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Atomic Exaggeration: The Infeasibility of IND Construction by Terrorist Organizations

Noah Kerwin

University of Michigan

2018
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INTRODUCTION

Purpose:

To argue against consensus that terrorists have the means to develop their own nuclear weapons.

Organization:

1. Summarization of the current consensus surrounding the threat of nuclear terrorism.

2. Refutation of key ideas and concepts surrounding the threat of nuclear terrorism.

3. Assessment of ISIS as a potential candidate for developing nuclear weapons.

4. Summarization of arguments against the consensus surrounding the threat of nuclear

terrorism.

Definitions:

Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND): INDs will be used interchangeably with “nuclear weapons”

or “nuclear devices. Unlike dirty bombs which use a conventional explosion to disperse

radioactive material, INDs produce a nuclear explosion.

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Uranium composed of at least 20% uranium-235. All HEU is

considered weapons-usable uranium (WUU).

Weapons-Grade Uranium (WGU): Uranium composed of at least 90% uranium 235.

CONSENSUS

As of 2016, the consensus is that nuclear terrorism is a real and immediate threat to

global security and stability. Barack Obama, IAEA officers, the United Nations, the leaders of

46 countries, and a slew of nuclear experts comprise this consensus. Their shared opinion is that

ISIS, along with numerous other terrorist organizations have the motive to obtain nuclear

weapons and inflict as much damage as possible (Cooper). While acknowledging the difficulty

in obtaining a complete nuclear weapon, it is their shared opinion that if fissile material can be
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stolen from inadequately secured nuclear facilities or purchased on the black market, terrorists

would have the ability to quickly construct their own nuclear weapons.

Many nuclear experts argue that the large global stockpile of 1.6 million kg of HEU and

lax security regulations make the ingredients for nuclear bombs “there for the taking” (Graham;

Moore). HEU is confirmed to be used in over 100 civilian research reactors, which are often

used for industrial or academic purposes, meaning they have low security standards (Union of

Concerned Scientists). Furthermore, many places that utilize HEU are in developing countries

which put security at a lower priority.

Fears continue to mount as attempts at stealing nuclear material proliferate. From 1993

to 2008, 18 cases of theft involving weapons-usable material occurred. (Brill et al.) Numerous

examples of almost-thefts have also occurred. One example occurred in 2007 where four men

broke into the Pelindaba facility in South Africa which contained enough HEU to build 30

weapons (Zenko). Although the alarms were triggered, the event demonstrated that nuclear

facilities are not impenetrable. Additionally, experts warn of the growing black market of

nuclear materials. In 2011, Moldovan police broke up a nuclear smuggling ring, which was

circulating at least 1 kg of HEU (Brill et al.).

The belief is that if fissile material can be acquired, construction of a nuclear weapon

would be simple and would take under a year to complete (Graham). Innovations in 3d printing

raise concerns that once-difficult nuclear components could be fabricated easily with access to

precise machinery. Many argue that blueprints for nuclear weapons could be bought on the

black market or from rogue states (Bagot). Fear from these threats is compounded by the lack of

universal standards for securing nuclear material. The consensus argues that IAEA nuclear
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security evaluations, UNSC regulations, and G-8 initiatives lack global uniformity and cohesion

(Brill et al.).

MAKING A BOMB

While a significant amount of literature exists on why terrorist nuclear attacks would be

easy to accomplish and devastating, very little explanation is given as to how terrorists would

actually build and acquire weapons themselves. In this section, the process of how a nuclear

bomb would be obtained is explained from the starting point of motivation all the way to the

actual completion of a bomb. From analysis of this process, it can be concluded that the threat of

terrorists building their own nuclear bomb is seriously overblown, and is unlikely to occur any

time soon.

