Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan filed with the was still under water, and
ter, and that he had used it as a site of his fish
G.R. No. L-28021 December 15, 1977
JULIAN SANTULAN substituted by his children named PATROCINIO,
ADORACION, ARTURO, CONSTANCIA, and PEPITA, all surnamed
SANTULAN and minor grandchildren, JOCELYN, ROSAURO and
ROBERTO, all surnamed SANTULAN assisted by their guardian ad
litem, PATROCINIO SANTULANpetitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and
ANTONIO LUSIN, substituted by his Heirs named TEODOSIA
BALANZA (widow) and Children LEOPOLDO, ARMANDO. ALFONSO,
EMILIANO, MAGDALENA, ERLINDA and ESTRELLA (ESTER), all
surnamed LUSIN, and Heirs of CAROLINA LUSIN-LUCERO named
MANOLITO LUCERO and MARIO LUCERO, respondents-appellees.
Isidoro Crisostomo for appellants Heirs of Julian Santulan.
Romulo C. Felizmeña for appellees Heirs of Antonio Lusin.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz Assistant Solicitor General
Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for The
Executive Secretary, etc.
AQUINO, J.
This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of the
public domain with an area of about four and one-half hectares
located at Barrio Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on Bacoor Bay and
the Ankaw Creek.
It is protracted controversy that has been pending for more than
thirty years between the rival claimants Julian Santulan plan and
Antonio Lusin, who have been succeeded by their heirs.
Santulan claimed that foreshore land was an extension of his land,
Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre, with an area of 17,301 square
meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of
Title No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent. The northern
boundary of Lot No. 986 is Bacoor (Manila) Bay (Exh. A). The said
foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated
by the alluvial action of the sea.
On December 5, 1942 Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed.
The survey plan was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944 (Exh.
B). On December 29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant to Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, filed an application, F.L.A. No. V 562,
to lease for five years for agricultural purposes an area of 36,120
square meters of the said foreshore land (Exh. F).
On that same date, December 29, 1942, Santulan, pursuant to Act
No. 3077 and Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3, filed with the
Bureau of Lands an application for a revocable permit to occupy the
said land. He indicated therein that he would use the land for 11
capiz beds and oyster beds, the planting of bakawan and pagatpat
and later to be developed into a fishpond" (Exh. G).
Bureau of Fisheries an application for an ordinary fishpond permit
or lease of the said foreshore land (Special Use Permit, pp. A. No.
5114, Exh. H).
At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director of Forestry
investigated the condition of the said foreshore land. The latter in
his first indorsement dated June 19, 1950 found that it was swampy
"and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and
that it is within the disposable areas for agricultural purposes under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).
The chief of the division of commercial fisheries sent a letter to
Lusin dated April 28, 1950 apprising him that he was reported to
have illegally entered the area covered by Santulan's fishpond
permit application and directing him to refrain from introducing
improvements, with the warning that court proceedings would be
taken against him (Exh. J).
On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the Director of Lands
wrote the following letter to Lusin advising him to vacate the
disputed land and maintain the status quo:
Mr. Antonio Lusin
Caiñgin, Kawit, Cavite
S i r:
We have been informed that the area which is presently
controverted by and between you and Julian Santulan, under the
applications noted above, was recently entered by you and some
companionand that you are destroying the dikes and other
improvements previously constructed thereon by said Julian
Santulan.
If this information is true, and inasmuch as you are aware that the
controversy is still pending final adjudgment in this Office, is desired
that you take proper advice and leave the area and its existing
improvements in status quo in order to avoid possible confusion of
rights which ma delay the final disposition of the area in question.
You are advised further that the acts imputed to you may make you
liable to prosecution and punishment under the law; and that
whatever improvements you may make for yourself in the premises
will not legally accrue to your benefit, nor will they serve as basis for
a claim to preferential rights. (Paragraphing supplied, Exh, J-1).
Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name for tax
purposes. Tax Declaration No. 2923, which took effect in 1948 and
which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 13816 also in Santulan's name,
shows that the land was assessed at P460. He paid the realty taxes
due on the said land for the years 1945-46, 1948-55 and 195760
(Exh. C, D and E, el seq.).
On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he died in 1962)
filed with the Bureau of Lands applications for a revocable-permit
and lease of a foreshore land, respectively, for the purpose of
producing salt on the said land. He claimed that he had been in the
continuous and exclusive possession of the land since 1920, when it
corrals.
He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a fishpond.
The entire area was enclosed with mud dikes and provided with a
concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood On the
northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes
placed at close intervals to serve as water breakers to protect the
mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. Lusin
introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and Lusin gave
rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict No. 8 (N). The Director of Lands in
his decision in that case dated February 1, 1951 found that the
disputed land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow
and ebb of the ordinary tides that it is an extension of Santulan's Lot
No. 986 and it was formerly a part of the sea; that Santulan was the
first to enter the land and to make dikes thereon, and that Lusin
entered the land later and made dikes also (Exh. K made a part
hereof for reference as Annex A).
The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to
reparian rights which may he invoked by Santulan as owner of the
upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1" (Exh. K). Hence the Director rejected Lusin's application for
a foreshore lease and for a revocable permit and gave due course to
Santulan's foreshore lease application.
Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration. The Director in his order of
October 19, 1951 denied that motion. lie found that Lusin was a
possessor in bad faith: that it is not true that Lusin had improved
and possessed the said foreshore land for twenty years, that the
disputed area is covered by water, two to three feet deep during
ordinary tides and is exposed land after the ebb of the tides, and
that Lusin's alleged possession and improvements could not nullify
Santulan's preferential right to lease the land by reason of his
riparian rights. The Director ordered Lusin to vacate the land within
sixty days from notice (Exh. L made a part hereof for reference as
Annex B).
Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources who in his decision of October 13, 1952 dismissed the
appeal and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M made a
part hereof for reference as Annex C). Lusin's motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Secretary's order of February 28,
1953 (Exh. N made a part hereof for reference as Annex D).
Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the case. His request was
granted. The Department ordered a reinvestigation on May 12,
1953.
After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, by authority of the Secretary, in
his order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's
revocable permit and foreshore lease applications but ordered
Santulan to reimburse to Lusin the appraised value of his
improvements (Exh. O made a part hereof for reference as Annex E).
Lusin appealed to the President of the Philippines after his motion
for reconsideration was denied in the Undersecretary's order of
May 19, 1955 (Exh. OO made a part hereof for reference as Annex
F).
