (and not to the natural "events"). Schneider's radical and fear-
less analysis has simply "exploded" the supporting structures (and every
raison d'etre) of a "scientific" psychiatry that is dragged along in an attempt
to absolutize cognitive categories incompatible not only with the infmite
dialectic region of the man-patient, but also with the very things that in their
essence constitute the human and psychopathological realities with which
psychiatry has to concern itself.
Psychiatry as a science of nature has no foundations whatsoever that are
not anchored in the human being reduced (and therefore to its reification)
to the furrow of isolated (and artificial) nosologic and nosographic schemes.
It is impossible to avoid this radical contestation - brought to its highest
moment of rigor - of the epistemological and ideological categories with
which the human reality of psychotic experience has been devastated and
profaned, however, other than via the alternative between the exasperated
radicalization of anti psychiatry and the approach phenomenologically
founded. Such an approach aims at grasping the experience of the world of
the other being as a "human possibility."
The phenomenological, especially Husserlian attitude makes it possible to
go beyond the critical frontiers of Schneider and to found the experience of
schizophrenia (which is only apparently shattered and disarticulate) in its
human significance and in its horizon of sense. The schizophrenic experience
as a "human possibility", freed of all vestiges of naturalistic reification,
therefore manifests itself in its evidence and in its counterreality that is yet a
bearer of sense, only on condition that it is considered in the context of a
rigorously phenomenological analysis. Husserl's phenomenology makes it
possible to undermine every kind of ideological superstructure and to bring
to light the unfathomable depth of the phenomena, freeing them from a
multitude of objectivizing and deforming stratifications. By anchoring our-
selves to Husserl's phenomenology and thereby abandoning every attitude
of a naturalistic and scientific type, we propose to bring back to the surface
and to describe the constitutive structures of an emblematic schizophrenic
experience in their ultimate Significance and in the foundation horizon
(originary and antepredicative) of the life-world.
The raison d'etre, and the single, unifying form, of the schizophrenic
experience will be grasped in their immediate, eidetic structure and in the
216 EUGENIO BORGNA

grazing light of an epoch!! (i.e., a radical suspension or bracketing) of all the

objective sciences and of all ideologies.
The radicalities of the antinomies and of the contradications that charac-
terize the human condition can be grasped with all their emblematic and
semantic pregnancy in the form of life that we are wont to call (when reifying
it and drawing it back into the descriptive vortex of the "label" of an illness)
"schizophrenic. "
In schizophrenia, which we can consider as a manifestation of one of the
life-worlds (that derives from an Ur-Lebenswelt), we rediscover the ultimate
reasons of some of the fundamental structures of the human condition. Thus,
the day-to-day experience of "being lacerated" and of "being shattered"
(of "being divided into two") manifests itself in a phenomenological and
epocheifying attitude as a constitutive component of schizophrenic existence,
which, although it represents a mundanization different from our natural
one, does not mean a desaggregation of the world, a nonsense and lack of
significance. Its radical experience (ineffable in the atrocity of its existential
dissolution) consists in the ultimate and abyssal laceration of the unity of the
ego, the "split" (Spaltung). It shows that the incomprehensibility of the modes
of being in schizophrenia is nothing other than the emblematic expression of
a form of life that is immanent in the very human condition - even though
the schizophrenic experience has dragged it into the lacerated epiphany of a
personal form. The fractured of unity of the ego cannot at one and the same
time be the lacerating metamorphosis of the world (since the world, as Husserl
points out, is only "for" an ego, and the ego is only inasmuch as it is in ego
that "is in the world"), but presents itself as an originary human experience
that forms an integral part of our common life-world.
The phenomenology of the life-world, and the constitution of the schizo-
phrenic split life-world, form the subject matter of our further discussion.
The constitutive foundation of the life-world lacerated by the split is
characterized by the defective constitution of the space-time structures and
the intersubjective structures that are immanent in every life-world. HusserI
has described a number of emblematic constitutive moments of the life-
world in his Crisis. The life-world constitutes itself as a "world" that is
centered on an "ego pole" in the dialectic (and intentional) context of related
space-time and intersubjective structures. In the horizon of the spatial struc-
tures that constitute the life-world (and which become radically transformed
in every schizophrenic experience) there reemerge in paradigmatic form the
structures of the "near" and the "far", of the originary home (Heimat) and of
foreign parts (Fremde).
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 217

Let us now consider both the antepredicative immediateness and the life-
worldly evidence of that vertical laceration of the ego - which is completely
incapable of reasserting its unity in any shape or form - and going beyond
the mere phenomenon of the split, expresses itself in the terrifying counter-
experience of its "doubling" (Verdoppelung).
This counterexperience has been described by von Gebsattel, who quotes
the example of one of his female patients immersed in a desertlike atmosphere
and submerged by a duplicative metamorphosis of the ego that became
disarticulated into two forms (egos "A" and "B"), each drastically separate
from the other. "Each of these egos is further removed from the other than
the distance between the North and South Poles. I always feel this division
into two inside myself." Lastly, from the self-description of this particular
patient let us also quote the different modes of being-in-the-world of "A"
"B." '''i..' is the empty ego, the mere skin, an empty space, a void. The
authentic ego is in 'B'; it is sanity, spirit, fullness of communication of life."
The split in von Gebsattel's patient is profound and radical; and yet one
cannot grasp and discover in it a duplicative metamorphosis of the ego as
lacerating and as bareboned as the one that we have observed in one of our
own patients (Cecilia), in whom the "duplication" of the ego and of the
world reaches a point where two life-worlds are actually configured, each
having both a space-time constitution and an intersubjective constitution of
its own. The experience of the "duplication" (the shipwreck of one's own
identity, its disintegration into two egotic nuclei that are sealed and kept
apart by an experiential independence and also by an intentional autonomy)
reemerges in our patient with truly drastic phenomenological evidence.
Let us suspend, for a moment, both psychopathological and diagnostic
judgment; here we do not fmd ourselves face to face with a clinical "case"
but rather with a person (Cecilia), who is twenty-nine years old and has come
to manifest a profound transformation of her intentional life and of her
horizons of existential significance. The "sympathetic communication" with
the world (the term used here in the sense of Straus) has become radically
metamorphosed. There emerge the particular lived experiences (the modalities
of being-in-the·world) that clinical psychopathology refers to as delusional
and hallucinatory. The metamorphosis of the ego is accompanied by the
metamorphosis of the world; in this way a very own life-world (Eigenwelt)
thus comes to be constituted. The image of the mother - whose voluntary
death has put an end to her existence but has left untouched and unscathed
her image in the memory of our patient - seems fatally destined to drag
Cecilia in its wake, into two desperate attempts of suicide. From both of
218 EUGENIO BORGNA

them she is saved only by a hair's breadth. A state of permanent conflict can
be noted in her family situation: the husband's countertestimony of aridity
almost overwhelms the sympathetic testimony of her two sons. Over and
above the psychopathological manifestations, however, there is always the
figure of Cecilia to bear witness to her defenseless and desperate humanity,
to her infinite capacity for grasping the shadow line of reality, of the other
image (obscure and enigmatic) of reality: "Dying, and attempting to die, it
seemed to me to be born again. This thought kept me company." It is in this
phase of her life (tragically marked by the temptation to seek voluntary death
and immersed in the frozen irreality of her delusions and hallucinations) that
we witness the transformation of the unity (and of the identity) of her ego.
The duplicative metamorphosis of the ego and of the world constitutes itself
as an essential and emblematic moment of Cecilia's existence: "Two ways
of living and two worlds are to be found in my life." The ego has become
disarticulated into two forms (almost two images that, rmding themselves
face-to-face, turn to headlong flight from each other). Cecilia's personal
process of becoming (in the sense of von Gebsattel) becomes shattered into
pieces, becomes transformed (doubled) into "Maria Luisa" and "Lucia."
The psychopathological analysis of a human experience, so overwhelming
in its nature, inevitably becomes arid when attempted in a formal clinical
context, especially when it is centered on the constitutive (and also destruc-
turizing) aspects of the consciousness of the ego that has become transformed
in its raison d'etre. On the contrary, I believe I have shown that the phenome-
nological approach allows us, first, to grasp the actual lived experience, as
well as the modes of being-in-the-world, of our patient in their antepredicative
(and precategorial) immediacy. Second, it allows us also to situate the ex-
perience of the split and the duplicative metamorphosis of the ego in the
interpretative context of the Husserlian life-world. What seems to be a "re-
ductive" experience and wholly devoid of sense, when seen from a psycho-
pathological point of view, appears on the contrary to be the very thing that
permits a phenomenological return to the foundations by recuperating
Cecilia's "form of life" in its human significance.
Let us now reconsider the constitutive phenomenological moments of the
two life-worlds that characterize the metamorphosis of the ego and of the
world as it has manifested itself in the life of our patient.
The laceration of the consciousness of the ego, and the contraposition of
the two forms (and of the two worlds that are associated with them) that run
their course as strangers to each other or are at least different from each other
as far as their space-time and intersubjective constitution is concerned, do not
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 219

from the phenomenological point of view have the meaning of a desert-

like anarchy and intentional fracturization but rather bear witness to the
restoration and the nostalgia of a line of sense. That is, they bear witness to
a limit situation - that is immanent in the human condition, to the "possible"
as an existential category in the Kierkegaardian sense.
From Cecilia's originary life-world (Ur-Lebenswelt), radically transformed
in its intersubjective foundation and dragged along to the fracture of every
communication with the other, we can discern as enigmatic and chimeric
monads, the form of "Maria Luisa" and that of "Lucia." In the originary
experience of the life-world there exists an area of reciprocity that is given
to us prereflectively, that is, even before we turn to the other-from-ourselves
who may be near or far. To communicate (understood as an originary phe-
nomenon of the life-world) means - in the sense of Natanson - to be already
involved in the world, in a horizon of infinite dialogic possibilities with the
other-from-ourselves. In the intersubjective constitution of a life-world
transformed by the schizophrenic process, the checkmate suffered by com-
munication reemerges as a fundamental, originary experience. Within the
context of this breakdown of communications it is not possible to articulate
an immediate reciprocity of significance and gestures, since the radical and
autistic solitude of the patient submerges every dialogic possibility. But in
turn, the ensnarement in this radical absence of dialogue and of communica-
tion causes the reemergence in our patient of two pre-dialogic forms of
existence (two adumbrated personal structures) that constitute compensative
counterrealities to replace a former reality - the reality of Cecilia - that has
become crushed.
The life-world in which "Maria Luisa" becomes mundanized bears the
hallmark of the radical monado-Iogical finitude and solipsism: "Maria Luisa"
is Cecilia in her ultimate schizophrenic metamorphosis of the life-world.
Nevertheless, "Maria Luisa" is a Cecilia that has been "rediscovered" and
from the immemorial past of her childhood, defenseless (Wehrlosigkeit, in
Burkhardt's sense) in her originary fragility, in her desperation, and in her
inability to recover the future as a horizon of transcendence and of a possible
realization.
"Lucia's" life-world, in its dialectic constitution of subjectivity and of
mundanisation, has a more articulate and open intersubjective foundation.
"Lucia" is the faded but still shining counterimage of Cecilia, the candid
parable still glimmering in the distance before being reduced to ashes; the
image lost in the mirror and snatched from the claws of the inexorable wind
of deraison; at last, it is the other part of the ego that mundanizes itself and
220 EUGENIO BORGNA

places itself out of reach in the desert of the soul. The form of "Lucia", with
its weak and slender line of hope and dialogic allusion, contains within it the
short-lived and futile inconsistency of something that is being inexorably
consumed and worn away (a flickering candle, to be precise); and yet in the
desert of her solitude, and in the devastating vortex of her interhuman
rupture, Cecilia finds in "Lucia" a dilemmatic and vaguely outlined illusion
of communication and of alterity.
Communication, being the supporting structure of the /ife-world, becomes
articulated in this latter within the context of a number of fundamental
space-time structures. The metamorphosis of the intersubjective structures of
the /ife-world is thus accompanied by the metamorphosis of the space-time
structures. Obviously, we are not here concerned either with an objective and
geometric space or an objective and measurable time. As Straus has shown in
his admirable phenomenological analyses, space and time in the life-world
are not abstract and reified categories, but are rather modes of mundanizing
oneself, of feeling the world.
In the psychotic /ife-world (and emblematically in Cecilia's /ife-world) the
metamorphosis of the space structures brings in its wake the radical negation
of every here and of every there, as well as the annihilation of every dialectic
articulation between here and there; one is simply besieged in the here-and-
now, and it is no longer possible to come out of the bounds of subjectivity,
just as it is no longer possible to reenter into them. The Copernican upheaval
(as Klaus Conrad defmes the possibility of coming out, transcending onself,
into the world that is common to ourselves and to the other), becomes
burned and annihilated in the context of an apophanic experience in which
every human and every thing no longer has any significance other than that
of becoming self-referred and overpowered. In a /ife-world deprived in this
manner of any and every sistolic-diastolic space articulation, we can observe
the leveling out and the liquefaction of the lived space, a space in which there
now comes to lack every distance, as also every separation, both devoured by
absence (in the sense of Blanchot). In the two forms ("Maria Luisa" and
"Lucia") which reemerge from the splitting laceration of Cecilia's conscious-
ness of her ego, there is no longer any defense (and there is no longer any
distance) vis-a-vis the other and vis-a-vis his alarming appearance. In "Lucia's"
life-world, indeed, this being-exposed to the other, this being handed over
to the inexorable human and thingly realities, assumes a configuration of
more drastic semantic pregnancy than in "Maria Luisa." And yet, neither the
one nor the other can completely deprive herself of every limit, of every
boundary between the "I" and the "world."
 PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 221

The metamorphosis of the spatial constitution of the life-world is accom-

panied by the metamorphosis of its temporal constitution. Indeed, in Cecilia's
schizophrenic experience, a phenomenological analysis throws into relief an
intentional shattering of time, although this crushing of time has different
constitutive articulations in the respective experiences of "Maria Luisa" and
"Lucia." In "Maria Luisa" on the one hand the disarticulation of time be-
comes radical and overwhelming, frozen as it is into a present that has been
radically dehistoricized and exists only in each instant (in the sense of Storch).
In this temporal horizon, therefore, future and past are tom apart (the one
being incredibly far removed from the other) and have no articulation what-
soever in the present, which dissociates itself from every relation to, and from
every expectation of, something, and thus eliminates every possibility of
projection and transcendence. In "Lucia", on the other hand, projection into
the future is not detached from existential time (Straus), because it is neither
burned in the present nor sucked down by the "burden" (Last) of the past.
Instead, the intentional fracture annihilates the past, since "Lucia" is a form
that is characterized by dehistorification and, therefore, by the loss memory.
(These transformations of time in the schizophrenic experience have been, as
well known, described in the investigations of Binswanger, von Geb sattel ,
Minkowski, and Straus.)
The intersubjective and space-time constitution of the psychotic experience
of our patient Cecilia bears witness from the phenomenological point of view
to the reemergence of a lacerating (duplicating) metamorphosis of the /ife-
world, which comes to manifest two "private" worlds that have a profound
human significance and also an articulated internal configuration of their
own. The ultimate, radical raison d'etre of every psychotic private world is
epitomized by its condition of autistic solitude; this nevertheless must not be
dogmatically understood as an annihilated closure to an encounter with the
other-from-oneself. In the life-world that has been radically transformed by
schizophrenia, and which is characterized by the simultaneous presence of
emblematic delusional and hallucinatory experiences and by a splitting of the
ego, it is possible to glimpse the sense of a "new" (Broekman and Milller-
Suur) intersubjective constitution and, at the same time, the desperate search
for a horizon of Significance that will permit the patient to heal the fracture
in his personality and communication.
In the last resort, therefore, the split (and its extreme psychopathological
and existential radicalization that is represented by the ego-doubling) con-
stitute themselves as possibilities associated with the human condition and,
when they are analyzed with the phenomenological approach, as bearers of
222 EUGENIO BORGNA

sense in the context of experience that would otherwise remain walled up in

th~ desert of insignificance and in the petrified silence of inanimate things
that are being vainly interrogated.
Psychopathology may in this way bring back into drastic relief human
phenomena of emblematic significance that the obviousness of day-to-day life
tends to conceal, phenomena that only creative imagination can sometimes
grasp. For example, the laceration of the unity of the ego as a human possi-
bility is brought out in Hofmannsthal's unfmished novel Andreas oder die
Vereinigten. In this book, indeed, Hofmannsthal's luminous imagination
captures the very essence of the overwhelming radicality of the schizophrenic
metamorphosis of the ego and of its raison d'etre as a constitutive structure
of the human condition. It reveals the atmosphere of "exile" and the gloomy
nightmare that characterize the shattering of selthood.
We find also in Goethe's Faust, the supremely accurate description of this
lacerated human condition,expressed in words to which there remains nothing
to be added:
Zwei Seelen wohnen ach in meiner Brust,
die eine will sich von der anderen trennen.
Die eine haIt in derber Liebeslust
sich an die Welt mit klammernden Organen,
die andere hebt gewaltsam sich vom Dunst
zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.

Translated by Herbert H. Garrett

University of Milan
B. HUSSERLIAN INVESTIGATIONS
 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM IN HUSSERL'S

PHENOMENOLOGY

1. LANGUAGE AND LOGIC

A need for an interpretation of the concept of formal logic prompted Hussed's

examination of the problem of language in his Logical Researches. The point
of view of Husserl's examination, as well as the manner in which he inter-
preted language, are two connected aspects of the same problem. In addition,
there are other aspects of Hussed's inquiry, rich in implications and results
and passing beyond the limits of a critical cognitive study of language con-
ceived as constituting an introduction and basis of pure logic.
The study of language in Logical Researches is based on tht: need to recover
the dimension of language in the field of logic. The first and fundamental
question that the phenomenological study oflanguage should answer is: What
is the relation between language and logic? From this is derived a particular
exposition of the problem of language and the way in which it is conditioned
by the requirements of the linguistic foundation of logic. It is from this point
of view that Hussed approached his study of language. Logic brings us to the
phenomenology of language, and this hitter to the theory of knowledge. The
full clarification (Kliimng) of the cognitive character of language constitutes
an introduction to pure logic, whose concept cannot be separated from the
concept of the form of language.
Now, assuming an inquiry into language and its cognitive structure is
a necessary basis for logic as pure theory, how should we characterize the
phenomenological approach to language? In what way is speech and lan-
guage interpreted in Logical Researches? And in what way does this in-
vestigation differ from the researches undertaken by the linguist or the
grammarian ?
After affirming that "discussions of language belong to the preliminary
elaboration indispensable in building up pure logic", Hussed expresses his
views concerning the nature of the study of language which should precede
actual logical study:
they are not grammatical discussions in the empirical sense, referring to any particular
historically determined language, but they are discussions of a more general kind as they
are dealing with the much wider field of an objective theory of knowledge and, in strict

225

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI,225-277.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
226 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

connection with this, of pure phenomenology of the lived experiences of thought and
of knowledge. 1

If Husserl does not have in view discussions and studies of an empirical

kind, i.e., of particular historically determined languages, then what kind of
language does he regard as the subject of phenomenological analysis? Surely a
"general speech", a "general language." The objects of phenomenological
description are "the essences directly grasped in the essential intuition and
the links which are forged purely in the essences." The study therefore
applies to the essence of speech, to the essence of expression, to the essence
of the utterance. Husserl is not interested in the empirical or historically
causal peculiarities of a language that make one language different from the
other in a particular historical epoch. But at this point it is necessary to make
a distinction which is legitimate in relation to the different intentions present
in Husserl's text. His attention and interest are directed to the ideal character
of the expression as well as to that of the "meaning", and obviously to the
ideal character of their relationship. In paragraph 11 of the First Research he
clearly explains what he means by the term "ideal", referring to linguistic
expression:

The ideality of the relation between expression and meaning, referring to both terms,
immediately reveals itself in the fact that, if we face the problem of the meaning of any
expression (e.g., quadratic rest), obviously by expression we do not mean the phonetic
formation pronounced hic et nunc, this fugitive sound, which is never repeated identi-
cally. We mean the expression in kind. The expression quadratic rest remains identical,
regardless of who pronounces it. And the same will be true if we talk about meaning, too:
in this case, obviously, we do not mean the lived experience which gives signification.

We should note that the expression referred to by the author which "remains
identical, regardless of who pronounces it" is quadratischer Rest, an expres-
sion belonging to the German language, which is a historically determined
language, and, like all languages, subject to historical transformations through
time. What Hussed says about the German expression is equally valid for the
Italian expression resta quadratica, which also belongs to a historically
determined language. It follows that what he now defmes as expression in
kind, which remains identical, appears as a relatively short-lived kind which
seems hard to conciliate with the character of necessity and immutability
of the kind as ideal essence. The author would certainly have an obvious
objection to make to our remark. What makes an object in its ideal state
remain identical is not the fact that a certain group of individuals continue
seeing it or thinking it in the same way but the fact that it maintains its
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 227

identity independently of being thought of, or perceived by, any individual.

Therefore, the ideal identity of the expression quadratischer Rest will not be
compromised at all, even though, two thousand years hence, Germans will no
longer pronounce that expression but some other, more or less similar.
However explicit the affirmation of Hussed, that he does not intend to deal
with language from an empirical point of view, referring to any "historically
determined language", it probably tends toward a still more general point of
view, toward an essence of speech beyond the historically determined limits
of languages. In view of this, the fact that a perceptible sign has a peculiar
physical aspect, which distinguishes the perceptible sign of one language
from the perceptible sign of another, is ideally estranged from the essence of
expression. It conforms to the general essence of expression to be made up
of a certain perceptible sign connected by association to a sense or meaning,
but the physical conformation pewliar to that sign, in its empirically and
historically determined character, is something external to that essence. The
concept of expression implies the presence of a particular perceptible sign,
but this sign is not necessarily physically determined in one way rather than
in another. The meaning "quadratic rest" from that point of view can be
equally well connected to the perceptible support quadratischer Rest as to
the corresponding one of the Italian language resto quadratico. I think this is
the ultimate sense of Hussed's thesis, that phenomenological analysis should
ignore empirical questions pertaining to historically determined grammars and
languages. The validity of this interpretation seems to be indirectly confirmed
by a defmition of expression or rather of the physical support of expression,
that we fmd in paragraph 19 of the Fifth Research. Here it is stated that in
the unitary act of expression - here we are dealing, specifically, with an
assertion - which is composed of a bodily aspect and a spiritual aspect, "the
phonetic complex, the physical expression will be nonessential" and its
function as mere support is specified as follows:
It is nonessential also because any other phonetic complex could replace it, developing
the same function; it could even be completely eliminated. But whenever it exists and
develops the function of a phonetic complex, it melts with the acts forming a single act.
This too is certain: the connection here is, in a certain sense, completely extraessential,
since the expression itself, that is, the phonetic complex which appears (the objective
written sign, etc.) has value neither as a component element of objectuality intended in
the total act, nor, in general, as something belonging to it "intrinsically" or in any way
able to determine it.

Here, too, we have another aspect of the defmition of the perceptible sign
which is equally important: not to consider the perceptible sign, or the
228 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

phonetic complex, as a component of "objectuality intended in the total act."

We shall deal with this later. At the moment we are interested in making clear
that the determined conformation of the perceptible support of an expression,
of its empirical character, is something external to the concept of expression
in its character of essential generality; this generality puts the essence of the
perceptible sign of an expression above the differences that the historically
determined perceptible signs assume in each empirically existing language.
Something similar is to be found in the thOUght of Ferdinand de Saussure
concerning the perceptible or acoustic aspect of the linguistic sign. When he
affirms that language is fonn and not substance and that "in language every
term gains its value from opposition to the other terms", he determines the
function of the perceptible or acoustic aspect of the sign, of the signifier
(signifiant), which is what allows the speaker to distinguish a signified
(signifie) - i.e., what is associated arbitrarily to that "signifiant" - from all
other signifies, which are associated by the same distinctive function with all
the other signifiants. Accordingly, the purely differential character of the
acoustic or perceptible aspect of the linguistic sign is placed strongly in
evidence. If the function of the signifiant is purely distinctive, then what is
essential for the signifiant is simply to be different from all other signifiants
of the same language; for the function enunciated by the signifiant, it is not
important whether its perceptible aspect is conformed in one way rather than
another. Just as in a game of chess "the material or the form of the pieces
have no importance as long as the opposition values are constant";2 accord-
ingly, by applying the same criterion to language, Saussure can state that the
material or the form of the signifiant has no importance, so long as the latter
fulfills its distinctive function or, in other words, maintains its opposition
value.
The essence of expression, and more specifically the essence of the "per-
ceptible sign" of the expression, with its "nonessential" character ,has assumed
a meaning in phenomenological analysis which from many points of view is
analogous to that of Saussure's signifiant. In Husser!, the perceptible sign of
expression, in its general conception, has the same distinctive function, that
is, to recall a determined meaning. It hardly matters whether this perceptible
sign is historically determined as a sign belonging to the German language or
to any other language, if, within each language, it preserves its opposition
value.
Up to this point we have intentionally limited our examination to only
one aspect of the essence of expression, that is, to the perceptible sign or
the physical aspect of expression, in order to explain Husserl's unequivocal
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 229

attitude toward the studies based on historically determined languages, and

to enunciate a phenomenological concept of expression with a character of
general essentiality. But his position turns out to be radically different from
that of Saussure, if we consider the concept of expression no longer from the
point of view of the perceptible sign (the signifiant of Saussure) but of the
meaning. For Husserl, the "nonessentiality" of the perceptible sign, or of the
physical aspect of expression, really means only the arbitrariness of the
perceptible sign, of the signifier: the distinctive function of the perceptible
sign is simply a recall function, because the world of the signified is a world
of internal distinctions and articulations, in no way conditioned by the
opposing entities of the perceptible signs, or signifier. On the contrary, in
the "system" of language as dermed by Saussure, signifiant and signifie are
related by a process of reciprocal conditioning: inside the system, which is a
complex opposition of coexisting values, the signifies are equally conditioned.
The arbitrariness concerns the signifies as well as the signifiants. If the choice
of this signifiant (acoustic image) for this signifie (idea or concept) is made
arbitrarily by the language, to the same extent the choice of this signifie for
this signifiant is arbitrary. If language is a "system of signs" and a sign is
the association of a signifian t with a signifie, all the signifies of a language
are constituted within the system of the signs, which is different for each
language.
The position of Husserl is completely different. In his conception of
language the arbitrariness or "nonessentiality" of the signifier, or perceptible
sign, finds a place, but the idea of any arbitrariness of the signified or concept
has no sense. The world of the signified is the world of concepts, of essences,
which are intrinsically necessary.
It is true, the presence of "vague expressions" has been ascertained. These
are "the expressions of common life, like tree and shrub, animal and plant .
. . . "3 On the other hand, scientific expressions are exact. The vague expres-
sions are obviously those expressions whose meaning wavers; a meaning which
changes according to different cases in which such expressions are used. The
phenomenologist limits himself to such considerations as may involve the
vocabulary of a language; but what he says concerns the complex of meanings
in any particular language; he is not interested in establishing the differences
of meaning which are structurally composed in each linguistic system. Fur-
thermore, we can observe that the vagueness of some expressions, hence of
their meaning, does not affect the meaning or concept in itself, which as
such cannot be anything other than exact and necessarily articulated, but
concerns only the subjective, individual, and accidental way in which they are
230 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

conceived or thought of, in some circumstances, by some individuals. This

means that if a concept is understood in a vague way, in reality it is not
understood, or it is only partly and imperfectly understood. But what is now
thought vaguely and imperfectly by one individual can successively be thought
in a strict, exact way. The concept itself, or the meaning in itself, on the
other hand, remains absolutely unaffected by such changes.
Beyond this great difference concerning the way in which the wodd of
meanings is defmed, there is another aspect in the linguistic position of our
author approaching in some way the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de
Saussure. As a general linguistics, the latter does not deal historically with
anyone particular language and does not constitute an empirical study of
the grammar of a language. The object of such study is language in general,
and has for its aim the collection and defmition, through a complete set of
strictly connected propositions, of those characteristics of a language system
which are to be found in every existing language in history. Once he has built
up his own system of concepts, the scholar of general linguistics is confronted
with the theoretical possibility of offering the results obtained as a method-
ological instrument, which can be applied in any particular linguistic study.
In reality, there is a circular relationship between general and particular
linguistic study in scholars like Ferdinand de Saussure and Louis Hjelrnslev,
and if it is true that the general survey conditions the particular one, it is no
less true that the particular survey conditions the general one.
The position of Hussed is similar to that of students of structurallinguis-
tics, in the sense that his attention and interests are also focused on "language
in general"; but there is a profound difference between the two positions,
chiefly because of the different way in which the phenomenologist deals with
language in general. As we have seen, Hussed does not take into consideration
the arbitrary structuralistic character of linguistic meanings; therefore, con-
cerning the problem of signification, he implicitly adheres to tradition in
considering the perceptible sign of expression as a mere physical support of an
idea or concept, which is defmable in itself independently from that support.
As we shall see, forms and structures are discussed in Hussed's phenome-
nology, but only insofar as the specifically logical aspects of expression are
concerned, where expression loses its linguistic character and acquires the
pure signification of a logical category.
Secondly, whereas linguistic structuralism deals with language in general,
in order to discover what a language is as a system of elements available for
the act of linguistic communication, and at the same time, to prepare a whole,
coherent, and strict set of methodological instruments applicable to any
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 231

particular linguistic survey, Hussed's phenomenological analysis turns to

"language in general" only to acquire those notions of a linguistic-gnoseologic
kind which constitute a necessary introduction to the study of pure logic. In
Logical Researches the author deals with the problem of language, since he
wants to point out the fundamental cOl).cepts on which logic should be built.
The study of language appears in this way to be strongly conditioned by a
perspective according to which the fmal aim is the determination of the
cognitive bases of pure logic. Notwithstanding this subordination of linguistic
researches, which have to offer a ".{:larification" of the concepts at the basis
of the construction of logical theory, the very subtle analyses carried out by
Hussed, above all in the First Research, attain, however, results which have
bearing upon linguistic problematics beyond this subordination.
Nonetheless, we cannot forget that such a subordination exists. Our author
begins his discussion of logic with the problem of language in a study aimed
at discovering the characters and structures of language which appear as in
some way a beginning of logical reflection itself: logic, at the beginning, is
meta -language.

2. EXPRESSION AND INDICATION OR COMMUNICATION

In paragraph 1 of the First Research a clear distinction is made between

"expression" (Ausdntck) and "sign" (Zeichen); the latter is replaced by the
more precise term "signal" (Anzeichen), which assumes the function of
indicating or communicating (Anzeigen), as distinct from the function of
signifying (Bedeuten) which belongs to the "expression." Whereas expressions
mean, signs or signals indicate or communicate. The sign as a signal is an object
(a state of things), which, to the subject perceiving it, constitutes a reason to
presume the existence of another perceptible object or state of affairs. The
motivation leading from the first obiect (the indicative) to the second (the
indicated) is described as not "evident." In fact, in the recall mechanism
involved in indicating, we have neither demonstrative evidence, since the
passage from the indicative to the indicated is based on a purely associate
link, nor intuitive evidence, since the indicated is only a presumed object. In
this sense, we must consider signs both to be nonartificial signals like the
canals on Mars and fossil bones, the former pointing to the existence on Mars
of intelligent beings, the latter to the existence of antediluvian animals, and
to be the signals "formed arbitrarily with the aim of indicating" such as
branding, marking with chalk, and so on.
In the expression too, which, in its way, is a sign, a linguistic sign, a kind
232 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

of recall or sending back occurs: from the perceptible sign of expression,

which is a phonetic or graphic complex, to a content or meaning and more
exactly to an act conferring the sense or the meaning. It would be well to
make clear here that in the Logical Researches, sense (Sinn) and meaning
(Bedeutung) are equivalent terms.
Expression is therefore a complex act in which the aim is a meaning,
through a material or perceptible support that, as we will see, may be effec-
tively perceived or simply imagined or represented. To express is therefore
"an act of meaning which fmds support in the intuitive content of the repre-
sentation of the word but is essentially different from the intuitive intention
addressed to the word itself." 4
Before beginning the discussion of the most important subject of this
analysis, the co-presence in linguistic speech of the two characters of the sign,
to indicate and to express, to communicate and to mean, it is necessary to
consider the reasons which are at the basis of the distinction. In what way
is the "signal" as an indication different from the "expression", from the
meaning? The answer to these questions will lead us to results that we can
use when we are dealing with the interlacing, in human speech, between com-
munication and expression.
In the indication, the indicative and the indicated are things, perceptible
things, even if not actually perceived. We do not exclude from the essence
of indication the possibility that the object indicated may be really perceived.
What is indicated by the canals on Mars, hence the presence of intelligent
beings on Mars, is, naturally, only a presumed object, but, however much it
is implicit in the indication, it is theoretically possible that under unusual
circumstances, it may really be perceived_ On the other hand, in the signi-
ficative expression, only the perceptible support of the expression can be
perceived - the object meant absolutely cannot be. It is of course true that
our author talks about filling out the meaning through perception. Thus,
if I talk about a certain horse, the person listening to me can fill out the
signification of my expressions only when he has direct perception of that
animal and of the things I am saying about it, for example, that it is black
with white patches_ But, as we know, the perception of the object, referred
to by the meaning or the sense of an expression, is not essential to the under-
standing of the meaning: there is a purely symbolic use of language in which
realization of the reference to an object is lacking, a use where language
performs its expressive and communicative function perfectly. Thus the
meaning as such, the meaning as pure meaning, cannot be the object of
perception; only the object, which the meaning refers to, may be perceptible,
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 233

but we know that Hussed makes an unequivocal distinction between the

meaning and the object. The affirmation that a meaning cannot be a per-
ceptible object is the same as the thesis that meaning has an ideal nature. 5
Therefore, we have in the indication two perceptible objects, the indicative
and the indicated, and their relationship is such that they c~ theoretically
invert their roles, as in the relation between cause and effect, where the cause
can be the signal of the effect, but also the effect can become a signal, thus
disclosing the phenomenon which caused it. The rain falling can be considered
as a signal that my clothes will get wet, but my wet clothes are a signal of the
rain that has fallen.
On the other hand, expression is not a matter of two perceptible objects,
and - strictly speaking - of even one object. Indeed, the perceptible support
of the expression is not necessarily a perceptible object; from a certain point
of view, it is a purely ideal object. We notice the perceptible support of the
expression as "existing" (daseiend) only when the expression is found in
communicative speech. But this does not happen when the expressions are in
isolated or solitary speech.

