1. ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN: G.R. No.

213847; August 18, 2015

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was
Ponente: Bersamin
heard by the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not

yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of
Doctrines:
his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would only
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a
be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due
good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to
to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13,
ISSUES:
Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules
1) Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime
of Criminal Procedure to wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an
charged is punishable byreclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
strong.
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of

the criminal prosecution.”

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner would be

convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is strong.
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority

Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus

2. Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.
Motion requested to post bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3,

2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was issued, leading to Petitioner's

HELD:
voluntary surrender.
1. YES.
Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence. Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal perpetua [or life imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is

proved. This right is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the

bail. evidence of guilt is strong.Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may

be granted according to the discretion of the court.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial

and so the amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

the accused when so required, but no higher than what may be reasonably

calculated to fulfill this purpose. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an

offense not punishable by death,reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment,

Bail as a matter of discretion admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided

repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if

the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be

admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to

the criminal prosecution. continue on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the

same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall

be bailable.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment,

years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a or reclusion perpetuasubject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs.

showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or Elma, the court held: “[S]uch discretion may be exercised only after the

other similar circumstances: hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose

of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.” Bail hearing with

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit

conditional pardon; his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as

amended);

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if

released on bail; or 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application

for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of

pendency of the appeal. enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary

resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in of evidence of the prosecution;

either case.
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available

approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their

denied. fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be

admitted to bail. (emphasis in decision)

2. YES.

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion

Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the
appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
international community arising from its commitment to the Universal
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As
Declaration of Human Rights. We therefore have the responsibility of
such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process
to Fix Bail.It acted whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross
and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting fromGovernment of Hong Kong SAR vs.

Olalia, the SC emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and

dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II

of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every

human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” The

Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and

promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process,

ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the

proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the

legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other

Juan Ponce Enrile Vs. Sandiganbayan, and People of the Philippines; GOVERNING BAIL WITHOUT SUFFICIENT CONSTITUTIONAL,
LEGAL AND JURIS PRUDENTIAL BASIS.
G.R. No. 213847; July 12, 2016