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the President, held
in his decision of April 10, 1958 that section 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on April 30, 1936 pursuant to
Acts Nos. 2874 and 3038) was "rendered obsolete" by section 67 of
the Public Land Law which took effect on December 1, 1936 (Exh. P
made a part hereof for reference as Annex G).
On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the record is silent as
to whether or not the land in question has been declared by the
President as not necessary for the public service and as open to
disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law), the Executive Secretary
sustained Lusin's appeal and reversed the orders of the Director of
Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in
favor of Santulan. Secretary Pajo decided the case in the alternative
as follows:
On the assumption that the land in question has been declared
open for disposition and is not necessary for the public service, this
Office directs that an oral bidding for the leasing thereof to
interested parties pursuant to the provisions of Section 67 of
Commonwealth Act .No. 141 be conducted and the contract of lease
awarded to the highest bidder whoever shall be the highest bidder,
if other than the appellant, shall be required to pay to the appellant
the appraised value of the improvements introduced by him on the
land to be determined by that Department.
If the land in question has not been so declared, this Office directs
that a revocable permit under Section 68 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 be Id to the appellant requiring him to pay permit fees since the
year 1951.
Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that Department and the
Bureau of Lands are hereby revoked.
Santulan's case was distinguished from that of Gonzalo Monzon
whose Lot No. 987 adjoins Santulan's Lot No. 986. Executive
Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice) in his decision of May
10, 1954 upheld the preferential right of Monzon to lease the
foreshore land north of his lot, which foreshore land is adjacent to
the foreshore land now in dispute in this case (Exh. Q made a part
hereof for reference as Annex H).
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of
the Acting Executive Secretary dated August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).
On October 22, 1959 Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cavite a petition for certiorari wherein he alleged that the Executive
Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in misinterpreting
certain provisions of Act No. 2874, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
In the lower court the parties agreed that the case Involves only a
question of law. On August 18. 1961 the lower court dismissed the
petition and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision. Santulan
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution of July 21,
1967 elevated the record to this Court on the ground that Santulan
in his brief raised only the legal questions of whether the Public
Land Law repealed section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7 1
and whether the Executive Secretary's decision is "legally sound and
correct" (CA-G. R. No. 30708-R).
It should be emphasized that. as found by tile investigators of the
Bureau of Lands, Santulan was the prior possessor of the foreshore
land in question. lie had it surveyed in 1942. The survey plan
Psu-115357) was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944.
Santulan paid the realty taxes on that land .
It should further be underscored that the regulations pie him a
preferential right to lease the land as a riparian owner. Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30. 1936. which was issued
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the
recommendation of the Director of Lands for the disposition of
alienable lands of the public domain, provides:
32. Preference of the Reparian Owner — The owner of the property
adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water
bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be
given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as
may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and
regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right.
Paragraph 32 quoted above is a substantial copy of paragraph 4 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3 dated April 20, 1936, which was
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for issuance of
temporary permits of occupation and use of agricultural lands of the
public domain.
The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental
regulations is used in a broad sense as referring to any property
having a water frontage (Shepard's Point Land Co. vs. Atlantic Hotel,
44 S. E. 39, 45, 132 N. C. 517, 65 C. J. S. 143, note 84). Strictly
speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian owner is a person
who owns land situated on the bank of a river.
But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not
only the owners of lands on the banks of rivers but also the littoral
owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea
or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region
including both the land along the coast and the water near the coast
or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.
Therefore, on the basis of paragraphs 32 and 4 of the said
administrative regulations, Santulan or his heirs Should be allowed
to leased or occupy the said foreshore land.
But the Executive Secretary ruled that paragraph 32 was rendered
obsolete by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or, as held by the trial
court, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed by the
Public Land Law. Is that conclusion correct? We hold that it is
wrong.
It is true that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 were
issued when the 1919 Public Land Act was in force or before the
present Public Land Law took effect on December 1, 1936. But that
circumstance would not necessarily mean that the said
departmental regulations are not good under the 1936 Public Land
Law.
In rationalizing the alleged repeal of paragraph 32, the Executive
Secretary cited the following provisions of Act No. 2874, the 1919
Public Land Act (15 Public Land laws 24):
SEC. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the highest bidder;
and if there is no bidder besides the applicant, it shall be
adjudicated to him. The provisions of section twenty-seven of this
Act shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots
remain unleased or unsold the Director of Lands Shall from time to
time announce in the Offcial Gazette or otherwise the lease or sale
of those lots if necessary . (Section 27 refers to sealed bidding).
The Executive Secretary held that the above-quoted section 64 was
by the for provisions of on wealth Act No. 141 which took effect on
December 1, 1936:
SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding-, and
ajudication shall be made to the highest bidder. However, where m
applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit
issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be
made by sealed bidding as prescribed in section twenty-six of this
Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If
all or Dart of the lots remain unleased or unsold. the Director of
Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazzate, or in
any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of
those lots, if necessary. (Section 26, like section 27 of Act No. 2874,
refers to sealed bidding).
The Executive Secretary noted that under section 64 of Act No.
2874 sealed bidding was the general rule of procedure in an award
of a lease of foreshore land and that the t is entitled to equal the bid
of the highest bidder. On the other hand, under 67, oral bidding is
the general rule.
Hence, the Executive Secretary assumed that, while under section
64 of the 1919 old Public Land Act, the fact that the applicant has a
preferential right to lease foreshore land was a crucial factor it is
thus under section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law because in oral
bidding the appellant is not entitled to equal the bid of the highest
bidder.
The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the preferential
right of the applicant to lease foreshore land was immaterial under
67 of the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, which gives such preference. had
become "idle and useless".
That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the erroneous
hypothesis that section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different
from section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law. They are not different.
The truth is that section 64 was amended by Act No. 3517 which
took effect on February 4, 1919 (24 Public Laws 416). Section 64, as
thus amended, is substantially the same as section 67 of the 1936
Public Land Law.
That fact was overlooked by the Executive Secretary. Hence, his
conclusion, that paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 71
was repealed or rendered obsolete by section 67 of the present
Public Land Law, is wrong because its premise is wrong.
In other words, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1,
issued on April 30, 1936, was promulgated under section 64 of the
old Public Land Law, as amended. And since the amended section
64 was substantially reproduced in section 67 of the 1936 Public
Land Law, it is glaringly incorrect to say that section 67 rendered
obsolete the said paragraph 32. Paragraph 32 is still in force and is
good under the existing Public Land Law.