Usually in fact, in this case, we accept represented words in the place of real ones. In our
imagination we see a word - a pronounced or printed sign - a word which really does
not exist .... The nonexistence of the word does not bother us. Besides, it does not
interest us. It has no relevance to the function of the expression as expression. 6

It follows that, in solitary speech, the word as sound or writing is only a

represented or imagined word and, as such, represents a purely interior fact
carrying out perfectly its function of recalling the act which gives meaning:
two purely interior facts or acts, the act which represents the perceptible sign
and the act which gives meaning. But since sign and signification are closely
connected, and the first one has the sole function of recalling the second or
substituting for it - like a print substitutes for the object represented -
we can conclude that the expressive act, in solitary speech, appears to be a
complex interior act which is essentially unitary. We have to make clear too
that, in this complex act, what is really important for Husserl is the act which
gives the signification. The perceptible support has a subordinate function,
like the act which perceives it or represents it. The ultimate aim of the
expressive act is to constitute or to determine the meaning. We may say that
Husserl's linguistics of expression are essentially linguistics of meaning,
meaning as an ideal identity: linguistics which are, in a preliminary phase, a
kind of logic, insofar as logic is the doctrine of forms, and forms have as their
necessary basis a meaning in their ideal state. In fact, the constitution of the
234 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

logical forms is conditioned by the existence of significations, since the forms

are only forms of the significations.
The most complex and interesting problem of this phenomenological
analysis of speech is the distinction between expression and communication
and their relationship in linguistic conversation which is at the same time ex-
pression and communication. We have seen that there is one kind of linguistic
speech, solitary or interior speech, which is only expression, expression
without communication, where the perceptible sign, which recalls the act
giving the sense or the signification, is purely represented or imagined. In the
Logical Researches, the author does not consider the problem of the origin
of the linguistic form of this solitary speech, which is pure expression; he
does not ask himself how and why this speech, in its solitary development,
necessarily uses the same signs as are adopted in communicative conversation.
He confronts this problem later, in the Crisis of the European sciences (in
appendix 3), in dealing with the origin of geometry. In the First Research,
paragraph 7, there is only a fleeting allusion to the fact that the commu-
nicative function in speech is basic with respect to the expressive function:
"considering expression above all in its communicative function, which was
its original [urspriingliche] destiny."
Let us now examine the problem of the distinction between expression
and communication and their relationship in conversation, which contains
both. The concept of expression simply implies recalling, or pointing to, the
meaning. The perceptible sign has that exclusive function. To understand a
proposition is the same as to grasp the meaning, and to grasp the meaning
of a proposition is the same as to use it as an expression. The meaning of
expression, the simple recall from the perceptible sign to the signification,
is demonstrated to us quite evidently by a scientific proposition, e.g., a
geometric proposition. Here we have two possibilities: I can formulate this
geometric proposition in a solitary experience, e.g., while I am talking to
myself; or I can pronounce this proposition by addressing myself to a listener,
informing him about a certain geometric property of the triangle. In the first
case we have pure expression without communication, in the second we
have both expression and communication simultaneously in the linguistic
experience of both speaker and listener; expression, because both my listener
and myself can understand the Signification of this proposition; communica-
tion, because I intend to make another person understand that signification,
and because this person, hearing me talk, understands that I am making a
judgment and that I intend to arouse the same act in another person, that is,
I want to communicate a piece of information to him. Hussed examines the
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 235

problem of communication, mainly assuming the point of view of the listener

who is receiving the communication. What can the speaker communicate to a
listener? What can be the object or content of the communication? Can the
meaning, as such, form the contents of the communication? Let us answer
first this last question. We have understood that the signification is the content
of the expressive act and that linguistic speech, inasmuch as it is communica-
tion, is composed of signals, and the signals "do not express anything", that
is, they do not signify. Nevertheless, HusserI admits that "the expressions in
living conversation assume the function of the signal at the same time" 7 and
he adds that in communicative discourse the speaker gives the words a sense
(Sinn) that he wants to communicate (mitteilen) to the listener:

The articulated phonic complex becomes a spoken word, communicative discourse,

merely by dint of the fact that the speaker produces it intentionally "to express himself"
through it, "about something"; in other words, by dint of the fact that in some psychical
acts he gives them a sense that he wants to communicate to the listener. 8

Therefore, a spoken proposition which has a signification that expresses

itself about something is an expression which becomes communication in
concrete dialogue. It is expression, acting, ipso facto, as a signal. In acting
as a signal, it thus communicates a meaning or a sense. Then, can a signal -
the expression having become a signal - be a signal of a signification? Does
this contradict the view that the sign has a signification only insofar as it is
expression, and that signs, as signals, "do not express anything"? It is true that
HusserI, to the view that signals do not express anything, adds the following
proviso, "unless they carry out the function of conveying a meaning over and
above the function of indicating." But this does not exclude the fact that
both functions remain separate in the same sign - word or proposition - that
acts at times as expression and at times as a signal, and that when acting as
expression it signifies and when acting as a signal, it communicates. On the
other hand, in the above case, we seem to have a signal communicating a
signification, a signal which is the signal of a signification. This would destroy
the distinction, according to which expression is the expression of a significa-
tion and a signal is the signal (indicative) of an indicated object (which is not
a signification). In the case examined above, the two functions would seem to
be fused together, the signal communicating the meaning or indicating the
meaning. HusserI brings us face to face with that difficulty without giving a
clear solution. Perhaps the difficulty could be avoided by affirming that there
is a fundamental type of communication in which the speaker by the act of
speech intends to promote in the listener an analogous act of significative
236 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

expression at the very moment that he articulates a proposition. In this case,

the act of linguistic communication, as communication or a signal, does not
communicate or indicate a signification; on the contrary, it provokes or
arouses (indicates) a judgment or an expression, which can be made by the
listener, who can only express or understand the meaning by himself.
The specific content of communication, as distinct from expression, is
constituted by that function of linguistic expressions that HusserI calls
"informative." All the expressions in communicative conversation that act
as signals "are useful as signs of the 'thoughts' of the speaker, e.g., of his
psychically lived experiences which give the sense, just like other psychically
lived experiences which are contained in the communicative intention." The
content of the communication is composed of psychically lived experiences
which, in that way, are made known. Linguistic expressions act as signals of
the psychically lived experiences, that is, of the acts made by the speaker.
Even when they are acts which give sense to certain expressions or proposi-
tions, what the speaker has said is the whole of the acts or psychically lived
experiences and not the sense or the signification given in them. HusserI
defines the comprehension of information as a kind of intuition or inadequate
perception. The psychically lived experiences which make a person of a
speaker cannot, strictly speaking, be contained in the intuition of anyone
else:

the listener perceives that the speaker externaIises certain psychically lived experiences,
and to a certain extent he perceives them, but he does not live them himself, he does not
have an internal perception of them but only an external one.

The distinction between the content of expression (the meaning) and

the content of communication (the acts or the psychically lived experiences
of the speaker) is illustrated very clearly by an example in paragraph 11 of
the First Research, which refers to a geometric proposition. Concerning
the linguistic act of the speaker, who, addressing himself to his listener,
enunciates a geometric proposition, what can we attribute to the meaning and
therefore to the expressive function of the sign in its strict sense, and what
can we attribute to the content of the communication? Should we speak of
meaning, says the author, we obviously "do not intend the lived experience
which gives the significance." The meaning consists precisely in the strictly
geometric content of the proposition, that ideal content which can be re-
ceived identically by those who are trying to understand the meaning of that
proposition. On the other hand, the content of the communication will be
the psychically lived experience of the speaker, that is, the judgment being
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 237

expressed by the speaker when, addressing himself to a listener, he pronounces

the proposition. This is expressed in a very clear way:
If I say (in a discourse we are supposing to be true), "the three perpendiculars of a
triangle intersect at one point", obviously at the basis of this statement we always have
the fact that I judge it to be thus. The person who is hearing and understanding me talk
knows this too, that is, he perceives me as one who judges it to be in this way. But is
my judgment which I am making known here also the .signification of the enunciated
proposition? Is that what the pronouncement means and in this sense leads it to expres-
sion? Certainly not. Usually, nobody will understand the question related to the sense
and to the signification in such a way that he is forced to think of judgment considered
as a psychically lived experience. Rather, to such a question everybody will give this
answer: what this sentence states is the same thing, whoever affirms it by pronouncing it,
and independently from the circumstances and the time when it is pronounced; and this
same thing is just that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect at one point -
nothing more, nothing less.

The content of the communication, of which the pronounced word is a

signal, is "my act of judgment that I made known here." To make known
and to communicate or indicate are equivalent terms. What I communicate or
tell is not the sense as the ideal content of the announcement, which remains
identical regardless of the single act of the person who, under different
circumstances, will pronounce it; what I communicate to my listener are my
acts, my thoughts, my psychically lived experiences among which are not
only the judgments through which I formulate a proposition, but also the
desires, the hopes, the doubts, the wishes. In these last, a coincidence can
occur between what is the object of the announcement, which therefore
constitutes its signification, and what has been communicated, in this specific
case, my judgments.
In a proposition such as "I would like a glass of water" I am indicating a
desire, but at the same time I am formulating a proposition in which my
desire is a component of the signification of the sentence and, therefore, of
its object too, since every signification contains reference to the object. It is
only a partial coincidence between what is meant and what is signaled, since
what is signaled is not only my deSire, as a psychically lived experience of the
speaker, but the act too through which I judge or formulate the proposition.
This judgment is not included in the meaning of the announcement.

3. COMPARISON WITH SAUSSURE AND CROCE

This interconnection of expression and communication, in the concrete

dialogue process, is one of the most important topics in the First Research;
238 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

but we must not forget that, for the author, solitary discourse - as purely
significative and in which expression is always and only used as expression
and never as a signal - represents the kind of speech most worthy of atten-
tion. In the phenomenological analysis of language, the main problem, the
fundamental one, is the problem of the recall from the linguistic sign to the
signification; this recall is always carried in the expressive act, which aims
purely at meaning, and the expressive act is fully realized "in the isolated
psychic life." Therefore, in solitary speech only the "informative function",
or the communication of the word, is lacking, but certainly not its expressive
or significative function, which, in the Logical Researches, is undoubtly the
most important one.

The word ceases to be word only when our interest is directed exclusively toward the
perceptible thing, to the word as a simple phonic complex. But when we live in its under-
standing, it expresses and always expresses the same thing, whether or not addressed to
someone. 9

We must consider the fundamental fact that the "signification of the

expression" must not be confused with its informative function, in other
words, with the content of the communication. Certainly, in Husserl's analysis
of speech, expression and communication, expressive words and signals,
signification and information are clearly distinguished. This distinction
constitutes one of the most interesting and original aspects of the studies
contained in the First Research.
The purely expressive moment of the linguistic act to which Husserl gives
particular emphasis is the moment when the thought externalises, so to speak,
its own contents in words, sentences (simple or complex), and chains of
sentences. The linguistic meaning is then the content of the thought, concept,
or idea which is fixed or externalised in the same way in the perceptible
sign of the expression. We shall examine later the manner in which this
externalisation 10 in the perceptible sign should be understood, and hence the
linguistic form, from the position adopted in the Logical Researches to those
adopted later. It is sufficient for the moment to consider the fact that the
expressive act, through which a certain sense or meaning is given to the
perceptible sign of the word, is an act by which the thought, the thinking
subject, informs itself, through the process of verbal expression, about its
own contents, the results of its own reflections. For the moment Husserl does
not explain how this autonomous moment in expression, where the thinking
subject seems to reveal himself to himself, depends indirectly on the distinct
intersubjective process of communication and exchange, and, how, on the
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 239

other hand, this latter depends on the former. The author wants, first of
all, to distinguish clearly between the two moments and to make quite clear
that the process of the determination or fixing of the meaning is a purely
expressive process. They are fundamentally two different attitudes of the
thinking subject: one attitude in which the subject faces the world of his own
experiences, including the experiences of others as men and human beings,
and tries to obtain certain conceptions or meanings, along with their articula-
tions and connections; and another attitude, in which the thinking subject
looks for collaboration and exchange with others, in order to expand his
world of knowledge or perhaps to correct and modify it. The importance of
communication with others, on a practical plane, is beyond all question here.
Certainly, Husserl feels a deep need to keep the two attitudes distinct in his
theorization of expressive speech and of communicative speech. The linguistic
distinction springs directly from a phenomenological distinction between the
intentional act, whatever it may be, which is a psychically lived experience,
an Erlebnis, and what is given in it as objective content. The expression, or
rather, the expressive act, aims at the objective content, configured as signi-
fication. Communication, instead, has as its specific content the intentional
act in its empirical reality, the psychically lived experience, whatever it may
be, e.g., a judgment or a purely practical attitude, such as a desire or a will.
At the basis of Hussed's distinction there may be some gaps, some obscure
points, some difficulties. We pointed out only one of these, but we also
suggested a fairly easy way to overcome it. Nobody can deny, I think, the
legitimacy of the need for the distinction he gave in a form that is undoubtedly
singular and original. In any case, nobody will deny a problem concerning the
distinction. Anyone who only sees in speech the character of communication
runs the risk of not even understanding the meaning of speech as communica-
tion. This is the pitfall encountered by the linguistic theory contained in
Wittgenstein's Philosophische Untersuchungen. 11
It might be interesting to compare Husserl's position on this point with
that of two other scholars of quite different origin, namely, Saussure and
Croce.
In Saussure's general linguistics, in his reflections on the semiological
nature of language, we fmd nothing analogous to Hussed's distinction of
expression and communication. He directs his attention and his interest to
the essentially communicative character of speech. Every linguistic act
(parole), which is conditioned by language (in itself a social institution),
draws from language its property of being comprehensible and communica-
tive. It is true that Saussure gives ample space to the individual who, in the
240 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

linguistic act, can express his personal thought in the parole. The individuality
and personality of the linguistic act, according to Saussure, consists mainly
in the freedom given to each speaker to combine the signs of language in
various ways, making a unique use of the code. But this sphere of freedom
given to the individual in linguistics does not mean it can be compared to
what HusserI calls expression. Even though the Genevan linguist, referring to
that sphere, sometimes uses the term exprimer, as in "exprimer sa pensee
dans une phrase", 12 we have to remember the sphere he designates is only the
sphere of the parole, of the linguistic act, as opposed to the sphere of the
langue. Here the distinction, the opposition, is between parole and langue
and certainly not between expression and communication. To exclude any
possibility of a comparison between the free combination in the linguistic
act or Saussure's parole and HusserI's concept of expression, it is enough to
consider the fact that, within the linguistic act, Saussure feels absolutely no
need for a distinction between a purely expressive linguistic act and a com-
municative linguistic act. It does not even occur to him to devote much space
in his study of speech to the examination of that kind of discourse that
HusserI has called solitary or isolated. On the contrary, since HusserI was not
interested in the problem of language as a system, as a social institution,
nor in the distinction and opposition of langue and parole, he devoted a
considerable part of his inquiry above all to the distinction between merely
expressive or significative speech (solitary discourse) and communicative
discourse (dialogue) and thereafter, within the communicative discourse
where the two functions always intersect, to the distinction between the
word as expression and the word as a signal.
The reasons why Saussure felt no need to distinguish between expression
and communication have perhaps to be sought in the drastic way he interprets
the relation between thought and speech. We know that for him "the thOUght
in itself is a nebulous mass where nothing is necessarily defmed" and "nothing
is distinct before the appearance of language." 13 This clear position excludes
any possibility of considering the activity of thought as autonomous and
independent of the linguistic form, or of dealing with the activity of thought
and the linguistic forms as two different terms, entering in various ways into
a relationship of mutual conditioning, to which the activity of thought is not
always necessarily linked. Saussure's reflections left these problems totally to
one side. On general lines the linguist Hjelmslev confirmed in "Language and
Thought" (1936)14 Saussure's thesis about the necessary dependence of the
activity of thought on the linguistic form. He put the question of the relation
between them in a fairIy problematic form by seriously considering the
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 241

opposite thesis and discussing the validity of certain of Saussure's arguments.

Hjelmslev made certain distinctions like that of thought-system and thought-
habits, directly coded in one language, and left the door open for a conclusion
differing from the one arrived at by the author himself.
In Saussure there is none of this, but only a drastic identification of
thought, as real thought capable of internal articulation and organization, and
linguistic form, in the sense that linguistic form contains the articulations
of thought, and that these articulations of thought cannot be divided from
linguistic form. This position on the thought-language relation, which differs
from Husserl's - as we shall see - prevents Saussure from considering expres-
sion as distinct from communication. Purely expressive activity, as is found
in Husserl's phenomenological study, is a linguistic activity that presupposes,
on the one hand, the thought, the thinking subject, in the act of selecting
or intentionally establishing its own objects or contents, and on the other
hand, the linguistic sign, which is destined to assume the function of sign or
expression of those contents. How far and in what way those intentional
contents can be distinguished from their respective linguistic signs is a very
complex question which should be investigated more closely, but what is
certain is that in Husserl's study there is the need for, and the problem
of, such a distinction and the various ways in which their relationship is
determined. The total absence of this need, and this problem, in Saussure's
problematics, prevents the author from having even a glimpse of the existence
of an autonomous problematic of expression.
On the other hand, notable analogies can be found if we compare Husserl's
philosophy of language with Benedetto Croce's. Although they were con-
temporaries they did not know each other. However, one common element
ideally unites them: both are linked, though in different ways, to idealism
and to the problem of the transcendental. While Croce does not deny this
historical basis of his philosophy, which places it in a particular relationship
to the positions of Kant and Hegel, Husserl declares his independence from
the philosophical tradition and refuses a Kantian or neo-Kantian interpretation
of phenomenological transcendentalism. Yet the fact that he cannot avoid
using the term transcendental, which is so often associated with the terms
ego, subject, consciousness; the fact that he vigorously centered his own
phenomenological studies on the constituting activity of consciousness, an
activity that was defmed many times as productive and creative; and the
fact that, in Cartesian Meditations, he sets this consciousness as the tran-
scendental basis of the world; all these facts, in my opinion, are sufficient
reasons to consider Husserl's transcendental phenomenology as linked to the
242 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

transcendental-idealistic school of thought. The notable differences existing

between HusserI's phenomenological idealism, which implies phenomenolog-
ical reduction, and the historical idealism of Croce, which is defmed as
abolute, cannot hide the affinity of problems and interests forming an ideal
cormection between the two philosophies.
Croce too, like HusserI, clearIy distinguishes between speech as expression
and speech as communication, and he considers communication to be non-
essential to the linguistic act. It is true that Croce defmes communication
as a purely practical fact. Recalling his "dialectic of the distinct", where
two theoreticai forms - art and philosophy - and two practical forms -
economics and ethics - are operating, he places communicative conversation
in the practical sphere, and expressive speech in the theoretical sphere, in the
sphere of art, to be precise. On the other hand, HusserI, who, unlike Croce,
does not distinguish between the theoretical and the practical spheres, defines
communicative conversation and expressive discourse on the basis of their
contents. While the former, the communicative one, has as its content the
acts and the psychically lived experiences of the speaking subject, expressive
discourse deals with the objective state of signification.
Notwithstanding the difference in the philosophical terminology used by
the two philosophers to defme linguistic communication, we cannot help
noticing that, for HusserI too, communication with its content, the psychi-
cally lived experiences, which must be considered empirically true, does not,
strictly speaking, belong to the sphere of knowledge, whose objects are pure
ideal essences.
A lesser affmity is observed between the two philosophers as to the
concept of expression. Whereas, according to HusserI, expression is the
linguistic act by which the signification constitutes itself verbally, and while
he attributes a specifically logical sense to this term, such as, for example, the
"signification" of a geometrical proposition, in Croce, on the other hand,
expression is intuition, vision, knowledge of the individual, art and poetry.
The logical sphere is distinguished from the purely expressive sphere; the
former Croce terms philosophical, but adds that philosophy implies, or
assumes in itself, the previous form, that of art or expression. Here enormous
difficulties arise over the linguistic problem, since logical or philosophical
thought has its own way of expressing itself, or verbally externalising itself.
Indeed, Croce states that a thought mayor may not be logical but can only
be linguistic. Then, if speech is expression, and expression is art, is logical or
philosophical thought artistic too? But logical or philosophical thought
becoming art is no longer logical and philosophical thought. Logical or
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 243

philosophical thought cannot therefore be linguistic, cannot be expressed.

Croce tried to overcome these difficulties in Poetry (1935), in which he dis-
tinguished between artistic or poetical expression - expression in a pregnant
or genuine sense - and expression in prose which is the expression of logical
or philosophical thought; expression that he considers - unlike artistic
expression - to be perfectly translatable from one language to another and
for which he utilizes, for the first time, a notion similar to that of the sign,
which Husserl himself had already adopted for defming the concepts of
expression and communication.
Taking into account the difficulties noted above and the manner in which
Croce, in the field of the philosophy of speech in general, tries to overcome
them, the central thesis, according to which "a thought mayor may not be
logical but can only be linguistic" , appears insufficiently motivated. Why does
a thought have to be linguistic? To this question Croce gives no satisfactory
answer. It is true that he does not feel the need, which is strongly felt by
HusserI, to explain how the thought, the thinking subject, to which a certain
autonomous field for operation is given, succeeds in expressing its intentional
contents through a verbal sign.

4. THE PROBLEM OF THE LINK BETWEEN LOGICAL THOUGHT

AND LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION

HusserI is convinced that logical thought depends in part on linguistic forms.

This is the reason why so much space in the Logical Researches is devoted to
the problem of language. The First and the Fourth Researches are entirely
linguistic. Studies on language constitute a necessary introduction to the
construction of pure logic. We are familiar with the point of view of those
studies, which involves a distinct theory of knowledge. For HusserI, research
on language means studying the linguistic dimension of knowledge, the
discovery of the part played by linguistic form in the experience and the
knowledge that the subject has of himself and of the worId. Since the point
of view of the studies on language is critical-cognitive, and since the studies
on speech are a necessary basis for the specifically and strictly logical re-
searches, we must conclude that for HusserI pure logic necessarily implies the
theory of knowledge.
In paragraph 2 of the introduction to the Logical Researches HusserI states
clearly the necessary link between a certain type of theoretical study and
linguistic form, even though he admits that a theoretical study does not
develop only through acts of expression:
244 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

Every theoretical study, although in no way developed simply through acts of expression
or even assertions, leads, in the last analysis, to assertions. Only in this form does truth,
and particularly theory, become the permanent property of science, a property con-
stituted by a complete set of documents, always available, for the continuous progress
of knowledge and research. "

In such propositions we are dealing with an aspect of linguistic formula-

tion, writing, which makes the results of knowledge more stable and the
possibility of their communication greater. (This topic was, eventually, the
subject of careful examination in On the Origins of Geometry, published in
1936.)
We are now interested in emphasizing the fact that, according to Hussed,
a truth, and particularly a theory, acquires the character of science only
through linguistic form, that is, through the expressive acts that bind certain
cognitive contents to certain linguistic signs. This point is reiterated in the
following statements:

Whether or not for essential reasons the connection of the acts of thought and oflanguage
(in other words, the way of exhibiting the resolving judgment in the form of assertion)
is necessary, it is certain that judgments belonging to the upper sphere, above all to the
scientific sphere, cannot be made if they are not expressed in one language.

Therefore, judgments belonging to the upper sphere are obviously linguis-

tic. Does there then exist a sphere distinct from the upper or scientific one
where we have the faculty to make a judgment without any connection with
verbal expression? This is a question that the author does not answer for the
moment, although the topic is dealt with in a later work, Erfahnmg und
Urteil, where a kind of knowledge is dermed, of the first degree, in which
the logical-linguistic form of predicative judgment is still absent.
As for the upper sphere of judgment, which directly concerns logic, Husserl
has no doubts; it is of necessity connected with linguistic form. But, in the
preceding lines, another aspect of the question is revealed: the care, the
caution, with which he considers the problem of the connection of the acts
of thought with linguistic forms. Husserl seems to be on such uncertain
ground here as to admit the possibility that the connection might not be
necessary, from an essential point of view. And these doubts are, in some
way, in contrast with the certainty that he clearly shows concerning such a
connection in relation to the upper sphere of judgment.
The thesis that proper logical thOUght must be linguistic thought is con-
firmed by Husserl, some thirty years later, in the work that represents the
most mature phase of his studies on logic, Formale und traszendentale Logik.
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 245

In it he states that scientific formations "are expressed through language and

are entrusted to documents for posterity", and, referring to the concept of
thought in. the more general sense, he further states:

considering the fact that human thought usually takes place in language and that ab-
solutely all manifestations of reason are linked to speech, considering the fact that every
criticism from which the truth must appear in the rational sphere utilizes language, since
it is intersubjective criticism and always leads in the end to some assertions, then it is not
the simple acts of thought and the simple thought that come directly under discussion,
but above all the acts of assertion and the thoughts as assertion. 15

In the Researches it was stated that judgments belonging to the upper sphere
can be made only if they are expressed in a language, and here that thesis is
confirmed in substance, by the analogous statement that "absolutely all
manifestations of reason are linked to language." Whereas in the Researches
mention is made of the important problem of the essential necessity of the
connection of the acts of thought and of language, here the problem is not
even mentioned. But the discussion in the Logic is also deficient in respect of
another aspect of the linguistic problem; in all the analyses carried out with
a view to defining the concept of logic as formal logic which should have a
transcendental foundation, no explanation is given of the relationship linking
concrete or natural speech to the artificial and symbolic language of mathe-
maticallogic.
The need for a link between scientific thought, deductive thought, and
linguistic formations is confirmed in appendix 3 of Crisis, On the Origins of
Geometry. But along with this we also fmd in this work of 1936 a different
way of understanding the function of the linguistic sign related to the ideal
identity of meanings.
The main problem concerns the passage of the ideality of geometry - and
consequently of the other sciences too - from its initial phase, "originally
intrapersonal, for which reason it is a formation which belongs to the con-
scious space in the soul of the first inventor", to its ideal objectiveness. The
passage from the subjective character of the first act of knowledge - an act
celebrated inside the individual who is isolated in his cognitive experiences -
to the objective character of pieces of knowledge which are thus shown to be
differently based, is possible only through language, in which those pieces of
knowledge are incarnated.
Language can transform a purely intrasubjective formation into an objective
formation, by the sole fact that it makes a psychic, internal, and subjective
piece of knowledge become an intersubjective piece of knowledge, that is, an
246 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

ideal objectiveness. Thus, objectiveness is ideal only insofar as it is the content

of an intersubjective piece of knowledge. In isolated experience, the single
knowing subject cannot reach such objectiveness.

The original presence itself in the actuality of the flrst productive act, that is, in the
original "evidence", does not lead to a permanent result, entitled to an objective
existence. 16

A permanent, stable result cannot even be obtained by the knowing

subject through the reactivation of past evidence, through the memory. In
this case, too, we "do not succeed in bypassing the subject, nor its subjective
possibilities of evidence," Objectiveness can only be attained by communi-
cation "in the connection provided by mutual linguistic comprehension."
It is owing to linguistic communication that the "original product and the
productive act of the single subject can be understood actively by others."
As we can see, the link between scientific thought and speech is unequivo-
cally reaffirmed. But there is a radical difference in the manner in which the
function of the linguistic sign is defmed in relation to the cognitive activity of
the thinking subject, who fmds in the linguistic sign the element by whose
means he can obtain ideal objectivity. Why, now, are we stating that an ideal
objectivity is such, only insofar as it is the permanent and stable content
of intersubjective communication? Here the objectifying function of the
linguistic sign is identified with the simple function of communication and
the exchange of ideas among knowing subjects. A cognitive content, like,
for example, a geometrical formation, can become an ideal objective fact only
when different knowing subjects, through the same linguistic signs, can identi-
cally address their thought to one and the same objective content. We have
come a long way from the theses of the Researches, wherein the distinction
of expression and communication was explained along with the consequent
statement that "the meaning" is content related to expression and not to
communication, and that communication, being what it is, is only a signal
and has the function of indicating and not meaning. In On the Origns of
Geometry the position is reversed with respect to the Logical Researches. In
it, in fact, communication was considered as nonessential for expression, and
expression was considered perfectly apt to establish the ideal objectivity of
the meaning. The objectivity of the cognitive content was a fact regarding
essentially the relation between the thinking subject and his own cogitata.
The cognitive subject, in its intention to stablize, fix, or determine its own
cognitive contents, met with the linguistic sign, which was exactly suited for
such a purpose. Thus expression and not communication was considered as
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 247

essential to language. Expression alone placed the cognitive subject in direct

relationship with his own intentional objects. If we split the expression that
has a sense - says Husserl in paragraph 8 of the First Research - into its
two components, "expression" and "sense", "we see that the word itself is
indifferent, but the sense, on the other. hand, is what is "aimed at" with the
word, what is intended by means of this sign." The expression detaches
interest from itself, to concentrate it on the meaning that it evokes. But all
this mainly concerns the single subject in its direct relationship to its own
contents. Therefore, it is stated that "the signification of the expression is
what belongs to it as essence, and this cannot be identified with its informative
or communicative function." And it is denied that solitary psychical discourse
is a kind of communicative discourse, in which the subject communicates in
some way with himself. In solitary discourse, the subject has a relationship
only to his own objective facts and it is through this discourse that he takes
them for ideal objective fact. This does not mean that Husserl in the Logical
Researches has not understood the importance of communicative discourse
with relation to expressive discourse as well. When he attributes a commu-
nicative function to expressions themselves, he means that an expressive act,
made by a single subject in a communicative function, can provide a similar
expressive act in another subject. Accordingly, a single judgment pronounced
by a single subject toward another subject, can arouse in the latter the same
judgment. In paragraph 7 of the First Research he states:

the articulated phonetic complex (the written sign, etc.) will change into a spoken word,
into a communicative discourse in general, for the simple reason that whoever is speaking
produces it intentionally "to pronounce on something", that is, he gives it, in certain
psychical acts, a sense he wants to communicate to the listener.

It is certain, in any case, that in the Logical Researches expression as pure

expression, and therefore distinct and autonomous from communication,
constitutes the primary basis in the determination of meanings as ideal objec-
tivities; while communication takes on a subordinate function in relation to
expression, and to the very determination and stabilization of significations.
In the 1936 work, on the contrary, communication, the intersubjective
exchange of ideas and cognitive contents assumes a primary function in the
process of objectifying meanings. A cognitive content becomes an objective
and ideal entity only insofar as it is the content of intersubjective knowledge,
and intersubjective knowledge is possible only through the communicative
function of the linguistic sign. In this way the communicative function is
considered primary and as fundamentally related to the expressive function.
248 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

This thesis is confirmed and to a certain extent enlarged by the importance

that the author attaches to the written, documented linguistic expression
which creates a strengthening and limitless amplification of communication
beyond the fleeting exchange of the spoken discourse, when the speaking
subject addresses a listening subject hic et nunc. Written discourse constitutes
a "virtual communication", allowing the infinite repetition of one selfsame
identical communication. Therefore, it strengthens the character of stability,
identity, and objectivity of the ideal significations:

Through written recording, we produce a modification of the original character of the

formation of a sense ... the evidence, so to speak, fossilizes. But the reader can make
it evident again, he can reactivate it.

HusserI admits the written expression can be grasped in "passive com-

prehension", which should, however, be distinguished from the act by which
we can reactivate the sense of an expression. A written expression has its
own specific communicative value, since for every cognitive subject it makes
possible, without limits, the reactivation of the evidence of its original sense.
The characteristics of the written expression, in relation to its possibility as
a continuous reactivation of the evidence of its sense, recall certain charac-
teristics of the expression. In order to allow such reactivation in the identity
of an evident meaning, the expression must be given in an equally clear way.
The formation of the words, of the propositions, and of the verbal links
should be carried out most carefully. The perfect realization of the commu-
nication, through the written discourse, depends on certain characteristics of
the expressive act, which formulates concepts, judgments, and deductions.
But only through communication - or, more specifically, through written
communication - can we reach a higher degree of objectivation and idealiza-
tion of the contents of scientific knowledge.

