Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on
pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May
3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case
No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and
the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.

The antecedents:

On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the
inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case
for continuation of trial.3

On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule,
does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the
rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.

After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC,
in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that
can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil
aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a
party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.

Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking
the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter
No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.

On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had
already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.

On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:

I.

the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity
of granting the writ;

II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW;

III.

THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN

IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS
DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI;

IV.

THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC’S).4

This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5

Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law
student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in
Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.

The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as
an agent or friend of a party litigant.

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf
of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney
duly accredited by the law school.

Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his
3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board
or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under
the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly
accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers
to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed
to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8

SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules
of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must
have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of
appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to
act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis
for the petitioner’s appearance.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability
may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.

It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case
do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10

The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO,
petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino
along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a
result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial
court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation
was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two
(2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's
En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of
office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice
of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his
probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18
June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of
good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard
as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license
to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the
elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the
good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means
that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character
expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of
a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is
to aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path
than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of
 requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for,
after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and
annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or
business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual
attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one of
them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character,
like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of
their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts
could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have
fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law
unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more
important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning.
Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar
with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will
become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to
his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry
is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope
than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him
for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his
disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his
guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry
into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his
co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed
of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar
examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter
alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known
Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show
to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has
become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the
father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of
this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
WILSON PO CHAM, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDILBERTO D. PIZARRO, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before this Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Wilson Po Cham
(complainant) against Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro (respondent) for commission of falsehood and
misrepresentations in violation of a lawyers oath.

Complainant gives the following account of the facts that spawned the filing of the present
administrative complaint.

Sometime in July 1995, Emelita Caete (Caete), Elenita Alipio (Alipio), and now deceased Mario
Navarro (Navarro) who was then the Municipal Assessor of Morong, Bataan, offered for sale to
him a parcel of land with an area of approximately forty (40) hectares, identified as Lot 1683 of
Cad. Case No. 262, situated at Sitio Gatao, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan (the property).

He having expressed interest in the offer, Caete and Navarro arranged a meeting between him
and respondent at the latters residence in Balanga, Bataan1[1] where respondent categorically
represented to him that the property being offered for sale was alienable and disposable.2[2]
Respondent in fact presented to him 1) Real Property Tax Order of Payment3[3] dated July 10,
1995 covering the property signed by Edna P. Pizarro as Municipal Treasurer and Navarro as
Municipal Assessor; 2) a Deed of Absolute Sale4[4] dated July 25, 1995 purportedly executed by
the alleged previous actual occupant of the property, one Jose R. Monzon (Monzon), transferring
all his rights, interest and possession thereover in favor of Virgilio Banzon (Banzon), Rolando B.
Zabala (Zabala) and respondent for an agreed consideration of P500,000.00; and 3) Special
Power of Attorney5[5] dated July 25, 1995 executed by Banzon and Zabala authorizing him
(respondent) to:
1. x x x offer to sell [their] rights over a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly
described as follows:

AREA: 40 has. more or less

situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan covered by Tax Declaration

No. 6066 PIN #108-08-044-05-126

2. x x x negotiate and enter into a contract for the consumation (sic) of sale of the subject
property; and to sign the same.

3. x x x receive proceeds thereof with obligation to distribute the corresponding share of

each co-owner;

x x x6[6] (Underscoring supplied)

On July 25, 1995, he as buyer and respondent as seller executed an Option to Buy,7[7] the
pertinent portions of which provide:

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the owner and Attorney-In-Fact of his co-owners of rights with
planted trees (improvements) containing an area of FORTY THREE (43) hectares, situated in
Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan; (Portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong
Cadastre), covered by Tax Declaration 6066.

WHEREAS, the BUYER is interested to buy the same for a total price of THREE MILLION
AND SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P3,700,000.00) payable in two (2) gives (sic),
as follows:

a) Earnest money of P10,000.00 upon signing of this contract and the balance of full
payment within three (3) weeks from date hereof which offer the SELLER accepts;

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the terms and
conditions hereunder specified the parties have agreed on the following:

1) That the Buyer shall give an option money and earnest (sic) of P10,000.00 upon signing
of this contract, which shall form part of the contract price if and when the buyer comply (sic)
with his obligation to pay in full within three (3) weeks from date hereof, otherwise should the
BUYER fails (sic) to comply with his obligation to pay in full on the scheduled period the
P10,000.00 earnest money shall be forfeited in favor of the SELLER and the Option to Buy is
automatically cancelled.

2) That the SELLER upon full payment of the price shall execute a final Deed of Sale and
shall surrender all documents, plans and paper relative to the properties subject of sale;

3) That the SELLER shall warrants (sic) their rights and claims over the above stated
properties including the trees planted on it as against the rights of third party except that of the
government.8[8] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In accordance with the terms of the Option to Buy, he paid respondent the amount of P10,000.00
for which respondent issued the corresponding Receipt9[9] reading:

Received the sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) from MR. WILSON CHAM,
representing earnest/option money for Lot 1683 of Cad. Case No. 262 situated at Boundaries:

NORTH : Right of Catalino Agujo

SOUTH : National Road-Bagac-Morong
WEST : Right of Nicasio Canta
EAST : Sapang Batang Panao

including the trees and improvement situated thereon.

Full payment shall be paid within three (3) weeks from date hereof.10[10] (Underscoring supplied)

On August 21, 1995, respondent executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11[11] over the property in his
favor, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
For and in consideration of the sum of THREE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY
TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY THREE (P3,372,533.00), Philippine Currency,
the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged from the BUYER to the entire satisfaction of the
SELLERS, the said SELLERS do by these presents SELL, TRANSFER and CONVEY, in
manner absolute and irrevocable, in favor of the said BUYER, his heirs and assigns, all their
rights, interest and participation over that certain real estate destined for, and in actual use as
fruit land, situated at Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan and more particularly
described as follows:

Location : Pook Batangas, Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan

Area : That portion of Lot 1683, Cad. 262, Morong Cadastre, containing an area of 392,155
square meters more or less.

Boundaries : North : Right of Catalino Agujo

South : National Road, Bagac-Morong
West : Right of Nicasio Canta
East : Sapang Batang Panao

The SELLERS do hereby declare that the boundaries of the foregoing land are visible by means
of monuments, creeks and trees; that the land including the permanent improvements existing
thereon consist of fruit-bearing trees assessed for the current year at TWO HUNDRED SIXTY
TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED P262,400.00 as per Tax Declaration No. 5010; and that
the property is presently in the possession of the SELLERS.

The SELLERS hereby agree with the BUYER that they are the absolute owners of the rights
over the said property; that they have the perfect right to convey the same; that they acquired
their rights over the said property by absolute deed of sale from Jose R. Monzon who acquired
his rights over the property from Marianito Holgado; that Marianito Holgado acquired his right
from Pedro de Leon who, in turn, acquired his right from Julian Agujo who was the original
owner who cleared the land and who was in possession of the same immediately after the Second
World War.

The SELLERS warrant their rights and claims over the aforedescribed real estate including the
trees planted thereon and they undertake to defend the same unto said Vendee, his heirs and
assigns against the claims of any third person whomsoever.12[12] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Respondent thereafter furnished him with a copy of Tax Declaration No. 501013[13] with Property
Index No. 018-08-004-05-126 issued in his (respondents) name and his alleged co-owners, and
Real Property Tax Receipt No. 02520114[14] dated August 17, 1995 issued in his (respondents)
name.

He thus gave respondent two checks dated August 21, 1995 representing the purchase price of
the rights over the property, Asian Bank Corporation Check No. GA06321015[15] in the amount of
P168,627.00 payable to respondent, and Asian Bank Managers Check No. 004639GA16[16] in the
amount of P3,193,906.00 payable to respondent, Banzon and Zabala.

He subsequently took possession of the property and installed a barbed wire fence at its front
portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached him and informed him that the property
could not be fenced as it was part of the Bataan National Park.17[17]

Upon investigation, he discovered that the property is not an alienable or disposable land
susceptible of private ownership. He thus secured a Certification18[18] from the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENR) in Bagac, Bataan of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated July 2, 1998, signed by CENR Officer
Laurino D. Macadangdang, reading:

This pertains to your request for a certification as to the status of land claimed by spouses
Perfecto and Purificacion, Jose Monson, et. al, Virgilio Banzon and Edilberto Pizarro, all located
at Nagbalayong, Morong, Bataan.

Please be informed that per verification conducted by the personnel of this Office, said lands fall
within the Bataan Natural Park per L.C. Map/N.P. Map No. 34 as certified on December 1, 1945.
Under the Public Land Law, lands within this category are not subject for disposition.19[19]
(Underscoring supplied)

He also obtained a Letter-directive20[20] dated August 31, 1995 issued by Officer-in-Charge

Ricardo R. Alarcon of the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENR) of
Balanga, Bataan to the Municipal Assessor, the pertinent portions of which read:

Please be informed that it comes to our attention that there are some forest occupants that are
securing land tax declarations from your office in (sic) the pretext that the area they
occupied (sic) were (sic) within alienable and disposable lands. Presently, this tax
declaration is being used in the illegal selling of right [of] possession within the Bataan
Natural Park which is prohibited under our laws.

xxx

In this regard, I would like to request for your assistance by way of informing us and in
controlling this land rush and massive selling and buying of rights of possession within
prohibited areas as stated above.21[21] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Upon his request, the PENR issued a Certification22[22] dated March 14, 1996 stating that those
named by respondent as prior owners of rights over the property from whom respondent and his
alleged co-owners acquired their alleged rights were not among those inventoried as occupants
per the PENRs 1978 to 1994 Forest Occupancy Census (IFO) Survey.

Despite repeated demands, respondent refused to return the purchase price of the rights over the
property.23[23]
In his present complaint24[24] dated September 10, 2001, complainant charges respondent to have
violated his oath as a member of the Bar in committing manifest falsehood and evident
misrepresentation by employing fraudulent means to lure him into buying rights over the
property which property he represented to be disposable and alienable.25[25]

In his Comment26[26] dated January 12, 2002, respondent denied having employed deceit or
having pretended to co-own rights over the property or having represented that it was alienable
and disposable. He claimed that complainant, being engaged in speculation in the purchase of
property, knew exactly the character and nature of the object of his purchase;27[27] and that
despite complainants awareness that he was merely buying rights to forest land, he just the same
voluntarily entered into the transaction because of the propertys proximity to the Subic Bay
Economic Zone.