The foregoing discussion reveals that the Executive Summary's
rationalization of the alleged repeal of paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 (identical to paragraph 4 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 8-3) is not only deficient in clarity and
cogency but is predicated on the false assumption that section 64 of
the 1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the present
Public Land Law. Consequently, the aforementioned decision of
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo under review bas to be set aside.
This case is governed by the precedent established in the case of
Gonzalo Monzon, which, as already noted, is similar to this cm since
the foreshore land involved in the Monzon case is adjacent to the
foreshore land involved in this case.
In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the
oft-cited paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 held
that Monzon, the littoral owner of the registered land abutting
upon the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease the
foreshore land,
The location of the lots of Santulan and Monzon and the foreshore
lands abutting thereon is shown in the following sketch bawd on the
plan, Psu-115357 (Exh. B):
Manila Bay or Bacoor Bay
Disputed Area
Psu- 1 15358
Psu-1 15357
Forshore land
Foreshore land
leased to
claimed by
Gonzalo Monzon
Julian Santulan
and
Antonio Lusin
Lot no. 987
Lot No. 986
Belonging to
Belonging to
Gonzalo Monzon
Julian Santulan
Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santolan's lot is
in the same situation as the foreshore land abutting upon Monzon's
lot, there is no reason why Santulan should not enjoy, with respect
to the disputed foreshore land, the rights given to Monzon over the
foreshore land adjacent to his lot.
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner
the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his
land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands
added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by
the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands,
"when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment
of special industries, or for the coast guard service", shall be
declared by the Government "to be the property of the owner of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof" (cited in Ignacio
vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the
littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore
land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of
the sea (Ker & Co. vs. Cauden 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U.S. 268, 56 L. Ed.
432, 435; Jover vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094,
1100, 221 U.S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification
for giving accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion
compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land
suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters (Cortes vs.
City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the case of littoral lands, he who
loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession
(Banks vs. Ogden 2 Wall. 57, 67, 17 L. Ed. 818, 821).
That preferential right is recognized in American jurisprudence
where the rule is that the owner of the land adjacent to navigable
waters has certain riparian or littoral rights of a proprietary nature
not possessed by the general public which rights are incident to the
ownership of the banks or the uplands: riparian as respects the
waters of a river and littoral as to sea waters or the waters of a lake
(65 C.J. S. 143-145).
It may be mentioned that the Director of Lands stated in his
manifestation of October 26, 1977 that Lands Administrative Orders
Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 are still in force and have not been superseded by
any later regulations and that the directive of the President of the
Philippines to the Director of Lands dated May 24, 1966, stopping
the grant of foreshore leases all along Manila Bay, towards Cavite
and Bataan, has not rendered the instant case moot and academic
"because the foreshore lease application involved is pending
award."
In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's decision
and the decision of the Executive Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are
reversed and set aside and the order of the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954 and
the orders of the Director of Lands dated February I and October 19,
1951 are affirmed.
The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of
February 1, 1951 should be recorded in the names of his heirs and
the obligation to make reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive
part of the Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the
heirs of Santolan. The reimbursement should be made to the heirs
of the late Antonio Lusin The obligation to vacate the disputed land,
as required in the Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves
upon the heirs of Lusin Costs in both instances against respondent
heirs of Lusin (As amended by Resolution of February 17, 1977.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ.,
concur.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Fernando and Santos, JJ., are on leave.
Annexes to Opinion in L-28021, Julian Santolan
vs. Executive , et al.
F. L. A. No. V-562, R. P. A. (New). Julian Santolan, Applicant &
Contestant vs. F. L. A. (New), R. P. A. (New), B. L. Conflict No. 8 (N)
Psu- 1 15357, Kawit, Cavite.
Julian Santolan, Applicant-Appellant vs. Antonio Lusin,
Applicant-Appellant, D.A.N.R. Case No. 625, Psu- 1 15357, Kawit,
Cavite.
Annex A — Order of Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951.
Annex B — Order of Director of Lands dated October 19, 1951.
Annex C — Decision of Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated October 13, 1952.
Annex D — Order of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
dated February 28,1953.
Annex E — Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resource dated December 14, 1954.
Annex F — Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources dated May 19, 1955.
Annex G — Decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo dated April
10, 1958.
Annex H — Decision of Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro dated
-May 10, 1954 in Emiliano del Rosario vs. Gonzalo Monzon.
ANNEX A
ORDER
Julian Santolan, who owns Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, under
a free patent grant with Original Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to
him on June 9, 1937, claims preferential rights to all the areas
extending seaward from the said lot. He caused the said areas to be
surveyed for him in 1942, and the survey plan thereof was approved
in 1944, as may be seen in the Survey Plan Psu-115357 of this Office
which is reproduced in the sketch drawn. on the back of the last
page hereof. Except the portion marked "A" in the sketch, he made
a foreshore lease application and a revocable permit application for
these areas in 1942 to devote the areas applied for to fishpond
purposes. Presently, he now includes the portion "A" in his
applications herein mentioned to be devoted to the same purposes
— in fact, he now intends to utilize the entire area comprised in his
Survey Psu-115357 for fishery purposes and has filed therefor with
the Bureau of Fisheries fishpond permit application No. 5114. Upon
this claim he contests the revocable permit (new) application and
the foreshore lease (new) application for the portion O these mm
marked "X" in the sketch which were filed by Antonio Lusin in 1942
and 1945, respectively, for salt-producing purposes.
Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, mentioned above as owned by
Julian Santolan, a to be bounded on the north by the Bacoor Bay. It
is evident therefore that the areas now in Santolan's Survey
Psu-115357, were formerly parts of the bay, and that presently they
exist as a result of the of the waters of the sea. Investigation
disclosed that these areas are now foreshore lands, — covered and
uncovered by the flow and ebb of the tides. Santolan was found to
have entered the areas first and made dikes Lusin was found to
have entered lately and made does also. None of them, however,
has obtained from this Office any permit of occupancy and use, and
their applications are not yet approved.
