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Chapter 5:

RULE-MAKING POWER
1A / 2H Notes Compilation

Josephine Angelica Beatrice M. Enriquez | 2H


BASIC CONCEPTS
a. power given to administrative agencies;
RULE-MAKING POWER b. to issue or promulgate rules and regulations;
(power of subordinate legislation)
c. necessary to carry out its functions

a. those issued by administrative or executive officers;


RULES and REGULATIONS b. in accordance with and as authorized by law.

Administrative bodies have:


RATIONALE a. competence
b. opportunity

a. in order to adopt to the increasing complexity;


NECESSITY b. of modern life and variety of public functions

a. relaxation of separation of powers; and


NATURE OF GRANT b. an exception to non-delegation of legislative powers
PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGATION of POWERS

RULE: potestas delegata non delegari potest


RULE BASIS: Delagated Power = (Right + Duty) – Further Delegation = Negation

KMU v. Garcia
239 SCRA 386

FACTS:

LTFRB Circular – authorized provincial bus operators to increase or decrease prescribed fair without first having filed
petition for the purpose and without the benefit of public hearing.

Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Phil. (PBOAP) – pursuant thereto, announced 20% fare increase

KMU – opposed the move. However, LTFRB dismissed the petition. KMU went to SC assailing to constitutionality of said
Circular on the ground that it violates Sec. 16(C) of Public Service Act (CA 146) which tasks LTFRB with the duty to fix
and determine just and reasonable fares.

HELD:

a. Legislature delegated to the defunct PSC the power of fixing rates of public services. LTFRB (regulatory body today),
is likewise vested with the same under EO 202.
b. Nowhere under said law is LTFRB authorized to delegate that power to transports operators. The authority given by
LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set fare range is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority –
Potestas delegata non delegari potest.
3 ISSUES on RULE-MAKING POWER

1. whether or not there is: 1. Delegation of Tariff Powers to the President


2. Delegation of Emergency Powers to the President
PERMISSIBILITY a) legislative grant of authority;
3. Delegation to the People at Large
of b) to administrative bodies; 4. Delegation to Local Governments
DELEGATION c) to issue rules and regulations 5. Delegation to Administrative Bodies

1. statute is complete in all its essential terms and


conditions when it leaves legislature so that there will
2. whether or not the grant meets be nothing left for delegate to do when it reaches him
VALIDITY the: except to enforce it.
of a) completeness test; 2. statute fixes a standard, mapping out the boundaries of
the delegate's authority by defining the legislative policy
DELEGATION b) sufficient standard test and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be
pursued and effected.

1. Not Inconsistent with the Constitution


3. whether or not regulation 2. Not Inconsistent with Statute
VALIDITY conforms with: 3. Cannot Amend Act of Congress
of 1) what the statute provides; 4. Cannot Exceed Provisions of Basic Law
EXERCISE 2) whether the same is reasonable 5. Uniform, Reasonable, not Unfair or
Discriminatory
1st ISSUE – PERMISSIBILITY OF DELEGATION

PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION LEGAL BASIS


Sec. 28(2) Art. VI - "The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
1) Delegation of Tariff Powers to specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
the President rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts..."

Sec. 23(2) Art. VI - "In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
2) Delegation of Emergency
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
Powers to the President national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof."

Sec. 2 Art. XVII - "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly


3) Delegation to the People at
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
Large of the total number of registered voters..."

Sec. 3 Art. X - "The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
4) Delegation to Local
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
Governments through a system of decentralization..."

By legislative act – authorizing it to promulgate rules and regulations;


5) Delegation to Administrative
By implication – adopt rules and regulations deemed necessary in the efficient
Bodies exercise of the powers expressly granted
1st ISSUE – PERMISSIBILITY OF DELEGATION
1. Delegation to By legislative act – authorizing it to promulgate rules and regulations;
Administrative Bodies By implication – necessary to the efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted

PASEI v.TORRES
212 SCRA 298

FACTS:

DOLE Sec. Rubben Torres – as a result of published stories regarding abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
in Hong Kong, issued Department Order No. 16 temporarily suspending recruitment by private employment
agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong.”

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) – filed for prohibition on the ground that 1)
respondents acted in excess of their rule-making authority; 2) Circulars are contrary to Constitution are
unreasonable, unfair, and oppressive.

HELD:

a. Art. 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict recruitment and placement
activities. Department Order No. 16 merely restricted the scope of petitioner’s business operations by
excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong til after the
establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to
Hong Kong.

b. Circulars are a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.
1st ISSUE – PERMISSIBILITY OF DELEGATION
1. Delegation to By legislative act – authorizing it to promulgate rules and regulations;
Administrative Bodies By implication – necessary to the efficient exercise of the powers expressly granted

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
270 SCRA 106

FACTS:

Comelec Resolution No. 2300 – was issued to govern “the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
Initiative and Referendum and National and Local Laws.”

Sen. Miriam Santiago – argues that Comelec Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires since only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law pursuant to Art. XVII, Sec. 2(2) which provides that,
“The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the rights.”

HELD:

a. Comelec does not have the power under RA 6735 to promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative.

b. Reliance on Sec. 2(1), Art. IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by Comelec under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C and a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
2nd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF DELEGATION

PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION LEGAL BASIS

a) statute is complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature
1) COMPLETENESS TEST b) so that there will be nothing left for delegate to do when it reaches him except to
enforce it.

U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho (43 Phil. 1) – Legislature did not specify under what
conditions the rules may be issued and did not define what constitutes
Illustrative Case extraordinary increase in price of cereals. Promulgation of rules is left to sole
discretion of Governor General. Law is thus incomplete as a legislation.

a) statute fixes a standard, mapping out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
2) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST b) by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is
to be pursued and effected.

Ynot v. IAC (148 SCRA 659) – One searches in vain for the usual standard
Illustrative Case and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the officers must
observe when they make their distribution.There is none.
2nd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF DELEGATION

1. COMPLETENESS statute is complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature so
TEST that there will be nothing left for delegate to do when it reaches him except to enforce it

U.S. v. ANG TANG HO


43 Phil. 1

FACTS:

Act No. 2868 (1919) – authorized Governor-General to issue and promulgate rules “whenever, for any cause, conditions
arise resulting in extraordinary rise in price of palay, rice or corn.”

Governor-General – pursuant thereto, issued E.O. 53 fixing the price at which rice shall be sold

Ang Tang Ho – was charged with the sale price greater than that fixed by E.O. 53. He was found guilty as charged and
was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus P500.00 fee. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue
delegation of power to the Governor General.

HELD:

a. Promulgation of rules is left to the discretion of the Governor-General, Legislature did not define under what
conditions the rules may be issued.

b. Legislature also does not define what constitutes extraordinary increase in price of cereals. Neither did it specify or
define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued.
2nd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF DELEGATION
2. SUFFICIENT statute fixes a standard, mapping out the boundaries of the delegate's authority by defining the
STANDARD TEST legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected.

YNOT v. IAC
148 SCRA 659

FACTS:

E.O. 626-A – prohibits inter-provincial transportation of carabaos, and provides further that such “carabao transported
in violation thereof shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, and that the confiscated property
shall be distributed to deserving farmers through dispersal on the Director of Animal Industry may see fit.”

Restituto Ynot – on Jan. 13, 1984, transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo in a pump boat. His carabaos were
confiscated by the police for violation of E.O. 626-A.

Ynot – sued for recovery with RTC-Iloilo, which sustained the confiscation. On appeal, IAC upheld RTC. Thus, Ynot went
to SC contending that E.O. 626-A is unconstitutional.

HELD:

a. The phrase “may see fit” is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is, if condition it is. It is
laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard
and the reasonable guideline or better still, the limitations that said officers must observe when they make there
distribution.There is none.Their options are apparently boundless.

b. There is invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
3rd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE
Constitutional provisions control what DAR v. SUTTON (GR No. 162070; 19 Oct. 2005) - The
1) Not Inconsistent
rules and regulations may be DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms exempted by
with Constitution promulgated by administrative bodies. the Constitution from coverage of agrarian reform law.
SOL. GEN. v. MMA (204 SCRA 837) - PD 1605
(granting MMA powers related to traffic management and
2) Not Inconsistent Statutory provisions control what rules control in Metro Manila) does not allow either removal of
and regulations may be promulgated by
with Statute license plates or confiscation of driver's license for traffic
administrative bodies.
violations. MMA Ordinance imposes sanctions PD 1605 does
not allow and actually prohibits.
BOIE-TAKEDA v. DE LA SERNA (228 SCRA 329) - In
including commissions in the computation of 13th month pay,
3) Cannot Amend May not amend, alter, modify, supplant, DOLE unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as
enlarge or expand, restrict or limit the
Act of Congress defined in PD 851. Implementing rules cannot add or detract
provisions or coverage of the statute.
from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.
They cannot widen its scope.

