1. Tanada v. Tuvera
BENGZON V DRILON
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law.
Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders. The respondents argued that petitioners have no legal
standing to bring the petition in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances. Upon the other
hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any
specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
Issue: Whether the petitioner may file a petition for mandamus as against the the
respondents to compel them to publish the unpublished laws on the basis of their right to
be informed on matters of public concern.
Ruling: YES. The clear object of Article 2 of the Civil Code is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application
of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Without publication, the people have no means
of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people,
such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. It is needless to add that the publication of presidential
issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
2.
FACTS: 1990, Congress sought to reenact old laws (particularly Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain
retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297)
on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government
officials.
Afterwards, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking
the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed by P.D. No.
644 because the said PD was one of those unpublished which were subject of the case of Tañada v.
Tuvera. Hence, repealing law never existed due to nonpublication and in effect, RA 1797 was never
repealed. So, Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress readjust General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992 and allotted additional budget for
pensions of retired justices. Congress made an item entitled “General Fund Adjustment”, included
therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, some provisions of General Appropriations, the said lines which provided for the
pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB, were vetoed again by the President. She
explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed HB 16297. This
prompted Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality
of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.
RULING: NO. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to
them by Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. Remember the separation of powers
doctrine, the president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally
vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its
exercise.
The Supreme Court explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of
an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the
Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. President must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all; or veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president
did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion
which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations
to the other departments of the government. However there is an exception to the rule. The
exception is provided in par2,Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants the President power
to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. The veto in such case
shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
***No Pocket Veto Power
Under the Constitution, the President does not have pocket-veto power. It is the disapproval of a
bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill
represented to him within 30 days after the
3. NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG INC. V. MILITARY SHRINE
SERVICES-PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
FACTS: The Supreme Court nullified the revision made by President Ferdinand Marcos on his
own proclamation when the government failed to include the former president’s insertion in the
published version of the law.
This case arise from a series of presidential proclamations issued by Presidents Garcia, Marcos
and Aquino concerning several parcels of land that comprise the area now known as Fort
Bonifacio.
Originally Fort Bonifacio land area is not for disposition for being part of a military reservation.
However, Fort Bonifacio’s land area was reduced pursuant to Marcos’ issuance of Proclamation
No. 423. The proclamation converted part of Fort Bonifacio into a national shrine now known as
Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is currently under the administration of the Military Shrine
Services Philippine Veterans Affairs Office.
In 1986, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 to amend Proclamation No. 423. The law excluded
barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of the previous
proclamation and declared these areas open for disposition to the public. At the bottom portion of
Proc No. 2476, Marcos made a handwritten and countersigned addendum stating that Western
Bicutan was likewise declared open for disposition. The Marcos proclamation was later published
in the Official Gazette but it did not include his handwritten addendum.
When President Corazon Aquino assumed power, she issued Proclamation No. 172 which
reiterated Proc No 2476, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation
of No. 423 and declared said lots open for disposition.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. The military created Task Force Bantay to primarily
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort
Bonifacio.
1999, Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig filed a petition considering that they were
occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan their claims were fixed on the handwritten addendum
of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to
include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public
land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proc No 2476.
Petitioners are praying for
1. the declaration of Lot 3 of Western Bicutan, the area that they were occupying, to be
converted from public land to alienable and disposable land
2. the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands and
3. the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject land
to its occupants.
COSLAP granted the Petition and declared the portions of the land in question as alienable and
disposable. The Court of Appeals reversed the COSLAP decision. The High Court affirmed the
appellate court’s ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable
and disposable on the ground that the handwritten addendum of Pres. Marcos was not included
in the publication of the said law.
RULING: NO, because without publication, Western Bicutan was not declared alienable and
disposable as the handwritten note never had any legal force and effect. Therefore, the petition by
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. is denied for lack of merit. The handwritten
addendum by President Marcos was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.” Also, as held in Tañada v. Tuvera 1986**, the Court said that publication is an
indispensable requirement in order for a law to become effective. The term law covers all
presidential decrees, executive orders, local ordinances and others which invariably affect public
interest. The Tañada case also held that “publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.”
4. Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary
Facts: Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued
by the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that
said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the
consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations including
the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all classified or
confidential information between the President and the public officers covered by the EO.
The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging the
Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract
covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.
Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the
hearing. On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this
development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently relieved for
defying the President’s order.
 Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group),
for certiorari and prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging
the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
RULING: YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress,
hence it deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the
Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry –
with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be had on others
who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. The
operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.
Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions
to the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’. It is defined
by Schwartz as “the power of the government to withhold information from the public,
the courts and the Congress.” (e.g. state secret privilege, informer’s privilege, generic
privilege)
The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation
of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the
intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so
and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions,
the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is
impermissible.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public,
is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)
A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question
hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinct functions of the
legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of the
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of
Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere
fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from
this power – the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond the
reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are likewise
exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of powers and fiscal
autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
On the constitutionality of EO 464
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be
construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question
hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated
by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible,
in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound
in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or
by the Executive Secretary.
Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464,
therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims
of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege
authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. The claim of privilege under
Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It
is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the
power of inquiry of Congress.
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O.
464 is, just as direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.
 Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason
therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow
the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means then by which
officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed
valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire
into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater
value – our right as a people to take part in government.
5. AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY v. THOMAS G. AQUINO
Facts: Petitioners non-government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers seek via the present petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) including... the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee requested herein respondent
Undersecretary Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the Philippine Coordinating
Committee created under Executive Order No. 213 ("Creation of A Philippine
Coordinating Committee to Study the Feasibility of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement") to study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the
Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the JPEPA. Usec. Aquino did not heed the
request, however.
In its letter dated 15 June 2005, [the] D[epartment of] F[oreign] A[ffairs] explains
that the Committee's request to be furnished all documents on the JPEPA may be difficult
to accomplish at this time, since the proposed Agreement has been a work... in progress
for about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will however be forwarded to the
Committee as soon as the text thereof is settled and complete. Congressman Aguja also
requested NEDA Director-General Romulo Neri and Tariff Commission Chairman
Edgardo Abon, by letter of July 1, 2005, for copies of the latest text of the JPEPA.
In its third hearing conducted on August 31, 2005, the House Committee resolved
to issue a subpoena for the most recent draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not pursued
because by Committee Chairman Congressman Teves' information, then House Speaker
Jose de Venecia had requested... him to hold in abeyance the issuance of the subpoena
until the President gives her consent to the disclosure of the documents.
Amid speculations that the JPEPA might be signed by the Philippine government
within December 2005, the present petition was filed on December 9, 2005.The
agreement was to be later signed on September 9, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in Helsinki, Finland, following
which the President endorsed it to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution. To date, the JPEPA is still being deliberated upon by the
Senate.
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement to be entered into
by the Philippines with another country in the event the Senate grants its consent to it,
covers a broad range of topics which respondents enumerate as follows: trade in goods,
rules of... origin, customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
intellectual property rights, government procurement, movement of natural persons,
cooperation, competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and settlement,
improvement of the business... environment, and general and final provisions.[...
respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up to the filing of
petitioners' Reply - when the JPEPA was still being negotiated
 the initial drafts thereof were kept from public view.
ISSUE: WON the refusal of the government to disclose the documents bearing on the
JPEPA negotiations violates their right to information on matters of public concern.
RULING:NO. The JPEPA is a matter of public concern.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no
rigid test which can be applied. Public concern' likepublic interest' is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public... may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for
the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest
or... importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is evident
that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiations towards its
execution are matters of public concern. This, respondents do not dispute. They only
claim that diplomatic... negotiations are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege,
thus constituting an exception to the right to information and the policy of full public
disclosure.
In relation to Art. VII
Respondents' claim of privilege
It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither the right to information nor the policy
of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of public concern or
public interest, are recognized as privileged in nature.
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to
negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the right of access
to information on matters of public concern and policy of public disclosure. They come
within the coverage of... executive privilege. At the time when the Committee was
requesting for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are still
now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change.
Considering the status and nature of such documents... then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and settled
jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the negotiations of the representatives of the Philippines as well as
of Japan... must be allowed to explore alternatives in the course of the negotiations in the
same manner as judicial deliberations and working drafts of opinions are accorded strict
confidentiality. The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the
information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains to diplomatic
negotiations then in progress.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to
the conclusion of treaties... and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest." The Court denied the petition, stressing that
"secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information." The Resolution went on to state, thus: The nature of diplomacy requires
centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive
action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.