A. THE DECISION OPENLY IGNORED AND ABANDONED

THE CONSTITUTIONALLY-MANDATED PROCEDURE
RESOLUTION FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A PERSON ACCUSED
OF A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION
PERPETUA OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT SUCH AS
PLUNDER CAN BE GRANTED BAIL.
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, have filed their Motion
for Reconsideration to assail the decision promulgated on August 18, 2015 B. THE DECISION ALSO DISREGARDED
granting the petition for certiorari of the petitioner, and disposing thusly: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND RELEVANT
COURT PROCEDURES WHEN IT GRANTED
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR BAIL ON THE GROUND
of certiorari ANNUL[L]ING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by THAT HE IS NOT A FLIGHT RISK, PREMISED ON A
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July LOOSE FINDING THAT THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF
14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of BAIL IS MERELY TO SECURE THE APPEARANCE OF
petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a AN ACCUSED DURING TRIAL.
cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is
being detained for some other lawful cause. C. CONTRARY TO THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION ON THE MATTER OF GRANTING
No pronouncement on costs of suit. SO ORDERED.[1] BAIL TO PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIMES
PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA OR LIFE
The People rely on the following grounds for the reversal of the decision of IMPRISONMENT, THE DECISION ERRONEOUSLY HELD
August 18, 2015, to wit: THAT PETITIONER SHOULD BE GRANTED BAIL
BECAUSE OF HIS FRAGILE STATE OF HEALTH, AND
I. THE DECISION GRANTING BAIL TO PETITIONER WAS
BECAUSE OF OTHER UNSUPPORTED AND
PREMISED ON A FACTUAL FINDING THAT HE IS NOT A FLIGHT
DEBATABLE GROUNDS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RISK, ON A DETERMINATION THAT HE SUFFERS FROM A
PURELY PERSONAL AND PECULIAR TO HIM, WITHOUT
FRAGILE STATE OF HEALTH AND ON OTHER UNSUPPORTED
REFERENCE TO THE STRENGTH OF THE
GROUNDS UNIQUE AND PERSONAL TO HIM. IN GRANTING
PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
BAIL TO PETITIONER ON THE FOREGOING GROUNDS,
THE DECISION UNDULY AND RADICALLY MODIFIED
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES II. THE DECISION VIOLATES THE PEOPLE’S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW SINCE IT WAS BASED ON
 GROUNDS NOT RAISED IN THE PETITION AND THEREFORE
NEVER REFUTED OR CONTESTED.
III. THE DECISION GAVE PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND
UNDUE FAVOR TO PETITIONER IN A MANNER INCONSISTENT
WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.[2]
The People argue that the decision is inconsonant with deeply-embedded
constitutional principles on the right to bail; that the express and
unambiguous intent of the 1987 Constitution is to place persons accused of
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua on a different plane, and make their
availment of bail a matter of judicial discretion, not a matter of right, only
upon a showing that evidence of their guilt is not strong; and that the Court
should have proceeded from the general proposition that the petitioner had
no right to bail because he does not stand on equal footing with those
accused of less grave crimes.
The People contend that the grant of provisional liberty to a person charged
with a grave crime cannot be predicated solely on the assurance that he will
appear in court, but should also consider whether he will endanger other
important interests of the State, the probability of him repeating the crime
committed, and how his temporary liberty can affect the prosecution of his
case; that the petitioner’s fragile state of health does not present a
compelling justification for his admission to bail; that age and health
considerations are relevant only in fixing the amount of bail; and that even
so, his age and health condition were never raised or litigated in
the Sandiganbayan because he had merely filed thereat a Motion to Fix
Bail and did not thereby actually apply for bail.
Lastly, the People observe that the decision specially accommodated the
petitioner, and thus accorded him preferential treatment that is not ordinarily
enjoyed by persons similarly situated.
Ruling of the Court
The Court finds no compelling or good reason to reverse its decision of
August 18, 2015.
To start with, the People were not kept in the dark on the health condition of
the petitioner. Through his Omnibus Motion dated June 10, 2014 and
his Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014, he manifested to the
Sandiganbayan his currently frail health, and presented medical certificates
to show that his physical condition required constant medical attention.
[3] The Omnibus Motion and his Supplemental Opposition dated June 16,
2014 were both heard by the Sandiganbayan after the filing by the
Prosecution of its Consolidated Opposition.[4] Through his Motion for
Reconsideration, he incorporated the findings of the government physicians
to establish the present state of his health. On its part, the Sandiganbayan, to
satisfy itself of the health circumstances of the petitioner, solicited the
medical opinions of the relevant doctors from the Philippine General Hospital.
[5] The medical opinions and findings were also included in the petition
for certiorari and now form part of the records of the case.
Clearly, the People were not denied the reasonable opportunity to challenge
or refute the allegations about his advanced age and the instability of his
health even if the allegations had not been directly made in connection with
his Motion to Fix Bail.
Secondly, the imputation of “preferential treatment” in “undue favor” of the
petitioner is absolutely bereft of basis.[6] A reading of the decision of August
18, 2015 indicates that the Court did not grant his provisional liberty because
he was a sitting Senator of the Republic. It did so because there were proper
bases – legal as well as factual – for the favorable consideration and
treatment of his plea for provisional liberty on bail. By its decision, the Court
has recognized his right to bail by emphasizing that such right should be
curtailed only if the risks of flight from this jurisdiction were too high. In our
view, however, the records demonstrated that the risks of flight were low, or
even nil. The Court has taken into consideration other circumstances, such
as his advanced age and poor health, his past and present disposition of
respect for the legal processes, the length of his public service, and his
individual public and private reputation.[7] There was really no reasonable
way for the Court to deny bail to him simply because his situation of being 92
years of age when he was first charged for the very serious crime in court
was quite unique and very rare. To ignore his advanced age and unstable
health condition in order to deny his right to bail on the basis alone of the
judicial discretion to deny bail would be probably unjust. To equate his
situation with that of the other accused indicted for a similarly serious offense
would be inherently wrong when other conditions significantly differentiating
his situation from that of the latter’s unquestionably existed.[8]
Section 2, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court expressly states that one of the
conditions of bail is for the accused to “appear before the proper court
whenever required by the court or these Rules.” The practice of bail fixing
supports this purpose. Thus, in Villaseñor v. Abaño,[9] the Court has
pronounced that “the principal factor considered (in bail fixing), to the
determination of which most factors are directed, is the probability of the
appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.”[10] The
Court has given due regard to the primary but limited purpose of granting
bail, which was to ensure that the petitioner would appear during his trial and
would continue to submit to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to answer
the charges levelled against him.[11]
Bail exists to ensure society’s interest in having the accused answer to a
criminal prosecution without unduly restricting his or her liberty and without
ignoring the accused’s right to be presumed innocent. It does not perform the
function of preventing or licensing the commission of a crime. The notion that
bail is required to punish a person accused of crime is, therefore,
fundamentally misplaced. Indeed, the practice of admission to bail is not a
device for keeping persons in jail upon mere accusation until it is found
convenient to give them a trial. The spirit of the procedure is rather to enable
them to stay out of jail until a trial with all the safeguards has found and
adjudged them guilty. Unless permitted this conditional privilege, the
individuals wrongly accused could be punished by the period of
imprisonment they undergo while awaiting trial, and even handicap them in
consulting counsel, searching for evidence and witnesses, and preparing a
defense.[12] Hence, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring
his presence at trial.[13]
Admission to bail always involves the risk that the accused will take flight.
[14] This is the reason precisely why the probability or the improbability of
flight is an important factor to be taken into consideration in granting or
denying bail, even in capital cases. The exception to the fundamental right to
bail should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion
of prosecution. Apparently, an accused’s official and social standing and his
other personal circumstances are considered and appreciated as tending to
render his flight improbable.[15]
The petitioner has proven with more than sufficient evidence that he would
not be a flight risk. For one, his advanced age and fragile state of health have
minimized the likelihood that he would make himself scarce and escape from
the jurisdiction of our courts. The testimony of Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, Director
of the Philippine General Hospital, showed that the petitioner was a geriatric
patient suffering from various medical conditions,[16] which, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risks to his life. The medical findings and
opinions have been uncontested by the Prosecution even in their
present Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010.
FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose
Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for
the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years
and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction
to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked
the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion Ampatuan v. De Lima
to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner now questions as grave FACTS:
abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering that none
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors
of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph massacre. One Kenny Dalandag, was admitted into the Witness Protection
of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. Program of the DOJ and was later on listed as one of the prosecution
ISSUE: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced witness. On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel request the
by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does
inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that
the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
his two sworn declarations. Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on
HELD: NO, discretionary nature of bail mentioned in Section 5 of Rule 114 October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010. But Secretary De Lima denied
does not mean automatic grant of bail in case of appeal.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates petitioner’s request.
and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant
of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court,
allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge
approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial the QC RTC. The RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference and issued a pre-
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the
trial order. The respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial
accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of
our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review.
In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil
other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of
conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a Case No. 10-124777 dismissing the petition for mandamus. Hence, this
mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES:
Whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao
massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program of the
DOJ.

