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RIGHTS OF PERSONS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

Group Report of Abalos, Cambe, Reyes and Tecson

Article III. Bill of Rights

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation
to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Cambe, Gay Anne Malou C.

The rights of the accused under custodial investigation first appeared as the second sentence in Article IV,
Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution.

SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The right against self-incrimination (first sentence of Article IV Section 20) was separated from the right
of the accused under investigation in the 1987 Constitution to emphasize that it is not just a right against
self-incrimination but also a guarantee of the right to proper treatment of those under investigation. The
brief sentence in the 1973 Constitution was expanded to clarify the scope of the right.

The rights under this section are available to “any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense.

Investigation is defined by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as “investigation conducted by the police
authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC (Philippine
Constabulary) and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government.” This includes conversations
with a barangay captain that is part of an ongoing custodial investigation, Section 12 (1) applies.

Cases:

Escobedo vs. Illinois


 Not allowing someone to speak with an attorney, and not advising them of their right to remain
silent after they have been arrested and before they have been interrogated is a denial of assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. A law enforcement system that relies too much on the
confession is more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained through skillful
investigation.
 Defined custodial investigation as the time when ‘the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect’. The suspect has been taken
into custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements.

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966)

 Miranda Rights is a right to silence warning given by police to criminal suspects in police custody
(or in a custodial interrogation) before they are interrogated to preserve the admissibility of their
statements against them in criminal proceedings.
 Rights available during custodial investigation:
 The person in custody must be informed at the outset in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has a right to remain silent.
 After being so informed, he must be told that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court.
 He must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have
the lawyer with him during the interrogation. He does not have to ask for a lawyer. The
investigator should tell him that he has the right to counsel at that point.
 He should be warned that not only has he the right to consult with a lawyer but also
that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
 Even if the person consents to answer questions without the assistance of counsel, the
moment he asks for a lawyer at any point in the investigation, the interrogation must
cease until the attorney is present.
 If the foregoing protections and warnings are not demonstrated during the trial to have
been observed by the prosecution, no evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation
can be used against him

 Custodial Investigation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way. Custodial interrogation before or after charges have been filed, are considered critical pre-
trial stages in the criminal process.

Republic Act No. 7438 (AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF) states that, “custodial investigation shall include the
practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of
law.”

Difference between Preliminary Investigation and Custodial Investigation


 Preliminary investigation
 a proceeding to determine whether there is a sufficient ground or well-founded belief that
a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty and should be held for trial
 it is still NOT a trial since its purpose is to determine the existence of a probable cause
 no need to present any evidence to prove or disprove guilt at this point since only a quasi-
judicial officer is conducting this
 right to preliminary investigation is a substantial right although the absence of such does
not render the Information or complaint against the accused as defective; to afford the
accused of its right to life and liberty, the trial court must order the prosecuting officer to
conduct a preliminary investigation

 Custodial Investigation
 it refers to the questioning initiated by a police officer AFTER a person has been taken into
custody or deprived of his freedom of action
 When a person is arrested, the arresting officer must inform him of his constitutional rights
or more popularly known as the Miranda rights. He should be informed of the reason for
arrest, the constitutional right to remain silent where any statement made may be used
against him and the right to communicate to a lawyer or any family member or relative.
 It is also important to take note that in this stage, the presence of a lawyer is required. Such
right to counsel may be waived however, it should still be done in the presence of a counsel
otherwise, the waiver has no effect at all.
 In case any of the constitutional rights mentioned are not properly observed and the accused
made statements that may be used against him, it will be treated as INADMISSIBLE,
meaning it has no effect and cannot be used against him in court. It's as if the accused did
not say anything.
 After such investigation, it shall be put into writing where the accused will signify that he
attests to the truthfulness of the report. However, the contents must be explained especially
when he does not know how to read or write.

Statements rendered by the accused during preliminary investigation are admissible in evidence, even if the
rights provided by Section were not applied, because preliminary investigation is not part of custodial
investigation.

Rights of person under investigation (Section 12, Subsection 1)

1. The right to remain silent


 A person under investigation has the right to refuse to answer any question. His silence,
moreover, may not be used against him.
2. The right to counsel
 It is a right to effective counsel from the first moment of questioning and all throughout.
3. The right to be informed of such right
 The right of a person under investigation ‘to be informed’ implies a correlative obligation
on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed.

Rights cannot be waived except in writing and signed by the person in the presence of his counsel. The
right to remain silent and the right to counsel may be waived, but not the right to be informed of these
rights.
Confessions or admissions obtained in violation of rights are inadmissible in evidence.

Two Kinds of Involuntary or Coerced Confession under Section 12 (People vs. Vallejo, G.R. No. 144656,
May 02, 2002):

1. Coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods, such as torture, force, violence, threat
and intimidation.
2. Uncounselled statements given without benefit of the Miranda warning.

Cases:

People vs. Lungod, G.R. No. 136253, February 21, 2001

 Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel,
and that if he cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. There
was also no evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights which waiver must be done
in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of
confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel
cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-appellants rights under the Bill of
Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter
how brutal the crime committed may be. In the same vein, the accused-appellants act in pointing
out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the accused-appellants right
to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is considered a
fruit of the poisonous tree. The records do not support the confession allegedly made by the
accused-appellant to the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. The testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to
the alleged confession made by the accused-appellant is not conclusive for the Vice Mayor did
not ask specific questions worthy to bring about the guilt of the accused. Accused-appellant merely
responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did not state in
certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. Hence, such confession has no
bearing.

People vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999

 Del Rosario was deprived of his rights to during custodial investigation. From the time he was
invited for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective
custodial investigation but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers.
The police already knew the name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del
Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime
even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against him, as the same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a
hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious designs to perpetrate a
dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected
to flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more
concerned with his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only
saw for the first time that day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was
not proved beyond a whimper of a doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any
complicity in the crime charged.

People vs. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262 (1992)

 Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the
Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, Bolanos should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which
explicitly provides: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3)
Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violation of this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices and their families. Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to
the manner by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged
confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction,
besides Bolanos's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no recourse
but to reverse the subject judgment under review.

Rhode Island vs. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)

 The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply
taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.
"Interrogation," as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion
above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is
to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to
any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from
the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the
suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards
were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive
police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice
that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect
thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the
unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response. Herein, Innis was not "interrogated" within the meaning of
Miranda. It is undisputed that the first prong of the definition of "interrogation" was not satisfied,
for the conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included no express questioning
of Innis. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue between the
two officers to which no response from Innis was invited. Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded
that Innis was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. It cannot be said, in short,
that Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from Innis. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
the officers were aware that Innis was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience
concerning the safety of handicapped children. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that
the police knew that Innis was unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court erred, thus, in equating "subtle compulsion" with interrogation. That the
officers' comments struck a responsive chord is readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode
Island Supreme Court did say, that Innis was subjected to "subtle compulsion," but that is not the
end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the
product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the present case.

People vs. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)

 Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his
constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of Mahinay
given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person.
He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when he was sworn to the truth of his statement on
8 July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession
abound with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys
Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to
Mahinay his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That
he signed the statement given by Mahinay. A lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected
to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the
physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of death
Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent
with the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the
victim lost consciousness. There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were
obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated
in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct and freely or voluntarily
given. In his extrajudicial confession, Mahinay himself admitted that he had sexual congress with
the unconscious child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides 8 others, established the felony of
rape with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, RA 7659.

