PABLO-GUALBERTO v.
GUALBERTO her Order of April 3, 2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to
June 28, 2005 | Justice, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation To Custody of
Minors
Digester: Magtanong, Patch
SUMMARY: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer
for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her
wife took away with her from their conjugal home and his school when she
left him. No evidence
that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual proclivities (lesbian)
or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
The Court granted the custody of the child to Joycelyn. According to the
tender years presumption, under certain circumstances, the mother’s
immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of
custody. In this case however, the Court said that sexual preference or moral
laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. The husband
must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on
the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from
exercising proper parental care. Since Joycelyn was granted custody, the
Writ of Habeas Corpus is not proper.
DOCTRINE: A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the “rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,” a
situation that does not apply here.
FACTS:
 On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed RTC of
Parañaque a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn
D. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of
their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello.
 On April 3, 2002, the Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to
Crisanto:
o Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that he
was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn
and came up with the conclusion that she is having lesbian relations
with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
o The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by Cherry Batistel,
a house helper of the spouses who stated that [the mother] does not
care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and on
one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.
 On April 16, 2002, the hearing of Joycelyn’s motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto was set but the former did
not allegedly present any evidence to support her motion. However, on
May 17, 2002, the Judge allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing
Joycelyn.
 The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is barely
four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall not be
separated from his mother unless the Court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by Crisanto not to be
compelling reasons. The father should however be entitled to spend time
with the minor.
RULING: Petition granted.
Whether – YES.
 When love is lost between spouses and the marriage inevitably results in
separation, the bitterest tussle is often over the custody of their children.
The Court is now tasked to settle the opposing claims of the parents for
custody pendente lite of their child who is less than seven years old.
 On the one hand, the mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the
Family Code, her minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other
hand, the father argues that she is “unfit” to take care of their son; hence,
for “compelling reasons,” he must be awarded custody of the child.
 Article 213 of the Family Code provides:
“ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall
take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the
child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
 No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
 This Court has held that when the parents are separated, legally or
otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child.
Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
“Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be paramount. No mother
shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reasons for such measure.”
 The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be
separated from their mother finds its raison d’être in the basic need of
minor children for their mother’s loving care.
 In explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus:
“The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where
a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the
deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The
exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for the
good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart
 is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the
penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily
be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not
have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the
situation.”
 Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the
compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It has indeed been
held that under certain circumstances, the mother’s immoral conduct
may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody.
 But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental
neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother is a prostitute
or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child.
 To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that
her moral lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child
or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental
care.
 The word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6 of Rule
99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory
character.
 The principle of “best interest of the child” pervades Philippine cases
involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status, minors in
conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it has long been
recognized that in choosing the parent to whom custody is given, the
welfare of the minors should always be the paramount consideration.
 The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s
unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody of
her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect,
abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease.
[TOPIC}
Whether the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for by Crisanto is proper– NO.
 As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor son in her
custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary mandatory
injunction prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand on.
 A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the “rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,” a situation that
does not apply here.
 On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory
injunction cannot be granted, because Crisanto’s right to custody has not
been proven to be “clear and unmistakable.”
 Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter
requires the performance of a particular act that tends to go beyond the
maintenance of the status quo. Besides, such an injunction would serve
no purpose, now that the case has been decided on its merits.
Gapusan-Chua v. CA
March 15, 1990 | Narvasa, J.| Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of
minor natural children
Digester: Melliza, F.S.L.
SUMMARY: Felisa died intestate and without legitimate issue. Ligaya, who
claims to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa, instituted judicial
proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate. She was later appointed
to be designated as Special Administratrix by the probate court. Sometime
later, Prospero, Felisa’s surviving spouse, filed a motion for reconsideration
of the CFI’s Order. He denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child
of his deceased wife, and applied for his own appointment as administrator of
his wife's estate. Hearings were held to on the issue of Ligaya’s filiation.
Ligaya presented the following documents: (1) Felisa's sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, in which she names and describes Ligaya as her
daughter; (2) her application for GSIS life insurance in which she again
describes Ligaya as her daughter; and (3) her application for membership in
the Negros Occidental Teachers' Federation, where she names Ligaya as her
"adopted daughter". Probate Court ruled for Ligaya, but the CA reversed and
appointed Prosporo instead. The CA held the evidence at best showed
merely that Ligaya had been treated as a daughter by Felisa, but that this did
"not constitute acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel recognition;" It
further ruled that Ligaya had failed to establish that she had been
acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of the Civil Code.
Ligaya appealed with the SC, arguing the statements in the documents were
"authentic writings" in contemplation of Article 278 of the Civil Code. The SC
reversed the CA. It held that the documents do constitute authentic writings
required by Art. 278, and that the lack of judicial recognition on Ligaya’s part
was ratified by her when she reached the age of majority.
DOCTRINE: Authentic writing need not be public documents for purposes of
voluntary recognition. It is enough that they are genuine or indubitable
writings of the father (or mother).
Lack of judicial approval may be cured by the express or implied ratification
effected by the minor upon reaching age of majority.
Implied ratification may be shown where the child keeps the acknowledgment
papers and the use of the parent’s surname.
Judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a
will.
On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor
is effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in
a court of record or an authentic document. In any case the individual
recognized can impugn the recognition within four years following the
attainment of his majority.
FACTS:
 Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue.
 Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter
of Felisa, instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter's
estate.
 Ligaya filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the
settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of administration in
her favor. She also sought her designation as Special Administratrix
pending her appointment as regular administratrix.
 CFI appointed Ligaya Special Administratrix of Felisa Parcon's estate.
 Sometime later, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the CFI’s Order. He denied that
Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and
applied for his own appointment as administrator of his wife's estate.
 Hearings were had on the issue of Ligaya claimed filiation. Ligaya
presented following documents:
1. Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities, in which she
names and describes Ligaya as her daughter;
2. her application for GSIS life insurance in which she again
describes Ligaya as her daughter; and
3. her application for membership in the Negros Occidental
Teachers' Federation, where she names Ligaya as her "adopted
daughter".
 Prospero Parcon, on the other hand, sought to demonstrate that Ligaya's
exhibits did not constitute conclusive proof of her claimed status of
acknowledged natural child, for the reason that:
1. Another document, Felisa's application for membership in Negros
Occidental Teachers' Federation (NOTF), merely named Ligaya as
her "adopted daughter;"
2. in the distribution of death benefits pursuant to the decedent's GSIS
insurance policy, supra, Ligaya was allocated only P500.00 whereas
Prospero received P1,000.00; and
3. Mrs. Leticia Papasin (Felisa's sister) and Vice-Mayor Solomon
Mendoza travelled from afar to affirm before the Probate Court on
the witness stand that Ligaya was not the daughter of Felisa, Mrs.
Papasin's testimony being that in 1942 an unknown "drifter" had sold
Ligaya, then an infant, to Felisa.
 Probate Court ruled that Ligaya is the acknowledged natural child of the
late Felisa.
 CA reversed the Probate Court.
o In the CA’s view, the evidence at best showed merely that Ligaya
had been treated as a daughter by Felisa, but that this did "not
constitute acknowledgment" but "only a ground to compel
recognition;"
o It further ruled that Ligaya had failed to establish that she had
been acknowledged by Felisa in accordance with Article 278 of
the Civil Code (Article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889).
 Ligaya wasn’t maligaya with the CA ruling, so she appealed to the SC.
 Ligaya argued the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently
establish her status as the acknowledged natural child of Felisa Parcon,
and that her appointment as regular administratrix is justified by law and
jurisprudence. These documents, voluntarily made, were adequate
foundation for a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These
statements, she alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of
Article 278 of the Civil Code:
Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing.
 On the other hand, Prospero Parcon argued:
1. that, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, the statements designating
Ligaya as Felisa's daughter merely furnished ground for Ligaya to
compel recognition by action which, however, should have been
brought during the lifetime of the putative parent in accordance with
Article 285 of the Civil Code, reading as follows:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural
children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had been heard
and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
 In this case, the action must be commenced within four
years from the finding of the document.
2. Since, Parcon continues, no such action was instituted prior to the
death of Felisa, proof of the "authentic document" (sworn statement
of assets and liabilities) in the proceedings for the settlement of the
latter's estate was inefficacious as basis for a declaration of filiation
or heirship.
RULING: CA ruling set aside; Probate Court ruling reinstated. Ligaya
Gapusan-Chua is the decedent's acknowledged natural child and appointing
her regular administratrix.
(See Notes for discussion between compulsory and voluntary recognition)
Whether the documents presented constitute authentic writings for
purposes of voluntary recognition—Yes.
 An "authentic writing" within the contemplation of Article 278. "An
'authentic writing' for purposes of voluntary recognition . . . (is)
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the father" (or mother),
including "a public instrument" (one acknowledged before a notary public
or other competent official with the formalities required by law), and, of
course, a public or official document in accordance with Section 20, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court.
 The sworn statement of assets and liabilities filed by Felisa Parcon is a
public document, having been executed and submitted pursuant to a
requirement of the law. So it has been held by this Court.
 The other two writings above mentioned are, to be sure, not public
documents, but this is of no moment; neither of them has to be a
public document in order to be categorized as an "authentic
writing."
 It is enough that they are the genuine or indubitable writings of
Felisa Gapusan Parcon. That in one of the writings, Felisa's
application for membership in the Negros Occidental Teachers'
Federation, Felisa describes Ligaya as her "adopted" daughter is
also inconsequential.