Respondent surmised that complainant bought the rights over the property in the hope that lands
belonging to the public domain in Morong would be eventually declared alienable and
disposable to meet the rising demand for economic zones.28[28]

By Resolution29[29] of February 6, 2002, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90)
days from notice.

On May 6, 2002, complainant filed before the IBP his Reply30[30] to respondents Comment,
maintaining that the sale of rights over the property was attended with deceit as respondent
deliberately did not disclose that the property was within the confines of the Bataan National
Park.31[31] And he denied being engaged in speculation, he claiming that with his purchase of the
property, he would venture into low-cost housing for the employees of the nearby Subic Bay
area.32[32]

To complainants Reply, respondent filed his Rejoinder on June 21, 2002.33[33]

Complainant later filed his Affidavit34[34] and Position Paper35[35] on June 21, 2002 and
September 17, 2001, respectively, reiterating his assertions in his previous pleadings.

The record shows that complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent,
Banzon, Zabala, Caete, Alipio and Navarro in 199936[36] arising from the questioned sale of
rights. The complaint was twice dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On petition
for review, however, the Department of Justice, through then Secretary Hernando B. Perez, by
Resolution37[37] of March 6, 2002, reversed the dismissal of the complaint as it found probable
cause to indict respondent et al. in court. An information for estafa was thereupon filed against
respondent et al. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-00-94232.

By Report and Recommendation of April 20, 2004, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), through Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, finding respondent to have violated his oath as
a member of the Bar to do no falsehood and misrepresentations, recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three (3) months, subject to the approval of the members of the
Board of Governors. Pertinent portions of the Report and Recommendation read:

. . . [I]t is evident that as early as of (sic) 1992, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
NIPAS ACT38[38] prohibited the illegal selling of rights or possession of the areas occupied
within the Bataan Natural Park, the subject property not excluded as per letter of OIC CENRO
Laurino D. Mapadanig [illegible], Bagac, Bataan per L.C. map/N.P. Map No. 34 to the
Municipal Assessor therein and certified on December 1, 1945 that subject property which is
within this category was not subject for disposition; a fact supposed to be known by the
respondent being a resident of Balanga, Bataan and was in the practice of his profession also in
said area.

Aside from the fact that the alleged original owner Monzon was not among those inventoried
occupants as per Forest Occupancy (IFO) Survey since 1978 up to the latest census in 1994 from
whom respondent allegedly bought the subject property; the Absolute Deed of Sale executed
between the complainant Wilson Po Cham and the respondent relative to the same subject
property was not notarized which partook the nature of a private and not official document.

Although respondent furnished complainant the foregoing documents to prove their rights,
interest and possession to the subject property, respondent and his co-owners failed to show a
permit from the government conferring upon them rights or concessions over the subject
property, which formed part of the Bataan Natural Park classified as public and not subject to
disposition, therefore respondent and his co-owners have no rights and interests whatsoever over
the subject property and their representations to complainant were simply not true but a
falsehood.

Respondent being extensively conversant and knowledgeable about the law took advantage of
his versatility in the practice of law and committed misrepresentations that he and his co-owners
have irrevocable rights, interests and possession over the subject property which convinced
complainant into purchasing subject property unmindful that the same is not alienable or
disposable being a portion of the public domain; whereby respondent violated his solemn oath as
member of the Philippine Bar for having committed such falsehood and misrepresentations to the
complainant.39[39] (Underscoring supplied).
By CBD Resolution No. XVI-2004-407 of October 7, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the April 20, 2004 Committee Report and Recommendation.

The case was forwarded to this Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.40[40]

The IBP findings are well-taken.

The Bar is enjoined to maintain a high standard of not only legal proficiency but of honesty and
fair dealing.41[41] Thus, a member should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any
degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
legal profession.42[42]

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to thus render him unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him, may be sanctioned with
disbarment or suspension.43[43]

Thus, under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2)
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral conduct; 4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.

And he may be faulted under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
mandates a member of the Bar to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law. Rule
1.01 of the Code specifically enjoins him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Conduct, as used in this rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection
with the performance of professional duties.44[44]

In the case at bar, as reflected above, complainant presented certifications from the DENR that
the property is part of the public domain and not disposable as it is within the Bataan National
Park. Indeed, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2445[45] issued on December 1, 1945, all properties of
the public domain therein designated as part of the Bataan National Park were withdrawn from
sale, settlement or other disposition, subject to private rights.

On the other hand, respondent has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having
irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to complainant.
E.g., he could have presented any document issued by the government conferring upon him and
his alleged co-owners, or even upon his alleged predecessors-in-interest, with any such right or
interest, but he presented none. He merely presented a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly
executed by a certain Jose R. Monzon in his, Banzons and Zabalas favor on July 25, 1995, a
month shy of the execution on August 21, 1995 of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
complainant.

The tax declaration and receipt which respondent presented do not help his cause any as neither
tax receipts nor realty tax declarations are sufficient evidence of the right of possession over
realty unless supported by other effective proof.46[46] The presentation of a tax declaration must
indeed have been a pretext, as observed by the PENR in its earlier-quoted portion of its letter-
directive to the Balanga Municipal Assessor that the area occupied . . . [is] within alienable and
disposable land.

Respondent must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing complainant to purchase, for
P3,372,533.00, non-existent irrevocable rights, interest and participation over an inalienable
property.

In Lizaso v. Amante47[47] where therein respondent lawyer enticed the therein complainant to
invest in the casino business with the proposition that her investment would yield her substantial
profit, but therein respondent not only failed to deliver the promised return on the investment but
also the principal thereof, this Court took occasion to expound on sanctioning lawyers for
committing fraud, deceit or falsehood in their private dealings:

It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent Amante
and complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that complainant entered into with respondent
did not require respondent to perform professional legal services for complainant nor did that
transaction relate to the rendition of professional services by respondent to any other person.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez the principle that it can
exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an
attorney and client. x x x

x x x [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown,
through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty as
render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal
business of others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court
which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of a
good moral character.

xxx

The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness, whether relating to
professional or non-professional matters, justifies suspension or disbarment, was expressed by
Mr. Chief Justice Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence and restraint:

As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters
which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the
standard of test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the
determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and
dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to
be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. x x x
misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-
professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.

The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo x xx:

The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out
of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice,
when the attorneys character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.48[48]
(Italics in the original)

This Lizaso ruling was reiterated in Co v. Bernardino49[49] and Lao v. Medel.50[50]

To be sure, complainant is not entirely blameless. Had he exhibited a modicum of prudence

before entering into the transaction with respondent, he would have spared himself from
respondents sham.

It is jurisprudentially established though that in a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the

complainant is not blameless or is in pari delicto as this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the
complainant, but one to purge the law profession of unworthy members to protect the public and
the courts.51[51]

The record does not disclose the status of the estafa case against respondent. His conviction or
acquittal is not, however, essential insofar as the present administrative case against him is
concerned.52[52]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and
they may proceed independently of x x x criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, clearly preponderant
evidence is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative
proceedings.
It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result
in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondents acquittal does
not necessarily exculpate him administratively.53[53] (Emphasis supplied)

It is not thus sound judicial policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless
from vigorously applying the rules on admission to and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is pending final disposition when the
objectives of the two proceedings are vastly disparate.54[54]

While the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the imposition of so severe a
penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of this Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar
must, nonetheless, be exercised as it cannot be denied that respondent violated his solemn oath as
a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.55[55]

The penalty of suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP is not, however,
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong committed by respondent. This Court finds that
respondents suspension from the practice of law for One (1) Year is warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, is SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for One (1) Year and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will merit a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.

EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the
said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including
a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution
and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976,
reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint
reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties
were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter
was thenceforth submitted for resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that
the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-
A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of
the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III,
of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2
Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to
issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:

SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these

words of the Court Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official

national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,'
composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court
Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-
condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him
by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are
made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke
the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case
before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for
the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the

arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities.
Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all
the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the
Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations
of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and
legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of
the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia
vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of
the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body
corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because
then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all
individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

 xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in

all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of
law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of
law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and
are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit
himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the
public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to
compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence,
Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right
of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be
a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All
that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost
of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries
of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a

member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent
acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of
his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of
its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and
under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike
the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or
statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate,
indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an
arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative
likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they
are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the
Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of
the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ...
and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec.
5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the
legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional
nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion,

Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan : 151809-12 : April 12, 2005 : J. Callejo Sr : En Banc : Dissenting
Opinion

EN BANC

[G.R. NOS. 151809-12. April 12, 2005]

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, v.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN,
FLORENCIO T. SANTOS, NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI
NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO TAN KEE HIONG
(represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN,
TAN ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL
KHOO, JAIME KHOO, ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG,
ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA, WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING
CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY, INC.,
BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.,
GRANDSPAN DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING
SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT CORP.,
NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC.,
SHAREHOLDINGS, INC., SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes' proverbial 'bad man who
wants to know just how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without
running into trouble with the law. Rather, it is drawn for the 'good man as a beacon to assist him
in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct.1
ςrνll

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case behooves
the Court to strictly apply the Code of Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical
compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the profession, often find themselves in the
unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without exception, no
profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity;
in which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are continually arising.2 The Code of
Professional Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal
profession and the Court must not shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its
provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any departure from the 'straight and narrow
path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers to be like Caesar's
wife - to be pure and appear to be so.3

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 14 of then President
Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a complaint for 'reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages'
against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos,
Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian,5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong
(represented by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung
Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso
Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation, Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel
Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services
and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant,
Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and
Development Corp. (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don
Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of
sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking
advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by
the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein as
follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A. Civil Case No. 0096 - Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding
and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG,
which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in
Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano
Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel
Holdings, Inc.;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

b. Civil Case No. 0097 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's
Order dated August 12, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by
and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and
Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c. Civil Case No. 0098 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tobacco
Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen
Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr.,
Shareholdings, Inc.; andcralawlibrary

d. Civil Case No. 0099 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T.
Santos, Natividad Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG's
Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or
in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and
Natividad Santos.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of
former President Marcos.

The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor
General and counsel to the Central Bank, 'actively intervened in the liquidation of General Bank
and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al.
and became Allied Banking Corporation. As shown above, among the litigated properties are the
sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).