Ladiana vs. People, G.R. No. 144293, December 4, 2002


 Custodial interrogation is the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.In
the present case, petitioner admits that the questioned statements were made during the preliminary
investigation, not during the custodial investigation. However, he argues that the right to competent
and independent counsel also applies during preliminary investigations. The Supreme Court
disagree. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or a proceeding to determine whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Evidently, a person undergoing
preliminary investigation before the public prosecutor cannot be considered as being under
custodial investigation. In fact, the Court has unequivocally declared that a defendant on trial or
under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation.
Extrajudicial Confession is a confession made out of court, and not as a part of a judicial examination or
investigation. Such a confession must be corroborated by some other proof of the corpus delicti, or else it
is insufficient to warrant a conviction.

An extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must be:

1. Voluntary
2. With assistance of counsel
3. In writing; and
4. Express

 Administrative Investigations

The purpose of an administrative inquiry is to gather facts and relevant evidence to provide the basis for
management determining what, if any, action to take. An administrative inquiry is an investigation that
is not for the purpose of law enforcement or criminal prosecution.

The rights during custodial investigation are not available before government investigators become
involved.

Cases:

People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989)

 Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. He had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded. The note that he sent to his superiors offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang, 271 SCRA 316 (1997)

 The Constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invked only
during custodial investigation. Such investigation is defined as an investigation conducted by police
authorities who will include investigation conducted by police authorities who will include
investigation conducted by Municipal Police (PNP) and the NBI and such other police agencies.
Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. During the investigation, Malla repeated
what she basically stated in her affidavit, i.e., that she used substantial amount for her personal
need. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claimed was employed against
her.

People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 157399, November 17, 2005

 The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed. Considering that his statement was taken during
the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit team and before he was taken into
custody. As such inquest was still a general inquiry into an unsolved offense. Appellant cannot
claim that he is in police custody because he was confined at the time at Heart Center and he gave
this statement to NPC personnel, not to police authorities. The interview where the sworn statement
is based was conducted by NPC personnel for NPC’s administrative investigation. Any
investigation conducted by the NBI is a separate proceeding, distinct and independent from the
NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped together with the latter.

 Police Line Up

A police lineup or identity parade is a process by which a crime victim or witness's putative identification
of a suspect is confirmed to a level that can count as evidence at trial. It is not considered a part of any
custodial inquest, because it is conducted before that stage of investigation is reached.

Situations where Section 12 (1) does not apply:

1. Subjection to parrafin test, because it is not communicative action or testimonial compulsion.


2. One placed in a police line-up, unless there is a move on the part of the investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or a person already under custodial investigation who is placed in a
police line-up is still entitled to Section 12.

Cases:

Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988)

 Police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled at such
stage to counsel. When the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as
when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services
of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet
been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted
by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated
petitioner’s right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had
not begun. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be accompanied by counsel to avoid pernicious practice
of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense. On the right to due process, the Court finds that
petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of the substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly
represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard
and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted
to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order
issued is lifted.

United States vs. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967)

 Neither the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was required to do in the
lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege "protects an accused only
from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature." Compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for
observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give
evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical
characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. It is no different from
compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those
instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly, compelling Wade to speak within
hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not
compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an
identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt. The Court held in Schmerber that the
distinction to be drawn under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one
between an accused's "communications" in whatever form, vocal or physical, and "compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical evidence.'" The Court recognized
that "both federal and state courts have usually held that [the privilege] offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular
gesture." None of these activities becomes testimonial within the scope of the privilege because
required of the accused in a pretrial lineup. However, the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused
the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the prosecution at pretrial
proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of counsel might
derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps as
analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was
entitled to the aid of counsel. There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point,
(1) because of the manner in which confrontations for identification are frequently conducted, (2)
because of dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and suggestibility inherent in the context
of the confrontations, and (3) because of the likelihood that the accused will often be precluded
from reconstructing what occurred and thereby obtaining a full hearing on the identification issue
at trial. This case illustrates the potential for improper influence on witnesses through the lineup
procedure, since the bank employees were allowed to see respondent in the custody of FBI agents
before the lineup began. The presence of counsel at the lineup will significantly promote fairness
at the confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification. Further, in-court
identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before trial in the absence of counsel
must be excluded unless it can be established that such evidence had an independent origin or that
error in its admission was harmless. Since it is not clear that the Court of Appeals applied the
prescribed rule of exclusion, and since the nature of the in-court identifications here was not an
issue in the trial and cannot be determined on the record, the case must be remanded to the District
Court for resolution of these issues.

People vs. Escordial, G.R. No. 138934, January 16, 2002


 While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of
his custodial interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or
exculpatory - which was used in evidence against him. No uncounseled statement was obtained
from Escordial which should have been excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial was
never assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the
time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at the
Bacolod police station. Although Escordial made no statement during this time, this fact remains
important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of Escordial by the
prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Mark
Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a
police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the
previous cases are different inasmuch as Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police
after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already
under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect
is identified by a witness from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial
investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. This is
because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce
the trial itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle
Darunda in a show-up on 3 January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega,
and Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when
Escordial did not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible
in evidence against him. Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these
identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup
'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.”

People vs Piedad, G.R. No. 131923, December 5, 2002

 The claim by the defense that Piedad’s pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of
a police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident,
Luz Lactawan knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Piedad because they played
basketball together. Hence, the witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar
with, where arguably, improper suggestion may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were
presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to confirm whether they were the ones
responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate the accused simply because
they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain they recognized
the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a suspect
can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses
positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason
to doubt the veracity of Luz’s and Fidel’s testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel
positively, categorically and unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck Mateo on the
head with a stone, and Garcia as the one who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting
traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually led to Mateo’s death. Indeed, if family
members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the
assailants, the Court sees no reason how a wife, who witnessed the violence inflicted upon her
husband and who eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be stressed
that Luz was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz
could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot
away from Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Garcia on the other hand was identified
by both Luz and Fidel as the one who was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from
a bulb 5 meters away from the scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high
degree of reliability the identity of the criminals at any given time. Hence, the proximity and
attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative illumination of the surrounding area,
bolsters the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al. Neither is the lack of counsel during the
pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et. al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make any extrajudicial
confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may have been
suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess
to the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia were not under custodial investigation. In
fact, Piedad averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything
at the police station on the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.

Lumanog vs. People, G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010

 Generally, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-up considering that
such is usually not a part of custodial investigation. An exception to this rule is when the accused
had been the focus of police attention at the start of the investigation. The line-up in this case
squarely falls under this exception. It was established that Joel was already a suspect prior to the
police line-up. In fact, even before Joel’s apprehension, the police had already zeroed in on Joel as
one of Abadillas killers. As such, Joel was entitled to counsel during the police line-up. However,
there is no question that Joel was not assisted by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided
by the police, during the line-up. As Joel’s identification was uncounseled, it cannot be admitted in
evidence for grossly violating Joel’s right to counsel under Section 12(1) of the Constitution.