Motivation:

Nuclear weapons are viewed in a category of their own: a technology so powerful that it

can make even the strongest nations bend to any demands imposed on them. Given their status

as a geopolitical trump card, it is logical to assume a universal interest to harness this power. Of

all possible proliferators, terrorists are the group posited as being the most-determined to develop

these capabilities. And this portrayal makes sense: being composed of the political voiceless,

what could possibly provide them with more political leverage than the threat of nuclear

annihilation against their oppressors? Two different lines of thought may drive terrorists to

create weapons: the first is that terrorists would develop a nuclear bomb in order to use it in a

one-off effort to achieve their aims through perpetuating mass fear. The second, more

frightening, scenario has terrorists develop and keep the bomb, milking its utility as a way to

coerce governments to appease them. While logic may be sound for why terrorist organizations
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would be compelled to obtain nuclear weapons capabilities, a closer look shows that there is very

little motivation to create nuclear weapons among terrorists.

1. Conducting a nuclear attack would almost inevitably be conducted as a suicide

bombing, given the power of the weapon and the terrorist group’s lack of access to cruise

missiles. Although painted by the media as common practice, suicide tactics are reserved as a

last resort measure, only to be used against hard targets that cannot be successfully attacked

through conventional means (Berman 22-23; and Berman and Laitin 1-7). The reasoning behind

this is simple: recruitment and radicalization is difficult; losing a member dedicated enough to

give their life is a valuable asset to the group. With this in mind, what sort of hard targets would

be attacked? While a populated city seems attractive, terrorists can easily create a similar

amount of public fear through acts such as mass shootings or car bombs. Military bases are an

example of a hard target, yet they would provide little benefit to terrorists if attacked, as

casualties and fear would be minimal. So, the question still stands: where would terrorists even

want to use a nuclear device?

2. Investigation of Al-Qaeda, the only large-scale terrorist group to publicly state

intentions of getting nuclear weapons, shows that minimal efforts were made to acquire them at

their peak in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Aside from Osama Bin Laden’s bold statements in

1998, discussion of nuclear weapons by the group was fairly limited. In a computer seized from

an Al-Qaeda base in 2001, documents showed a WMD budget of $2000, most of which being

focused on chemical weapons (“The Truth About Al Qaeda”). In fact, it seems like their

attention was directed towards heads other than warheads, as about 80% of the data on Al-Qaeda

computers recovered in the early 2000s was allocated to pornography (Ferren et al).
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3. Terrorist groups tend to be conservative and stick with methods that are tried and true.

In the case of nuclear weapons, not only do the attacks themselves present a myriad of

uncertainties, but the actual process of obtaining the weapons in the first place create untenable

pressures on the organization. In most cases, the technical difficulty required to construct a

bomb prove to be prohibitive (Moore). I believe that Kenneth Waltz says this point best:

“Terrorists live precarious lives. Nobody trusts them, not even those who finance, train, and hide

them. If apprehended, they cannot count on the help of others. They have learned how to use

conventional weapons to some effect; but nuclear weapons would thrust them into a world

fraught with new dangers. Secrecy is safety, yet to obtain and maintain nuclear weapons would

require enlarging the terrorist band to include suppliers, transporters, technicians, and guardians.

Inspiring devotion, instilling discipline, and ensuring secrecy become harder tasks to accomplish

as numbers grow” (Waltz 83-87).

Acquisition of Materials:

Black Market:

The dominant narrative around nuclear security paints a reality filled with shady figures

dealing truckloads of plutonium to the most sinister terrorist organizations. What actually

happens could not be more different. The fact of the matter is that the scale and utility of the

black market for fissile materials is lackluster at best.

Established in 1995 by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Incident and

Trafficking Database tracks the movement of fissile materials around the world. While there

were 662 attempts to trade radioactive materials between 1995 and 2004, only 18 involved

weapons-grade materials (Moore). In all 18 of these instances combined, only 8.5 kg of uranium

was traded. For reference, even the smallest and simplest IND requires around 50 kg of
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weapons-grade uranium, meaning that the total amount of material in the entire nuclear black

market can only create a fraction of a bomb (Moore). In addition, low supply creates prices that

are prohibitively expensive for most terrorist groups. It is also worth noting that there are no

completed nuclear weapons on the market, and there is little evidence that terrorists, rogue states,

or transnational criminal organizations are participating in the nuclear black market (Lee 1).