HELD:
No. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the
Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests
the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of
factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors.
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may
only be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person to take action, but it cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way discretion is to be exercised,48or to compel the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of judgment
or discretion.49
As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the
letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in a certain way
such as to grant or deny such letter-request.
Juan Ponce Enrile vs Sandiganbayan ( 3rd division ) and People of the
Philippines
Facts:
Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan
for their alleged involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation
under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued, Sen. Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP
General Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:
1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion
temporal considering that there are two mitigating circumstances,
his voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be
seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:
1. He is charged with a capital offense;
2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail
because the prosecution have not yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail and unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health
and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is safeguarded by the
constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused
during trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing
the guarantee of due process which is the presumption of his innocence until
proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that Bail for the
provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be
allowed independently of the merits charged, provided his continued
incarceration is injurious to his health and endanger his life. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to
bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed
and attended, which will then enable him to attend trial therefore achieving
the true purpose of bail.
Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. 180122, March 13, 2009
FACTS
Sandiganbayan tried and affirmed graft charges against Felicimo Lazarte Jr.,
an engineer and chair of the National Housing Authority(NHA). He allegedly
used public funds amounting to P230,000 to pay a Makati-based construction
company for a ghost project(financing a project that is not part of a plan) in
Bacolod City.
Further, he was accused of conspiring with fellow officers;namely, Josephine
Angsico, Virgilio Dacalos, Robert Balao, and Josephine Espinosa. They filed
a motion to quash the allegation, and after a thorough investigation, the court
dismissed the charges of the alleged conspirants for failure to prove
participation, but it retained Lazarte’s charge.
Issue: As department manager of the NHA (Salary Grade 26), does the
Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over petitioner Lazarte?
RULING
The Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As
correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner
does not occupy a position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department
manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled corporation, at the
time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the scope of
its jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers
and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. NHA
being part of that.
Further, the position of manager in a government-owned or controlled
corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of
respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade,
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan---- that which includes
the position held by Lazarte.
Rodriguez v Ponferrada
DOCTRINE:
1. While the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two
distinct criminal offenses—estafa and violation of BP22—the same
involves only once civil liability for the offended party since he sustained
only a single injury.
2. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil
action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil
action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check
3. While ordinarily no filing fees were charged for actual damages in
criminal action, the rule on the necessary inclusion of a civil action with
the payment of filing fees based on the face value of the check involved
was laid down to prevent the practice of creditors of using the threat of a
criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge
FACTS:
1. Rodriguez was charged with Estafa and violation of BP22 (bouncing
checks law)
2. City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office found PROBABLE CAUSE to charge Rodriguez with
ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD 818 and
for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
3. Violation of BP22 was filed in MTC of QC - docket fees were
accordingly paid by private complainant
4. ESTAFA was filed with RTC of QC
5. During the hearing, Judge Ponferrada noted the Formal Entry of
Appearance of Atty. Felix R. Solomon as PRIVATE prosecutor (in order
to pursue Civil Liability against Rodriguez), but this was opposed by
Rodriguez.
6. Rodriguez’s Contention: that the private prosecutor is barred from
appearing before this Court as his appearance is limited to the civil
aspect which must be presented and asserted in B.P. 22 cases pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (and not in the
Regional Trial Court where his ESTAFA case is being tried)
7. RTC held: civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is deemed instituted, unless the offended party (1)
waives the civil action, (2) reserves the right to institute it separately, or
(3) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Considering that
the offended party had paid the corresponding filing fee for the estafa
cases prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases with the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), the RTC allowed the private prosecutor to appear and
intervene in the proceedings. (Did not go thru CA)
ISSUES: Whether or not a Private Prosecutor can be allowed to intervene
and participate in the proceedings of the above-entitled Estafa cases for the
purpose of prosecuting the attached civil liability arising from the issuance of
the checks involved which is also subject matter of the pending B.P. 22
cases.
HELD: Petiton has NO MERIT. Civil Action in BP 22 Case Not a Bar to Civil
Action in Estafa Case
RATIO:
1. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may
give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of Court allow the offended
party to intervene via a private prosecutor in each of these two penal
proceedings. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising
from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case
bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action.
While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended
party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two crimes arise
from a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it.
2. [Memory AID: SWoRN) An offended party may intervene in the
prosecution of a crime, except in the following instances: (1) when, from
the nature of the crime and the law defining and punishing it, no civil
liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from the
nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity,
but (a) they waive the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly
reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has already been instituted. In
any of these instances, the private complainant’s interest in the case
disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the
public prosecutor. None of these exceptions apply to the instant case.
Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred from intervening in the
estafa suit.
3. The traditional theory is that when a person commits a crime he offends
two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political
entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual
member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property
was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act
or omission…While an act or omission is felonious because it is
punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a
crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things
pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make
whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be
punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage
or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action
4. Thus, the possible single civil liability arising from the act of
issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions People v Beriales
deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Facts: A case of three men who were charged for the murder of Saturnina on
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court expressly allows, even automatically Sept. 13, 1974. During the hearing on Nov. 26, 1974, upon motion of the
in the present case, the institution of a civil action without need of defense the Court ordered the re-investigation of the case pending
election by the offended party. As both remedies are submission of the Fiscal of its reports. Couple of postponements was made
simultaneously available to this party, there can be no forum until Dec. 13, 1974 hearing when the Court proceeded with the arraignment
shopping. and trial in the absence of the Fiscal and its report on re-investigation, and
5. Hence, this Court cannot agree with what petitioner ultimately espouses. over the disagreement of the defense. The CFI of Leyte relied on the private
At the present stage, no judgment on the civil liability has been prosecutor being authorized by the Fiscal to present evidence and the
rendered in either criminal case. There is as yet no call for the offended defense presumed to have waived its right over its disagreement. Trial then
party to elect remedies and, after choosing one of them, be considered proceeded and the 3 found guilty of he offense. Thus, this appeal on the
barred from others available to her. constitutional requirement of due process.
6. Doctrine of Election of Remedies: the purpose of the doctrine of 