Tecson, Jimmy

CASES BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 not applicable

Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3 March 1975]; also Simeon vs. Villaluz [GR L-37424] and
People vs. Isnani [GR L-38929] En Banc, Fernandez (J): 6 concur

Facts: No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court
of First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A.
Villaluz of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede admissible the confessions
of the accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt,
Inocentes De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto
Gabion, and Rafael Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance (Branch
II) of Zamboanga de Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the
accused in said case (Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of their
right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court. Issue:
Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively. Held: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense,
the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means
that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be
given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated. Consequently, because the
confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were taken before the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated as to render them
inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of "their right to remain silent and to counsel,"
"and to be informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time. The argument that the second
paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by Republic Act 1083 enacted in
1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with his attorney or counsel,"
impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is untenable.
The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his
detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer with
counsel at any time. The historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution shows
that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of such right under
pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a prospective and
not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel
would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the
acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties in many
criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in
accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional
Convention could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if
the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is
acquitted.

RULES UNDER THE 1973 CONSTITUTION (VOLUNTARY, KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT


WAIVER)

People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17 January 1980] En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result

Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on 14 September 1973, in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y Gonzales (Criminal Case 146-V-73), with the
case, after the raffle, being assigned to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa. Upon
arraignment on 5 October 1973, Yupo pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded, the
prosecution having presented 6 witnesses, including the father of the deceased, Miguel Tribol, and his
common-law wife, Lydia Begnotia, who allegedly received the ante mortem statement of the victim,
Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the hearing on 3 June 1974, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of
the Meycauayan Police Department, before whom a written statement of Yupo and his alleged waiver of
his right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken. After this witness had
identified the statement of Yupo and the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating answers in such
statement to the police, but there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel based on the ground
of such statement being inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any
counsel assisting the accused in the investigation. Judge Caguioa sustained the objection of the defense on
the view that such judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional,
it appearing that the accused was not assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such
right could not be waived. Upon his refusal to reconsider such ruling, the petition for certiorari was filed.
Issue: Whether the right to remain silent and right to counsel during custodial investigation may be waived.
Held: While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be intelligently waived, otherwise
a court's jurisdiction starting at the beginning of the trial may be lost in the course of the proceeding.
Statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain
silent, that any utterance may be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel,
either retained or appointed. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed,
unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual
is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with
an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Tested by such a clear and unequivocal standard, the
alleged waiver herein falls far short. Yupo merely answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to Corporal Conrado
B. Roca of the Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat
tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay
may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na
iyong gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon o laban
sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" and that was all.

People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980] En Banc, Aquino (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: At around 10:00 a.m. of 14 January 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital, went to the toilet to answer
a call of nature and to fetch water. Jose Tampus y Ponce and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal
institution, who were tubercular patients in the hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of
their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed
him nine times. Saminado died upon arrival at 11:00 a.m. on that same morning in the prison hospital. After
emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the
guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus
and Avila, both members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales (also a member of the
Oxo gang) in December 1975 by a member of the Batang Mindanao gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang.
Saminado was a member of the Batang Mindanao gang. The officer of the day investigated the incident
right away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated
that, according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was seated in the
comfort room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck.
Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and
obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. Tampus and
Avila were charged for murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch 36 (Criminal
Case 18510). After trial, the court convicted Tampus for murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him
to pay the heirs of the victim, Celso Saminado, an indemnity of P12,000.00. In the same decision, Rodolfo
Avila, the coaccused of Tampus, was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal
as maximum and to pay the same indemnity. Avila did not appeal. (Avila was sentenced to death, together
with Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala, in another case, Criminal Case 1187. The death sentence is under
review in GR L-38141). The present automatic review involves Tampus' conviction. Issue: Whether the
“custodial” investigation pursued by Lahoz, where allegedly Tampus was not informed as to his rights to
have counsel and to remain silent, negates the extra-judicial confession made by Tampus in the killing of
Saminado. Held: As the confession in the present case was obtained after the 1973 Constitution took effect,
section 20 of Article IV applies thereto. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made.
Investigator Buenaventura de la Cuesta in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply
with section 20. Even considering that Vivencio C. Lahoz investigated the killing two days before the
confession was taken by investigator de la Cuesta on 16 January 1976 and that allegedly during said
custodial interrogation Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent,
Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him
that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation,
was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that; the two
accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or
suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That admission was
confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from
the judgment of conviction. It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's
evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the trial court should have advised him
of his constitutional right to remain silent. That contention is not well-taken considering that Tampus
pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to
apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for
him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right. It should
be stressed that, however, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt, confession, plea of
guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.

THE GALIT RULE

People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985] En Banc, Concepcion (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part

Facts: In the morning of 23 August 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the
bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of 7 wounded inflicted
upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More than 2 weeks thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or
suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, 8 September 1977, the case was referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of
the Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a
team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the
suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, 9 September 1977,
Francisco Galit allegedly voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the
crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. Actually, Galit had
been obtained and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently maintained
his innocence. The investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. They covered
his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. With Galit's will having been
broken, he admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they
prepared. Galit was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. Trial was held, and on 11 August 1978, immediately after the
accused had terminated the presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in
open court, finding Galit guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the
heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review. Issue:
Whether a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary admission that may be used
against the accused. Held: As held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be
the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone
if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence." Herein, there were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state
witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against
Galit is his alleged confession. A long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws.
Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a
dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Galit is from Samar and there is no showing
that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted to communicate
with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay
that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to
counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again
Galit was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights. Trial courts
are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession, especially
where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to the
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.

REQUIREMENT OF COMPETENT & INDEPENDENT COUNSEL


People vs. Bandula [GR 89223, 27 May 1994] First Division, Bellosillo (J): 2 concur, 2 on leave

Facts: On 27 January 1986, at around 10:00 p.m., 6 armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut
Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard Antonio Salva of
the plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two
others who wore masks were simply referred to as "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the 2 masked
men held Salva who was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back.
They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation,
hog-tied him, and divested him of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver.
From there, the 6 armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay,
Manager of the Polo Coconut Plantation. Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while Bandula and
the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing their way
into the house, the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other
valuables. Thereafter, the hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano inside
his house together with Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots coming from the
direction of the gate of the compound. After succeeding in untying themselves, Pastrano and Salva went to
report the matter to the police. On their way, they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay
(dead with 3 gunshot wounds). On 28 January 1986, Dionanao was "picked-up for investigation" and
interrogated by Cpl. Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in Tanjay where he implicated accused
Sedigo. The following day, on 29 January 1986, he was brought to the Office of the Municipal Attorney of
Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where he supposedly executed his extrajudicial confession in the presence of
the latter. On 4 February 1986, upon the suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the
Supplementary Sworn Statement of Dionanao, again in the presence of Atty. Zerna. In his Sworn Statement,
Dionanao supposedly admitted that he was with Bandula when the latter, together with "Boy Short" and
"Boy Tall," shot Atty. Garay. He added that he was going to be killed if he did not join the group. He also
said that Sedigo and Ejan were with them that evening. Then, in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he
implicated 3 more persons but they were not thereafter included in the Information. Pn the other hand,
Bandula was arrested on 28 January 1986, at around 6:00 a.m., brought to the Tanjay Police Station and
there interrogated. He was investigated by Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl. Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat. Moso and Pat.
Baldejera. In that investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted that he together with 2 others shot Atty. Garay
with a .38 cal. revolver. At that time, there was no counsel present "because that (investigation) was not yet
in writing." Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty.
Zerna admitting his participation in the killing of Atty. Garay. In that statement, Bandula narrated that after
"Boy Short" and "Boy Tall" shot Atty. Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered likewise to shoot the latter which
he did. Bandula, Sedigo, Dionanao and Ejan were were charged for robbery with homicide. On 5 May 1989,
after hearing 12 prosecution and 9 defense witnesses, the trial court rendered judgment finding Bandula
guilty of the crime charged. However, his 3 co-accused were acquitted "for insufficiency of evidence."
Issue: Whether admissions obtained during custodial interrogations requires mere counsel or independent
counsel present. Held: Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to
Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused
was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
violence was used against Bandua. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which
mandates in Section 12, Art. III, that (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations
of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families. The present case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus, where it was
held that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later
reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. The
Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public
or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to
the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective
extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna
does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal
assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to
the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can
effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better
than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.