5. THE PROBLEM OF A POSSIBLE INDEPENDENCE OF

INTENTIONAL ACTIVITY AND OF ITS COGNITIVE
CONTENTS FROM LINGUISTIC EXPRESSION

The phenomenological investigation of language leads us to another problem,

namely, to the possible independence, within certain limits and at a certain
level, of cognitive experience, of the contents of thought, in relation to the
linguistic forms, that is, of a possible priority of the contents of thought in
relation to their linguistic expression. We have seen that, in the introduction
to the Logical Researches, no solution was given to the problem of whether
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 249

the link between thought and word or the expression of a definite judgment
in the form of an assertion, was necessary in essence. The question was raised
on that occasion, whether the essence of thought and of its intentional objects
was not necessarily connected with the linguistic element. A positive answer
was given to this question in the Fifth Research, where it was recognized that
its arguments were valid. While admitting that an utterance or an assertion is
a strictly unitary, lived experience, made up of one single act, in which we
perceive a bodily aspect (the perceptible sign) and a spiritual one (the content
or meaning given by the act of signification), the author nevertheless under-
lines the fact that in this unity the perceptible'sign, the phonetic complex, or
the physical expression has the value of a nonessential element. Among the
reasons for the nonessentiality of the perceptible sign he points to the fact
that its place could be taken by any other phonetic complex, having quite
the same function; but he develops a further, wider explanation by arguing
that the perceptible sign, the phonetic complex "could even be completely
eliminated." 17 The author seems convinced that, should the perceptible sign
be eliminated, the intentional content temporally belonging to it would
preserve its integrity even after separation from its linguistic form. This
nonessentiality of the perceptible sign of expression related to the content
expressed, leads HusserI to admit the extraessentiality of the very connection
between the former versus the latter, between the linguistic form and the
intentional content of the objectifying act. The extraessentiality of this con-
nection depends on the fact that the expression itself, that is, the perceptible
sign, be it phonetic or graphical, "has no value either as a constituting element
of the objective state of the intentional act as a whole, nor, in general, as
something belonging to it 'intrinsically' or in any way determining it."
Therefore, the linguistic form not only is not an element intrinsic to the
objective state intended by the act, but it is in no way able to determine it.
The author adopts a more moderate and cautious position in paragraph
26 of the Sixth Research, where he states that, in relation to its meaning,
the sign is "completely indifferent", in the sense that a meaning has only a
general need for a supporting content (the perceptible content of the sign)
but any content can represent it, since "no necessary connection can be
found between the specific peculiarity of such a content and the specific
peculiarity of the significative matter, the matter constituting meaning.
HusserI, however, admits that the meaning needs the perceptible sign "and
that it cannot, so to speak, be suspended in mid air." The perceptible sign,
the linguistic form, is something nonessential, something unable to determine
the objective content of the act of meaning, but the meaning seems, almost as
250 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

if by defmition, indissoluble from the perceptible sign, from the linguistic

form expressing it.
The First Research ends with a paragraph entitled 'Meanings "in them-
selves" and expressed meanings', that is, with the thesis that there are mean-
ings which, strictly speaking, should not be given this term, which in normal
use is relative, since it implies the existence of a perceptible sign recalling the
meaning.
We must, however, point out that these meanings which the author calls
meanings "in themselves" are conceivable as ideal unities, without any link
with linguistic expression, only insofar as they are considered as objects or
meanings regarding which the act, which can think or express them, is not yet
realized. For example, such are the objectivities logic, concepts, propositions,
truth. A meaning "in itself" figures, therefore, as an ideal unity possible only
for thought that can actuate it in a cognitive act. It is a meaning without any
link with linguistic form, since it is only thinkable. The author declares it
explicitly, taking on logical meanings as an example:

They form an ideally closed system of general objects, for which the fact that they are
thought or expressed is quite accidental. There are therefore countless meanings which
are, in the common sense of the term, merely possible meanings, whereas they never
come to be expressed and will never be able to be expressed owing to the limits of the
forces of knowledge of man.

Meanings which are never expressed are merely possible meanings. It might,
then, be appropriate to ask, are the meanings which the thinking subject
realizes in an act of knowledge always inevitably connected with expression,
with linguistic form?
Twelve years later,in the first book of the Ideas for a pure phenomenology
and, to be more precise, in the chapter dedicated to the problem of noetic-
noematic structures, HusserI considers whether it is better or, rather, necessary
to extend the terms "to mean" (bedeuten) and "meaning" (Bedeutung)
beyond the linguistic sphere, and to make certain distinctions within the
whole noetic-noematic sphere including all acts, between that which is not
connected and that which is connected with expression. While in the Logical
Researches the term Sinn ("sense") is used as a synonym of Bedeutung
("meaning") and is assumed in a general way in referring to all intentional
Erlebnisse, in the Ideas the term "meaning" (Bedeutung) is specifically
assigned to "expressive" or "logical" meaning, while the term "sense" (Sinn)
is adopted in the widest sense as before.
There is a perception of an object where an object is given with a defmite
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 251

sense, "monothetically placed in defmite fullness." The author calls what is

given in this way "sense of the object", which presupposes a simple perceptive
learning in which we work over the data and unify in a relationship the parts
or remains we have discovered. So, for example, we see that whole, which is
the object, as white. But the fact of this simple seeing of the object being
articulated in its properties "does not in the least call for any 'expression',
neither in the sense of a vocal sound, nor in the sense of a meaning through
words." Language, as verbal expression, implies a "new layer" linked with
"what is aimed at as such" by perception. This new layer, a linguistic one,
is constituted if, in relation to that same object of perception, "we have
thought or affinned: 'this is white.'" What was "aimed at" by simple per-
ception as we described it, in a noematic sense, has become "expressible
through meanings." Husserl adds, then, that "the logical meaning is an
expression."
Here we may observe different identifications: to think is to state; to state
is to express through meanings; logical meaning is expression. While perception
gives me the sense of a unitary articulated object, and, as a simple perceptive
affirmation, does not require an expression at all, the thought or the affirma-
tion of a property of the object, as in ''this is white", implies the presence
of the verbal layer, the expressed meaning, and the expressed meaning is a
logical meaning. "The sound of a word can be called expression only because
it expresses the meaning belonging to it." But the sound of a word has the
power of raising every "neomatic kernel", every sense, to the sphere of Logos:
"Expression is a characteristic form, which can be adopted to every 'sense',
elevating it to the realm of Logos, of concepts and therefore universal."
Under the title "express" a special layer of acts is indicated through which
every noematic sense of act and therefore their relationship and objectivity
assume a conceptual character. To express is an intentional medium with the
property of "reflecting in its form and in its content every other intention, of
reflecting [abbilden) it in a singular way, of representing [einbilden) it in its
own form or concept."
Husserl warns that the terms "reflect" or "represent" "are to be adopted
with caution", since they could alter the precise mediating function of the
verbal layer. Every science, in its theoretical and demonstrative content, "is
objectified in the specific logical medium which is the medium of expression."
The nonexpressive Erlebnisse, with their immanent "sense", "matter", and
quality determining the character of the act of the thesis, constitute the "pre-
expressed", but undergo a change at the moment of expression. Notwith-
standing the fact that Husserl defines the layer of expression in its specific
252 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

characteristic as unproductive, he then corrects this defmition to a certain

extent by stating: "Or, if one wishes: its productivity, its noematic operation
is exhausted in expression and in the form of concept, which accompanies it
as a new element."
In relation to this transformation, produced by the expression, by what, in
its essence, is not yet conceptual, into what is properly conceptual, he states
that the two layers, the expressive one and the one subjected to expression,
in their thetical character constitute a whole. He reveals this coincidence in
the sense that
the former, the expressive layer, takes on the essence of the latter in such a way that
we call the expressive representation simply representation and the expressive acts of
believing, supposing, doubting without further ado believing, supposing, doubting ....

The expressive layer must have a positional or a neutral thesis qualified in

exactly the same way as the one belonging to the layer undergoing expression.
In the two layers we do not fmd two theses to be distinguished but only one
thesis.
The fact that the first layer, the expressive one, takes on the essence of the
second one, seems to imply a coessentiality of the two layers. Moreover, the
expression layer assumes the value of a factor of objectiveness in relation to
the noematic sense of a complete intentional act, as it determines in itself the
conceptual form. Husserl's position appears to be substantially changed from
the time of the Logical Researches where he affirmed the extraessentiality
of the connection between linguistic form and the content of an intentional
act, and denied that the perceptible sign of expression had the value of a
constituting element of the objective state of the act itself.
The character of coessentiality of the two layers appears to be confirmed
by a defmition of expression that we find at the end of paragraph 124:

Expression is not a kind of varnish that is painted on, or a dress put on, the expressed;
it produces a mental formation [FormungJ exercising new intentional functions on the
intentional sublayer, and it is correspondingly conditioned by the latter's intentional
functions.

From the compound of two intentional acts, the one at the basis of expres-
sion and the other at the basis of the expressed, something new arises which
did not exist before the expressive act took place.
This does not prevent Hussed from keeping both layers clearly distin-
guished as to "the method of clarification" (paragraph 125). Thus, he admits
that distinct comprehension of the word and of the proposition, that is, of
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 253

the acts of linguistic affirmation, can tolerate the confusion of "sublayers."

The clarifying operation, the transformation of what is confused into what
is distinct with respect to the basic "sublayer" can be carried out after
the strictly logical acts, once those have been brought to a "perfect, logical
distinction."
Consequently, we have two "kinds of evidence", one related to purely
logical relationships, to essential connections of noematic meanings stemming
from the fundamental laws of formal logic, the other related to the sublayers
which receive logical expression.
Proceeding to the need for a distinction between the two layers, that of
meaning, which is really the layer of expression, and an underlying one,
which is called "sub layer" , paragraph 126 states that the universal essence of
expression implies that "all the peculiarities of the expressed can never be
reflected in the expression." The layer of meaning is not a kind of duplication
of the sub layer. Hence the modifications of the relative clarity and distinction,
the attentional modifications, etc., which constitute variable characteristics
of the sublayer, cannot be contained in the expressive meaning. A wide,
exhaustive correspondence between the layer of meaning and the sub layer
is not possible, for "the layer of meaning is not, and is not in principle, a
duplication of the sublayer."
In On the Origins of Geometry the problem of a first cognitive act not yet
connected to linguistic formation again arises. HusserI's aim is to define the
original conditions which give rise to the first intuitions of the geometric
object; and he conceives initial knowledge as produced by the thought of
the isolated discoverer. In relation to that act of knowledge, which fmding
realization in a solitary thought is construed as being without any connection
with the linguistic instrument of communication, the distinction between
the object of linguistic formulation, called the "thematic object", and the
linguistic formulation itself assumes an unequivocal sense. The thematic
object is distinct from its formulation:

In whatever way it may be formulated, the thematic object, the object of the formula-
tion [its sense I is distinguished from the formulation itself, which, when it is formulated,
is never, and cannot be, thematic. Here merely ideal objective states are thematic, which
are quite different from those belonging to the concept of language. 18

The last lines of the quotation allude to the thesis that words as well as
propositions have, as linguistic entities, an ideality of their own. On this
point the author states that the word "Lowe" remains identical even when
pronounced by a large number of people. However, he adds that the ideality
254 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

of words, propositions, and geometrical theories - considered purely as

linguistic formations - is not equal to the ideality of the geometrical objects
to which those linguistic formations correspond. Again, in relation to the
linguistic formation of geometrical truths, he argues that geometry is identical
in the "original language" of Euclid's as in all translations; passing from one
language to another, the object of geometry keeps its unchangeable ideal
identity. Hussed expressed a conviction concerning the perfect translatability
of scientific concepts in his paper of 1936. Almost at the same time Benedetto
Croce, in Poetry, which placed a considerable strain on his linguistic theories
by identifying language with art, stated the same thing, although beginning
from a different theoretical position:

There is no doubt that the sphere in which translation occurs is that of prose expression,
which works through symbols and signs. Those signs are changeable at will - not only in
mathematics, in physics, and in other sciences, but in philosophy and history too. 19

As for Hussed's position, it is certain that also his thesis of the perfect trans-
latability of geometrical concepts and theories satisfies the need for a dis-
tinction between objects or cognitive contents as such, and the linguistic
formulations referring to them. These appear as pure instruments of com-
munication, arbitrary insofar as they are changeable.
Here it seems to me that we must attribute to Hussed the thesis of a
priority of the thematic object with respect to its linguistic formulation. He
admits, as we see, a formation created in the psychical, interior dimension.
This formation, before acquiring a peculiar intersubjective objectivity through
linguistic mediation, is obviously considered a prelinguistic formation. This
"original presence itself", given in the actuality of the first productive act, is
not yet "a permament result having a right to an objective existence." Without
language, here fundamentally defmed as intersubjective communication, we
cannot bypass the limits of the subject, "not even if the activity of possible
rememorization occurs, through which the past-lived experience is renewed,
as it were, and is experienced again." The fact that the subject can relive his
own, lived experiences, rethink what he had already thought, have a second
intuition of past intuition, is not sufficient reason to state that he has reached
objectivity. However, Husser! admits, and we must emphasize it, that this
interior activity, which is carried out within an isolated subjectivity, not
only takes place, but has a well-determined function and importance, since
objectivity, which is reached through intersubjective linguistic exchange, has
its primary basis in this isolated subjective activity, which by defmition is a
form of pre linguistic cognitive intentionality. On the Origins of Geometry,
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 255

as well as the earlier works we have examined, from the point of view of
the linguistic problem, and specifically of the relationship between the
intentional activity of the cognitive subject and language, demonstrate clearly
that Hussed's position is very far from the thesis of such scholars, linguists,
and philosophers who lay at the basis of the linguistic problem an absolute
detailed identification of the operations of thought with the linguistic opera-
tions, and deny the possibility of any form of knowledge independently of
linguistic forms. We fmd, for example, such linguists as Saussure and Hjemslev,
and such philosophers as Cassirer, Wittgenstein, and Croce defending this
position. Hussed differs widely from them, since he is convinced we have to
make a distinction between cognitive intentional activity and purely linguistic
operations, even though there is a close relationship between them, so close
that it is difficult to pick out or distinguish the moments of independence of
the former from the latter.
There can be no doubt, however, that Hussed tends to consider the
intentional content of the linguistic sign as having priority over the sign and
as conditioning the sign itself. The linguistic sign would not have originated
if there was no intentional content to be established or expressed. The per-
ceptible sign of expression is defined in the Logical Researches 20 as "imprint"
(Gespriige) or the "mark" (Auspriigung) of the "meaning" (Bedeutung).
The meaning should ideally take precedence over its imprint and its mark. In
an essay21 in which he compares the position of Husserl and of Saussure,
Herman Parret observes that

In Saussure the sign is primary, that is, in the meming relationship, signifier (expression)
and signified (content) are formed. In Husser! the meaning is at the origin: it operates
the conditioning (reduction) of the sign.

Meaning has a privileged position in relation to the perceptible sign of expres-

sion, a function that Parret defmes as "transcendental."
In Erfahrung und Urteil, published in Prague in 1938 and elaborated upon
and edited by Ludwig Landgrebe, the linguistic problem is set in a special
light; in fact, rather than in light, it appears in tWilight. It is really rather
difficult to establish the function of linguistic expression, in a strict sense,
within the field of cognitive experience, which Hussed defines as predicative,
and which he places on a higher level than antepredicative or simply receptive-
perceptive experience. It is equally difficult to establish whether antepre-
dicative experience, since it is a strictly prelogical experience, should be
considered at the same time a strongly prelinguistic experience. Analysis of
the text leaves us uncertain about many aspects of the question. On the other
256 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

hand, it is important to verify whether antepredicative experience is strictly

prelinguistic, that is, if it is strictly independent of verbal forms, considering
that predicative experience - according to explicit statements in chapter 4
of Logik and in the first section of Erfahrung und Urteil - is radically based
on antepredicative experience. In other words, a nonlinguistic cognitive
experience is at the basis of a predicative experience and is thus connected, in
some way, with linguistic expression.
What the author calls antepredicative experience is an experience that
has a certain original meaning in a pregnant sense; it is external sensitive
perception. Its original character was also stated, in a certain sense, in the
Sixth Research, where the need to explain the equally original character of
"categorical intuition", that is, of nonsensitive intuition, led the author to a
compromise, to the thesis that the "categorical intuition" itself must be based
on sensitive perception. In this way, sensitive perception and categorical
intuition were distinguished as founding perception (sensitive) and founded
intuition or perception (nonsensitive).
The main problem in Erfahrung und Urteil consists in establishing what
link or relationship exists between antepredicative experience and predicative
experience, i.e., what belongs to the first and what belongs to the second.
Antepredicative experience, which is included in the general concept of
sensitive perception, takes place in two parts; in the first, the object, in its
original bodiliness, simply presents itself to us in the perceptible field. Here
an attitude of passivity toward the given object predominates, but it is
uncertain whether the ego pays it active attention. However, the ego could
not pay it any attention if it were not already present in the field of con-
sciousness in pure passivity. The second part, which is the moment of active
experience (receptivity), presupposes the first (passivity).
What the author calls "the normal concept of experience", both as per-
ception and as representation to the memory, is identified with the second
moment, that is, with active experience. Here we find a concept of particular
interest for us, since it is aimed at explaining the characteristics of a cognitive
activity, presumed to be independent of language. I am referring to what is
called "explicative experience." This experience takes place when the ego, as
it turns toward the intended object, does not pick it up as a unit, but in the
different moments it is made up of. Thus the tendency of the ego toward the
object is fulfilled under manifold aspects:

It is directed toward an identical object, "represented" [darstellt] in every apparition,

as being the same seen from one side or another, near and faroff; but the tendency is to
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 257

change that something, determined in a certain kind of apparition, into the same some-
thing in a different kind of apparition. It aims at "producing" constantly new kinds of
apparition, which we can also define as "images" [Bi/der]. 22

We know that the objec.t to which the ego turns its attention in different
moments is the same; furthermore, every moment or determination of the
object evokes successive moments or determinations. All this constitutes the
concept of the perceptive horizon. At this level, the various modalizations
of perfect or immediate certainty are articulated. Negation, doubt, open
possibility, modified or derived certainty, before becoming characteristic of
predicative judgments, appear in their original form in the antepredicative
sphere of receptive experience. Thus we see that the lowest level of cognitive
activity, which does not appear to be linked to forms of verbal expression,
anticipates, and in some way, preconditions the more complex forms pro-
duced at the higher stage of predicative thought.
Explication, which is the authentic contemplation of the object in its
various apparitions, can take place either in the field of the internal horizon
of the object or in the field of the external horizon. In the latter case, the
interest of contemplation centers on the way the object relates to the other
objects in the same field of perception. In this way, perceptive contemplation
is developed in a higher sphere, to be precise, in that of the external horizon.
Thus in the object arise, by opposition between interior determinations and its explicata,
the relative determinations which explicate what it is in relation to other objects; for
example, the pencil lies beside the ink, it is longer than the pen, etc. (op. cit., p. 115)

Besides, the horizon concept, implying protensional anticipations and expec-

tations and operations connected with the perceptive tendency, is closely
related, by an important property of perceptive activity, to what is called
the object's character of familiarity being known [charakter der Bekanntheit]. The
object exists, first of all, in the character of familiarity; it is the object of a certain type,
already known in some way, although taken in a vague generic way. (op. cit., p. 114)

The typical characteristics of familiarity, through which, even at this level

of purely perceptive activity, objects appear in a certain way to be distributed
in species or classes or concepts, do not refer solely to the single objects and
to the penetration of their interior horizon, but also to the more complex
sphere of the exploration of external horizons, which contains the typical
characteristics, too, of, for example, the determinations of relations such as
being beside, being near or far, being alike or unlike, being dependent or
having a causal relationship, etc. From this we can see how, in the field of
258 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

purely perceptive activity - on the level of explicative experience, which has

certain characterics and articulations in common with the higher activity of
predicative experience - we not only find the capacity of the ego and its
mind to hold a past object and to take in its various properties - that is, to
make a sort of judgment based only on perception - but also the capacity
to distribute objects and relationships into types or classes of objects or
relationships. Thus can we discover that cognitive power of the mind which
is fundamental for the activity of abstraction and the formation of concepts,
even in the field of purely perceptive activity, and independently of linguistic
formulations? Does not the familiar character of objects, their typical char-
acter, constitute at least a secure anticipation and a safe basis for those
formations which will be perfectly actuated in the predicative sphere? It
is by no means easy to answer these questions. HusserI makes no explicit
comparison between the typical character existing in the sphere of antepre-
dicative activity and the true concepts that are the product of the higher
sphere. This does not deny that he may be deeply convinced that there is
order and organization in antepredicative experience and that the charac-
teristics of typicality or familiarity of the objects play an important part. Is
linguistic expression completely alien to this level of experience, which is,
after all, a level of knowledge with its own structure and organization? Is
there no relation between antepredicative experience and verbal language?
The only thing that is absolutely certain is the fact that Husseri does not
include the problem of language in a strict sense in his study of the lower
level of cognitive experience. He does not even take into consideration
the possibility that the perceiving ego may need perceptible verbal signs to
which it can link the corresponding notions of the object in the totality of its
determinations and typical characteristics, in order to grasp the object in its
identity, with its various internal determinations or typical characteristics.
But what is even more striking is the fact that, strictly speaking, the
linguistic problem remains essentially alien even to phenomenological analysis
aimed at determining the origin of the forms of predicative thought. The
convergence of this genetic analysis and these purely linguistic questions
seems to be more of an incidental fact than an explanation. Nevertheless,
the consideration of linguistic forms and the definition of the forms of
predicative thought at times intertwine or run together. On the other hand,
in the field of the analysis of antepredicative experience, the linguistic factor
is never taken into consideration, as it does not interfere in any way with the
problematics of purely perceptive experience.
Let us return briefly to this first stage of knowledge, which is the explica-
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 259

tive synthesis of perception, a kind of knowledge in which linguistic con-

siderations never appear. In explicative synthesis, attention is centered on a
certain subject (S), which is fixes as a theme of knowledge, as a substratum of
certain properties. From the S to its determinations a, b ... the perceptive
mind does not run from one object to other different objects which have
no link with the first. The theme of perceptive attention is one and only
one, and the effort of knowledge is directed toward one unitary, totally
articulated object.
Let us take an object, called S, and its interior determinations, a, b, etc. The process
triggered off by our interest for the object S does not simply provide the succession
taking in S, taking in a, b, etc. as though each thing taken in had nothing to do with
the others and as though the theme changed. Thus the case is different from the one
in which, after our cognitive interest in an object has weakened and been replaced by
interest in a second, then a third object, we turn our attention toward those objects
which win our attention through the powerful influence they exert upon us. It is rather
that in the entire process of single acts leading from the taking in of S to the taking in
of a, b ... , we learn to know S. It is a process of contemplation in development united
with articulated contemplation. Throughout the entire process, S preserves the character
of the theme, and as we gradually grasp one moment after another and one part after
another, these are moments or parts, or, in general terms, properties or determinations;
the moment or the part, then, is in itself nothing, but is something belonging to the
object S, something stemming from it and existing in it. (op. cit., pp. 125, 126)

This is a cognitive operation taking place on the plane of pure perception.

S and a, b ... do not appear as linguistic symbols; they are thus only in
Hussed's phenomenological language which takes the explicative synthesis of
perception as its object of study. S is none other than an object on which
perceptive attention concentrates, and a, b ... are properties or parts of it
which are perceived. Here, no reference is made to the problem of whether S
and a, b ... , in order to be really a unitary object and its properties, have to
be associated to linguistic terms such as noun, adjective, or copula. The same
considerations apply to that different kind of perceptive contemplation
which has nothing to do with grasping a single object, and which is called
extraductive (herausgehend, hinausgehend) or relational, because it takes
place when one object is placed in relation to other objectivities which are
given along with it in the field of experience.
But, in reality, the author does not use linguistic terms directly and
explicitly even when defining the characteristics of superior, authentic,
predicative knowledge. The determination of the two distinct stages of
knowledge uses a different criterion which only indirectly involves the
problem of the connection of predicative thought with the linguistic element.
260 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

In the sphere of antepredicative experience, there is a certain possession of

the object, too; in this sphere, types, horizons of familiarity, are determined.
However, it is only in the field of superior (predicative) knowledge that true
possession of the known object is realized, which can be used at will, "which
we can reexhume at any time, and of which we can give news to other people."
There is a clear reference to language as communication, but this is to remain
without systematic implication as far as the character of the objectivity of
predicative thought is concerned. The position adopted in Erfahrung und
Urteil in relation to this problem is quite different from that of On the
Origins of Geometry, a treatise that, for certain aspects, we have to consider
as following the other, chronologically speaking. In Erfahrung und Urteil it
does not seem as if the authentic possession of the known object depends on
the fact that it is communicable in words, but rather on that other character,
which also renders it communicable in words. In the explicative experience,
true possession of the object of knowledge cannot be reached because of the
lack of participation of the will. Hence, the author uses, first and foremost,
the decision of the will to determine the specific character of knowledge in
the higher sphere:

... in the authentic interest in knowledge we have a new kind of voluntary participation
of the ego: the ego wishes to know the object and to establish what is known once and
for all. Every step of knowledge is guided by an active impulse of the will to keep what
is known unchanged, as a substratum of its determining notes in future life, and to place
it in relation to other things, etc. Knowledge is action of the ego; the aim of the will is
to take in the object in its identical determination and to fix "once and for all" the
result of contemplative perception. (op. cit., p. 233)

Thus the fact that the result of contemplative perception is fixed "once and
for all" seems to depend on the impulse of the will of the knowing subject,
as does the fact that the known object is kept unchanged, as a substratum of
its determinations.
But the thesis of a will that wishes to keep its object unchanged, that
wishes to fix the perceptive content, requires an explanation of how this will
operates in order to reach its objective. It must be possible to conserve the
known object, identically; it has to be possessed in a permanent way, even
when the corresponding intuition in which the object is given in its original
presence has disappeared. The conservation is entrusted to

"formations" [Gebilden], which, by indications that at first are empty [durch zuniicht
leere Indikationen 1, can bring us to the intuition of the identical, which can be obtained
either through presentifications or through renewed self-donation.
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 261

The indications, at first empty, then afterward full, are the linguistic
meanings and the formations mentioned here, the perceptible signs of lin-
guistic expression. Authentic possession of the known object is possible with
the mediation of linguistic formations. The contents of predicative thought
are incorporated, so to speak, in the linguistic expressions with which the dis-
tinction between empty and full intentionality takes on a pregnant meaning.
In fact, this distinction is to be found as early as the level of antepredicative
experience where there occur anticipations of perception and the corre-
sponding perception itself. Then, can we say that predicative thought is
essentially characterized by the linguistic expression? Is it the only thing that
allows us to fix and conserve in their identity the objectivities touched upon
in acts of knowledge? It is not possible to give a simple and unequivocal
answer to these questions.
Beginning with the Logical Researches Husserl takes a detached attitude
to the linguistic problem interpreted in a historically concrete sense. Even at
that time the object of attention and analysis was language in its general,
pure essence, not this or that language but the expression in its general, ideal
meaning. In Erfahrung und Urteil, this detachment is perhaps accentuated.
Predicative judgment is considered here as an objectivity articulated in
categorical terms (subject and predicate) which cannot be identified with any
linguistic term, even if, in fact, a predicative judgment is expressed in the
terms of a given language. The words of any given language do not constitute
the essential element of the so-called categorical objectivities. What con-
stitutes the determining quality of predicative knowledge, in opposition to
the receptivity of pure perception or explicative experience, is "creative
spontaneity, productive of the objects themselves."
Although Husserl grasps the importance of linguistic expression, mairJy
because it constitutes the basis for intersubjective communication of knowl-
edge, he nonetheless denies, in a peremptory way, that the problem of the
connection between language and predicative thought may be considered an
authentic problem of the phenomenological study of predicative knowledge:
The whole plane of expression, which is undoubtedly closely linked to predicative
operations, and all questions about the connection between language and predicative
thought, that is, if and how much each predicative thought is linked to words, and what
connection exists between the syntactical articulation of the expression and the arti-
culation of the thought - all this has to be left aside. Predicative operations will be
studied only as they are offered phenomenologically in the way of lived experience,
being subjective activities, independently of all these connections. 23

HusserI's position is in some ways analogous to Kant's: the latter also seems
262 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

convinced - even though he fails to say so explicitly - that the problem of

language, in its historically concrete manifestation, cannot have any essential
link with a transcendental theory of knowledge. HusserI admits, as is clear
from the foregoing quotation, that "the plane of expression" is closely con-
nected to predicative operations, but he does not go beyond this concession.
He recognizes the link as a fact but then proceeds to exclude the fact from
phenomenological analysis aimed at grasping the essence of predicative
thought. In this, he has not gone back on the linguistic theses of the Logical
Researches, where he admitted that no judgments can be made in the higher
sphere of the intellect without linguistic expression, but, at the same time, he
replied in a substantially negative manner to the question of whether the link
between thought and word is necessary for essential reasons.
Confirmation of this view, that the problem of the connection between
language and predicative thought should be excluded from the phenome-
nological study of predicative knowledge, is also found in other paragraphs
of Erfahrnng und Urteil (for example, paragraph 55, in which, dealing with
the relationship of "articulation in principal and secondary propositions" and
of the attributive proposition, HusserI uses symbols and expressions such as
S is p, S is q, "S that is p is q" and explains how, in the relation established
between principle and secondary propositions, the ego is not directed in a
single beam at identificative synthesis, as in the case "S is p and q", but in "a
double beam that splits into a principle beam and a secondary beam"). This
logical phenomenological explanation is followed up by an explanation of
the value to be attributed to the linguistic element:

Here too, as seems evident, these expressions do not primarily indicate anything linguistic
but the manner of categorical synthesis that gives meaning to linguistic expression;
and this manner of synthesis may but does not have to find expression in a linguistic
hypotasis, according to what the structure of a language allows.

It is categorical synthesis that gives meaning to linguistic expression. The

fact that categorical synthesis is connected to linguistic expression is true, but
it is a fact that remains foreign to essential phenomenological analysis. What
appears to be essential is the distinction between receptive action, which
belongs to the lower sphere (mere sensory perception without connection
with linguistic form), and the productive or spontaneous action of predicative
knowledge with which the objectivities of the intellect are grasped originaliter.
What distinguishes the higher sphere of knowledge from the lower, receptive,
sphere is, once again, the presence of productive spontaneity and of the will
of the ego:
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 263

what here seems to be [predicative] determination of the object is not something

that is merely accepted, absorbed by the ego on a receptive basis; instead, it is totally,
intentionally characterized in itself as a product [Erzeugnis] of the ego, as a piece of
knowledge produced by its own action.
This is proved by the constant return to pieces of knowledge once they have been
acquired, and by the reproduction of intuitions in the form of memory or other pre-
sentification. These reproductions are something more than the mere memory of
a previous intuition. We return to what is reproduced as to an acquisition of ours -
actively produced by our will. It is intentionally characterized as such. Thus it is re-
produced differently from a mere memory: there is a modification of the will as in every
acquisition. (op. cit., p. 238)

In explicative experience, when we first focus on an object (S), then pass

on to its moment p and experience the coincidence of Sin p, we have not so
far made a predicative judgment, because this implies something different
from, and more than, simply having S in focus; what characterizes a predica-
tive judgment is the act by which we return to S, the will or intention to
'return to S and to identify it as such:

We return to S, thus we identify it with itself, which simply means here that by "going
back" it "exists again" as S: in this new thematic taking in we enrich the sense of the
object as a mere protension, in connection with the retention of the stage already gone
through. (op. cit., p. 244)

In explicative experience, cognitive attention does not return directly to

S, but goes on to establish determinations: S is changed in the process of
contemplation through the grasping of the detenninations with which it
coincides. On the contrary, in the predicative sphere, there is a return to
S, which has grown in meaning through the determinations of explicative
synthesis. In focusing on S again, we identify it. Once identified, S is not a
subject. The new "thematic taking in" of S allows us to take in once more its
determinations (tendency to new enrichment: protension), but in connection
with the enrichment already obtained through explicative synthesis. At this
point we have to emphasize two aspects of the question: first, the fact that
explicative synthesis (the first stage of knowledge) and predicative synthesis
(the second stage) are co-related and interconnected, the former being the
sure basis of the latter; second, that to determine the sense of predicative
thought, activity is opposed to receptivity or passivity:

An active intention aims at grasping what was only a passive coincidence before, then
at producing what S is increased by, in an originally active manner and in an active
passage.
264 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

So far as concerns the connection between explicative and predicative

synthesis, we have to note how the difference and, at the same time, the
fairly precise interrelation between the two stages is shown by means of
the distinction between the implicit (explicative synthesis) and the explicit
(predicative synthesis). Identifications and articulations which at the level
of explicative experience are solely implicit, become explicit at the level of
predicative experience:

Beforehand, during the process of explication, the object is implicitly determined as p,

that is, it explains and distinguishes itself as this p, but this "determination as" is not
grasped. It is grasped only when the synthesis is actively renewed, which presupposed
previous explication. S must have been explicit already, but now it is predicatively stated
absolutely as S, which is identical however it may be explicated.

In paragraph 80, in discussing the general character of the universal, Husserl

distinguishes three different phases or stages. The first way in which this
generality appears is in the field of simple perception, "that horizon of
familiarity and typicality" that gives form to every single object perceived;
the second way is that of pure perceptive judgment, as in "this rose is red",
where the need is felt to use "some name with a general meaning." Although
in the second form of generality a linguistic term with a general meaning
intervenes, Husserl does not consider it as a true "formation of the universal",
since in it the object is thematic only as a single, individual object, as this
individual object. The kinds of universality examined up to now, the typical
familiarity peculiar to the perceptive horizon, and the general term of percep-
tive judgment, are "only passively preconstituted" universalities, that is,
non thematic universalities. Thus they form the basis for that new kind of
objectivity (typical universal) that exists only when the reference to the
universal becomes thematic. This happens in judgments of a new kind, where
the object is no longer thematic, as in the case of this individual object ("this
rose is red"), but as an object of this kind or that type, for example, as in the
judgment "the rose is a flower", in which the subject is not this rose but the
rose in general. As is easy to observe, the criterion for distinguishing the kinds
of universality in a higher sphere from those in a lower sphere is certainly
not a criterion of language but is still, specifically, intentional activity of the
ego, the way in which it addresses its object. True universality is thematic
universality, which is grasped as such, in a new kind of spontaneously produc-
tive operation. What distinguishes the higher sphere of knowledge is not
simply its connection with linguistic formations, but activity, productivity,
spontaneity.
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 265

We know that the "lower" form of knowledge, i.e., explicative experience,

constitutes the basis for the higher form, predicative experience, and that
between the two there is not only a connection but a genetic relationship,
or more precisely, that the higher form of knowledge stems from the lower
form. But we cannot talk of the temporal precedence of the lower form in
relation to the higher form. For Husserl, the two forms are quite inseparable
in the concrete activity of the knowing subject:
Predicative formation and knowledge go along with receptive grasp, at the same pace,
and while they are separate from a genetic point of view, being, in fact, of different
degree they are interwoven and inseparable in a concrete consciousness. Rather, the one
is based on the other: each step of predication presupposes steps of receptive experience
and of explication. Only what is given, taken in, and explicated in an originally intuitive
way can be originally predicated. (op. cit., p. 241)

In the first part of this quotation Husserl affirms, without doubt, that
the two forms of knowledge, explicative experience and predicative thought,
are inseparable. In this specific case, does "inseparable" mean that they
depend upon each other? Hence, does the explicative experience depend on
predicative thought, too? I think we have to reply in the negative to this
question. If it were otherwise, there would be no sense in the description
that Husserl gives of explicative experience. In fact, not a single line in the
pages dedicated to the analysis of this experience mentions the presence
of any factual link between the moments and operations of explicative
experience and linguistic expressions. Hence the inseparability of the two
forms of knowledge must be compatible with their independence. In that
case, the affirmation of their inseparability takes on - at least as far as
antepredicative knowledge is concerned - the sense of simple temporal
concomitance, as though to say that explicative experience is in some way
contemporaneous to predicative thought. In fact, when indicating their
relationship, Husserl observes that they are "interwoven" in concrete con-
sciousness. The interweaving of two experiences does not necessarily mean
that they are interdependent.
In the second part of the quotation, beginning with the word "rather",
this inseparability of predicative knowledge and explicative experience is
clearly shown to be the necessary dependence of the latter on the former,
where explicative experience appears as the founding experience and predica-
tive knowledge as the founded experience. Thus he states that "each step of
predication presupposes a step of receptive experience and of explication"
and that "only what is given, taken in, and explicated in an originally intuitive
way can be originally predicated."
266 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

All that Husserl has to say on the subject, in particular with regard to
the relation between knowledge and linguistic expression, implies the in-
dependence of explicative experience from predicative knowledge, and,
consequently, of the full autonomy of the former in relation to linguistic
operations. The first moment of knowledge, in its ideal and factual inde-
pendence, is not only conceived as an essentially necessary phase of the
cognitive process, but it is also conceived as a prepredicative and hence,
prelinguistic, phase where all aspects, articulations, and structures of the
successive phase of predicative thought are anticipated, in a preliminary,
imperfect form, from the simpler distinctions between subject and predicate
to the more complex forms of predicative judgment and judgment of relation-
ship, considering, too, their various modal manifestations.