 It may be explained by her reluctance to confess publicly to her
colleagues in the teaching profession that she had borne a child out of
wedlock. It is in any case a categorical avowal by Felisa that Ligaya is
indeed her daughter, an admission entirely consistent with the two other
authentic writings executed by her in which she acknowledges Ligaya to
be her daughter without qualification.
 Moreover, if these three (3) writings are considered in conjunction with
the undisputed fact that Ligaya had been continuously treated by Felisa
as her daughter, the proposition that Ligaya was indeed Felisa's daughter
becomes well nigh conclusive.
Whether the lack of judicial approval of the recognition may be ratified
by the minor upon reaching the age of majority.—Yes.
 The point need not be belabored, however. For whether Ligaya were still
a minor or already of age at the time of her recognition in the authentic
writings mentioned, that circumstance would be immaterial in the light of
the attendant facts.
 In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age
who has been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or tacitly.
Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary
recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto.
 Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to
impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly
manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her
rights thereto.
 Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her
recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was
necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that
recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of
the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on
the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural
daughter.
 The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is
clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial
approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment
made. The judicial approval is for the protection of the minor
against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice."
 "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a
defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor
may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor consents to
the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no
difference.
 Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by
such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the
acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's surname.
Notes:
The Court discussed between compulsory and voluntary recognition of
the child:
Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of
paternity or maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form
prescribed by the Civil Code. Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that
the child is his; the formality is added to make the admission incontestable, in
view of its consequences." 9 The form is prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil
Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a voluntary recognition "shall be
made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing."
Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to
distinguish it from that which is a purely voluntary act of the parent. 11 It is
recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by
Articles 283 and 284, setting forth the cases in which the father or mother,
respectively, is obliged to recognize a natural child, and Article 285 providing
that generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents.
The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of
voluntary recognition is dealt with in Article 281 of the Civil Code.
Art. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without
his consent.
When the recognition of a minor does not take place in a record of
birth or in a will, judicial approval shall be necessary.
A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years
following the attainment of his majority.
In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily
made —
1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or
2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or
in a will.
On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor
is effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in
a court of record or an authentic document. In any case the individual
recognized can impugn the recognition within four years following the
attainment of his majority.
Modequillo v. Salinas
May 31, 1990| Gancayco, J| Family Home
Digester: Mercado, Carlo Robert M.
SUMMARY: Modequillo and Malubay were ruled against by the CA in a case
for damages due to a vehicular accident. This judgment became final and so
execution of the judgment proceeded. The sheriff levied two properties of
Modequillo in Davao del Sur. Modequillo filed a motion to quash the levy
because one of the properties there was his family home, constituted since
1969. SC ruled that the said property is subject to execution. Articles of the
Family Code on Family Home do not have retroactive effect., thus the
property was constituted as a family home only upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 The debt or liability which was the basis of
the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on
March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by
the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. Therefore, at the time the act giving rise to
liability and the money judgment therefrom were before the property was
constituted as a family home. Thus, the property is subject to execution.
DOCTRINE:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If
the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as
contemplated by law.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein
It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 (Provisions on Family Home) of
said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
FACTS
 January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals
ordering Modequillo and Malubay to pay Salinas and Culan-Culan the ff.
(not specified for what acts but its due to a vehicular accident so quasi
delict probably)
o the Salinas spouses:
 the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for
the death of their son Audie Salinas;
 P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the
death of said Audie Salinas;
  the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie
Salinas; and
 the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
o Culan-Culan:
 the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of
Renato Culan-Culan; and
 P5,000.00 for moral damages.
o Both Salinas and Culan-Culan,
 P7,000.00 for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
 The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy
the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay
 July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcels of land in satisfaction of the
judgment
o residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
o agricultural land located at Dalagbong, Bulacan, Malalag, Davao
del Sur
 Both in the name of Modequilo
 A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by
defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since
1969 prior to the commencement of this case
o And that the judgment debt does not fall under exceptions where
family home may be levied against (still did not state the facts
that gave rise to the money judgment zzz)
o As to the agricultural land: although it is declared in the name of
defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who
was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the
proper government agency
 TC: denied motion
Petitioner’s contention, restated
 The residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence
in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the Family
Code which took effect on August 4, 1988.
 Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt
from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family
Code
 And that the decision in this case pertaining to damages arising from a
vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final
in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of the
Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on
execution.
HELD Petition denied
W/N a family home was constituted on the residential property in issue
–YES, but NOT at the time that obligation was incurred, thus it could be
levied upon
 Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no
need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the
Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a
family home as contemplated by law.
 The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the
constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein.
As applied
 The residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family
home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became
a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the
Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one
year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988
being a leap year).
 The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home
from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken.
o Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that “the
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.”
o It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
are exempt from execution
o Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to
a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
In short
 Property is subject to execution. The debt or liability which was the basis
of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular
accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom
was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded
 the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
On the agricultural land
 As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court
correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
o So it is also subject to execution
NOTES
Family Code provisions on family home
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and
the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except:
1) For nonpayment of taxes;
2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after
such constitution; and
4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA v.
SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,
SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO
SANTOS
January 16, 2012| Reyes, J. | Constitution of the Family Home
Digester: Roa, Annamhel Monique
SUMMARY: Petitioners purchased the subject property and occupied the
same as their family home before the effectivity of the Family Code. A month
after the Code’s effectivity, the wife obtained a loan from Acero, secured by a
mortgage over the same property. The check issued by the said wife
bounced upon presentation, prompting Acero to file a BP 22 case against the
petitioners. Though they were acquitted, they were nevertheless ordered to
make payment with legal interest. A writ of execution was issued upon the
property and the Sheriff levied upon the same. It was sold on public auction,
with Acero being the highest bidder. Later, a Final Deed of Sale and a new
TCT would be issued in Acero’s name. Acero leased the property to
petitioners and one Juanito Oliva. Petitioners and Oliva paid to rentals,
leading to Acero successfully filing a case for ejectment against them. This
decision was appealed all the way to the CA, which affirmed the validity of
the ejectment. The CA decision became final. Petitioners then filed at the
RTC a complaint to nullify Acero’s TCT and other documents, contending that
it was a family home. The RTC ruled that although the property is indeed a
family home, it was validly levied upon. The CA and the SC both affirmed
this.
DOCTRINE: Family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially
constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but
were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. The settled rule is that the right to exemption or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the
sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges
that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up
and proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:
 Parcel of land = No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes Subdivision,
Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, formerly covered by TCT No. T-76.725 (M)
issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and registered
under petitioner Araceli (Araceli) Oliva-De Mesa’s name
 April 17, 1984 - Petitioners jointly purchased the subject property while
they were still merely cohabiting before marriage. A house was later
constructed on the property, which they occupied as their family home
after they got married sometime in January 1987.
 September 1988 - Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr.
(Acero) in the amount of P100,000.00, secured by a mortgage over the
subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a check drawn against
China Banking Corporation payable to Acero.
 The check bounced; the account from which it was drawn had already
been closed. Petitioners failed to heed Acero’s subsequent demand for
payment.
 Information was filed with the RTC Malolos for BP 22.
 RTC – Acquitted the petitioners but ordered them to pay Acero the
amount loaned with legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
 A writ of execution was issued and a Sheriff Samonte levied upon the
subject property. It was sold on public auction, with Acero being the
highest bidder and the corresponding certificate of sale issued to him.
 February 1995 - Acero leased the subject property to petitioners and a
certain Oliva (Oliva). Petitioners and Oliva, however, defaulted in the
payment of the rent, their accountability mounting.
 March 24, 1995 - A Final Deed of Sale over the subject property was
issued to Acero. A month later, petitioners’ TCT was cancelled and a new
one was issued in his name.
 Unable to collect the rentals due, Acero and his wife (Sps. Acero) filed a
complaint for ejectment with the MTC Meycuayan against the petitioners
and Juanito.
 In their defense, the petitioners claimed that Spouses Acero have no
right over the subject property.
o Petitioners deny that they are mere lessors; on the contrary,
they are the lawful owners of the subject property and, thus
cannot be evicted.
 MTC – In favor of Sps. Acero; Ordered petitioners and Juanito to vacate
the subject property; Dismissed the petitioners' claim of ownership over
the subject property; Title belongs to Acero, as shown by TCT; From the
time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Acero’s name
up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never
assailed the validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity
of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of
Acero’s Torrens title.
 RTC - Dismissed petitioners’ appeal due to the petitioners’ failure to
submit their Memorandum. MR denied.
 CA – Denied. Decision became final.
 In the interregnum, petitioners filed against the Sps. Acero a complaint to
nullify Acero’s TCT and other documents with damages with the RTC
Malolos, asserting that the subject property is a family home, which is
exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have
been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the March 15, 1993
writ of execution.
 RTC - Dismissed the petitioners’ complaint. Citing Article 155(3) of the
Family Code, even assuming that the subject property is a family home,
the exemption from execution does not apply. A mortgage was
constituted over the subject property to secure the loan Araceli obtained
from Acero and it was levied upon as payment therefor. MR denied.
 CA – Affirmed; ratiocinating that the exemption of a family home from
execution, attachment or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code is not automatic and should accordingly be raised and proved to
the Sheriff prior to the execution, forced sale or attachment, which
petitioners at no time was able to do. MR denied.
 Petitioners filed the instant petition for review.
o Comment of Sps. Acero: Petition ought to be denied on the
ground of forum-shopping as the issues raised had already
been determined by the MTC in its on the complaint for
ejectment filed by petitioners, which had already become
final and executory following the petitioner’s failure to appeal
the CA Decision affirming it.