People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998] Third Division, Romero (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a widower,
Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned 16 hectares
of coconut land in the area. On 16 September 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two hired hands,
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra,
Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and Bernardo Jr. went
back to Sitio Libod that same day. At around 6:00 p.m. of 17 September 1988, Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo
Malita to come to the former's house to discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo
Jr.'s house, he saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. Bernardo Jr.
thereafter proposed that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after
the rain had stopped. Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, Bernardo Jr. knocked on
the door, asking his father to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked
the old man down. Reynaldo then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr. and Eddie ransacked
Bernardo's aparador looking for money but they found none; so, the 3 of them left. The body of Bernardo
was discovered the next day by Bernardo Jr.'s son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. On 27
September 1988, Leo Quidato confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and
Eddie Malita were the ones responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested by the police.
Aside from arresting the latter two, however, the police also arrested Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988,
the Malita brothers were interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When
Mara apprised them of their constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent
to confess even in the absence of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of
counsel, Mara took down the testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their
affidavits. Instead, he escorted the Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their
unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom
conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie, again advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer
explained the contents of the affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and
voluntary execution of the same. Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits.
On 17 January 1989, Bernardo Jr. was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court
of Davao. A murder case was likewise filed against his co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita.
Bernardo Jr. and the Malita brothers pleaded not guilty. The two cases were tried jointly. The Malita
brothers withdrew their "not guilty" plea during trial and were accordingly sentences. Only Bernardo Jr.'s
case was tried on merits. After due trial and on 2 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch
4, rendered judgment finding Bernardo Quidato, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the
offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246 (of the Revised Penal Code), for the death of his father,
Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the
amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. Bernardo Jr. appealed.

Issue: Whether an initially uncounseled extrajudicial confession, signed in the presence of a counsel in a
later day, is admissible as evidence against the accused. Held: The prosecution relied heavily on the
affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers were, however, not presented on the witness
stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to present the two gives these affidavits the
character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants themselves take the witness stand to
affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial proceeding, being
inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made extrajudicially are not admissible in
evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an opportunity to hear him testify and
cross-examine him. Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were obtained by the police render the
same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The settled rule is that an uncounseled
extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the
presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the Malita brothers gave their
statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the same in the presence of
counsel the next day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's (accused’s wife) testimony,
as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on record with which to
justify a judgment unfavorable to Bernardo Jr. He was therefore acquitted.

People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur

Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf,
borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the an Isuzu passenger type jeepney
(Plate DFB 550) as a collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a
check payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It
bore a signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who
subsequently deposited it in his account. On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power
of attorney from Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons failed to pay the
indebtedness. So, Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the
amount borrowed but Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as
Pons also failed to produce a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a complaint against him
for estafa before the NBI. Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew,
Jr., the jeepney and its driver to the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in
Silang and Imus, Cavite. Two weeks after 4 September 1987, the body of 23-year-old Andrew Patriarca,
Jr. was found in a sugarcane plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed from his body. The body of the
driver, Geronimo Malibago, stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, was recovered after the
harvest of sugarcane in the plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified the body from its clothing.
Acting on the complaint, the NBI contacted the relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines
Sur, identified the jeepney and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and
conductor (deceased Andrew Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers. Patriarca's widow also filed a
complaint with the NBI. Upon investigation, an NBI team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found
out that the carnapping of the jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a
group of 4 persons named Rene Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and Eduardo Sarinos alias
Digo. The team also discovered that the jeepney was disposed of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well
as Cid, were arrested in Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the
carnapping incident. The jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine partly dismantled. Upon
being informed by the NBI that the jeepney had been found, an insurance company brought it back to
Manila. From the "oral investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the
team learned that Sarita and Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where
presumably they were killed. Because Januario and Canape volunteered that their companions were their
neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to take
down their statements at the NBI head office in Manila. The team traveled with Januario and Canape to
Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28 March 1988. At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI,
the team took the statements of Januario and Canae one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who
was "just around somewhere," to assist Januario and Canape during the investigation. Agent Arlis Vela
took the statement of Januario while Supervising Agent Toribio took that of Canape. On 7 November 1988,
an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario
and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo
charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539 (AntiCarnapping Law). Arraigned on 7 February 1989,
Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by
counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and Sarinos remained at large. After trial, the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City, disposing of Criminal Case TG-1392-89,
rendered judgment finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation
of Section 14, last sentence, of Republic act 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and
imposed upon them the supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or life imprisonment, and ordered them to
pay jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims, namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew
Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c)
P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the costs of the proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue: Whether Saunar’s presence as counsel in the custodial investigations satisfies the requirements of
Article III, section 12 (1). Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario
and Canape is, however, not a guarantee that their respective confessions had been taken in accordance
with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice." Saunar was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation counsel.
Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances described by
the prosecution however, he could not have been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by the
Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty
was to the confessants. In fact, he was actually employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although
Saunar might have really been around to properly apprise Januario of his constitutional right as reflected in
the written sworn statement itself, the same cannot be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed
of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if
he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if he so desires or
that one could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the constitutional mandate.
In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he
was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his
right to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the right of a person under custodial investigation to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective communication that results in an
understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's sworn statement, which reads and sounds so lifeless on paper,
fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing
in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have exerted more effort in
explaining to him his constitutional rights. The law enforcement agents' cavalier disregard of Januario's and
Canape's constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section 12 (1) of Article III of
the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the same article which
mandates that an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance of counsel;
otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.

People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in the national highway
at Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry
Feliciano y Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away, through intimdation or violence, cash
amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado,
and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or
about 16 April 1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash
money. In the course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an
information was filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery
with homicide (as per 16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information dated 20 May 1993 was
filed against Feliciano and Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993
incident). Only Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the Maharlika
Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was detained while Jonelto
Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 25 found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation
in the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
offended party (the heirs of Florentino Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the
sum of P35,000.00 representing funeral expenses and to pay the cost. The trial court also found Feliciano
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period as the maximum term and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00,
representing the value of the P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the
sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial court
convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial. Feliciano
appealed. Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of
counsel. Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when
he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started
questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney
driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.
Feliciano had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel; inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez
investigated Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further,
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to
Feliciano the consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is
possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty. Chavez’s independence as counsel
is suspect — he is regularly engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects
who cannot avail the services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his
services.