On the basis alone of actual occupancy or introduction of
improvements neither of the parties here may claim preferential
rights, for under the law and regulations, it is only such occupancy
and introduction of improvements as are made upon the authority
of an official permit issued by this Office which could serve as a
reason for holding a sealed bidding in a public auction of the right to
low at which the permittee is given the preferred right to equal the
highest bid that might be put by any other party. This is the rule
prescribed by Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public
land Act)' It appears, however, that the areas — portions "A", "X"
and the parts extending up to the Bar Bay now, as may be seen in
the sketch, — which are comprised by Santolan's Survey Plan
-Psu-115357, are immediately adjoining Lot No. 986, which is his
private property, and are extensions of the said lot to the sea. The
areas, being foreshore lands, are therefore subject to riparian fights
which may be invoked by Santolan as owner of the upland in
accordance With Section 32 of lands Administrative Order No. 7-1
which provides the following:
Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands,
marshy lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations
governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor
within 60 days from the date he receives a communication from the
Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right
As Julian Santolan is interested in utilizing the entire area covered
by his Survey Psu- 1 15357 over which he is fully entitled to exercise
his riparian rights, the above-noted foreshore lease (new)
application and revocable (new) application of Antonio Lusin, both
covering the portion marked "X" in the sketch, are hereby rejected.
The lease application of Santolan, shall be recorded as Foreshore
Urn Application No. 562 and given due course for the whole area
(including portion "A) shown in the said sketch.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 1, 1951.
JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands
ANNEX B
ORDER
Counsel for respondent Antonio Lusin has filed in due time a motion
for the reconsideration of our Order of February 1, 1951, which
resolved this case in favor of contestant Julian Santolan, praying
that the said order be set aside and the case, reopened for purposes
of a formal hearing for the submission of evidence. Substantially
stated, respondent Lusin claims that he is entitled to preference
because he has been in possession of the premises for a period of
over twenty years, placing stakes and planting aquatic trees for the
raising and cultivation of shell fish and sea shells, besides
constructing dikes for pending fish and making salt beds, — all these
works undertaken by him being the cause for the gradual filling of
the area and its conversion into a productive state. He contends
that the areas under question had been formed thru "artificial
accretion" caused by his own labor and, consequently, he has the
right of pre-emption.
There is no question, however, that the areas under question are
parts of the foreshore. Under Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (Public Land Act), they are disposable to private parties by k
only and not otherwise; and under Section 67 of the same Act, the
lease shall be made thru oral bidding, the adjudication to be made
to the highest bidder.
There is no question also that the areas under question extend to
the sea from lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, which is actually
owned by respondent Santolan under Original Certificate of Title No.
6 of the land records of Cavite. Undoubtedly, respondent has
riparian rights to the foreshore in question which he can invoke
against contestant Lusin under the provisions of Section 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, quoted in toto in the order sought to
be reconsidered.
Records show that the areas under question are also involved in the
Fishpond Application No. 5114 of Julian Santolan with the Bureau of
Fisheries which is also contested by Antonio. lt appears that upon
request of the Director of Fisheries to the Bureau of Forestry for
certification as to the availability of the areas for fishery purposes,
the latter made investigation, inquiring at the same time into the
claim of Antonio Lusin, made formally in writing, that he has
improved the areas into a fishpond and has been in occupation
thereof for more than 20 years. The Bureau of Forestry made the
findings that those areas are within the disposable areas for
agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands;
and that they are swampy lands, formerly under sea water of the
Bacoor Bay, "and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio
Lusin". These findings were transmitted to the Director of Fisheries
under first indorsement dated June 19, 1950.
Our own investigating officer, reporting on this case on January 25,
1951, stated the following: "On December 15, 1950, when I
conducted the first ocular inspection of the premises in the
presence of both parties, the only visible improvements found
thereon are the newly-constructed dikes made thereon by Julian
Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about two to three
years old, bamboo stakes placed thereon at intervals, and a small
old hut located at almost the middle of the land in question. All
these improvements were claimed to have been introduced by
Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin, however, claimed that those
bamboo stakes found therein were his."
It is evident from the findings of both the inspecting officer of the
Bureau of Forestry and our own investigating officer that the areas
under question are foreshore lands, and that they have not been
really improved and possessed by respondent Lusin for over twenty
years as he alleged. The improvements found therein have been
recently made, and they are not of such nature and extent as would
have changed the character of the areas as foreshore. In fact,
according to the investigating officer, the areas have been seen by
him on different occasions, and he found that the same, as well as
the neighboring areas in the same belt, were covered by tidal
waters of from 2 to 3 feet deep during ordinary rise of the tides, and
uncovered by the tides at ebb.
There is, therefore, no reason for changing our disposition in our
order of February 1, 1951. It is not necessary to re-open the case to
receive evidence on respondent's allegation that he has been in
possession of the premises for over 20 years and has gradually
improved them because, aside from the fact that the allegation is
belied by the physical condition of the premises, whatever evidence
may be gathered on that allegation could not change the nature of
the areas as foreshore, nor would it avoid the rights of contestant as
riparian owner. The presence of the respondent in the premises has
not been authorize by competent authorities, and his introduction
of improvements thereon was not done with proper permit of
temporary occupancy and -use such as is prescribed in our
administrative practice. The circumstances under which he made
improvements cannot justify his claim for a preferred right under
Section 67 of the Public Land Act; on the contrary, he stands to
forfeit the improvements to the Government for, as reported by our
investigating officer, he entered the Premises and commenced
making the improvements after contestant Santolan himself has
already made improvements, and after he has been warned on
December 15, 1950 by the investigating officer not to continue
working, which warning was confirmed by us in our letter to him of
January 12, 1951. His bad faith is quite evident, and he cannot avail
of his presence in the premises now to demand the issuance to him
of a provisional or revocable permit of temporary occupancy and
use under our rules and regulations in order to legal his entry and
give validity to his improvements. The right to demand issuance of
such a permit is concomittant to the right of contestant Santolan to
be a preferred applicant by virtue of his riparian right recognized in
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 cited hereinabove.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the instant motion for reconsideration and
reinvestigation of respondent Antonio Lusin is hereby denied, and
he shall vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of notice
hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 19, 1951.
JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands
ANNEX C
DECISION
The order of the Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951, rejected
Foreshore Lease Application (New) and Revocable Permit
Application (New) of Antonio Lusin and gave due course to the
Foreshore Lease Application No. 562 of Julian Santolan. Antonio
Lusin claims that the order is against the fact and the law. He
presented three (3) motions for reconsideration: one on October 19,
1951; the other on December 12, 1951; and the last on April 9, 1952.