election of remedies is not to prevent recourse to any remedy, but to
prevent double redress for a single wrong. It is regarded as an Issue: Whether or not due process of law had been observed. 

application of the law of estoppel, upon the theory that a party cannot, in
the assertion of his right occupy inconsistent positions which form the 

basis of his respective remedies. However, when a certain state of facts
under the law entitles a party to alternative remedies, both founded upon Held: Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case remanded to CFI
the identical state of facts, these remedies are not considered for arraignment and trial. Court should have held in abeyance the trial while
inconsistent remedies. In such case, the invocation of one remedy is not the report on e-investigation was still pending. Consistent disregard of the
an election which will bar the other, unless the suit upon the remedy first defense objection on the arraignment, trial, presentation of private
invoked shall reach the stage of final adjudication or unless by the prosecutor’s evidence, and rendition of judgment violates due process.
invocation of the remedy first sought to be enforced, the plaintiff shall Prosecutor or Fiscal entrusted with the investigation is duty bound to take
have gained an advantage thereby or caused detriment or change of charge until final termination. They shall have direction and control of the
situation to the other. It must be pointed out that ordinarily, election of criminal prosecution over private prosecutors.
remedies is not made until the judicial proceedings has gone to
judgment on the merits.
7. In the case at bar, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa
cases and the inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP
22 cases are not exactly repugnant or inconsistent with each other.
Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil
action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law
precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil
action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.
Heirs Of Federico C. Delgado And Annalisa Pesico - Versus - Luisito Q.
Gonzalez And Antonio T. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 184337, August 7, 2009
Gonzalez and Buenaflor were charged with the murder of Delgado and
frustrated murder of Pesico. The investigating Prosecutor conducted
the preliminary investigation and thereafter dismissed the complaint for
lack of probable cause. The acting secretary of Justice reversed the
finding of the Investigating Prosecutor. The CA affirmed the existence
of probable cause. In a motion for reconsideration, it ordered that the
Informations charging the accused with murder and less serious
physical injuries be quashed and dismissed.
The Solicitor General did not appeal the appellate courts Amended
Decision which reversed her Resolutions when she was Acting
Secretary of Justice. Thus, the Court declared the case closed and
terminated.
The two exceptions are: (1) when there is denial of due process of law to the
prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the
prejudice of the State and the private offended party,[70] and (2) when the
private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower
court. These two exceptions do not apply in this case. We reiterate that it is
only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
State in all criminal proceedings before the appellate courts.
Hence, the Solicitor Generals non-filing of a petition within the reglementary
period before this Court rendered the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals final and executory with respect to the criminal aspect of the case.
The Solicitor General cannot trifle with court proceedings by refusing to file a
petition for review only to subsequently, after the lapse of the reglementary
period and finality of the Amended Decision, file a comment.