RULING: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity and other
documents, and the Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Whether petitioners are guilty of forum shopping - NO.
 Forum-shopping - When two or more actions involve the same
transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical
causes of action, subject matter, and issues
 Elements: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered
in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration
 There is no identity of issues and reliefs prayed for in the ejectment case
and in the action to cancel TCT No. T-221755 (M). Primordial issue in the
ejectment case is who among the contending parties has a better right of
possession over the subject property while ownership is the core issue in
an action to cancel a Torrens title.
 The resolution of ownership issue in the ejectment case is only
provisional as the same is solely for the purpose of determining who
among the parties therein has a better right of possession over the
subject property.
 Hence, a judgment rendered in an ejectment case is not a bar to action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.
Whether the CA erred in refusing to cancel the TCT in the name of
Acero – NO.
 The rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption
from execution, summarized:
o First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of
the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order
to be exempt from execution;
 o Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically
deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution
from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
o Third, family residences which were not judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code.
 Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in
January 1987 (before Family Code effectivity). There was no showing,
however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still,
when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in
asserting that the subject property was a family home.
 Nevertheless, Court agrees with the CA that the petitioners should have
asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
 Honrado v. CA - At no other time can the status of a residential house as
a family home be set up and proved and its exemption from execution
claimed but before the sale thereof at public auction.
 Sps. Versola v. CA - The settled rule is that the right to exemption or
forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege
granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by
the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at
public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
Parting Note
 Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the
repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. From the
time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment. The family home is a real right, which is gratuitous,
inalienable and free from attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases. However, this right can be waived or be
barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the
property as a family home at the time of the levy or a reasonable time
thereafter.
 The petitioners’ negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption is a personal right, it
is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within
the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s duty to presume or raise
the status of the subject property as a family home.
 Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand that
Claudio’s title to the property be respected
MONCUPA v. ENRILE, Ver, Kintanar, Gorospe, And Castro
January 30, 1986 | Gutierrez, Jr., J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Santos, Ihna
SUMMARY: Moncupa was arrested and detained. On the allegation that he
was a National Democratic Front staff member, a Presidential Commitment
Order was issued against him and 8 other persons. After 2 separate
investigations, it was ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any
subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of
the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
subversive documents under PD No. 33. Consequently, 2 separate
information were filed against Moncupa, one, for illegal possession of
firearms and the other for violation of PD No. 33. During the pendency of this
petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not
been pursued. And yet, Moncupa’s motions for bail were denied by the lower
court. Hence, Moncupa filed the instant petition. The respondents, in their
return of the writ, justified the validity of Moncupa’s detention on the ground
that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to Moncupa. However,
the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that Moncupa was
temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister of National
Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents argued that
since Moncupa is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents,
the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic
as in similar cases. SC held that the respondents’ contention that the petition
has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Moncupa may
have been released from his detention cell but the restraints attached to his
temporary release preclude freedom of action which warrants SC’s inquiry
into the nature of his involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints
as may be illegal. In this case, the reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the temporary release of Moncupa constitute
restraints on his liberty. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of
Moncupa. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of
habeas corpus.
DOCTRINE: Temporary release of detainee from detention does not render
the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. A release that
renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be
one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be
unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is
present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely
involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of
freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments,
become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may
still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
FACTS:
 Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about
10:50pm, at the corner of D. Tuazon Street and Quezon Avenue, QC. He
was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay where he was detained. The
next day, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front
(NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was
issued against him and 8 other persons.
 After 2 separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel
Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation
Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of QC, it was
ascertained that Moncupa was not a member of any subversive
organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the
petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
subversive documents under PD No. 33.
 Consequently, 2 separate information were filed against Moncupa, one,
for illegal possession of firearms before the CFI of Rizal and the other for
violation of PD No. 33 before the City Court of QC. Against the other
accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of PD No. 885, as
amended. Significantly, Moncupa was excluded from the charge under
the Revised Anti-Subversion Law.
 During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment
and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, Moncupa’s
motions for bail were denied by the lower court. Hence, Moncupa filed
the instant petition.
 The respondents, in their return of the writ, justified the validity of
Moncupa’s detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been
suspended as to Moncupa.
 However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss
stating that on May 11, 1983, Moncupa was temporarily released from
detention on orders of the Minister of National Defense with the approval
of the President. The respondents argued that since Moncupa is free and
no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for
habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.
Attached to Moncupa’s temporary release are these restrictions imposed
on him:
 His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that he
gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro
Manila.
 His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case he wants to change his
place of residence.
 His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he
should not “participate in any interview conducted by any local
or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press
release or information that is inimical to the interest of national
security.”
 He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives.
RULING: Petition granted. The conditions attached to the temporary release
Moncupa are declared null and void. The temporary release of Moncupa is
declared absolute.
Whether the instant petition has become moot anc academic in view of
Moncupa’s temporary release – NO. The respondents have failed to
show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on Moncupa’s
freedom of movement should not be lifted.
 Moncupa argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an
improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
He stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petitioner moot and academic but that “it merely shifted the inquiry from
the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions
imposed by the respondents.”
 SC agreed with Moncupa. The reservation of the military in the form of
restrictions attached to the temporary release of Moncupa constitute
restraints on his liberty. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement
of Moncupa. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the
writ of habeas corpus.
 SC cited several jurisprudences to support its decision (see notes).
 A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a
person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be
unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in
the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person
concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of
the privilege of the writ.

NOTES:
Jurisprudence supporting SC’s ruling:
 Villavicencio v. Lukban: The women who had been illegally seized and
transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official
restraint. Unlike Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile
without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to
return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints
caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed
the hope that its “decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.”
 Caunca v. Salazar: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it
may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no
power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force
has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not
make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s
residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the
will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at
the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of
justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
 Tibo v. The Provincial Commander: Although the release in the custody
of the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could once again
enjoy their full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it
could be withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary
act. When the hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it turned out that
counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have acted in a hasty
manner when he set forth the above allegations in his manifestation of
August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for
petitioners, while conceding that there was such a release from
confinement, also alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting their
activities as labor union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of
the Philippines and Allied Services, presumably in Manila, as well as the
Ministry of Labor. As the voting was to take place in the business firm in
Bataan, the limits set would nullify whatever efforts they could have
exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition against their going to
Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and
academic character of the petition was far from clear.
 Toyota, et al. v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al.: Ordinarily, a petition for habeas
corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of
the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so
held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different
situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve
the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent
jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the
one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners
being merely “temporary” it follows that they can be re-arrested at any
time despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold
that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of
men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a
criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same
offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no
elaboration.
NBI Director Epimaco VELASCO et al v. CA and Felicitas Cuyag for
Lawrence Larkins
July 7, 1995 | Davide, Jr., J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Solis, Jose Miguel
SUMMARY: On September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by the
Pasig RTC against Larkins for an alleged violation of BP 22. Meanwhile, on
November 1994, Larkins was arrested for rape after one Desiree Alinea filed
a complaint-affidavit with the NBI stating the crime happened on November
19 in Valley Golf, Antipolo. Larkins then posted for bail on the BP 22 charge
and the Pasig RTC allowed it. However, the NBI refused to release Larkins
arguing that he was being detained for another cause (rape) for which he
would be held for inquest. The RTC of Antipolo having jurisdiction over the
rape case held that he was legally detained even after the judge who issued
the warrant for BP 22 has ordered his release because of the rape charges.
The CA reversed this ordering his release since he was illegally detained for
1 day since he has posted bail. The Supreme Court held for herein
petitioners stating that persons may be detained upon submitting themselves
to the jurisdiction of the court. Upon posting bail, it was deemed that he
submitted himself on court jurisdiction. It further explained that any illegal
detention is cured by this and the charge that followed.
DOCTRINE: The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will
not be allowed.
FACTS:
 On September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Padolina
(Pasig RTC) against Lawrence A. Larkins for violation of BP 22.
 While on 20 November 1994, one Desiree Alinea filed a complaint-
affidavit in the NBI accusing Larkins of rape committed against her on 19
November 1994 at Valley Golf, Cainta, Rizal.
The following day, the NBI Special Investigators arrested Larkins in his
office at Makati sans warrant of arrest and was detained in the NBI
Detention Cell at Taft, Manila.
 The day following his arrest, Larkins posted a bail bond of P4,000 for the
BP 22 Criminal Case. Thereafter, Judge Padolina cancelled the arrest
warrant issued for the BP 22 violation and ordered the release of Larkins
unless otherwise detained for some other cause. The NBI Special
Investigators refused to release him because he was detained for the
crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest.
 On 23 November, a complaint for rape against Larkins was executed by
Alinea.
 Then on 2 December 1994, the complaint for rape was filed with the RTC
of Antipolo and assigned to Judge Caballes.
 On the other hand, Atty. Ulep (Counsel of Larkins) filed an urgent motion
for bail, alleging that the evidence of guilt against Larkins for rape is not
strong and that Medico Legal report indicates that Alinea’s hymen is still
intact (not lacerated nor ruptured). Moreover, Atty. Ulep said that Larkins
is entitled as a matter of right to bail and that he also had no intention to
leave the country.
 6 December 1994, Larkin’s new lawyer Atty. Theodore Te filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate
Release, principally based on the alleged illegality of the warrant of
arrest.