People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002] En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur

Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay
Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, 6 year old John
Ardee Balisi, were the neighbors of Samus’ father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna. At 4:20 P.M. on 2 September 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his
office at the 4th PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba,
Laguna when he received an order from his superior to investigate the murder of the two victims. Their
office had received a telephone call from a local barangay official informing them of the victims’ deaths.
Arriving at the victims’ residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and
his team conducted an investigation, making a sketch of the relative positions of the victims, lifting
fingerprints from the crime scene and taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation report was prepared by
Garcia and signed by his superior, Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of maong
pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of
earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was likewise reported missing from her body by her daughter, Nora B.
Llorera. The victims’ bodies were brought to the Funeraria Señerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that same day,
Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an acquaintance of Samus,
happened to meet Samus at Sammy Pacheca’s house in the same barangay where Samus asked Ponciano
to accompany him to Ponciano’s wife to pawn a pair of earrings. Ponciano’s wife was mad at first but upon
Ponciano’s prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with no interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box;
thereafter, Samus received another P250.00. At 6:00 P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the
Criminal Investigation Group received information that Samus was the principal suspect in the killing of
the 2 victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay
Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a team composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence
Commission Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the site at past 7:00 P.M., the team,
accompanied by local barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo spouses to enter the house,
which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof. Rushing outside, they saw
Samus crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped from the roof and landed
hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right forearm. At that point,
the police team closed in on Samus who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the killings upon a query
from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation Office where he was
informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of 11 September 1996,
Samus, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his statement admitting the killings. SPO3 Malabanan also
took the statements of tricycle driver Rafael Baliso, the victims’ relatives Salvacion and Mona Balisi and
witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the same day, PNP
Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from Samus. His prints exactly matched
with a set of prints found at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover the
pawned earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Two separate Informations
were filed on 27 November 1996, charging Samus (in Criminal Case 5015-96-C) with homicide for the
death of one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years old), and (in Criminal Case 5016-96-C) with murder
for the death of one John Ardee Balisi y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned on 28 May 1997, Samus,
assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course, the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, Branch 36, found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide (Criminal Case
5015-96-C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor
as minimum up to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
Dedicacion Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for her death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and
actual damages and cost of suit. The trial court also found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder (Criminal Case 5016-96-C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him
to indemnify the heirs of John Ardee Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for his death and another P50,000.00
as and for moral and actual damages and cost of suit. Hence, the automatic review. Issue: Whether
uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible. Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus was not
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel.
Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers during custodial investigation are normally
inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers readily admitted that Samus was subjected
to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open court, they tried to skirt this issue by
stating that it was only the media that had questioned Samus, and that they were merely present during the
interview. However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law enforcers show the folly of their
crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. In the absence of testimony from any of the media
persons who allegedly interviewed Samus, the uncertainties and vagueness about how they questioned and
led him to his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated Samus and elicited from him
uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they executed on 11 September 1997,
as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even if the uncounselled admission per
se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances the Court cannot rule it out because of Samus'
failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence under Article III,
Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation and was made
without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation during the trial,
with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. If only Samus had
made a timely objection to the admissibility of Pontaños testimony and the picture of a pair of earrings
together with the turnover receipt, which Samus identified during his testimony, the prosecution could have
been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case. To disregard unceremoniously
a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present additional evidence as substitute
for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.

Reyes, Joselle

Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides that, “Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."

Counsel of Choice

 In the case of People v. Gallardo, (G.R. 113684, Jan. 25, 2000), Herein, Atty.Velasco acted properly
in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and informed the accused of their Constitutional
rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the statements given by the accused
were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the investigating officers
to extract a confession from them.

 However in People v. Barasina, 229 SCRA 450 (1994), the phrase "competent and independent" and
"preferably of his own choice" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not
convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the rule
were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for
one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have
been contemplated by the framers of the charter.

Counsel’s presence required in entire proceedings

 In the case of People v. Morial, G.R. 129295, August 15, 2001: the person under custodial
investigation enjoys the right to counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its
termination — indeed, "in every phase of the investigation." An effective and vigilant counsel
"necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of RA 7438 requires
that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted
by counsel." The last paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of
any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted." The right of Leonardo Morial to
counsel was therefore completely negated by the precipitate departure of Atty.
Seized Articles

 In People vs. Castro, 274 SCRA 115 (1997 ), it was held that Castro's signature on the "Receipt of
Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was assisted by counsel
when he signed the same. Since this is a document tacitly admitting the offense charged, the
constitutional safeguard must be observed. Be that as it may, even disregarding this document,
there is still ample evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the same having
been shown by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust operation.

 In People v Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996) The Court holds that the signatures of
accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing "shabu", are inadmissible in
evidence. Specifically, accused were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the
right to remain silent and to counsel and any statement they might make could be used against
them. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounseled extra-judicial confession
which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1] [3], Article III, 1987 Constitution).
They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in
violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them.

 However, in a case of mail pilferage as to Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 109242, Jan. 26,
1999), the accused were asked to sign the envelopes purportedly for purposes of identifying the
envelopes taken from them. This was done in custody without the assistance of counsel. Hence, it
is not admissible. The envelopes would be evidence of guilt.

 People v. Macabalang, (G.R. No. 168694, Nov. 27, 2006), the prosecution was able to prove that
a valid buy-bust operation was conducted to entrap appellant. The testimony of the poseur-buyer
clearly established that the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which
is the shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust team.
They acknowledged that they were the same drugs placed in two (2) plastic bags seized from
appellant.

Confession to newsmen

 In the case of People v. Andan, 269 SCRA 95 (1997),it was held that statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and admissible in
evidence.

 In People v. Endino (G.R. No. 133026, February 20,2001), An interview that was recorded on
video that shows accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the
presence of newsmen is admissible evidence. Such confession does not form part of custodial
investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy
and forgiveness from the public.

 People v. Ordono, (G.R. No. 132154, June 29, 2000), Note that Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3),
Art. Ill, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions to a radio announcer. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.

 People v. Guillermo, (G.R. 147786, January 20, 2004), as held in People v. Andan, statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and
admissible in evidence. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are
meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s coercive power as would lead an accused to
admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting
the truth outside the sphere of such power.