Said motions were all denied. Hence, the present appeal. The
subject of contention is the strip of land having an area of 41/2
hectares from Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre No. 203 to the
waters of Bacoor Bay. Lot No. 986 is covered by I Certificate of Title
No. 6 issued to Julian Santolan on June 9, 1937. Santolan's titled
property is bounded on the north by Bacoor Bay.
On December 5, 1942, Santolan filed his foreclosure km application
for the entire tract entervening between his property and Bacoor
Bay. So he caused Psu- 115357 to be executed and same was
approved in 1944 by the Director of Lands.
On November 26, 1945, Antonio Lusin applied for permit for an area
of 4.5 for salt bed purposes. The area for which permit was asked is
by his F.L.A. (New) filed on November 17, 1945, the boundaries of
which are as follows:
NE — V. del Rosario and E. del Rosario
SE — Julian Santolan
SW — Ankaw River
NW — Bacoor Bay
The two applications of Santolan and Lusin cover the same area.
Julian Santolan duly protested in 1946 against Lusin's application.
The question to be decided in this appeal is: Which of the two
applicants, Julian Santolan or Antonio Lusin, has right of preference
to the land in controversy?
By virtue of the fact that he is a riparian owner, Julian Santolan has
the right of preference pursuant to the provisions of Section 32 Of
Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:
Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands,
marshy lands, or hinds covered with water bordering upon the
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given
preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not
be needed for the public service, subject in the laws and regulations
governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor
within sixty (60) days from the date he receives communication
from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential right.
It is true that appellant Lusin introduced improvements on the in
question, but that fact does not give him preferential right , not only
because he had not acquired any permit from the Bureau of Lands
before doing so, but also because his entry on the was duly
protested by Santolan.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and finding that the order of the
Director of lands on Feb. 1, 1951, is in accordance with the facts of
record and the provisions of the law on the matter, the herein
appeal from said order should be, as hereby it is, dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 13, 1952.
JOSE S. CAMUS
Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX D
ORDER
This is a motion filed by Antonio Lusin, thru counsel, for the
reconsideration of the decision of this Office dated October 13,
1952, dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of
Lands under date of February 1, 1951.
In support of the said motion for reconsideration, Lusin substantially
alleges that he has been improving the land in question since 1920,
spending for such improvements no more than P20,000.00, and for
that reason, he should be given the preferential right to acquire the
said land. To reinforce his allegation, movant cites the case
ofRosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico, CA G.R. No.
9050, decided by the Court of Appeals on June 30, 1943, wherein it
was held that because Tragico has constructed fishpond on a
portion of the land in question by means of the improvements he
has introduced thereon and has possessed the land for sufficient
time to acquire the land by right of prescription, he was awarded
the land in dispute.
We have found this allegation of movant to be far from the truth. lt
is the finding of the investigating officer who made an investigation
of this case that it is Julian Santolan and not movant Lusin who has
been actually occupying the land in question and introducing
improvements thereon. The pertinent portion of his M reads as
follows:
On December 16, 1950,, when I conducted the first ocular
inspection of the premises in the presence of both parties, the only
visible improvements found thereon were the newly constructed
dikes made thereon by Julius Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape
trees of about two to three years old, bamboo stakes placed
thereon at intervals and a small old hut located at almost the middle
of the land in question. All these improvements were claimed to
have been introduced thereon by Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin,
however, claimed that the bamboo stakes found thereon were his.
Moreover, according to the further finding of the said investigating
officer, the WW in question fails under the category of foreshore
land. That portion of his report referring to this finding is hereby
quoted as follows:
It may not be amiss to state in this connection that I have. or
different occassions, the opportunity to inspect the land subject
hereof on both high and low tides. During ordinary low tide, the
whole area. and further seaward, is entirely ex to the surface while
during ordinary high tide, it is wholly covered with tidal water with
an approximate depth of two to three feet. The land in question in
its entirety is marshy covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of
tidal water.
As the land is a foreshore land, the same is susceptible to the
riparian right of the owner of the adjoining land. According to
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the owner of the
property adjoining foreshore land, shall be given preference to
apply for such land adjoining his property as may not be needed for
the public service. Inasmuch as the land in question adjoins Lot No.
980, Kawit Cadastre, which is a private property of Julian Santolan,
said Julian Santolan shall have the preference right to apply therefor
over and above any other applicant. It may be mentioned, in this
connection, that the said case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs.
Magdaleno Tragico who had and improved the land claimed by him,
it is Santolan and riot movant Lusin who has been actually
occupying and improving the land subject of the present
controversy.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by
Antonio Lusin, as well as his request for reinvestigation of this case,
should be, as hereby it is, denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 28,1953.
FERNANDO LOPEZ
Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources
ANNEX E
ORDER
On October 13, 1952, the Office a in connection with the above-case
can, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
In view of all the foregoing and that the order of the Director of
Lands on February 1, 1961, is in with the facts of record and the
provisions of law on the matter the herein appeal from the said
order should be, as hereby it is dismissed.
From the said decision Antonio Lusin filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied as per order of this Office dated
February 28, 1953. Still not satisfied with the aforementioned order,
Lusin again filed a second notion for reconsideration predicating his
motion on the following grounds:
1. That he (Lusin) is in actual ion of the land in question since 1920;
2. That said area is an agricultural land actually devoted to fishpond
and, therefore, is not a foreshore land;
3. That even granting without admitting that Santolan is a riparian
owner, Santolan had lost his riparian right thereto in view of the
continuous ion by Lusin of the area since 1920; and
4. That in the investigation relied upon by the Director of Lands in
his decision and confirmed by this Office, the movant herein was
not given opportunity to be heard because the said investigation
was never completed, and as a result, the conclusions of the
investigator thereat were one sided
Adhering to its Policy of giving party litigants the outmost
opportunity to present their respective sides of the case, this Office
ordered a reinvestigation of the case to determine whether or not
the allegations of Antonio Lusin are true.
From the said reinvestigation, the facts of this case may be stated as
follows:
The disputed area is a strip of land containing an approximate area
of 4-1/2 hectares located at the Barrio of Kaingin, Municipality of
Kawit, Province of Cavite- lt is bounded on the North by Bacoor Bay,
on the East by the property occupied by Vicente del Rosario and E.
del Rosario, on the South by Lot No. 896 of Kawit Cadastre No. 203;
and on the West by Ankaw River. Lot 986, mentioned above as the
boundary of the area in question on the South, is owned and
possessed by Julian Santolan, his ownership thereof being
evidenced by a free patent grant with Original Certificate of Title No.