Compounding the issue of scale is the market’s tenuous credibility and reliability. The

black market is filled with undercover police, making deals incredibly risky for terrorists to

initiate. Additionally, the market is populated with many fraudulent sellers. For example, in the

1990s, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, al-Qaeda’s lead agent in acquiring nuclear materials, was

scammed multiple times, being sold materials unfit for building weapons (Moore). If legitimate

materials are actually obtained, terrorists must resolve a whole slew of other problems such as

transporting the materials and actually using them to construct a bomb.

Theft:

Seeing as nuclear supplies are extremely limited in the black market, the even more

difficult task of stealing them must be taken on if a nuclear weapon is desired. Most radioactive

materials that can easily be stolen are of a type incompatible with making nuclear weapons,

typically being useful only for medical or scientific purposes. Those places that do have

weapons-grade HEU are often heavily guarded. Military nuclear weapons facilities are nearly

impenetrable, so stealing an entire weapon is infinitely unlikely. Reactors would be the place

most-susceptible to theft; however, recent efforts by the DOE and FBI on the global scale,

combined with standard reactor safety procedures make reactors almost as secure as weapons

facilities (Council on Foreign Relations; Al). While many cases of fissile materials theft have

been reported, none have been or the quantity or quality necessary to make a weapon, and no
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evidence exists that a nuclear device has ever been made from these materials. To illustrate the

absurdity of a large-scale nuclear heist, I have provided the sequence of events that would have

to be followed to successfully steal a significant amount of fissile materials. In this example, a

pressurized water reactor (PWR) will be used, as they are the most common type of reactor. The

steps are as follows:

1. Terrorists must locate a PWR that utilizes HEU as their main source of fuel – information

that is not always public.

2. A team of terrorists must be assembled, all of which having to “remain loyal throughout

the long process of planning and executing the heist” (“The Atomic Terrorist”).

3. Each member must obtain clearance to the nuclear facility.

4. A large flatbed truck must be acquired and parked inconspicuously outside of the facility.

5. The team must enter the facility unarmed and without blowing their cover.

6. The team, must navigate around security cameras, identification checks, and hand/retina

scans to reach the room containing the reactor.

*Note: step 6 may be skipped if a staff member is corrupted to assist in the operation, although

this is extremely unlikely, as workers have been required to complete a myriad of psychological

evaluations and background checks to permit their employment at a nuclear facility.

*From this point further, the process goes from foolishly difficult to comically absurd.

7. The reactor must be shut down via its complex control system, alerting the entire facility.

*While the story would end here in any conceivable instance, for the sake of argument I will

assume that either the alarm is not triggered or security does not intervene in a timely manner.

8. Provided that shutdown has not caused a meltdown resulting in the death of everything in

a 10-mile radius, the team would have to physically open the reactor, coated in thick
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metal and filled with boiling water (Department of Homeland Security). Given that laser

cutters or wrecking balls would likely not be permitted in the facility, knowledge of

passwords would be necessary to gain greater access to the reactor and its components.

9. Top-of-the-line heat and radiation resistant safety gear must be obtained and worn to

prevent near-immediate death from intense heat or radiation poisoning.

10. The team must disconnect the fuel assembly from the rest of the reactor core, and lift the

fuel assembly, at 4 meters; 700kg; and 292.7 degrees Celsius, from boiling water without

the use of heavy machinery (Buongiorno 22; Pramuditya).

11. Somehow, the searing hunk of radioactive material must be lugged through the entire

facility without being caught by security, trapped by emergency lockdown, or killed by

the heat and radiation of the fuel assembly.

12. Before being loaded onto the truck, the materials would need to be put in a container fit

for transporting nuclear materials to avoid radiation emission or risks of criticality mid-

transportation. To transport a moderate amount of nuclear materials safely, a Type-B

containment unit would have to be acquired, which can cost upwards of a million dollars

and come at a size similar to a large car (World Nuclear Association).