Abalos, Florence

 OTHER CONFESSIONS

CASES:
1.) People v. Edna Malngan (GR 170470)
Facts: On January 2, 2001, accused Edna Malngan, housemaid of Roberto Separa,
with intent to cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
deliberately set fire upon the house of Roberto Separa and family. The fire resulted to
the death of Roberto Separa, Sr., and Virginia Separa together with their 4 children,
who sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately
thereafter. Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and his tanods apprehended Edna
and immediately brought her to the Barangay Hall for investigation. At the Barangay
Hall, Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto and whose house was also burned,
identified accused Edna. Upon inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside
accused Edna’s bag. Thereafter, accused Edna confessed to Brgy Chairman Bernardo
in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Brgy hall that she set her
employer’s house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and
that she wanted to go home to her province but her employer told her to just ride a
broomstick in going home. Edna was then turned over to arson investigators headed
by SP04 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Manila
where she was further investigated and then detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went
to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to
ask accused Edna at the latter’s detention cell why did she burned her employer’s house
and accused Edna replied that she set the fire because when she asked permission to
go home to her province and narrated how she did the burning of her employer’s house.
When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN, accused Edna while
under detention admitter the crime and even narrated the manner on how she
accomplished it and was heard by SPO4 Talusan. SPO4 Talusan was able to hear the
same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television. When arraigned,
accused Edna with assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded “Not Guilty” to the crime
charged. However, she was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Due to the death
penalty imposed by the RTC, the case was directly elevated to Court of Appeals for
automatic review. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in allowing and giving credence to the hearsay
evidence and uncounseled admissions allegedly given by the accused.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the provision of Article III, Section 12 (1) and (3)
applies to the stage of custodial investigation – when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect. Said constitutional guarantee has also been extended to situations in which an
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for
questioning.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessionsmade
must satisfy thefollowing requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chair man, in this
particular instance, maybe deemed as law enforcement officer for
purposes of appl ying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused -appellant was br ought to the barangay hall
in the morning of 2 January 2001 , she was already a suspect, actually
the only one, in the fire that destroyed sever al houses as well as killed
the whole famil y of Roberto Separa , Sr. She was, therefore, alr eady
under custodial invest igation and the ri ghts guaranteed by Article III,
Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed
or applied to her. Accused -appellants confession
to Barangay Chair man Remi gio Bernardo was made in response to the
interrogation made by the latter admittedl y conducted without fi rst
infor ming accused -appellant of her rights under the Constitution or
done in the presen ce of counsel. For this reason, the confession of
accused -appellant, gi ven to Barangay Chairman Remi gi o Bernardo, as
well as the li ghter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissibl e in
evidence against her as such were obtai ned in vi olation of her
constitutional rights.
2.) People v. Gomez (GR 101817)
Facts: On 27 February 1990, Felipe Immaculata was sent to Bangkok, Thailand to
canvass ready-to-wear clothes by his employer, Art David. David and Eduardo Gomez
followed Immaculata about a week later (04 March 1990). Immaculata fetched the two
at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and Gomez proceeded to and stayed at the
Union Towers Hotel. After 2 days, they transferred to the apartment of Lito Tuazon
where they spent the rest of their stay in Bangkok. On 14 March 1990, Immaculata,
Gomez and Aya Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded Manila-bound flight. Gomez
checked-in two golfbags, and he was issued interline claim tags PR 77-28-71 and 77-
28-72. In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags with the interline baggage room
for his connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL")
flight 058 scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March 1990). The golfbags
were kept in the transit rack baggage along with other pieces of luggage destined for
San Francisco via the UAL flight. Before flight time on 15 March 1990, Romeo
Dumag, a customs policeman at the NAIA, was requested by Customs Collector
Edgardo de Leon to help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo Gomez. Dumag sought
from his security officer’s, Capt. Reyes, permission. Having received the go-signal,
Dumag accepted from De Leon the ticket and passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded
to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's lady staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed
Dumag to first claim the passenger's items to be checked-in at the interline baggage
room. At the interline baggage room, Dumag spoke to Michael Angelo Benipayo, a
PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and baggage handling
section, and presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport
and plane ticket. Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized to retrieve the
baggage, Benipayo released, upon the approval of a customs examiner named Nick,
the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To acknowledge the release, Dumag affixed
his signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL loader Edgardo Villafuerte
helped carry the golfbags to the UAL check-in counter. Annabelle Lumba attached a
San Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and wrote the name
"Gomez" on each side of the golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the boarding pass
and UAL plane ticket for Gomez. Dumag proceeded to Patio Manila, a restaurant at
the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the travel papers of Gomez.
Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded from the
aircraft. At around 4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the golfbags back to
the check-in counter for a security checkup. The x-ray machine showed unidentified
dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the information to Capt.
Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force
Security Command ("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico rushed
to the check-in area. He instructed his men to get the golfbags pass through the x-ray
machine once again. Satisfied that something was indeed wrong, Capt. Sindico
reported the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to have the golfbags go,
for the third time, through the x-ray machine. The unidentified dark masses having
been definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the glued bottom zipper
of the golfbags. The golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with an approximate size
of 1" x 6" x 4," containing a white powder substance suspected to be "heroin" with a
total weight of 20.1159 kilograms. The examination by the PAFSECOM personnel
was witnessed by the NAIA manager, a representative of the UAL and other customs
personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver,
were implicated in the crime of transporting 20 kilograms of heroin, estimated to be
worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two golfbags. Also charged, with having violated
Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act 6425 (the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito
Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able to evade arrest. Gomez surrendered to
the officer-in-charge of the then Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City. The OIC of
Clark Air Force Base turned over custody of Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") of the United States in Manila. The DEA, in turn, surrendered him to the NBI.
On the other hand, on 22 March 1990, David and Immaculata left for Hongkong
reportedly to get some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car. In Hongkong, after
buying the car spare parts, David and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of
Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for David, Immaculata was confronted by a group
of people, who turned out to be from the Hongkong Immigration Office, requesting for
his travel papers. Immaculata was brought in for investigation because of an expired
visa, then turned over to the police authorities and finally to the court which decreed
his imprisonment. In the Hongkong prison, Immaculata was visited by NBI agents for
his implication in the "heroin" case. He denied the accusation. Later, he agreed, without
the assistance of counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the Stanley Prison. After his
prison term, Immaculata was deported to Manila. Gomez and Immaculata entered a
plea of "not guilty" to the accusation. After trial, Gomez and Immaculata were each
meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113 (Criminal Case 90-4717). While
Gomez and Immaculata filed separate notices of appeal to the Supreme Court from
their conviction, only Immaculata, however, filed his brief. Gomez, assisted by
counsel, filed a "manifestation of withdrawal of appeal" to which the Solicitor General
interposed no objection. The Court would only thus consider the appeal of Immaculata.

Issue: Whether Immaculata’s uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in


Hongkong is admissible as evidence in the Philippines.

Held: While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the
Stanley Prison in Hongkong during his incarceration was not made the basis for
Immaculata's conviction by the court, a word could be said about the manner in which
it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata was merely apprised in general terms
of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He then was asked if he
would be willing to give a statement. Having answered in the affirmative, the NBI
investigating agent asked him whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the
investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly was in compliance with
Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel
to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial
that the sworn statement was executed in a foreign land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen,
should enjoy these constitutional rights, like anyone else, even when abroad.

3.) Illinois v. Perkins (496 US 292, 4 June 1990)


Facts: In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in a suburb of East St.
Louis, Illinois. The murder remained unsolved until March 1986, when one Donald
Charlton told police that he had learned about a homicide from a fellow inmate at the
Graham Correctional Facility, where Charlton had been serving a sentence for
burglary. The fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins. Charlton told police that, while at
Graham, he had befriended Perkins, who told him in detail about a murder that Perkins
had committed in East St. Louis. On hearing Charlton's account, the police recognized
details of the Stephenson murder that were not well known, and so they treated
Charlton's story as a credible one. By the time the police heard Charlton's account,
Perkins had been released from Graham, but police traced him to a jail in Montgomery
County, Illinois, where he was being held pending trial on a charge of aggravated
battery, unrelated to the Stephenson murder. The police wanted to investigate further
Perkins' connection to the Stephenson murder, but feared that the use of an
eavesdropping device would prove impracticable and unsafe. They decided instead to
place an undercover agent in the cellblock with Perkins and Charlton. The plan was for
Charlton and undercover agent John Parisi to pose as escapees from a work release
program who had been arrested in the course of a burglary. Parisi and Charlton were
instructed to engage Perkins in casual conversation and report anything he said about
the Stephenson murder. Parisi, using the alias "Vito Bianco," and Charlton, both
clothed in jail garb, were placed in the cellblock with Perkins at the Montgomery
County jail. The cellblock consisted of 12 separate cells that opened onto a common
room. Perkins greeted Charlton who, after a brief conversation with Perkins,
introduced Parisi by his alias. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any more
time" and suggested that the three of them escape. Perkins replied that the Montgomery
County jail was "rinky-dink" and that they could "break out." The trio met in Perkins'
cell later that evening, after the other inmates were asleep, to refine their plan. Perkins
said that his girlfriend could smuggle in a pistol. Charlton said: "Hey, I'm not a
murderer, I'm a burglar. That's your guys' profession." After telling Charlton that he
would be responsible for any murder that occurred, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever
"done" anybody. Perkins said that he had and proceeded to describe at length the events
of the Stephenson murder. Parisi and Perkins then engaged in some casual conversation
before Perkins went to sleep. Parisi did not give Perkins Miranda warnings before the
conversations. Perkins was charged with the Stephenson murder. Before trial, he
moved to suppress the statements made to Parisi in the jail. The trial court granted the
motion to suppress, and the State appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed,
holding that Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), prohibits all undercover
contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.