 RTC: Refused to dismiss the complaint, to release the accused and to
grant Larkins bail. Issued a hold departure order against Larkins.
Felicitas Cuyag, the common law wife of Larkins, filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus with Certiorari.
 CA: Ordered the NBI to appear and produce Larkins before the court and
to show cause why Larkins’ liberty is being restrained. Thereafter, the CA
decided to release Larkins because he was detained without a warrant of
arrest which did not meet the requirements of Rule 113 ROC.
RULING: Petition granted.
Whether the NBI is justified in detaining Larkins despite the lack of an
arrest warrant for the crime he is being held for – YES.
Whether a writ of habeas corpus is proper in Larkin’s case – NO.
PETITIONERS:
 Larkins had already been charged with the crime of Rape and that he
applied for bail (thereby submitting himself to the Jurisdiction of the
court). Ergo, the writ is no longer available.
RESPONDENTS:
 Habeas Corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of
information or complaint but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or
warrant of commitment. No warrant of arrest nor warrant of commitment
was issued so Habeas Corpus is still available.
COURT:
 Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his
release or discharge from custody. In the case at bar, even if the arrest
was illegal, the restraint of liberty being questioned is already by virtue of
the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is
no longer available since the previous illegality has already been cured.
 The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that
the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order,
or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed.
 Moreover, by filing his motion for bail in the rape case, Larkins admitted
that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his
person to its jurisdiction. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by
the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction
of the court.
 When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court
by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the
submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the
question of the court's jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint, files any dilatory
plea, or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over
his person. The Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint
and Immediate Release filed by the new counsel was made too late
since it was filed after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail.
 Nevertheless, the court chastised the NBI based on the following a) After
the warrantless arrest, Larkins was not delivered to the nearest police
station, b) He was not delivered to Judicial Authorities within 36 hours but
to the custody of NBI, c) It took some time before the complaint
previously executed was actually filed in court. Moreover, the Trial Court
did not conduct a hearing on the Urgent Motion for Bail. Well, this is also
partly Larkins’ fault since he should have pressed on for a hearing for
bail.
Whether the common law wife of Larkins has standing to file the
petition for habeas corpus – YES.
 The common law wife of Larkins had the standing to file a petition for
Habeas Corpus because she falls within the term “some person”
 provided in Section 3, Rule 102 of ROC. However, she is not the proper
person to file the petition for certiorari aspect of this case since it can
only be filed by Larkins.
 Although normally, the writ of Habeas Corpus will not be granted when
there is an adequate remedy available such as writ of error, appeal, or
writ of certiorari, it may nevertheless be available in exceptional
circumstances.
For the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural
limitations which glorify form over substance. It must be kept in mind that
although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and
certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its
jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and
“reaches the body but not the record” while the latter assails directly the
judgment and “reaches the record but not the body.”
 Law. Hence this petitioner for certiorari and habeas corpus.
CRUZ v. CA
January 19, 2000 | Puno, J. | Writ of habeas corpus
Digester: Sumagaysay, Rev
SUMMARY: 1992, Cruz was found guilty for violation of RA 6425 by the RTC
for selling 2.70 grams of marijuana and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Meanwhile, RA 7659 was enacted amending the penalties applicable to the
Dangerous Drugs Act of RA 6425. The applicable penalty was 6 mos 1 day to
6 years. This petition for habeas corpus was filed since Cruz had already
served 6 years and 3 months. The SC granted the petition.
DOCTRINE: An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon
verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the
application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or
name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place
where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the
commitment or cause of detention of such person. The writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty.
FACTS:
 1992, petitioner David Cruz was charged before the RTC Manila with a
violation of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for selling 2.70
grams of marijuana. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
imprisonment. He appealed.
 RA 7659 and People v. Sunga was promulgated ruling that the applicable
penalty for selling less than 750 grams was reduced to prision
correccional to reclusion temporal.
 Cruz filed with an "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal." Attached to the
motion was the Indorsement of Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva,
Bureau of Corrections, stating that the legal effects of the Motion were
adequately explained to Cruz. This was referred to the CA.
 1995, CA held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to withdraw
appeal and noted that the penalty imposable for the offense charged
against David Cruz, considering the quantity of the prohibited drug
involved, is 6 months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional, as the maximum, and that by
1996 Cruz shall have served the maximum penalty imposable.
 1997, Meanwhile, Cruz’s counsel was required to file an appellant’s brief
three times but none was filed so the appeal was declared as
abandoned.
 1998, petitioner’s mother, Maria Cruz sought the assistance of OLA, UP
RULING: Petition granted.
Whether the CA erred in declaring the appeal of petitioner David Cruz
as abandoned and dismissed – NO.
 Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure :
o Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to
prosecute.-The appellate, court may, upon motion of the
appellee or on its own motion and notice to the
appellant, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file
his brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except
in case the appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio.
 An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, upon motion of the
appellee or upon the court's own motion, if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the prescribed time. The only exception is when the appellant
is represented by counsel de officio.
 Petitioner David Cruz was represented not by counsel de officio, but by
counsel of his own choice. His lawyer, Atty. Carmelo Arcilla, was counsel
de parte before the trial court, before this Court on appeal, and before
the Court of Appeals. There is nothing in the records that would show
that Atty. Arcilla withdrew his representation of petitioner. On the contrary,
the notice from the Court of Appeals requiring the filing of the appellant's
brief was received by Atty. Arcilla. And despite this receipt, still no
appellant's brief was filed. It was more than three (3) months later that
the appellate court issued the questioned Resolution. By dismissing
David Cruz's appeal, the Court of Appeals acted within its discretion.
Whether a new trial to determine penalty should be granted – NO.
 A new trial to determine his penalty cannot be granted petitioner. A
motion for new trial may be granted by the Court of Appeals only on the
ground of newly discovered evidence material to the accused's defense.
This is clear from Section 14, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides:
o Sec. 14. Motion for new trial.-At any time after the appeal
from the lower court has been perfected and before the
judgment of the appellate court convicting the accused
becomes final, the latter may move for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence material to his
defense, the motion to conform to the provisions of Section
4, Rule 121.
Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be granted – YES.
 David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He was convicted on
September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment and its
accessory penalties. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on
October 13, 1993. On December 31, 1993, RA 7659 took effect. This law
amended provisions of several penal laws, including the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
 The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was "life
imprisonment to death." Under R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the
quantity of the drug. The sale of "750 grams or more of Indian hemp or
marijuana" became punishable by reclusion perpetua, to death. The
penalty for the sale of less than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to
a range "from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon
the quantity" of the drug.
 In the 1994 case of People v. Simon y Sunga, we held that for drugs with
quantities weighing 750 grams or more, and for drugs with quantities
weighing below 750 grams, reclusion perpetua could not be imposed
twice. The penalty of "prision correccional" to reclusion perpetua" for
drug offenses where the quantity involved is less than those enumerated
in the first paragraph of Section 17 of R.A. 7659 was construed as
"prision correccional to reclusion temporal." This was the range of the
imposable penalty for drugs weighing less than 750 grams and the
proper penalty depended on the quantity of the drug involved. If the drug
weighs less than 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision
correctional; from 250 grams to 499 grams, prision mayor; and from 500
grams to 749 grams, reclusion temporal.
 In the instant case, the amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was
convicted is 2.70 grams. The imposable penalty for this amount under
the Simon ruling is prision correctional which has a duration of six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has
already served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which
is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The continued
detention of Cruz at, the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the
Solicitor General as already illegal. David Cruz should therefore be
released from prison without further delay.
 An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified
petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the
application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the
officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or
restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of
such person. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty.
DAVID SO, on behalf of daughter, MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE v. HON.
ESTEBAN TACLA, JR., DR. BERNAROD VICENTE
HON. TACLA JR., PEOPLE v. SO
October 19, 2010 | Nachura, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Tan, Raya Grace
SUMMARY: Guisande was accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case
pending before Judge Tacla. So, in filing for the issuance of the writs of
habeas corpus and amparo alleged that Guisande was under a life-
threatening situation while confined at the NCMH to ascertain the actual
psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable
offense. The independent forensic assessment of Guisande revealed that
she has Bipolar I Disorder but nevertheless competent to stand trial. During
the pendency of the consolidated petitions, the criminal case against
Guisande was dismissed. OSG then filed MTD of the petitions. Granted.
Moot and academic because the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and
amparo was based on the criminal case already dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are
clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to
violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should be illegal
or unlawful.
FACTS:
 Before us are consolidated petitions
o (1) Petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo filed
by David So, on behalf of his daughter Ma. Elena So
Guisande, against Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr and Dr.
Bernardo A. Vicente.
 o (2) Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the
OSG on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH,
assailing the Resolution of the CA.
 Guisande was accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending
before Judge Tacla. Prior to the criminal proceedings, Guisande was
committed by so for psychiatric treatment and care at the Makati Medical
Center (MMC).
 The warrant for the arrest of Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, was
returned stating that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood
Disorder and that she was “not ready for discharge,” as certified by her
personal psychiatrist, Dr. Tan.
 Judge Tacla ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent
forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to determine if she
would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.
NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente was to have temporary custody of the accused.
 Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E,
instead of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric Section, where female court
case patients are usually confined at the NCMH.
 Claiming “life-threatening” circumstances surrounding her confinement at
the NCMH which supposedly worsened her mental condition and violated
her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of
counsel, Guisande So simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion
for Relief from Solitary Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong
City, and the present petition for the issuance of the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo.
