THE HOLY SEE VS. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR.
invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome,
Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent,
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot
was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
Private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and
damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack
of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
The trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business
contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner
official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a
lot to a private entity
RULING:
The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign.
The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations
with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal
practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were
made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign
to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and
entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters
have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by
the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through
diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to
espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign
Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between
the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905,
919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases
to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-
183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA VS. JAMES VINZON
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision made by Court of Appeals in ruling that the
Republic of Indonesia gave its consent to be sued and voluntarily submitted itself to the laws
and jurisdiction of Philippine courts and that petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and
Minister Counsellor Kasim waived their immunity from suit.
Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and
Services. The equipment covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units
and was to take effect in a period of four years.
When Indonesian Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of
Administration, he allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Hence, the Indonesian
Embassy terminated the agreement.
The respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Hence, he
filed a complaint against the petitioners which opposed by invoking immunity from suit.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from suit.
(2) Whether or not petitioners Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
may be sued herein in their private capacities.
Discussions:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. The practical justification for the doctrine
of sovereign immunity is that there can be no legal right against the authority that makes the
law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign States, the rule is derived from the
principle of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim par in parem non
habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another.] A contrary attitude would “unduly vex the peace of nations”.
The rules of International Law, however, are not unbending or immune to change. The
increasing need of sovereign States to enter into purely commercial activities remotely
connected with the discharge of their governmental functions brought about a new concept
of sovereign immunity. This concept, the restrictive theory, holds that the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (public acts of the
government of a state), but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis (the
commercial activities of a state
DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT (GTZ) VS. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS: The Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified and
agreement which lead to the Social Health Insurance—Networking and Empowerment
(SHINE) program wherein the program seeks to provide health care to Filipino families,
especially the poor. The Republic of Germany assigned the GTZ as the implementing
corporation for the program, while the Philippines designated the Department of Health and
the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation. Private respondents, as employed by GTZ for
the implementation of the SHINE, had a misunderstanding with the Project Manager of
SHINE. This lead to an exchange of letters which was interpreted to be the resignation of the
private respondents. Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the
labor arbiter. GTZ contends that it is immune from suit as it is the accredited agency of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GTZ is immune from suit.
HELD: A state may waive its immunity through a general or specific law. The special law can
take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. In this case
however, GTZ presented any evidence to support their claim that they are immune from suit,
and has failed to obtain a certification of immunity from suit from the Department of Foreign
Affairs. If GTZ has done so, then there would be no ambiguity in their claim that they are
immune from suit.
DFA VS. NLRC
Facts: On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against
Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and
the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent
Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities
pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement
Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's
Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had
waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi.
The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the
matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment."
When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies,
ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction
giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition
4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case
Held:
1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations,
as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their
part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are
treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which
must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs
and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason
for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization;
besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."
2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction,
which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service
contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign
immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute
theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not
with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.
“Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot
be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”
The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB
for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons
and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged,
entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the
country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary
or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the
international community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto
are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements
are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest
executive department with the competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the
international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in
good detail; viz:
"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign
or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it
is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the
foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the
Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the
Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to
immunity.
"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international
organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic
immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts
varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because
it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242
(1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer
vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States
Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor
General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.
"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs
moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court
allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of
sovereign immunity.
"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts
by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass
the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as
to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."
4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has,
under special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the
questioned order or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the
order or decision is a patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to
obtain in the present case. When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before
him, his action that assumes otherwise would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August
1993 is VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. (DFA vs NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18 September
1996)
WHO VS. AQUINO
Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were
allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC)
suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the
official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a
search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the
search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the
quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the
quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO
joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under
the diplomatic immunity.
Held:
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally
advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor
General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said
petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers
that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government
as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General
in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the
government in conducting foreign relations.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in
disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs.
Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
LASCO VS UNRFNRE
Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the
United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a
special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint
project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat
Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent
alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed
diplomatic immunity.
Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity
Held: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United
Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to
which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial
venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by
thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION VS. CALLEJA
FACTS: ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the
refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the
request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and
voluntary work.
IRRI on the other hand was intended to be an autonomous, philanthropic, tax-free, non-
profit, non-stock organization designed to carry out the principal objective of conducting
“basic research on the rice plant, on all phases of rice production, management, distribution
and utilization with a view to attaining nutritive and economic advantage or benefit for the
people of Asia and other major rice-growing areas through improvement in quality and
quantity of rice.”
The labor organizations in each of the above mentioned agencies filed a petition for
certification election, which was opposed by both, invoking diplomatic immunity.
ISSUE: Are the claim of immunity by the ICMC and the IRRI from the application of Philippine
labor laws valid?
HELD: YES. There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international
immunities to international organizations. These principles, contained in the ILO
Memorandum are stated thus:
1) international institutions should have a status which protects them against control or
interference by any one government in the performance of functions for the effective
discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in
which all the nations concerned are represented;
2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on
common international funds; and
3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States members, be accorded the
facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its
individual member States.
The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. “It
is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of
functional independence necessary to free international institutions from national control
and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities impartially on behalf of all their
members. The raison d’etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded
performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.
**
ICMC’s and IRRI’s immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic
rights, which are guaranteed by our Constitution.
For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled.
Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations provides that “each specialized agency shall make provision for
appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of
private character to which the specialized agency is a party.” Moreover, pursuant to Article IV
of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government,
whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the
privileges and immunities accorded.
Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as,
in fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as
evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM)
wherein “both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of
maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees.”
NOTES:
The term “international organization” is generally used to describe an organization set up by
agreement between two or more states. Under contemporary international law, such
organizations are endowed with some degree of international legal personality such that
they are capable of exercising specific rights, duties and powers. They are organized mainly
as a means for conducting general international business in which the member states have
an interest. The United Nations, for instance, is an international organization dedicated to
the propagation of world peace.
“Specialized agencies” are international organizations having functions in particular fields.
KHOSROW MINUCHER VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ARTHUR SCALZO
Facts: Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a
“buy-bust operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo
in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized.
Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being
merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a
special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States
Embassy addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna
Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
RULLING: YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long
as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the
case.
The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation”
conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to
the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug
suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would
then be expected to make the arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the
buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
LIANG VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce
Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral
defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The
next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that
petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in
the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit,
the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter
filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig
City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner
elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with
regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere
to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in
“official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity
agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in
the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
such as this case. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.