4) Cannot Exceed UNITED BFHA v. BF HOMES (310 SCRA 304) - There


They must be within the scope and
was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of PD
Provisions of purview of the statutory authority granted
902-A. The inclusion of the phrase "GENERAL PUBLIC OR
by legislature
Basic Law OTHER ENTITY" is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do.
LUPANGCO v. CA 160 SCRA 848 - PD 1605 (granting
5) Not MMC powers related to traffic management and control in
Unreasonable, They must not act arbitrarily and Metro Manila) does not allow either removal of license plates
capriciously in promulgating rules and
Unfair or or confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations. MMA
regulations.
Ordinance imposes sanctions PD 1605 does not allow and
Discriminatory
actually prohibits.
3rd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE
1. Not Inconsistent Constitutional provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by
with Constitution administrative bodies.

DAR v. SUTTON
G.R. No. 162070; 19 Oct. 2005

FACTS:

The Suttons (Della, Ella, Harry) – in 1987, made voluntary offer to sell (VOS) to DAR their landholdings.

Luz Farms v. Sec. of DAR – in 1990, SC ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not
included in the definition of agricultural . Thus, the Suttons filed request to withdraw their VOS as their
landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising.

DAR Administrative Order No. 9 – issued Dec. 27, 1993, provided that only portions of private agricultural
lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage
of the CARL.

HELD:

a. A.O. No. 9 is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. A.O. Sought to regulate livestock forms by including
them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing maximum retention limit for their ownership.

b. DAR has no power to regulate livestock form which have been exempted by the Constitution from the
coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
3rd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE
2. Not Inconsistent
Statutory provisions control what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative bodies.
with Statute

SOL. GEN. v. MMA


204 SCRA 837

FACTS:

MTC v. Gonong, G.R. No. 91023, July 13, 1990 – SC held that confiscation of license plates for traffic violations was not among
the sanctions that MMC could impose under PD 1605. Each confiscation of driver’s license was not prescribed nor was it allowed to
be imposed by MMC.

Motorists – complained to the court on various dates (1990-1991), on the confiscation of their driver’s licenses and removal of
license plate numbers of their vehicles.

MMA – contended that since the Ganong decision said that confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of valid law or
ordinance, MMA Ordinance No. 11 was issued, authorizing itself “to detach license plates of motor vehicles...obstructing flow of
traffic in Metro Manila.”

Solicitor General – complained to the court on various dates (1990-1991), on the confiscation of their driver’s licenses and
removal of license plate numbers of their vehicles.

HELD:

a. PD 1605 does not allow either removal of license plates or confiscation of driver’s license for traffic violations committed in
Metro Manila. Ordinances in question do not merely add to requirement of PD 1605, but worse, impose sanctions the decree
does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.

b. In doing, ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
3rd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE

3. Cannot Amend Act May not amend, alter, modify, supplant, enlarge or expand, restrict or limit the provisions or
of Congress coverage of the statute.

BOIE-TAKEDA v. DELA SERNA


228 SCRA 239

FACTS:

PD 851 – required all employers to pay all their employees receiving basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a
month a 13th month pay.

DOLE Implementing Guidelines – included “commissions” in the computation of 13th month pay

Boie-Takeda Chemicals – did not include commissions of its medical representations in the computation of
their 13th month pay. Thus, it was ordered by DOLE to pay the differential. Boie-Takeda argues that PD 851 and
its implementing rules speak of BASIC salary and therefore exclude all other remunerations which are not part
of the BASIC salary.

HELD:

a. Including commissions in the computation of 13th month pay, DOLE unduly expanded the coverage of “basic
salary” as defined in PD 851.

b. Implementing rules cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. They
cannot widen its scope.Administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
3rd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE

4. Cannot Exceed
They must be within the scope and purview of the statutory authority granted by legislature
Provisions of Basic Law

UBFHAI v. BF HOMES
310 SCRA 304

FACTS:

PD 902-A – vetted Home Insurance Guarantee Corp. (HIGC) with jurisdiction over homeowners’ disputes
controversies arising “between such association and the state, insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or
right to exist as such entity.”

HIGC’s Revised Rules of Procedure – the phrase “general public or other entity” was added.

HELD:

a. HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure.
There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A.

b. The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot do.
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use
either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the
scope intended.
3rd ISSUE – VALIDITY OF EXERCISE

5. Not Unreasonable,
They must not act arbitrarily and capriciously in promulgating rules and regulations.
Unfair or Discriminatory

LUPANGCO v. CA
310 SCRA 304

FACTS:

PRC Resolution No. 105 – prohibits examinee from attending any review class or receiving any hand-out or
review material 3 days before examination day, and provides sanctions for its violation. One who is caught
committing the prohibited act is barred from taking future examinations.

Lupo Lupangco, et al. – reviewees for the licensure examinations in accountancy filed with RTC Manila an
injunction against PRC and to declare the same unconstitutional. RTC declared the Resolution as unconstitutional.
PRC appealed to CA, which reversed the decision of RTC. Hence, the petition to SC.

HELD:

a. PRC Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.

b. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. It is inconceivable how PRC can manage to have watchful eye on each and every examinee
during the three days.
PENAL SANCTIONS
BASIC CONCEPTS
a. refer to rules and regulations;
RULES AND REGULATIONS
b. carrying criminal or penal sanctions;
WITH PENAL SANCTIONS c. for violation of the same

a. legislature cannot delegate to administrative agency;


GENERAL RULE b. the power to declare what acts shall constitute a
criminal offense and how it shall be punished

a. power to punish crime;


RATIONALE
b. is a legislative function

a. where the law itself;


b. makes the violation of the administrative rules and
EXCEPTION
regulations;
c. punishable and provides for its penalty.
REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY

REQUISITES RATIONALE ILLUSTRATION

1. a) Legislature cannot delegate to an Marcos v. CA (278 SCRA 843) -


Law authorizing the executive official the power to declare
issuance of rules and what acts should constitute a criminal
Sec. 34, Central Bank Act provides
regulations must itself offense. thus: violation of this Act or any rule
declare as punishable the b) It can authorize the issuance the or regulation issued by the Monetary
violation of "any rules and issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for
Board shall be punished...
regulations issued
thereunder." in the law itself.

2. Marcos v. CA (278 SCRA 843) - Sec. 34, Central


Power to define crime and Bank Act provides thus: violation of this Act or any
Law should define or fix
rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board,
the penalty for the provide for punishment is shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty
violation of the rules and essentially a legislative function. thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more
regulations. than five years.

People v. Que Po Lay (94 Phil. 640) - circulars


and regulations, which prescribes a penalty for its
3. violation should be published before becoming
effective.
Rules and regulations
Tañada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446) -
must be published in the
administrative rules and regulations must also be
Official Gazette. published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation.
MARCOS v. CA
278 SCRA 843

FACTS:

Central Bank Act – expressly grants Monetary Board (MB) the power to “issue rules and regulations necessary
for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and powers assigned to MB and to CB.”

Sec. 34, CB – provides “violation of this Act or any rule or regulation issued by MB, shall be punished by a fee of
not more than P20,000 and by imprisonment of not more than 5 years.”

CB Circular 960 – provides “...residents, firms, associations, or corporations unless otherwise permitted under
CB regulations are prohibited from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad.”

Imelda Marcos – in 1991, was charged before RTC-Manila for allegedly opening and maintaining foreign
exchange accounts abroad from 1968-1991 without prior authorization from CB. Her Motion to Quash was
denied. She went to CA, which likewise denied her petition.Thus, the appeal to SC.

HELD:

a. CB Act itself defined the offense and provided the penalty therefor. The questioned circular merely spelled
out the details of the offense.

b. Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where
the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty.
PEOPLE v. MACEREN
79 SCRA 450

FACTS:

Section 11 of Old Fisheries Law (Act 4003) – “punishes the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance or
explosive in fishing.”

Administrative Order No. 84 – issued by the Secretary of Agriculture which prohibits electro-fishing in all
Philippine waters. Said order was amended by AO 84-1 by restricting the ban against electro-fishing to fresh water
fisheries.

Jose Buenaventura and four others – were charged with violation of AO 84-1 for having used electro-cutting
device called “sensored” to catch fish in the waters of Barrio San Pablo, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Complaint was dismissed
by the lower court stating that electro-fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or
poisonous substance as contemplated in the Fisheries Law and since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing,
the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. CFI-St. Cruz, presided by Judge Maximo Maceren,
affirmed the dismissal.Thus, the appeal to SC.

HELD:

a. Since electro-fishing is not banned under the Fisheries Law and the Secretary is powerless to penalize it, AO 84
and AO 84-1 are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro-fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the Old Fisheries Law.

b. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a
criminal offense. It cannot authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the death penalty
provided for in the law itself.
US v. PANLILIO
28 Phil. 608

FACTS:

Act No. 1760 – requires the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous or communicable diseases and
provides for a penalty for violations of any of its provisions.

Director of Agriculture – declared and ordered that carabaos exposed to rinderpest be under quarantine and
ordered kept in a corral until released by the Director of Agriculture.

Adriano Panlilio – owned carabaos that had been exposed to rinderpest, and in spite of knowledge of the
order of the Director of Agriculture, took his carabaos from the corral and drive them from place to place in his
hacienda and used them as work animals.Thus, he was charged with violation of the Act.

HELD:

a. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the Orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor
is such violation punished in any way therein.

b. What the Act penalizes is the violation of any of its provisions and not the violation of any of the rules and
regulations that may be issued thereunder.
PEOPLE v. SANTOS
63 Phil. 300

FACTS:

Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 – issued by Sec. of Agriculture pursuant to Sec. 4 of Act No. 4003
prohibits fishing within 3 kilometers from the shoreline of islands and reservations and provided that boats not
subject to license may fish in said areas only upon the written permission of the Secretary.

Augusto Santos – was charged with violation of said AO in that within 1,500 yards north of Cavalry Point,
Corregidor Island, Cavite, he wilfully had his boat operated by a fisherman and ordered them to fish, loiter, and
anchor without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture. CFI-Cavite dismissed the case. Hence, the appeal
to SC.

HELD:

a. The conditional clause constitutes no only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an excess of a legislative power which he does not have.

b. Therefore, said conditional clause is null and void and without effect.
HON. SEC. v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION
G.R. No. 159149; June 26, 2006

FACTS:

LPG Refillers Association – filed petition for prohibition. RTC-Pasig nullified Circular 2000-06-010 on the ground
that it introduced new offenses (no price display board, no weighing scale, etc.) not included in the B.P. 33. With the
denial of the MR, petitioners went to SC

illegal under-filling/ under Penalty


BP 33 hoarding Overpricing
trading/adulteration delivery P20,000-P50,000
no weighing scale; Penalty
no trade name; no price
Circular 2000-06-010 hoarding no tare weight; or P20,000
unbranded cylinders; display board
incorrect tare weight for retail outlets

HELD:

a. Under the general description of what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products under BP 33, the
DOE Circular merely lists various modes by which said criminal acts may be perpetrated.

b. The monetary penalty under BP 33 is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. Under the
Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by
law. RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992) DOE is tasked with formulating and implementing polices
and programs to ensure sustainable, stable, secure, sufficient, and accessible energy.
PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY
94 Phil. 640

FACTS:

Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 20 – required those who had foreign currency to sell the same to the CB.

Director of Agriculture – had in his possession US $7,000.00 but failed to sell the same to CB.

CFI Manila – found him guilty and meted the penalty of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P1,000.00 in his
appeal to SC. Que Po Lay claimed that the said circular has not yet been published in the Official Gazette before
his alleged violation of the same and he should therefore be acquitted.

HELD:

a. It is true that Circular No. 20 is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

b. Circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its concerns, especially
its penal provisions, a law regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
TAÑADA v.TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Lorenzo Tañada – seeks writ of mandamus to compel Juan Tuvera, Executive Assistant to the President, to
publish in O.G.Various PD.s, LOIs, P.P.s, E.O.s, and A.O.s

Solicitor General – contends that publication in O.G. is not sine qua non requirement for the efficiency of laws
where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Citing Art. 2 of the Civil Code, “Laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided.”

HELD:

a. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.

b. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
TAÑADA v.TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

Tuvera – In a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 24, 1985 decision, argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they
were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

Tuvera – sought clarification of the following questions: 1. What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general
applicability”? 2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? 3. What
is meant by “publication”? 4.Where is the publication to be made? 5.When is the publication to be made?

HELD:

a. The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to date of effectivity and not to requirement of
publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that legislature may make
law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

b. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion

c. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all. Under Art. 2 of the Civil Code, the
publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere; publication must be made
forthwith or at least as soon as possible.
Chapter 6:
ADJUDICATORY POWER
1A / 2H Notes Compilation

Josephine Angelica Beatrice M. Enriquez | 2H


BASIC CONCEPTS

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER a. power to hear and determine or ascertain facts and decide
(Adjudicatory Power) b. by the application of rules to the ascertained facts

3 ELEMENTS OF ADJUDICATORY POWERS

a. it involves the rights, duties and obligations;


1. Specific Parties
b. of specific individuals and persons

2. Adjudication by Persons a. power or function that partakes of the judicial;


other than a Judge b. but is exercised by a person other than a judge

3. Adjudication by Agency a. convenient way to justify exercise of judicial power;


other than a Court b. by an administrative agency
JURISPRUDENCE
PRINCIPLE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
PRES. ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE v. CA (171
SCRA 348) – PADS TF was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial
1. Office of Public Prosecutor functions. As the president’s arm called upon to combat dollar
is not a quasi-judicial body. salting or the black marketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is
tasked alone by the decree to handle the prosecution of such
activities, but nothing more.

COJUANGCO v. PCGG (190 SCRA 226) – While the


2. Prosecutor is not a quasi- investigating officer strictly speaking is not a judge, by the nature of
judicial officer. his functions he is and must be considered to be a quasi-judicial
officer.

SANTIAGO JR. v. BAUTISTA (32 SCRA 188) – Before


tribunal board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts,
3. Not every function wherein there should be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
judgment and discretion persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are
are exercised is a judicial made and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before the
tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and authority to
function.
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective
rights of the contending parties.
PRINCIPLE NO. 1 Office of Public Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial body.

PRES. ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE v. CA


171 SCRA 348

FACTS:

PADS TF – created by PD 1936 was tasked to investigate and prosecute dollar salting activities in the country. State
prosecutor Jose Rosales of PADS issued search warrants against Karamfil Export Import Co.

Karamfil – went to RTC Makati to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question.

RTC Makati – declared search warrants to be null and void and ordered to return all personal properties and
documents seized by virtue of said search warrants.

PADS TF – appealed to CA which initially ruled for PADS; That PADS is special quasi-judicial body and ranks. With RTCs,
and that RTC had no jurisdiction do declare search warrants null and void. Upon MR, CA reversed itself. Thus, the resort
to SC with PADS contending that CA erred in not holding that PADS has not been granted under PD 1936 judicial or
quasi-judicial jurisdiction.

HELD:

a. PADS TF was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions.

b. As the president’s arm called upon to combat dollar salting or the black marketing and salting of foreign exchange it
is tasked alone by the decree to handle the prosecution of such activities but nothing more.
PRINCIPLE NO. 2 Prosecutor is not a quasi-judicial officer.

COJUANGCO v. PCGG
190 SCRA 226

FACTS:

PCGG – gathered evidence as to alleged ill gotten wealth of Eduardo Cojuango and after satisfying itself that there is a
prima facie case, sequestered and issued freeze order for his all properties. Based also on said finding of prima facie case,
PCGG filed civil complaint against him for alleged ill gotten wealth including alleged misuse of coconut levy funds.

Eduardo Cojuangco – went to SC alleging that PCGG may not conduct preliminary investigation of the complaints filed
by solicitor general without violating his rights to due process and equal protection of the law, and that PCGG has no
right to conduct such preliminary investigation.