Does the non-filing of the Solgen of a petition within the reglementary period
before this Court rendered the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals final
and executory? Yes. Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states that the Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

The law clearly requires the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the
Government in the Supreme Court in all criminal proceedings before this
CourtWe have ruled in a number of cases that only the Solicitor General may
bring or defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or
represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals.

However, jurisprudence lays down two exceptions where a private

complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file a petition directly
with this Court.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOEL "ANJOY" On the same day, AAA and her mother BBB reported the incident to the
BUCA, Accused-Appellant.
 police. They also went to a physician to have her examined. The medical
examination revealed thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

no digest :( PROVISIONAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE4

DECISION
xxxx
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

ANOGENITAL EXAM
On appeal is the June 17, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-MIN convicting accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy"
Buca of the crime of rape.
 Genitalia (+) Erythema, perihymenal area


(+) Whitish and yellowish discharge
We state the antecedents as summarized by the CA2:

Anus Normal

On December 24, 2002 at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon AAA,3 a

seven (7) year old girl, together with her younger siblings CCC, DDD and
EEE were in their house at Taal 2, Royal Valley, Bangkal, Davao City.
Accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca (Anjoy for brevity), a neighbor of their
family, entered the house and ordered AAA's siblings to go to another room
to sleep. When Anjoy and AAA were all alone, Anjoy placed AAA on his lap,
pulled down her panties and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. He
began to have sex with AAA. CCC, the younger brother, who was at that time
hiding below a bench, saw what was happening. CCC came out and pulled
AAA away from Anjoy. Then, Anjoy warned AAA not to tell anyone of what he
did or else he will kill her parents.
CONCLUSION
1. Genital findings are suspicious for sexual
abuse
On January 7, 2003, BBB executed an Affidavit-Complaint. Three (3)
Informations were filed against accused-appellant Anjoy. The accusatory
portions of the three (3) Informations state:cralawlawlibrary

BBB, the mother of AAA[,] came home after buying food. CCC met her at the
door and told her, "Mie, Mie, si Ate (referring to AAA) gani no ky gibastos ni
Anjoy". BBB pretended to ignore the information relayed by CCC as Anjoy
was still inside their house. BBB was scared that Anjoy might notice her
reaction. About ten minutes after, Anjoy left their house. AAA then disclosed
that Anjoy did the same thing to her many times already.
I. In Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary



"That sometime in the months prior to December 2002, in the City of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned [accused], by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
had carnal knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by
 forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.


 As regards Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003, the trial court dismissed it during
CONTRARY TO LAW";ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 the trial on May 28, 2007 after Prosecutor Dayanghirang manifested that the

 prosecution will not present evidence because "during his interview with the
witness, she could not recall the dates x x x it was between 2001 and 2002
II. In Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003
 but she could not recall, so [the prosecution] will not anymore present"5.


"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime During his examination, accused-appellant vehemently denied the
of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as accusations against him. He insisted that on December 24, 2002 at about
Amended by R.A. 8353, committed as 5:45 in the morning, he passed by AAA's house. AAA called him as Uncle
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 Joel and requested that he look after her younger brother who was crying.

 When asked where their mother was, AAA answered that she left to buy
That sometime before December 24, 2002, in the City of Davao, food. When he was about to leave, AAA called him again because her
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the younger sibling was crying and she requested if he could watch over them.
above-mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did Accused-appellant declined as he was about to go to his work. He further
there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal testified that there was no unusual incident that happened on the day of
knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by forcibly December 24, 2002. Furthermore, he insisted that he has no knowledge
inserting his penis into her vagina.
 whatsoever of the other accusations of AAA and BBB against him.


CONTRARY TO LAW"; and 
 In a Judgment6 dated November 11, 2010, the [Regional Trial Court (RTC)]

 found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
52,261-2003, the dispositive portion of which
III. In Criminal Case No. 52, 262-2003
 provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary


"That sometime in the months after December 25, 2002, in the City WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence in Criminal
of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Case No. 52,260-2003, the said Criminal Case is hereby ordered
Court, the above-mentioned accused, by means of force and DISMISSED.
intimidation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
had carnal knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by As to Criminal Case [N]o. 52,262-2003, for failure of the prosecution to prove
forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.
 the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt, the said case is hereby

 ordered DISMISSED and the ACCUSED is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
CONTRARY TO LAW." charged in the Information.
chanrobleslaw
As to Criminal Case [N]o. 52,261-2003, the Court finds Accused guilty
On August 24, 2004, accused-appellant was arraigned and entered his pleas beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under
of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
the said Accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay AAA, the sum of SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS, as
civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral
damages.
Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the Accused, who is detained, is
hereby entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed
voluntarily in writing to abide by the rules and regulation[s] imposed upon
convicted prisoners. If he did not agree, he shall be entitled to 4/5 of his
preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.chanrobleslaw
Accused-appellant appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and agreed
that the testimony of AAA was sufficient to establish the crime. The fallo of
the appealed CA Decision reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 11, 2010 of the RTC, Branch
12, Davao City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-
appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without the benefit of parole.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages and interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.7
chanrobleslaw
Hence, this appeal.
The issues for our consideration are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of rape; and