6 issued on June 9, 1937. The only issue to be resolved in this case is
whether or not Julian Santolan, as riparian owner, is entitled to the
preference provided for in Section 32, Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, which reads as follows:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner.— The owner of the property
adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with
water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or
rivers, shall be given preference to apply or such lands adjoining his
property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing Ian of this nature, provided that he
applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a
communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right.
During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this
Office, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin is the actual occupant of
the area in question - his present possession thereof dating back as
of 1951. During his occupation, Lusin has introduced considerable
improvements in the area investing his fife sa therein. Today, a
portion of approximately two hectares of the said area is a complete
fishpond surrounded with dikes. A concrete gate was constructed
on the western side of the fishpond in 1951. Water breakers were
constructed around the dikes to protect them from the action of the
waves. The remaining portion of the area in question is fenced with
bamboo stakes.
On the other hand, it is apparent that the area in question is an
extension of Lot 986 to the sea and that its present existence is the
result of the continuous recession of the water of the sea. There is
no doubt that the area in question is a foreshore, it being situated
along the shore lying between medium high and low water marks
and is covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of ordinary tide.
Both Parties claim prior ion of the disputed area, Santolan's claim
dating way back in 1907, the year he claims said area was donated
to him by his father-in-law while Lusin alleges that he was already in
possession of the same since 1920. The evidence presented by both
parties during the reinvestigation were so diametrically opposed
with each other that they only create doubts as to the veracity of
the respective claims of said parties. From the testimonies of
witnesses for both sides, there could be gathered sufficient grounds
to believe that prior to 1942, neither Party Possessed the area to
the exclusion of the other. Rather, there are good reasons to believe
that both parties fished in the premises jointly and/or
simultaneously without claiming the property exclusively for
themselves because then the area was covered with water which at
that time was still deep. It was only in 1942 that Julian Santolan
took positive step to claim the property by filing a foreshore lease
and a revocable permit application for said area with the intention
of converting the same into a fishpond. Santolan caused said area to
be surveyed in 1942, the survey plan was approved in 1944 as may
be seen in survey Plan Psu- 115357 of the Bureau of Lands. Since
1942, Santolan exercised dominion over the property although Lusin
occasionally entered the premises with a similar intention of
claiming the area for himself. In January of 1951 Lusin entered the
area in question and wrested the n thereof from Santolan. Since
then up to the present, Lusin is in continuous possession of the
same notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of Santolan.
Lusin alleges that the area in question does not fall within the
purview of the above quoted Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1 on the theory that the lands enumerated in said
provision, whether foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered
with water, must be bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers. And it is argued that the area in question is
bordering the shores of Manila Bay, which is neither a lake nor a
river, the owner of the adjoining property is not en to the
preferential right accorded by said Lands Administrative Order.
We cannot agree with this contention. This Office is of the opinion
and so holds that the said provision of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, Section 32 speaks of the following kinds of lands, distinct
and separate from one another:
(1) Foreshore lands
(2) Marshy lands, or
(3) Land covered with water bordering upon the shores of navigable
lakes or rivers.
The phrase "bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or river"
in said provision modifies only the third classification, that is, "lands
covered with water", for if the law that said phrase should modify
the three types of land enumerated are then the punctuation mark,
comma, should not have been placed before the alternative "or"
but instead between the words "water" and "bordering" making
said provision to appear as follows:
The owner of the property adjoining foreshore ands marshy lands or
lands covered with water, bordering upon the shores or banks of
navigable lakes or rivers ... .
The use of the alternative "or" instead of the conjunction "and"
shows the intention of the law in segregating foreshore lands from
marshy lands and those two from lands covered with water
bordering upon shores of navigable lakes or rivers.
It is also alleged that even granting that Santolan was the
preferential rights accorded to a riparian owner, said right has
prescribed on the ground that Lusin has been in continuous ion of
the said area since 1920. This allegation was not duly proven during
the reinvestigation. While Lusin claims ion of the disputed area
since 1920, on the other hand. Santolan claims that he possessed
the same since 1907 when it was donated to him by his
father-in-law. As we have- already stated, it is the - finding of this
Office that prior to 1942, neither party the premises exclusively. It
was only in 1942 when Santolan took positive steps to claim the
area for himself. There are even evidence on record that Santolan
paid the land taxes for the area in 1936. In 1951, Lusin effected his
entry to the area up to the present. It may be recalled, however,
that these actuations of Lusin had been the subject of a criminal
complaint filed by Santolan before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Kawit, Cavite, wherein Lusin was acquitted on the ground that his
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Needless to say, proof beyond reasonable doubt is absolutely
necessary before conviction in criminal cases could be had. On the
other hand, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove a
matter of fact in civil and/or administrative cases. The
preponderance of evidence adduced at the reinvestigation of this
case conducted by a representative of this Office, shows that the
present occupation of Lusin of the area in question was effected by
force, although there are good reasons to believe that such force
was employed by Lusin to assert what he believed was his right over
the property in question.
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is therefore,
apparent that the area in question is a foreshore land, and Santolan,
being the riparian owner, is entitled to the preferential rights
accorded by the provision of Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1. Considering, however, the fact that during the
reinvestigation of this case, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin had
introduced considerable improvements in the premises and had
invested his life savings therefor, and considering further that if
Santolan were the one who converted the area into a fishpond, as
he intends to do, he would have incurred the same expenses as was
incurred by Lusin in the premises in question, it is the belief of this
Office that justice would be fully served if Santolan be required to
reimburse Lusin of the value of the improvements now existing in
the area as may be appraised by the Committee on Appraisal of the
Bureau of Lands.
WHEREFORE, the above-noted foreshore lease (New) application
and revocable permit (New) application of Antonio Lusin should
remain, as hereby it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease Application
No. V-65 of Julian Santolan given due course, PROVIDED, he
reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the
improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days after
notification of said appraisal.
The Director of Lands is hereby directed to instruct the Committee
on Appraisal concerned to make the necessary appraisal of the
value of the improvements now existing in the area in question
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this order and to notify Julian
Santolan of the result of said appraisal.
In the event that Julian Santolan fails to reimburse Antonio Lusin of
the appraisal value of the said improvements within the period
specified in this order, he shall lose his preferential rights over the
area and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate public
land application therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, December 14, 1954.