The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as

follows:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial difficulties. The
Central Bank then extended an emergency loan to GENBANK reaching a total of P310 million.
In extending this loan, the Central Bank, however, took control of GENBANK with the
execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK's outstanding shares in favor of the
Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of
Directors of GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central
Bank issued a Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business and
placing it under receivership.

2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities was
scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on March 28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding were: (a)
submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to
guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and (b) a 2-year period to
repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. 'On March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a
Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy
Co. This bid, among other things, offered to pay only P500,000.00 for GENBANK assets
estimated at P688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts of P103,984,477.55; Cash of P25,698,473.00;
and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices. The required letter of credit
was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfilo O.
Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the
advances of the Central Bank in the amount of P310 million. Without this letter of commitment,
the Lucio Tan bid would not have been approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud
because it was not meant to be fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O.
Domingo conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as the doing away
with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of the term of payment from two
years to five years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances
which was deficient by more than P90 Million, and many other concessions to the great
prejudice of the government and of the GENBANK stockholders.

3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977. Respondents
Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co and Florencio T. Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they
are also the major shareholders of this new bank.6 ςrνll

Atty. Mendoza allegedly 'intervened in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al.
since Atty. Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank's officials
on the procedure to bring about GENBANK's liquidation. Further, he appeared as counsel for the
Central Bank in connection with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. He
filed the said petition with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of and
docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812.7 ςrνll

The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza's present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers
from accepting 'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.

Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the assailed Resolution
dated July 11, 2001 stating:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Acting on the PCGG's 'MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to have been resolved
by then Second Division of this Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in
substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his
'OPPOSITION dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his opposition to the
same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court's Order dated March 7,
1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005
(pp. 134-135, Vol. I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts
the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp. 1418-
1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said motion as its Resolution in the
case at bar.8 ςrνll
The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the assailed
Resolution dated December 5, 2001, which
reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Acting on respondent PCGG's 'MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated August 1, 2001

praying for the reconsideration of the Court's Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion
to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed
an 'OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001 dated
August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent's 'REPLY (To Opposition to Motion for
Reconsideration) dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic v. Lucio Tan, et al.) and
the resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion
as well as of the motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG
failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby
DENIED.9 ςrνll

The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005, which was adopted by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar
motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence,
that the PCGG 'has failed to prove that there exists an inconsistency between Atty. Mendoza's
former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group.11 The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained,
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under consideration is
not whether the attorney has ever appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear, but
whether his accepting the new retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new
client, to do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he
formerly represented against him, and whether he will be called upon, in his new relation, to use
against his former client any knowledge or information acquired through their former
connection. Nor does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having once been
employed by a client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter against him but merely forbids
the attorney's appearance or acting against the client where the attorney can use, to the detriment
of such client, the information and confidences acquired during the existence of their relation as
attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp. 828-829, cited in Primavera Farms, Inc., et al. v. PCGG, supra).
Significantly, PCGG's 'Reply does not controvert Atty. Mendoza's claim that in appearing in the
instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of the Central
Bank of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty. Mendoza's claim that
the position he took as Solicitor General in behalf of the Central Bank in 1977 when he filed the
said case (SP No. 107812) has been maintained by his successors in office. In fact, even
incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed no objection to Atty. Mendoza's
appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as long as he maintains the same position he
has taken on behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which position
refers to the various resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank in regard
General Bank and Trust Co. as being regular and in accordance with law (Annex 'A', Rejoinder,
Records, Pp. 1404-1405).12 ςrνll

The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza's appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The
said provision prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his
resignation, retirement or separation from public office.

As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was
adopted by the Fifth Division in the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the
recourse to this Court by the PCGG.

Procedural Issues

The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether the assailed
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final
and executory; hence, the PCGG should have filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 thereof;
and (2) whether the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division)
Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.

In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant Petition for
Certiorari, respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which
reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified Petition for Review on Certiorari . The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
likewise, states:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. -

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The above-mentioned
rules do not preclude the resort to this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court of orders or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil action of
certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.13 ςrνll
In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of its motion
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order;
hence, not appealable. The word 'interlocutory refers to 'something intervening between the
commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter, but is not a final
decision of the whole controversy.14 An interlocutory order does not terminate nor does it finally
dispose of the case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties' contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits.15 ςrνll

Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions for certiorari of
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example,
in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan ,16 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the Petition for
Certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan denying the petition for bail,
motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio. Also, in San
Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan ,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions
for certiorari of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered shares of
stock in the San Miguel Corp.

To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to assail
the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant
petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22,
1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the doctrine of res judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application in this case.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in

part:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by
a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be
as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or
special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
capacity; andcralawlibrary

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts (1) bar by former judgment and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment.18 Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res
adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while paragraph (c) estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness
of judgment.19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit ,20 Justice Artemio Panganiban
explained that the term 'final in the phrase judgments or final orders in the above section has two
accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal because
the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible
tribunal involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be
done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory.22 The phrase refers to a final determination
as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral
matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss
or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of judgment
apply only to those falling under the second category.23 ςrνll

For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must
concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the
two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.24 When there is no identity of
causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment.25 ςrνll

In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment,
the doctrine of res judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier
discussed, leaves nothing else to be done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a judgment or an
order on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is upheld, as
distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point.26 To reiterate, the said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some
incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.

The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No.
0005 denying the PCGG's similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. therein was evidently an interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose
of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or collateral matter arising therein. As such, it
cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases
because, strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by prior
judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders
adjudicating interlocutory motions.27

Substantive Issue

The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction
embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility

reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that
justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.

A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted
from the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA).28 Rule 6.03, in
particular, is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provided:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which
he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not
after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to
promote or advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he
intervened as a public official.29 Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to
lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows that the interdiction (1)
applies to a lawyer who once served in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting
'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in
said service.

In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations applicable to former
government lawyers is called the 'revolving door - the process by which lawyers temporarily
enter government service from private life then leave it for large fees in private practice, where
they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.30 To
address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private practice
may be sought based either on 'adverse-interest conflict or 'congruent-interest representation
conflict.

In the 'adverse-interest conflict, a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a

client in private practice if the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with
while employed by the government and if the interests of the current and former clients are
adverse.31 It must be observed that the 'adverse-interest conflict applies to all lawyers in that they
are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the
interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are the
same or substantially related.32 On the other hand, in 'congruent-interest representation conflict,
the disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer from
representing a private practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the
new client are entirely parallel.33 The 'congruent-interest representation conflict, unlike the
'adverse-interest conflict, is unique to former government lawyers.

I believe that Atty. Mendoza's present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil
Case No. 0096, which involves the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates
the ethical precept embodied in Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, which is
akin to the doctrine of 'congruent-interest representation conflict.

Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject

matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with

or related to a 'matter, i.e. the liquidation

of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had

intervened as the Solicitor General

The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) 'any matter and
(2) 'he had intervened thereon while he was in the government service.34 ςrνll

The United States' ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to formulate a
precise definition of 'matter as used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested
that the term 'contemplates a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transaction between
identifiable parties.35 ςrνll

There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the
procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by respondents
Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with the then CFI of, the petition for assistance in the
liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No. 107812).36 GENBANK was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp., whose shares of stocks
have been sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096.

The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he 'merely advised the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK which procedure is 'given in black
and white in R.A. No. 265, section 29. This procedural advice, according to the majority opinion,
'is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling within the
contemplation of the term 'matter within the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty. Mendoza's
giving counsel to the Central Bank on the procedure to go about GENBANK's liquidation and
the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No. 107812 did not merely involve the
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law.37 These acts were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable
transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, i.e., the procedure for
the liquidation of GENBANK. Consequently, the same can be properly considered 'matter within
the contemplation of Rule 6.03.

Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in Rule 6.03 does
not only apply if precisely the same legal issues are involved in each representation.38 The
Comments of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of Professional
Responsibility explained that the restriction covers 'engagement or employment, which means
that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the
matter in which he intervened as a public official.39 The sequestration of the shares of stock in
Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No.
0096, necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in
which Atty. Mendoza had intervened as the Solicitor General.

It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza's participation in GENBANK's liquidation is

sufficient to place his present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case
No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His role was significant and substantial. The
Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials40 of the Central Bank, is
revealing:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and
evaluation had been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is
believed that the bank can not be reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted
to resume business with safety to its depositors and creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank
and indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing
decision to liquidate the bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the
proceedings which had been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank.41 ςrνll

The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that Atty.
Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him
in filing with the court the petition for assistance in the bank's liquidation. The pertinent portion
of the said minutes reads:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The Board decided as follows:

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject
memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March
29, 1977, together with copies of:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of
Genbank;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23,
1977;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary
Board, dated March 24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended
by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments;
andcralawlibrary

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General.

for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the Court in
the liquidation of Genbank.42 ςrνll

By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK and,
more significantly, by filing the petition for assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had
clearly intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents
Tan, et al.

I disagree with the ponencia's holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as having
intervened as it describes the participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he 'had no iota of
participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK.

That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central Bank,
without the participation of Atty. Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his participation in
the proceedings taken subsequent to such declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the Central Bank
on how to proceed with GENBANK's liquidation and his filing of the petition in Special
Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 2943 of Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes
'intervention as to place him within the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means'

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or

come between points of time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or
modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to occur or lie between two things '44 ςrνll
Further, 'intervention is defined as'

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;

2: interference that may affect the interests of others '45 ςrνll

With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the Central Bank
on how to proceed with GENBANK's liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with
the court, Atty. Mendoza 'had intervened, 'had come in, or 'had interfered, in the liquidation of
GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking
institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK as well as its
stockholders.

Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies

even if Atty. Mendoza did not 'switch sides' or did not

take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if

no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza's

former government client (Central Bank) and

his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)

As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA's Canons of

Professional Ethics, now superseded by the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu
of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
that:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9101(B) commands,
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee.

The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion
No. 37, is [to avoid] the manifest possibility that ' [a former Government lawyer's] action as a
public legal official might be influenced (or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by
the hope of later being employed privately to uphold or upset what he had done.46 ςrνll

The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the policy
consideration that an attorney must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil.47 ςrνll
Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American courts and
the ABA has persuasive effect on the interpretation of Rule 6.03.48 Accordingly, I find the case
of General Motors Corporation v. City of New York,49 where the pertinent ethical precepts were
applied by the United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit), particularly instructive. The said US
court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of New York in the antitrust case it
filed against the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US
Department of Justice, had not only participated in the latter's case against General Motors Corp.
but signed the complaint in that action.