2. Whether accused-appellant may be convicted of rape despite the
failure to allege the exact date of the commission of the crime in the
Information.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant is guilty of rape.
Accused-appellant contends that his guilt was not proved as the credibility of
AAA and CCC, whose testimonies were utilized to establish the elements of
rape, is in serious doubt due to their lack of candor and forthrightness in
testifying. Accused-appellant further points out that there are inconsistencies
in the narrations of the prosecution's witnesses that cast doubt on their
statements.
We do not agree.
Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
defines the crime of rape:cralawlawlibrary
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
C O
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
URT
present.chanrobleslaw
:
In the case at bar, the lower courts found that the element of carnal Q: Do you know why he was in your house?
knowledge was established by the testimony of the victim, AAA, to
A: I don't know.
wit:cralawlawlibrary
x x
PROS. DAYANGHIRANG III: xx
Q: According to you, you and your three
This time we go to Crim. Case No. siblings were there in your house at that
52,261-03 time together with the accused, and your
Q: On December 24, 2002, at around one mother left to buy viand. Tell us, what
o'clock in the afternoon, where were you at happened?
that time, Miss Witness, if you can recall? A: He again cuddled me and put me on his lap
[AA and pulled down my panty.
A] Q: Who at that time again cuddled you? Where
A: In our house. were your other siblings?
Q: Who were with you in your house, at that A: He ordered my other siblings to go inside
time? the room and put them to sleep.
A: My siblings and younger brothers. x x
Q: You are referring to your younger brothers xx
named what? Q: Now, according to you, the accused pulled
A: [CCC, DDD and EEE.] down your panty and cuddled you. What did
he do next?
Q: Aside from you, the three other siblings, A: He inserted his penis on (sic) my vagina.
who else were there and in your house at
that time? Q: What did he do next after he inserted his
A: No more... Anjoy. penis on (sic) your vagina?
A: He was pumping again.
Q: You mean, the accused was also in your
house at that time? Q: What did you feel?
A: Yes. A: Pain.

Q: What part of your body was painful?
A: My vagina.
Q: That incident of sexual abuse and
molestation happened in what part of the
house?
A: Near, at the door.
Q: What happened next?
A: One of my brothers saw it and he pulled me.
8
chanrobleslaw
We find the testimony of AAA sufficient to establish the element of carnal
knowledge. We note that the RTC described the testimony of AAA as
positive, credible, natural and convincing.9 The Court has held time and
again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve
full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age,
would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong
committed against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It
is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the
ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if
what she claims is not true.10
Further, it is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court,
especially on the credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.11 The Court observes restraint in
interfering with the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility,
absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some
material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the CA
sustained such assessment, as in this case, where it affirmed the trial court's
findings of fact, the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses, the
determination of physical evidence and conclusions.12
Furthermore, the narration of AAA is even more convincing as her testimony
coincided with that of CCC, who witnessed the crime.13 We note that the
RTC also observed CCC's testimony to be positive, credible, natural and
convincing.14
As to the alleged inconsistency in the testimony of AAA and that of her
brother CCC, accused-appellant points out that AAA testified that her brother
pulled her away from accused-appellant while CCC narrated that she was
released by accused-appellant. In People v. Laog,15 the Court clarified that
minor inconsistencies are not enough to sustain the acquittal of an accused,
to wit:cralawlawlibrary
xxx Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which
had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies
referring only to minor details and collateral matters - not to the central fact of
the crime - do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of
witnesses' declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically
believable on the whole. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the
testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must
establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime
charged. It cannot be overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is
not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.
(Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
The minor inconsistency in this case is how AAA was released by accused-
appellant which is not an element of rape. Such fact not being an element of
the crime will not put to doubt the prosecution witnesses' testimony
establishing the crime.
As to the element that the victim is under 12 years of age, the presentation of
her birth certificate16confirming that she was indeed seven years old at the
time the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 sufficiently established
the second element of rape in this case.