Delegates from other countries come and tell you in confidence of their troubles
at home and of... their differences with other countries and with other delegates; they tell
you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would not do under other
circumstances. . . If these reports . . . should become public . . . who would ever trust
American Delegations in another conference?
Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the
final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential - since there should be
"ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved" - the offers exchanged...
by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published.
A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be open to public
scrutiny would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their
views during negotiations. Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as
privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no
exception. It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive.
Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be
determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information,... strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. Arguments
proffered by petitioners against the application of PMPF v. Manglapus They stress that
PMPF v. Manglapus involved the Military Bases Agreement which necessarily pertained
to matters affecting national security; whereas... the present case involves an economic
treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce between the Philippines and Japan,
matters which, unlike those covered by the Military Bases Agreement, are not so vital to
national security to disallow their disclosure.
6. CTRM vs NEDA
FACTS: The CTRM, an office under the National Economic Development Authority
(NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to recommend to President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161
from 7% or 10% to 5% starting July 2005. On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras),
then the Chairman of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines
(APMP), the main industry association in the petrochemical sector, wrote to the CTRM
Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to request a copy
of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005. Director Mendoza denied the request
through her letter of June 20, 2005.
The CTRM, again through Director Mendoza, sent a second letter dated August
31, 2005 as a response to the series of letter-requests from the APMP.
The APMP sent another letter-request dated October 27, 2005 to the CTRM
through Director Mendoza reminding about the legal implications of the refusal to
furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of the petitioner’s Constitutional right of
access to information on matters of public concern. However, the CTRM continued to
refuse access to the documents sought by the APMP.
The attitude of the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring the
petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the copy of the minutes
and to grant access to the minutes.
ISSUE: Are meetings of the CTRM and the minutes thereof exempt from the
Constitutional right of access to information?
RULING: The constitutional guarantee to information “does not open every door to any
and all information.” It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Likewise, the State’s policy of full public disclosure
is restricted to transactions involving public interest, and is further subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law.
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by
writ of mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public
concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation
of the constitutional guarantee. As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in
determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern or public
interest. Both terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want to be familiar
with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the issues “naturally
arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen.” As such, whether or not the information sought
is of public interest or public concern is left to the proper determination of the courts on
a case to case basis. In his capacity as a citizen and as the Executive Director of the APMP,
the petitioner has sought to obtain official information dealing with the policy
recommendation of the CTRM with respect to the reduction of tariffs on petrochemical
resins and plastic products. He has asserted that the recommendation, which would be
effected through E.O. No. 486, not only brought significant losses to the petrochemical
industry that undermined the industry’s long-term viability and survival, but also
conflicted with official government pronouncements, policy directives, and enactments
designed to support and develop an integrated petrochemical industry. He has claimed
that the implementation of E.O. No. 486 effectively deprived the industry of tariff support
and market share, thereby jeopardizing large investments without due process of law.
The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic and
other related materials, and provides essential input requirements for the agricultural
and industrial sectors of the country. Thus, the position of the petrochemical industry as
an essential contributor to the overall growth of our country’s economy easily makes the
information sought a matter of public concern or interest. The second requisite is that the
information requested must not be excluded by law from the constitutional guarantee. In
that regard, the Court has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the
people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence
information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.
Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court has ruled that the right to
information does not extend to matters acknowledged as “privileged information under
the separation of powers,” which include “Presidential conversations, correspondences,
or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings.” Likewise exempted from the right
to information are “information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement
agencies before the prosecution of the accused.”
The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005 meeting
was classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the committee’s composition
and the nature of its mandate dealing with matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-
making. They assert that the information withheld was within the scope of the exemption
from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were directly related to the exercise of the
sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of State in the conduct of foreign
affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section 3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 6713.
Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to
the people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of
confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege as a cause for exemption from the
obligation to disclose information must be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for
the exemption. In case of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency
concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to be obtained is
not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted from the coverage of the
constitutional guarantee. We reiterate, therefore, that the burden has been well
discharged herein.
In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of the
people and the interest of the Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the
protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to allow the free exchange of
ideas among Government officials as well as to guarantee the well-considered
recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive public.