 RTC granted the motion subject the condition that only the accused’s
counsel and the accused’s physician on her hypothyroid condition are
allowed to visit the accused in coordination with the respective
psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric
examination upon accused. Joint writ of habeas corpus and amparo was
issued and referred to CA.
 December 3, 2009, NCMH submitted its evaluation report diagnosing
Guisande with Bipolar I Disorder. But no manifest signs and symptoms of
psychosis at the present time. Neither a manic episode nor a severe
depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at our
center, despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although she is
complaining of mood symptoms, these are not severe enough to impair
her fitness to stand trial. She is therefore deemed competent to stand
the rigors of court trial.
 CA closed and terminated the petition for writ of habeas corpus and
amparo. Although the case involves a non-bailable offense where
normally the Accused should have been confined in jail, considering the
peculiarities of this case, the parties have all agreed to the set up as
provided in this Order – the patient shall be confined at the St. Clare’s
Medical Center, her hospital of choice, under the headship of Dr. Yat.
 During the pendency of these consolidated cases, the following events
happened:
o February 4, 2010, Judge Tacla ordered the dismissal of the
Criminal Case. Therefore, the issuance of TRO has been
rendered moot and academic.
o In view of the dismissal of the criminal case, petition for writ
of habeas corpus and writ of amparo should be dismissed for
having been rendered moot and academic.
 OSG thus filed a motion to dismiss. So opposed because they filed
criminal complaints and an administrative case against Judge Tacla and
Dr. Vicente, as well as NCMH and attending doctor thereat, for purported
violations of accused Guisande’s rights during her confinement at the
NCMH. So further filed a petition to cite Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in
contempt before the CA for their supposed submission of an altered and
falsified document.
 OSG filed another Manifestation and Motion reiterating its motion to
dismiss and informing the court of the following:
o June 7, 2010 resolution dismissing the charge of falsification.
o July 27, 2010 resolution where petitioner So’s verified
petition for contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and
where the CA ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of
amparo closed and terminated
RULING: Petitions denied for being moot and academic.
WoN the consolidated cases should be dismissed – YES, the cases have
been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of Criminal Case for
Qualified Theft pending before the RTC Mandaluyong City.
 As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas
corpus and amparo was based on the criminal case for Qualified Theft
against Guisande. With the dismissal of the non-bailable case against
accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be confined in a jail
facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person,
and treatment of any medical and mental malady she may or may not
have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the RTC
Mandaluyong City. NOW MOOT AND ACADEMIC!
 The question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the
NCMH or a medical facility of accused’s own choosing, accused
Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental
condition. It was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a
separate opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand
trial.
 The Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-
Pilares, unmistakably foreclose the justiciability of the petitions before
this Court.

Re: Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus1 and Amparo2 [copy-pasted the
entire court’s discussion on it kasi maikli lang]
 The act or omission or the threatened act or omission complained of
confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to
violate, a person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases should be
illegal or unlawful.
 The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from
fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary
writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the
prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.
Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and
undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for
purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
 The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is
that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint.
If an individual’s liberty is restrainted via some legal process, the writ of
habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant
of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature
of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of
liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. x x x The
1 Rule 102, Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Except as
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
2 Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Section 1. Petition. - The petition for
a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will
proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is
thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the
petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will
be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must
be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima
facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is
satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty
will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents
are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose
behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed.
NOTES:

ILUSORIO v. BILDNER
May 12, 2000 | Pardo, J. |
Digester: Valena, Maria Patricia S.
SUMMARY: Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus with the CA, alleging
that respondents (her two daughters) prevented her from seeing her husband
Ilusorio. The CA dismissed the petition upon finding that Ilusorio was
completely sane and was not being held against his will, but granted Erlinda
visitation rights. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the petition but
reversed the order granting visitation rights, ruling that the CA exceeded its
powers in issuing the same, which were not even prayed for.
DOCTRINE: To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be
an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal
restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
FACTS:
 Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio, who is
about 86 years of age and possessed of extensive property valued at
 millions of pesos. For many years, he was Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club.
 Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio were married on July 11, 1942. In
1972, they separated for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila
and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio
City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
 The spouses had six children: Ramon Ilusorio, Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner,
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta, and Shereen.
 On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the US, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, and as a
consequence, his health deteriorated.
 On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo City a
petition for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due
to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
 On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati.
 Erlinda filed a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of
Potenciano, alleging that respondents refused her demands to see and
visit her husband and prohibited him from returning to Antipolo City. The
CA dismissed this petition but ordered that Erlinda be granted visitation
rights. Both parties appealed.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus – NO.
 A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from
the one entitled thereto.
 Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another,
commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated
time and place, with the day and cause of his capture and detention, to
do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the court or judge awarding the
writ shall consider in that behalf. It is a high prerogative, common-law
writ, of ancient origin, the great object of which is the liberation of those
who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is issued when one is
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented from exercising legal
custody over another person.
 It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,
where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become
arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom.
 The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the
restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective, not merely nominal or moral.
 There was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that he is about
86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or
medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his
actions.
 Potenciano did not request the administrator of the Cleveland
Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or
visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them. As to
his mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound
and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the
satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with
the capacity to make choices. He made it clear before the Court of
Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing
people.
 With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. The Court of
Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a
petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such
right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of his sanity. The CA
also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of
contempt - Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
 In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at
liberty to do so. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a
husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any
other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
TUNG CHIN HUI v. RODRIGUEZ, Commissioner of Immigration
April 2, 2001 | Panganiban, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Venturanza, Maria
SUMMARY: Petitioner, a Taiwanese national, was arrested and turned over
to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). The BID subsequently
issued a Summary Deportation order, finding him guilty of possessing a
tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. Petitioner then
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was
illegal. The RTC granted his petition. Respondents filed a notice of appeal 17
days after receipt of judgment, which was granted due course. The CA
subsequently overturned the decision of the RTC and the Court affirmed this.
On the procedural aspect, the Court held that the appeal from the trial court
was proper. It was filed within the reglementary period because the
reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now
similar to that in ordinary civil actions.
Regarding the substantive issues, the Court found that petitioner’s
confinement was in accord with the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which
provides that aliens who violate the condition upon which he was admitted to
the country, one of which is to present an unexpired passport, shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the BID and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence to show that he was
an undocumented alien, including official letters of the Taiwan Economic and
Cultural Offices, which state that petitioner was using a passport already
cancelled in 1995.
DOCTRINE: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
FACTS:
 The Petitioner, a Taiwanese national, arrived in this country on November
5, 1998, as a temporary visitor. A few days later, he was arrested by
several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID). Petitioner was duly charged.
 The BID Board of Commissioners issued a Summary Deportation Order
dated November 25, 1998, finding him guilty of possessing a tampered
passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities.
 On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a
Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal.
 Trial Court: Granted petitioner’s petition and ordered his release. MR
Denied.
o Respondents received the trial court’s Order on January 29, 1999.
They then filed a Notice of Appeal on February 16, 1999, which
granted due course to the Notice of Appeal on February 18, 1999.
 Court of Appeals: Appeal granted. Petition for habeas corpus
dismissed.
 Meanwhile, during the pendency of the proceedings before the CA,
petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court, contending that
the RTC should have rejected the appeal for allegedly being filed late -
beyond the 48-hour period provided under the pre-1997 Rules of Court.
The Court denied the petition.
RULING: Petition denied.
Whether the appeal from the trial court was improper – NO.
 Argument of petitioner: Appeal not proper for (1) it was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided under the pre-1997 Rules of Court and (2)
it assailed not a judgment but a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration, contrary to Section 1 of Rule 41.
 Argument rejected. The reglementary period for filing an appeal in a
habeas corpus case is now similar to that in ordinary civil actions and is
governed by Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.
 Moreover, in referring to the trial court’s ‘judgment’, respondents were
clearly appealing the January 7, 1999 Decision. Had they thought
otherwise, they would have referred to the ‘Order’. Indeed, ‘judgment’ is
normally synonymous with ‘decision’.
Whether the writ of habeas corpus was proper – NO, confinement was
not illegal and there was no justification for a writ of habeas corpus.
 Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another,
commanding the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated
time and place. Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that
“the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.”
o The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or
detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued.
 In the present case, petitioner’s confinement is in accord with Section 37
(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which reads
as follows:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another officer
designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board
of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
xxx
 (7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any
limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a non-
immigrant;
 One such condition for the admission of aliens is found in Section 10 of
the same law, which requires them to “present for admission into the
Philippines unexpired passports or official documents in the nature of
passports issued by the governments of the countries to which they owe
allegiance or other travel documents showing their origins and identity as
prescribed by regulations xxx.”
 Herein petitioner was properly charged before the BID for illegally
entering the Philippines with the use of a passport issued to another
person and cancelled by the Taiwanese government in 1995.
Subsequently, the BID Board of Commissioners issued the Summary
Deportation Order.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to show that petitioner was an
undocumented alien – YES.
 Argument of petitioner: No evidence was presented to prove that he
was an “undocumented alien”; that is, that he tampered with a passport
that had already been cancelled by the Taiwanese government. He
further contends that he was in fact allowed to enter the Philippines
seventeen times from 1995 to 1998, notwithstanding the alleged
cancellation of his passport in 1995.