George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, served as a trial
attorney assigned at the General Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US
Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962. Sometime in 1954, he participated in the investigation
of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the city and intercity bus business.
The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust complaint against General Motors
Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time
that he left the Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.

In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft 'has not
changed sides' - i.e. 'there is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two governments in
question, stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the
ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of the side chosen in private
practice. The said court believed that it 'is as it should be for there lurks great potential for
lucrative returns in following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of
governmental resources.50 ςrνll

The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but he signed the
complaint in that action and admittedly had 'substantial responsibility in its investigatory and
preparatory stages. It thus concluded that 'where the overlap of issues is so plain and the
involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the appearance of impropriety must be
avoided through disqualification.51 ςrνll

The General Motors case is illustrative of the 'congruent-interest representation conflict doctrine.
It bears stressing that this doctrine applies uniquely to former government lawyers and has been
distinguished from the normal rule applicable for non-government lawyers in this wise'

To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has
represented passenger A and has recovered substantial damages in a suit against a driver. No
conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the lawyer from later representing passenger B
against the driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may obtain the benefits of the
lawyer's help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ to B's advantage
information and strategies developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the
interest of A and B do not conflict.

The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into one that is
arguably more connected with the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents
Small Soap Company in its suit for damages under the federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap
Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified from representing Medium Soap Company
against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for damages based on precisely the same conspiracy. The
congruence of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly mean that
the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a conflict - an opposing interest
between the two clients ' the existence of a substantial relationship between the matters involved
in both cases is irrelevant.

Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant Soap Company
to force divestiture of an acquired company on a theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant
Soap has monopolized an industry in conflict with antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving
government service and while in private practice, represent Medium Soap Company against
Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does the absence of
opposing interests between Medium Soap and the lawyer's former government client similarly
mean that there should be no disqualification?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the normal
former-client conflict rules: the lawyer is disqualified from representing the successive client in
private practice, despite the fact that the interests of the client and the lawyer's former
government client are apparently aligned. All that is required for disqualification is the
relationship between the former and the succeeding representations.52 ςrνll

The rationale for the 'congruent-interest representation conflict doctrine has been explained,
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other rule would
have upon the decisions and actions taken by the government lawyer during the course of the
earlier representation of the government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the fear
that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf of a government client that later could be to the
advantage of private practice client would present grave dangers that a government lawyer's
largely discretionary actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure private
practice employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice clients'

The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not idle. Lawyers
who represent the government often exercise enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client
who oversees the lawyer's work. For that reason a special rule is needed to remove the incentive
for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions with an eye cast toward advantages in
future, nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification accomplishes that and,
particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm with
which the former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily discouraging
lawyers from entering temporary public service.53 ςrνll

The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual reading of
Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or
adverse interests is required for the interdiction to apply. If it were so, or if conflict of interests
were an element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule 15.03)54 would apply. Rather,
the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly covers 'engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. To reiterate, the drafters of our Code
of Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer 'cannot accept any work
or employment from anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened as a
public official, except on behalf of the body or authority which he served during his public
employment.55 ςrνll

In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the Central Bank but
respondents Tan, et al. Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice clients
(respondents Tan, et al.) and former government client (Central Bank) are apparently aligned, the
interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.

Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit

temporal limitation because cases have to be

resolved based on their peculiar circumstances

Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of the
provisions therein. That Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is
deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time is a factor to consider in determining its
applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For example, in Control Data
Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US District Court of Minnesota held that the
lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee of the Department of Justice had been in charge
of negotiations in antitrust case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel
for the plaintiffs suing such corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose conduct was the
subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited, was himself 10 years removed from the matter
over which he had substantial responsibility while in public employ at the time he accepted the
private engagement relating to the same matter.57 Clearly, it is the degree of involvement or
participation in the matter while in government service, not the passage of time, which is the
crucial element in Rule 6.03.

The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that 'body of principles
by which the conduct of members of the legal profession is controlled. More specifically and
practically considered, legal ethics may be defined as that branch of moral science which treats
of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his clients, to the courts, to the bar, and to the
public.58 In this connection, the Court has consistently characterized disciplinary proceedings,
including disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor pure criminal,
they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They]
may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon
a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice59
ςrνll

For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in
disqualification cases against lawyers.

In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that had lapsed is
not sufficient to consider it far removed from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the said
liquidation is still pending with the Court.60 The validity of the sequestration of the shares in
Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is necessarily
intertwined with Special Proceeding No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and
the acquisition thereof by respondents Tan, et al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are
so overlapping and the involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain,
direct and substantial, his disqualification as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No.
0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03.

Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar

circumstances of this case justify the strict application
of Rule 6.03

The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would have a
'chilling effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.
This concern is similar to that raised by the City of New York in the General Motors case where
it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would 'chill the ardor for Government
service by rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ.61 It appeared that
the City of New York relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v.
Standard Oil Co,62 knownasthe Esso Export Case,
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long
a time, or will prevent him from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which he has
devoted years in acquiring, and if that sterilization will spread to the firm which he becomes
associated, the sacrifice of entering government service will be too great for most men to make.63
ςrνll

Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice Irving F.
Kaufman, also the ponente of the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that the
said court denied the motion to disqualify the former government lawyer in Esso Export Case
because the lawyer therein 'never investigated or passed upon the subject matter of the pending
case - never rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal advice in relation to the
regulations involved in the litigation.64 Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high
ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into
Government service, on the other, was struck under far different circumstances of the Esso
Export Case.
In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The Former
Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics65 was considered more to the
point:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the attorney,
although he did not 'investigate or 'pass upon it, ', there would undoubtedly be an appearance of
evil if he were not disqualified.66 ςrνll

Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case for the
cautious application of the 'appearance-of-evil doctrine because the former Government lawyer's
connection with the matter at issue was the tenuous one of mere employment in the same
Government agency.

In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and
preparatory stages, but also signed the complaint in the action. Thus, according to the US court,
where the overlap of issues is so plain, and the involvement while in Government employ so
direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification cases involving former
government lawyers will have to be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending
each case. A balance between the two seemingly conflicting policy considerations of maintaining
high ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging
entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck based on, inter alia, the relationship
between the former and the succeeding representations of the former government lawyer.
Likewise, as already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter while in Government
employ is a crucial element in determining if his present representation is within the purview of
Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation
of GENBANK while he was the Solicitor General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety
must be avoided through disqualification.

Conclusion

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was improperly
influenced while in government service or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to
represent respondents Tan, et al. However, I am constrained to vote for his disqualification in
Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety lest it taint both the public
and private segments of the legal profession.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify Atty.
Estelito P. Mendoza is GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 4346 April 3, 2002

ERLINDA ABRAGAN, MILA GINA JAVIER, REYNALDO MERCADO, PATERNO

TORRES, BENIGNA ANTIBO, ELEISER SALVADOR, EDNA SAPON, JULIANA
CUENCA, ESPERANZA BUENAFE, VICENTE BARNAGA, MARTHA SAPON,
JOSEFINA OPEÑA, PUREZA WABE, RONULFO LOPEZ, DOMINADOR
HERNANDEZ, FELIPA EMBATE, ROQUE CATIIL, JERRY SAPON, CONCEPCION
MATANOG, and PABLO SALOMON, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. MAXIMO G. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers violate their oath of office when they represent conflicting interests. They taint not only
their own professional practice, but the entire legal profession itself.1âwphi1.nêt

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Petition1 praying for the disbarment of Atty. Maximo G. Rodriguez
because of alleged illegal and unethical acts. The Petition relevantly reads as follows:

"2. That sometime in 1986, the petitioners hired the services of the respondent and the
latter, represented the former in the case entitled PABLO SALOMON et al vs.
RICARDO DACALUZ et al., before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 3 docketed as Civil Case No. 11204, for Forcible Entry with Petition for a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages, [and] a Certified True and Correct Copy of
the COMPLAINT by Clerk of Court III Gerardo B. Ucat of the said Court, is herewith
attached to the original of this PETITION, while photocopies of the same are also
attached to the duplicate copies of this same Petition and marked as Annex 'A' hereof;

"3. That after the Case No. 11204 was finally won, and a Writ of Execution was issued
by the Honorable Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 3, the
same respondent lawyer represented the petitioners herein;
"4. That when respondent counsel disturbed the association (Cagayan de Oro Landless
Residents Association, Inc.), to which all the complainants belong, by surreptitiously
selling some rights to other persons without the consent of the petitioners herein, they
decided to sever their client-lawyer relationship;

"5. That in fact, the National Bureau of Investigation of Cagayan de Oro City, is
presently undertaking an investigation on the illegal activities of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez pertaining to his express involvement in the illegal and unauthorized
apportionment, assignment and sale of parcels of land subject to the Case No. 11204,
where he represented the poor landless claimants of Cagayan de Oro City, which include
your petitioners in this case;

"6. That petitioners herein later filed an indirect contempt charge under Civil Case No.
11204 against Sheriff Fernando Loncion et al., on August 2, 1991 engaging the services
of Atty. LORETO O. SALVA, SR., an alleged former student of law of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez, [and a] certified true and correct copy of the complaint thereat consisting of
four (4) pages is herewith attached and photocopies of which are also attached to the
duplicates hereof, and correspondingly marked as their Annex 'B';

"7. That respondent lawyer, Atty. Maximo Rodriguez, (in the Indirect Contempt Case
under the same Civil Case No. 11204,) REPRESENTED and actively took up the defense
of FERNANDO LONCION et al. much to the dismay, damage and prejudice of the
herein petitioners, [and] a copy of Atty. Rodriguez's Answer, which is also certified true
and correct by Clerk of Court III Gerardo Ucat of Branch 3 of MTCC – Cagayan de Oro
City, consisting of three (3) pages, is attached to the original of this Petition, while
photocopies of the same are attached to the other copies hereof and accordingly marked
as Annex 'C';

"8. That the records will bear the petitioners out that their counsel, Atty. SALVA SR.
later on withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Maximo
Rodriguez; and instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution;

"9. That on January 12, 1993, the herein respondent, without consulting the herein
Petitioners who are all poor and ignorant of court procedures and the law, filed in behalf
of the plaintiffs (which include the herein Petitioners) in Civil Case No. 11204, a Motion
to Withdraw Plaintiffs' Exhibits, [and] a certified true and correct copy of said Motion by
Mr. Gerardo Ucat of MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City is herewith attached to the
original of this Petition, while photocopies of the same are also attached to the rest of the
copies of this same Petition, and are correspondingly marked as their Annex 'D'.