By Authority of the Secretary:
JAIME M. FERRER
Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX F
ORDER
On December 14, 1954, this Office issued an order in connection
with the above-entitled case wherein the rejection of the foreshore
lease application and revocable permit (both new) of Antonio Lusin
was upheld and Foreshore Lease Action No. V-62 of Julian Santolan
given due course provided he reimburses Antonio Lusin of the
appraised value of the improvements now existing in the area
within sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal.
From said order, both parties to this conflict filed separate motions
seeking reconsideration of the same.
Santolan premised his motion on the theory that as fat as that po of
the order which requires him to reimburse Lusin of the appraised
value of the improvements within sixty (60) days after notification
of said appraisal is concerned, same is contrary to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and of the New Civil Code.
Santolan argues that the best procedure that should have been
followed in the disposition of this case was for the Government to
forfeit all the improvements introduced by Lusin in the area in
question in its (Government's) favor and then let Santolan pay to
the Government the appraised value of said improvements within
ten (10) years after notification of said appraisal. He further argues
that the "law does not authorize the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources to dispose of the proceeds of the sale of the
improvement to any person whomsoever", and "certainly the
Secretary does not claim the prerogative of disbursing government
funds without authority of law."
In the first place, the order sought to be reconsidered does not
contemplate any ale from which proceeds could be disposed of by
the Secretary "to any person whomsoever". In the second Place, in
the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered this Office has
taken into consideration the Provisions of Wealth Act No. 141 and
those of the Civil Code cited by movant Santolan with in go me
respect to the forfeiture ' favor of the government of the
improvements found in the areas covered by rejected applications.
However, this Office is also fully aware of that cardinal principle that
'no man shall enrich himself at the expense of another.
During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this
Office, it was found that Lusin was the, actual occupant of the
disputed area since 1951. During his occupation, Lusin was
introduced considerable improvements in the area, investing his life
savings therein. At the time of inspection, approximately two (2)
hectares of the said area was a veritable and complete with dikes
and water breakers, and the remaining portion was surrounded
with bamboo stakes. While this Office of Lusin's occupation as
having effected by force, this Office also believes that such force
was employed by Lusin only to enforce what he believed was his
right over the property in question. This being the case, justice and
equity demands that Lusin should be compensated of the
improvements introduced by him in the area in question by
whomsoever shall enjoy the fruits of his (Lusin's) toil. Julian
Santolan, being the person who shall benefit from said
improvements, it is only fair and just that he should reimburse Lusin
of the value of said improvements, especially considering that the
said area adjudicated to Santolan is already a producing fishpond.
Antonio Lusin, on the other hand, contends that the order sought to
be reconsidered is contrary to the facts of the case and to the law
applicable thereto.
Lusin assigns the following errors as having been allegedly
committed by this Office:
(1) In holding that the possession of Lusin dated only as Of 195 1;
(2) In holding that the ion of Lusin was effected through force;
(3) In holding that Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1
is applicable in the instant case;
(4) In not holding that the preferential rights of Julian Santolan,
granting that he has any, has already prescribed; and
(5) In giving due course to the foreshore lease application of
Santolan for the entire area in question.
With respect to the first two assignments of errors, a review of the
records of this case shows that the findings of this Office are in
accordance with the facts of the case as deduced from the
reinvestigation Of this conflict, and as supported by previous
records of this case. This Office, therefore, finds no sufficient ground
to disturb its findings of facts.
Anent the next two assignments of errors, which are mere
reiteration of movant's allegation in his previous memorandum, and
which were thoroughly passed upon by this Office, it is believed that
discussing them further is no longer necessary since after another
close examination of the case, this Office finds its disposition in this
particular respect well justified and in accordance with the law and
regulations applicable thereto.
Now coming to the last allegation, Lusin contends that the
foreshore lease application of Julian Santolan, if given the course,
should not cover the entire area in question. Movant Lusin advances
the theory that since the reason behind the law in granting
preferential rights to reparian owners is to compensate for
whatever loss said riparian owner may suffer from the actions of the
water, said riparian owner cannot stand to lose more than what he
owns, and therefore, since Santolan's property, which adjoins the
area in question, is only two (2) hectares, Santolan can never lose
more than two hectares.
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the particular
Point of law involved provides as follows:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner.— The owner of the property
adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with
water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or
rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands, adjoining
his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to
the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided
that he applied therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he
receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him
of his preferential right.
The above-quoted provision of the Lands Administrative Order does
not impose any restriction or limitation with respect to the extent of
the area to which a riparian owner is preferred as long as said area
is not needed for public service. The said order, being clear on this
point, this Office has no other alternative but to interpret said
regulation in the meaning it clearly conveys.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant
motion for reconsideration filed respectively by the conflicting
parties herein, should be, as hereby they are, denied.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-39473 April 30, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LASTIMADO, respondents.
Eduardo G. Makalintal for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review (Appeal) by certiorari filed by the
Republic of the Philippines from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on September 30, 1974 in CA-G.R. No.
Sp-01504 denying the State's Petition for certiorari and Mandamus.
Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent, Isabel Lastimado, filed on September 11, 1967,
in the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch I, a Petition for the
reopening of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of
the Mariveles Cadastre, consisting of 971.0569 hectares, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 931, as amended by Republic Act No. 2061,
docketed as Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097. In the
absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from
private individuals, private respondent was allowed to present her
evidence ex-parte. On October 14, 1967, the trial Court rendered a
Decision granting the Petition and adjudicating the land in favor of
private respondent. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance
of a decree of registration on November 20, 1967, and on
November 21, 1967, the Land Registration Commission issued
Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually,
Original Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor.
Private respondent thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and
the corresponding titles. Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 18905 to
18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deeds.
On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of
registration, petitioner filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec.
38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud alleging that during the
period of alleged adverse possession by private respondent, said
parcel of land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan.
which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines
only on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public
forest of Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to
disposition or acquisition under the Public Land Law. Respondent
field an Opposition thereto, which was considered by the trial Court,
as a Motion to Dismiss, and on December 20,1968, said Court
(Judge Tito V. Tizon, presiding) issued an Order dismissing the
Petition for Review mainly on the ground that the Solicitor General
had failed to file opposition to the original Petition for reopening of
the cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from
questioning the decree of registration ordered issued therein. On
January 28, 1969, petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was
denied by the trial Court in its Order dated May 20, 1969, for lack of
merit.