 These contentions are not meritorious. The Return of the Writ submitted
by respondents before the trial court clearly shows that petitioner had
lawfully been charged and ordered deported for being an undocumented
alien. Section 13, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court specifically provides
that “the return [of the writ] shall be considered prima facie evidence of
the cause of the restraint xxx”
 Moreover, attached to the Return of the Writ were copies of official
letters of the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Offices. These
documents show that petitioner, whose real name is Chen Kuan-Yuan,
was using a passport that had already been cancelled by the Taiwanese
government in 1995 and previously issued to a man named Tung Chin
Hui.
o The letters show that the Philippine government was informed about
the cancellation only in 1998, which is why he was allowed to enter
the country in 1995.
o Furthermore, the foregoing letters of the official representative of the
Taiwanese government belie petitioner’s submission that there was
no evidence to prove the findings of the CA and the Board of
Commissioners. Verily, these documents constitute sufficient
justification for his deportation.
Whether petitioner was accorded due process – YES.
 Argument of petitioner: Petitioner relies on the ruling of the trial court,
which said “[w]hile it may be true that there is a Summary Deportation
Order against the petitioner allegedly for being [an] undocumented alien,
having used a passport which had already been cancelled, there is no
showing that he was informed about it.”
 Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, however, we find no sufficient
basis to overturn the presumption that the BID conducted its proceedings
in accordance with law.
 In any event, when petitioner filed the Petition for Habeas Corpus before
the RTC, he was afforded ample opportunity to air his side and to assail
the legal and factual bases of the Board of Commissioners’ Summary
Deportation Order. Moreover, he could have raised the same points in
the proceedings before the CA and even before this Court. Indeed, an
alien has the burden of proof to show that he entered the Philippines
lawfully.
 Petitioner has not discharged this burden. He has not controverted either
before the RTC, the CA or this Court the Board of Commissioners’ ruling
that he was in fact Chen Kuan-Yuan, who was “sentenced to 8 years and
2 months’ imprisonment for drug trafficking and violation of controlling
guns, ammunition and knives law” and was holding a passport cancelled
by the Republic of China in 1995.
 Argument of petitioner: At the time of his detention, there was no
deportation charge filed against him.
 Assuming arguendo that his arrest was illegal, supervening events bar
his subsequent release.
 In this case, when the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed, petitioner
had already been charged and ordered deported by the Board of
Commissioners.
Tijing v. Court of Appeals
March 8, 2001 | Quisumbing, J. |
Digester: Villafuerte, Beatriz C.
SUMMARY: Bienvenida was a laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante. One
day, Angelita went to Bienvenida’s house for an urgent laundry job. Since,
Bienvenida was on her way to the market, she asked Angelita to wait until
she returned. She left her four month old son Edgardo, Jr., under the care of
Angelita. When Bienvenida returned, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida later learned that Angelita moved to another place. Years later,
Bienvenida read in the tabloid about the death of Angelita’s common-law
husband whose remains were lying in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida and her
husband immediately went to Hagonoy and allegedly found her son,
Edgardo, Jr., for the first time in four years. She demanded Angelita to return
the child to her but the former refused. Bienvenida and her husband then
filed the present petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme Court ruled in
favor of Bienvenida and ordered that the person of the child be turned over to
her and her husband. It ruled that petition for habeas corpus was the proper
remedy and that it was established that the child found was actually
Bienvenido’s son. (see ratio for pieces of evidence considered by the Court in
establishing the child’s identity)
DOCTRINE:
Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially
thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and
the same. Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose
behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have
rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf
the application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty
their right of custody over the said minor.
FACTS:
 Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest
is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana,
Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private
respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
 According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to
fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to
do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She
also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was
doing laundry.
 When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr.,
were gone.
 Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but
did not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her
employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back
later. She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover
that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained
to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved
by her pleas for assistance.
 Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine
how her spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child
and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they
looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their
serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
 Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about
the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of
Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy,
Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where
she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four
years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin
Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John
Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
 Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the
trial court in order to recover their son.
o Petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and
Benjamin Lopez.
o Lourdes Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one
Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana,
Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records.
o Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez,
could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter
was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped
his private part against the edge of a banca causing him
excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John
Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita
were not blessed with children.
 Angelita’s claim:
o She is the natural mother of the child.
o She asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez
on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in
Singalong, Manila.
o She added, though, that she has two other children with her real
husband, Angel Sanchez.
o She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-
law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila
on August 4, 1989.
 [RTC] Granted petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent
Angelita Diamante was ordered to immediately release from her
personal custody minor John Thomas Lopez and turn his person to
petitioners, Spouses Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing.
o Since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.
o The minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.
o Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of
petitioners.
 o Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, was also commanded to
implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners
in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr.,
the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez
 Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.
 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the order of
the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff
stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned over
the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.
 [Court of Appeals] Reversed and set aside the decision rendered by
the trial court. It directed the custody of the minor to be returned to
respondent Angelita Diamant
o The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of
the habeas corpus.
o In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient
to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
o It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing,
Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person.
 Hence instant petition
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.
Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy—YES.
Writ of habeas corpus
 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.
 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will.
 It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale
for the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the
purpose of determining the right of custody over a child.
 It must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question
of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions
including those as to identity of the person.
As applied
 In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of
the writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor
named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring.
Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one
and the same person and is the son of petitioners—YES.
 We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the
minors biological mother.
 Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons,
initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are
indeed one and the same. Petitioners must convincingly establish that
the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the
person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the
identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made,
petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the
said minor.
 A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the
evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that
John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
1. There is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.
 she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she
underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before
she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in
1974.
 Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she
claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child
between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years.
 The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not
presented in court.
 No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the
clinic were ever submitted.
2. There is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is
no longer capable of siring a son.
 Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas,
was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted
to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
 Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had
no children after almost fifteen years together.
 Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for
fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
 3. It is unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four
months after the alleged birth of the child.
 Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in
attendance at birth should cause the registration of such
birth.
 Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent
register the birth of his child.
 The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar within
thirty days after the birth.
 Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas
Lopez and private respondent were legally married on
October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false
because even private respondent had admitted she is a
common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other
data in said birth certificate.
4. The trial court observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their
faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
 Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
 The trial courts conclusion should be given high respect, it
having had the opportunity to observe the physical
appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned.
5. Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving
birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic.
 Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures
of petitioners.
Final Note
 Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
 Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for
identification and parentage testing.
o The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis.
o The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child
are analyzed to establish parentage.
 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge.
 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future
it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage
and identity issues.
SALIENTES v. ABANILLA
August 29, 2006| Quisimbing, J. |Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Agustin, Chrissete
SUMMARY: Abanilla and Salientes are the parents of Lorenzo Abanilla. Due
to in-laws problems, Abanilla suggested to Salientes that they move to their
own house (they were still living with Salientes’ parents), but Salientes
refused. When Abanilla left the house, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Abanilla then filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody before the RTC.
The RTC ordered the Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the
body of Lorenzo. The CA and the SC affirmed the RTC Order. Contrary to the
contention of the Salienteses that the Order violates Art. 213, the Court held
that the RTC did not rule on the custody of Lorenzo, but it merely directed the
Salienteses to produce the minor in court. It was merely a precedent to the
RTC’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending.
DOCTRINE: Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful
custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 (FC),
Loran and Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the
absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are
still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private
respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his
child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him.
FACTS:
 Loran S.D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the
parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
Marie Antonette’s parents.
 Due to in-laws problems, Loran Abanilla suggested to his wife that they
transfer to their own house, but she refused. So, he alone left the house
of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
 Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the
representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody
before the RTC of Muntinlupa.
 RTC: On January 23, 2003, the RTC ordered the respondents
(petitioners in this case) to produce and bring before the RTC the body of
Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00
o’clock in the afternoon and to show cause why the said child should not
be discharged from restraint.
 Petitioners filed MR – Denied. Petitioners filed certiorari with the CA,
 CA: Affirmed RTC Order. The January 23, 2003 Order did not award the
custody of the 2- year-old child to any one but was simply the standard
order issued for the production of restrained persons. CA held that the
RTC was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding,
on the cause of the minor’s detention and the matter of his custody.
 Petitioners filed MR – Denied. Petitioners appealed to the SC via
certiorari.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
November 10, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the CA are
AFFIRMED.
Whether the CA erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari
against the trial court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 (granting of
habeas corpus) and February 24, 2003 (denial of MR) – NO
PETITIONERS:
 Order is contrary to Article 213 (FC) which provides that no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Loran had the burden of
showing any compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie
proof thereof.
 Even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy
for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas
corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the
mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. There
was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother.
There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the
custody of her very own child.
RESPONDENT:
 Article 213, FC applies only to the second part of his petition regarding
the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to
his right as the father to see his son.
 The writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains
the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa.
 The instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really
intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new
rules on custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates
specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of
the trial court.
 Under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody
and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when
petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as
an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of
their son and not the maternal grandparents.
COURT:
 The assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant
custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners
to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his
liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the
trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending
before it.
 Under Rule 41, Section 1 of the ROC, an interlocutory order is not
appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action
under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present
case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the order.
 Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is
withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 (FC), Loran
and Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the
absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents
are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right
to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him.
 In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the
child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration
 Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor
to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor
in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his
child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-04-
SC (Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors) that within 15 days after the filing of
 the answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court
shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners) to
present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court
did.
 Moreover, Article 213 (FC) deals with the judicial adjudication of custody
and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court.
Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s
petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see
his own child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing
or visiting his child under seven years of age.
BARREDO v VINARAO
August 2, 2007 | Corona, J. | Topic
Digester: Angat, Christine Joy F.
SUMMARY: Barredo was found guilty of carnapping and illegal possession of
firearms and was sentenced to an imprisonment of 30 years and 18 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal, respectively. He was then confined at the
maximum security compound of the New Bilibid Prison. Barredo eventually
filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that by virtue of the Board of
Pardon’s recommendation for the commutation of his sentence and the
revised computation table for crediting of a prisoner’s good conduct, his
sentence was already reduced and he was able to serve the same. The
Court held that Barredo is not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Writ of
habeas corpus is availed of in instances of illegal confinement, while
Barredo’s confinement was due to a valid judgment by the court. Likewise,
since he has not yet served his sentence, he continues to be validly confined,
therefore he is not entitled to the writ.
DOCTRINE: Writ of habeas corpus is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
cause and thus to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is a writ of inquiry
intended to test the circumstance under which a person is detained.
GENERAL RULE: The writ of habeas corpus may not be availed of when the
person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.
EXCEPTION: It may be availed of post-conviction when:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of
a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such
excess.
FACTS:
 Samuel Barredo was charged and found guilty of carnapping and illegal
possession of firearms.
o For the charge of carnapping, he was sentenced to undergo an
imprisonment term of 30 years.
o For the charge of illegal possession of firearms, he was sentenced to
an imprisonment term of 18 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
 During the trial, Barredo was committed to the custody of the Quezon
City Jail as a detention prisoner (starting March 15, 1993). When the
conviction came out and became final and executory, he was transferred
to and confined at the maximum security compound of the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City on July 23, 1994.
 On August 2, 2004, Barredo filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing
that as of said date, he already served a total of 18 years and should
therefore be released.
o The Board of Pardons and Parole passed a resolution
recommending the commutation of his sentence to a period of from
15 years to 20 years.
o Based on the Bureau of Corrections revised computation table for
determining the time to be credited prisoners for good conduct while
serving sentence, he should only serve 14 years, 9 months, and 18
days.
RULING: Petition denied
Whether Barredo is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus– NO
 Writ of habeas corpus will not issue if detention is by virtue of valid
judgment.
o Writ of habeas corpus is a remedy to obtain immediate relief for
those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient cause and thus to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is
a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstance under which a
person is detained.
o Thus, the writ applies to all cases of illegal confinement, detention or
deprivation of liberty. If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or
by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record the writ of
habeas corpus will not be allowed (Rule 102, Sec. 4)
 GENERAL RULE: The writ of habeas corpus may not be availed
of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by
virtue of a valid judgment.
 EXCEPTION: It may be availed of post-conviction when:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess.
 o IN THIS CASE: Barredo was detained pursuant to a final judgment
convicting him for the crimes of carnapping and illegal possession of
firearms. The same being a valid conviction, he cannot be entitled to
the writ of habeas corpus.
Whether Barredo has already served his sentence so his continued
imprisonment is considered illegal confinement as to warrant his
release - NO
 The trial court’s sentence imposing the penalty of imprisonment for
30 years is voided.
o Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the crime charged is
punishable by a special law, the court should impose an
indeterminate sentence with a maximum term not exceeding the
maximum fixed by the special penal law and a minimum term not
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same law.
o IN THIS CASE: Barredo was charged with carnapping and was
sentenced to a straight penalty of imprisonment for 30 years.
Barredo was therefore deprived the benefits of the ISLAW.
 The proper penalty should have been imprisonment not for 30
years but for an indeterminate sentence of 17 years and 4
months as minimum to 30 years as maximum.
 Thus, for failure to impose the ISLAW, the sentence of 30 years
is considered void and is modified and the correct penalty is
imposed.
 Barredo is entitled to a reduction of the penalty imposed upon him
in the illegal possession of firearms.
o In criminal law, laws that are for the benefit of the accused should be
applied retroactively.
o IN THIS CASE: RA 8294, which amended the existing law on illegal
possession of firearms, reduced the penalty for simple illegal
possession to prision correccional (1 year 1 day to 6 years) in its
maximum period and a fine not less than P15,000.
o Barredo was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 18 years and 1
day of reclusion temporal. However, applying the benefit of RA
8294’s retroactive application, as well as the ISLAW, the proper
imposable penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day
as minimum to 6 years as maximum
 Notwithstanding all these considerations, Barredo has not yet
served the penalties imposed on him.
o In criminal law, the person convicted has to serve the penalties
imposed on him successively, in the order of their severity.
o IN THIS CASE: Barredo has first to serve the more severe penalty,
i.e. the penalty in the carnapping case imposing imprisonment for 17
years and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as maximum. Only after
he has served this will he commence serving the less severe penalty
imposed in the illegal possession of firearms case: imprisonment for
4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.
o However, as stated in the certifications issued by the Bureau of
Corrections, as of April 3, 2007, Barredo has only served a total of 18
years, 4 months and 26 days, inclusive of his good conduct time
allowance and preventive imprisonment.
 While Barredo has already served the minimum penalty in the
carnapping case, he has not yet served the minimum penalty in
the illegal possession of firearms case. He is therefore not
illegally confined as to entitle him to the issuance of writ of
habeas corpus.
o Neither can it be said that he is eligible for parole. Only prisoners
who have served the minimum penalty imposed on them may be
released on parole on such terms and conditions as may be
prescribed by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
o Moreover, even if Barredo’s claim that the Board of Pardons and
Parole issued a resolution recommending the commutation of his
sentence, the same does not justify the issuance of writ of habeas
corpus. Commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief
Executive and the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and
Parole was just a mere recommendation. Unless the President has
approved of the same, there is no commutation to speak of.
NOTES:
 For those details which are not important but seems important.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
EUFEMIA RODRIGUEZ v. LUISA VILLANUEVA and TERESITA PABELLO
June 29, 2008 | Corona, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
Digester: Aspi, Maria Margarita
SUMMARY: Petitioner Veluz alleged that respondents, the legally adopted
children of Eufemia, took the latter from his house. Despite repeated
demands for the return of Eufemia, respondents still failed to do so. Claiming
that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, petitioner filed a
petition for habeas corpus. This was denied by the CA. SC affirmed. In
passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire
into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the
writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only
where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is found to be unlawful, then
the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. If otherwise, the writ
will be refused. In this case, the CA made an inquiry into whether Eufemia
was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not. SC found no
cogent reason or compelling reason to disturb this finding.
DOCTRINE: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by
which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. The
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a
writ of habeas corpus is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or
moral, illegal restraint of liberty.
FACTS:
 Eufemia Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a
poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was
living with petitioner Edgardo Veluz, her nephew, since 2000. He acted
as her guardian.
 Morning of January 11, 2005: respondents Luisa Villanueva and Teresita
Pabello (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) took Eufemia from
petitioner’s house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia
but these proved futile.
 Claiming that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty,
petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the CA on January 13,
2005.
 CA: petition denied; petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that
respondents were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He
also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was
not her legal guardian.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration; denied.
RULING: Petition DENIED
Whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty– NO.
Petitioner
 In determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a
court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is
unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider legal
custody or custodial rights. Respondents themselves have no right to
Eufemia’s custody. The issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is
important is Eufemia’s personal freedom.
 The writ of habeas corpus is available not only if the rightful custody of a
person is being withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if the
person who disappears or is illegally being detained is of legal age and is
not under guardianship.
 A writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal
custody of another. As long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally
deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his
physical body may be brought before the court that will determine
whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
Respondents
 State that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent
Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister while respondent Teresita was Eufemia’s
niece and petitioner’s sister.
 It was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the
other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the
house, the utilities and other household needs.
 Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the “encargado” or
administrator of the properties of Eufemia as well as those left by the
deceased Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from
tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the
late Maximo.
 In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an
inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. These
demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were
compelled to file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.
 Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health,
respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005.
The latter willingly went with them.
 Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the
illegality of respondents’ action.
Court
 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the
rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled
thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully
being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person.
 It contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of
the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
 The issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully
withheld from petitioner but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her
liberty.
 In order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.
 In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine
whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The
writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
 A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.
 In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first
inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is
not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will
proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is found to
be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. If otherwise, the writ will be refused.
 While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition.
Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the
judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is
entitled to the writ.
 It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If
the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be
dismissed.
 In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia
was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not:
“There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained
of her liberty by respondents. Nothing on record reveals that she
was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents,
being Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her.”
 The Court finds no cogent reason or compelling reason to disturb this
finding.
MARTIN GIBBS FLETCHER vs. THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU
OF CORRECTIONS
July 17, 2009 | Corona, J. | Writ of Habeas Corpus
SUMMARY: Fletcher filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus seeking his release from prison. He claimed that his prison sentence
of 12 to 17 years for having been convicted of estafa was commuted by then
President Fidel V. Ramos to nine to 12 years. Since he had already served
14 years, three months and 12 days, including his good conduct allowance,
his continued imprisonment is illegal. The SC ruled against him. The Court
held that the writ extends only to cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, not in a case, such as Fletcher's,
where the detention is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
DOCTRINE: The writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however,
should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a
judicial process or a valid judgment.
FACTS:
 Martin Gibbs Fletcher was convicted of estafa in 1996 and was
sentenced to imprisonment of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to
17 years and four months of reclusion temporal as maximum, with
payment of actual damages of P102,235.56. He began serving his
sentence on July 24, 1997.
 Another case for estafa was filed against him in 1996 where he pleaded
not guilty during the arraignment in 2008.