"10. That the illegal and unethical actions of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez are most
obnoxious, condemnable, and highly immoral, to say the least, more so if we consider his
social standing and ascendancy in the community of Cagayan de Oro City;

"11. That the records of Civil Case No. 11204 which are voluminous will bear the
petitioners' allegations against the herein respondent, who, after representing them
 initially, then transferring allegiance and services to the adverse parties (Lonchion,
Palacio and NHA Manager), came back to represent the herein petitioners without any
regard [for] the rules of law and the Canons of Professional Ethics, which is highly
contemptible and a clear violation of his oath as a lawyer and an officer of the courts of
law;

"12. That these acts are only those that records will bear, because outside of the court
records, respondent, without regard [for] delicadeza, fair play and the rule of law, has
assigned, apportioned and sold parcels of land[,] subject matter in Civil Case No. 11204
which legally have been pronounced and decided to be in the possession of the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 11204, who are partly the petitioners herein. Thus, they cannot yet
enjoy the fruits of the tedious and protracted legal battle because of respondent's illegal
acts, which have instilled fear among the plaintiffs and the petitioners herein;

"13. That respondent lawyer even represented ERLINDA ABRAGAN, one of the herein
petitioners, in a later proceedings in Civil Case No. 11204 wherein the apportionment of
parcels of land was erroneously, unprocedurally and illegally submitted to a
commissioner, and that ERLINDA ABRAGAN, after winning in the said Civil Case was
later on dispossessed of her rights by respondent counsel's maneuver, after the decision
(in Civil Case No. 11208) became final executory;

"14. That to make matters worse, respondent Atty. Rodriguez eventually fenced an area
consisting of about 10, 200 square meters within Lot No. 1982[,] the subject matter in
Civil Case No. 11204 without the consent of the herein petitioners. He even openly and
publicly proclaimed his possession and ownership thereof, which fact is again and also
under NBI investigation;

"15. That all the foregoing acts of respondent lawyer plus his continuing and ongoing
illegal and unethical maneuvers have deprived the herein petitioners of their vested rights
to possess and eventually own the land they have for decades possessed, and declared as
such by final judgment in Civil Case No. 11204."

In his Comment,2 respondent flatly denied the accusations of petitioners. He explained that the
withdrawal of the exhibits, having been approved by the trial court, was not "illegal, obnoxious,
undesirable and highly immoral." He added that he took over the 8,000 square meters of land
only after it had been given to him as attorney's fees. In his words:

"14. Respondent ADMITS that he fenced an area of about 8,000 sq. [m]. after the
association had awarded the same as attorney's fees in Civil Case Number 11204, the
dismissal of the appeal by the NHA, the successful handling of three (3) cases in the
SUPREME COURT, the pending case of QUIETING OF TITLE filed by the NHA, and
for the pending reconveyance case, Civil Case No. 93-573, supra. These area of 8,000 sq.
[m]., was awarded as attorney's fees, which [were] supposed to be ten percent of the 22
hectares, Lot No. 1982, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 11204, but the association
and its members were able to take actual possession by judgment of the courts only o[f]
the twelve (12) hectares. [This] area consisting of 8,000 sq. [m]., and consisting of two
 (2) lots [was] fenced by the respondent to prevent squatters from entering the area. The
rights of possession and ownership o[f] this area by the respondent depends upon the
outcome of Civil Case No. 93-573, supra, for reconveyance of title by the association and
its members versus the NHA, et. al. If it is true that this is under investigation by the NBI,
then why, not wait and submit the investigation of the NHA, instead of filing this
unwarranted, false and fabricated charge based on preposterous and ridiculous charges
without any proof whatsoever, except the vile [language] of an irresponsible lawyer."3

Thereafter, petitioners filed a Reply4 in which they reiterated their allegations against respondent
and added that the latter likewise violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and/or decision.5

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In her Report and Recommendation dated January 23, 2001, Investigating IBP Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Her report reads in part as follows:

"From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that respondent represented conflicting interest
considering that the complainants were the same plaintiffs in both cases and were duly
specified in the pleadings particularly in the caption of the cases. Under the said
predicament even if complainants were excluded as members of the Association
represented by the respondent; the latter should have first secured complainants' written
consent before representing defendants in the Indirect Contempt case particularly
Macario Palacio, president of the Association, or inhibited himself.

"It is very unfortunate that in his desire to render service to his client, respondent
overlooked the fact that he already violated Rule 15.03 of [C]anon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:

'Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.'

"We have no alternative but to abide by the rules."6

IBP Board of Governors' Resolution

Upholding the above-quoted Report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended via its May 26, 2001 Resolution that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two (2) months for violation of Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

This Court's Ruling

We agree with the findings and the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but hold
that the penalty should be six-month suspension as recommended by the investigating
commissioner.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

At the outset, we agree with Commissioner Navarro's conclusion that apart from their allegations
in their various pleadings, petitioners did not proffer any proof tending to show that respondent
had sold to other persons several rights over the land in question; and that he had induced the
former counsel for petitioners, Atty. Salva Jr., to withdraw the indirect contempt case that they
had filed. Neither did the IBP find anything wrong as regards the 8,000 square meters awarded to
respondent as payment for his legal services. Petitioners' bare assertions, without any proof to
back them up, would not justify the imposition of a penalty on respondent.

Having said that, we find, however, that respondent falls short of the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers. They are expected to uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients repose in them require a high standard
and appreciation of the latter's duty to the former, the legal profession, the courts and the public.
Indeed, the bar must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might tend to lessen the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of their profession.7

In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts."

The Court explained in Buted v. Hernando:8

"[A] lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment
from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with respect to which
confidence has been reposed."9 (Italics in the original)

In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect contempt case and in the
Complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204.10 Respondent should have evaluated the
situation first before agreeing to be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt
proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their clients, and should at all times weigh
their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large. They must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times.

The Court will not tolerate any departure from the "straight and narrow" path demanded by the
ethics of the legal profession.1âwphi1.nêt
In Hilado v. David,11 which we quote below, the Court advised lawyers to be like Caesar's wife
– to be pure and to appear to be so.

"This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well as to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion
of unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As
has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar's wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice."

Because of his divided allegiance, respondent has eroded, rather than enhanced, the public
perception of the legal profession. His divided loyalty constitutes malpractice for which he may
be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

"SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of Attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. –

Any member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. x x x."

Complainants ask that respondent be disbarred. We find however that suspension of six (6)
months from the practice of law, as recommended by Commissioner Navarro, is sufficient to
discipline respondent.

A survey of cases involving conflicting interests on the part of counsel reveals that the Court has
imposed on erring attorneys12 either a reprimand, or a suspension from the practice of law from
five (5) months13 to as high as two (2) years.14

WHEREFORE, Maximo G. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1.nêt

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the
IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 11350 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4211], August 09, 2016

ADEGOKE R. PLUMPTRE, Complainant, v. ATTY. SOCRATES R. RIVERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This resolves a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Socrates R. Rivera for absconding with
money entrusted to him and soliciting money to bribe a judge.

On May 13, 2014, complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre filed a complaint for disbarment1 against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Complainant alleges that on March 7, 2014, he called respondent and asked for help in his
application for a work permit from the Bureau of Immigration.2 They met a few days later, and
complainant paid respondent P10,000.00 as professional fee.3 chanrobleslaw

They met again, and complainant gave respondent another P10,000.00, together with his
passport. This was allegedly for the processing of his work permit.4 chanrobleslaw

They met for a third time since respondent asked complainant to submit ID photos.5 Respondent
asked complainant for another P10,000.00, but complainant refused as they only agreed on the
amount of P20,000.00.6 chanrobleslaw

Respondent also asked complainant for P8,000.00, allegedly for complainant's other case, which
respondent was also working on.7 He explained that P5,000.00 would be given to a Las Piñas
judge to reverse the motion for reconsideration against complainant, while P3,000.00 would be
used to process the motion for reconsideration. Complainant gave him the P8,000.00.8 chanrobleslaw

Complainant claims that after respondent received the money, he never received any updates on
the status of his work permit and pending court case.9 Further, whenever he called respondent to
follow up on his work permit, respondent hurled invectives at him and threatened him and his
wife.10
chanrobleslaw

Complainant would retort by saying that he would file complaints against respondent if he did
not give back the money and passport. That was the last time complainant heard from
respondent.11 chanrobleslaw
After inquiring and researching on respondent's whereabouts,12 complainant was able to track
down respondent and get back his passport, which respondent coursed through complainant's
aunt.13 However, despite the return of complainant's passport, respondent still refused to return
the P28,000.00 earlier endorsed to him.14 chanrobleslaw

Complainant then decided to file a complaint against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.15
chanrobleslaw

On May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued the Order16 directing respondent
to file an answer to the complaint.

Respondent failed to show up at the September 17, 2014 mandatory conference,17 as well as at
the second mandatory conference set on October 22, 2014.18 The parties were directed to submit
their verified position papers, after which the case was submitted for resolution.19 chanrobleslaw

On May 27, 2015, the Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension for
two (2) years from the practice of law and return of P28,000.00 to complainant.20 chanrobleslaw

On June 20, 2015, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted and
approved21 the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation, but modified it to disbar
respondent from the practice of law, thus: Chan RoblesV irtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ", for Respondent's violation of
Canon 1, Canon 7, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, Canon 17 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, aggravated by his failure to file Answer and to appear in the Mandatory
Conference. Thus, Atty. Socrates R. Rivera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys and Ordered to Return the Twenty Eight
Thousand (P28,000.00) Pesos to Complainant.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On April 20, 2016, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines transmitted the case to this Court for
final action under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.23 chanrobleslaw

This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.

Respondent's repeated failure to comply with several Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines requiring him to comment on the complaint lends credence to complainant's
allegations. It manifests his tacit admission. Hence, we resolve this case on the basis of the
complaint and other documents submitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

In Macarilay v. Seriña,24 this Court held that "[t]he unjustified withholding of funds belonging to
the client warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against the lawyer."25 By absconding cralawred

with the money entrusted to him by his client and behaving in a manner not befitting a member
of the bar, respondent violated the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Chan RoblesV irtualawlibrary
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.