13. After being loaded onto the truck, the material must be transported to the team’s base of

operations without being stopped by authorities, which would have been called at some

point during the long endeavor.

14. Repeat steps 1-13 again. Unfortunately for terrorists, stealing a single, albeit massive,

fuel assembly provides nowhere near what is required to produce a bomb. For uranium

enriched to 90%, 50 kg is the minimum amount of uranium needed to make the smallest

type of nuclear device (Moore). However, the HEU that is used in commercial reactors
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rarely enriched to that level. In fact, most of the HEU that is used is barely WUU,

enriched to 20%. For reference, even Russian and Indian naval PWRs use around 45%

HEU, half the concentration of WGU (Moore et al). In reality, the HEU that would be

recovered from most PWRs would be closer to 20% enrichment, which would require a

whopping 800 kg of material to create the conditions necessary for critical mass and

nuclear explosion to be reached (Topychkanov). Knowing that a PWR fuel assembly

contains 264 rods, rods contain 400 pellets, and pellets contain approximately 0.0003 kg

of U-235, a maximum of 31.68 kg of fissile materials can be obtained; far short of what is

actually needed (Criss; Pramuditya; Moore).

Transportation of Materials:

Once obtained, fissile material must be transported to a location where it can be used to

develop a weapon. While simple in theory, moving stolen or purchased material is no easy task.

The biggest difficulties include improper storage, avoiding law enforcement, and crossing

national borders with the materials in possession.

The most-immediate danger is found in the materials themselves. As storing nuclear

materials is costly and difficult, it is not unreasonable to assume that materials would be poorly

stored and thrown in the back of a truck. In this scenario, the materials may never leave the site

of acquisition due to the terrorists being exposed to deadly doses of radiation.

Avoiding being caught is an even greater concern. Given the attention that a large-scale

nuclear heist would attract, law enforcement would be ubiquitous in the local area. If not

surrounded immediately upon exiting a facility, security footage showing the getaway vehicle

would provide police with the ability to track and pursue.

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If the terrorists’ base is located in a different country, border security must be fooled. As

Mueller points out, “To get the HEU across one or more international borders, smugglers must

be employed, and they must remain loyal despite, potentially, the temptations of massive reward

money” (“The Atomic Terrorist”). Even then, radiation portal monitors that detect the presence

of radioactive material are commonly found at borders to prevent things like nuclear smuggling.

Finally, it is very likely that multiple trips would be required. As previously stated, a

single typical heist would be unable to obtain all of the materials necessary to build an IND.

Knowledge and Construction:

Getting the materials is just the beginning of the long process of developing a nuclear

weapon. After buying or stealing materials and bringing those to the terrorists’ base of

operations, “A machine shop must be set up in an obscure area with imported, sophisticated

equipment without anyone becoming suspicious” (“The Atomic Terrorist”). Not only would this

process be costly and slow, it would also increase the chance of the group being caught.

Terrorists avoid detection by constantly moving; setting up a static workshop allows long-term

monitoring and infiltration to occur, drastically increasing the chance of intervention by law

enforcement.

In order to actually construct a weapon, a team of chemists, physicists, engineers, and

metallurgical experts must be assembled to assist at every level of construction. Given the large

budget and recruiting ability by groups like ISIS, hiring scientists is a doable task, however it has

been empirically very difficult. To hire scientist, terrorists have to go out of their comfort zone

and area of expertise by recruiting a very different kind of person than their typical brute.

Furthermore, the scientists that terrorists would be able to recruit would not be of Nobel laureate

quality. Instead, the people they would actually be able to recruit would be those scientists who
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were not quite able to make it in the legitimate market. For example, the Aum Shinrikyo group

that carried out sarin gas bombings in Japan were composed of very educated scientists, yet most

were those who did poorly in their universities and/or job market, and were offered a chance to

rekindle their career (Moore).