 Fletcher filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
seeking his release from prison. He claimed that his prison sentence of
12 to 17 years was commuted by then President Fidel V. Ramos to nine
to 12 years. Since he had already served 14 years, three months and 12
days, including his good conduct allowance, his continued imprisonment
is illegal.
 In its return to the writ, the OSG opposed the issuance of the writ on the
following grounds:
o The petition failed to comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. In particular, the petition was neither signed nor verified by
Fletcher or a person on his behalf or by his purported counsel.
Moreover, it was not accompanied by a copy of the cause of
petitioners detention or commitment order.
o Fletcher's prison sentence was never commuted by then President
Ramos, and that he had not been granted the status of a colonist.
o There were other pending cases against him warranting his
continued detention.
o He was put under custody by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
Whether Fletcher is entitled to the issuance of the writ. – NO.
 The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.
 Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that the writ obtains
immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when
the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.
 In the instant case, Fletcher's detention is by virtue of a judicial process
or a valid judgment when he was convicted of estafa. Therefore, the
issuance of the writ in his case is not applicable.
 His contention that he should be released on parole after serving the
minimum period of his sentence cannot likewise be countenanced. The
pendency of another criminal case is a ground for the disqualification of
such convict from being released on parole. In Fletcher's case, another
criminal case for estafa against him is pending before the trial court.
 Finally, Fletcher's claim that his sentence was commuted by then
President Ramos cannot be given any legal weight, in light of his failure
to adduce any proof of such commutation. Other than indorsements by
the Chief Justice, Public Attorneys Office and Undersecretary of the
Department of Justice, no document purporting to be the commutation of
his sentence by then President Ramos was attached in his petition and in
his subsequent letters to this Court.
 Fletcher’s barren claim of commutation therefore deserves scant
consideration, lest the Court be accused of usurping the President's sole
prerogative to commute his sentence.
[PROCEDURAL]
Whether a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus be
dismissed on technical grounds. – NO.
 OSG's contention that the petition should be dismissed for failure to
comply with Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court deserves scant
merit. Strict compliance with the technical requirements for a habeas
corpus petition as provided in the Rules of Court may be dispensed with
where the allegations in the application are sufficient to make out a case
for habeas corpus.
 The formalities required for petitions for habeas corpus shall be
construed liberally. The petition for the writ is required to be verified but
the defect in form is not fatal. It is the duty of a court to issue the writ if
there is evidence that a person is unjustly restrained of his liberty within
its jurisdiction even if there is no application therefor.
 Therefore, a petition which is deficient in form, such as Fletcher's
petition-letter in this case, may be entertained so long as its allegations
sufficiently make out a case for habeas corpus.
On the purpose of the writ:
 The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of
personal freedom.
 Where the restraint of liberty is allegedly authored by the State, the very
entity tasked to ensure the liberty of all persons (citizens and aliens alike)
within its jurisdiction, courts must be vigilant in extending the habeas
corpus remedy to one who invokes it. To strictly restrict the great writ of
liberty to technicalities not only defeats the spirit that animates the writ
but also waters down the precious right that the writ seeks to protect, the
right to liberty. To dilute the remedy that guarantees protection to the right
is to negate the right itself. Thus, the Court will not unduly confine the writ
of habeas corpus in the prison walls of technicality. Otherwise, it will
betray its constitutional mandate to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.
CABALLES V CA
February 23, 2005 | Callejo, Sr., J. | Petition
for Certiorai | Habeas Corpus
PETITIONERS: Glenn Caballes y Chua
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Hon. Emmanuel D. Laurea, Hon.
Benjamin T. Antonio, and People of the Philippines
SUMMARY
Caballes was charged with rape in RTC Malabon. He filed a “Petition for
Habeas Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition” with CA, alleging that he
was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of the case; that RTC Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting
himself from the case; and that the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion in denying his petition for bail. CA denied his petition for being an
improper remedy. He then filed a petition for certiorari with SC. SC ruled that
the CA decision already became final and executory for failure to file an
appeal within the reglementary period, which is 48 hours from notice of
judgment resolving a habeas corpus case. SC also held that the proper
remedy from a court’s denial of a writ of habeas corpus is an appeal, not a
petition for certiorari. Finally, SC ruled that the allegations of Caballes cannot
be resolved by filing a petition for habeas corpus.
DOCTRINES
1. See rules in ratios 1 and 2.
2. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal,
certiorari or writ of error. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the
prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is
alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court
are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody,
and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to
deprive the petitioner of his liberty.
FACTS
1. November 19, 2001: Peititoner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with
rape of a minor in RTC Malabon.
2. Caballes filed a petition for bail, which was later denied on the court’s
finding that the evidence of guilt is strong.
3. July 11, 2003: Caballes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that his
right to speedy trial has been violated.[1]
4. Judge Laurea issued an Order inhibiting himself from hearing the case
"to avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for probity and
objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of justice." The
case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin T. Antonio.
5. Judge Antonio denied Caballes’ MTD. He reasoned that there was no
violation of the Caballes right to speedy trial, considering that the apparent
delays could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone. The trial
court noted that the Caballes also sought Postponements of the trials.
6. Caballes then filed with CA a "Petition for Habeas Corpus and/or
Certiorari and Prohibition." Caballes averred in his petition for Habeas
Corpus that
a. He was deprived of his right to a speedy trial and his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case;
b. Judge Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; and
c. The trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion in
denying his petition for bail.
7. CA denied the petition, arguing that the petition for habeas corpus is
not the proper relief. MR denied.
8. Hence, Caballes filed a petition for certiorari with SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO
Issue 1: [Topic] Whether or not the decision of the CA is already final
and executory - YES
1. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that the period for
appeal from the judgment of any court in habeas corpus cases shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment appealed from.
2. While the said provision was not incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No. 01-1-03-SC
amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect on July 15,
2001, thus:
“However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight
(48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.”
3. (Note: Court did not mention when Caballes received the CA Resolution
and when he filed his petition for certiorari with SC. But we can infer he filed
said petition more than 48 hours from when he received CA reso. Otherwise,
why would SC say that CA decision became final and executory?)
Issue 2 [Topic]: WON the proper remedy from the appellate court’s
denial of a petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court – NO. Appeal should be
filed
4. Following the rules mentioned above, the petitioner should have
appealed to this Court from the CA decision denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus, as well as the denial of his motion for
reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
5. The well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the
aggrieved party’s remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the
ordinary course, the reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an
appeal or any other adequate remedy.
6. A habeas corpus action stands in no different position than with any
other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be reviewed by an
appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error committed by
the court is an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
Issue 3: [TOPIC] WON Caballes is entitled to the issuance of the writ -
NO
7. Resorting to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which the
complaint is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the
immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint.
8. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended
as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of
appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate
and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the
question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law
provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
exceptional circumstances.
9. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.
The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies
exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are
extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as
a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not
involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial,
subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty
must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where
restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus
because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
10. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in
rem when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint
presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be
inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not
act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only
parties before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person
holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved
is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his
liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
11. Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before
the CA reveals that it was a "petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative,
a petition for a writ of certiorari" The petitioner assailed therein the orders of
the trial court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the
ground that he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case
against him, and questioned Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. We agree
with the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined
with the special civil action for certiorari because the two remedies are
governed by a different set of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of
Court mandates that the joinder of causes of action shall not include
special actions or actions governed by special rules, thus proscribing
the joinder of a special proceeding with a special civil action.
12. We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas
corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the
trial court, while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or
judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only
jurisdictional errors. It has no other use, except to bring before the court a
record material to be considered in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of
certiorari reaches the record. On the other hand, a writ of habeas
corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also reaches
jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However, when
jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring
the body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is
necessary, to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may
be accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e.,
it is subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of
impeaching the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of
jurisdiction to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by
any body or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such
questions pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly
complained of.
13. The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should
be treated as a petition for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly
dismissed the petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to
the writ. The records show that the petitioner was charged with rape
punishable by reclusion perpetua and was detained based on the said
charge; hence, if the evidence of his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted
to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. There is no
question that the trial court had jurisdiction over the offense charged and over
the person of the petitioner. The jail warden has the authority and, in fact, is
mandated to detain the petitioner until granted bail by the court, or the case
against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted after trial. The petitioner failed
to establish that his incarceration pendente lite was illegal, and likewise failed
to establish exceptional circumstances warranting the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus by the appellate court.
DISPOSITIVE
Petition denied for lack of merit
[1] Caballes alleged in his MTD the following:
“2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before his counsel
had filed a Manifestation stating inter alia that his available dates for the next
hearing may be "any Monday, Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May
2003 and the first half of June 2003, except on May 14 and 21" – yet Atty.
Manalaysay (private prosecutor) asked for the next hearing on June 19 which
is already outside or beyond the dates mentioned in the manifestation, and
which was more than 1-1/2 months away, but which the Honorable Court
nonetheless granted;
3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any "good cause" as to
how come he was not able to present Dr. Marquez—the Medico-Legal Officer
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal
examination of the private complainant—as witness on April 30, 2003, and
then again on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid, his absence on March 6,
2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;
4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus it has
now been more than one year, or close to 400 days ago since trial started;
neither has there been any authorization from the Supreme Court that the
trial period may exceed 180 days;
5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its orders
granting continuance that "the ends of justice served by taking such action
outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in a speedy trial;"
6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false statement
before the Honorable Court in claiming they had asked Dr. Marquez to testify
in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact they had not.”