7. IN RE: PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS AND THE
ATTENDANCE OF COURT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS WITNESSES UNDER
THE SUBPOENAS OF FEBRUARY 10, 2012 AND THE VARIOUS LETTERS FOR THE
IMPEACHMENT PROSECUTION PANEL DATED JANUARY 19 AND 25, 2012
As far as the Court is concerned, its Members and officials involved in all proceedings are duty-
bound to observe the privileged communication and confidentiality rules if the integrity of the
administration of justice were to be preserved.
Facts: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the
Prosecution Panel manifested in a COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100
witnesses and almost a thousand documents, to be secured from both private and public
offices. The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court
officials and employees who will testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the
Court.
Atty. Vidal, Clerk of the Supreme Court, brought to SC’s attention the Subpoena Ad
Testificandum et Duces Tecum and Subpoena Ad Testificandum she received,
commanding her to appear at 10:00 in the morning of the 13th of February 2012 with the
original and certified true copies of the documents listed above, and to likewise appear in
the afternoon at 2:00 of the same day and everyday thereafter, to produce the listed
documents and to testify. In light of the subpoenas served, the urgent need for a court
ruling and based on the Constitution, the pertinent laws and of the Court's rules and
policies, there should be a determination of how the Court will comply with the subpoenas
and the letters of the Prosecution Impeachment Panel.
Issue: What is the policy of the Court with regard to the access to its records?
Ruling: In line with the public's constitutional right to information, the Court has
adopted a policy of transparency with respect to documents in its possession or custody,
necessary to maintain the integrity of its sworn duty to adjudicate justiciable disputes.
The Members of the Court may not be compelled to testify in the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice or other Members of the Court about information
they acquired in the performance of their official function of adjudication, such as
information on how deliberations were conducted or the material inputs that the justices
used in decision-making, because the end-result would be the disclosure of confidential
information that could subject them to criminal prosecution. Such act violates judicial
privilege (or the equivalent of executive privilege) as it pertains to the exercise of the
constitutional mandate of adjudication.
Jurisprudence implies that justices and judges may not be subject to any compulsory
process in relation to the performance of their adjudicatory functions.
With respect to Court officials and employees, the same rules on confidentiality that apply
to justices and judges apply to them. They are barred from disclosing (1) the result of the
raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the agenda of
the Court's session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases
and matters pending before it. They are subject as well to the disqualification by reason
of privileged communication and the sub judice rule. As stated above, these rules extend
to documents and other communications which cannot be disclosed.
These privileges, incidentally, belong to the Judiciary and are for the Supreme Court (as
the representative and entity speaking for the Judiciary), and not for the individual
justice, judge, or court official or employees to waive. Thus, every proposed waiver must
be referred to the Supreme Court for its consideration and approval.
To state the rule differently, Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on
matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of the Court, in the exercise of
their adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation where
the testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory functions and duties.
8. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND
NET WORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF
THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF
THE JUDICIARY
The information disclosed in the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) is a
matter of public concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
Facts: The Research Director and researcher-writer of Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth (SALN) of the SC Justices for the year 2008 for the purpose of updating their
database of information on government officials. Meanwhile, several requests for copies
of SALN and other personal documents of SC, CA and Sandiganbayan Justices were also
filed. The requests were made for different purposes. Although no direct opposition to the
disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform
position of the said magistrates and the various judges’ associations that the disclosure
must be made in accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such
circumstances that would not undermine the independence of the Judiciary.
Issue: Whether the SALNs of the Justices have to be disclosed for being matters of
public concern and interest.
Ruling: YES. Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN
as a matter of public concern and interest. The right to information goes hand-in-hand
with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service.
The public has the right to know the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests of public officials and employees including those of their spouses and
of unmarried children 18 years of age living in their households.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion
right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right,
the Constitution also provides that the people’s right. Jurisprudence has provided the
following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4)
other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available
to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official
records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
9. People v. Cabalquinto
FACTS: This is a case of child who has been defiled(raped) by her own father. [AAA
stated that her father had raped her seven (7) times since her mother left for abroad. She said
that she distinctly remembered having been raped by her father on November 8, 1998, her
friend's birthday; August 16, 1998 during the fiesta; and on November 13, 1998, the day before
her statement was taken. However, she said no longer remembered the exact dates of the other
incidents. Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, convicted Melchor Cabalquinto
(Cabalquinto) on two (2) counts for the rape of his eight-year old daughter, AAA.]