6. APRIORITY OF THE CATEGORIES AND FORMS OF MEANING

IN RELA nON TO THEIR CONCRETE LINGUISTIC
MANIFESTATION

The analyses contained in the Fourth Research bring us face to face with
another aspect of Husserl's position on the linguistic problem. He is intent
on defining "a pure morphology of meaning", that is, on building the basis of
a discipline that forms the first level in the construction oflogic. The task is
well-defined, and is intended to provide pure logic with the possible forms of
meaning, in other words, to defme the "a priori forms of complex meanings,
with unitary signification." The field of these complex meanings with unitary
signification is the same as the sphere of meanings that have a sense, as
opposed to the sphere of meanings without sense, that is, nonsense. The
desire to establish the validity, be it material (synthetic) or formal (analytic),
of these complex unitary meanings included in the sphere of meanings that
have a sense, does not belong to pure morphology, which, on the basis of
certain essential categories of meaning, has only to establish manifold a priori
laws of meaning, which abstract from the objective validity of meanings, that
is, from their real or formal truth. The task of establishing the logical laws
regulating the formal coherence of meaning and which thus prevent formal or
analytical countersense, belong to another level of logic, different from the
level of pure morphology. Thus, in this field, we have to consider as being
meanings with a sense even those complex unitary meanings which, materially
speaking, make nonsense ("a round square") or formal nonsense, such as a
complex contradictory proposition.
The pure morphology of meanings is a systematic search for all possible
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 267

forms of meaning and for their primitive structures. The author defmes the
basic idea in this way:

... all possible meanings are, in general, subject to a typology made up of categorical
structures, predelineated a priori in the general idea of meaning, and which, in the field
of meaning, dominates an a priori legaiity according to which all possible forms of
concrete configurations exist in systematic dependence on a small number of primitive
forms, from which they can be derived in a purely constructive way. (par. 13)

The typology, to which all possible meanings are subjected, is "predelineated

a priori in the general idea of meaning." We fmd ourselves faced with a set of
categorical structures regulated by a priori laws. What should be noted, above
all, is that "all possible forms of concrete configurations", in other words,
every type of language made up of complete meanings, that is, of words
whose content is determined, is of necessity subjected to these a priori
structures, which consist of "a small number of primitive forms, established
by existential laws." This means that all language, as a historically concrete
set of verbal expressions, is dependent upon a complex of categories and
forms of meaning and on the a priori laws of their possible connections,
within that sphere of sense in which, as we have mentioned, complex unitary
meanings can come into existence.
Meanings are subjected to a priori laws which regulate their connection in
new meanings. Every nonindependent meaning requires integration through
new meanings. This integration is subjected to an essential a priori law that
determines the kind and the form of contexts in which that meaning can be
inserted:

As far as the field of meaning in particular is concerned, even rapid reflection reveals
that when connecting meanings with meanings, we are not free and thus we cannot
arbitrarily exchange the elements inside a given unity of connection provided with sense.
Only in certain preliminarily determined ways are meanings reciprocally congruent
and constitute further unitary meanings with sense, whereas the remaining possible
combinations are excluded in accordance with a law: they produce only a plurality of
meanings instead of a single meaning. The impossibility of the connection is essential
and legal .... (par. 10)

This impossibility does not depend upon the particularity of the meanings
to be unified, but upon "essential kinds" to which they are subjected, that is,
upon the categories of meaning. And the same is true for possible meaningful
connections.
Given "the propositional form" "this S is p", if we try to materialize this
form by replacing the formal symbols, the variables, with concrete words, we
268 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

are not entirely free. The unity of sense is lost if we do not adhere to the
categories of meaningful matter (nouns, adjectives, relations, propositions).
These matters, within the sphere of sense, can be exchanged freely only
within their categories. This makes it impossible to formulate such proposi-
tions as "this green is tree", where a noun is replaced by an adjective and vice
versa, or "this 'the triangle is trilateral' is green", where the noun is replaced
by a proposition; but it makes it possible to formulate propositions such as
"this triangle is green" or "this tree is trilateral", where the symbol has been
replaced by the complete expression inside the same category of meaningful
matter. Thus every ideal structure of the type "this S is p" corresponds to
an a priori law of meaning:

It is a law for the constitution of unitary meanings starting from syntactical substances
which fall under flxed categories, belonging a priori to the fleld of meanings, and accord-
ing to syntactical forms which are also determined a priori and which, as can be seen at
once, are confluent in a flxed system of forms (par. 10).

Apart from these a priori laws regulating the construction of unitary mean-
ings, in which the syntactical substances (meaningful matters) in certain fixed
categories operate according to the normal connections of that category of
meaning (these connections form a basis), there are other a priori laws by
virtue of which the meanings change in various ways into new meanings,
maintaining an essential nucleus and taking on a categorical role not normally
thier own. Thus the adjective, which normally has a predicative function, can
become an attribute and, finally, a noun; in the same way, a proposition, by
going through a process of normalization, can take over the function of a
noun.
In conformity with this complex set of a priori laws, including those
concerning the deduction of the forms deriving from primitive forms through
the application of the laws of the primitive forms,24 it can be established that
within the sphere of sense, the connection "a round square", offering a
unitary meaning, has a place of its own in the "world" of ideal meanings,
whereas expressions like a "round or", "a man and is", which do not have a
unitary meaning, are nonsense, and do not have any kind of "existence" in
the "world" of ideal meanings.
Categories of meanings, syntactical forms, laws of connection and trans-
formation, make up the a priori structure of the meaning which, ideally, they
precede, and condition the structures and grammatical forms of historical
concrete languages as well as the linguistic operations carried out in those
languages.
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 269

In paragraph 3, Husserl states that a language, with its verbal material,

"should faithfully mirror the possible a priori meanings"; it must "have
grammatical forms which allow a distinguishable expression to be given to all
the distinguishable forms of meaning." If the meanings are possible a priori,
and if the forms of their possibility are determined a priori, the distinguishable
expression - which Hussed calls the sensorily distinguishable "signature"
(Signatur) - represents a secondary or later entity compared to the meaning.
That representations and thoughts, being expressible, must hold priority over
linguistic intentions, is a thesis contained in the following statement:
if expressible representations and thoughts of any kind are to be mirrored faithfully in
the sphere of signifying intentions, one form on the signifying [linguistic I side must
always correspond to every form of the representation, and this occurs a priori. 25

Shortly before, he defmes "the completeness or incompleteness of expres-

sions as a mark [Gespriige] of a certain completeness or incompleteness of
the meanings, and therefore, the grammatical distinction as the tracing of a
certain essential difference of the meanings." If linguistic expressions and
grammatical distinctions are considered as a tracing of the meanings and their
essential articulations, the very idea of the tracing surely makes us think of a
priority of meanings and their articulations before the linguistic entities
identified with the tracing.
As for relationships between the ideal wodd of meaning, studied by means
of pure morphology, and language, the Fourth Research offers certain precise
indications. The sense of these relationships is one only: in the a priori struc-
tures of meaning covered by pure morphology we fmd the explanation of the
articulations and grammatical forms present in a language, but the opposite
does not hold good. If we ask why, in our language, certain connections are
allowed and others not, we have to think, first of all, about linguistic habits
that have had a certain accidental historical process different from that
undergone by other groups of languages. But beyond the empirically con-
tingent historical differences, we shall find the a priori structures that are at
the basis of the grammar of any language:
For the rest, we meet with the essential difference between independent and non-
independent meanings, as well as in the a priori laws closely linked to that difference,
concerning the connection and transformation of meanings, laws which are more or less
clearly manifest, in any language which has ever evolved, in the grammatical morphology
and in a corresponding class of grammatical incompatibilities (par. 12).

For these reasons, Hussed, not unlike a linguist such as Chomsky, undoubt-
edly considers that the need, deeply felt by the rationalists of the seventeenth
270 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

and eighteenth centuries, for a universal grammar is legitimate. In this case,

too, empirical grammar is distinguished from universal grammar; in addition,
universal grammar forms the necessary basis for historically and empirically
determined grammar.
For Husserl universal grammar is none other than the pure morphology of
meanings: what distinguishes historically determined grammar from universal
grammar, or more precisely, from "purely logical grammar", is the fact that
whereas the former belongs to the empirical phane, the latter belongs to the
a priori sphere:

In the sphere of grammar, too, there is a fixed criterion, an a priori norm which cannot
be bypassed. Just as in the sphere of logic, the field of a priori, "pure logic" is distinct
from the field of empirical and practical logic, so in the grammatical sphere we distin-
guish between the empirical sphere and the so-called "pure" field of grammar, that is,
the a priori (the "ideal form" of language, as was pertinently said) (par. 14).

Husserl states unequivocally that, whenever philosophy comes into the

question, a clear distinction must be made between the a priori and the
empirical, and that important knowledge for the grammarian can be singled
out "only by starting from the morphology of meanings", that is, from an
a priori discipline which must be defmed in its purity. The idea has to be
accepted that a language "not only has its own psychological, physiological,
and historical-cultural foundations, but also its own a priori foundations."
Considered from the grammatical point of view, the pure morphology of
meanings "reveals an ideal scaffolding [ideale Genist] that every real language
mls out and clothes in various ways with empirical material. ... " Not only
are the ideal, a pliori structure of meanings and the effectively existing
language (faktische Sprache) distinct, and in some ways in opposition, but, as
we know, the latter depends on the former. All the types of meaning shown
to exist by pure morphology, together with the a priori laws of their connec-
tions and modifications, are "what in itself comes first." What in itself comes
first, what has ideal priority, is something that, although it is at the basis of
every language, strictly speaking does not belong to the linguistic sphere.
Whoever is interested in the problem of the distinction of thought from
language can find some singular suggestions in the analysis in Husserl's Fourth
Research. The categories of meaning, the forms of meaning, the a priori laws
governing their connection, all seem to be structures necessary to thought
rather than to language, even though the former forms the basis of the latter.
The process of the thinking and knowing ego moves from the sphere of
thought toward the sphere of language, thus the sphere of thought precedes
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 271

the linguistic sphere, and the former is the foundation for the latter. There
is no doubt that HusserI's position is in complete contrast to a thesis that
attributes a single origin to thought and to language, denying, on the plane
of rational thought in particular, the possibility of, and necessity for, a dis-
tinction and of a possible sphere where the activity of thought is autonomous
from language strictu sensu. The distinction between a priori and empirical,
linked to HusserI's idea of grammar, may indicate a way out from the vicious
circle of the pure and simple identification of thought and language.
Herman Parret, in his essay 'Expression et articulation,' in which he com-
pares Saussure's linguistics with HusserI's linguistical conception, defmes the
grammar of the Fourth Research as "a general aprioristic grammar" when
compared with the factuality of linguistic unities, which are the concrete
verbal unities of a historically determined language. Whereas Saussure only
considers these latter and tries to defme the relationships of opposition
within the language system, HusserI directs his attention and speculative
interest not toward what is historically determined, an actual language defined
by space-time coordinates, but toward a universal grammar, made up of
categories; he forms a priori laws of connection and transformation, that is,
a purely logical grammar, which is an ideal system and is outside the historical
time in which Saussure places his language system. The fact remains, none-
theless, that HusserI places purely logical grammar at the basis of every
empirically and historically determined grammar. If the former, the pure,
logical grammar, did not have its "existence" in the ideal world of meanings,
the latter, the historically defmed grammars and languages, would never have
had their historical birth nor development. Thus the factuality of linguistic
unities, theorized by Saussure, is explained by the a priori categories and
structures of the meaning, and not vice versa. Parret is not entirely wrong
when he sees in the opposition of general aprioristic grammar and historically
determined grammar the reasons for the difficulty in explaining the rela-
tionship that has to be established between the two, since there must be a
relationship if the one is the basis of the other. To be more precise, according
to Parret there exists an insurmountable obstacle to the integration of the
linguistic unities, since they are historically determined, into Husserl's pure
morphology, because of their very "factuality." In other words, there is a
kind of incompatibleness between what is real, factual, and empirically
defined and what is ideal, universal, and a priori.
Parret attempts to define the sense of HusserI's purely logical grammar.
In his opinion, the object of this logical grammar is language as expression,
interpreting expression not as a purely linguistic factor, but as expression in
272 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

a general sense. Otherwise stated, it is unimportant if the category of nominal

matter is linked to a word in one determined language, for example, to a
noun belonging to the German language; that expression could be replaced
by any other expression, provided it take on the same function by indicating
the same category of meaning. From one point of view Parret's interpretation
is questionable. Strictly speaking, the pure morphology of meaning does
not have expression in general as its object, but meaning in general, more
precisely, the categories and forms of meanings and their connections: the
real object of pure morphology is this general meaning and not general
expression, that is, any expression to which the meaning can be linked.
HusserI's definition of pure logical grammar as reinen Formenlehre, as
"pure morphology", and his definition of language as rein en Formensystem,
offers Parret the opportunity to compare it with Saussure's defmition of
language as pure form; Parret admits that "form in Saussure is the form of
the linguistic sign, and in HusserI is the form of the linguistic meaning." As
we observed before, the form of linguistic meaning appears, in the analyses
of the Fourth Research, as an ideal, abstract, a priori entity, which, strictly
speaking, is not precisely a linguistic entity. For Parret the most important
aspect of the question consists in knowing whether form in both cases, from
HusserI's and from Saussure's viewpoints, is more original than the sign and
the meaning. He wonders: "is not Hjelmslev's linguistic algebra the same thing
as HusserI's arithmetic of forms?" There is no doubt that for HusserI form,
the general form of meaning, is more original that linguistic meaning. Doubts
may arise when we try to identify Saussure's position with Hjelmslev's. But,
at the moment, we can only consider the comparison between HusserI and
Hjelmslev. In this way, Parret singles out the specific character of Hjelmslev's
formalism: the category of form largely dominates that of the sign, since the
sign has become the relation between two forms - of expression and of
content, that is, "one function among other functions" constituting the
system of forms.
It would be well to remember that Hjelmslev places the semiotic relation-
ship outside the sphere of language as a scheme, of language as an institution,
affirming at the same time that parole implies language as a scheme, without
necessarily being implied by it. The sign function and the semiotic relation-
ship belong to the sphere of the parole, which comprises a language as a
norm, as usage, and the linguistic act itself.26 This concept of form, which,
strictly speaking, is identified with language as a scheme, confronts us with
decidedly abstract structures which may be, in some ways, analogous to
HusserI's forms. In Hjelmslev's linguistic theory, the phonic, graphic, or
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 273

gestural substance in which they may appear is quite indifferent to the forms
of expression. 27 In HusserI's theory of the pure forms of meaning, meaning is
not considered in its detailed contents but in its general syntactical categories
and forms; from this point of view, a priori laws of the connection and
transformation of meanings can be discovered which have an equally general
and formal character. In Hjelmslev's linguistics too, both in the field of
expression and that of content, structures of abstract entities can be built
whose opposing relations play the past of "functions", such as determination
(simple implication), interdependence (double implication), and constellation
(mere compatibility). But, unlike HusserI, Hjelmslev does not offer certain,
exhaustive criteria for establishing the formal structures of the content,
except for the simple division of the content into meanings and figures, on
the basis of which the former can be analyzed in terms of the latter. Some
scholars have rightly observed,28 that this analysis of meanings in figures
creates notable difficulties on a strictly linguistic plane.
We also have to consider the different theoretical attitudes of the two
scholars. The formal structures that interest Hjelrnslev have an essentially
methodological meaning. They must possess an axiomatic-deductive character
that relates them in some way to the formal systems created by symbolic logic.
The formal structures at the basis of HusserI's phenomenological study, on
the other hand, are of a logical-gnoseologic nature. He does not detach formal
logic, which he calls pure logic, from the sphere of problems of problems of
knowledge, hence the formal structures of meaning dealt with in the Fourth
Research are structures of knowledge, necessary, a priori universal forms.
Let us now return to the conclusion reached in examining the Fourth
Research concerning the linguistic problem. The categories of meaning, the
forms of meaning, and the a priori laws of their combination appear more as
structures and articulations of the thinking, knowing subject than as purely
linguistic structures and articulations. From this stems the conviction of their
ideal priority over strictly linguistic forms. This thesis, which is basic to the
analysis contained in the Fourth Research, is indirectly confirmed by the
definition of the character of nonessentiality or extraessentiality, whether
of the perceptible sign of expression with respect to the significative content
in the overall unitary act of expression, or of the connection between the
former and the latter, since "the phonetic complex that appears has no value
as a constituting element of the objectivity of the complex act." In Erfahrung
und Urteil, in which are collected a number of works written over a period
of years fairIy distant in time from the publication of the Researches, the
theme of the categories and forms of meaning is taken up again through an
274 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

examination of predicative knowledge, constituting, in many respects, con-

firmation of the apriority of the categories and forms of meaning over their
particular, concrete, linguistic formation. In predicative knowledge "new
kinds of objectivities are formed, which can then be grasped and become
themes" (par. 47). Predicative judgment is a piece ofintellectual objectivity,
articulated in the categorical terms of subject and predicate. Husser! does not
identify these terms with linguistic expressions, and he considers the problem
of the connection between thought and language, the question "whether, and
how much, each predicative thought is linked to words", as something that
"has to be left aside." What he wants to draw our attention to is the fact that
predicative knowledge, as opposed to receptivity, is described as creative
spontaneity productive of the objects themselves.
Predicative operations will be studied only insofar as they present themselves phenome-
nologically in the way of a lived experience, being subjective activity, independent from
all connections with language.

In order to determine the sense of predicative thought, Husser! turns again

to topics of this kind: the activity, the returning of attention, the decision of
the will. Explicative and predicative experience are presented, the former as
a simple, synthetic operation, and the latter as a synthetic operation which
turns the synthesis itself into the theme:
Beforehand, during the explication, the object "is determined" implicitly as p; that is, it
explains and distinguishes itself as this p, but the "self-determination as" is not grasped.
It is grasped only when the synthesis is actively renewed, which presupposes previous
explication. The S must be explicated first, but now it is absolutely placed predicatively
as S which is identical, however it may be explicated (par. 50).

For the S (subject), being predicatively placed as such means being "ab-
solutely placed as identical." Hussed defmes all this in terms of activity,
spontaneity, and creation rather than in terms of linguistic expression.
Arguments of a linguistic kind are deliberately excluded from the explana-
tions and analyses of the categorical objectivities.
In paragraph 59, in dealing with articulation in principle and secondary
propositions and with the attributive form, he goes a little deeper into the
value to be attributed to the linguistic element, thereby providing further
confirmation of his conviction that the categorical objectivities such as subject,
predicate, attribute, predicative proposition, connection between main and
secondary proposition, do not indicate "primarily anything linguistic but
only the manner of categorical synthesis that gives meaning to linguistic
expression." Here too, just as many years before in the Fourth Research,
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 275

what he now calls categorical objectivities (which he then called categories

and forms of meaning) appear as ideal entities with priority with respect
to propedy linguistic expressions. He adds that "this manner of synthesis
(categorical) may but does not have to fmd its expression in linguistic hypo-
stasis, within the limits that the structure of a language allow." The logical
articulations are conceived of as intentional contents that have priority with
respect to the linguistic signs associated with them.
Erfahrnng und Urteil not only confirms the theses of the Fourth Research,
but also provides ample explanation and demonstration of them. Hussed's
concept of the linguistic problem becomes clearer, too. The basic concept,
which allows him to assume a position toward, and keep his distance from,
the logical-linguistic theses, is of explicative experience, a first stage of
knowledge identified with the purely and simply perceptive activity defined
as "receptivity." Receptivity is a term whose meaning is relative, insofar as
explicative experience - although it is, in its way, an active experience - is
defined as being simply receptive with respect to an activity of a higher kind,
such as predicative knowledge.
This explicative experience, which is never directly linked to expressive
or linguistic activity, assuming as it does the function of a basis for higher
predicative synthesis, anticipates and contains, in its own specific manner of
antepredicative experience, the modalities, the categories, the forms, and the
articulations of higher thought, above all, the fundamental ones of subject,
predicate, and predicative proposition. Thus this purely perceptive predicative
experience, being already logically articulated, in its way, proves the ideal
priority of the logical categories and forms with respect to strictly linguistic
expressions. These logical categories and forms will, then, become realized in
a logical way in predicative thought. It is easy to understand why Hussed in
his attempt to define predicative knowledge or "categorical objectivities",
does not consider it necessary to use purely linguistic arguments. Logical
articulations, already performed in the sphere of explicative experience in a
state of perfect autonomy with respect to linguistic expression, can and must
be defmed now, in the higher sphere of predicative thought in its stricter
sense, with a style of demonstration that refers directly to the analyses and
explanations of what is "called" antepredicative experience and does not
refer in any way to linguistic arguments. Thus in his study of the higher level
of predicative knowledge, Hussed tries to prove that we are face to face with
operations which, compared with what happens in the lower sphere, require a
quantitatively and qualitatively different intervention of the intentional
activity of the knowing subject. For example, categorical objectivities, in the
276 RENZO RAGGIUNTI

determination of an object state as the subject of a predicative judgment,

require an attention that returns once more to the object, a "new thematic
grasp", a will to preserve the object as identical in the act of grasping its
determinations. What makes an object the subject of a predicative judgment
is the will to know, the will to preserve S in its determination.
Whereas, in explicative experience, attention does not remain upon the
object, nor does it return directly to S, but goes on taking in determinations,
in the predicative sphere there is this return, in which S is properly identified
as the subject and its determinations are grasped as the determinations of that
subject. A passive coincidence (explicative experience) where the coincidence
of S with p is gathered in relational passivity, without returning to S, is
opposed to an active attention (predicative thought) where S is thematized,
like the S that is p, and thus S is grasped as the subject of the connection
"s is p." As may be remarked, there is not one single explanation of the
difference between the higher and the lower spheres, in which the author
refers to the need for the presence and the mediation of the linguistic element
in the field of knowledge belonging to the upper sphere, that is, of predicative
judgment.

NOTES

1 Logical Researches (Halle, 1922), introduction, par. l.

2 R. Giidel, Les sources manuscrites ... (Geneva, 1957), p. 79.
3 First Research, par. 27.
4 Ibid., par. 10. Guido Morpurgo Tagliabue, in La semantica e i suoi problemi (Corso
di teoretica, 1973-74, Universita degli Studi di Trieste), pt. 11, chaps. 17, 20, has some
interesting observations to make on Hussed's distinction between expression and signal,
signification and indication.
S G. Piana, Linguaggio e conoscenza scientijica (Padova, 1967), p. 27.
Jacques Derrida is convinced that at the basis of this concept of the ideality of
meaning there is a metaphysical presupposition; "a dogmatic or speculative adherence
... which would constitute phenomenology in its 'inside', in its critical plan, and in the
founding value of its suppositions: to be precise, it would constitute it in what will soon
be recognized as the source and guarantee of all values, the 'beginning of beginnings',
that is, the originally offering evidence, the present or the presence of the sense in full
original intuition" (La voix et Ie phimomene [Paris, 1967), introduction). The implica-
tions stemming from this concept of ideality as an indefmitely repeatable presence
have their effect, according to Derrida's interpretation, in the phenomenological inter-
pretation oflanguage and the relationship between language and logic.
6 First Research, par. 8.
7 Ibid., par. 6.
8 Ibid., par. 7.
 LANGUAGE, LOGIC AND HUSSERL 277

9 Ibid., par. 9.
10 The term externalisation is not really Husserl's.
11 R. Raggiunti, Problemi di significato (Florence, 1973), pp. 171-213.
12 Cours de linguistique generale (Wiesbaden, 1968), II, 284.
13 Ibid., chap. 4, par. 1.
14 'Sprog og tanke', Sprog og Kultur 5 (1936), 24-36.
15 Formale und traszendentale Logik (Halle, 1929), pp. 17 -18.
16 Krisis (The Hague, 1954), III, 459.
17 Fifth Research, par. 19.
18 Op. cit., p. 457.
19 La Poesia (Bari, 1935), p. 103.
20 Fourth Research, par. 4.
21 'Expression et articulation; une confrontation des points de vue husserlien et sau-
ssurien concernant la langue etle discours', Rev. Phils. Louvain, no. 71 (1973),72-112.
22 Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg, 1948), p. 88.
23 Op. cit., p. 234. For a full analysis of the problems dealt with in 'Erfahrung und
Urteil', see R. Raggiunti, Husserl (Florence, 1967), pp. 259-322.
24 "If now, the primitive forms having been made clear, we replace every simple term
gradually and progressively by a connection of these same forms, applying the primitive,
existential law in each case, we obtain new forms whose validity is assured by deduction,
which grow together, in free combinations. For example, for the conjunctive connection
of propositions:
(M and N) and P
(M and N) and (P and Q)
[(M and N) and PI and Q etc.
The same holds good for disjunctive and hypothetical connections of propositions and
for other kinds of connection belonging to any category of meaning. It goes without
saying that the complications go on in infinitum in a manner that can be controlled by
combination, that each form produced remains tied to the same category of meaning,
being a sphere of the variability of its terms, and that all the combinations of meaning
created within the sphere must of necessity exist, that is, they must show a unitary
meaning. It is also evident that the respective existential propositions are obvious deduc-
tive consequences of the proposition in its primitive form. It is clear that, instead of
applying the same form of connection all the time, we can use different combinations of
connective forms in arbitrary variation within what is allowed by law, in order to obtain
these constructions, generating thus infinite complex forms" (par. 13).
25 Par. 4. Hjelmslev, in his article 'Sprog og Tanke', starts off from the opposite thesis,
namely, that thought has no moment of autonomy or priority over language, thus
denying validity to the statement, taken literally, that language is the expression of
thought.
26 L. Hjelmslev, 'Langue et parole', in Cahiers F. de Saussure (1943).
27 It is doubtful whether such a concept of "form of expression" is strictly a linguistic
concept, or, more plausibly, a semiological concept, defining the meaning of the sign
"in general."
28 Cf. R. Raggiunti, Problemi di significato, pp. 84-120.
 FILIPPO COSTA

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS

ACCORDING TO DING UND RA UM

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION AND MODALITIES OF

CONSTITUTION

Hussed introduces his discussion of things and space with the following
declaration: "I can outline the subject of my lessons in a very few words: the
question concerns the fundamental parts of a future phenomenology of
overall experience." 1 By "phenomenology" Hussed refers to phenome-
nological reduction. We are concerned, then, about the differences between
two main conceptions of phenomenological reduction. According to the
first, the phenomenological reduction is carried out on "positing-the-being"
(Seinssetzungen) and is of a theoretical character. According to the second,
it is carried out on the Self, and is of a "life-experienced" character. Hussed
designates this as "transcendental" reduction.
The first conception can be expressed as follows:
We put out of action the general thesis attached to the "natural attitude." We place
between brackets everything this thesis embraces, i.e., the entire nature-world that is
for us constantly "here", "on hand", and will hold fast forever as consciousnesslike
"reality. ,, 2

This thought was expressed by Hussed in 1913 (Ideas I); but in 1907, a short
time before the Dingvorlesung (as Hussed called the lessons now edited as
Ding und Raum) were held, the author specified a first-level, or "Cartesian" ,
reduction designed to put out of action "all the transcendent positings" 3
viewed as the positings on which the sciences with their "natural attitude"
are based. This is followed by a second-level reduction, which neutralizes the
"ontic residue" of a consciousness in psychological understanding. There is,
finally, a third kind of reduction, leading from the self-giving obtained in
the second-level reduction to its "constitution."4 First-level reduction is not,
so to say, absorbed in the further ones, but remains as their presupposition.
In Ideas I, epoch/! is, as we have seen, conceived on the basis of positing-the-
being.
We are not concerned here with the modifications Hussed was to in-
troduce gradually into his theory of reduction. We need only observe his final
conception:
279

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 279-310.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
280 FILIPPO COSTA

Epoche allows me a universal reflection on my Self-being, insofar as I constantly have

this overall willingness .... The transcendental epoche is therefore such an "overturning"
of the self steadily living through its life-acts which in his straightforward attitude to the
world he intuits as his ever new will to live. 5

The theoretical epoche concerns the things and the world; the life-experi-
encing one concerns the Self and its being as "I will." The connection or the
"medium" between them is given in the Cartesian Meditations:

A universal inhibition from all "taking-up-positions" such that we may call it "phenome-
nological epoche" at once becomes the methodical means by which I catch myself as a
pure "I." ... Every mundane being and everything in space and time, is for me in so far
as I experience or perceive it. 6 .