Issue: Whether strategic deception may be employed by law enforcers to solicit


confessions from suspects, such as the deployment of an undercover agent posing as
an inmate, and without the need to give Miranda warnings.

Held: Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the
concerns underlying Miranda. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated
atmosphere" and compulsion are not present when an incarcerated person speaks freely
to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Miranda forbids coercion, not
mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he
supposes to be a fellow prisoner. As recognized in Miranda: "Confessions remain a
proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without
any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Ploys to mislead a
suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of
compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's concerns. Miranda was not
meant to protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of
persons whom they believe to be their cellmates. Herein, Perkins had no reason to feel
that undercover agent Parisi had any legal authority to force him to answer questions
or that Parisi could affect Perkins' future treatment. Perkins viewed the cellmate agent
as an equal and showed no hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail. In
recounting the details of the Stephenson murder, Perkins was motivated solely by the
desire to impress his fellow inmates. He spoke at his own peril. The tactic employed
here to elicit a voluntary confession from a suspect does not violate the Self-
Incrimination Clause. As held in Hoffa v. United States (385 US 293 [1966]), that
placing an undercover agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating information
was permissible under the Fifth Amendment. The only difference between the present
case and Hoffa is that the suspect here was incarcerated, but detention, whether or not
for the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that the use of an undercover
agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect makes any confession thus obtained
involuntary. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice
the Court's holding that undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to
incarcerated suspects. The use of undercover agents is a recognized law enforcement
technique, often employed in the prison context to detect violence against correctional
officials or inmates, as well as for the purposes served here. The interests protected by
Miranda are not implicated in these cases, and the warnings are not required to
safeguard the constitutional rights of inmates who make voluntary statements to
undercover agents.

4.) People vs. Lugod (GR 136253, 21 February 2001)


Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her
house together with her husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and
Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on the upper part" of her body. At
around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going down
the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she
was sleeping but she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of nature.
Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the place she slept but that her slippers were
still there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she stood up and began
calling out for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and
saw that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor
to see if Nairube was there but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top
of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The sole of the slippers was red while the
strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not belong to any
member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her
for help. Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to
report the loss of her child. She also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to
SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the police began their search for
Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching team.
During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her
daughter. After seeing the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home
while the others continued the search. Thereafter, they continued the search and found
a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the sleeve hanging
on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed
him that the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house
of Violeta Cabuhat. At around 7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the
basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He then brought Lugod to the police
station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied that he did
anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he
admitted to having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement
regarding the same. After having been informed that the body of Nairube was in the
grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the PNP, the Crime Watch and
the townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of
Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the
location of the cadaver, on 18 September 1997, that they found the body of Nairube.
On 19 September 1997, at around 3:30 p.m., Floro Esguerra, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti
attended the funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused in his cell. In
the course of his conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the
commission of the offense. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with
homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to
death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual damages.
Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether Lugod’s alleged confession to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavanti
can be used against him.

Held: The records do not support the confession allegedly made by Lugod to the Mayor
and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in
the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the
alleged confession made by Lugod is not conclusive. From the testimony of the Vice-
Mayor, Lugod merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor
propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and
killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that Lugod did not tell him that he
raped and killed Nairube. In addition, the Court notes the contradiction between the
testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke to Lugod
and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when Lugod confessed to
the Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used
against him, the only remaining evidence which was established by the prosecution are
circumstantial in nature. The circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening
and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. The evidence of the
prosecution does not provide a link which would enable the Court to conclude that he
in fact killed and raped Nairube.

 RE-ENACTMENT
- Re-enactment of the crime. Not being clear from the record that before the re-enactment
was staged by the accused, he had been informed of his constitutional rights, and that he had validly
waived such rights before proceeding with the demonstration, the Supreme Court declined to
uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to the re-enactment [People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA
36].
CASES:
1.) People vs. Luvendino (GR 69971, 3 July 1992)
Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home
at Deva Village, Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of
Manila where she was a sophomore commerce student. She would usually be home by
7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, but on that tragic day, she would not reach home
alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work
at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife and other children that
Rowena was not yet home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent on
an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's bag which he had found dropped in the
middle of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in seeking the help of the
barangay captain of Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied with the latter's promise to
send for a "tanod" to help locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig
Police Station to report his daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him
that a search party would be mounted presently. Panfilo returned home and, with the
help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena. The search
ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80
meters from the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena,
her pants pulled down to her knees and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her
underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint marks on her neck.
Rowena, her body still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she
was pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the multiple injuries indicated the
victim had struggled vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of spermatozoa
showed that the victim had sexual intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to
asphyxia by manual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an information had been filed in
the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol" and
Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest
were issued against all the accused but only Ernesto Luvendino was actually
apprehended; the other 2 have remained at large. It appears that Luvendino re-enacted
the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime scene, where
pictures were taken by a photographer brought by the police officers. In the course of
the demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: "Inaamin ko po na kasama ko si
Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape kay Rowena." At arraignment, Luvendino assisted by his
counsel, Atty. Luisito Sardillo, pleaded not guilty and then proceeded to trial. On 12
December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino guilty,
sentencing him to death, and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena
in the amount of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.

Issue: Whether Luvendino’s re-enactment of the crime may be admitted as evidence


against the accused.
Held: The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what
had occurred during the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. The re-enactment
was apparently staged promptly upon apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his
formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the trial court found that the
accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt.
Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino.
The decision itself, however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino
was brought to the police station. Thus, it is not clear from the record that before the
re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of his constitutional
rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right
before proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, the Court must
decline to uphold the admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.

 EXCLUSIONARY RULE
-Exclusionary Rule. Confession or admission obtained in violation of Sec. 12 and Sec. 17,
Art. Ill, shall be inadmissible in evidence. A confession is a declaration made voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement by a person acknowledging that he has committed or
participated in the commission of a crime. But before it can be admitted in evidence, the
Constitution demands strict compliance with the requirements of Secs. 12 and 17, Art. Ill, because
a confession of guilt constitutes formidable evidence against the accused, on the principle that no
one will knowingly, freely and deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless prompted by truth
and conscience, particularly where the facts given could only have been known by the accused
[People v. Fabro, G.R. No. 95089, August 11, 1997]. It is immaterial where the confession was
obtained. Thus, where the confession was given by the accused to NBI agents who visited him in
a Hongkong prison, the confession was still declared inadmissible in evidence [People v. Gomez,
270 SCRA 432]. On the other hand, any allegation of force, duress, undue influence or other forms
of involuntariness in exacting such confession must be proved by clear, convincing and competent
evidence by the defense. Otherwise, the confession’s full probative value may be used to
demonstrate the guilt of the accused. See also People v. Eglipa, 174 SCRA 1; People v. Basay, 219
SCRA 404.
WAIVER OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. For failure of the accused to object to
the offer in evidence, the uncounselled confession was admitted in evidence [People v. Samus, G.R.
Nos.. 135957-58, September 17, 2002; People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 142932, May 29, 2002].

 FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE


-Fruit of the poisonous tree. In People v. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293, the Court declared that we
have also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the “fruit of the poisonous tree”, a
phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated Nardone v. U.S.. According to this
rule, once the primary source (“the tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (“the fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the
principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence,
because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Thus,
in this case, the uncounselled admission being inadmissible, the pillow and the T-shirt with alleged
bloodstains — being evidence derived from the uncounselled confession — would, likewise, be
inadmissible.
CASES:
1.) People vs. Alicando (GR 117487, 12 December 1995)
Facts: In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim
Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his
(Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel Alicando y Briones
joined them but every now and then would take leave and return. Alicando was living in
his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m.,
Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada
saw the victim at the window of Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but
Alicando closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She approached Alicando's
house and peeped through an opening between its floor and door. The sight shocked her —
Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She retreated to
her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo
Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and
hastily left. Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie
Mae. He and his wife searched for her until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada
was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what
she knew. Instead, Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the time
Khazie Mae left his house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun
started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer
the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her
parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of
heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that Alicando committed the
crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal
confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from
Alicando's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained
pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.
On 29 June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera
of the PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After Alicando's plea of guilt,
the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for
reception of evidence for Alicando, if he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found
Alicando guilty and sentenced him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the offended
party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence derived
from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may be
admitted as evidence.

Held: It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible
evidence uncounselled confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of
Article III of the Constitution provide that "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible
against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce
the all important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent
counsel. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but
also evidence derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains
were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police
from Alicando. The Court has not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in
Philippine jurisdiction. It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone v. United States. According to this rule, once the primary source
(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized
evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least
once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is
based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to
gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain
silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation
rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence
derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to
be discharged by clear and convincing evidence.

2.) Harris vs. New York (401 US 222, 24 February 1971)


Facts: The State of New York charged Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling
heroin to an undercover police officer. At a subsequent jury trial the officer was the State's
chief witness, and he testified as to details of the two sales. A second officer verified
collateral details of the sales, and a third offered testimony about the chemical analysis of
the heroin. Harris took the stand in his own defense. He admitted knowing the undercover
police officer but denied a sale on 4 January 1966. He admitted making a sale of contents
of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it was baking powder and part of
a scheme to defraud the purchaser. On cross-examination, Harris was asked seriatim
whether he had made specified statements to the police immediately following his arrest
on January 7 - statements that partially contradicted his direct testimony at trial. In response
to the cross-examination, Harris testified that he could not remember virtually any of the
questions or answers recited by the prosecutor. At the request of Harris' counsel the written
statement from which the prosecutor had read questions and answers in his impeaching
process was placed in the record for possible use on appeal; the statement was not shown
to the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that the statements attributed to Harris by the
prosecution could be considered only in passing on Harris' credibility and not as evidence
of guilt. In closing summations both counsel argued the substance of the impeaching
statements. The jury then found Harris guilty on the second count of the indictment. The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion.

Issue: Whether the statements made by the accused after his arrest should be absolutely
excluded, or whether such statements can be used to impeach the accused who acted as his
own witness.

Held: Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use
of an uncounseled statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all
necessary to the Court's holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda barred the
prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused made while in custody
prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from Miranda that
evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all
purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal
standards. In Walder v. United States (347 US 62 [1954]), the Court permitted physical
evidence, inadmissible in the case in chief, to be used for impeachment purposes. It is true
that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included in his direct examination,
whereas Harris here was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes
charged. There is no difference in principle that warrants a result different from that
reached by the Court in Walder. Harris' testimony in his own behalf concerning the events
of January 7 contrasted sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest. The
impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing
Harris' credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost because of the
speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby.
Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct,
sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the
prosecution in its case in chief. The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into
a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
inconsistent utterances. The Court holds, therefore, that Harris' credibility was
appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.

3.) New York vs. Quarles (467 US 649, 12 June 1984)


Facts: On 11 September 1980, at approximately 12:30 a. m., Officer Frank Kraft and
Officer Sal Scarring were on road patrol in Queens, New York, when a young woman
approached their car. She told them that she had just been raped by a black male,
approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the name "Big Ben"
printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just entered an
A & P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun. The officers drove
the woman to the supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring
radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft quickly spotted Quarles, who matched the description
given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter. Apparently upon seeing the officer,
Quarles turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft pursued him with a
drawn gun. When Quarles turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight
of him for several seconds, and upon regaining sight of Quarles, ordered him to stop and
put his hands over his head. Although more than three other officers had arrived on the
scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the first to reach Quarles. He frisked him and
discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty. After
handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. Quarles nodded in the
direction of some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft
thereafter retrieved a loaded .38caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed
Quarles under arrest, and read him his Miranda rights from a printed card. Quarles
indicated that he would be willing to answer questions without an attorney present. Officer
Kraft then asked Quarles if he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Quarles
answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it in Miami, Florida. Benjamin
Quarles was charged in the New York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon.
The trial court suppressed the gun in question, and a statement made by Quarles, because
the statement was obtained by police before they read Quarles his "Miranda rights." That
ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun itself should be excluded
as evidence in light of the officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before
attempting to locate the weapon.

Held: There is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be
given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability
of that exception does not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers involved.
In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers, where spontaneity
rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day, the application
of the exception which the Court recognizes should not be made to depend on post hoc
findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting
officer. Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act
out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives -- their own safety,
the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from
the suspect. Whatever the motivation of individual officers in such a situation, the Court
does not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be applied in
all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a
concern for the public safety. The Miranda decision was based in large part on the Court's
view that the warnings which it required police to give to suspects in custody would reduce
the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices
of police interrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the station house. The
police herein, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were confronted with the
immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason
to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the
supermarket. So long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its
actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety:
an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it. In
such a situation, if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda warnings before
asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred
from responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were
deemed acceptable in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the
primary social cost of those added protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the
Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here, had Miranda warnings deterred
Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of the gun, the
cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in
convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his
case against Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the
concealment of the gun in a public area. Thus, the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule
protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The Court declines
to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to consider, often
in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions
without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover
inadmissible, or for them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of
evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to obtain that
evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them. Here, Officer Kraft asked
only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before advising Quarles of his rights.
It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued
with investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun. The
exception which the Court recognizes, far from complicating the thought processes and the
on-the-scene judgments of police officers, will simply free them to follow their legitimate
instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to the public safety. The Court
hold that the Court of Appeals erred in excluding the statement, "the gun is over there,"
and the gun because of the officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before
attempting to locate the weapon.

Sources:

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary by Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. (2003)
Constitutional Law by Isagani A. Cruz (2007)
Political Law by Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (2016)
Basic Criminal Procedure by Antonio Bautista (2010)

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