The mother of the child abuse victim sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice
expressing anxiety over the posting of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its
Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of
the child must prevail over public access to information and pleaded that her daughter’s
case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page. The Court
required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
National Press Club (NPC), Philippine Press Institute (PPI), Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa
Pilipinas (KBP) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to comment on
the issue:
The position of the OSG in its Comment is noteworthy. The OSG submits that the
posting of the full text of decisions in cases involving child abuse on the
Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the aggrieved
parties. In order to determine whether the subject matter upon which the right to
privacy being invoked falls within the constitutionally-protected zone of privacy, it
must be shown that the person’s expectation of privacy is reasonable. The
reasonableness of such expectancy depends on a two–part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.
According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented, through a
parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of
privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to
have intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to
the posting of the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an
expectation of privacy is reasonable considering the various statutes and rules which
reveal the intention of the State to maintain the confidentiality of information
pertaining to child abuse cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to post the full text of decisions of similar cases on
the Supreme Court Web Page in cases involving child sexual abuse.
RULING: NO. The provisions on confidentiality of the ff. enactments uniformly seek
to respect the dignity and protect the privacy of women and their children:
Sec. 29 of RA 7610 Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act provides:
Sec. 29. Confidentiality. — at the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld from
the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and
director in the case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of any
case of a violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the offended
party.
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004similarly provides:
Sec. 44. Confidentiality.—All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their
children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and
employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim.
Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone
number, school, business address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an
immediate family member, without the latter’s consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of
the court.
Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:
Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.—All hearings of cases of violence against
women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the dignity of women
and their children and respect for their privacy.
Taking all these opinions into account and in view of recent enactments which
unequivocally express the intention to maintain the confidentiality of information in
cases involving violence against women and their children, in this case and henceforth,
the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor and shall use
fictitious initials instead to represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of
the victims-survivors or any other information tending to establish or compromise
their identities, as well those of their immediate family or household members,
shall not be disclosed.
10. Ferdinand Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council
The qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence of an applicant
is not an internal regulation; hence, its publication is indispensable. It is but a natural
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial
positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
FACTS: Petitioner Ferdinand Villanueva was appointed as the Judge of Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Compostela – New Bataan. After more than one year of service, he
applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in three branches of RTC (in Tagum
City, Davao City, and Agusan Del Sur). Consequently he was not included by the JBC in
the list of considered applicants since he failed to meet the 5-year service requirement, as
he has been a judge only for more than a year. The petitioner averred that the assailed
policy violates procedural due process for lack of publication and non-submission to the
University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus,
the said policy should have been published.
ISSUE: Whether the 5-year service qualification should have been published.
RULING: YES. The assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have
been published. As a general rule, publication is indispensable in order that all statutes,
including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws,
attain binding force and effect. However, this publication requirement admits of some
exceptions. Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative
rules and regulations exempted from the publication requirement. The assailed policy
involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall determine proven competence
of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it would regulate and
affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process
involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing
to serve in the Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural
consequence thereof that potential applicants be informed of the requirements to the
judicial positions, so that they would be able to prepare for and comply with them.
 Nonetheless, the JBC’s failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
petitioner’s private interest. The petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers
nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these
qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind
one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Documents
the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on
every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues
11. Antolin v. Domondon may be ventilated, the SC deemed it best to remand the cases to the RTC for further
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The
proceedings.
people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is further
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
FACTS: Petitioner Hazel Ma. C. Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Examinations but did
not make it. Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to
respondent Domondon Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy for her to be
furnished a copy of her answer sheets and the questionnaires of the seven subjects she
took together with their answer keys. She was given only the copy of her answer sheet and
nothing else. The respondent contended that Section 36 of Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332 and Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No.
338 preclude the Board from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer
sheet) and that the same constituted a valid limitation on petitioner’s right to information
and access to government documents.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Antolin has the right to demand access to the Examination
Papers in view of her right to information as enshrined in the Constitution.
RULING: YES. Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. The people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is
further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the State’s policy
of full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The Court has always grappled with the
meanings of the terms public interest and public concern. The SC has also recognized the
need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security,
trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.
SC conceded that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are
matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular,
would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these
exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely
quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and
learning of the art and science of accounting. On the other hand, there may be valid
reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the
exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist