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So Ping Bun v. CA No. SC affirmed the decision.

However, award of
attorney’s fee was modified from 200k to 100k.
Facts:
In this case, Tek Hua Trading entered into a contract of Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
lease agreement with Dee C. Chua & Sons Inc (DCCSI). This injury, and damages are the compensation awarded for the
was done thru Tek Hua Trading’s manager So Pek Giok. The damage suffered. The elements of Tort of interference are:
subject of the leas were premises located in Binondo which will (1) Existence of a valid contract;
be used Tek Hua as stores in its textile business. Note that (2) Knowledge on the part of the third person of the
each contract has a 1 year term. More so, it is provided that existence of contract;
should the leesee continue to occupy the premises after the (3) Interference of third person is without legal
term, the lease shall be on a month to month basis. justification or excuse.

When the contract expired, parties did not renew the The above elements are present in this cae.
contract but Tek hua continued to occupy the premises.
This situation pertains to a third person who induce a
On 1976, Tek Hua trading was dissolved. Later, the party to violate his undertaking under a contract. In this case,
original members of Tek Hua, including Manuel C. Tiong petitioner asked DCCSI to execute contract of lease in its
formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. In 1986, So pek Giok died favor. As a result, petitioner deprived respondent corporation
in 1986 and was replaced by So Ping Bun who occupied the of the latter’s property right. Petitioner, however, argues that
warehouse for his own textile business named “Trendsetter damage is an essential element of Tort of interference.
Marketing”. Later on, Tek Hua Enterprising Corp, through Because the lower courts ruled that private respondents were
Manuel Tiong, requested petitioner So Ping Bun to vacate his not entitled to actual, moral, and exemplary damages, it
business and request for the company will use it. follows that he be absolve of any liability including attorney’s
fees. There was a situation in Gilchrist v. Cuddy where it was
However, petitioner refuse to vacate the premise for his difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and
textile business and requested formal contracts of lease with there was nothing on the record to serve as basis thereof.
DCCSI. He claimed that after his grandfather died, he had
been occupying the premises for his textile business and It is true that lower courts did not award damages but
religiously paid the rent. Hence, the lease contract was in this was only because the extent of damages was not
favor of Trendsetter was executed. quantifiable. In such situations, court will refrain from
awarding damages. Same conclusion applies in this case.
Tek Hua Enterpires Corp filed injunction and for
nullification of the lease contract between DCCSI and However, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of
petitioner. Also, they filed a damage suit. RTC annulled the actual or compensatory damages, is allowed under the
contract of lease without awarding damages. This ruling was circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
upheld by the CA. Code. One such occasion is when the defendant's act or
Issue: omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
Whether injunction be upheld and damages be granted. persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. But we
have consistently held that the award of considerable damages
Held: should have clear factual and legal bases.
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. CA when PCIB indorsed the said checks, Citibank cleared them
without verifying with Ford.
Facts:
PCIB has no hands in the embezzlement but since it
In 1977, 1978, and 1979 Ford Philippines was assessed
was its employees that mainly facilitated the fraud, it is
a tax liability in the amounts of P4.7 million, P5.8 million, and
likewise liable under the above stated principle. PCIB’s and
P6.3 million respectively. To pay said tax, Ford issued three
Citibank’s liabilities are fixed on a 50-50 basis, hence they
Citibank checks in the said amounts. The checks’ named payee
must equally shoulder the paying of the checks’ amounts to
was the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The checks are in
Ford with interest.
the nature of payee’s checks which are only supposed to be
deposited to the CIR’s bank account which is with Metrobank. As a general rule, banking corporations are liable for
However, Ford’s accountant, Godofredo Rivera, deposited said the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of their officers
checks with the Philippine Commercial International Bank or agents within the course and scope of their employment. A
(then called IBAA). The latter accepted the same and bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or
eventually, the checks were cleared by Citibank but the checks agents when acting within the course and scope of their
never reached the CIR hence the Bureau of Internal Revenue employment. It may be liable for the tortuous acts of its
notified Ford of the nonpayment of the tax liabilities. This officers even as regards that species of tort of which malice is
forced Ford to issue new checks to satisfy its tax liabilities. an essential element.
Ford then sued PCIB and Citibank in order for the two banks to
But since Ford is also negligent, as when it failed to
refund them the amounts of the checks earlier issued.
diligently check its books of accounts which could have avoided
An investigation ensued and it was found out that further loss, the interest rate upon which the two banks are to
Godofredo Rivera, Ford’s accountant, was a member of a pay is lowered from 12% to 6% per annum. Ford’s negligence
syndicate. He conspired with other members of the same is only contributory because it was not the proximate cause of
syndicate who were also ranking employees of PCIB in order to the embezzlement. Further, it was shown that Rivera’s act of
facilitate the fraud. Apparently, a PCIB manager (Remberto depositing the checks with PCIB was not confirmed by the
Castro) who was also a member of the syndicate, set up a Board of Directors of Ford.
fictitious savings account to help facilitate the fraud. After they
successfully carted with the money, they vanished and became
fugitives of justice.
Issue:
Whether PCIB and Citibank are liable for the tortuous
acts of their employees.
Held:
Yes, but also Ford for its contributory negligence.
Citibank is liable because as per its agreement with
Ford, the payee’s checks are only supposed to be deposited
with the CIR’s account which is with Metrobank, yet Citibank
SHANG PROPERTIES REALTY CORP. vs. ST. FRANCIS development projects constitutes unfair competition as well as
DEV’T. CORP. false or fraudulent declaration.
DATE: July 21, 2014 Petitioners claim respondent is barred from claiming
AWARD: None ownership and exclusive use ofthe mark "ST. FRANCIS"
because the same is geographically descriptive ofthe goods or
FACTS: services for which it is intended to be used. This is because
Respondent is a domestic corporation engaged in the respondent’s as well as petitioners’ real estate development
real estate business and the developer of the St. Francis projects are located along the streets bearing the name "St.
Square Commercial Center, built sometime in 1992, located at Francis," particularly, St. Francis Avenue and St. Francis Street
Ortigas Center, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila (Ortigas (now known as Bank Drive), both within the vicinity of the
Center). It filed a separate complaints against petitioners Ortigas Center.
before the IPO - Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA), namely: BLA: Petitioners committed acts of unfair competition against
(a) an intellectual property violation case for unfair respondent by its use of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS"
competition, false or fraudulent declaration, and damages but not with its use of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-
arising from petitioners’ use and filing of applications for LA PLACE." It, however, refused to award damages in the
the registration of the marks "THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS" latter’s favor, considering that there was no evidence
and "THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE" presented to substantiate the amount of damages it suffered
(b) an inter partes case opposing the petitioners’ due to the former’s acts.
application for registration of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS BLA denied petitioners’ application for registration of
TOWERS" for use relative to the latter’s business, the mark “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS.” allowing petitioners’
particularly the construction of permanent buildings or application for registration of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS
structures for residential and office purposes SHANGRI-LA PLACE." It found that respondent cannot preclude
(c) an inter partes case opposing the petitioners’ petitioners from using the mark "ST. FRANCIS" as the records
application for registration of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS show that the former’s use thereof had not been attended with
SHANGRI-LA PLACE." exclusivity. More importantly, it found that petitioners had
Respondent alleged that it has used the mark "ST. adequately appended the word "Shangri-La" to its composite
FRANCIS" to identify its numerous property development mark to distinguish it from that of respondent, in which case,
projects located at Ortigas Center, such as the aforementioned the former had removed any likelihood of confusion that may
St. Francis Square Commercial Center, a shopping mall called arise from the contemporaneous use by both parties of the
the "St. Francis Square," and a mixed-use realty project plan mark "ST. FRANCIS."
that includes the St. Francis Towers. As a result of its The IPO Director-General ruled that (a) petitioners
continuous use of the mark "ST. FRANCIS" in its real estate cannot register the mark "THEST. FRANCIS TOWERS"; and (b)
business, it has gained substantial goodwill with the public that petitioners are not guilty of unfair competition in its use of the
consumers and traders closely identify the said mark with its mark "THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE." However, the
property development projects. Respondent claimed that IPO Director-General reversed the BLA’s finding that
petitioners could not have the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS petitioners committed unfair competition through their use of
TOWERS" registered in their names, and that petitioners’ use the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS," thus dismissing such
of the marks "THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS" and "THE ST. charge.
FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE" in their own real estate CA: Petitioners are guilty of unfair competition not only with
respect to their use of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS"
but also of the mark "THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE." public. Neither did petitioners employ any means to induce the
Accordingly, it ordered petitioners to cease and desist from public towards a false belief that it was offering respondent’s
using "ST. FRANCIS" singly or as part of a composite mark, as goods/services. Nor did petitioners make any false statement
well as to jointly and severally pay respondent a fine in the or commit acts tending to discredit the goods/services offered
amount of ₱200,000.00. by respondent. Accordingly, the element of fraud which is the
core of unfair competition had not been established.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are guilty of unfair competition. The Court hereby grants the instant petition, and, thus,
exonerates petitioners from the charge of unfair competition
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The petition is meritorious.
Unfair competition "‘the passing off (or palming off) or
attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business
of one person as the goods or business of another with the end
and probable effect of deceiving the public.’ Passing off (or
palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative
devices on the general appearance of the goods, misleads
prospective purchasers into buying his merchandise under the
impression that they are buying that of his competitors. [In
other words], the defendant gives his goods the general
appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of
deceiving the public that the goods are those of his
competitor." The "true test" of unfair competition has thus
been "whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of
deceiving or are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer
making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of the
particular trade to which the controversy relates." Based on
the foregoing, it is therefore essential to prove the existence of
fraud, or the intent to deceive, actual or probable, determined
through a judicious scrutiny of the factual circumstances
attendant to a particular case.
Here, the Court finds the element of fraud to be
wanting; hence, there can be no unfair competition. The Court
disagrees with the CA that petitioners committed unfair
competition due to the mistaken notion that petitioner had
established goodwill for the mark "ST. FRANCIS" precisely
because said circumstance, by and of itself, does not equate to
fraud under the parameters of Section 168 of the IP Code as
above-cited. In fact, the records are bereft of any showing that
petitioners gave their goods/services the general appearance
that it was respondent which was offering the same to the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSARIA V. IGNACIO necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or
[G.R. No. 107801. March 26, 1997] repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
FACTS:
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the
The Rizal RTC convicted Rosaria V. Ignacio of parricide justifying circumstance of self-defense, whether complete or
for fatally hitting her fourth husband, Juan Ignacio, with a incomplete.
wooden club (palo-palo) during a heated argument.
"x x x. (F)or unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must
Testifying in her defense, Rosaria did not deny having be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
inflicted the fatal wounds on her husband. According to her, thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude
while she was resting on the wooden bed after having returned and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of
home from her laundry work, her husband arrived drunk, real aggression. It must be such as to put in real peril the life
armed with a bolo and then faced her. Exasperated, she finally or personal safety of the person defending himself or of a
stood up, pulled his hair, got hold of a palo-palo and hit him relative sought to be defended and not an imagined threat."
once on the head. The assault sent Juan hovering down the
floor seriously wounded. After the incident, Rosaria left the
By her own admission, appellant only thought that her
straggling (kikisay-kisay) Juan and surrendered to the police
husband would strike her. In fact, appellant's claim of self-
at the municipal building.
defense was belied by her own daughter in a previous
Rosaria has interposed this appeal praying that she be marriage, who declared that even before the victim could
acquitted on the basis of self-defense or, in the alternative, get his bolo, appellant already picked up her palo-palo and
that she be held guilty only of homicide rather than of parricide hit him. Further, according to the trial court, the bolo which
because "there was no clear evidence of marriage" between was allegedly in victim's possession and with which the victim
her and the victim. allegedly attempted to hit the accused, was never found, as in
fact, admittedly, its whereabouts was unknown to the accused
ISSUES: who naturally would have preserved the same and utilized it in
(1) WON Rosaria acted on self-defense; evidence to corroborate her claim.

(2) WON she should be held guilty only of homicide rather 2) No.
than of parricide. Appellant not only declared in court that the victim was
HELD: her fourth husband but she also swore that they were married
before a judge. The victim's son by his former wife testified
(1) No. that his father and appellant were husband and wife, in much
the same way that appellant's daughter, held the victim to be
An accused who interposes self-defense admits the
her mother's husband.
commission of the act complained of. The burden of proving
self-defense would now be on the accused who must show by Appellant's own admission that she was married to the
strong, clear and convincing evidence that the killing is victim was a confirmation of the semper praesumitur
justified and that, therefore, no criminal liability has attached. matrimonio and the presumption that a man and a woman so
In a plea of self-defense, it is required that there be (1) an deporting themselves as husband and wife had verily entered
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) a reasonable into a lawful contract of marriage.
In view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of Rosit vs. Davao Doctors Hospital
voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly imposed upon G.R. No. 210445
appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Facts
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
subject to the modification that the indemnity awarded to the Rosit got into a motorcycle accident. He was taken to Davao
heirs of the victim, Juan Ignacio, is increased from P30,000 to
Doctors Hospital (DDH). X-ray showed that he fractures his
P50,000.00. jaw. He was then referred to Dr. Gestuvo, a specialist in
mandibular injuries.

During the operation, Dr. Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened


to the jaw with metal screws to immobilize the mandible. As
the operation required the smallest screws available, Dr.
Gestuvo cut the screws on hand to make them smaller. Dr.
Gestuvo knew that there were smaller titanium screws
available in Manila, but did not so inform Rosit supposing that
the latter would not be able to afford the same.

Following the procedure, Rosit could not properly open and


close his mouth and was in pain. X-rays show that the fracture
in his jaw was aligned but the screws used on him touched his
molar. The dentist replaced them with a smaller plate and
screws. Rosit was able to eat and speak well.

Rosit demanded that Dr. Gestuvo reimburse him for the cost of
the operation and the expenses he incurred in Cebu amounting
to P140,000, as well as for the P50,000 that Rosit would have
to spend for the removal of the plate and screws that Dr.
Pangan installed. Dr. Gestuvo refused to pay.

Issue
WON Dr. Gestuvo is liable – YES

Ruling

Dr. Gestuvo is his failure to inform Rosit that such smaller


screws were available in Manila, albeit at a higher price.

The doctrine of informed consent within the context of


physician-patient relationships goes far back into English
common law. x x x From a purely ethical norm, informed additional operation replacing the screws might be required to
consent evolved into a general principle of law that a replace the same, as what happened in this case, Rosit would
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably not have agreed to the operation. It bears pointing out that
prudent physician in the medical community in the Rosit was, in fact, able to afford the use of the smaller titanium
exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his patient screws that were later used by Dr. Pangan to replace the
as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred screws that were used by Dr. Gestuvo.
from a proposed course of treatment, so that a patient,
exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced Fourth, as a result of using the larger screws, Rosit
with a choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or experienced pain and could not heal properly because one of
alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently the screws hit his molar. This was evident from the fact that
exercise his judgment by reasonably balancing the just three (3) days after Dr. Pangan repeated the operation
probable risks against the probable benefits. conducted by Dr. Gestuvo, Rosit was pain-free and could
already speak. This is compared to the one (1) month that
xxx x Rosit suffered pain and could not use his mouth after the
operation conducted by Dr. Gestuvo until the operation of Dr.
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove Pangan.
in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of
informed consent: “(1) the physician had a duty to Without a doubt, Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of withholding material
disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or information which would have been vital in the decision of
inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and Rosit in going through with the operation with the materials at
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient hand. Thus, Dr. Gestuvo is also guilty of negligence on this
consented to treatment she otherwise would not have ground.
consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the
proposed treatment.” The gravamen in an informed consent
case requires the plaintiff to “point to significant undisclosed
information relating to the treatment which would have altered
her decision to undergo it.” Decision

The four adverted essential elements above are present here. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The CA
Decision dated January 22, 2013 and Resolution dated
First, Dr. Gestuvo clearly had the duty of disclosing to Rosit November 7, 2013 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 00911-MIN are hereby
the risks of using the larger screws for the operation. This was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Further, the Decision dated
his obligation as the physician undertaking the operation. September 14, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in
Davao City in Civil Case No. 27,345-99 is hereby
Second, Dr. Gestuvo failed to disclose these risks to Rosit, REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
deciding by himself that Rosit could not afford to get the more
expensive titanium screws.

Third, had Rosit been informed that there was a risk that the
larger screws are not appropriate for the operation and that an
GAID vs People MCTC: found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
GR 171636, April 7, 2009 crime charged. It held Gaid negligent in his driving considering
that the victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from
Facts: the point of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his
Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of vehicle after noticing that the jeepney’s left rear tire jolted
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right.

At around 12:00 noon, Gaid was driving his passenger jeepney RTC: affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC.
along a two-lane road (where the Laguindingan National High
School is located) toward the direction of Moog in Misamis CA: affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification in
Oriental. His jeepney was filled to seating capacity. At the time that it found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence
several students were coming out of the school premises. resulting in homicide. It exonerated petitioner from the charge
Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on the ground
(Dayata), was seen by an eyewitness sitting near a store on that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident.
the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of
the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s ISSUE:
jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. Was there absolutely lack of precaution on the part of Gaid
However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis when he continued running even after he had noticed that the
Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to left rear tire and the jeep tilted to its right side?
ride at that point.
Before the SC, petitioner maintains that no prudent man
It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of placed in the same situation could have foreseen the vehicular
the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right accident or could have stopped his vehicle in time when its left
lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to rear tire bounced due to the following reasons: (1) the victim
see him go near the jeepney at the left side. Understandably, was only a trespasser; (2) petitioner’s attention was focused
petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayata’s haste to on the road and the students outside the school’s gate; and
board the jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with passengers and cargoes
pinned to the left rear tire. The next thing the witness saw, and it was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his
Dayata’s feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, vehicle.
after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. SC:
Dayata was then seen lying on the ground and caught in The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner
between the rear tires. Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of is determined by the operative events leading to the death of
the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The
side. Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney
Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival. while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when
he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered
The autopsy report stated cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause the span between the moment immediately after the victim
of death, and that the injuries could have been caused by was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to
having run over by the jeepney. a halt.
FIRST STAGE The standard test in determining whether a person is
During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to
negligent. the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man,
in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
to do, without malice, an act from which material damage consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course
part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. In or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous
this case, Gaid was driving slowly at the time of the accident. results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
Understandably, at the time of the accident, Gaid was focused admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before
on the road ahead. In Dayata’s haste to board the jeep which negligence can be held to exist.
was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear
tire. From the facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that
first stage for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing
because the proximate cause of the accident and the death of of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate court
the victim was his own negligence in trying to catch up with equates with negligence.
the moving jeepney to get a ride. Petitioner had exercised
extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent
vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a
the victim who came from behind on the left side. direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is
not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the
SECOND STAGE accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.
The prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate
cause of the victim’s death was petitioner’s alleged negligence, The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact
if at all, even during the second stage of the incident. proved to be the immediate cause of his death. His skull was
crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of
protection of the interests of another person that degree of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal. In this case,
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly there was no showing that the jeepney dragged the victim
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. after he was hit and run over by the jeepney. Quite the
contrary, the evidence discloses that the victim was not
The elements of simple negligence: are dragged at all. Right after the impact, the conductor
(1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; immediately jumped out of the jeepney and saw the victim
and lying on the ground.
(2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate
or the danger is not clearly manifest. Mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have
lived had petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a
conviction in a criminal case. Conviction must rest on nothing Ramos v. CA (1999)
less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to
Petitioner was acquitted on reasonable doubt. The award of remove stone from her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They
damages was deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De
Code which states that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation
recover damages. did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the
operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the
administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a
coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was
witnessed by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean
of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the


surgeon and the anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners
showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was
caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable
care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the
anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata
ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan.”

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was


robust and fit to undergo surgery.

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise


due care in intubating the patient, the surgeon was remiss in
his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for
arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the
negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation
after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon,
anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held jointly and
severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent


and thereby caused the comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD: Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are


solidarily liable for the damages.
negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants are not
means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, selection and termination of doctors who work there which is
taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship.
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a
medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was
negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the


operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to
the private respondents who had complete and exclusive
control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she
was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the
thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the


presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda
and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.
One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or
not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies
here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist
only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation
which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an
act of negligence and irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to


exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in
determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper
protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to
confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it


exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring
and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was
Custodio vs CA the Santoses. However, when Santos built the fence, he was
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996 well within his right. He built the fence inside his property.
J. Regalado There was no existing easement agreement, either by contract
Facts: or by operation of law, on his property. Hence, Santos has all
Pacifico Mabasa owns a property behind the properties of the right to build the fence. It was only after the judgment in
spouses Cristino and Brigida Custodio and spouses Lito and the trial court that the easement was created which was even
Ma. Cristina Santos. The passageway leading to Mabasa’s conditioned on the payment of Mabasa of the just
house passes through the properties of the Custodios and the compensation. Santos did not commit a legal injury against
Santoses. Mabasa when he built the fence, therefore, there is no
actionable wrong as basis for the award of damages. In this
Sometime in 1981, the spouses Lito and Ma. Cristina Santos case, the damage has to be borne by Mabasa.
built a fence around their property. This effectively deprived
Mabasa passage to his house. Mabasa then sued the Custodios
and the Santoses to compel them to grant his right of way with
damages. Mabasa claims that he lost tenants because of the
blockade done by the families in front. The trial court ruled in
favor of Mabasa. It ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to
give Mabasa a permanent easement and right of way and for
Mabasa to pay just compensation. The Santoses and the
Custodios appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court. However, the CA modified the ruling by
awarding damages in favor of Mabasa (Actual damages: P65k,
Moral damages: P30k, Exemplary damages: P10k).

ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of damages by the CA is


proper?

HELD: No. The award is not proper. This is an instance of


damnum absque injuria.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury.


Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the
loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.

In this case, it is true that Mabasa may have incurred losses


(damage) when his tenants left because of the fence made by
GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM & CA A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be
G.R. No. L-56487 couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt
October 21, 1991 as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be
Reynalda Gatchalian (Gatchalian) boarded the “Thames” mini attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly
bus of Arsenio Delim (Delim) at San Eugenio, Aringay, La and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in
Union, which was bound for Bauang. While the bus was such person.
running along the highway of Barrio Payocpoc, a “snapping
sound” was heard at one part of the bus and, thereafter, the In this case, the waiver cannot be said to be cast in “clear and
vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, unequivocal terms”. Moreover, the circumstances under which
went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. As a the waiver was signed must be considered, as Gatchalian
result, several passengers were injured and were taken to testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the
Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union for medical vehicular accident when the purported waiver was presented to
treatment. her for signing. Considering this, there is a doubt as to
whether Gatchalian fully understood the import of the Joint
While the injured passengers were confined in the hospital, the Affidavit she signed and whether she actually intended to
wife of Delim visited them and paid for their hospitalization waive any right of action against Delim.
and medical expenses. Before Mrs. Delim left, she had the
passengers – including Gatchalian – to sign a prepared Joint (2) Whether Delim was negligent. YES.
Affidavit that stated, among others, that “they were no longer
interested to file a complaint, civil or criminal, against the A duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the
driver and owner of the Thames, because it wasa an accident”. safety of its passengers is imposed upon a common carrier. In
case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory
Nonetheless, Gatchalian still filed a complaint against Delim to presumption arises that the common carrier was at fault or
recover compensatory and moral damages, alleging that the had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
injuries left her with a conspicuous scar on her forehead, extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and
thereby causing her mental suffering and inferiority complex 1755”.
and that, as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay
away from her friends. As it stands, the records of the Court are bereft of any
evidence showing that Delim exercised the extraordinary
In his defense, Delim averred that (1) the vehicular mishap diligence required by law. His negligence is also shown by the
was due to force majeure, (2) Delim had already been paid, failure to look after the roadworthiness of the mini bus, the
and (3) the right to institute any action was already waived by driver’s refusal to stop the bus after he heard the “snapping
Gatchalian. sound” and the cry of alarm of the passengers.

ISSUE / RULING: While Delim attempted to put forward the defense of force
majeure, he failed to prove and substantiate his claim. To
(1) Whether there was a valid waiver. NO. exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical
injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the
carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of
the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but Moral damages may be awarded where gross negligence on
also that it was impossible to avoid. Any participation by the the part of the common carrier is shown. Since the Court has
common carrier in the occurrence of the injury will defeat the earlier concluded that Delim and his driver had been grossly
defense of force majeure. negligent in connection with the bus mishap which had injured
the passengers, and recalling the aggressive maneuvers of
(3) Whether Gatchalian is entitled to the damages Delim to get the victims to waive their right to recover
prayed for. damages even as they were still hospitalized for their injuries,
he must be held entitled to such moral damages at the amount
(a) Unrealized income. NO. of PhP 30,000 and PhP 1,000 for attorney’s fees.
The first item claimed by Gatchalian relates to the revenue she
allegedly failed to realize because of the effects of the
vehicular mishap. She claims that on the day that the mini-bus
went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the district
supervisor of public schools for a substitute teacher's job, a job
which she had held off and on as a "casual employee."

However, it was found that she was no longer an employed by


the school because she was laid off and her stint as a
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic. As such, she
was found not to be entitled to the unrealized income she
alleged.

(b) Compensatory damages (plastic surgery) –


YES. (PhP15,000)
Gatchalian also claims damages for the cost of plastic surgery
for the removal of the scar on her forehead.

A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body;


if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is
suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due
and assessable. As such, Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as
nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the
mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman,
resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of
bodily integrity, giving rise to a legitimate claim for restoration
to her conditio ante.

(c) Moral damages – YES. (PhP30,000 + PhP1,000


atty’s fees)