....

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession,
and support the activities of the integrated bar.

....

CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come
into his possession.

Rule 16.01. - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

....

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

....

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

....

Rule 18.03. - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04. - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
As his client's advocate, a lawyer is duty-bound to protect his client's interests and the degree of
service expected of him in this capacity is his "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
ability."26 The lawyer also has a fiduciary duty, with the lawyer-client relationship imbued with
utmost trust and confidence.27 chanrobleslaw

Respondent failed to serve his client with fidelity, competence, and diligence. He not only
neglected the attorney-client relationship established between them; he also acted in a
reprehensible manner towards complainant, i.e., cussing and threatening complainant and his
family with bodily harm, hiding from complainant, and refusing without reason to return the
money entrusted to him for the processing of the work permit. Respondent's behavior
demonstrates his lack of integrity and moral soundness.

Del Mundo v. Capistrano28 has reiterated the exacting standards expected of law practitioners: ChanRo blesVirtualawlibrary
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their
fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by
imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.29 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
A lawyer must, at no time, lack probity and moral fiber, which are not only conditions precedent
to his entrance to the bar but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership.30 chanrobleslaw

II

When complainant refused to give respondent any more money to process his work permit,
respondent persuaded complainant to give him an additional P8,000.00 purportedly to ensure that
a motion for reconsideration pending before a Las Piñas judge would be decided in
complainant's favor.31 However, after receiving P28,000.00 from complainant for the work
permit and ensuring the success of complainant's court case, respondent made himself scarce and
could no longer be contacted.

Although nothing in the records showed whether the court case was indeed decided in
complainant's favor, respondent's act of soliciting money to bribe a judge served to malign the
judge and the judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won by the party with the
deepest pockets and not on the merits.32 chanrobleslaw

"A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system."33 Further, "a lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body."34chanrobleslaw

By implying that he can negotiate a favorable ruling for the sum of P8,000.00, respondent
trampled upon the integrity of the judicial system and eroded confidence on the judiciary. This
gross disrespect of the judicial system shows that he is wanting in moral fiber and betrays the
lack of integrity in his character. The practice of law is a privilege, and respondent has repeatedly
shown that he is unfit to exercise it.

III

As for the sufficiency of notice to respondent of the disbarment proceedings against him, this
Court notes that on May 14, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines directed respondent to
answer the complaint against him, but he failed to file his answer.35 The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines set two (2) separate dates for mandatory conferences36 after respondent failed to
attend the first setting, but he failed to appear in both instances.37 All issuances from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines had the requisite registry receipts attached to them.

Stemmerik v. Mas38 discussed the sufficiency of notice of disbarment proceedings. This Court
held that lawyers must update their records with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by
informing it of any change in office or residential address and contact details.39 Service of notice
on the office or residential address appearing in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines records
shall constitute sufficient notice to a lawyer for administrative proceedings against him or her.40 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Socrates R. Rivera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years. He is ORDERED to return to complainant Adegoke R. Plumptre the amount
of P28,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution
until fully paid. He is likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the
amount within 10 days from payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in respondent's personal record as a member of the bar,
and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79690-707 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 February 1, 1989

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALES, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

We have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988. We
have reviewed once more the Court's extended per curiam Resolution, in the light of the
argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude that we find no
sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied in that Resolution.
The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations and references to foreign
texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do not reflect the law in this
jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the

conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some of
the "Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration," made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.

1. In respondent's point A, it is claimed that it was error for this Court "to
charge respondent [with] indirect contempt and convict him of direct
contempt."

In the per curiam Resolution (page 50), the Court concluded that "respondent Gonzalez
is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer
of the court and member of the bar." The Court did not use the phrase "in facie curiae"
as a technical equivalent of "direct contempt," though we are aware that courts in the
United States have sometimes used that phrase in speaking of "direct contempts' as
"contempts in the face of the courts." Rather, the court sought to convey that it regarded
the contumacious acts or statements (which were made both in a pleading filed before
the Court and in statements given to the media) and the misconduct of respondent
Gonzalez as serious acts flaunted in the face of the Court and constituting a frontal
assault upon the integrity of the Court and, through the Court, the entire judicial system.
What the Court would stress is that it required respondent, in its Resolution dated 2 May
1988, to explain "why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected
to administrative sanctions" and in respect of which, respondent was heard and given
the most ample opportunity to present all defenses, arguments and evidence that he
wanted to present for the consideration of this Court. The Court did not summarily
impose punishment upon the respondent which it could have done under Section 1 of
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court had it chosen to consider respondent's acts as
constituting "direct contempt."

2. In his point C, respondent's counsel argues that it was "error for this
Court to charge respondent under Rule 139 (b) and not 139 of the
Revised Rules of Court."

In its per curiam Resolution, the Court referred to Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of
Court pointing out that:

[R]eference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the
Supreme Court such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the
terms of Rule 139 (b) of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the
charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.

The above statement was made by the Court in response to respondent's motion for
referral of this case either to the Solicitor General or to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines under Rule 139 (b). Otherwise, there would have been no need to refer to
Rule 139 (b). It is thus only necessary to point out that under the old rule, Rule 139,
referral to the Solicitor General was similarly not an exclusive procedure and was not
the only course of action open to the Supreme Court. It is well to recall that under
Section 1 (entitled "Motion or complaint") of Rule 139, "Proceedings for the removal or
suspension of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court, (1) on its own motion, or
(2) upon the complaint under oath of another in writing" (Parentheses supplied). The
procedure described in Sections 2 et seq. of Rule 139 is the procedure provided for
suspension or disbarment proceedings initiated upon sworn complaint of another
person, rather than a procedure required for proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court
on its own motion. It is inconceivable that the Supreme Court would initiate motu proprio
proceedings for which it did not find probable cause to proceed against an attorney.
Thus, there is no need to refer a case to the Solicitor General, which referral is made
"for investigation to determine if there is sufficient ground to proceed with the
prosecution of the respondent" (Section 3, Rule 139), where the Court itself has initiated
against the respondent. The Court may, of course, refer a case to the Solicitor General
if it feels that, in a particular case, further factual investigation is needed. In the present
case, as pointed out in the per curiam Resolution of the Court (page 18), there was "no
need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it [was] not substantially
disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed
to him" and that "in any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present
his defense: his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but
that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the
exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are
issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to
resolve such issues."

In this connection, we note that the quotation in page 7 of the Motion for
Reconsideration is from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Green v. United
State. 1 It may be pointed out that the majority in Green v. United States, through Mr.
Justice Harlan, held, among other things, that: Federal courts do not lack power to
impose sentences in excess of one year for criminal contempt; that criminal contempts
are not subject to jury trial as a matter of constitutional right; nor does the (US)
Constitution require that contempt subject to prison terms of more than one year be
based on grand jury indictments.

In his concurring opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:

Whatever the conflicting views of scholars in construing more or less

dubious manuscripts of the Fourteenth Century, what is indisputable is
that from the foundation of the United States the constitutionality of the
power to punish for contempt without the intervention of a jury has not
been doubted. The First Judiciary Act conferred such a power on the
federal courts in the very act of their establishment, 1 State 73, 83, and of
the Judiciary Committee of eight that reported the bill to the Senate, five
member including the chairman, Senator, later to be Chief Justice,
Ellsworth, had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention (Oliver
Ellsworth, Chairman, William Paterson, Caleb Strong, Ricard Basett,
William Few. 1 Annals of Cong 17). In the First Congress itself no less
than nineteen member including Madison who contemporaneously
introduced the Bill of Rights, had been delegates to the Convention. And
when an abuse under this power manifested itself, and led Congress to
define more explicitly the summary power vested in the courts, it did not
remotely deny the existence of the power but merely defined the
conditions for its exercise more clearly, in an Act "declaratory of the law
concerning contempts of court." Act of Mar. 2, 1831, 4 Stat 487.

xxxxxxxxx
 Nor has the constitutionality of the power been doubted by this Court
throughout its existence . In at least two score cases in this Court, not to
mention the vast mass of decisions in the lower federal courts, the power
to punish summarily has been accepted without question. ... 2

To say that a judge who punishes a contemnor judges his own cause, is simplistic at
best. The judge who finds himself compelled to exercise the power to punish for
contempt does so not really to avenge a wrong inflicted upon his own person; rather he
upholds and vindicates the authority, dignity and integrity of the judicial institution and its
claim to respectful behaviour on the part of all persons who appears before it, and most
especially from those who are officers of the court.

3. In his point D, respondent counsel urges that it is error "for this Court to
apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger"
rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was, more
modestly, simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court
which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice."

The "clear and present danger" doctrine invoked by respondent's counsel is not a magic
incantation which dissolves all problems and dispenses with analysis and judgment in
the testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech, and which compels a court to
exonerate a defendant the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending
apocalypse. The clear and present danger" doctrine has been an accepted method for
marking out the appropriate limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain
contexts. It is not, however, the only test which has been recognized and applied by
courts. In Logunzad v. Vda. de Gonzales, 3 this Court, speaking through Mme. Justice
Melencio-Herrera said:

...The right of freedom of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position

in the "hierarchy of civil liberties" (Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191 [1963]. It
is not, however, without limitations. As held in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 27 SCRA 835, 858 [1960]:

"From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear

that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
complex society preclude however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that all times
and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition."
 The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a
limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech
and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as
radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test" (Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of Rights, 1970 ed., p. 79). The
principle "requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation
(Separate Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899). (Emphasis Supplied) 4

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," we
believe that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature
and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam
Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the "substantive evil"
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant case,
relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of public
order. 5 What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and
prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair
hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation
of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts. The "substantive
evil" here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of public disorder or
rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in its implications for
society.

4. In his point H, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court
to hold that intent is irrelevant in charges of misconduct." What the Court
actually said on this point was:

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the

Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as
characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words
and acts. It is, upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that the
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited
no repentance (Resolution, p. 7; footnotes omitted).

The actual subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant because such subjectivities
(understood as pyschological phenomena) cannot be ascertained and reached by the
processes of this Court. Human intent can only be shown derivatively and implied from
an examination of acts and statements. Thus, what the Court was saying was that
respondent's disclaimer of an intent to attack and denigrate the Court, cannot prevail
over the plain import of what he did say and do. Respondent cannot negate the clear
import of his acts and statements by simply pleading a secret intent or state of mind
incompatible with those acts or statements. It is scarcely open to dispute that, e.g., one
accused of homicide cannot successfully deny his criminal intent by simply asserting
that while he may have inserted a knife between the victim's ribs, he actually acted from
high motives and kind feelings for the latter.

