INTERNET LIBEL - Under Article 355, a libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,

engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means. Is the internet used to post a malicious defamatory imputation through facebook within the
contemplation of the phrase “any similar means” in Article 355? Yes. Writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition has a common
characteristic, and that is, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver
penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation (People vs. Santiago, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30,
1962). Hence, the phrase “any similar means” should be understood in the lights of the said common
characteristic of the means to commit libel. Since nature of internet as a means of publication is likewise
permanent, it should be considered as a means to commit libel. What is the venue for internet libel
committed? As a general rule, the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is
limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published
(Article 360 of RPC).However, the place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the
internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is “printed and first published”. To rule
otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360, and that was the
indiscriminate laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or farflung areas, to harass an accused.
At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for internet libel in
their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in
relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms
that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 20335, February 18. 2014).

CYBERLIBEL Writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition are means of publication in libel (2002 Bar Examination). They have a common
characteristic, and that is, their permanent nature as a means of publication and this explains the graver
penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation. Hence, the phrase “any similar means” should
be understood in the lights of the said common characteristic of the means to commit libel. Thus,
defamation thorough amplifier constitutes slander under Article 358 and not libel since its nature as
means of publication is not permanent, and thus, it is not similar to radio or other means mentioned in
Article 355 since (People vs. Santiago, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30, 1962). On the other hand, television
though not expressly mentioned in Article 355 easily qualifies under the general provision “or any similar
means” (People vs. Casten, CA-G.R. No. 07924-CR, December 13, 1974; 2005 Bar Examination). Since
nature of internet as a means of publication is permanent, it should be considered as a means to commit
libel. In Disini, the Supreme Court ruled: “The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355
of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.” Venue of cyber libel - As a general rule, the
venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places,
namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2)
where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published (Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code). However, the place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the internet is not
equivalent to the place where the libelous article is printed and first published within the contemplation
of the rule on venue under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. To rule otherwise is to allow the evil
sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate or arbitrary
laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more
than harass or intimidate an accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more
acute where the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated
by spite or the need for revenge. To equate the “first access to the defamatory article on website” with
"printing and first publication of the article" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360
of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos that
would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages
therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private complainant may have
allegedly accessed the offending website. At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil
or criminal complaint for internet libel in their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati,
Branch 149,G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010)