Petitioner seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal and a Record on
Appeal, which was objected to by private respondent. On July 15,
1972, or three years later, * the trial Court (Judge Abraham P. Vera,
presiding) refused to give due course to the appeal. Petitioner filed
a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial Court denied it in its
Order of October 14, 1972 on the ground that the proper remedy of
petitioner was a certiorari petition, not an ordinary appeal, and that
the Order sought to be appealed from had long become final and
executory as petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was pro-forma and did not suspend the running of the reglementary
period of appeal.
On November 9, 1972, petitioner filed a Petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial Court
gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction when,
without the benefit of hearing, it summarily dismissed the Petition
for Review; and since said Petition raised certain issues of fact which
cannot be decided except in a trial on the merits, the dismissal of
the Petition on the basis of private respondent's Opposition,
considered as a Motion to Dismiss, constituted a denial of due
process of law. Petitioner then prayed that the Order of the trial
Court, dated December 20, 1968 dismissing the Petition for Review,
be declared null and void, and that said trial Court be directed to
give due course to the Petition for Review; or, in the alternative, to
give due course to petitioner's appeal.
On September 30, 1974, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial
Court's dismissal of the Petition for Review stating:
... We cannot find any allegation in the petition for review which
shows that private respondent had committed fraud against
petitioner. Its representations and officials were duly notified of
private respondent's petition for reopening and registration of title
in her name. In said petition, the technical descriptions of the
portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles (Bataan) Cadastre,
subject-matter of the petition were expressly stated, the boundaries,
specifically delineated. The alleged ground that the land forms part
of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said
petition. Failure to file opposition is in effect, an admission that the
petition is actually not part of a forest land. Indubitably, therefore,
no justifiable reason exists for the annulment of the Order, dated
December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition) of the lower court dismissing
herein petitioner's petition for review of the decree issued in favor
of private respondent Lastimado. 1
The Court of Appeals then disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the respondent Judge has not committed
any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the
issuance of an Order, dated December 20, 1968 (Annex D-Petition)
dismissing herein petitioner's petition for review, the present
petition for review is hereby denied.
The issuance of the writ of mandamus as prayed for in the petition
is no longer necessary as this Court, in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction and authority to supervise orderly administration of
justice, has already resolved on the merits the question whether or
not the dismissal of the petition for review had been done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. 2
From this Decision, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review
(Appeal) by certiorari assigning the following errors to the Court of
Appeals and to the trial Court:
1. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that there can be possession, even for the purpose of claiming title,
of land which at the time of possession is subject to a military
reservation.
2. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that such land which is subject to a government reservation, may
appropriately be the subject of cadastral proceedings, and hence.
also of a petition to reopen cadastral proceedings.
3. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that a parcel of land which is part of the public forest is susceptible
of occupation and registration in favor of private individual.
4. The Lower Court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the Republic of the Philippines is not estopped from
questioning the decree of registration and the title issued pursuant
thereto in favor of respondent Lastimado over the parcel of land in
question.
5. The Lower Court erred in dismissing the petition for review of the
Republic of the Philippines.
6. The Court of Appeals erred in denying Petitioner's petition for
certiorari and mandamus.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496) provides:
Section 38. Decree of registration, and remedies after entry of
decree.
If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and
proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration
shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind the land,
and quiet title thereto. subject only to the exceptions stated in the
following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof,
whether mentioned by name in the application, notice of citation,
or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern".
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affect thereby, nor by any
proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any
estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by
fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... 3
The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review
of a decree are: a) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right;
b) that he has been deprived thereof; c) through fraud; d) that the
petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser. 4
However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be
extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not
been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. 5 The following ruling spells the d without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation and
out the difference between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud: claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is
predicated, is held to be in error, because the lower Court should
Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it."
connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant
"outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented the military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case." But intrinsic cannot be the object of any cadastral p nor can it be the object of
fraud takes the form of "acts of a party in a litigation during the trial reopening under Republic Act No. 931. 9 Similarly, if the land in
such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which question, indeed forms part of the public forest, then, possession
did not affect the present action of the case, but did prevent a fair thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it
and just determination of the case. 6 is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register
The fraud is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the under the Torrens System. 10
Court. 7
Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for
In its Petition for Review filed before the trial Court, petitioner inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor General claims that it
alleged that fraud was committed by private respondent when she received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by
misrepresented that she and her predecessors-in-interest had been the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its
in possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and officials or agents. 11 Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal
adversely against the whole world as owner for more than forty
consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity,
years when, in fact, the subject land was in. side the former U.S. which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land"
Military Reservation, which was formally turned over to the under basic Constitutional Precepts, and that it is moreover charged
Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she with the conservation of such patrimony. 12
likewise contended that her rights, as derived from the original and
primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September
confirmation under existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of 30, 1974, dismissing the Petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
land is within the public forest of Mariveles, Bataan, and is not before it, as well as the Order of the Court of First Instance of
subject to disposition or acquisition by private persons under the Bataan (Branch I) dated December 20, 1968, dismissing the Petition
Public Land Law. for Review, are hereby set aside and the records of this case hereby
ed to the latter Court for further proceedings to enable petitioner to
The trial Court ruled, and was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that present evidence in support of its Petition for Review.
no fraud was committed by private respondent, which deprived
petitioner of its day in Court as there was no showing that she was No pronouncement as to costs.
aware of the facts alleged by the Government, so that she could not
SO ORDERED.
have suppressed them with intent to deceive. The trial Court also
noted that petitioner had failed to file an opposition to the
reopening of the cadastral proceedings despite notices sent not only
to the Solicitor General as required by Republic Act No. 931. but to
the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry as well. It then
concluded that "the remedy granted by section 38 of the Land
Registration Act is designed to give relief to victims of fraud, not to
those who are victims of their own neglect, inaction or carelessness,
especially when no attempt is ever made to excuse or justify the
neglect." With the foregoing as the essential basis, the trial Court
dismissed the Petition for Review.
We find reversible error. Although there was an agreement by the
parties to submit for resolution the Opposition to the Petition for
Review, which was treated as a motion to dismiss, the trial Court, in
the exercise of sound judicial discretion, should not have dismissed
the Petition outright but should have afforded petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged to
constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private
respondent. Thus, in the case of Republic vs. Sioson, et al., 8 it was
held that "the action of the lower Court in denying the petition for
review of a decree of registration filed within one year from entry of