5 In his point 1, respondent's counsel argues that it is error "for this Court
to punish respondent for contempt of court for out of court publications."

Respondent's counsel asks this Court to follow what he presents as alleged modern
trends in the United Kingdom and in the United States concerning the law of contempt.
We are, however, unable to regard the texts that he cites as binding or persuasive in
our jurisdiction. The Court went to some length to document the state of our case law on
this matter in its per curiam Resolution. There is nothing in the circumstances of this
case that would suggest to this Court that that case law, which has been followed for at
least half a century or so, ought to be reversed.

6. In his point J, respondent's counsel pleads that the imposition of

indefinite suspension from the practice of law constitutes "cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment". The Court finds it difficult to consider this a
substantial constitutional argument. The indefiniteness of the respondent's
suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman," has the
effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and
privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of
giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his
contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting
appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to
live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every
member of the bar and officer of the courts.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration for lack
of merit. The denial is FINAL.

The Court also NOTED the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion, dated October 25, 1988
and the Supplemental Manifestation, dated October 27, 1988, filed by respondent

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,

Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5838. January 17, 2005]

SPOUSES BENJAMIN SANTUYO AND EDITHA SANTUYO, complainants, vs. ATTY.

EDWIN A. HIDALGO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

In a verified complaint-affidavit dated September 18, 2001,[1] spouses Benjamin Santuyo and
Editha Santuyo accused respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo of serious misconduct and
dishonesty for breach of his lawyers oath and the notarial law.

Complainants stated that sometime in December 1991, they purchased a parcel of land covered
by a deed of sale. The deed of sale was allegedly notarized by respondent lawyer and was
entered in his notarial register as Doc. No. 94 on Page No. 19 in Book No. III, Series of 1991.
Complainant spouses averred that about six years after the date of notarization, they had a
dispute with one Danilo German over the ownership of the land. The case was estafa through
falsification of a public document.

During the trial of the case, German presented in court an affidavit executed by respondent
denying the authenticity of his signature on the deed of sale. The spouses allegedly forged his
notarial signature on said deed.[2]

According to complainants, respondent overlooked the fact that the disputed deed of sale
contained all the legal formalities of a duly notarized document, including an impression of
respondents notarial dry seal. Not being persons who were learned in the technicalities
surrounding a notarial act, spouses contended that they could not have forged the signature of
herein respondent. They added that they had no access to his notarial seal and notarial register,
and could not have made any imprint of respondents seal or signature on the subject deed of sale
or elsewhere.[3]

In his answer[4] to the complaint, respondent denied the allegations against him. He denied
having notarized any deed of sale covering the disputed property. According to respondent, he
once worked as a junior lawyer at Carpio General and Jacob Law Office where he was asked to
apply for a notarial commission. While he admitted that he notarized several documents in that
office, these, however, did not include the subject deed of sale. He explained that, as a matter of
office procedure, documents underwent scrutiny by the senior lawyers and it was only when they
gave their approval that notarization was done. He claimed that, in some occasions, the
secretaries in the law firm, by themselves, would affix the dry seal of the junior associates on
documents relating to cases handled by the law firm. Respondent added that he normally
required the parties to exhibit their community tax certificates and made them personally
acknowledge the documents before him as notary public. He would have remembered
complainants had they actually appeared before him. While he admitted knowing complainant
Editha Santuyo, he said he met the latters husband and co-complainant only on November 5,
1997, or about six years from the time that he purportedly notarized the deed of sale. Moreover,
respondent stressed that an examination of his alleged signature on the deed of sale revealed that
it was forged; the strokes were smooth and mild. He suspected that a lady was responsible for
forging his signature.

To further refute the accusations against him, respondent stated that, at the time the subject deed
of sale was supposedly notarized, on December 27, 1991, he was on vacation. He surmised that
complainants must have gone to the law office and enticed one of the secretaries, with the
concurrence of the senior lawyers, to notarize the document. He claimed he was a victim of a
criminal scheme motivated by greed.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. In a report[5] it submitted to the Court, the IBP noted that the alleged
forged signature of respondent on the deed of sale was different from his signatures in other
documents he submitted during the investigation of the present case.[6] However, it ruled that
respondent was also negligent because he allowed the office secretaries to perform his notarial
functions, including the safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.[7] It thus
recommended:

WHEREFORE[,] in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents

commission as notary public be revoked for two (2) years if he is commissioned as such; or he
should not be granted a commission as notary public for two (2) years upon receipt hereof.[8]

After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, complainants did not categorically state
that they appeared before respondent to have the deed of sale notarized. Their appearance before
him could have bolstered this allegation that respondent signed the document and that it was not
a forgery as he claimed. The records show that complainants themselves were not sure if
respondent, indeed, signed the document; what they were sure of was the fact that his signature
appeared thereon. They had no personal knowledge as well as to who actually affixed the
signature of respondent on the deed.

Furthermore, complainants did not refute respondents contention that he only met complainant
Benjamin Santuyo six years after the alleged notarization of the deed of sale. Respondents
assertion was corroborated by one Mrs. Lyn Santy in an affidavit executed on November 17,
2001[9] wherein she stated that complainant Editha Santuyo had to invite respondent to her house
on November 5, 1997 to meet her husband since the two had to be introduced to each other. The
meeting between complainant Benjamin Santuyo and respondent was arranged after the latter
insisted that Mr. Santuyo personally acknowledge a deed of sale concerning another property
that the spouses bought.

In finding respondent negligent in performing his notarial functions, the IBP reasoned out:

xxx xxx xxx.

Considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive respondent should
have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have
wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned
as notary public.

For having wholly entrusted the preparation and other mechanics of the document for
notarization to the secretary there can be a possibility that even the respondents signature which
is the only one left for him to do can be done by the secretary or anybody for that matter as had
been the case herein.

As it is respondent had been negligent not only in the supposed notarization but foremost in
having allowed the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his notarial registry which
was supposed to be done and kept by him alone; and should not have relied on somebody else.[10]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edwin A. Hidalgo is hereby found GUILTY of negligence in

the performance of his duties as notary public and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission
as a notary public for a period of two years, if he is commissioned, or if he is not, he is
disqualified from an appointment as a notary public for a period of two years from finality of this
resolution, with a warning that a repetition of similar negligent acts would be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5864. April 15, 2005]

ARTURO L. SICAT, complainant, vs. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

In an affidavit-complaint,[1] complainant Arturo L. Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang

Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the notarization of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez. According to
complainant, respondent made it appear that Benitez executed the said document on January 4,
2001 when in fact the latter had already died on October 25, 2000.

He alleged that prior to the notarization, the Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract
with J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management, represented by Benitez, for the
construction of low-cost houses. The cost of the architectural and engineering designs amounted
to P11,000,000 and two consultants were engaged to supervise the project. For the services of the
consultants, the Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January 10, 2001 in the amount of
P3,700,000, payable to J.C. Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or Cesar Goco.
The check was received and encashed by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA
notarized by respondent Ariola.

Complainant further charged respondent with the crime of falsification penalized under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain persons participated in an act or
proceeding when in fact they did not.

In his Comment,[2] respondent explained that, as early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already
signed the SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was only on January 4, 2001 that he was
able to notarize it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January 4, 2001 was not at all
necessary because Benitez had signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime before his death,
on May 12, 2000. Because it was no longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same day he
notarized it, hence, legally, there was no public document that existed. Respondent prayed that
the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping since similar charges had been filed
with the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
According to him, the complaints were later dismissed based on findings that the assailed act
referred to violations of the implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594,[3] PD 1445,[4] RA
7160[5] and other pertinent rules of the Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no
criminal and administrative charges were recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003,[6] the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP
submitted its investigation report:

x x x it is evident that respondent notarized the Special Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001
purportedly executed by Juanito C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It is also evident
that respondent cannot feign innocence and claim that he did not know Mr. Benitez was already
dead at the time because respondent, as member of the Prequalification and Awards Committee
of the Municipality of Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because the latter appeared before
the Committee a number of times. It is evident that the Special Power of Attorney dated 4
January 2001 was part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the Municipality of Cainta of money
which was allegedly due them, and that respondent by notarizing said Special Power of Attorney
helped said parties succeed in their plans.[7]

The IBP recommended to the Court that respondents notarial commission be revoked and that he
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.[8]

After a careful review of the records, we find that respondent never disputed complainants
accusation that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by Benitez on January 4, 2001. He
likewise never took issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was already dead. His act was a
serious breach of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it
was his duty to serve the ends of justice,[9] not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was expected to act
at all times in accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he would not only injure himself
and the public but also bring reproach upon an honorable profession.[10]

In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J. Montalvan,[11] where the respondent notarized
certain documents and made it appear that the deceased father of complainant executed them, the
Court declared the respondent there guilty of violating Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[12] The Court was emphatic that lawyers commissioned as notaries
public should not authenticate documents unless the persons who signed them are the very same
persons who executed them and personally appeared before them to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. The Court added that notaries public must observe utmost
fidelity, the basic requirement in the performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence of the
public in the integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be undermined.

In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died on October 25, 2000. However, respondent
notarized the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on January 4, 2001 or more than
two months after the latters death. The notarial acknowledgement of respondent declared that
Benitez appeared before him and acknowledged that the instrument was his free and voluntary
act. Clearly, respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement. Notarization
is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act.[13] It converts a private document into a public
instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.[14]
Neither will respondents defense that the SPA in question was superfluous and unnecessary, and
prejudiced no one, exonerate him of accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public
document contravened one of the most cherished tenets of the legal profession and potentially
cast suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As the Municipal Administrator of
Cainta, he should have been aware of his great responsibility not only as a notary public but as a
public officer as well. A public office is a public trust. Respondent should not have caused
disservice to his constituents by consciously performing an act that would deceive them and the
Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the construction project
could not have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000 and could not have foisted on the
public a spurious contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very Municipality of which he
was the Administrator. According to the COA Special Task Force:

Almost all acts of falsification of public documents as enumerated in Article 171 in relation to
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code were evident in the transactions of the Municipality of
Cainta with J.C. Benitez & Architects Technical Management for the consultancy services in the
conduct of Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount of
P11,000,000. The agent resorted to misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication of fictitious
document, untruthful narration of facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or imitating
signature for the purpose of creating a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted with deceit
perpetrated against the government resulting to undue injury. The first and partial payment, in
the amount of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of the required outputs. x x x[15]

We need not say more except that we are constrained to change the penalty recommended by the
IBP which we find too light.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered in the records of respondent, and brought to the
immediate attention of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 10231, August 10, 2016

OSCAR M. BAYSAC, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELOISA M. ACERON-PAPA, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
dated 13 February 2013 adopting and approving with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline which found Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-
Papa (respondent) administratively liable for notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. As a
consequence, the IBP Board of Governors revoked her commission as notary public and
disqualified her from being commissioned as notary public for three years with a stern warning
to be more circumspect in her notarial dealings.