HusserI uses adjectives such as "phenomenological", "transcendental",

"pure" and "absolute" in order to differentiate the various epochai. But
his distinction is not strong enough to endanger the unity belonging to the
phenomenological attitude. The epoche which is thought of with reference to
Descartes allows us to realize that the overturning of the Self depends on the
position it bestows on things before it - on its way of understanding the
thing-ness of things as such. A new ''will to live" is only achieved after the
phenomenology of external things.
From a methodological point of view we must note a fundamental dis-
tinction: the transcendental epoche maintains the thing-world; the life-
experiencing one transforms it. Nothing new is produced "in the world" by
"placing things between brackets" or "inhibiting all positing-the-being." On
the other hand, an absolutely new attitude is yielded in the Self as a result
of its inhibiting the general interest in mundane things.
In Ding und Raum a straightforward reduction is in fact performed. This
reduction is fulfilled as a constitutive view; it does not presuppose the
adoption of a transcendental position or any overturning of the Self. As a
starting point there is the naive human attitude, by which the thing-world
presents itself as an aspect of the milieu determined by human orientation.
At the center of the world there is no longer a Self as an "I think", "I act",
but a Self that gets its bearings in its milieu by starting with distinctions
between the great genera of things:

The world divides up before us into physical and spiritual things, or rather into things
that are both physical and spiritual .... In this fashion the world presents itself to naive
grasping and before the sciences. Thereafter all science of experience refers to this
world. 7
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 281

This remark was placed at the beginning of Russerl's discussion of the

phenomenology of external things. It reflects on the first presupposition of
experimental science: the divisio naturae into genera, species, and individuals.
Phenomenology starts with an analysis of the "presuppositional" character of
all science.
The second step consists in a sort of reduction sui generis: experience, as
presupposed by natural sciences, can be freed from its dogmaticis only if it
becomes the goal of preceding research. In this way phenomenology performs
its duty of eliminating all presupposition and thus of satisfying the need
for a presuppositionless knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot fulfill its
ends, because it cannot go beyond commonsense consciousness in mediating
its principles. Its theoretical display of notions and propositions far removed
from common experience makes it no less dependent than this on the overall
prejudice about really existent things:
However far removed the scientific world view may be from that of prescientific exper-
ience, whether this occurs as a plain experience, straightforward perception, or recollec-
tion, it is still experience that gives that world view objects to be theoretically deter-
mined by mere deviation from the common way of understanding. 8

What is criticized here is not the work of science, but what man wants to
do with science in aiming to satisfy his need for an unconditional or genuine
"knowing."
Science refers to experience as the source of all believed things. The world
is given in things. It is a proper task of phenomenology to explicate the sense-
constitution of the thing as such. We must now distinguish two stages in this
explication: (l) the comprehension of the mode-of-being of the thing, and (2)
the comprehension of its meaning. We may place our view of the mode-of-
being before that of meaning, in order to allow the first view to guide the
sense-constitution of thing-ness:
In general thing-ness has in its very essence the characteristic of an intentional unity
which constitutes itself in a multitude of appearances that may be real or possible. This
unity shows its being and its properties in a regulated and motivated connection of
appearances. The connected appearances harmonize with each other and satisfy each
other; they are therefore shot through by a sense of belief, or, if preferred, by a con-
sciousness of positing or also consciousness-of-there-being. 9

We need not illustrate further this view: it comes from the empiricist tradi-
tion as assimilated by Kant and drawn up by the neo-Kantians. Accordingly,
the very being of things is no more than a "function" whose "arguments" are
sense-data. But the novelty introduced by phenomenology is the resumption
282 FILIPPO COSTA

and interpretation of a constitutive process that, instead of reaching the thing

itself, falls short of it or modifies it. Neo-Kantianism is concerned only with
successful processes; phenomenology is concerned, above all, with unsuccess-
ful ones, insofar as they fail to grasp things in their ontic completeness. But
this is not all; every constitutive process with a successful outcome contains
some specific moment or function of a negative character. As phenomenology
does not in the least concern things as world-given realities but their constitu-
tion, systematically unsuccessful processes fall under its attention, just as
much as the successful ones. This fact shows us the first definitive performance
of epoch/! as a methodical phenomenological description.
There are indeed three constitutive modalities: position, alteration, and
negation. The concrete world we live in, which Husserl calls the "world-of-
life", is not built out of mere concordances, but also out of discordances,
whose outcome can be the thing-fallen-short-of - the "nothing" of a thing -
or otherwise a thing which turns out to be "other" than the presumed one.
The three modalities mentioned above are not drawn from a merely subjective
intention, but depend on the style of the perceptual stream of the constitutive
performance. A special kind of constitution-stream occurs, for example,
when no real thing corresponds to a given image, i.e., when no perception
occurs that is "normally" associated with it. We can provide a schema of this
situation as follows:
Let us first suppose there is an image 1 and that the presumptive perceptual
content P is associated with it. Then, if the corresponding perception P
follows, the associated presumption is fulfilled and a thing T is constituted.
If we have Q in the place of P, such that Q excludes P, then the presumed P
is disappointed and a new object is constituted "as-if", namely, 10 . This new
object is not a thing but a [ictum, a sham To. It may also be that p' takes
place, in such a way that, even though P and p' turn out to be mutually
incompatible, p' is produced as a realization of a p' associated with a new
1'. This implies that the original datum is not merely I, but something like
I{P).
An essential feature of the process described consists in a profound dif-
ference between 1 and 10 . In the case of a sham thing the verifying experience
does not merely lead us back to I, but it moves us forward to something
new like 10 • At the same time, we see that experience of the sham, which
is phenomenologically irreducible to one of fulfillment or verification, is
functionally second order with respect to the first.
We cannot here limit our discussion to association frequencies, as classical
empiricism has done. We must now explore the structures of intentional
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 283

functionality. As Husser! says, one must acknowledge that ''without Being

there is no non-Being":
non-Being finds its touchstone in Being and it is only a clash against a pregiven Being
that gives rise to the "pretension" as such which establishes its "pretended" Being as a
fiction. One might therefore say that declaring all and every appearing Being as a mere
fiction is just nonsense. 10

All this cannot be understood as a dogmatic confutation of a universal

skepsis, but is an ontological translation of the phenomenological structure
outlined above, i.e., of constitutive modalities. But this "derivation" from
non-Being admits a derivation in the opposite direction. The successful stream
of consciousness is a form of progress. Therefore the hypothesis of an overall
nothingness of the wor!d reduces itself as long as the testing-force goes on
growing. This conception evidently comes from J. S. Mill.
But all perception is a relational positing-of-something, that might not be at all ....
This positing in the perception, nevertheless, is not an absolute one; it looks like a force
that could be overwhelmed by stronger counter-forces. 11

We must recognize, therefore, a further reality-intention beside the P-

intention associated with I. That is the intention indicated by Husser! as
"force": "That force which founds the Being grows up as long as experience
is progressing." 12
If we denote the intention toward Being as E, we can represent the entire
scope of intentionality in the following way:
(I -)- P) -+ E

We could now represent "constitutiveness" as:

(I -)- P) -+ E

If we have before us a case of "positive" modality, we obviously obtain a

situation agreeing with the formula just written. If, on the other hand, we
have a constitution of "alteration" , a more complex formula is obtained:
«I fr P) -+ (I -+ P')) -)- E

But what happens with the third modality? The situation now occurring can
be formulated as:
«I -)- Q) -)- (I .fr P)) .fr E

A difficulty arises in interpreting this formula: one can easily understand

284 FILIPPO COSTA

what "I f,. P" means, but " ... f,. E" is at least ambiguous. All negative
constitutions certainly say something about reality, by putting into action
the counterforces HusserI speaks about. It therefore has an indirect meaning-
value about reality, not an empty meaning at all. Must we then admit that a
growing process is applicable in the case of counterforces too? Does denial
have the same capacity to increase the positing-value as confirmation? The
phenomenological confirmation-modality is, of course, different from denial-
modality: a disappointment of a confirmation-intention is somehow inessen-
tial - if it is the case that "I f,. P" it may well be that "I -+ P"! For each I
one can fmd an indefmite number of formulas like this. In every case the
asymmetry between the two modalities is undeniable. And it is in virtue of
this asymmetry that Husserl can defeat epistemological skepsis. The principle
of a growing force does not hold for denial, Le., for negative constitutions.
But this fact does not prevent us from acknowledging the specificity and
phenomenological "positivity" of negative constitutions.
The modality of alteration is a principle for every adjustment and correc-
tion of scienfic hypotheses. We detect a hidden intention toward p' in the
constitution of I. What is the value of this process in Signifying reality? In
metaphysical terms, must we recognize a principle of "otherness" besides
"Being" and "non-Being"? And, from a phenomenological point of view, is
there a quasi-constitutive, typically "irregular" (regelwidrig) process, besides
the "regular" (regelmiissig) one and the "orderless" (regellos) one? In the
phenomenological structure of experience, processes that are "nomic",
"anomic", "heteronomic" appear. The question about the real correlatum
for these modalities is still unsettled.
Experience is performed according to immanent motivation-rules: the
elements that enter a context are perceptions endowed with intentionality
toward positing-the-being. At the perceptual level this intention is merely a
"pretension" which can never be warranted defmitively; but it has its rights
growing alongside experience itself. Following this growing process, phe-
nomenology overcomes the doubt about world-being, insofar as it represents
and reproduces the doubt itself in terms of motivational links. The phe-
nomenological constitutum is then revealed as a signification of world-reality.
"Every fantasy", Husserl writes,

has a possibility-value and conceals a possibility of perception. But this very possibility
is at first merely groundless. The situation as regards "real" or founded possibilities,
as implied in perception, is very different from that concerning those fantasy like or
ungrounded possibilities.... Any appearance is by itself compatible with any circum-
stance. Granted that one of these possibilities actually occurs, and that, for example,
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 285

experience E is given together with circumstances ~, then a functional ~otivation subsists

according to which the experience-sequence EE would occur if CC holds. If, then, a
definite unity EC is really formed, no further connection whatever between appearances
and circumstances is yet possible. 13

The "thetic" value of perceptual links resides in passing from "fanciful

possibilities" to "real possibilities", and from ungrounded to founded ones.
"Reality" is a well-founded possibility, based in gesetzen Wirklichkeiten,
in view of links with a wealth of qualities and intentionalities. The "real",
therefore, does not lie at the end of the "possible" but consists in progressive
enrichment of possibilities themselves. Reality is never given, is never owned,
but it is ever more "giveable" or "haveable." What really exists is set within a
system of perceptual possibilities that are phenomenologically "real" ones.
The theory of phenomenological modalities can be translated in this way
into the language used by traditional judgment-modalities, i.e., in terms of
"possible" and "real"! This translation helps us to reveal a modal aspect
belonging to phenomenology, but must not mean the resolution of phenome-
nological modalities into classical ones.

II THE "PRE-EMPIRICAL" AND THE REALITY-MEANING OF THINGS

From what has been said above it appears that the being of things has a con-
stant sense of "possibility" that takes shape in three constitution-modalities,
which we may call "nomic", "anomic", and "heteronomic." The next phe-
nomenological reflection presents us with the giving of the thing itself as
a "possible self-giving." If the natural givenness in which the thing is lived
out according to the naive attitude presupposed by science is to be brought
back to the possibility of self-giving-by-itself, this can only be achieved by
a phenomeological analysis of the sense possessed by the thing itself. If,
according to the tradition, we call the ground in which things are merely real
"empirical", we shall call the ground of "possible self·giving" "pre-empirical",
insofar as it constitutively precedes the empirical one.
The thing-phenomenology Husserl develops in Ding und Raum is based on
the notion of the "pre-empirical." What holds "prior to" (in a positively
phenomenological meaning still to be clarified) experience, also holds "prior
to" science. The problem of the pre-empirical is at the same time the problem
of science, which is about the foundations of science. In the notion of pre-
empirical which appears in Ding und Raum we note an early approach to the
problem of the foundations of science which is a subject central to Crisis of
the European Sciences.
286 FILIPPO COSTA

The notion of pre-empirical may be given two senses: (1) the sense of the
plenitude of "straightforward life-experience" in the naive attitude which
ignores all objectivity belonging to cognitive experience; or (2) the sense
of the first stage of sense-constitution under the heading "Experience",
i.e., as thought of from the starting point of experience through a kind of
phenomenological reduction sui generis. We can call this second stage a
structural, or dynamic, or functional one. The pre-empirical, therefore, has
no experiential status of its own; it is not concretely lived through. We cannot
exclude, of course, that Husserl admitted the first sense beside the second
one. There is clear evidence of his hesitancy in the oscillation between his use
of pre-empirical as an adjective and his use of the prefix "pre" only. To fully
respect Husserl's thought in Ding und Raum, one must normally maintain the
prefix form, instead of correcting it in every case, as Cleasges does in editing
the text, to the adjective "pre-empirical." The prefix has a sense of "not yet"
which affects the next term, whereas the adjective makes one suppose there
is a separate qualification. To say, for example, as Hussed does, "that the
depth-sensation or predepth is not in itself a thinglike depth" means that
the sensation of depth is not yet a perception of depth, i.e., that the depth-
quality is not properly "given" in sensation. But it also means that a tendency
to become a perception is inherent in the depth-sensation. But if, as in
Cleasges' edition, we talk about "pre-empirical" depth, this implies a distinc-
tion between two modes of appearance of depth, the first pre-empirical or
senselike, the other real-empirical or perceptual. A structural succession now
replaces tendency and intentionality. 14
The meaning of the prefix is essential to present phenomenology, whose
theme is, in fact, "the process in which the experience-objectivities constitute
themselves at the level of lower experience." 15 The pre-empirical only
contains straightforward presentations and immanent contents, and it knows
nothing at all about the attributive relation according to which a quality is
understood as belonging to a substance. Common language brings the dif-
ferences between this level and that of things into focus; a color-quality, for
instance, is attributed to a thing, but not to the sensation or perception
of it. Pre-empirical giveness is not only lacking in functional relations and
predicative reference, but it cannot even be said to be posited as an isolated
unity; it is not subject to the experience-category called "unity." Between
one pre-empirical datum and another the reflexive distinction by which
every datum stands as a self-giving unity no longer holds. The data are not
related, but they are not even relationless "monads." The pre-empirical is
not the merely ontic, for it contains, as an immediate datum, the "fact" of
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 287

intention that projects it toward the empirical thing. Perception contains the
transcendence-intention immanently in itself. 16
We now glimpse an immanent-temporal structure in the essence of the
pre-empirical. HusserI introduces his discourse about the pre-empirical by
dealing with inner time-consciousness. The inner-temporal stream is not a
"form" containing life-experience in succession, but a stream characteristic
inherent in every life-experience. For this reason, HusserI rejects the Kantian
theory of pure intuition: "'intuition-forms' is a thoroughly false expression
and it involves - even in Kant's view - a fatal mistake." 17 Phenomenological
"inner" time is not the "interior" time of consciousness - it is a phenome-
nological property of percepta:

This stream is not a stream of objective time such I can measure with a watch, it is not
the world-time, ... for this is an object to phenomenological reduction .... We, instead,
will call the inner stream "pre-empirical" or phenomenological time. IS

HusserI speaks about Zeitemp/indungen (time-sensations); they are not

the same as a time of sensations, the real time within which sensations flow.
But this does not exclude that the time of flowing sensations has a proper
"sensitive" substance. A sort of sameness of content and form holds in the
pre-empirical, insofar as life-time displays itself in extensive time. But the
time-content is still distinguished from the quasi-form of duration itself.
What is so picked out is the content rather than the form itself. In every
sensation of a lasting object the subject itself emerges. HusserI calls it "the
identical substratum of the phantom perception." 19 There are not two
substances, a phantom one and a real one, but there is only a substance-thing
appearing as a phantom, i.e., in the mode of detachment or prominence. In its
immediate and mere appearance, "thing" is endowed with a being-as-if; its
phenomenal actuality places itself between brackets the corresponding "thing
in itself." But at the same time the phantom complex is a sign of something
underlying it, or that gives rise to an actual phenomenon. According to
Husserl, immanence and transcendence are phenomenologically linked; they
can be distinguished only by analysis or by phenomenological reduction.
The way toward a singular thing admits of many stages. In the first of
them our attention lingers over the time-meaning: "When we perceive a house,
this object, by its very essence - as required by the meaning of perception -
has its own time-expansion. It appears as an unchanged entity in its going
forth, as an identical thing in its duration." 20
Here we encounter a sort of pre identity preceding constitution; it does not
belong to the realm of the "fore-given", but to that of the straightforward
288 FILIPPO COSTA

self-presentation. The situation is reflected by the semantic structure of the

word "pre-sensation" (Vor-stellung): the prefix "pre" implies the positing of
a thing before the representing subject. The presented thing is also endowed
with a previous formal unity. The time-expansion of appearing things is a
quality of their very appearance; it is not an "objectual" property. A thematic
pretemporality's opposite is thetic pre,temporality; this reveals itself as a
typical "inadequacy" in or of perception:

Time with its fullness is not given in any adequate way; we cannot take it to be a sensa-
tion. In the same way we cannot constitute the identity of a thing and its property in
any adequate way, i.e., in the way we constitute the identity of a sound in its sounding
or in its reechoing stream. 21

Inadequacy explains the meaning of "phantom." The thing in itself cannot

be grasped straightforwardly beyond its phantom appearance. This appearance,
however, by announcing its inadequacy, is provided with an intention which
aims at a real thing. Phantomness is just flimsiness, a lack of perceptual
firmness. Inadequacy is a theme for phenomenological analysis, by which
we can recover - on the transcendental level - the transcendent reality which
swerves out of perceptual reach. "Systematic inadequacy" may be proposed
as a typical term for phenomenological analysis.
What is now the true relation between time and things? HusserI attributes
two senses to the concept "time", first, pre-empirical, and second, real-
empirical. There is no such thing as "time" as an a priori intuition or an
a priori "intuited." Real things, which are constituted through systematic
inadequacy, only admit a real time, which is, in fact, inadequate. Phantom
things, which are presented through a straightforward adequacy, admit only
a quality-time - a duration perceived simultaneously with the "as-if" thing.
This distinction by itself is insufficient to clarify our question. For, when I
have any perception whatsoever - a lasting perception - I do not, in that very
act, feel its lasting as a quality immanent to the perceptum. When I perceive
this duration in an immanent way, I truly perceive my own duration alone.
The inner time of my perceptum is now nothing but my interior life-time.
There is not, in that case, a duration of perceptum apart from my lasting
perceiving. Therefore, the phenomenological status of perceived time looks
doubtful.
I now notice that perception is lasting in time only when it disappears or
when there is no more of it. I perceive it as still lasting only if I fancy its
capacity to fail at any moment.
This fact makes our situation more complicated: duration, as a perceived
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 289

quality, turns out to be a negative property, a reflected, mediated one. It has,

so to say, a "constituted" character. In other words, time-as-form reappears.
We talk on the pre-empirical level about form, where form is Gestalt.
The pre-empirical is not a realm of perceivable "monads", but contains shapes
and figures that in their own way "synthesize" shape-elements. Pre-empirical
Gestalten are "configurations." One must therefore analyze temporal Gestalten
even before spatial ones, granted that the analysis of pretime precedes the
analysis of prespace. Hussed does not unfold a phenomenology of Zeit-
gestalten, because these, as Kant pointed out, turn out to be impossible. What
can we say about time-shapes in general?
As time lacks shapes, it does not have a constitutive capacity powerful
enough to enable us to attain to things themselves. External time itself is
constituted according to motion and this involves space; external time is
spatialized. By this me do not mean (as Bergson does) that time is represented
through space, but that it is endowed with a character of external reality by
virtue of the reality that belongs to motion, which, in its turn, is linked to the
externality of space. Lastly, the notion of a stratification, which gives the
constitution style its peculiarity, belongs in the first instance to space. It is
only with reference to space that we can differentiate an adequate perception
of external things as three-dimensional objects which are adumbrated by a
sequence of two-dimensional Gestalten.
The phenomenological area constituted between adequacy and inadequacy,
that belongs to space-constitution, acquires the ability to reveal or give rise
to the external, bodily thing. The notion of the thing implies an exteriority
which is specifically implied by the inadequacy of perceptual acts. But the
notion of inadequacy also implies an adequacy-intention which is directed
to an external object. Before any constitution can be carried out, object-
intention must be active, and it must be distinct from the act-intention.
In order to strengthen the preceding distinction, Husserls needs only to
notice that "the perception of surfaces is not a surface." 22 He points out
the transcendence of single things by distinguishing transcendent Darstellung
from immanent Vorstellung (but he does not maintain this terminology
later on). We must refer the essence of the "inadequating" intention to the
perceptual intentionality of a lower level: "One must first of all notice, that
we talk about an identity-consciousness that unifies two perceptions and so
gives rise to consciousness of an object as one and the same. But identity-
consciousness does not identify the two perceptions, as if they were the
same." 23
Here Hussed expresses what I will call ''the first phenomenological law for
290 FILIPPO COSTA

external things." The identity of a thing is of a transcendent kind with regard

to perceptions, insofar as it is formed out of perceptions which hoid as
distinct. The "one-and-many" of the thing in general is not an objective unity
(it is not substratum-accidentia in form), nor a subjective one (it is not a
unifying "I" -consciousness in form). We note, by the way, that Hegel in his
Phenomenology of Consciousness ignores this kind of unity that goes beyond
the objective and the subjective.
Now, Hussed's phenomenology does not allow a pure and simple unity,
but furthers many unity-modalities according to the different constitution-
levels. Moreover, perceptions are able to fit together into configurational
unities, in such a way as to be able to connect up as many aspects of the same
thing. This capacity inheres in their inner constitution, and is parallel to the
complex unity-functions belonging to the acts which posit the thing as a
unity in itself. As the outcome of these acts, an independent thing-unity
arises.
Hussed describes the analysis of the thing as a move from "givenness" to
"self-positing", i.e., from transcendence to immanence. He calls the act by
which something is brought to its self-positing Selbstgebend. On the one
hand, a perceptual consciousness stands out, aiming at a transcendent unity,
i.e., at the transcendent thing; on the other, there arises "an absolute self-
giving consciousness, by which the absolute self-givenness of an identity
stands out."24
The notion of a "self-giving consciousness" makes up the fundamental
paradox of phenomenology. The straightforward consciousness-data are
not produced by the consciousness itself, and yet they are, and are meant to
be, "by themselves" only insofar as they are endowed with this meaning
by the work of consciousness itself. This paradox turns out to involve no
inconsistency: consciousness is no substance, nor is it a power which yields
data. It is the way the data present themselves as consciousnesslike data.
Things as transcendent data are not endowed with the proper givenness
belonging to self-giving consciousness. In fact, there are not two conscious-
ness - one relating to immanent givenness, and the other to the transcendent
things. There are only two givenness-modes or two modes of being-conscious
of data. A functional link exists between immanence and transcendence: the
objectifying consciousness presupposes the self-giving one.
The phenomenology of external things is based on the gap between act-
and object-structure. In fact, the constitutive frame of acts does not agree
with that of objects: "The stream and the frame of the absolute giving-
consciousness is not the stream or the frame of the given object." 2S
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 291

The distinction of the thing from consciousness is not ontic in character.

The more complex the net of consciousnesslike constitutive links making up
the sense of the thing is, the more the thing is itself. The mode of "being-a-
thing" and the mode of "being-a-consciousness" can be differentiated from
each other, in the same way as what is relative is differentiated from what is
absolute - provided that we attribute a sense of immanence to the absolute-
ness of consciousness. All this requires the reduction to be brought over the
Self as an original being. "We exclude the transcendent positing of the Self
and keep to the absoluteness of consciousness in its absolute sense." 26
This specification of the meaning of "absolute" is essential to an under-
standing of the sense of reality belonging to singular things. "Absolute" does
not mean "substantial", "ontic", or ens a se, but the functional or constitu-
tive primum, that given-by-itself which resides properly in giving-by-itself.
Realiter, this absolute is a "no-thing", for consciousness is only a sense-giving
immanence. It is a primum with respect to a secundum - a secundum that is
so in a functional sense.
Things do not tum out to be mere Vorhandenheiten, as Heidegger some-
times calls them; they are not ontic data, but what presents itself under the
heading "real datum", so implying a distinctive manifoldness of sense-layers.

III AN OUTLINE OF PARONTOLOGY

As we have seen, the pre-empirical is not an ontic plane underlying or pre-

ceding the empirical-real one, but is a constitutive functionality of experience.
Therefore, pre-empirical syntheses are properly presyntheses. They do not
end in constituting thinglike unities, but remain within the constitution-
process. The phenomenology of the pre-empirical aims to explain the ex-
perience which gives rise to the sense of external objects.
Our analysis can now proceed in two main directions: the way I will call
secundum essentiam and the way I will call secundum existentiam.
The experience of an actual present thing contains many sense-strata made
up according to perceptual categories and laws. Husserl's analysis confines
itself to the study of the formations secundum essentiam. He leaves out the
following terms: (1) the experience of self-giving, by which a thing confronts
us, showing its proper sense-of-presence; (2) our actual feeling that "there is
Something rather than Nothing"; (3) the constitution of a thing in the fact
of its plain being, rather than in its perceived properties. These three items,
on further reflection, tum out to be the same when viewed from different
phenomenological angles.
292 FILIPPO COSTA

HusserI's exclusion, just noticed, is a methodological one. His phenome-

nology is a sense-analysis requiring the placing between brackets of all real
things. He uses reduction, so that, in fact, he presupposes that no actual
constitutive process takes place in the mere self-giving of extant things - the
constitution itself takes place only with respect to sense-perception.
But if we let any thing thrust its presence against us and if we prepare
ourselves for the pure feeling of this presence, we are then able, at the same
time, to detect the narrowness of Husserl's analysis. And if we intend to go
beyond Husserl's boundaries, we must not overlook - on the other hand -
the need for phenomenological epoche.
When we pass from a sense-stratum to another we fail to grasp the decisive
moment when the empirical is detached form the pre-empirical. The ex-
perience of a straightforward presence of the thing is diluted in a sequence
of presentations none of which is endowed with a sense of this presence. We
must now regain the experience Husserl has overlooked, and we can try to
represent it by using a "Cartesian style of thought."
"I exist" is my first certainty. I know that there is a reality at all, only
insofar as I know that I am there. There-being is to-be-in, and what I am in is
called "the world." The primary certainty of my own existing contains the
secondary certainty of the existing world. This is given to me in a merely
presumptive way. I am there, but the world must be there. The presumptivity
just noticed is not deduced from the first certainty, but belongs to it as its
condition. The two uses of "there-being", for the Self and for the world, do
not at first prove to denote two separate realities, but constitute their objects
as correlated aspects within "being-in-the-world", by which alone I can
perceive my very existence.
The "I" of the first certainty is a hic-et-nunc-stans - not a mere nunc-stans
as Husserl claims. The assertion "I am there" potentially contains the question
"where and when?" The correct answer to this question consists in conceiving
the world as what I am there in. Therefore the sum of cogito ergo sum is in
fact a prae-sum - my there-being is nothing but a being-before, or a being-
present. Being in the world is being-in-the-presence-of.
Accordingly, time and space can be modes of the world insofar as they
are coordinates of the (Being as a) Presence. They are implied by the first
certainty by which the Self is a hic-et-nunc-praesens. The way the world is
relative to the Self does not affect Being in an absolute sense but the presence
of things to or before the Self.
We can now detect the fundamental mistake of idealistic metaphysics,
which misunderstands the relatedness belonging to presence, insofar as it
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 293

interprets it as a relativity, attributed to Being. Phenomenological inten-

tionality is then interpreted as a "producing imagination" (Fichte). Husseri
too is not quite free from this misunderstanding, at least in his last works.
Going a step further, I will introduce the term "parontology", deriving it
from 1rotp6v (a present thing). Classical ontology turns out to be a misunder-
stood parontology.
The basic notion of the former is ouaia, that of the latter 1rapovaia (at this
point we cannot investigate the relation between parontology and Christology,
insofar as they are both concerned with rrapovaia). The logic of ouaia is
"predicative", ,the logic of rrapovaia is "relational."
As to idealistic metaphysics, we may notice that it gets entangled in
the predicative logic, i.e., in classical ontology, even though it tends to a
relationlike world view. Phenomenology, insofar as it thinks of phenomena as
appearing or "putting forward", moves in the area of relational parontology.
Husseri, in contrast, finds the mark of the thing in itself in its pregivenness;
put differently, in the prae of prae-sum (in the Vor belonging to both Vor-
gegebenheit and Vorgabe). The very meaning of this vor belongs to the
pre-empirical.
What is now the world according to parontology? One can describe it as a
relation between being-in and being-before. I am in the world just because I
am before something (or someone), and the thing is just because it confronts
the "I" as something arising in the area of my world-relatedness.
Parontology is now a phenomenology, because talking about being or
about things, i.e., about the world, is talking about the Self as that before
which the original self-showing of thing takes place. My primordial experience
of the worid gives me no things as created or set up by the Self, but shows
thing-complexes as being-before the Self and presented (in space and time)
by the Self. Therefore the Self, or the "I", is the starting point of every
explication of thing-ness. The primordinal or pre-empirical sense of hic-et-
nunc makes its appearance together with the certainty of my being - of
the existing "I" set up hic-et-nunc. This very setting gives meaning to the
presence and existence of things-in-world.
The parontological primum is not the Self (idealism) nor the Thing (realism)
but the area' or world-space which allows the presence-correlation between
Self and Thing. Things are insofar as they put themselves before on the stage
in which the Self gives a sense of presence to represented data. The act of
sense-giving turns out to be a representation as a basic act of the self-positing
"I." The awareness (the Cartesian s 'apercevoir) is preceded by perception
understood as signification of the reciprocal presence of Self and Thing. To
294 FILIPPO COSTA

perceive (Vorstellen) is having a thing in the modus of a prae (Vor), Le.,

having in advance the space in which things can be present insofar as they are
represented on the stage of the Self.
Every perceived thing makes its appearance as what has come to take its
place within the consciousness-stage, gaining here its lasting position. It is not
first of all a colored surface, a mere surface-quality, as Hussed maintains, but
the outcome of a motion beginning at the background and leading to the
stage of consciousness. This stage - the pro-scenium - is the field of all
1uxpovai.a.
Following our parontological path, we encounter Hussed's figure of an
"unconcerned spectator." But it is preferable, in my opinion, to talk about
a concerned spectator, understanding the notion of "concernedness" in a
new way, that is, with reference to the interest the spectator unfolds in
bringing things out on the stage or the "surface" of being.
Berkeley's space theory may now come to mind: he, in fact, envisages
two-dimensional space as the original perceptual status of things given in the
world. The commonplace esse est percipi is thus made available to a profound
interpretation or periphrasis: perceiving means (as we have seen) bringing to
the presence-stage - calling from background or from behind the scenes on
the stage. But the link between esse and percipi is still missing. In order to
make up this absence, we call for Hussed's pre-empirical as we have used this
term, parontologically. According to Husserl the space-surface, or Riemann-
space - as he renames it - takes shape as the pre-empirical endowed with a
sense of an original "giveable." Its sense shifts, therefore, from geometry
to phenomenology, even though Husserl's language is still affected by geo-
metrical terms.
As our point of view has changed, we must reverse the direction ontologists
usually attribute to the intention directed toward reality itself. Ontologists,
in fact, think of things as an outcome of a movement proceeding from surface
to depth, from appearance to underground reality. Understanding is some-
thing like "undergrounding." Phenomenologists see the thing-reality in the
surface-outcome of the very appearance that makes a thing real. The surface
is not viewed by these as a sort of "not yet" of depth, but as a field in which
things assume their essential sense of being-before.
The parontological thing-unity is a surface-event, which happens on the
stage. As we talk about a "concerned" or "interested" spectator, happenings
on that stage tum out to be a perturbation of perceptual a priori (meant now
as a capacity of the Self). Perception is therefore a passive synthesis by which
the Self is affected by present things. Correspondingly, the being-act of the
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 295

Self (its actus essendi) is not an activity but a passive happening, a perturbation
of Selfs extant being. This situation, at a higher level, is interpreted as doubt.
Phenomenology explains the dubito - in a Cartesian way connected with
the sum - as an original perturbation of presence-act, i.e., of mutual standing-
before of Thing and Self. My self-awareness is produced by that self-reflection
on myself that is reacting against a perturbation provoked (in a literal mean-
ing) by things acting on the perceptual stage. Therefore, primordial self-
consciousness is given by "I perceive." Happenings are parontological acts;
the "pre-being" of things is their pre-empirical status affecting the Self.
Thinglike being is not a sort of inertial staying (as lying like unsold stock
- cf. the Italian giacenza), but the wielding of a power that strikes our
senses. The sense of presence, by which I can say "I am", is a product of this
wielding.
Now, we may proceed to compare classical ontology with the version of
phenomenology which I have called parontology.
Classical ontology has no place for anything but Being and non-Being. The
self, therefore, either is or is not ("to be or not to be"). When it is, it is as an
ens a se, a substantia - fullness of being. It no longer has to be. Therefore,
man no longer has anything to do with things. Man's life is a mere property
thought of as an accidens. Before him there is no really living worId (or
world-of-life), because he has life as something "haveable", but he does not
have to live. As he fails to understand life, he also fails to understand death.
Therefore, he thinks of himself as being incapable of dying - as an immortal
soul.
By contrast, phenomenology knows nothing about pure Being or non-
Being. If we are to give these terms some meaning within the phenomenologi-
cal field, we must take them as merely ideal extremes of the segment made
up of real objects existing in the mode of "more or less being."
As a result, HusserI's thing-phenomenology remains under the heading
secundum essentiam, and ends up by missing the experienced presence of
things. In recovering this experience, however, we must take great care to
avoid reverting to ontological dualism. This may be done by explaining the
presence of things as their constitutive move from the background of dark
Being to the stage of clarifying consciousness.
From a parontological point of view, everything has its own presentation-
capacity, by virtue of which the Self can be said to be more or less authentic.
Both for the Thing and for the Self we must say that they are "more or less."
We understand this parontological principle at best by thinking about the fact
that whatever is present is so only in the mode of "more or less", i.e., every
296 FILIPPO COSTA

presence implies a certain degree of absence. Moreover, we must recognize

that every presence has a quality of its own. The principium identitatis
indiscemibilium could be reformulated in parontological terms, as "no two
things can be given, such that their respective presence be the same in both
degree and quality."
As to the Self, its "being-less" is anonymous existence. The Self is not in-
sofar as it is not Itself, reducing to the Man of typical German construction of
impersonal sentences. This is a well-known view of Heidegger's. But we must
ask, moreover, What is the first and proper origin of that everyday triviality,
in which the Self loses its very being? What has happened at all, so that the
Anonymous has invaded the field of the lost Self? What is it that has lost
man's soul - and body?
If, as Heidegger maintains, being is for man a being-in-the-world, the loss
of being must concern the world, too. In parontological terms, a sort of loss
of the presence-power things are (or were) endowed with is at the root of
human lost-ness or dejected-ness (Geworfenheit). In the extant lost existence
the stage for thing-existence is still empty: No-Thing appears. Things are as
if they were not; they are corruptible by their very essence. If corruptible,
they are breakable into pieces: man is able to construct things, once he
has broken them down. The presence of things is constituted (secundum
existentiam) by the structure of this two-sided motion. "Loseness" is inscribed
in the essence of things, as things-in-presence.
The well-known technological turmoil running through the world gives no
place to an authentic Self. The world in which the Self is supposed to be in -
is no longer before it. Loss of presence engenders corruption in things and in
the Self.
Once things have lost their being-before, it can be recovered as a mere
abstractum (rational ontology) or as an ultimate Reality (theology). Having
lost the paradise of holiness, where things were authentically present, the
only thing man can do is to think of an "Ultimate Concern" (Tillich). That
concern has become "ultimate", because things that are at hand can no longer
be the object of concern. Thus, ontology, theology (in its classic rationalistic
form), loss of the Holy, and technology turn out to be linked closely.
Instead of the Holy which favored the authentic presence of things, we
only fmd things which are, so to say, "loseable", because of the deceptiveness
they have acquired. As a result, they have decayed, becoming relegated to
the status of consumer goods, so that our age may be labeled a "consumer
culture." This situation engenders the spread of an economistic worldview.
Religious thought uses "creation" as a symbol for the primeval sense of
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 297

provenance things have lost. Creation holds for authentic things only. There
could be no God who creates things which are called artefacta, including the
ideal objects of culture, such as sciences or theories. But our age has replaced
creation by manufacturing, so endangering the existence-resources things have
in potentia.
Through parontological reflection we can recover the lost presence of
things by unfolding the memory of Being we keep inside ourselves. And we
can rename parontological constitutions "presyntheses", insofar as they
precede the constitutive syntheses Husserl performs by putting one sense-
stratum on the other. In fact, we cannot fmd out-and-out syntheses in the
field of the pre-empirical here; only the quasi-synthesis we have named
"configuration" holds.
In principle, we cannot separate Husserl's thing-analysis (secundum essen-
tiam) from our parontology (secundum existentiam), though no trace of the
latter can be found in his writings. But the intimate affmity between the two
conceptions can be traced in the theory of "inadequacy" Husserl places in
the center of his thing-phenomenology.

IV INADEQUACY AS A TITLE FOR THE INTENTION AIMING AT

THE THING ITSELF

The existential presynthesis constituting things as "given-before" impresses

the seal of "inadequacy" on the presenting perception: perceptions constitute
things secundum essentiam by typically inadequating acts. In reconstructing
a thing in its many sense-strata, consciousness starts with inadequate space-
perceptions.
The first quality of things is extension. Extension, at its turn, is expansion
in time and extension in space. Time-expansion does not belong to the same
constitution-level as space-extension. Accordingly, Husserl allows us to
disregard the former in dealing with the latter. 27
A thing is expanded in space, insofar as there is a matter filling space.
Now, according to Husserl, a "perceptual space-expansion is constituted by
means of the extension of phenomena. It belongs to every time-point of a
whole phemenon, and, essentially, remains distinct from time-constituting
expansion." 28 Space-extension does not involve any time-peculiarity. Husserl's
analysis of space-constitution implies its independence from the phenome-
nology of time. For this reason, he can ensure the pre-empirical status of
space as a straightforward quality.
In the prespace no composition arises, only prephenomenal "side-by-side"-
298 FILIPPO COST A

being. A specific content (for example, a colored surface) can appear beside
another, without giving rise to any synthesis. This fact does not prevent us
from regarding a particular surface as a "fullness" (a singled out fullness-
unity). HusserI speaks about a "form of pre phenomenal space-ness" meaning,
in fact, a preform. Shape-unity taking place in pre-empirical space is not such
that it contains its parts as a "stuff" within itself.
But a question now arises: how can a single shape-unity stand out from the
whole visual field it belongs to? Is the visual outline, from which a shape-
unity juts out, to be delimited from outside, i.e., from an entire visual field,
or from inside, i.e., from the place the shape covers?
A certain ambiguity is now produced concerning the notion of prespace:
on the one hand, a shape appears as a given unity in its immediate wholeness;
on the other, it stands out (without any synthesis) as a shaping in its space-
extension, at the completion of a "filling." It is very difficult to think of this
process without invading the empirical field which is characterized by a
proper constitution.
As to HusserI, he takes great care in keeping his attention on what we may
call a "neutral zone", where the pre-empirical, so to say, leans out toward
the empirical. As we will see, the real differentiating criterion between these
two realms is to be found in the dynamic point of view which constitute a
thing by filling its space in a "static" way. In doing so, HusserI dwells on the
neutral zone mentioned above. He therefore conceives the proper space a
thing takes up as the scope of the expansion of its fullness.
Accordingly, I would call this space an "inner" space. As the place where
the various thing-qualities converge, it no longer belongs to the pre-empirical
which allows no identity-synthesis.
But what a real thing is as a unity is foretold in the pre-empirical realm
where a splitting of perceptual shapes "referring" (in the mode of a linguistic
reference) to that thing takes place. With this situation in view, it is advisable,
at this stage, to speak about a "second-Qrder inadequacy", whereas the "first-
order inadequacy" would occur within the same perceptual genus.
The boundaries between the pre-empirical and empirical do not appear
to be very neat here. HusserI must introduce a "mixed" perception and a
"mixed" fullness, thereby indicating an unregulated perceptual association
rather than a single perception composed of elements belonging to either
genus." 29 Now, I ask whether this mixing belongs to the pre-empirical or
empirical. An answer could be supplied by appealing to the "neutral zone."
But, for the moment, we must leave the question open.
We will now consider the notion of adequacy in greater detail. As we
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 299

approach a thing, a new inadequacy appears at every step. We fmd "improper

appearances" more and more. Now, according to HusserI, there are two kind
of improperness:

the first kind of improperness includes the aspects of a thing that do not belong to the
phenomena in a proper sense. The other includes what is seen and belongs to a proper
phenomenon but is not touched .... Moreover, we notice that the inadequacy con-
cerning a backside neither seen nor touched is essentially different from the inadequacy
concerning a foreside that is seen but not touched. The latter inadequacy refers directly
to tactile properties. 3o

HusserI does not say what creates the "essential difference" he speaks
about. In this paper, we can appeal to experience now described and state
that the more appearances become inadequate and inappropriate, the more
they tend to coalesce in mixed indirect perceptions, so that they can denote
the thing itself as being independent of any kind of perception. Tactile,
visual "not perceiveds" are deposited in consciousness, and so constitute the
presence-sense of a thing which is, therefore, "intended" as keeping at a
distance from the perceiving subject.
As HusserI notices, the stratification of objects does not belong to the
pre-empirical but to "apprehension" (Auffassung). According to our de-
scription it takes place on the base of "residues" left over by inadequate
and improper perceptions. This constitutive work can be labeled "secondary
constitution." 31 The thing in question is not perceived in a single sense, but
only seen, touched, and so on. In fact, as the main result of HusserI's analysis,
the notion of a perception as such is no longer justified. In its place we fmd
the following items: (1) many sense-strata of distinctive perpectual genera
(such as "seeing", "touching", "weighing up", "hearing", and so on); (2)
a mixing of different genera without a consequent perceptual genus; (3)
a syntheses of various kinds; (4) a "thing in itself" as a mere heading for
coalescing constitutions. Accordingly, what we call usually "perception" is
nothing but a term denoting a task for syntheses in progress.
As denoting thing-unity, "perception" turns out to be a mere co"elatum a
parte subjecti of the intended external reality. The very meaning of perception
itself can be grasped, therefore, in the tendency every perceptual genus
possesses to "lean out" toward another genus. In Husserl's words, "the pre-
extension belongs to the tactile component, but it also belongs to the "cold-
hot" component only by transferring its original "sphere of influence." The
same holds with respect to the feeling of pain."32
This transfer is not yet a synthesis, but is no longer a mere shaping be-
300 FILIPPO COSTA

longing to the pre-empirical. It has its place in the "neutral zone" we have
mentioned.
At the higher revel of things themselves, thing-unity is no longer a shape
outlined within the visual field, but consists in the superposition of sense
strata which goes beyond the pre-empirical and give rise to mixed perceptions,
transfers, alienness, and so on. Husser!, moreover, stresses the peculiar func-
tion the surrounding thing-world performs in giving the thing the world posi-
tion that constitutes its higher-level-reality.
The apprehension aiming at an isolated thing supplies itself with a second-
order apprehension aiming at the thinglike horizon a thing is endowed with.
The very act by which we point at a single thing thus prevents us from taking
it as a monad. We must try to recover a thing from the appearance-continuum
it is originally made of. But this same continuum, in its tum, is "charged"
with an intentionality-power which makes the thing in question able to func-
tion as a 'sign." A single thing becomes an "indication" of other things.
We can now resume discussion of Hussed's analysis: "The sensation-
contents of a thing fulfill their sense-function for that thing itself. But, on the
other hand, they are linked with other contents of the same kind, functioning
as representations of other thingS."33 In other words, no thing can get its
empirical unity without the second-order function, fulfilled by what goes
beyond its immanent contents and is thus intended as the "referent" of these.
In its tum, the complex so arising acquires its own sense as a subject of
inadequate representation. "The whole space and the perceptual thing-world
belong to the phenomenon, in its narrow sense, only partially and from one
side." 34
The inadequacy-structure, that is, the systematic difference between
immanence and transcendence, stands out as much as the perception which
intends a real unity varies to an increasing extent, in both quantity and
quality. "To represent" now takes on the sense of "to stand for" or "to
replace." The identifying power of "representative" perceptions keeps up
with their variations. The consciousness of the thing-identity is produced
by partial apprehensions superimposing upon each other:

We well know that all superpositions of this sort are essentially based on superposition-
phenomena. Letting the same object approach its appearance means only giving rise to
its identification according to the essence of phenomena related to it. 35

Without difference in apprehensions and in correlated pre-empiricals there

is no identity in the thing. The proper place of a thing in the space before
us is an "index" of our possibility of moving near or far away from it. We
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 301

"intend" a thing as placed before us, insofar as we perform a process which

makes it near and involves "concordances" and "discordances." 36 The sense
of a thing as "itself" chiefly arises at crucial moments when it is missed by a
straightforward perception, or by any direct intention in general. The thing
is present to us as itself just when it turns out to be different from what we
were expecting. Husser! explicates this as follows:
Every thing-perception is endowed with a capacity to go beyond what is just contained
in a given phenomenon. But this going-beyond may be unsuccessful: the standing object
does not agree with apprehension - it disagrees .... Yet the same object persists through
all constitutive steps. ... Reuniting disagreements or failures become constitutive
moments of that object. The object fIrst intended is now replaced by an "otherwise-
being" one. The fact of this replacement now belongs to the essence of this object. 37

We can intend a thing as "itself and the same" insofar as it keeps a capacity
to be "otherwise." It owes this capacity to its spacelike constitution. Hussed
continues: "The back of a thing can always be thought of as being 'otherwise'
than its appearance from the front. This fact is not a mere chance at all." 38
The phenomenological analysis of spatial depth, as the third dimension
belonging to things, describes the possible "otherwise-being" which may
disappoint the expectations arising from perceptual object-intentions. The
identity of a thing goes through the sequence of the syntheses, where a cer-
tain identification takes place. But the really identical thing is never attained;
it shifts from one synthesis to another and becomes a mere end-in-view. In
Hussed's terms: "We may talk about superposed strata or sense-strata which
are unceasingly constituting an identity. But no real identification takes place
at all." 39
The end-in-view of this process is never a datum, it is its mere possibility.
It is essentially affected by the incompleteness that derives from constitutive
"improper appearance-moments."40 Things are, therefore, endowed with a
certain degree of perceptual fullness. Correspondingly, consciousness can
never get rid of the inadequacy of thing-perceptions:
Every thing-perception is inadequate, the static ones precisely because they are just
one-sided, the variable ones because they never reach the goal of absolute giveness. In the
case of the latter, the constitution can only proceed in a scattered fashion .... The
complete physical shape can never be attained by the intention which aims at an absolute
givenness. 41

To speak about a fully "realized" thing-ideal is nonsense. If, however,

this were ever achieved, the thing referred to would not contain the depth
required for it to be able to stand as "itself" beyond the subjective status of
302 FILIPPO COSTA

perceivedness. Husser! asks: "Would there still be any difference between

appearance and what appears? And would there be a transcendence at all
arising fromit?"42

V KINAESTHESIS AND ITS CONSTITUTIVE FUNCTION

We feel the presence of a thing because our perceptions of it maintain their

systematic inadequacy, which allows intentionality as a tension of conscious-
ness in action. Inadequacy, in fact, gives rise to the presence of something
"not perceived" - or "unperceived" - we credit the thing with. The thing
itself exceeds its own perceptual status; the thing's presence "transcends"
perception. Correspondingly, the acts intentioning the thing itself are called
"transcendent."
Now, HusserI acknowledges many degrees of transcendence - two, at
least: "(1) a transcendence given adequately, and (2) a transcendence given
inadequately, or rather to be given inadequately." 43 In order to explicate
the first, we need only recover the pre-empirical, but in order to explicate
the second, we must have recourse to sensations of a new kind, the so-called
kinaestheses.
At this point it is advisable, in my opinion, to distinguish between a static
and a dynamic constitution, the first taking place on the basis of the pre-
empirical and its related first-order transcendence, the latter on the basis of
kinaestheses and of their related second-order transcendence. Now, the main
question in phenomenology we are discussing concerns the move from the
first to the second: What supplies the passive shapes of the pre-empirical with
their capacity to transcend toward things themselves?
HusserI prepares a convenient answer by introducing the notion of kin-
aesthesis. But the analysis of kinaesthesis is in its turn preceded by an account
of the sense of touch. Both touch and kinaesthesis belong to what we may
call a bodily sense or feeling, meaning by this our body's involvement in
both.
In general, by kinaesthesis one means the sense of a muscular effort taking
place in a bodily movement. In HusserI's view every act of a sense-organ
implies a motion-sense. When I, for example, see a colored spot, I not only get
a certain impression on my retina, but I make an effort at ocular adaptation
to focus on the spot. This adaptation is an inner move,not an external motion
at all. From a phenomenological point of view we can say: A thing is really
"seen" insofar as an ocular kinaesthesis takes place ending in it. Kinaesthesis
is a sense of motion constituting an external image as the outcome of visual
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 303

acts referring to it. Kinaesthesis transfonns a mere sense-content into a fixed

image endowed with an object-value. 44
We can regret that HusserI does not develop the intimate connection
between touch and kinaesthesis, which he touches on only briefly. From a
phenomenological point of view, indeed, touching something is to bring it
into one's own presence. In touching we therefore perfonn an act of motion,
that particular motion phenomenology describes as approaching to the Self
(as a body). That is to say, touching is a kind of kinaesthesis, because its
constitutive motion is an object of feeling at the same level of touch-sense.
But we cannot now dwell particularly on this point.
The main function kinaesthesis must accomplish consists in connecting the
disparate shapes of the pre-empirical field into an unique object-synthesis,
that could not be achieved by mere superimposition of sense-strata. The new
thing-sense arising in the synthesis of kinaesthesis constitutes the sense of the
three-dimensional object, to be kept distinct from the depth-sensation taking
place in the pre-empirical. If, as Husserl says again and again, visual contents
do not suffice to constitute a thing as extended in its three dimensions, a
synthesis of a new kind is needed which yields a presentation "comprising
all sense-content, i.e., all physical data entering into the unity of a phenome-
non. By this presentation we perfonn an animating apprehension of data and
give rise to the appearance of a thing-sense."45
HusserI proceeds to specify what may be called the phenomenological
place kinaestheses take up within constitutive activity. First of all, we must
notice that this activity is no longer an activity of pure consciousness, but of
conscious body, insofar as kinaesthetic acts can only be performed by sense-
organs of a living and conscious body. Our perceiving body fills its constituting
function as a perceiving body and as a perceived one at the same time. Con-
stitutive kinaestheses obtain their power from activities performed by a living
body. Kinaestheses are really bodily acts. The acting subject which constitutes
a thing as real is engaged as a body among a world of bodies. What makes the
oneness of a Self is then its being "distinct" in the very mode in which bodies
can be distinguished from each other. This bodily distinction of the Self is of
course richer and deeper than the subject-object one.
Now, the constitutive power of kinaestheses turns put to be a sort of
natural widening of the distinctive capacity the Self-Body possesses insofar
as it exists among other bodies (things or Selves). Granted this link between
Self-Body and kinaestheses, we can resume HusserI's discourse:

We are particularly interested in kinaesthetic sensations. They are not essential to the
304 FILIPPO COSTA

appearance of physical things as such. They do not fulfill a representing function, in a

pregnant sense; they constitute no matter as a thing, not even a matter which "adheres."
They only allow of an apprehension which transforms a· matter as a thing into many
adherent properties. This apprehension is purely subjective. 46

The incapacity of kinaestheses to make a partial content to (physically)

adhere to another content, in order to compose a material thing, is only due
to its "ocular" nature. But if we, enlarging HusserI's notion of kinaesthesis
(as himself elsewhere suggest),47 take tactile kinaestheses into account, we
can approach the phenomenology of physical matter as constituted by
"adhesion' and "cohesion." As to HusserI, he attributes a privileged position
to visual kinaestheses.
An ocular kinaesthesis, for example, does not belong to the perceived
thing at all, but to the perceiving Self-Body only. I can be concretely aware
of myself, insofar as kinaestheses do not end up in an objective property but
only in a modification of the Self. Mutual independence of Self and thing is
due to systems of kinaestheses which give rise to the (algebraic) "invariances"
constituting Self and thing respectively.
Summing up HusserI's research, we may establish the following outline. We
denote by "I", "II", and so on, phenomenological steps coming is succession.
Other symbols are explained in our context:
I. S', S", S'II .. , are coexistent shapes.
S is the shape they belong to.
First of all, we constitute:
S = {S', S", ... , sn }
S is a mere set and no relation is presupposed between its elements.
II. W is a relation such that W(A, b) reads: A (= a single a or a set of a's) is
(are) part of b.
In our case, we then constitute:
W(si, S)

III. J is a relation such that J (a, b) reads: a intentions b (is associated with -
in an irreflexive relation, aims to, attracts, and so on).
In our case, we constitute:
J(Si, Si+l)
on the basis of II. It is obvious that the intention by which an element aims
to another depends from the whole.
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 305

Before going on with our outline, we notice the decisive step HusserI takes
by setting up a relation between kinaestheses and other sense-fields. He thinks
of S as a sequence, so that we can write
IV. S =- S' -+ S" -+ ... -+ Sn

He now supposes a sequence K of kinaesthetic acts to guarantee each Si its

intentional power we have put under III, and its status as a fully perceived
image at the same time. By virtue of K, the si's are connected together as the
many two-dimensional sides of the same three-dimensional thing. A special
moment in this connection arises at the end where one may fmd:
S' =sn

In this case the process is circular: the intention of S' comes back to S' itself.
HusserI does not fail to observe this important case, but he does not mean
to discover its subjective correlatum. This consists in the property of the
Self-Body, by which it can go back to its former starting point, or return
to its country. If we think of kinaesthesis as an original mode of being of
the Self-Body, we must assert that its actus essendi involves its kinaesthetic
capacity to return to its country. But I must now urge a further remark.
We could conceive of K function-act leading on the whole S. In this case
a kinaesthesis is produced only in relation to a passage from one shape to
another. There is no a single kinaesthesis corresponding to a single shape.
Now, HusserI's analysis demonstrates the functional link existing between K
and S as a one-to-one mapping in form. According to him we must recognize
something as:
V. (a) K = cpS
(b) Ki =cpSi

In my opinion, V.b is untenable and a danger to V.a, that is, to the synthetic
function of kinaesthesis.
Moreover, we contend that HusserI is wrong in maintaining that S is a
whole composed of parts, as the II above suggests. The link between II and
III is doubtful: if we perceived any si as a part, we would not have a real
sequence but a series:
VI. S = S' + S" + ... + Sn

But this is not the case, for in the sequence which constitutes an overall
shape-unity every si is in reality the same S from the particular point of view
306 FILIPPO COSTA

"i." The S obtained is thus of a logical higher order than any si. This dif-
ference in height comes from kinaestheses giving S itself a dynamic nature sui
generis.
Husserl's statement V.b gives rise to the following paradox: Any Ki turns
out to be a motionless sense of motion, i.e., a static fixing of the mapped Si.
Of course, motion in K is no motion in a thing, and vice versa. But what the
motion formula IV means is nevertheless neutralized in any punctual Ki!
The kinaesthesis which must guarantee "animation" in the shape-sequence
S melts away spliting up into a discontinuous set of K-dots.
Moreover S's nature is static, K's nature is dynamic. On principle, S admits
of many internal divisions, so that we may write:

VII. If an S is such as W(si, S) and

S= {S', S" ... },
then there are a W* and S*i such that
W*(S* , S) and
S= {S*', S*", ... }

By means of VII we can think of S itself, say lSI, as the class of all *-partitions
ofS.
Now, if we adopt V.b, we must necessarily allow something as IKI. But
this is made impossible by the dynamic nature of K. As to S, we must notice
that the height VII speaks about is not the same height VI speaks about.
At this point, it would be necessary to adopt Russell's theory of types, in
order to distinguish height of different kinds. But nothing of that holds of
K.
According to the set-theoretical description Husser! in fact proposes, we
could not smooth out the difficulties it gives rise to, unless we resorted to a
kinaesthesis of a new kind filling the function of connecting any K-moment
with the following one. These moments require a synthesis of a higher level,
while they had been require to fulfill a synthetic function for the given
sequence of shapes.
Granted the functional parallelism of K and S, Husser! can give a new
version of the two-fold transcendence:

Any two-fold sequence of shapes and K, which is now occurring, may be unified by
means of an apprehension-continuity possessing its own unity. It gives every (K, S)
of every time-phase its functional unity as a unity if apprehension; thus, it obtains a
phenomenon flowing with others in a phenomenal whole .... S-elements supply in-
tentions as "directed-to", and K-elements supply the motivations for such intentions. 48
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 307

The sequence of shapes is a mere passing from one shape to another, and the
sequence of kinaestheses is a motivation-sequence embracing the elements of
the total-shape S. The specific motivation inherent in K is then correlated to
the unity-sense inherent in S.
For this very reason I have preferred to talk about a whole motivating K
rather than about a motivation-sequence of Kj,s. These appear to me as the
inseparable aspects the whole K consists of.
As to Husserl, he needs a higher unity in order to give rise to the overall
synthesis referring to a single thing. This further unity is, however, no longer
of a bodily character, but announces itself as "consciousness." We will con-
clude that Husserl's reduction to pure consciousness - his detachment from
constitutive bodyness - is the logical consequence of his hypothesis about
the sequence-nature of K.
In fact, Husserl says:

A unity-consciousness unfolds in the continuity of phenomena which essentially matches

the continuity of K-motivations. It is that unity that makes up the unity of a thing and
constitutes it .... The consciousness of a real givenness, that goes through an actual
continuity of shapes, is a consciousness of the givenness taking place in a realizing shape
or in a shape aiming at a new realization. 49

By appealing to consciousness Husserl no longer needs to involve Self-Body.

He thus reaches a decisive turning point in his phenomenological itinerary.
It is a fact that when Husserl in Ding und Raum uses the phenomenological
notion of kinaesthesis, he has no straightforward recourse to consciousness,
and when he uses the notion of consciousness he gives up kinaesthesis.
But that is not all: the same word "kinaesthesis" can be used in two
different meanings: (1) as a subjective act, requiring no body, or (2) as an
act of Self-Body involving an organic move, so that the feeling of motion
and act of feeling coincide. Husserl conceives of kinaesthesis as a sort of
projection from subjective feeling to constituted shape-object. Thus, the
function of Self-Body remains concealed.
I object to this concealment, and contend that the constitutive function
kinaestheses assume in making a thing a real and external thing depends on
the Self-Body as a kinetic living system.
A sign of the insufficiency of Husserl's analysis can be found in his adoption
of the narrow and reductive language of the old empiricism. According to
Husserl,
As a consequence of associationism any perceptual field belonging to a certain K at a
determinated moment is endowed with an intentional property. This property turns out
308 FILIPPO COST A

to be a unitary apprehension which gives the shape an "animation" and so allows the
consciousness to create a sense of objective unity as a permanent fulfillment of object-
intention. 50

By adopting associationism as it had come down to him, Husserl is induced

to absorb the psychological atomism it presupposes. He fransfers atomism to
kinaesthesis, talking about K as a sequence-set. But he cannot help mitigating
the crude discontinuity of kinaesthetic atoms by rephrasing them as "kin-
aesthetic circumstances." As he says, "any sequence of shapes gives off, so to
say, living intentions under kinaesthetic circumstances, so that the intentions
can be satisfied at every phase" 51 of the perceptual process which constitutes
a given phenomenon.
Hussed applies an algebraic representation to the phenomenology of things
in order to obviate psychological atomism. The thing itself then appears as a
continuum (a mathematicial "integral") of moments ("differentials"). But as
Hussed himself acknowledges, this integration does not suffice. To constitute
a thing in its spatial givenness we must resort to bodily movement by which
the Self-Body varies its distance from the thing, now approaching it, and now
going away from it. The set of possible movements that the Self-Body can
perform by its freedom of movements gives the thing its independent reality
in space.
What remains untouched by Hussed's untenable hypotheses is the emphasis
laid upon the function of our body in constituting the sense of presence of a
thing as a real thing. Animating kinaestheses are not units joining correlated
shapes, but happenings in the Self-Body severing itself from a world of other
bodies by projecting kinaestheses on itself (in a sort of feedback).

VI FINAL REMARKS

We cannot follow Hussert's further analysis of bodily movements constituting

that deeper thing-unity which arises in the field of space, which is endowed
with a capacity of motion, or in the field of all possible motions. To me the
most noteworthy outcome of Hussed's present analysis is the conception
of the dynamic nature of external thing-existence. External space is a kin-
aesthetic constitutum implying our body in kinetic action.
In order to implement and improve Hussert's analysis, I propose, as an
outline, the following statements: (1) granted S as a sequence of "aspects"
(S-aspects), neither set-theoretical elements nor parts, we think of K as a set
of kinaestheses, each of them gives or constitutes a single aspect belonging
to S; (2) therefore, "the" shape in itself, and a thing in itself, cannot exist
 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS 309

because S or else lSI is of higher logical level than any datum at all; (3) in the
place of Husserl's formula
K=¢S
we state

where the two functions are of different meaning and structure - they are
not merely reciprocal. This means that there is no partial shape foregoing
kinaestheses. (4) Kinaesthesis presupposes no intention given in a shape, but
is the same as intention at all. Thus, no Self-Body, no external things.
On another occasion I hope to explore the many questions Hussed's thing-
phenomenology leaves open. An exhaustive examination of the problem of
the thing in parontological terms will lead us from Hussed to Heidegger.

NOTES

1 Edmund Hussed, Ding und Raum, Husserliana, XVI, 4; hereafter cited as DR.
2 Husserliana, vol. 3, pt. 1 (1976), p. 65.
3 See F. Costa, Cos'e la fenomenologia (Milan, 1962), p. 74.
4 See ibid., p. 78.
5 Husserliana, VI, 472.
6 Husserliana, I, 8.
7 DR, p. 5.
8 DR, p. 6.
9 DR, p. 285.
10 DR, p. 287.
11 DR, p. 290.
12 DR, p. 290.
13 DR, p. 292.
14 DR.
15 DR, p. 8.
16 See, for example, DR, pp. 35-36.
17 DR, p. 43.
18 Husserliana, X, 124.
19 Ibid., p. 125.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 126.
22 DR, p. 17.
23 DR, p. 26.
24 DR, p. 36.
2S DR, p. 38.
26 DR, p. 41.
310 FILIPPO COSTA

27 See DR, p. 66.

28 DR, p. 68.
29 See DR, p. 74.
30 DR, p. 74 ..
31 See Husserliana, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 6 ff.
32 DR, p. 79.
33 DR, p. 82.
34 Ibid.
35 DR, p. 92.
36 DR, p. 96.
37 DR, pp. 96-97.
38 DR, p. 98.
39 DR, p. 102.
40 DR, p. 107.
41 DR, p. 110.
42 DR, p. 116.
43 DR, p. 255.
44 See DR, sec. 4.
45 DR, p. 266.
46 DR, p. 163.
47 See DR, chap. 10.
48 DR, p. 187.
49 DR, p. 189.
50 DR, p. 221.
51 DR, p. 223.
 ROSA MIGNOSI

REAWAKENING AND RESISTANCE: A STOIC SOURCE

OF THE HUSSERLIAN EPOCHE

In recent years what had been in the 1960s a typical theme of French neo-
phenomenology, that is to say, the coupling of the Husserlian problematic of
the e1roxil with the Freudian one of the antithesis between dream and wake-
fulness, has been gradually enriched by a more specific and not unimportant
element: that of the resistance to reawakening of the prephenomenological
consciousness. I am referring, in particular, to Jacques Derrida's 1971 essay
on Valery entitled "Qual queUe." It centers on the figure, which is at the same
time psychological and phenomenological, of the "implex", which means a
resistance to passing - to what Husserl calls the "awakened consciousness":
L'implexe, non-presence, non conscience, alterite repliee dans Ie sourdre de la source,
enveloppe Ie possible de ce qu'il n 'est pas encore, la virtuelle capacite de ce que presente-
ment il n 'est pas en acte. 1

An immediate, implied reference in this new theme of Derrida's is clearly

to Husserl's Idee II, whose posthumous publication in 1952 made - as is
weU known - a marked contribution to the renewal of the phenomenological
problematic. The precise reference is to paragraph 26, "Awakened conscious-
ness and drowsy consciousness":

Nothing prevents us from thinking that the interruption of the awakened consciousness
we are familiar with may extend infmitely. No essential capacity excludes the possibility
that the consciousness can be totally opaque. On the other hand, inherent in this con-
sciousness, as in any consciousness in general, is the essential and unconditioned possi-
bility of becoming a waking consciousness. 2

This problem of the resistance to reawakening from the "drowsy conscious-

ness" is no doubt a derivation of Heidegger's dialectic between Entschlossen-
heit and Erschlossenheit. 3 However, what was not contained in Heidegger's
untranslatable play of words and concepts between "decision" and "opening"
of being conscious was the reference to the e1roxil. This is Husserl's very
own fundamental point as compared with Heidegger on this point; it is not
by chance that the paragraph which, in the Cartesian Meditations, for the
first time presents the praxis of the constitution, opens with a discussion of
Entschlossenheit. 4 While for Heidegger Entschlossenheit leads pessimistically
311

A. Ales Bello (ed.;, Analecta Husserliana, Vol. Xl, 311-319.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
312 ROSA MIGNOSI

to the discovery of one's own "guiltiness", to one's own Schuldigsein, for

Hussed, a few lines after the passage quoted, it is clear that Entschlossenheit
leads to a constructive "placing the objective world between brackets",
or a phenomenological €1rOxf/. It is not by chance that these reflections
on the waking consciousness and the drowsy consciousness are not to be
found in Ideas I but in Ideas II, devoted as is well known to the praxis of the
"constitution", that is to say, to the positive-constructive moment of the
phenomenological process. One can therefore safely say that the theme of
the "reawakening" is the most direct declaration of the optimistic and
constructive aspect of Hussed's erroxf/, which exists side by side with its
skeptical aspect (which is the most striking aspect, if only for the resumption
of the ancient keyword of Pyrrho's school) and which at the same time clearly
separates the Entschlossenheit of Husserl from that of Heidegger.
If the "reawakening" expounded in Ideas II is set against the Heideggerian
type of Entschlossenheit insofar as faith in the possibility of the "constitu-
tion" of the world is set against the sense of guiltiness, it follows that re-
sistance to reawakening is in Husserl motivated in a radically different way
from that in Heidegger. In the latter the resistance to Entschlossenheit derives
essentially from fear, the fear offmding out that we are "guilty." 5 In Husserl,
on the other hand, the resistance to reawakening - what Derrida proposes to
identify with the psychoanalytical phenomenon of the "implex" - derives
not from fear, but from "laziness." In Ideas II Husserl in fact describes the
resistance to reawakening not in terms of an existentialist "fear", but rather
according to the module of quandoque dormitat Homerus: "our waking con-
sciousness can be interrupted for certain periods, can transform itself into a
drowsy, opaque consciousness." 6 Husserl's resistance to reawakening, that is
to say, like Derrida's implex, comes from a sort of force of inertia of the dream.
But the idea of a force or of inertia of the dream, which generates a laziness
that works as resistance to reawakening, is one of the ideas that Husserl
derives directly from Descartes. AnG here again we must thank Derrida (in
particular in a debate with Foucault in 1963), for having drawn attention to
the pages of Descartes' '-First Meditation" that pose the question.

In his essay entitled "Thought and History of Madness" 7 - which takes as its
starting point some pages of Foucault's History of Madness 8 - Derrida
denies that, in the "First Meditation", Descartes pays more attention to the
phenomenon of madness than to that of dream as Foucault would maintain
when he asserts that "Descartes avoids the possibility of dream and error."
On the contrary, in Descartes, according to Derrida,
 REAWAKENING AND RESISTANCE 313

anyone who sleeps, or who dreams, is madder than the madman; or, at any rate, anyone
who dreams, as far as the problem of knowledge which Descartes is concerned with here,
is further from true perception than the madman. 9

Dream, that is to say, and not madness, is for Descartes the most serious
and most paradoxical danger of the drowsiness of the consciousness; not
madness but dream preoccupies him philosophically: "But they are mad"
Descartes says with regard to madness, "and I should be no less extravagant
if I fell in line with their example." On the other hand, he immediately goes
on:

I must however consider that I am a man and that, as a consequence, I am in the habit of
sleeping and of representing in my dreams things that are the same and at times have even
less verisimilitude than the things of the irrational when they are in a waking state. to

And so Derrida concludes by thus interpreting Descartes' thought: "The

madman is not deluded always or in everything .... It is in the case of sleep
and not of extravagance that the absolute totality of the ideas of a sensible
origin becomes suspect." 11 It is hard to challenge Derrida's interpretation.
However, it is a pity that Derrida himself, who, as we have seen, in 1972
traced HusserI's resistance to reawakening to the psychoanalytical concept of
impiex, did not realize that the very line of interpretation, which attributes
resistance to reawakening to a sort of laziness, or rather the force of inertia
of the dream, is directly derived from the closing part of Descartes' "First
Meditation", to which Derrida's debate with Foucault was devoted.
In that final part of the "First Meditation", Descartes stated that:

I shall therefore take care not to accommodate in my mind any falsity .... But this is
a painful and wearisome design, and a certain laziness makes me drift imperceptibly into
the channel of my ordinary life. And, just as a slave enjoying in dream an imaginary
freedom, when he begins to suspect that freedom is no more than a dream, is afraid of
being awakened ... so I, too, fall inperceptibly into myoid opinions, and I am afraid
of awakening. t2

As can be seen from this passage, in Descartes there is not only the Heideg-
gerian conception of resistance to reawakening as a fear of it but also the
Husserlian one of resistance to reawakening as laziness. That HusserI depends
at this point on Descartes is only too evident: Descartes' Meditations was
among the works most deeply studied by HusserI and thus the coincidence
of their thought on this point can only be interpreted as a derivation.
To have chosen Hussed's dependence on Descartes with regard to the
connection between E1TOxii and reawakening and to the concept of erroxil as
314 ROSA MIGNOSI

an overcoming of the resistance to reawakening seems to me to be of interest

not only for the purpose of a more precise definition of the relations between
HusserI and Descartes but for a reason that I feel to be much more important.
It is a question of an apparent inconsequence in the origin and setting out of
HusserI's concept of E1TOxiI which until now has been neither pointed out
nor resolved. That is to say, the word €1TOXr1 which HusserI chose for his
conception stems from the lexicon of Greek skepticism although the way
that it presents the concept of E1TOxil - as constructive rather than destructive
- is not at all typical of Greek skepticism but rather of Stoic thought. It was
the Stoics and not the Skeptics who saw the only possible justification of
€1ToXil in its possible constructive use, which consisted in the reawakening
of man from the appearance of daily life. Yet HusserI does not demonstrate
in any of his writings that he knew Stoic thought - neither the thought of
the authors who have come down to us in an integral form nor, even less,
that of the fragments of the ancient Stoics. Now this apparent incongruency
becomes clarified inasmuch as it is possible to trace and document Descartes'
dependence on ancient Stoicism and thus the Stoic origin, mediated through
Descartes, of the concept of reawakening of a positive use of the €1Toxil.

In point of fact, at the origin of Stoic thought concerning this point lies the
polemic of Chrysippus against the followers of Pyrrho which is conserved in
the Stromata of Clement of Alexandria. Here Chrysippus confutes Pyrrho's
praxis of the €1TOXil with the typical antiskeptic argument according to which
skepticism destroys itself: if the €1ToXil maintains that there is nothing sure or
true, it must start by applying this criterion to itself: €i IJ.€V '?TIOLV 11 E1TOX11
/3€/3ll'LOV EiVO'L IJ.'T/O€v, oij'Aov on a4{!' EO'U7ije; c'xP~O'/J.€V'T/ 1TPWTOV cXKVPWO€L
eO'VTr/vY Once, however, this self-destruction of the €1TOXr1 which denies all
certainty is established, Chrysippus introduces a single exception in which
this self-destructive E1TOXr1 acquires instead the positive value of "revelation of
truth": When it coincides with reawakening from a dream, in particular from
the kind of dream in which it is the dream itself, personified, that tells us that
it is unreliable: (;/;1 <.;J rap 4{!€v017e; O€iKVVTO'L iI 6lVll'LpoiJoO' i:JrOXr1, ev TOVr'fJ Tex
cXVll'LpovlJ.€vO' 6l'A'T/~ O€iKVVTO'L, we; b OV€LpOe; b 'A€rwv 4{!€vo€ie; elOVL 1TC~VTO'e;
vove; ov€ipove;. That is to say, the "epochizing" of dream (in simple words,
"awakening") "epochizes" E1TOXr1 itself, inasmuch as it was the deceitful
dream that distracted us, with its t/J€vo€ie; OV€LPot. of the truth; in this case the
E1TOXr1 is no longer preclusive of the truth, as in the school of Pyrrho, but acts
as a homeopathic care against the truth's dropping off to sleep, to the extent
that Chrysippus can assert that such a reawakening a'A'T/iJij O€iKVVTll'L.
 REAWAKENING AND RESISTANCE 315

How then can it sometimes happen that a man does not decide to wake up
from the deluding dream? At the end of the fragment, Chrysippus advances
two hypotheses on the possible causes of a failure to decide to reawaken to
truth: TirOL 7rapa ),VWIlT/<: datJI:V€WlV ... Ti 7rapa rwv AO)'WV iaoatJl:V€WlV
("either due to the weakness of thOUght ... or to its equivalent of the force
of the contrary arguments"). In both cases, the resistance to reawakening
comes from a sort of force of inertia or drowsiness that either robs decision
of any force or balances the force of decision with that of nondecision. This
solution of the datJl:v€La and of the iaoatJl:V€La is notoriously Stoic: such it
has been considered both in ancient times (see Cicero in De finibus: "quoniam,
inquit, omne peccatum imbecillitatis et incostantiae est"),14 and by modem
students of Stoicism such as Pohlenz:

for Chrysippus the causes of the acute disorder are, from the objective point of view, a
representation which imposes itself with violence, and from the subjective point of view
the aa"eveWi and the aTovic. of the soul. 15

The interpretation of resistance to reawakening as laziness or mental weak-

ness is shown by Pohlenr to have been a doctrine explicitly maintained by
Chrysippus; hence it seems that there would be good grounds for the doctrine
of Descartes who in fact attributes the resistance to reawakening from gnose-
ological sleep to laziness or fear dating back to it.
Two objections, one of a content and the other of an historical nature,
could be made to this identification of Chrysippus as the source of the
Cartesian doctrine of the deluding dream and resistance to reawakening.
The first is the fact that Descartes' discourse on gnoseological dream, re-
awakening, and resistance to reawakening is inserted and framed by him with-
in the hypothesis of a deluding God, an hypothesis which does not appear
in the fragment of Chysippus handed down to us by Clement of Alexandria.
The other objection is that it is very unlikely that Descartes had read Clement:
the first Latin translation of the Stromata was in 1616. 16 Even if when
Descartes began writing his works in Holland in 1629 some copies of that
edition were in circulation in Holland, the fame of Clement was not great,
or at any rate not sufficient to lead Descartes to make such a careful reading
as to trace the fragment by Chrysippus.
However, both objections fmd a pointed rebuttal in ;t passage, until now
totally unnoticed, in Plutarch's 7r€pi ~roiKwv i;vavTLwIlCtrwv. This not only
reports Chrysippus's thought on deceitful dream and its "epochization" but
even aduces the hypothesis of a gnoseologically deceitful God, which was to
316 ROSA MIGNOSI

be taken up again by Descartes. A comparison of the text of the two passages

is extremely eloquent:

Descartes, Meditations, I Plutarch, De Stoic. repugn., 47, 105 7a

... Deum esse qui potest omnia ... ita Au()t<; be <{)'rIot Xpvomrro<; 1<00t TOV ()eov
ego ut faJlar ... fingi potest? ... quo tjJevliei<; €/JrroLeiv <pOIVTOIOtOl<; '" fl/JO:<;
minus potentem originis meae authorem be <pOIVA-OV<; IlVTOI<;, vrr' ao()evel.a<<;
assignabunt, eo probabilius erit me tam OV-YI<OITOITt()eo()OIL TOIi<; TotaVTOIt<;
, 17
imperfectum esse ut semper faHar. <pCtVTCtoLOlL<; •

As can be seen, the two passages are in agreement not only on the hypothesis
of a God who provokes the delusion of the senses, but also on the cause of
resistance to reawakening, which in Descartes is attributed to the lack of
potentia and in Plutarch equally to a~€vet.a: which was then the only way of
justifying the persistence in error in a providentialist world such as the Stoic
and Cartesian ones. IS
The historical objection also falls by the same stroke: while Clement was
more or less unknown in seventeenth-century France, Plutarch's work had,
on the other hand, been compulsory reading for every French intellectual
since the second half of the sixteenth-century. The determining cause in this
widespread diffusion were the two famous and often quoted French transla-
tions by Fran90is Amyot: Parallel Lives (1559) and Opera Moralia (1572).19
These translations were so successful that Montaigne went as far as to write
in his Essays, with regard to Plutarch: " ... depuis qu'il est Fran~ais."20
There is therefore no doubt that Descartes had read with great care the Opera
Moralia in Amyot's translation.

It was therefore by means of Plutarch's text that Descartes must have came
to know that particular Stoic reevaluation of the e7roxil of the school of
Pyrrho which was enunciated with even greater precision by Chrysippus in
the passage quoted by Clement of Alexandria. However, there is an element
contained in Clement's text, and taken up by Descartes, that only partially
emerges from Plutarch's text: the commitment, not only of a moral nature
(plutarch's Mil (pcdi'A.ov~ elvcxL) but also strictly gnoseological of the reawaken-
ing: the aA'T]~ii oeU(VI)VCXL of the fragment quoted by Clement which is the
methodic kernel of the passage in Descartes: " ... and if in this way I cannot
attain the knowledge of any truth, I can at least always suspend my judg-
ment."21
To flIl this gap I feel that I may dare advance a further hypothesis.
 REAWAKENING AND RESISTANCE 317

Although it cannot be supported by such an unchallengeable textual corre-

spondence as the one between the passage from Plutarch and the passage
from Descartes, yet it seems to contain highly reliable elements. The source
of the most truly gnoseological part of the passage from Descartes can be
traced back to the chapter 1rPO~ TOV~ 'AKO!oT/l.J.u<ov~ in Epictetus' Diatribes. 22
This chapter begins by accusing the Skeptics of "petrifying both the intel-
lect and the capacity to be ashamed: <i1rOAtiJwaet~ 0' el.at OtTmt. Tj J.1€V TOU
V01/TtKoo cX1roAiiJwat~, Tj O€ TOO €V1'pe1r1'tKOu. And it goes on by citing Chrysip-
pus' example of the dream. However Epictetus adds a new emphasis, namely
by insisting on the fact that the resistance to reawakening prevents us from
distinguishing sleep and waking: KO!TO!ACXJ.1[3avet~ on (;'Ypr/'YopO!~; "ov," 'I'17aiv-
"ooo€ 'Yap, arO!v (;vroi~ V1rVot~ I{XXvrarWJ.1O!t, art f'YprnOpO!". OUO€V ovv otO!tp€pet
00.'/1'1] Tj 1{)O!VT00aicx fK€ivT]~; "OvO€V". Just like Descartes: " ... and, just as a
slave enjoying in dream an imaginary freedom ... turns himself into the
complice of his pleasant illusion in order to be longer deluded."
Even if the concordance between Descartes' conceptual turn of phrase
and Epictetus's is not as neat as the one between Descartes and Plutarch,
Descartes' well known long familiarity with Epictetus' writings does, however,
encourage the hypothesis that Descartes had not only Plutarch's text in mind
but Epictetus' too. That Epictetus' works were favorite reading matter for
Descartes has been amply proved both by students of Descartes such as
Julien-Eymard d'Anger in his essay "Seneque, Epictete et Ie Stoicisme dans
l'oeuvre de Rene Descartes"23 and by students of Stoicism such as Michel
Spannent in his Permanence du Stoi"cisme. 24
The most likely explanation is therefore that Descartes drew the image of
a deceitful God and the idea of resistance to reawakening due to weakness,
from the passage in Plutarch but that, in reformulating it, he considered the
more strictly gnoseological version of Chrysippus' ideas supplied by Epictetus.
In any case, it seems apparent how Chrysippus' thought, mediated either
through Plutarch alone or through Plutarch and Epictetus, could be seen as
the primary source of the ideas on dream and reawakening enunciated by
Descartes in Meditationes de Prima Philosophia and by HusserI in Ideas II.

The tracing back of Descartes - HusserI's source - to the thought ofChrysip-

pus allows us to explain the apparent incongruity of a HusserI who utilizes in
Stoic (rather than in the Pyrrhic sense) the concept and function of €1rOx'f/,
even though nowhere does he give any sign of having a direct knowledge of
Stoic thought.
The signification of this point is not merely historical and philological. The
318 ROSA MIGNOSI

possibly Stoic ongm of the contraposition between waking consciousness

and drowsy consciousness fonnulated by Hussed in Ideas II allows a more
significant appreciation of Hussed's idea of "resistance to reawakening",
taken in a modern key from Chrysippus's concept of aof}ev€LO:.
When read in the Stoic key, Husserl's idea of "resistance to reawakening"
lends itself much better than at fIrst sight to the phenomenological and
psychoanalytical interpretation of Valery's implexe proposed by Derrida
with which, and for a good reason, we set out. If for Valery the implexe is a
"capacite de resistance", Derrida argues that: "On ne se demandera pas quel
est Ie sens de cette resistance avant d'avoir releve que ce aquoi Valery entend
resister, c'est precisement au sens."25 And what better understanding could
there be offered to Derrida's argument than Chrysippus's ideas quoted above
in the presentation of Epictetus?: KwoiXCX[J.(3Wetc; on €'Ypmopcxc;; "olf ...
oVO€ 'YOtp, OTav €V Tciic; ihrvotc; I{XXVTcXtWP.CXt, on erpmopcx."
That is to say, according to Stoic thought, it is only the reawakening that
can give a meaning not only to the reawakening itself but also to the earlier
resistance to reawakening. Thus the taking into account of both Chrysippus -
and Derrida - can much enrich the literal interpretation of the chapter of
Ideas II mentioned above, where Hussed states that "On reawakening from
this opaque sleep, we can turn our reflective gaze back, we can gather what
has just passed in its opacity."26 It allows us also to appreciate properly
Merleau-Ponty where, in developing Husserl's ideas of reawakening and
reistance to reawakening he writes: "our mis.takes do not become truth unless
at some time they are recognized." 27

NOTES

1 J. Derrida, "Qual queUe", in Marges de la philosophie (Paris, 1972), p. 360. AU

translation made by the present writer.
2 E. Husser!, Idee per una [enomenologia pura (furin, 1965), p. 504.
3 The conceptual dialectics, together with the etymological relationship, between
Entschlossenheit and Erschlossenheit are to be found in § 60 of Sein und Zeit. Cf. M.
Heidegger, Essere e tempo (Turin, 1969), p. 438.
4 E. Husserl, Meditazioni cartesiane (Milan, 1960), p. 63.
5 M. Heidegger, Essere e tempo, p. 233-36.
6 E. Husserl, Idee, p. 504.
7 In Derrida's La scrittura e la di[[erenza (Turin, 1971), pp. 39-79.
8 M. Foucault, Storia della [ollia (Milan, 1963), pp. 77-80.
9 J. Derrida, La scrittura e la di[[erenza, p. 64.
10 R. Descartes, Opere filosofiche (Turin, 1969), p. 198.
11 J. DElIIida, La scrittura e la di[[erenza, p. 64.
 REAWAKENING AND RESISTANCE 319

12 R. Descartes, Opere filosofiche, p. 202.

13 Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Von Anim, II (Stuttgart, 1928), p. 36, fr. 121.
14 Cicero, De fin. IV, 77, Stoic. Vet. Fragm., III, p. 142, fro 531.
15 M. Poh1enz, La Stoa (Florence, 1959), I, 298.
16 Clem. Alex., Stromata, (D. Heinsins, Hervetus, Lugd. Ba., 1616).
17 Plutarchus, De Stoic. repugn., 47, 1037a;Stoic. Vet. Fragm., III, p. 42, fro 177.
18 M. Baldassari in Plutarco, Gli opuscoli contro gli Stoici, ed. M. Baldassarri (Trento,
1976), 139, duly underlines "the aporia of the presence of error in a world conceived
in such a rigorously providentialistic way as the Stoic one was."
19 Plutarque, Vies Paralleles, trans. F. Amyot (paris, 1559); Oeuvres morales, trans. F.
Amyot (Paris, 1572).
20 M. de Montaigne, Essais, I, 10.
21 R. Descartes, Opere filosofiche, p. 202.
22 Epictet, Discussiones, 1,5, 3-7.
23 J. E. D'Angers, "Sem!que et Ie Sto'icisme dans l'oeuvre de Rene Descartes", in Rev.
Theol. et Phi/os., 4 (1954), 169-96.
24 M. Spannent, Permanence du Stoicisme. De Zenon a Malraux, (Gembioux, 1973),
pp.284-9l.
25 J. Derrida,Marges de la philosophie, p. 362.
26 E. Husserl, Idee, p. 504.
27 M. Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia della percezione (Milan, 1972), p. 510.
 FILIPPO LlVERZIANI

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION AS A SCIENCE

AND AS A PHILOSOPHY

Among the various religious sciences is in'cluded one that is now designated as
the "phenomenology of religion." Chantepie de la Saussaye, the first to speak
of phenomenology of religion in a scientific sense, held that, by means of
comparative history, an historian of religion could highlight the significance
of facts that would otherwise remain isolated. Van der ~euw, author of
the first important treatise in the field of the phenomenology of religion,
surveyed the typical structures in religious phenomena but tended to neglect
their historical contexts, which were subsequently examined by Eliade.
Pettazzoni conceived of phenomenology and history as two complementary
and essential aspects of a single religious science.
Di Nola has pointed out that van der Leeuw derives the concept of phe-
nomenology from Hussed, assigning to it the additional religious significances
that it had assumed in the works of Scheler; but, as Di Nola notes, van der
Leeuw's phenomenology refrains "by conviction, from identifying the
ultimate limit", because "as a science of phenomena it does not want to be
considered a form of metaphysics and proceeds as if behind the phenomena
there were nothing else." Di Nola also notes that, in actual practice, van der
Leeuw has not kept faith with some of his theoretical premises which "if
brought to their logical consequences, should have founded nothing but a
classificatory typology of religious facts." When all is said and done, however,
van der Leeuw ends up by treating religion "religiously" (Le., in a "religious"
manner).!
This comment by Di Nola provides a rough idea of how certain phenome-
nologies of religion are put forward as scientific phenomenologies, at least as
regards the orientation of their search. We may consider as phenomenologists
of religion both those who in this context are programmatically inspired
by Hussed's method, but without going beyond the bounds of the purely
historico-scientific, and the much larger group of scholars who, in analyzing
the religious phenomenon from a historical point of view, make use of
the comparative method. In Italy, therefore, the phenomenologists of re-
ligion in this scientific sense may be considered to include Pettazzoni, De
Martino, Di Nola, and, inasmuch as he teaches at the Pontifical Gregorian
University, Father Dhavamony. The latter prefers to speak of an "historical
321

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 321-334.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
322 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI

phenomenology of religion" and considers it to be an empirical science, a

human science, even though, among the various human sciences, he deems
it to be the one that comes closest to the philosophy of religion, by very
virtue of the fact that "it studies the religious phenomena in their specific
aspect of religiousness." 2
It is clear that the phenomenology of religion considered so far is an
"historico-scientific" phenomenology of religion and not a "philosophical"
phenomenology. In saying this, I do not wish to suggest that it cannot be
considered as a phenomenology at all; indeed, it not only studies the pheno-
mena but to some extent - and quite explicitly so - takes its inspiration
from HusserI and intends to make use of HusserI's phenomenological method.
As far as van der Leeuw is concerned, the phenomenology of religion (i.e., the
historico-scientific variety) "must take its place by the side of the phenomena
and, by means of epoche, seek to look at what is put in view." 3 We know the
influence he has had on authors who, in more recent days, have developed
this type of phenomenology. Dhavamony, within the selfsame ambit of the
historical phenomenology of religion, affirms that epoche is essential as a
"suspension of the judgments formulated before the phenomenon to permit
this latter to speak for itself."4 But Dhavamony himself goes on to point out
that he chose the term historical phenomenology of religion for the very
reason of avoiding confusion between this discipline and "the phenomenology
of religion understood in the sense of HusserIian philosophy." 5
I doubt whether a purely historico-scientific phenomenology can discern
the specificity of the religious as such without in some way basing itself,
at least implicitly, on a defmition of a philosophical character. There is a
religious a priori to be discovered and brought out, and this can be done
only in the course of a religious experience that has its themes set by a
phenomenology; but the phenomenology in question is not strictly a scientific
one, but rather a philosophical one. Only in this way is it possible to formulate
a specific and truly autonomous concept of religion that will resist all attempts
at reducing it to something that, properIy speaking, it is not. Morra, in Dio
senza Dio (God without God), distinguishes four such classical attempts of
reduction of the religious phenomenon: a rationalist reduction (gnosticism,
Bruno, Spinoza, Hegel, etc.), a moralist reduction (Kant, first and foremost,
but also Cohen, Natorp, Rickert, Windelband, down to Troeltsch and Tillich),
an anthropological reduction (Hume, Feuerbach), and a sociological reduction
(Durkheim and other phenomenologists of religion in the aforementioned
historico-scientific sense, i.e., Tylor, Uvy-Bruhl, Mauss, etc.). I personally
would extend Morra's anthropological type of reduction to include also the
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION 323

various attempts at providing a reductive explanation of the religious phe-

nomenon in purely psychological (or even biologico-physiological) terms that
bear the names of William James, Girgensohn, Wobbermin, Stanley Hall,
Starbuck, James H. Leuba, Freud, and Jung.
The religious phenomenon, as Morra points out, "has a peculiar evidence
of its own that can be grasped only with the help of the phenomenological
method." 6 It seems clear to me that at a certain more fundamental level only
philosophy can grasp the specific essence of the religious phenomenon. As far
as Morra is concerned, the liberation from reductionism was brought about,
above all, by the philosophies of Schleiermacher, Otto, and Scheler, each of
which, in its own way, can be considered as phenomenological.
Thus there is a phenomenological philosophy or philosophical phenome-
nology, Le., philosophical as regards the objective but phenomenological
in method, that is very different from a phenomenology of the historico-
scientific type. This latter has the connotations of a religious science or a
comparative religious history and brings out certain constants or typical
structures of the religious phenomenon, but does not evaluate this phenome-
non; it limits itself to describing it, undoubtedly with a considerable degree
of poignancy and penetration, but presents the religious phenomenon in what
- in a wider sense - we could call psychological terms, without ever entering
into the merits of the value of the religious phenomenon, without ever asking
itself whether the religious phenomenon has an objectively real value of its
own, or whether, going to the other extreme, it merely represents a gratifica-
tion of the subject and is therefore illusory, substantially and fundamentally
illusory every time it presumes to testify something that should transcend the
sphere of the subjective, the psychological, the human.
It seems to me that the scientific phenomenology of religion offers us
testimonial material of great interest, material that in some way is already
ordered and selected and which we could utilize to gain greater philosophical
insight into the religious phenomenon. But before this material can talk to us
in a manner that is philosophically relevant, we will have to stop considering
it as something scientific and look at it with different eyes.
It does not follow that this different or phenomenologico-philosophical
manner of considering the realities will always and necessarily enable us to
arrive at positive results. If we want to see well, we must be capable of
looking properly. If we stop at certain of the more empirical and natural,
psychological, sociological, cultural, and historical aspects of the religious
phenomenon, if we absolutize these aspects and do not succeed in looking
beyond them, the result - which I consider to be negative - can only be
324 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI

that of reducing the entire religious phenomenon to precisely these human

aspects and of failing to discover any transcendental origin in the religious
phenomenon.
In any case, we have to pass from a phenomenologico-scientific attitude to
a phenomenologico-philosophical attitude, which latter is the one essential to
phenomenological research as we understand it and try to use in our work.
Let us now see if we can describe this latter attitude in contraposition to the
former and thus highlight the features that are peculiar to it.
Before doing so, however, let me say that there is not just a single science,
but rather several sciences; that there is no unique model of scientificalness,
but that every science has a scientificalness, a scientific rigor of its own. I do
not think it possible to say that biology is less of a science than physics or
astronomy simply in view of the fact that the phenomena in these latter two
sectors of research are capable of being defmed and forecast with greater
accuracy. Each science is a science in its own way. One cannot say that
the biologist is less of a scientist than the physicist, the chemist, etc., or
that, compared with them, he has partly failed as a scientist. Clarifying this
principle, however, is not the same as saying that all sciences are equally
exact. All the sciences can be equally rigorous, each in its own way, but there
can be no doubt that some sciences are more exact than others; these are the
sciences where one can more readily obtain objective verifications, univocal
formulations in mathematical terms, precise measurements, calculations,
forecasts, and experimental repetitions of the various phenomena. 7
As one passes from certain fields of knowledge to others, one can note
that knowledge of the logico-mathematical type becomes more and more
inadequate as a means of grasping all the phenomena that are being studied
and that it stands more and more in need of becoming integrated by another
form of knowledge, a knowledge of the existential-participative type, let us
say, a knowledge that lives its realities and penetrates them by virtue of a
vital sympathy to the point where, face to face with the human world,
with historical facts, with literary and artistic works and, more generally,
with psychological phenomena, it endeavors to comprehend and interpret
them.s
I would say that this second type of knowledge is, par excellence, the one
that is realized in philosophical knowledge; it is the knowledge with which
man, fmding himself thrown into the midst of existence, seeks to interpret
the significance of his own being. Indeed, I would classify philosophical
knowledge in the second type of knowledge, because it essentially interprets
existence and in some way grasps its being. That is, it grasps that which one
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION 325

could not possibly explain in the scientific sense (and here I mean erkliiren),
but whose mystery one can in some sense comprehend (verstehen), a being
that one can understand, above all, by immersing oneself in it by virtue of a
form of participative knowledge that we might call a "metaphysico-religious
experience." Such metaphysico-religious experience is made possible by a
"metaphysico-religious sensitivity", a quality that is not possessed to the
same degree by all, and many people, indeed, hardly have it at all; a sensitivity,
however, that one can develop in oneself by practice and in others by giving
them suitable stimuli and pointers. 9
Philosophical knowledge is a knowledge that interprets, that asks itself
the reason why, a knowledge that is profoundly different from the one that
is associated with the exact sciences. And yet, in the last resort, one can
say that even the adept of the exact sciences bases his conclusions on an
existential knowledge, on a pre- and extrascientific knowledge of what Husserl
calls the world-of-life (Lebenswelt). Even such recent critics of science as
Kuhn, Feyerabend, etc., are agreed in drawing attention to the very important
part that is played, particularly in scientific revolutions, by this pre scientific
aspect, this philosophical moment of interpretation, this moment when the
scientist asks himself the reasons why and when he elaborates interpretative
forms that at first sight may appear as extremely fanciful and arbitrary and
at the time practically impossible to verify.
In the concrete elaboration of the ever-new scientific formulations there is
thus, let us say, a more philosophico-existential interpretative moment and,
likewise, there is a more scientifico-abstractive moment in the elaboration of
new philosophical formulations; this latter is the moment when every new
philosophical interpretation has to be critically reexamined with a view to
seeing whether and to what extent it is coherent with itself and in keeping
with the observed phenomena.
In the wider sense, then, I would equate this philosophico-phenomenolog-
ical knowledge with any type of pre- and extrascientific knowledge, with any
type of existential knowledge that we can obtain, through living, of what
Hussed calls the life-world. Indeed, one can say that in each and every con-
scious act of our lives we always evaluate reality; we feel that there is some-
thing that attracts us and something that repels us, and we may even sense that
there is something that, although it repels us on a superficial level, attracts us
on a more profound level, something that seems to us to constitute a value to
be pursued notwithstanding the effort and the suffering that such a choice may
imply. Existential knowledge is an evaluative knowledge, the very opposite of
scientific knowledge which, by its very nature, is always nonevaluative.
326 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI

Existential knowledge is a contact knowledge of reality, and it is also

the knowledge of phenomena, of live phenomena that are perceived as
the manifestation of reality. In our daily experience, then, an observed
phenomenon always reveals an essence to us, always reveals a "how things
stand" as such. Scientific knowledge, on the other hand, by its very nature,
shrinks back from what Galileo called "essaying the essence" ("il ten tar
l'essenza"). Science considers and studies phenomena in themselves and in
their relationships to each other (especially their quantitative relations); it
does not study phenomena as revealers or indicators of a metaphysical reality
that lies behind and beyond them. As far as science is concerned, phenomena
are in a certain sense substantialized, absolutized; their explanation lies
in themselves, without there being any metaphenomenological pointer or
suggestion.
Again, one may say that scientific knowledge aims at defming its objects
in a univocal and exact manner. It succeeds in this rather well because the
objects of scientific knowledge are either purely ideal beings or realities that
have been partially idealized by virtue of previous defmitions, definitions that
are always to some extent conventional and arbitrary. We also know that the
very opposite happens in existential knowledge, where the subject does not
defme the reality in which he lives but interprets it. These interpretations may
find their expression in symbols that are always imperfect, never exhaustive.
Reality always appears mysterious to those who know it existentially. Science
generates an intellectual knowing, but phenomenological philosophy inter-
prets, puts itself forward as a hermeneutic.
While the empirical sciences endeavor to ascertain the facts, phenomeno-
logical philosophy sets itself the problem of the meanings. "Essences",
"values", "significances", in the last analysis, are equivalent terms; whether I
say essences, values, or significances, what I am saying is always the equivalent
of the "whys and wherefores" of existence, the whys and wherefores under-
stood in a sense that need not be merely causal but many also involve the
finalities. Science, on the other hand, at least at the moment when it for-
mulates its results, is not so much concerned with ascertaining the whys and
wherefores of the observed phenomena, but rather with how they come
about.
There is yet another difference. A scientific verification always endeavors
to be objective and such that all the possible subjects, no matter what their
biological, psychological, social, or cultural differences, will always arrive at
the same conclusions if they adopt instruments of logic, recording, measure-
ment, and calculation conventionally assumed to be valid, conclusions,
 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI 327

moreover, that can always be expressed in terms of exact formulas. In phi-

losophical research as conceived in its originary existential sense, on the
other hand, the verification always passes through the interior experience of
individual· subjects and, consequently, the results that are testified by one
subject may be recognized by other subjects only to the extent to which they,
too, succeed in maturing analogous experiences in their own intimacy.
Scientific research is objective, disincarnate, disinterested, coldly detached,
and abstract, or at least becomes such at its most abstract and most specifi-
cally "scientific" moment, i.e., the moment at which it formulates its results
and verifies them, and this quite irrespective of the human, pragmatic, or
political motivations that may concretely have caused this or that research
project to be undertaken, projects that always represent activities originating
in and from the Lebenswelt. Unlike scientific research as such, the kind of
research that each one of us can undertake when he questions himself about
the meaning and significance of his own existence is a vital research, a question
in which the subject calls himself into question, a question that is closely
connected with the life of the subject, the very problem of how the subject
should live, with the entire life of the subject clearly depending on the
solution of the problem. 10
Let us now see how one can derme more precisely this concept of a
philosophical phenomenology of religion. I would say that a philosophical
phenomenology is a philosophy pursued with a phenomenological method.
In this sense, therefore, it seems to me that Heidegger is right when to all
intents and purposes he identifies phenomenology with ontology, when he
writes that "phenomenology is the manner of demonstratively determining
[Le., in the sense of "showing"] the matters that must constitute the theme
of ontology" and when, continuing this thought, he concludes that "ontology
is possible only as a phenomenology." 11 If phenomenology and ontology
represent two different concepts, it seems to me that this is due primarily
to the different viewpoints from which one cor,siders what, in the last resort,
is one and the same reality. Phenomenology is not a way of abstractly con-
sidering phenomena for their own sake, but rather a way of seeing the Being
through the phenomena. I have already said that to see certain things one has
to know how to look at them in a certain way. If we look in an inadequate or
less adequate manner, we simply have to correct our way of looking. It may
even be that we shall induce other subject~ to look at things in a different
way in order to see them better. In case these other subjects should remain
faithful to their customary way of looking at things and seeing them one can
try to make use of a kind of Socratic irony in the hope that these other
328 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI

subjects, through an internal critique and within the ambit of the personal
and interior experience of each one of them, may succeed in transmuting
their present way of considering things. At this point, indeed, we could adopt
a kind of maieutic practice, a midwifery designed to induce these other
subjects to gradually modify their look, hoping that in due course they will
succeed in seeing something similar to what we already see. This complex
operation has to pass via the epoch/!. It is our customary manner oflooking
at things that prevents us from seeing them in a different and more adequate
way. Even though a rejection of this manner A of "looking at" things does
not yet appear to be sufficiently motivated, let us try at least to suspend
this manner of "looking at." Thereby we shall at least have neutralized the
inhibiting shackles. Once we have performed this negative operation, there
will inevitably come a time when we shall have to perform a positive one,
when we shall have to try to look at things in the manner B. And then, by
virtue of the fact that we continue to scrutinize things in this different way,
we may perhaps succeed in also seeing something different.
This "suspension of the looking at" in one way and this "looking in a
different manner" cannot be considered as two logico-scientific operations
(even though there is a rational element in them, an element of reasonableness
and a critical attitude that should be developed further as rapidly as possible);
rather, they are to be more properly considered as existential acts, they
represent two acts that the subject cannot perform without a considerable
effort and, I would add, a considerable ascesis. They involve the whole of the
personality of the subject, and not just his intellect. When it is understood
in this sense, the phenomenology of religion becomes an integral part of a
spiritual itinerary. Or, rather, of the cognitive aspect of this itinerary; and we
could even say that it becomes its cognitive but not intellectualistico-abstract
aspect, something that is vitally connected with the evolution of the entire
personality in all its aspects. Very briefly, almost in passing, let me mention
some examples.
Hussed's classical example is that of the suspension of the naturalistic
attitude. Such an epoch/! may enable us to make an important discovery:
nothing can exist if not in relation to a consciousness.
But here there lies the danger of slipping into a form of idealism that will
reduce all things to mere phenomena of this consciousness that I possess at
this moment, that in actual practice will reduce all things to phenomena
of this personal and empirical consciousness of mine. One must therefore
suspend the undue absolutization of my consciousness that I either assume or
am tempted to assume - in the same way as in the example of Hussed's
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION 329

reduction of the naturalistic attitude, where the problem really was to put
"in parentheses" or "out of play" the improper absolutization that we are
always tempted to attribute to the natural world, as if it were something that
had an absolute existence of its own. This putting out of play of both the
naturalistic attitude (to which Husserl refers) and of the idealist attitude will
enable us to gradually mature the awareness that everything that exists does
in fact exist in relation to a consciousness, but a consciousness that cannot be
merely my own empirical consciousness or even the sum of the conscious-
nesses of all men, but rather a consciousness that includes and transcends all
these empirical consciousness, that is to say (for want of a better term), an
absolute, divine consciousness. This is not the place for developing these
arguments further; here we can only very briefly adumbrate the possibility
that in a certain way they offer us of applying the epoche; but at this point
I must stress once again that this epoche, being a negative operation, must not
be separated from that positive adoption of a new manner of looking, which
is the only thing that can positively put us in condition to penetrate further
into reality and improve what we see.
Continuing, then, we may note that our adoption of an authentically
philosophical attitude may be inhibited by the survival within us of a praxis-
oriented attitude, of an undue absolutization of praxis, of everything that
constitutes 'practical life" , and also by the survival within us of a scientistic
attitude, of an undue absolutization of science as the only form of research
and of scientific knowledge as the only possible form of knowledge. These
undue absolutizing attitudes, too, must be put out of play, and we know just
how difficult this is for the so-called modern man.
Certain phenomenological reductions may smooth our way toward the
realization of a religious attitude. But we know how many religious truths
take shape in the human mind through myths. We also know that the fabula-
tory psychological mechanism that is responsible for the creation of myths
is something that is very similar to the process of the formation of dreams
and even of "dreams dreamed with open eyes." A myth is often the vehicle
of very profound truths. The problem is not really that of performing a
"demythification" in the manner of Bultmann (because this would truly
involve the risk of "throwing away not only the dirty water, but also the
baby in the bath tub"); the problem is rather one of "transmythifying", that
is to say, placing the myth in its proper light, making it perform its proper
function as a vehicle of revelation, because truly there are many myths that
can tell us spiritual truths in a manner that is far more profound and pregnant
than intellectual arguments and concepts. But if we are to do all this, we must
330 FILIPPO LlVERZIANI