In sum, we agree with the RTC and CA that the elements of rape were duly
established.
The conviction of accused-appellant
based on the Information stating that the
crime was committed sometime before
December 24, 2002, despite the fact that
the crime was committed on
December 24, 2002, is valid.
Accused-appellant argues that the statement in the Information17 that the
rape occurred sometime before December 24, 2002 despite the fact that the
prosecution established that the crime was committed on December 24,
2002 violates Section 11,18 Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, on the requirement of stating the date of the
commission of the offense and the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We do not agree.
The Court has already addressed this issue in People v. Lizada,19 to
wit:cralawlawlibrary
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that
the precise date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an
essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the exact date when the
rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason
for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the
private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, x x x Moreover,
in People vs. Salalima,20 this Court held that:cralawlawlibrary
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is
obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an
element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was
committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was
committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15,
1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime
in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent
thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
chanrobleslaw
Notably, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, states that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a
material ingredient of the offense. Such requirement is not applicable to the
crime of rape where the date of the commission of the offense is not an
essential element. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime may
be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission. The information charging accused-appellant of
rape sometime before December 24, 2002 when the crime was committed
exactly on December 24, 2002 is sufficiently compliant with said Section 11.
In addition, as correctly pointed out by the CA, the Information is valid as
under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
an information is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.21
The Court has also discussed the essence of the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him in Andaya v.
People,22 to wit:cralawlawlibrary
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged
in the information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of
a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense,
x x x (Emphasis supplied)chanrobleslaw
It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testify about the
incident on December 24, 200223 because the date alleged was not vague or
covering an unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to prepare
his defense which is the essence of the right allegedly violated. It is worthy to
note that the records are bereft of any objection by the accused-appellant
about the date of the commission of the crime at the time of arraignment,
24 during the formal offer of exhibits25 and at the time the prosecution put AAA
on the witness stand26 to establish the rape committed on December 24,
2002. In People v. Gianan,27 the Court held that an accused-appellant's
failure to raise a timely objection that the time difference alleged in the
information covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object.
We further observe that accused-appellant did not even disavow knowledge
of the incident on that date but, in fact, admitted that he spoke with AAA at
their house on December 24, 200228 and even entered AAA's house.29 The
testimony of accused-appellant leads us to conclude that the allegation was
sufficient to inform him of the date the crime charged occurred which enabled
him to prepare his defense. Thus, we find the allegations in the Information
and the subsequent conviction of accused-appellant by the lower courts valid
and lawful under the circumstances.
Proper use of the phrase "without
eligibility for parole" in indivisible
penalties.
The CA, in the dispositive portion of its Decision, sentenced accused-
appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the benefit of
parole.30 A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC31 is instructive on the matter of using the
phrase without eligibility for parole to qualify indivisible penalties, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II.
In these lights, the following guidelines shall be observed in the imposition of
penalties and in the use of the phrase "without eligibility for
parole":chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
II.
(1) In cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no need
to use the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; it is understood that convicted persons penalized
with an indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole; and
(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death
penalty, but this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. 9346, the
qualification of "without eligibility for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion
perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been
sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A. No. 9346.
In the instant case, since the accused-appellant committed simple rape, a
crime penalized by reclusion perpetua only, the dispositive portion of this
decision should plainly state that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without any qualification.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
The Decision dated June 17, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00888-MIN is AFFIRMED with a clarification that the accused-
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 People v. Delfin
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellee V. FRANCASIO DELFIN
accused-appellant; GR. No. 190349; December 10, 2014; Second
Division; Del Castillo, J.
TOPIC/PURPOSE:
This is a case regarding two counts of rape.
FACTS:
There are two counts of rape.
The first rape incident happened on May 27, 2001 at around
10:00pm. “AAA”, an 11 year old girl was watching TV at a market in Naval,
when she went out, the appellant summoned her, she tried to run away,
however, Delfin threatened her, thus she approached him. When she was
near Delfin, he grabbed her arm and dragged her to the second floor of a
newly constructed building near the market. Under threat, Delfin was able to
rape “AAA”. Delfin then gave her money and told her not to tell anyone of the
incident or her family will be harmed.
The second rape incident happened on June 30, 2001 at around
11:00 pm. “AAA” was sleeping at a parked jeepney outside a billiard hall. She
was awakened by Delfin when he flashed a flashlight towards her. He went
inside the jeepney and raped “AAA”.
After experiencing pains and swelling, “AAA” decided to tell her aunt
“BBB” about the rape incidents. “BBB” brought “AAA” to the hospital and was
examined. The results stated that she has a lacerated hymen at the 6:00
o’clock position and a corrugated hymen. “AAA’s” family subsequently
reported the incident to the DSWD.
The Defense presented five witnesses, including the appellant. The
witnesses gave their testimonies. One stated that Delfin was with him at the
time of the crime, and another testimony is that there was no jeepney parked
near the billiard hall. Delfin also contended that “AAA’s” allegations were
false, and that such allegations were instigated by “CCC”, “AAA’s” aunt.
Since he once reported to the police that “AAA’s” aunt “CCC” was involved in
illegal drug activities. The defense also pointed out that there were
inconsistencies to “AAA’s” account.
CASE:
On November 19, 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declared
that the appellant is guilty of two counts of statutory rape. On appeal, on
January 27, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the
Decision of the RTC of Naval, Brilian Branch 16, sentencing Francasio Delfin
of the crime of simple rape instead of statutory rape, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim civil indemnity and
moral damages at PhP. 75,000 each and acquitting him of statutory rape,
hence the appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Delfin raped “AAA” on two counts
2. Whether or not the inconsistencies have a bearing in the present
case
3. Whether or not the allegations were false and was instigated by
“CCC”
RULING:
1. Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the CA with
modifications. The Supreme Court pointed out the elements of rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC and that such elements were
present in the case namely: (1) the offender was a man, in this case
Delfin; (2) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
lastly, (3) the act was accomplished by use of force or intimidation.
The testimonies established that Delfin had carnal knowledge of
“AAA”, which was proven by the medical examinations, and that he
used force and intimidation in approaching her.
2. No, the inconsistencies in “AAA’s” statements are trivial matters.
The Court reiterated the ruling of CA, that such inconsistencies are
only minor and collateral matters. It has been stated that such
inconsistencies were not an essential element of the crime, and that
it has no bearing on the essential facts. It is a well-settled rule that
factual findings of trial courts in regard of the credibility of witnesses
are given great weight ad respect most especially since it has been
affirmed by the CA.
3. No, “CCC” did not instigate the allegations against Delfin. The
Defense was not able to prove the connection of “CCC” to the rape
cases. There was no showing that “CCC” knew about the rape
incidents, since they were not able to meet and talk after the
incidents and she was not informed by “AAA” about such incidents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the January 27, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
GR. CR-H.C. No. 00077 finding appellant Francasio Delfin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
(1) Appellant Francasio Delfin shall not be eligible for parole;
(2) the award of moral damages is decreased from P75,000.00 to
P50, 000.00;
Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for
the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would
have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.
Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was
allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an
amended information. The amended information was filed, however, the
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation.