For stolen fuel assemblies, the uranium inside of them is not readily accessible. The

zirconium rods that encase the uranium must be removed without damaging the materials inside;

an arduous task considering that zirconium is highly resistant to heat and corrosion (New York

Times). Then, the uranium must be extracted from each of the 400 pellets in each of the 264 fuel

rods that compose the assembly. If only WUU was recovered, terrorists must somehow develop

the means to enrich it to WGU. At this point is where both the routes of theft and black market

trading converge: the uranium must be converted into a chalky substance so that it can properly

disperse when combined with an explosive device.

Even if terrorists are somehow able to create a useful form of uranium, they would still

have to develop a dispersion method. Unlike dirty bombs, which are as simple as gluing a chunk

of radioactive material to a stick of dynamite, legitimate nuclear weapons require complex

blueprints and precise construction. The simplest device that can be created is a gun-type fission

bomb, the same type of weapon utilized by the US in WWII and the same type that was

developed by South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. If these were as easy to make as some claim,

why did it take 125,310 employees and 30 billion dollars (adjusted to 2012 inflation) to build

them in the US (“The Price of the Manhattan Project”; “How Many People”). Or, why did it

take South Africa a decade, with their own enrichment and mining program, with elite scientists

and help from multiple state actors a decade to build these “simple” bombs (Hecht 20)? Unlike
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South Africa or the US, terrorists do not have the expertise or budget to build weapons in any

sort of timely manner.

Two common arguments made by alarmists are that blueprints for nuclear weapons are

easily accessible. For historical examples, they point to the “A-Bomb Kid” and rumors that

Pakistan has given schematics to terrorist groups.

The story of the “A-Bomb Kid” can be quickly summarized as this: John Aristotle

Phillips, a student at Princeton University, wrote his term paper on describing a general outline

of how the atomic bomb that was used in Nagasaki was constructed. Dr. Frank Chilton, a

nuclear engineer, upon reading the paper said that Phillips design was almost certain to work.

When news of this became public, the FBI confiscated and classified Phillip’s paper (Spokane

Daily Chronicle 9).

The thought is that if a college kid can design a bomb, then any dedicated group could

easily design a working nuclear device. This cannot be any farther from the truth. One

commonly overlooked part of the story is that in addition to Dr. Chilton, two other respected

scientists looked at the paper and had a completely different conclusion. Phillip’s faculty

advisor, renowned physicist and member of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and his

professor, Harold Feiveson, a theoretical physicist and expert on nuclear energy policy, both

agreed that Phillip’s design had no chance of working (Verini). Additionally, it is highly

unlikely that detailed schematics on how to exactly design a working nuclear weapon were in

Phillip’s paper, considering he had never seen the internals of a nuclear weapon. Instead, it is

more reasonable to believe that the general steps to achieving criticality were outlined and that

the FBI classified the material just to be safe (Moore).

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Another myth commonly brought up is that Pakistan gave Al-Qaeda blueprints for a

nuclear weapon. Aside from the fact that Al-Qaeda never had dedicated more than a few

thousand dollars to develop WMDs, no evidence exists that Al-Qaeda ever had any schematics.

If they were given anything, Al-Qaeda probably received something along the lines of a roadmap

for where they could go to obtain supplies (Moore).

Even if terrorists believed they had successfully developed or acquired the schematics to

construct a bomb, it would likely take years of trial and error to actually engineer what seems

like a working weapon. However, it would be foolish to plan an entire attack around a device

without knowledge that it even works. This presents a dilemma: either be very unsure if their

weapon works, or test their weapon and expose their intentions and location. Given the accuracy

of satellite imagery, the ubiquity of foreign intelligence forces, and the presence of devices like

anti-neutrino detectors, testing a nuclear device is synonymous with being caught.

ASSESSING ISIS

The terrorist group that is believed to be the most capable of developing nuclear weapons

is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. With al-Qaeda’s time passed and Hezbollah becoming a

legitimate part of the Lebanese government, the only group that seems even remotely capable of

possessing the means to obtain a nuke is ISIS. Seen as the ultimate terrorist organization for

their unparalleled ability to execute attacks in different locations simultaneously and hold

territory. The group is now on the decline; their diminishing cohesion and capabilities now

render them incapable of developing a nuclear weapon.