fust put out of play or into parentheses any kind of mythifying attitude or
undue absolutization of myths, a frame of mind that could induce us to take
the myth literally and thus to confound it with the more profound truth
of which it is the vehicle, to confound it with the Being of which it is the
phenomenon. 12
Another undue absolutizing attitude within the religious realm that has to
be put out of play with the help of a far from easy ascetic operation may be
the attitude of creating for oneself other absolutes by the side or even in
place of the one and only absolute truth. In this connection let us recall the
recurring temptations of the ancient Jews, temptations that the prophets had
to fight against without cease; and also the analogous temptation that, albeit
in other forms, operates in the spirit of us moderns and creates for us new
idols and false absolutes; I am referring, of course, to the many isms of our
day and age, each with its core of truth elevated to an improper absolute.
Another temptation could be the one that many theologians, metaphysi-
cians, and ordinary believers have been unable to resist, the temptation of
enclosing God in an image or a concept (a temptation that is vigorously
opposed by, among others, apophatic theology).13
Yet another temptation could be the one, suffered by many religious
spirits, of attributing to God full and direct responsibility for each and every
one of their thoughts and actions, even of those thoughts and actions that
are particularly obviously the results of human conditioning and should be
explained, at least to a very considerable extent, with the help of the human
sciences (although carefully avoiding a slip back into the reductive attitudes
previously discussed).
A further temptation (and here I shall terminate these examples even
though it would be easy to continue) could be the one of looking for and
discovering the presence of God only in certain places and environments
(one's own intimate religious life, certain religious traditions, certain religious
manifestations), a priori excluding that this selfsame presence of God could
also manifest itself in other and different ambits, say (to mention just a few),
in other religions, in nature, and in history, and in the "signs of the times"
interpreted in a particular way, even in a humanist and political interpretation.
All these are temptations of unduly absolutizing a particular way of looking
at things, temptations that could prevent us from seeing things in a more
adequate way. They are temptations of which we must be conscious and
aware, which we must combat within us by means of a rigorous ascesis, and
which we must begin to subject to epoch!!, at least at the intellectual and
cognitive level, and thus to set ourselves the problem, at least at this level
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION 331

again, of beginning to look at things with different eyes, thereby enabling our
religious consciousness, and with it the whole of our spiritual and human life,
to develop and gain better insights.
I have endeavored to give some idea of what, in my opinion at least, a
philosophical phenomenology could be as a theoretical moment of a religious
itinerary that cannot but involve the whole of man. At this point it becomes
interesting to establish a relationship between a philosophical phenomenology
of religion and a scientific phenomenology of religion of the type proposed
by van der Leeuw, Eliade, Pettazzoni, and Di Nola. Certainly, a confrontation
with the religious testimonies of others is very important for the religious,
and the scientific phenomenology of religion offers him an ample and well
coordinated documentation of such testimonies that the phenomenologist-
philosopher of religion and the religious seeker can accept and consider
not only as material of psychological, historical, sociological, and cultural
interest, but also and above all as material that is of spiritual interest to
him and relevant to his personal religious ascent or development and, in-
deed, relevant to the religious realization of man. The concordance of these
testimonies can greatly strengthen a religious person in his convictions and
help him not to feel alone and isolated in many of his religious attitudes.
But what significance is he to attribute to the numerous discordancies that
he will fmd in religious phenomenology and, above all, how is he to explain
them? I believe that the religious person or, if you prefer, the phenome-
nologist-philosopher of religion, having made use of the material organized
by the scientific phenomenology of religion, may in tum extend a helping
hand to this scientific phenomenology by explaining not only why it is that
the religious agree in certain fundamental experiences, but also why they
diverge so profoundly from one individual to another and also from one
tradition to another. It may well be that all of them see the same things;
and if, in part, they see the same things - although there are other things that
they see in different ways - then this could be due precisely to the fact that
there are certain things that they are accustomed to looking at in the same
way and certain other things that they habitually look at in different ways.
It may well be that certain religious spirits stop at a vision A that is less
adequate than a vision B for the simple reason that they have not suspended
their manner A of looking at things and therefore have not yet overcome this
limitation that prevents them from adopting the manner B of looking that is
the condition, the sine qua non for acceding to the more adequate vision B.
The scientific phenomenology of religion, by definition (Le., by the very
fact of being scientific), does not formulate any value judgments; but the
332 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI

philosophical phenomenology of religion - inasmuch as it lives these experi-

ences and evaluates them by living them and, what is more, lives them in a
participative type of existential knowledge - the philosophical phenomenology
of religions, as I was saying, is reasonably authorized to conclude that the
vision B is more adequate than the vision A. The phenomenologist-philosopher
can therefore qualify the two visions, and he can also explain how it comes
about that certain subjects are still anchored to the vision A and, indeed, why
they are still anchored to the vision A even though they could have attained
to vision B if only they had created the necessary conditions, if only they had
made themselves more receptive to a more profound illumination. It seems to
me, moreover, that a confrontation with the philosophical phenomenology
of religion could stimulate the historico-scientific phenomenology of religion
to a more profound understanding of the material it studies, this at least to
the extent to which it is true that a human science ought not to limit itself
to describing the phenomena from the outside, but should rather endeavor
to understand their inner nature to the greatest possible extent. Nothing
authorizes us to enlarge unduly the limits within which what I have here been
saying may be considered to have been scientifically verified, but it is very
important, not least for the progress of the sciences themselves, that the
horizon of our knowledge should be wider than the rather narrow one within
which a certain scientistic ideology is contained. Understanding things a little
more thoroughly has never yet done harm to anybody, not even to a scientist.
It is quite clear, therefore, that a better existential comprehension cannot but
further scientific knowledge itself and constitute an advantage for it. Here
one must also bear in mind that this selfsame scientific knowledge, even
though by its very nature it puts itself forward as an analytical and abstractive
knowledge, is not for that reason - and abstractly so - an end in itself.
Scientific knowledge springs from the life of man and is also orientated and
fmalized toward the life of man, so that man may know ever more and
understand better, so that human knowledge as a whole may progress, that
knowledge which, as Hussed himself has quite rightly pointed out (and
insistently so), is in the last resort one and indivisible.

NOTES

1 See the presentation of the Italian edition of G. van der Leeuw's Phenomenology of
Religion published under the title Fenomenologia della religione (Turin: Boringhieri,
1975), pp. ix-xii.
2 Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion, Documenta Missionalia no. 7 (Rome:
 PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION 333

Gregorian University ~ress, 1973), pp. 3-27. See also R. Pettazzoni, "n metodo com-
parativo", Numen, 6 (1959), 1-14; C. J. Bleeker, ''The Phenomenological Method",
Numen, 6 (1959), 96-111 and "The Conception of Man in the Phenomenology of
Religion", Studia Missionalia, 19 (1970), 13-38; M. Dhavamony, "Phenomenology of
Religion; Appellation and Methodology", The Heythrop Journal, 17 (1976), 64-67,
and "Fenomenologia storica della religione", in Le scienze religipse oggi, ed. C. Cantone
(Rome: LAS, 1978), pp. 9-83; and A. Di Nola, "Fenomenologia della religione", in
Enciclopedia delle religioni (Florence: Vallecchi, 1970). Di Nola, in the aforementioned
article, gives the following definition of the phenomenology of religion: "Denomination
properly applied to the interpretative theory of religious facts developed by Gerardus
van der Leeuw (1890-1950) and his school. In a more general sense and, to a certain
extent, independently of the theoretical positions of van der Leeuw, P. o. R. indicates
the analysis and the definition of individual religious facts or phenomena in their ty-
pological characterization (for example, prayer, rite, sacrifice, offering, etc.) with the
help of the comparative method, but without examining their historical development"
(the italics are mine). Last, see also U. Bianchi, Problemi di storia delle religioni (Rome:
Studium, 1958), pp. 18-19.
3 Fenomenologia della religione, p. 542.
4 Phenomenology of Religion, p. 17.
5 Ibid., p. 9.
6 G. Morra, Dio senza Dio (Bologna: P:hron, 1970), p. xii.
7 "It is even more important to stress that Husserl's ideal of knowledge, although
originally elaborated on the model of the mathematical and positive methods, transcends
them in all essential respects, does not enclose itself in their rules and, without in any
way being contrary to its own nature, can therefore also embrace a superscience, philo-
sophy, superior to its realizations" (P. Valori, Il metoda fenomenologico e la fondazione
della filosofia [Rome: Descil!e, 1959); the question as a whole is then treated on pp.
85-90; the above is confirmed and documented by A. De Waelhens, Phenomenologie
et verite [Paris: PUF, 1953), pp. 13-14,28,32).
8 In this connection one should recall the well known premises postulated by Dilthey,
Boutroux, and Bergson.
9 W. Dilthey refuses metaphysics; for him, therefore, comprehension relates only to
historical realities (this, at least, is what he is saying at the more explicit level). M.
Heidegger, on the other hand, irrespective of the terminology that he uses and notwith-
standing the fact that he rejects the idea of intellectualistic metaphysics, is nevertheless
a metaphysician: as far as he is concerned, understanding is a metaphysical experience
and implies comprehension (lived in an "affective situation") of a reality that transcends
the existence of man, even though it reveals itself through that existence (an ontological
reality that the later Heidegger was to stress more strongly). In this connection P. Ricoeur
speaks of an "ontology of comprehension" of a "complete reversal of the relationship
between understanding and being" brought about by Heidegger. As regards this turning
upside down, one may say that "it also accomplishes the most profound desire under-
lying Dilthey's philosophy, this to the extent to which life was its primary concept; in
his work, indeed, historical understanding was not exactly the pendant of the theory of
nature; the relationship between life and its expressions was rather the common root of
the double relationship between man and nature and between man and history. If one
follows this suggestion, the problem is not one of strengthening historical knowledge as
334 FILIPPO LIVERZIANI

compared with physical knowledge, but rather one of digging below scientific knowledge
(here taken in its full generality) in order to establish a link between historical being and
the whole of being that would be more originary than the subject-object relationship of
the theory of knowledge" (Le conflit des interpretations [Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1969], pp. 11-12).
10 See M. Heidegger, Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik, chap. 1; P. Prini, Discorso e situa·
zione (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 1969), chap. 5 ("11 discorso sull'essere").
11 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1927), p. 35. See also, more
generally, the introduction to this work, pp. 2-40.
12 P. Ricoeur defines two moments or aspects of demythification: a phase of de-
mystification, which can liberate us from the alienating aspect of the myth, and one of
demythologization, capable of bringing out the authentic sense and significance of the
myth. In this connection see his essay "Demythiser l'accusation", in Le conflit des
interpretations, pp. 330-46.
13 See Morra's Dio senza Dio, especially the chapters entitled "Teologia negativa e
teologia positiva" (pp. 219-47) and "Le 'prove' di Dio" (pp. 249-300).
 ELiO COSTANTINI

EINFOHLUNG UND INTERSUBJEKTIVITAT BEl EDITH

STEIN UND BEl HUSSERL

Meine kurze Abhandlung wird einen historischen Charakter haben, ihr Argu-
ment bezieht sich auf ein Thema das schon in einigen der vorhergehenden
Vortragen aufgetaucht ist: es handelt sich urn die Theorie der Intersubjek-
tivitat wie sie von Husserl dargestellt worden ist. Es ist nun meine Ansicht,
dass a1s Fundament der intersubjektiven Beziehungen das Einftihlungs-
problem zu stell en ist, das bisher unverdienterweise in den Hintergrund
gedrangt wurde und das uns ausserdem noch die Gelegenheit verschafft
anschaulich darzustellen was flir ein Zusammenhang zwischen Psychologie
und Phanomenologie bestehen kann.
Ich mochte nun gem darauf hinweisen welche Beziehungen zwischen der
Theorie der Intersubjektivitat und der Einftihlungslehre bestehen und dabei
auf die unersetzliche und grundlegende Arbeit von Edith Stein, die das
Einftihlungsproblem in einer personlichen und erschopfenden Weise behandelt
hat, aufmerksam machen. 1 Das Verdienst das Einftihlungsproblem bis auf
den Grund ana1ysiert zu haben und es systematisch aufgearbeitet zu haben ist
ganz und gar Edith Stein zususchreiben.
Was die Beziehungen zwischen der Theorie der Intersubjektivitat und der
Einftihlungslehre anbetrifft ist folgendes zu bemerken: wenn die trans zen-
dentale Intersubjektivitat die Konstitution des fremden Ich voraussetzt (a1s Ich
das ausserha1b jeder Ichzugehorigkeiten besteht), so setzt diese Konstitution
ihrerseits ein Erfassen des fremden Bewusstseins vorraus, Erfassen das durch
einen Einftihlungsakt ermoglicht wird. Mit anderen Worten: Einftihlung
a1s Erfahrung fremden Bewusstseins ist Fundament flir das Phanomen der
Intersubjektivitat mit wessen Hilfe es moglich ist die objektive Welt in ihrer
Gesamtheit zu erleben.
Den Schriften Husserls kann man entnehmen dass er sich grundlegend mit
dem Problem der Intersubjektivitat beschaftigt und, unzufrieden mit den
von ihm erreichten Losungen, immer wieder auf das Problem zuriickkommt.
In der V. "Meditations cartesiennes" defmiert Husser! die Natur des
intersubjektiven Phanomens und stellt fest dass es sich auf dem Gebiet der
Transzendenta1itat entwickeit, wenn das konstituierende Ich, dank einer
besonderen Ausscha1tung, von der "immanenten Transzendenz" in die
"objektive Transzendenz" tibergeht, d.h; von der Intentiona1itat die sich auf
335

A. Ales Bello (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XI, 335-339.

Copyright © 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.
336 ELIO COSTANTINI

alles bezieht was fremd fUr das Ich ist, zur Intentionalitiit die sich auf die Welt
inneren Erlebens bezieht. Man kann aber auch feststellen, dass Husserl sich
wenig mit dem eigentlichen Einflihlungsproblem befasst, indem er vielleicht
annimmt, dass dieses Problem schon vorausgesetzt sei und in gewisser Weise
schon mit demselben Problem der Intersubjektivitiit verwachsen ist. - Ander-
erseits hat aber Edith Stein ausscWiesslich das Einflihlungsproblem behandelt
und es ist ihr gelungen zu einer wesenhaften Defmition desselben zu gelangen:
Einftihlung besteht wenn wir ein Erlebnis erleben dass einem fremden Be-
wusstsein angehort, d.h. wenn wir in originiirer Weise ein Erlebnis erleben dass
fUr uns nicht-originiir ist.
Wenn wir nun behaupten dass Edith Stein und nicht HusserI das Ein-
flihlungsproblem gelOst hat, bedeutet das nicht Husserl etwas abzustreiten,
denn niemand wird behaupten dass HusserI Edith Stein nicht den Anstoss
gegeben hat sich mit dem Problem zu beschiiftigen. In einigen Monographien
die Edith Stein gewidmet sind wird entweder nicht auf dieses Argument
eingegangen, oder es wird einfach damit abgetan: Edith Stein habe sich woW
mit dem Einflihlungsproblem beschiiftigt, hiitte aber weiter nichts getan als
in die Fusstapfen ihrer Mt:isters zu treten. Es ist woW ausser Frage dass die
Forschungen der Stein sich im Wirkungskreis der Phanomenologie Husserls
bewegten, es ist aber ebenso gewiss dass all das was die Stein im Bezug auf das
Einftihlungsproblem analysiert und geleistet hat, nicht HusserI zuzuschreiben
ist und es entspricht nicht der Wahrheit wenn behauptet wird, dass das
Werk Edith Steins weiter nichts wiire als eine Wiederholung dessen was
HusserI schon gesagt hatte. Wenn dem so wiire wiirde ihr auch das Verdienst
vorenthalten die in anderen Einflihlungstheorien enthaltenen negativen
Aspekte herausgestellt zu haben, besonders diejenigen von Theodor Lipps auf
psychologischem Gebiet und die von Max Scheler auf phiinomenologischem.
Dazu kommt noch ihre brillante Beweisflihrung gegen die Nachahmungs-
theorie, die Assoziationstheorie und die AnalogiescWusstheorie, die nicht
als genetische Theorien tiber das Erfassen von fremden Bewusstsein gel ten
k6nnen. 3
Wir mochten uns nun niiher mit dieser Frage beschiiftigen. Es ist bekannt
dass HusserI in seinen Schriften "Ideen I and II", in "Formale und transzen-
dentale Logik", in "Meditations cartesiennes" und in "Krisis der europiiischen
Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phiinomenologie" ausflihrliche
Forschungen zur Theorie der Intersubjektivitiit anstellt, und ihr Wesen
definiert, sich aber mit der "Einflihlung" nur im II. Buch der "Ideen"4 und in
der V. 'Meditation" beschiiftigt; besonders ausflihrlich in der zweitgenannten
Schrift.
 ON EDITH STEIN AND HUSSERL 337

1m ersten Text erwiihnt Hussed die Einflihlung als ein Phanomen das das
Phanomen der Intersubjektivitat voraussetzt, d.h. die Einflihlung wird in
das Bereich der Intersubjektivitat eingeschlossen, wahrend in der zweiten
Schrift Husseds, in der V. Meditation, die Einfuhlung erwiihnt wird, aber ihre
eigentliche Natur und ihr Wesen nicht definiert werden. Bei Husserl werden
auch die verschiedenen Stu fen des Einflihlungsaktes nicht beriicksichtigt,
kurz: die Einflihlung wird nur in ihrer Wirkung dargestellt, oder besser, sie
wird nur von den Seiten angesenen die sich auf die Intersubjektivitat besiehen,
als Akt mit Hilfe dessen es erm6glicht wird die Welt der Objekte als Ganzes zu
erkennen.
Was Hussed nicht untemommen hat finden wir hingegen in Edith Steins
ausfuhdichem Werk vor, dass dem Problem der Einflihlung gewidmet ist. Es
ist interessant, dass Edith Stein nur einmal, am Ende ihrer Dissertation,S auf
das Problem der Intersubjektivitat hinweist; sie geht nicht auf das Problem
ein, lasst aber verstehen, dass ein Zusammenhang mit der Einflihlung besteht.
Es kommt fast vor, als ob der Meister und die Schillerin ausgemacht hatten
beide Probleme getrennt und jeder flir sich, zu behandeln.
Als Hussed 1913 an der Universitat Gottingen wahrend einer Vodesung
uber "Natur und Geist" sagte, dass die Erkenntnis der Welt als Ganzes nur
durch das Edeben fremden Bewusstseins moglich ist und dieses Erleben
"Einftihlung" nannte, ohne aber selbst festzulegen was Einflihlung in sich
selbst ist, wurde die Einflihlung als phanomenologisches Problem bekannt.
Es galt nun herauszustellen was Einflihlung selbst ist und diese Lucke "galt
es auszuftillen" wie Edith Stein selbst sagt. Und solange die Stein dieses
Problem nicht in ihrer Dissertation bearbeitet hatte und in all seinen Aspekten
untersucht hatte, blieb diese Lucke bestehen. 6 Dies tat sie mit Gutheissen
Husseris, der ihr den Auftrag gegeben hatte dieses Problem in ihrer Dissertation
zu bearbeiten.
Es ist ein allgemeiner falscher Glaube dass (wie man auch in einigen Mono-
graphien uber sie Ie sen kann), Edith Stein flir ihre Arbeit die Manuskripte
Husserls des zweiten Buches der "Ideen" benutzt hat, wo von Einflihlung die
Rede ist. 7 Es ist dem nicht so.
1m "Vorwort" zu ihrer Dissertation die im Jahre 1917 mit der Beflirwor-
tung Husserls gedruckt wurde, schreibt sie selbst: 8

Zudem haben besondere unstiinde mich verhindert, die Arbeit vor der Veriiffentlichung
noch einmal griindlich zu iiberarbeiten. Seit ich sie der Fakultiit einreichte, habe ich
niimlich in meinen Funktionen als Privatassistentin meines verehrten Lehrers, Herm
Professor Husser!, Einblick in die Manuskripte zum II. Teil seiner "Ideen" erhalten,
338 ELIO COSTANTINI

die zum Teil dieselben Fragen behandeln, und wiirde natiirlich bei einer neuen Beschiifti-
gung mit meinem Thema nicht umhin konnen, die empfangenen neuen Anregungen zu
verwerten.

Daraus kann man ersenen dass die Stein den Inhalt der Manuskripte der Ideen
II. weder vor noch wruuend der Niederschrift ihrer Arbeit kannte. Sie fahrt
dann fort: "Freilich sind Problemstellung und Methode meiner Arbeit ganz
aus Anregungen hervorgewachsen die ich von Herrn Professor Hussed empfing
... " und schliesst, "Indessen kann ich sagen, dass die Ergebnisse, die ich
jetzt vodege, in eigener Arbeit gewonnen sind, und das konnte ich nicht mehr
behaupten, wenn ich jetzt Anderungen vornahme." Edith Stein, wie man
sieht, scheidet selbst ihre eigene Arbeit von dem was Hussed zukommt und
besteht auf ihrem personlichen Beitrag zum Einflihlungsproblem.
Zum Schluss mochte ich noch die Worte Husserls selbst zitieren, die sich
auf Edith Steins Werk beziehen. 1m Sommer 1916 trafen sich Husserl, seine
Frau Malvine, Edith Stein und ihre Freundin Erika vor der universitat in
Freiburg i. Br. und gingen zusammen weiter. 9 Hussed sprach mit Edith Stein
tiber ihre Doktorarbeit und setzte unter anderem hinzu": leh habe nur
Bedenken, ob diese Arbeit neben den 'Ideen' im lahrbuch moglich sein
wird. leh habe den Eindruck, dass Sie manches aus dem II. Teil der 'Ideen'
vorweggenommen haben."
Es scheint mir von grundlegender Bedeutung, dass Hussed selbst die
personliche und von ihrn unabhangige Erarbeitung des Einflihlungsproblerns
von Seiten Edith Steins anerkannt hat und hoffe damit dass es mir gelungen
ist dies hier herausgestellt zu haben.

ANMERKUNGEN

1 Edith Stein: "Zum Problem der Einftihlung", Halle, 1917.

2 Das Wort "Einftihlung" wurde von Theodor Lipps (Psychologiedozent in Miinchen,
1894) eingeftihrt und von Husser! im Jahre 1913 iibernommen.
3 S. "Zum Problem der Einftihlung" S. 23 ff.
4 "Ideen" II. Sektion Cap. IV.
5 Es ist von Wichtigkeit noch zu bemerken, dass die Niederschrift der Dissertation von
Edith Stein, in der das Einftihlungsproblem bis auf den Grund analysiert wird, vor der
VerOffentlichung dieser beiden Texte liegt. Edith Stein begann ihre Arbeit im Jahre 1915
und hat sie 1916 beendet, sie ist schliesslich 1917 gedruck worden.
6 Edith Stein begann ihre Abeit im Jahre 1915 und sie dauerte bis Sommer 1916.
7 Das erste Buch der "Ideen" wurde im Jahrbuch 1913 veroffentlicht wiihrend das
zweite Buch erst viel spiiter erscheint. Die Stein konnte die Manuskripte erst nach der
Niederschrift ihrer Dissertation sehen, als Husserls Privatassistentin.
8 Edith Stein vollendete ihre Arbeit und iiberreichte eine Kopie dem Meister und eine
 ON EDITH STEIN AND HUSSERL 339

der Fakultat in Freiburg i. Br. ein paar Tage nach Ostern 1916; am 3. August desselben
Jahres bestand sie ihre Doktorprufung und wurde Privatassistentin Husserls.
9 "Aus dem Leben einer Jiidischen Familie", Edith Steins Werke VII, Kapitel 7: "Von
den Studienjahren in Gottingen", p. 289 f. Ed. Nauwelaerts, Louvain 1965.
 CENTRO IT ALIANO DI RICERCHE FENOMENOLOGICHE

The Phenomenology Conference

Viterbo, February 24-25,1979

THE SPECTRUM OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Directed by Angela Ales Bello

Director, Centro Italiano di Ricerche Fenomenologiche,
Roma

PROGRAMME

Saturday, February 24,9.15 a.m. Session 1

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF CARDINAL KAROL
WOJTYLA
Anna-Teresa Tyrnieniecka:
The World Phenomenological
Institute, Belmont, MA, USA
Hans Koehler:
University of Innsbruck
Austria
Robert Magliola:
Purdue University, USA
"The Phenomenological Conception
of the Acting Person in Cardinal
Wojtyla's Anthropology"
"The Phenomenology of Cardinal
Karol Wojtyla"
"The Spiritual Meditation in The
Sign of Contradiction and Heideg-
ger's Meditation on the Holy"

3.00 p.m. Session 2

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY: SYMPOSIUM
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF THE LIVED WORLD
Participants: Eugenio Borgna, Psychiatric Hospital of Novara
341
342 CENTRO ITALIANO 01 RICERCHE FENOMENOLOGICHE

Bruno Callieri, University of Rome

Maurizio De Negri, University of Genua
Vincenzo Rapisarda, University of Catania
Loredana Paradiso, University of Catania

Sunday, February 25,9.15 a.m. Session 3

INTENTIONALITY AND LANGUAGE

Presided over by Marie-Rose Barral, Seaton Hall University, USA

Renzo Raggiunti: "The Linguistic Problem in the

Phenomenology of Hussed"

Filippo Costa: "Intentionality in the Contribution

of the External Object according to
Ding und Raum"

11 a.m. Session 4

Mario Sancipriano: "Phenomenology of the Sacred and

University of Siena/Arezzo of the Spirit"

11.45 a.m. Session 5

PROBLEMS OF THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SCIENCE

Presided over by J. C. Piguet, University of Lausanne

Paolo Valori: "Methodological Problems of the

Gregorian University of Rome Phenomenology of the Human
Sciences"

Bianca Maria D'Ippolito: "HusserI and Galilei - Philosophy

University of Naples and Science"

13.15 p.m. Reception given by Reidel Publishing Company

Mr. B. Vance, Director
 CENTRO IT ALIANO DI RICERCHE FENOMENOLOGICHE 343

3.00 p.m. Session 6

Presided over by Angela Ales Bello

Aurelio Rizzacasa: "Epistemological and Phenome-

University of Siena/Arezzo nological Considerations concerning
Natural Science in Hussed"

Elio Costantini: "Empathy in E. Stein"

University of Viterbo
 INDEX OF NAMES

Amyot, F. 316 Clement of Alexandria 314, 316, 319

Aquinas,T.49,51-57,116,122 Cobb-Stevens, V. 36
Aristotle 5, 19-20, 51-52, 56, 60, Cohen, H. 322
64-65,99-100,115-16 Collingwood, R. G. 36
Aubenque, P. 68 Conci, D. 143,146
Augustine, St. 100 Conrad, K. 220
Avenarius, R. 147 Croce, B. 239,241-43,254-55

Baccarini, E. 146 D'Anger, J.-E. 316,319

Baldassari, M. 319 De la Saussaye, C. 321
Banfi, A. 137, 145 Del Noce, A. 171
Barison 191 De Martino 321
Beckett, S. 25 De Negri, M. 179
Bergson, H. 333 Dentoni, F. 146
Berkeley, G. 14 Derrida,1. 276,311-13,318-19
Bianchi, U. 333 Descartes, R. 5, 12,41, 117, 156, 280,
Binswanger,1. 221 312-16,319
Bisterfeld, J. M. 62 De Waelhens, A. 333
Blanchot 220 Dhavamony, M. 321-22,333
Bleeker, C. J. 331 Dilthey, W. 333
Bobbio, M. 137, 145 Di Nola, A. 321,331,333
Bohr, N. 156 D'Ippolito, B. M. 142-43,146
Bolzano, B. 147 Duns Scotus 118
Bosio, F. 141-42,146 Durkheim, E. 322
Brentano, F. 8,147
Broekman, J. M. 221 Einstein, A. 156
Bruno, G. 322 Eliade, M. 321,331
Biichner, G. 122 Epictetus 316,319
Bultmann 329
Burkhardt 229 Feuerbach, L. 322
Feyerabend, P. 325
Cairns, D. 201 Fichte, J. G. 293
Calvi 179 Filippini, E. 137
Carcano, F. 142-43,146 Foot, F. 162-63
Carnap, R. 174 Foucault,M.312-13,318
Cassirer, E. 200,255 Frege,G. 147
Chomsky, N. 269 Freud, S. 323
Chrysippus 314-315,317-318
Cicero 315,319 Galilei, G. 154-56,326
Cleasges, U. 286 Gide, A. 36

345
346 INDEX OF NAMES

Gilson, E. 125 Landgrebe, 1. 103,201,255

Girgensohn, K. 323 Leibniz, G. W. 5,9,12-13,59-68,143
Giidel, R. 276 Leuba, J. H. 323
Goethe, J. W. von 222 Levin, D. M. 103,112
Gurwitsch, A. 201-2 Levy-Bruhl, 1. 322
Lipps, T. 336
Hall, S. 323 Lovejoy, A. O. 11-12,17-18,30,37,
Hartmann, N. 8, 69, 76-87, 90-97, 67,99,107,110,112
108 Lugarini,1. 137,145
Hegel, G. W. F. 108, 241, 290, 322 Luther, A. R. 109,112
Heidegger, M. 5, 13, 25,28,31,35-36,
78, 198, 200, 204, 291, 296, 309, Mach, E. 147
311-13,318,327,333-34 Mannheim, K. 199
Heisenberg, W. 156 Marx, K. 108
Hellwag, C. F. 73 Masullo, A. 139, 146
Hempel, C. G. 139 Melandri, E. 139-40,146-47
Herder, 1. G. 73 Merleau-Ponty, M. 8, 31, 138, 202,
Herring, J. 122 204,319
Hippocrates 59 Mill, J. S. 283
Hjelmslev, 1. 230, 240-41, 255, 272- Minkowski, E. 221
73, 277 Montaigne, M. de 319
Hudson, W. H. 157,163,171 Moore, G. E. 162
Hume, D. 14,322 Morra, G. 322-23, 333-34
Husserl, E. 5-8, 10, 13-15, 17-18, Morris, V. C. 202
22, 25-26, 34, 41-51, 78, 99, Moustakas, E. 202
102-4, 113, 116, 122, 137-56, Miiller-Suur 214,221
158, 162, 171, 173-74, 200-202,
204, 210, 215-16, 225-76, 279- Natanson, M. 219
314, 317-18, 322, 325, 328-29, Natorp, P. 322
335-39 Neri, G. D. 137-38,143,145-46
Newton, I. 71,73
lngarden, R. 6, 13-18, 22, 24-26, 28, Nietzsche, F. 101,143
34-36,122
Otto, R. 323
James, W. 323 Owens, T. 1. 174
Joyce, J. 25
Jung, C. G. 323 Paci, E. 137-39, 142-43, 145, 202
Parret, H. 255, 271-72
Kaelin, E. 9 Pascal, B. 110,117,122
Kafka, F. 25 Pedroli, G. 140, 143, 146
Kant, 1. 5, 9, 30, 41, 64, 69-77, 86, Pettazzoni, R. 321,331,333
88, 90, 94-97, 99-100,158, 241, Piaget,1. 203
261,281,287,289 Piana, G. 276
Kelly, E. 111-12 Plato 11-12, 18, 20, 99, 110, 116,
Kierkegaard, S. 13 121
Kircher, P. A. 60 Plotinus 12
Kisker 14 Putarch 315-17,319
Kuhn, T. S. 213,325 Pohlenz, M. 315,319
 INDEX OF NAMES 347

Pohleur 315 Stein, E. 48-50,113-23,235-39

Pope,A. 9,69,71-75,94 Straus, E. 220-21
Pyrrho 314, 316
Tagliabue, G. M. 276
Raggiunti, R. 142, 146, 276 Tillich, P. 314,322
Rickert, H. 322 Troeltsch, E. 322
Ricoeur, P. 6, 8, 333-34 Tylor, E. B. 322.
Riemann, G. F. B. 141 Tymieniecka, A.-T. 10,13,15,18,21-
Rousseau, J. J. 73 25,27,30,32-37

Sartre, J.-P. 25,31,138,202 Valery, P. 32,311,318

Saussure, F. de 228-29, 239-41, 255, Valori,P.171
271-72 Van der Leeuw, G. 321-22,331
Scheffler, I. 13 9 Van Praag 214
Scheler, M. 99-112, 158,162-63, 169, Voltaggio, F. 141-42,146
174,323,336 Voltaire, F. M. A. 62
Schleiermacher, F. 323 Von Gebsatte1, V. E. 213,217-18,221
Schneider, K. 213-15
Schlitz, A. 173, 175,201-2 Weierstrass, K. 143,147
Scrimieri, G. 141, 146-47 Werkmeister, W. H. 95,97
Semerari, G. 137-38 Whitehead, A. N. 5
Sini, c. 140, 145 Windelband, W. 322
Socrates 19, 64 Wittgenstein, L. 56,239,255
Spannent,M.317,319 Wobbermin, G. 323
Spiegelberg, H. 111, 175
Spinoza, B. 322 Zaner, R. 175,202
Starbuck, E. D. 323 Zecchi, S. 142, 146
 Analecta Husserliana
Volume I: Analecta Husserliana
1971, ix + 207 pp. ISBN 90-277-D171-7

Volume II: The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology

Idealism-Realism. Historicity and Nature
1972, vii + 374 pp. ISBN 90-277-D223-3

Volume III: The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds

The ~ Priori'. Activity and Passivity of Consciousness.
Phenomenology and Nature
1974. vii + 386 pp. ISBN 90-277-D426-D

Volume IV: Ingardeniana

A Spectrum of Specialized Studies Establishing the Field of Research
1976, x + 438 pp. ISBN 90-277-D628-X

Volume v.- The Crisis of Culture

Steps to Re-Open the Phenomenological Investigation of Man
1976, vii + 383 pp. ISBN 90-277-D632-8

Volume VI: The Self and the Other

The Irreducible Element in Man
Part I: The 'Crisis of Man'
1977, xi + 186 pp. ISBN 90-277-D759-{i

Volume VII: The Human Being in Action

The Irreducible Element in Man
Part II: Investigations at the Intersection of Philosophy and
Psychiatry
1978, xvii + 261 pp. ISBN 90-277-D884-3

Volume VIII: Japanese Phenomenology

Phenomenology as the Trans-Cultural Philosophical Approach
edited by
YOSHIHIRO NITTA and HIROT AKA TATEMATSU
1979, xi + 291 pp. ISBN 90-277-D924-{i

Volume IX: The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology

The Irreducible Element in Man
Part III: Telos' as the Pivotal Factor of Contextual Phenomenology
1979, xv + 496 pp. ISBN 90-277-D981-5

Volume X: The Acting Person

by KAROL WOJTYI-A
1979, xxiii + 367 pp. ISBN 90-277-D969-{i (library binding)
ISBN 90-277-D985-8 (cheaper cloth bindir