HELD:

a. An indispensable requisite of due process is that the person who presides and decides over a proceeding including a
preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

b. While the investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a judge, by the nature of his functions he is and must be
considered to be a quasi judicial officer.

c. PCGG cannot possibly conduct preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge, as it has prejudged the matter.
Not every function wherein judgment and discretion are exercised is a
PRINCIPLE NO. 3
judicial function.
SANTIAGO, JR. v. BAUSTISTA
32 SCRA 188

FACTS:

Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor – was constituted for the purpose of selecting honor
students of its graduating class at Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City as school year 1964-1965 was about
to end.

Teodoro Santiago, Jr. – was adjudged by the committee as 3rd honors. Three days prior to graduation, Santiago
Jr., represented by his mother and with his father as counsel, sought invalidation of said ranking before CFI
Cotabato, against committee members for grave abuse of discretion.

CFI Cotabato – dismissed case for lack of cause of action. Santiago went to the SC.

HELD:

a. Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions.

b. There is nothing on record about any rule of law that provides that when teachers sit down to assess the
individual merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors, such function involves that
determination of what the law is and that they are therefore automatically vested with judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.
STEPS TO THE EXERCISE OF
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
a. ascertain facts;
FIRST STEP b. from pleadings and from evidence adduced.

a. determine what the applicable law is;


SECOND STEP b. what are the legal rights of the parties

a. decide controversy;
THIRD STEP b. render judgment thereon
JURISPRUDENCE
PRINCIPLE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
1. Doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies applies only where SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. NTC (G.R. No. 151908; 12 Aug.
2003) – In questioning the validity of Rule or Regulation issued by an
the act of administrative
administrative agency, party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
agency was performed going to court. This principle applies only where the act of administrative
pursuant to its quasi-judicial agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function.
functions.

GUERZON v. CA (164 SCRA 182) – Jurisdiction to order a lessee to


vacate leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for
2. Grant of particular power unlawful detainer or accion publiciana. There is nothing in PD 1206 that would
suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to bureau of
must be found in the law itself. energy utilization. BEU’s jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or
non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or
permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations.

ANTIPOLO REALTY v. NHA (153 SCRA 399) – Before a tribunal board,


3. Administrative body may be or officer may exercise judicial or quasi judicial acts, there should be a law that
vested with exclusive original gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse
claims to such rights are made and the controversy ensuing therefrom is
jurisdiction on certain disputes brought, before the tribunal, board or officer clothed with power and
falling within its expertise. authority to determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the
respective rights of contending parties.
Doctrine of exhaustion of remedies applies only where the act of
PRINCIPLE NO. 4
administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. NTC
G.R. No. 151908; 12 Aug. 2003

FACTS:

MC 13-6-2000 Billing Circular – issued by NTC, requires 2 year validity of prepaid sim and call cards, identification of
prepaid car buyers and call balance announcement.

IslaCom and PILTEL – sought nullity of circular before RTC-QC alleging that is oppressive, confiscatory and
constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law. Globe and Smart Intervened.

NTC – moved to dismiss case on the ground of Smarts’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

RTC – denied motion to dismiss. NTC appealed to CA which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Hence,
petition before SC.

HELD:

a. In questioning the validity of Rule or Regulation issued by an administrative agency, party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of administrative agency was
performed pursuant to its quasi judicial function.

b. Issuance by NTC of circular was pursuant to its quasi legislative or rule making power. As such, Smart was justified in
invoking the judicial power of RTC to assail validity of said issuances.
PRINCIPLE NO. 5 Grant of particular power must be found in the law itself.

GUERZON v. CA
164 SCRA 182

FACTS:

Pedro Guerzon and Shell – are parties to Service Station Lease for the use of Shell’s properties, facilities and equipment and
Dealer sale’s contract for the sale of shell gasoline and other petroleum products at gasoline station located at Cagayan De Oro
City.

BEU – approved the said contract. Paragraph 9 of the Contract provides that cancellation or termination of dealer sale’s
contract shall automatically cancel the lease.

Guerzon – for his failure of to surrender premises, and upon expiration of contract, was ordered by BEU to vacate premises.

Shell – accompanied by law enforcement, authorities secured possession of gasoline station. He filed an action for injunction but
RTC dismissed the complaint.

CA – sustained RTC. Hence, Guerzon appealed to the SC.

HELD:

a. Jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful
detainer or accion publiciana.

b. There is nothing in PD 1206 that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to bureau of energy
utilization.

c. BEU’s jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate,
license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations.
Administrative body may be vested with exclusive original jurisdiction on
PRINCIPLE NO. 6
certain disputes falling within its expertise.

ANTIPOLO REALTY v. NHA


153 SCRA 399

FACTS:

Jose Hernando – acquired over a lot in Ponderosa Heights, Antipolo, from Antipolo Realty. He transferred his rights to Virgilio
Yuson.

Yuson – for failure of Antipolo Realty to fully develop the subdivision and introduce improvements, in accordance with clause
17 of contract to sell, stopped monthly instalment payments. Antipolo Realty rescinded the contract and forfeited all payments
made by Yuson.The latter went to NHA which ordered reinstatement of the contract.

Antipolo Realty – with the denial of its motion for reconsideration, went to the SC asserting that jurisdiction over the case
was lodged in the regular courts, not NHA, since the complaint involved interpretation of the contracts to sell.

HELD:

a. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi judicial power which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency.

b. Under PD 1344, in addition to its powers provided by PD 957, NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature. 1) unsound real estate business practices. 2) claims involving refund and any other claims
filed by sub-division lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman and 3)
cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
CLASSIFICATION OF ADJUDICATORY POWERS – E.D.D.S.E.

KIND DEFINITION EXAMPLE


a. grant or denial of license (business or
a. to permit or allow something; occupation)
1) ENABLING b. which the law undertakes to regulate b. issuance of securities or certificate of public
convenience

a. to issue orders directing parties; a. power of assessment of BIR or BOC;


2) DIRECTING b. to conform to governing statutes or b. reparations under public utility laws;
rules c. awards under women’s compensation laws

a. Zoning Boards – may vary provisions of


a. to exempt from general prohibition;
zoning ordinances;
3) DISPENSING or
b. Phil. Army Acceptance Board – relieve
b. relieve individual from affirmative duty
certain persons from military training

a. to apply compulsion to effectuate a. abatement of nuisance;


4) SUMMARY legal purpose; b. restraint or levy property of delinquent
b. without judicial warrant taxpayer

a. power to make proper application;


5) EQUITABLE b. of rules of equity
a. cease and desist order
Chapter 7:
ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS
1A / 2H Notes Compilation

Josephine Angelica Beatrice M. Enriquez | 2H


BASIC CONCEPTS
a. every quasi-judicial body has its own rules and procedure;
RULES OF PROCEDURE b. which it issues as guides in its adjudication of cases filed with it

1. nature of administrative bodies;


FORMULATION 2. purpose for which they are organized;
3. persons who compose them

POWER TO ISSUE RULES OF PROCEDURE


Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), 1987 Constitution – “...rules of procedure
CONSTITUTION of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court.”

a. law creating the agency usually grants the agency;


CONFERRING LAW b. express power to promulgate its rules of procedure

a. even when the law creating the agency is silent on the matter;
BY IMPLICATION b. quasi-judicial body has implied power to issue procedural rules
CHARACTERISTICS of ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
a. results in an order;
1) ADVERSARIAL b. in favor of one person against another

a. taking of evidence;
2) QUASI-JUDICIAL b. determination of facts;
c. adjudication

3) CIVIL IN NATURE a. civil rather than criminal in nature

a. administrative proceeding is not a private one;


4) NOT AN ACTION AT LAW
b. but a public one with a public end

Sec. 2, Rule 118, Revised Rules of Court – Pre-Trial:


5) RULES OF COURT APPLY SUPPLETORILY amicable settlement, referral to arbitration

6) TECHNICAL RULES OF COURT ARE a. decisions may be reached;


NOT APPLIED WITH RIGIDITY b. on the basis of position papers only

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), 1987 Constitution – “...rules of


7) SUPREME COURT MAY MODIFY RULES
procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
OF PROCEDURE unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.”

8) QUANTUM OF PROOF IS SUBSTANTIAL a. reasonable mind may accept as adequate;


EVIDENCE b. to support a conclusion
CHARACTERISTIC NO. 6 Technical rules of procedure are not applied with rigidity.

BANTOLINO v. COCA-COLA
G.R. No. 153660; June 10, 2003

FACTS:

Prudencio Bantolino and 61 others – filed on 15 February 1995 a complaint against Coca-Cola for unfair
labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the “Cabo
System”.
Eduardo Cojuangco – ruled for employees. NLRC sustained LA. On appeal, CA ruled that affidavits of some of
the complainants should not have been given probative value for the failure to affirm the contents thereof and to
undergo cross-examination. CA dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. Thus, the petition for
review on certiorari with the SC.

HELD:

a. The argument that use of affidavits without presentation of affiants for cross-examination is hearsay is not
persuasive because the Rule of Evidence are not strictly observed in the proceedings before administrative
bodies like NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
b. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of
evidence.
CHARACTERISTIC NO. 7 Supreme Court may modify Rules of Procedure.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS v. CA


237 SCRA 519

FACTS:

First Lepanto Ceramic’s – application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its
registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles” was granted by BOI on December. 10, 1992.

Mariwasa – after denial of its MR, filed a petition for review with CA pursuant to Circular 1-91 (Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals in the CA from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies),
which mandates that appeal be taken to Court of Appeals within 15 days from receipt of order or decision. Court of
Appeals temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision.

First Lepanto – filed a “Motion to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order” on the ground that the CA has no
appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case, the same being exclusively vested with the SC, pursuant to Art. 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987 which provides: all appeals (from the decision of BOI), shall be directly taken to the SC within
30 days from receipt of order or decision. CA denied the petition. Hence, recourse to the SC.

HELD:

a. While right to appeal granted to Omnibus Investments Code is a substantive right, which cannot be modified by a
rule of procedure, question of where and in what manner the appeal can be brought are matters of procedure which
the Supreme Court has power to regulate pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power.
b. Art. VIII, , Sec 5(5) 1987 Constitution- “rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.”
HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCIARY RULES

a. proof of such a convincing character that;


PROOF BEYOND criminal
b. you would be willing to rely and act upon it
REASONABLE DOUBT
without hesitation proceedings

a. evidence presented by a party during the trial;


CLEAR AND b. must be highly and substantially more probable
to be true than not; habeas corpus
CONVINCING EVIDENCE
c. and the trier of fact must have a firm belief or
conviction in its factuality

PREPONDERANCE a. evidence as a whole adduced by one side is


superior to that of the other – greater weight civil cases
OF EVIDENCE
or more convincing

a. such evidence as a reasonable mind may accept; administrative


SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
b. as adequate to support a conclusion proceedings
ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

VILLA v. LAZARO
189 SCRA 34

FACTS:

Anita Villa – in 1980, was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Boulevard in Gen. Santos City.

Dr. Jesus Veneracion (owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital) – filed a suit for injunction with CFI against Villa, because
allegedly it is violative of the Zoning Ordinance since the hospital was about 132.36 meters from the funeral parlor. CFI
dismissed the case. Veneracion went to Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) alleging that Villa failed to
secure locational clearance.

HSRC – sent a telegram to Villa requiring her to submit proof of locational clearance. Villa complied. She received another
communication requiring to send the proof of locational clearance and since she had already complied with this order
previously she made no response.Thereafter, she was fined P10,000.00.

Villa – eventually appealed to the OP. Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs, Manuel M. Lazaro, denied the appeal.

HELD:

a. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials.

b. Administrative due process includes: (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the
proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce
witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of
honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by
substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.
REQUIREMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

1) Right to notice, be it actual or constructive of Paterok v. Bureau of Customs (193 SCRA 132) – In a forfeiture
proceeding where the owner of the allegedly prohibited article is
the institution of the proceedings that may
known, mere posting of the notice of hearing of the BOC’s Bulletin
affect a person’s legal right. Board does not constitute compliance with procedural due process.

Lumiqued v. Exevea (G.R. No. 117565; 08 Nov. 1997) –


Administrative due process does not necessarily require the assistance
of counsel. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in
a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be presented by counsel and
that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such
2) Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant indispensable.
evidence in his favor. Casimiro v. Tandog (G.R. No. 146137; 08 June 2005) – In
administrative proceeding, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard”
does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard
through pleadings.

3) Tribunal so constituted as to give him Lozano v. Delos Santos (274 SCRA 452) – PD 902-A grants the
reasonable assurance of honesty and SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction over intro-corporate disputes. A
controversy between members of separate and distinct associations
impartiality, and one of competent does not involve introcorporate dispute and the SEC has therefore no
jurisdiction. jurisdiction over it.

Globe v. NTC (G.R. No. 143964; 26 July 2004) – The assailed


4) Finding or decision by that tribunal supported Order of NTC violated due process for failure to sufficiently explain
by substantial evidence presented at the the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by
substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and imposing a
hearing, or at least contained in the records corresponding fine on Globe, despite the absence of due notice and
or disclosed to the parties affected. hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence
on its behalf.
REQUIREMENT NO. 1 Right to Notice

PATEROK v. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS


193 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Ute Paterok – shipped from Germany in the Philippines two container, one with used household goods and the
other with two used automobiles (Bourgetti and Mercedes Benz). The first container was released by the Bureau
of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the
said Bureau.
Collector of Customs – thereafter issued decision ordering the forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz.
Ute Paterok – had not been informed that a separate seizure case was filed on the same Mercedes Benz. He
only later found out later that, a Notice of Hearing concerning the said Mercedes Benz was posted on the
bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs. Ute, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial before the Collector of
Customs, but the latter, denied the same, invoking the failure of the former to appear in the said hearing despite
the posting of the notice on the bulletin board.

HELD:

a. In a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the allegedly prohibited article is known, mere posting of the
notice of hearing of the BOC’s Bulletin Board does not constitute compliance with procedural due process.
b. Although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the
ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown.
c. The owner could not have been unknown. He had previous transactions with the Bureau of Customs and in
fact, the latter had earlier released the first container.
REQUIREMENT NO. 2 Right to Counsel

LUMIQUED v. EXEVEA
G.R. No. 117565; 18 Nov. 1997

FACTS:

Arsenio Lumiqued – was Regional Director of DAR-CAR until Pres. Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that
position pursuant to AO. No. 52. In view of Lumiqued’s death, his heirs instituted petition for certiorari
questioning such order.
RSP Apolinario Exevea – was chairman of the DOJ Committee that was created to investigate the complaints
against Lumiqued.
Heirs of Lumiqued – fault the Committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the
hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless his waiver was in writing and in the
presence of a counsel.

HELD:

a. Administrative due process does not necessarily require the assistance of counsel. There is nothing in the
Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be presented by counsel and
that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings.
b. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
REQUIREMENT NO. 2 Right to Counsel

CASIMIRO v.TANDOG
G.R. No. 146137; 08 June 2005

FACTS:

Haydee Casimiro – Municipal Assessor of San Juan, Romblon, allegedly was involved in the anomalous
cancellation of tax declaration.
Mayor Filipino Tandog – directed Casimiro to answer the charges against her. After evaluating the evidence
against her, the Mayor fired her for dishonesty.
Casimiro – appealed to CSC, which affirmed Mayor’s order of dismissal. She elevated her case to CA, which
subsequently affirmed CSC decision. She went to SC raising the lone issue of whether or not she was afforded
procedural and substantive due process when she was terminated form her employment.

HELD:

a. In administrative proceeding, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not
mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard through pleadings.
b. Records show that Casimiro was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to
the formal charge against her.
REQUIREMENT NO. 3 Tribunal of Competent Jurisdiction
LOZANO v. DELOS SANTOS
274 SCRA 452

FACTS:

Reynaldo Lozano – President of the Kapatirang Mabalacat-Angeles Jeepney Drivers’ Association (KAMAJDA)
Antonio Anda – President of the Samahang Angeles-Mabalacat Jeepney Operators’ and Drivers’ Association (SAMAJODA).
Lozano and Anda – both agreed to consolidate their respective associations and form the Unified Mabalacat-Angeles Jeepney
Operators’ and Drivers’ Association (UMAJODA) and also to elect one set of officers who is tasked to collect daily dues. Lozano
won and Anda protested alleging fraud and continued collecting dues from his association.
Lozano – filed for damages against Anda before the MCTC of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. Anda moved to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction claiming that SEC has jurisdiction. MCTC denied the motion and MR.
Judge Eliezer Delos Santos – found the dispute to be intro-corporate and directed MCTC to dismiss the case.

HELD:

a. PD 902-A grants the SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction over intro-corporate disputes.
b. The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be viewed in the light of its nature and function under the law. This jurisdiction is
determined by a concurrence of two elements: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of
intracorporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State in so far as it concerns their individual franchises.
The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation, partnership or association or deal with the internal affairs of the corporation, partnership or association.
c. A controversy between members of separate and distinct associations does not involve introcorporate dispute and the
SEC has therefore no jurisdiction over it.
REQUIREMENT NO. 4 Decision Based on Substantial Evidence

GLOBE TELECOM v. NTC


G.R. No. 143964; 26 July 2004

FACTS:

Smart – In 1999, due to the so called telecom war between Smart and Globe, filed a Complaint with the NTC,
praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smart’s and Globe’s GSM networks particularly their
respective SMS or texting services.
NTC – issued an order where it held that the implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory pursuant to
EO 59. NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it and
directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS within 30 days, subject to the payment of
fine in the amount of two hundred pesos (P200.00) “from the date of violation and for every day during which
such violation continues.”
Globe – petitioned for Certiorari with the CA alleging that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an
administrative penalty for an offense for which neither Globe nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in
violation of their right to due process.

HELD:

a. The assailed Order of NTC violated due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the
decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and imposing
a corresponding fine on Globe, despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded
Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf.
Chapter 8:
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
1A / 2H Notes Compilation

Josephine Angelica Beatrice M. Enriquez | 2H


MATRIX OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
DOCTRINE MEANING FUNCTION APPLICATION RATIONALE

a. when competence or
jurisdiction is vested
upon an administrative a. take advantage of
body to act upon a administrative
PRIMARY matter; determines who adjudicatory expertness;
JURISDICTION b. no resort to courts may initially decides function b. attain uniformity of
(prior resort)
be made before such application of
administrative body shall regulatory laws.
have acted on the
matter

a. if there in an available
administrative remedy a. obviate resort to
provided by law;
courts;
EXHAUSTION OF determines
adjudicatory b. give agency change
ADMINISTRATIVE b. no judicial recourse can timing of judicial
function to correct its error;
REMEDIES be made until all such review
c. principle of comity
remedies have been
and convenience.
availed of and exhausted

a. when interest of plaintiff a. prevent premature


RIPENESS determines
is subjected to or rule-making adjudication
FOR timing of judicial
imminently threatened function b. protection from
REVIEW with substantial injury review
judicial interference.
JURISPRUDENCE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Villaflor v. CA (280 SCRA 297) – Consistent with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, CFI and CA had reason to rely on the findings of the Bureau of
Lands on the identity of land in dispute and the factual qualifications of awardee
of sales applications. The Bureau of Lands is the administrative agency with
expertise to determine such matters

Commissioner v. Navarro (77 SCRA 264) – The prevailing doctrine is that


the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector
of Customs precludes a Court of First Instance from assuming cognizance over
such a matter.

ILLUSTRATIVE Centeno v. Centeno (343 SCRA 153) - The rule is that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident involving the
CASES
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Nuesa v. CA (G.R. No. 132048; 6 Mar. 2002) - Collector of Customs when


sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the law
expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the
forfeiture and further disposition of the subject matter of such proceedings.

Regional Director v. CA (G.R. No. 110193; 27 Jan. 1994) - It behooves


the court, in the interest of good order and conformably with the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the
final outcome of the administrative charges.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

VILLAFLOR v. CA
280 SCRA 297

FACTS:

Vicente Villaflor – protested with Bureau of Lands, the Sales Application of Nasupit Lumber, claiming that the
company has not paid him as provided in the Relinquishment of Rights.
Director of Lands – found that payment was duly proven and dismissed protest.
Villaflor – appealed to Ministry of Natural Resources, which upheld Director of Lands. He then filed with CFI-
Agusan case for “Declaration of Nullity of Contract.” CFI – dismissed the case. On appeal, CA – sustained CFI.
Thus, the recourse to SC on the contention that CA erred in adopting the factual findings of Bureau of Lands, as
sustained by Ministry of Natural Resources.

HELD:

a. Consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, CFI and CA had reasons to rely on the findings of
these specialized administrative bodies.
b. Questions on identity of land in dispute and factual qualifications of awardee of sales application require
technical determination by the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with expertise to determine
such matters.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

COMMISSIONER v. NAVARRO
77 SCRA 264

FACTS:

Juanito Flores and Asiatic Inc. – imported 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, which were borrowed by CB
Circulars and therefore considered as prohibited importation subject to forfeiture proceedings by Collector of
Customs.
Judge Pedro Navarro (CFI-Rizal) – issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Bureau of Customs
from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods.
Commissioner of Customs – pointed out how violative was the assumption of jurisdiction by the Judge over
an incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which, as held in a number of decisions, was a matter
falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities.

HELD:

a. The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the
Collector of Customs precludes a Court of First Instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter.
b. Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the law
expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further
disposition of the subject matter of such proceedings.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

CENTENO v. CENTENO
343 SCRA 153

FACTS:

Ignacia Centeno – owner of two parcels of riceland situated at Malolos, Bulacan, subject of an earlier case filed
by Ignacia against Cipriano Centeno et al. Before DAR, where it was established that petitioners, through fraud
and misrepresentation, obtained Certificate of Land Transfers in their names.
Ignacia Centeno – filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB), for
“Maintenance of Peaceful Possession alleging that, despite the decision of DAR recognizing her ownership over
said Lots, petitioners have prevented her from exercising acts of possession over the landholdings.
Provincial Adjudicator – ruled in favor of Ignacia. The decision was affirmed on appeal by DARAB. Not
satisfied with the decision of DARAB, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA, which affirmed the
decision of DARAB. Hence, the instant petition contending that DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:

a. Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB provides: The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

NUESA v. CA
G.R. No. 132048; 06 Mar. 2002

FACTS:

Antonio M. Nuesa (DAR Regional Director) – promulgated an order canceling the order of award of two lots
(Buenavista Estate) issues in favor of Jose Verdillo.
Jose Verdillo – filed a petition with the Provincial Adjudication Board, Region III, for Annulment of Said Order.
Nuesa – filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the proper remedy was an appeal to the Secretary of Dar
from the Order of the Regional Director and not by a Petition with the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator.
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator – denied the Motion to Dismiss and reversed the Order of Regional Director.

HELD:

a. The DARAB has primary, original, and appellate jurisdiction “to determine and adjudicate al agrarian disputes.
“Agrarian dispute” is defined to include any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture.

b. Petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever.
Consequently, DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of
private respondent’s petition in the first place.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION

REGIONAL DIRECTOR v. CA
G.R. No. 110193; 27 Jan. 1994

FACTS:

32 Public School Teachers of Negros Oriental – held a strike from their school classes, to demand the
release of their salaries by the Department of Budget.
Regional Director Teofilo Gomez (of DECS) – issued a return-to-work order with a warning that if the
“striking” school teachers did resume their classes within 24 hours, administrative charges would be filed, which
was not heeded by the teacher.Thus, complaints were filed against them and an investigating panel was created.
Public School Teachers – filed with RTC, complaint for injunction, which was granted. RD filed petition for
mandamus with SC, which referred the case to CA.Appellate Court denied the petition. RD went to SC.

HELD:

a. Issuance of restraining orders by lower court against further proceedings of the administrative complaints is
inappropriate in as much as DECS RD had power to issue the return to work order, initiate administrative
charges, as well as to constitute the investigating panel.

b. It behooves the court, in the interest of good order and conformably with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome of the administrative
charges.
EXHAUSTION
OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

a) where there is an available administrative remedy


provided by law;
MEANING b) no judicial recourse can be made until all such
remedies have been availed of and exhausted.

FUNCTION a. it determines the timing of judicial review.

a. when the administrative exercises adjudicatory


APPLICATION function.

a. obviate resort to courts;


RATIONALE b. give agency chance to correct its error;
c. principle of comity and convenience
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

EXHAUSTION – resort first to appropriate administrative


GENERAL authorities in the resolution of controversy falling under their
RULE jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to court of justice for
review.

1. Administrative remedy is Permissive only.


2. Where the issue involved is Purely legal question.
3. Patently illegal act of administrative body.
4. No administrative order yet.
5. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
EXCEPTIONS 6. Nullification of claim being asserted.
(to exhaustion doctrine) 7. Doctrine of Qualified political agency (alter ego) is applicable.
8. Issue raised is the Constitutionality of the statute under which the
PPP-NNN-Q-CISE administrative agency acts.
9. Irreperable damage or injury will be suffered by a party unless resort to
court is immediately made.
10. Strong public interest is involved.
11. When there is Estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

LAGUNA CATV v. MARAAN


G.R. No. 139492; 19 Nov. 2002

FACTS:

Laguna CATV – failed to comply with Order directing it to pay unpaid claims of its employees. DOLE RD Alex
Maraan issued writ of execution, and by virtue of which, L300 van of Dr. Bernardo Bailon, its owner, was levied and
his bank deposits garnished.
Bailon – moved to quash the writ, levy, and garnishment. Maraan denied motion to quash for failure to perfect the
appeal.
LAGUNA CATV – filed with CA motion for extension of time to file petition for review.

CA – dismissed case holding that Laguna CATV failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Hence, recourse to SC.

HELD:

a. Laguna CATB should have first appealed to Secretary of Labor. Under Art. 128 of the Labor Code, “An order
issued by ... Representative of Secretary of Labor and Employment ... May be appealed to the latter.”

b. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless available administrative
remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities have been given opportunity to correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum.
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE – PPP-NNN-Q-CISE

EXCEPTIONS RATIONALE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Corpus v. Cuaderno (4 SCRA 749) – Sec. 132, R.A.


265, "No officer or employee of Central Bank subject to Civil
1) administrative remedy exhaustion is not a Service Law or Regulations shall be removed or suspended
expect for cause as provided by law." Central Bank law
is permissible only condition sine qua non prescribes procedure for disciplinary action against its
officers or employees. Corpus need not go to CSC to
question his dismissal.

Madrigal v. Lecaroz (91 SCRA 20) – Only a legal


question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the
interpretation of law is abolition of Madrigal's position as "capataz" was in
2) purely legal question accordance with law. Were pure questions of law are
court's prerogative raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies cannot apply because issues of law cannot be
resolved with finality by the administrative officer.

Cabada v. Alunan (260 SCRA 838) – Commissioner


of Napolcom acted in a patently illegal manner, because
lack or excess of only the Secretary could act on the appeal and that
3) patently illegal act Napolcom, being a collegial body, cannot be bound by
jurisdiction the act of an individual Commissioner,. It being a patent
nullity, the filing of MR before the institution of this
special civil action may be dispensed with.
EXCEPTION NO. 1 Administrative Remedy is Permissive Only

CORPUS v. CUADERNO
4 SCRA 749

FACTS:

Monetary Board – citing Sec. 14 of the Central Bank, after finding that the continuance of Marino Corpus
in the service of the Central Bank would be prejudicial to the best interest of the Central Bank, considered
Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.

Marino Corpus (Special Assistant to CB Gov.) – filed suit for damage in CFI-Manila against CB Gov. Miguel
Cuaderno, alleging that his suspension was unwarranted and had been brought about by Cuaderno’s malicious
machinations. After trial, the court dismissed the complaint. Corpus appealed directly to the SC.

Central Bank – contended that Civil Service rules should apply.

Corpus – invoked Sec. 132, RA 265, which provides, “No officer or employee of Central Bank subject to the Civil
Service Law or regulation shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.”

HELD:

a. Central Bank law procedure prescribes for disciplinary action against its officers or employees.
b. Corpus need not go to Civil Service Commission to question his dismissal.
EXCEPTION NO. 2 Issue Involves Purely Legal Question

MADRIGAL v. LECAROZ
91 SCRA 20

FACTS:

Gov. Aristeo Lecaroz and Member of Provincial Board of Marinduque – abolished Joventino Madrigal’s
position as a permanent construction capataz. The abolition was allegedly due to the poor financial condition of
the province and it appearing that his position was not essential.

Madrigal – appealed to Civil Service Commission which declared the removal of Madrigal from the service
illegal. Provincial Board denied Madrigal’s request for reinstatement because his former position no longer exists.
Madrigal filed a petition before the CFI-Marinduque for mandamus and damages. The court issued an order
dismissing the petition on the ground that Madrigal’s cause of action was barred by laches. He appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the latter elevated the matter to the Supreme Court since it raised pure questions of law.

HELD:

a. Only a legal question is to be resolved, that is, whether or not the abolition of Joventino Madrigal’s position
as “capataz” was in accordance with law.
b. Where pure questions of law are raised, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot apply
because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.
EXCEPTION NO. 3 Administrative Remedy is Permissive Only

CABADA v. ALUNAN
260 SCRA 838

FACTS:

SPO3 Noel Cabada and SPO3 Rodolfo De Guzman – were ordered dismissed from the police service for
grave misconduct by RD of PNP-Recom 8. They appealed to DILG Secretary and Chairman of Napolcom.

NAPOLCOM through Commissioner Alexis Canonizadol – denied due course to the Cabada’s appeal on
the ground that both the Decision and the Resolution of the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and
executory. Hence, the petition to the Supreme Court.

Solicitor General – seeks to dismiss the petition on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners failed
to exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction
over disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office.

HELD:

a. Commissioner of Napolcom acted in a patently illegal manner because only the Secretary could act on the
appeal and that Napolcom, being a collegial body, cannot be bound by the act of an individual Commissioner.
b. It being a patent nullity, the filing of Motion for Reconsideration before the institution of this special civil
action with the Supreme Court may be dispensed with.
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE – PPP-NNN-Q-CISE

EXCEPTIONS RATIONALE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito (186 SCRA 704) –


RD of BFAR has not rendered any decision and is
4) no administrative order about to conduct investigation which is the very act
ripeness for review sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative
yet remedies that must be exhausted, although available,
cannot be resorted to.Thus, recourse to the court for
prohibition was proper.

NFA v. CA (253 SCRA 470) – Appeal to NFA


Board and the Secretary of Agriculture was not a
5) no other plain, speedy, plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
urgency of situation course of the law. The urgency of the situation
or adequate remedy
compelled Greenview to go to court to stop the
implementation of negotiated security contracts.

Gravador v. Mamigo (20 SCRA 742) – Gravador


need to await the final outcome of his protest filed
with his superior before filing quo warranto because
6) nullification of claim time is of the essence the one period to file it in court is not suspended by
administrative case. The rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply where
insistence on its observance would result in the
nullification of the claim being asserted.
EXCEPTION NO. 4 No Administrative Order Yet

DATILES and Co. v. SUCALDITO


186 SCRA 704

FACTS:

Datiles and Company– is a holder of fishpond lease agreement.


Jesus Deypalubos – submitted to Bureau of Fisheries his protest against Datiles’ existing fishpond permit.
Bureau Director – directed “an immediate formal investigation” of the protest of Deypalubos.

Daties – filed petition for “Prohibition” before CFI-Zamboanga del Sur, which eventually ruled that Datiles has
an available, adequate and speedy remedy that it to appeal this matter of investigation to the proper superior
official-which in this case is the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff having failed to do this,
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for prohibition. Hence, the appeal to the SC.

HELD:

a. Regional Director has not rendered any decision and is in fact about to conduct an investigation which
happens to be the very act sought to be prevented. Consequently, administrative remedies that must be
exhausted, although available, cannot be resorted to.
b. There being urgency in stopping the investigation but no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, recourse to the court for relief by way of petition for prohibition was proper.
EXCEPTION NO. 5 No Other Plain, Speedy, or Adequate Remedy

NFA v. CA
253 SCRA 470

FACTS:

NFA – terminated the contract for Security Services of Greenview Investigation and Security Agency and three
other security agencies, and had awarded the contract for security services by negotiated contracts to other
security agencies.

GREENVIEW – filed petition for prohibition with the RTC-QC, which granted the same.

NFA – appealed to CA, which enjoined NFA from implementing its contract with the new security agencies.
NFA went to SC contending that Greenview failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

HELD:

a. Appeal to the NFA Board and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative
Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
b. Private respondents’ contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements
hired barely five days after their termination.
c. The urgency of the situation compelled Greenview to go to court to stop the implementation of negotiated
security contracts.
EXCEPTION NO. 6 Observance of Doctrine Results to Nullification of Claim

GRAVADOR v. MAMIGO
20 SCRA 742

FACTS:

Pedro Gravador (school principal) – were ordered dismissed from the police service for grave misconduct
by RD of PNP-Recom 8. They appealed to DILG Secretary and Chairman of Napolcom.
Gravador – wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date
of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Then he filed for quo warranto, mandamus and
damages in the CFI-Negros Oriental. Named one of the respondents was Eutiquio Mamigo.
Mamigo – argued that the action was prematurely brought because Gravador had not availed of all
administrative remedies.

HELD:

a. Gravador need not await the final outcome of his protest filed with his superior before filing quo warranto
because the one year period to file it in court is not suspended by administrative case.
b. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence on its observance would
result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE – PPP-NNN-Q-CISE

EXCEPTIONS RATIONALE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES


Almine v. CA (177 SCRA 796) – She need not appeal
to OP and may file certiorari in court. Department
secretaries are alter egos of the President and their acts
redundant are presumed to be those of the latter, unless
7) qualified political agency
exercise disapproved or reprobated by him. Failure to appeal to
OP from the decision of Minister of Agrarian Reform is
not a violation of the rule an exhaustion of
administrative remedies.

Smart Communications v. NTC (408 SCRA 678)


– Where what is assailed is the constitutionality of a
rule or regulation issued by the administrative body in
8) constitutionality of rules
judicial prerogative the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the regular
and regulations courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same, but an
act performed by it pursuant to its quasi-judicial function
is subject to exhaustion doctrine

UP Board of Regents v. Rasul (200 SCRA 685) –


Airing his protest to UP BOR would be fruitless. Unless
9) irreparable damage or he goes to court, irreparable damage or injury on his
self-preservation
injury part will be caused by proposed reorganization as the
Nomination Committee is set to screen application for
the position to which he was appointed.
EXCEPTION NO. 7 Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency is Applicable

ALMINE v. CA
177 SCRA 796

FACTS:

Hilda Almine – filed a sworn application for redemption of her riceland or for exemption thereof from the
Operation Land Transfer Program with then Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
Minister Conrado Estrella – denied the application for retention.
Almine – appealed to then IAC. CA dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this present action.

HELD:

a. She need not appeal to the Office of the President and may file certiorari in court, Department secretaries
are alter egos of the President and are presumed to be those of the latter, unless disapproved or reprobated
by him.
b. Failure to appeal to OP from the decision of Minister of Agrarian Reform, is not a violation of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
EXCEPTION NO. 8 Constitutionality of Law or Rules and Regulations

SMART v. NTC
408 SCRA 678

FACTS:

MC 13-6-2000 (Billing Circular) – issued by NTC, requires 2 year validity of prepaid sim and call cards,
identification of prepaid card buyers, and call balance announcement.

IslaCom and PILTEL – sought nullity of the circular befor RTC-QC alleging that: 1) it is oppressive,
confiscatory and constitutes deprivation of property without due process of the law; 2) that the circular will
impair the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid
SIM and call cards and that the requirements of identification are unreasonable. Globe and Smart intervened.

NTC – moved to dismiss the case on ground of Smart’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. RTC denied
motion to dismiss. NTC appealed to CA which granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Hence,
petition before SC.

HELD:

a. In questioning the validity of RULE or REGULATION issued by an administrative agency, party need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. The principle applies only when the act of the
administrative agency was performed in pursuant to its quasi-judicial function.
b. Issuance by NTC was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rulemaking power. As such, Smart was justified in
invoking the judicial power of RTC to assail the validity of said issuances.
EXCEPTION NO. 9 When There Is Irreparable Damage or Injury

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. RASUL


200 SCRA 685

FACTS:

Dr. Felipe A. Estrella, Jr. – was appointed by the UP Board of Regents as Director of the Philippine General
Hospital to take effect on 1 September 1986 to 30 April 1992.

UP Board of Regents – approved on 20 March 1989 the so-called reorganization plan for the PGH where
certain key position of UP Manila including that of Estrella will be declared vacant. Thereafter, the nomination
committee for UP PGH Medical Center Director are scheduled to nominate Estrella's replacement as Director.

Estrella – filed with SC , his complaint for injunction, where respondents raised Estrella's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.

HELD:

a. This case has special circumstances that make it fall under the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions to the
rule. Estrella was about to be replaced by the nomination committee.
b. He must have believed that airing his protest to the Board of Regents would only be fruitless and that unless
he goes to the court, irreparable injury or damage would be caused by the implementation of the proposed
reorganization.
EXCEPTIONS TO EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE – PPP-NNN-Q-CISE

EXCEPTIONS RATIONALE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Arrow Transportation Corp. v. BOT (63 SCRA


193) – It is undeniable that at the time the petition
was filed, there was pending MR with BOT.
Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior
thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity can
10) strong public interest avoid uncertainty be raised. This Court was impelled to go into the
merits of the controversy at this stage, not only
because of the importance of the issue raised but
also be cause of the strong public interest in having
the matter settled

Tan v. Veteran Backpay Commission (105 Phil.


agency is bound by its 377) – VBPC is in estoppel to invoke this rule
11) estoppel because it its own resolution, it led Tan to conclude
actions that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be
accepted by the Commission.
EXCEPTION NO. 10 Strong Public Interest is Involved

ARROW TRANSPORTATION CORP. v. BOT


63 SCRA 193

FACTS:

Arrow Transportation – is a holder of Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate utility bus.
BOT – approved the application of Sultan Rent-a-car for CPC to operate similar service without the required
publication and granted to Sultan provisional permit to operate.
Arrow – filed with the BOT Motion for Reconsideration and Cancellation of the Provisional permit granted to
Sultan Rent-a-car. Before MR could be resolved by BOT, Arrow filed certiorari with SC.

BOT – raised the question of whether the controversy is ripe for judicial determination.

HELD:

a. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed there was pending MR with BOT. Ordinarily, its
resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on prematurity can be raised.
b. This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the
importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.
EXCEPTION NO. 11 Estoppel on Party Invoking Doctrine

TAN v. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION


105 Phil. 377

FACTS:

Maria Natividad Tan – a widow of a deceased veteran, filed for back pay with Veterans Back Pay Commission
(VBPC).

VBPC – denied her request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to back pay and stated in its Resolution
the " opinions of Secretary of Justice are advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignores by the
office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse."

Tan – filed petition for Mandamus to CFI-Manila which granted the petition. Hence, VBPC went to the SC
contending that Tan should have appealed to the Office of the President first and that failed to exhaust available
administrative remedies.

HELD:

a. VBPC is in estoppel to invoke the rule because in its own resolution, it led Tan to conclude that only a final
judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission.
QUESTIONS OPEN TO REVIEW
QUESTION MEANING RULE
administrative agency – determines facts of a
when doubt or differences arise as to what
controversy and apply the law to those facts.
that law is pertaining to a certain state of
of facts.
reviewing court – decide whether correct rule
Law of law was applied to the facts found, and
example:
whether there was evidence before the
constitutional issues, jurisdiction, compliance
administrative tribunal to support the findings
with law and procedure, interpretation
made.

question of law is conclusive and not subject to


when doubt or differences arise as to the
review by the courts if supported by substantial
truth or falsity of alleged facts.
evidence
of
determined by:
Fact except: a) when expressly allowed by law; b)
special circumstances of each case in the
fraud, imposition or mistake other than error in
exercise of judgment and not by any fixed rule
judgment; c) error in appreciation of pleadings
of law
and interpretation of evidence submitted.

where what purports to be a finding of a


question of fact is so involved with and administrative finding on question of fact and
of Law dependent upon a question of law as to be in law is subject to judicial review.
and substance and effect a decision on the latter.
of Fact courts may substitute its judgment for
example: that of the administrative agency.
whether the thing is nuisance
RIPENESS FOR REVIEW
This doctrine is the similar to that of exhaustion of
administrative remedies except that it applies to the rule
MEANING making and to administrative action which is embodied
neither in rules and regulations nor in adjudication or
final order.

a. when the interest of the plaintiff is subjected to or


imminently threatened with substantial injury;
b. if the statute is self-executing;
c. when a party is immediately confronted with the problem
of complying or violating a statute and there is a risk of
criminal penalties;
d. a debilitating legal uncertainty by reason of which private
WHEN DOES IT APPLY? parties may be injured seriously enough;
e. when plaintiff is harmed by the vagueness of the statute;
f. informal administrative action;
g. governmental action is contingent upon the plaintiff’s
action or upon other events;
h. judicial discretion to decide the issue of legality in special
circumstances

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