While at one point seeing as many as 2000 new recruits per month, the number of ISIS

recruits crossing the Turkey-Syria border has dropped to a measly 50 (Witte et al.). Efforts by

Western countries to stop the flow of recruits have been very successful, due to increased
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intelligence sharing, increased deportations, and restricting travel to Syria (Witte et al.). In

addition, air and ground assaults conducted by the US, Turkey, Iraq, and Kurdistan have kept

ISIS at bay, preventing outwards expansion and cornering key leadership.

In addition to the dwindling of their recruitment capabilities, ISIS is also losing their

economic and territorial advantages that made them such a threat. Holding territory has been a

double-edged sword for ISIS; it has allowed them to expand their power but it has also made

them extremely vulnerable to foreign attacks (“Assessing ISIS”). Unlike most terrorist

organizations which stay hidden, ISIS has a defined base of operations, which is visible to

foreign militaries. While initially winning many battles, the combined Western and Middle

Eastern militaries have dealt a string of crushing losses to ISIS, hurting their morale and ability

to receive funding. With their territory being taken away, ISIS loses access to the key supply

lines that keep them afloat along with the ability to tax and extort money from the people in that

territory. Furthermore, their ability to maintain public support has also declined as ISIS is less

capable of providing public services like school, water and medical care. Compounding their

economic problems is the decrease in oil prices. ISIS fighters themselves also have lower morale

as their salaries have been cut in half. ISIS has lost one of their biggest sources of money, and

they have run out of the money they received from capturing bases in 2014 due to corruption and

mismanagement by their leaders (“Assessing ISIS”).

A counterargument that could be made is that ISIS’s ability to carry out highly

destructive attacks on France, Germany, and Belgium earlier this year indicates that the group

still possesses a significant amount of strength. While devastating in terms of the death and

terror these attacks caused, they are not indicative of a powerful ISIS. The main reason is that

the terrorists that carried out those attacks had only tenuous connections to ISIS; it is more likely
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that they were simply sympathizers and not legitimate ISIS operatives (Witte et al.).

Sympathizers are not the people that are needed to build nuclear weapons. Their lack of

communication with central leadership renders them useful only in performing conventional

attacks that ISIS can then claim responsibility for.

In short, ISIS does not have the capacity to build nuclear weapons. Their defined

location means that they are subject to constant attacks and surveillance, making construction of

a nuclear weapon incredibly difficult. Decreased funding means that it will be difficult to

purchase the resources necessary to build a bomb, and money problems combined with

recruitment problems make it extremely difficult to hire the people that would have the ability to

work on building a nuclear bomb. Mismanagement of funds by leaders shows that even if they

did have funding, corruption may result in an insufficient amount of money being diverted

towards the project. Lastly, ISIS has shown that they are uneducated on building nuclear

weapons. ISIS stole 40 kg of uranium in 2014 from Mosul University to the dismay of many

people, however, that uranium was of a low-grade and was not enriched or anywhere near ready

to be used in weapons (Cottee and Esfandiary).

CONCLUSION

Most sources of authority point to empirical examples of nuclear security blunders and

the growing presence of ISIS as proof that nuclear terrorism is a real and immediate threat. In

fact, many leading figures on nuclear security argue that terrorists possess the means to both

acquire fissile materials and construct a nuclear bomb from scratch in less than a year. As the

consequences of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons are dire, a lot of fear has been generated

on the issue.
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Despite the belief of the consensus, the harsh reality of nuclear security and engineering

mean that mainstream anxiety about nuclear terrorism are vastly overblown. While theoretically

terrorists could manufacture an IND, every realistic scenario points towards the impossibility of

a terrorist IND. A myriad of impediments to acquisition stem from a lack of motivation and the

difficulties of obtaining materials, transporting materials, recruiting engineers and scientists, and

actually building a device.

This paper does not argue that nuclear terrorism could not occur through theft or purchase

of a complete nuclear weapon from a state-actor, rather it is meant to show that attention placed

on homegrown terrorist nuclear programs are terribly misplaced.

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