(3) appellant Francasio Delfin is ORDERED to pay "AAA" the
amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and,
(4) appellant Francasio Delfin is ORDERED to pay "AAA" interest at
the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the amounts of
damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,
without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the
original information, may legally and validly be admitted.
HELD:
Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.

SO ORDERED.
Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to
matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the
accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed
ENRILE v PEOPLE (supra)
against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG - G.R. No. originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional
103102 allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime.
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992 Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed
vs. even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
FACTS: accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite
preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY vs. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF
from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA
Facts: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in
expenses and anxiety of a public trial. the RTC against petitioner committed as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in

the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his
commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with
his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body
which caused his instantaneous death.

With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt.

Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.

Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by a counsel de parte pleaded not

guilty to homicide. Pretrial and trial was set by the judge. However, on the
same day after arraignment, the judge issued another order directing the trial
prosecutor to amend the information to murder, in view of the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information, which public
respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder. The
prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and
instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening parafraph of
the Information. On the date scheduled for pre trial, the accused was to be
re-arraigned for the crime of murder. Petitioner objected on the ground that
he will be placed in double jeopardy. Petitioner then filed a motion to Quash
with Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of double jeopardy. He
alleged that he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court I
the information for homicide, and the case was terminated without his
express consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his
express consent, the subsequent filinf of information for Murder in lieu of
Homicide placed him in double jeopardy. Said Motion to Quash was denied
by the responded judge ruling that a claim of former acquittal or conviction
does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless
judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide,
since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before
trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings
could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating
circumstance of “disregard of rank,” the crime of Homicide is qualified to
Murder. Petitioner then filed for a Motion for reconsideration alleging that
contrary to respondent judge’s conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the
killing to murder, it is a general aggravating circumstance only which only
serves to affect the imposition of the period of penalty. , and that the
amendment ordered by the judge was substantial and is therefor not allowed
byt the Rules of Court as the petitioner has already been arraigned. Motion
for reconsideration was granted,and ruled that the original information
charging the crime of homicide stands. A petition for certiorari was filed by
the petitioner alleging among others that the motion was not really
reconsidered as the prayer was for the judge to grant the Motion to Quash.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the
charge from Homicide to Murder.
Held: NO. Sec 7 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the
defense of double jeopardy may prosper to wit;
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1)
a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first.
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid
indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or
termination of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense or
any attempt to commit the same or the frustration thereof; or prosecution for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or
terminated his case for homicide without his express consent, which is
tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a
definite or unconditional dismissal which terminates the case. And for the
dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of
acquittal.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial
prosecutor to correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same
upon the filing of a newInformation charging the proper offense as
contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only
when the offense charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the
accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged in the
information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of
the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper
offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves
the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the
respondent judge merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not
the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the same original
information that was amended by merely crossing out the word “Homicide”
and writing the word “Murder,” instead, which showed that there was no
dismissal of the homicide case.
Matalam v Sandiganbayan

On November 15, 2004, Datu Guimid Matalam, the Vice-Governor of

Cotabato City and the Regional Secretary of DAR, and other low-ranking
public officials were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, Matalam illegally and unjustifiably
refused to pay the monetary claims of several employees of the DAR. Later,
the Information was amended charging him of illegally dismissing from the
service the complaining employees. He then insisted that he is entitled to a
new preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not Matalam is entitled to a preliminary investigation since

he was not informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the
complaining witnesses.

Held: Yes. According to the SC, if the petitioner is not to be given a new PI
for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will
be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding
the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged
dismissal. He will be denied due process. Although the charge remained the
same, which is violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 as amended, the prohibited
act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims to
illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence
on the absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to
the illegal dismissal. Accused has not waived his right to a new PI and in fact
asked for one.