The Facts

Complainant Oscar M. Baysac (complainant) owns a property with an area of 322 sq. m. covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-581591 and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
Trece Martires City. The property was mortgaged by complainant to Spouses Emmanuel and
Rizalina Cruz (Spouses Cruz) on December 20, 2000.2 The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage3 was
notarized by Atty. Renelie B. Mayuga-Donato on December 20, 2000.

In February 2003, complainant went to the Registry of Deeds of Trece Martires City to get a
certified true copy of the certificate of title of the property because the property had a prospective
buyer. However, complainant was surprised to find out that TCT No. T-58159 had already been
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-670894 was issued in favor of Spouses Cruz.5 chanrobleslaw

After further investigation, complainant found out that the property was transferred in the name
of Spouses Cruz pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale6 which was allegedly executed on January
13, 2003 for the consideration of P100,000.00.7 chanrobleslaw

The Deed of Absolute Sale which was allegedly signed by complainant, as the owner of the
property, was notarized by respondent on January 13, 2003.8 Complainant, however, vehemently
denied having ever signed the Deed of Absolute Sale and having ever appeared before a notary
public on January 13, 2003 to acknowledge the same. He claimed that he was in Tanza, Cavite
that entire day with Ms. Flocerfida A. Angeles (Ms. Angeles) searching for a buyer of the
property.9 Complainant further stated that the Deed of Absolute Sale showed that what he
allegedly presented to the notary public when he acknowledged having executed the document
was his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) issued on May 26, 2000 or three years prior to the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The same CTC was used for the notarization of the Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage on December 20, 2000.10 chanrobleslaw

To support this allegation, complainant submitted the affidavit11 of Ms. Angeles and Questioned
Documents Report No. 515-70312 dated October 8, 2003 issued by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).

In her affidavit, Ms. Angeles declared that she was with complainant in Tanza, Cavite from 7:00
in the morning until 10:30 in the evening on January 13, 2003. She further declared that
complainant did not execute the Deed of Absolute Sale and did not personally appear before a
notary public in Cavite City on January 13, 2003.13 chanrobleslaw

In the Questioned Documents Report No. 515-703, the NBI confirmed that the signature of
complainant in the Deed of Absolute Sale and the signatures in other sample documents which
he actually signed were not made by one and the same person.14 chanrobleslaw

More, a few months after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, and subsequent to the
transfer of the title to Spouses Cruz, Atty. Estrella O. Laysa (Atty. Laysa) as counsel for Spouses
Cruz, allegedly sent a letter to complainant. The letter demanded him to vacate the property
subject of the alleged sale. According to complainant, Atty. Laysa is respondent's partner in
Laysa Aceron-Papa Sayarot Law Office. Thus, complainant claimed that respondent's act of
improperly notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale caused him injustice because he was ousted
from his property.15chanrobleslaw

In view of these circumstances, complainant filed a Complaint; for Disbarment16 dated April 14,
2009 with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for violation of Section 1, Rule II of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.

Records show that respondent did not file any answer to the complaint. The Order17 dated April
23, 2009 directing respondent to answer was returned to the Commission on Bar Discipline with
a notation "Moved Out, Left No Address."18 During the mandatory conference on August 27,
2009, only the counsel for complainant was present.19 Nevertheless, the Commission on Bar
Discipline, in its Order20 dated August 27, 2009, terminated the mandatory conference and
directed the parties to submit their verified position papers so as not to delay the early disposition
of the case. Despite the Order dated August 27, 2009 being received by respondent as evidenced
by the Registry Return Receipt21 signed by a certain Zyra N. Ningas, it was only complainant
who filed a position paper.22 chanrobleslaw

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

Based on the documents submitted, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag

(Atty. Hababag) of the IBP Commission on; Bar Discipline (to whom the case was referred for
investigation, report and recommendation) submitted his Report and Recommendation23 dated
November 25, 2009. He found respondent administratively liable for notarizing a fictitious or
spurious document. Atty. Hababag also stated; that respondent was notified of the Order dated
August 27, 2009 requiring the parties to submit their position papers.24 The order was sent to her
new address on September 14, 2009, as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt signed by Zyra
N. Ningas. Despite due notice, respondent failed to submit her position paper, and is therefore
deemed to have waived her right to present her position to the case.25 Atty. Hababag cralawred

recommended that respondent be suspended for two years as notary public.26 chanrobleslaw

On February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XX-2013-13627 which
adopted the findings of the Investigating Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty.
Instead of suspension for two years as notary public, the IBP Board of Governors recommended
the disqualification of respondent from being commissioned as notary public for three years with
a stern warning to be more circumspect in her notarial dealings and that repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court's Ruling

We affirm the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors finding respondent administratively
liable, but we modify the penalty imposed.

We note that the complainant and the IBP Board of Governors cited Section 1, Rule II of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice28 as basis for the complained acts of respondent. However, we
find Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103,29 otherwise known as the Notarial Law, to be the
applicable law at the time the complained acts took place. Nonetheless, as will be seen below,
both laws provide for a similar provision on acknowledgment.

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides: Chan RoblesV irtualawlibrary

xxx

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not,
his certificate shall so state. (Emphasis added.)
Section 1, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice emphasizes the requirement of affiant's
personal appearance in an acknowledgment: ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary

Section 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares
that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed,
and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity. (Emphasis added.)
In fact, the Acknowledgment in the Deed of Absolute Sale explicitly states: ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Cavite, this day of 13 JAN [2003] in Cavite
City, personally appeared OSCAR M. BAYSAC x x x who made known to me to be the
same person who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that the
same is his own free act and voluntary deed. x x x30 (Emphasis added.)
Based on the foregoing, the party acknowledging the document must appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.31
In Agbulos v. Viray,32 we held: ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary

To be sure, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the
same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who
actually executed the document in question, the notary public would be unable to verify the
genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the
party's free act or deed.33
chanroblesvirtuallaw library

In this case, however, it would have been physically impossible for complainant to appear before
respondent and sign the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 13, 2003. On that same day,
complainant was with Ms. Angeles in Tanza, Cavite the whole day. Ms. Angeles, in her
affidavit, confirmed this fact. Further, the NBI's findings in its Questioned Documents Report
show that the signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was not signed by complainant. These
allegations remain unrebutted despite the opportunity given to complainant to do so.

Therefore, the affidavit of Ms. Angeles, and the findings of the NBI prove that respondent
violated the Notarial Law when she notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without the personal
appearance of complainant. It was respondent's duty as notary public to require the personal
appearance of the person executing the document to enable the former to verify the genuineness
of his signature.34 Doing away with the essential requirement of physical presence of the affiant
does not take into account the likelihood that the documents may be spurious or that the affiants
may not be who they purport to be.35 chanrobleslaw

This Court has consistently held the following principle in a number of cases: ChanRob lesVirtualawlibrary

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts the document into a public one
making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined.36 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Failing to comply with the Notarial Law, respondent was even very lenient and negligent in
accepting the outdated CTC of complainant as competent evidence of identity. Although the
Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized on January 13, 2003, respondent allowed the presentation
of a CTC issued on May 26, 2000. Respondent should have been diligent enough to make sure
that the person appearing before her is the same person acknowledging the document to be
notarized. Respondent should have checked the authenticity of the evidence of identity presented
to her. Further, she should not have relied on the CTC in view of the ease with which CTCs are
obtained these days.37 It should likewise be pointed out that the CTC is not included in the list of
competent evidence of identity that notaries public should use in ascertaining the identity of
persons appearing before them to have their documents notarized.38 chanrobleslaw

We have emphasized that among the functions of a notary public is to guard against any illegal
or immoral arrangements.39 By affixing her notarial seal on the instrument, she converted the
Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a public document. As a consequence,
respondent, in effect, proclaimed to the world that: (1) all the parties therein personally appeared
before her; (2) they are all personally known to her; (3) they were the same persons who
executed the instrument; (4) she inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument;
and (5) they acknowledged personally before her that they voluntarily and freely executed the
same.40chanrobleslaw

By notarizing a spurious document, respondent has made a mockery of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment.41 Respondent's failure to perform her duty as a notary public
resulted not only in the damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but also in
undermining the integrity of a notary public, and in degrading the function of notarization.42
Precisely because of respondent's act, complainant was unlawfully deprived of his property.

Respondent is reminded that as a lawyer commissioned as notary public, she is required to

uphold her sacred duties appertaining to her office, such duties being dictated by public policy
and impressed with public interest.43 In Ang v. Gupana,44 this Court held: ChanRoblesVirtualawlib rary

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred

duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with
public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
respondent and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion. As the Court has held in Flores v. Chua,45 chanrobleslaw

Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason
of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. The
Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.46 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Since such responsibility is incumbent upon her, she must now accept the commensurate
consequences of her professional indiscretion. Her act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed
of Absolute Sale without ascertaining the identities of the persons executing the same constitutes
gross negligence in the performance of duty as a notary public.47 chanrobleslaw

More, as a lawyer, respondent breached Canon 148 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Canon 1.01.49 By notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale, she engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.50 chanrobleslaw
We modify, however, the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors in order to be in
full accord with existing jurisprudence. Based on existing jurisprudence, when a lawyer
commissioned as a notary public fails to discharge his duties as such, he is given the following
penalties: (1) revocation of his notarial commission; (2) disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years; and (3) suspension from the practice
of law for one year.51 chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa GUILTY of violating the
Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, this Court REVOKES
her incumbent commission, if any PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary public
for two (2) years; and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective
immediately. She is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
the respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.