JOSELITO MA. P. JACINTO (FORMERLY PRESIDENT OFF.

JACINTO GROUP, acquiesces to and voluntarily complies with the judgment is estopped from
INC.), Petitioner, v. EDGARDO* GUMARU, JR., Respondent. taking an appeal therefrom.” 33

Petition for Review on Certiorari

"When a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review” ,1 and “there With the above development in the case, the instant Petition is rendered
are no more proceedings to speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by moot and academic. The satisfaction of the judgment in full has placed the
the satisfaction of the judgment.” case beyond the Court’s review. “Indeed, there are no more proceedings to
speak of inasmuch as these were terminated by the satisfaction of the
FACTS judgment.”
 Decision was rendered in favor of respondent Eduardo Gumaru
 Petitioner - appealed
o not perfected for failure to post the proper cash or surety
bond;
o December 6, 2004 Decision became final and executory.
o Entry of judgment November 23, 2005.
o February 6, 2006, a Writ of EXEC was issued - expired
o 2nd alias WExec -> real prop levied
 June 20, 2008
o petitioner filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Lift and Annul
Levy on Execution – DENIED BY LA
 Appeal – NLRC: LA dec set aside; MR denied
 Cert – CA: denied

ISSUE:

SC: MOOT AND ACADEMIC

In a Manifestation, respondent informed this Court that the judgment

award has been satisfied in full. The petitioner does not dispute this claim,
in which case, the labor case is now deemed ended. “It is axiomatic that after
a judgment has been fully satisfied, the case is deemed terminated once and
for all.” 32 And “when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond
review, satisfaction being the last act and the end of the proceedings, and
payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces
permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who
 IMPT: Pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villasenor’s MR, Ombudsman
directed QC Mayor and DILG Sec to enforce the Joint Decision previously issued
GERARDO R. VILLASEÑOR AND RODEL A. MESA, Petitioners, SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION CA
FOR CERTIORARI DISMISSED
vs. -assailing OMB’s order -OMB decision was
of immediate immediately executory
OMBUDSMAN AND HON. HERBERT BAUTISTA, City Mayor, Quezon City, implementation of the pending appeal and would
Joint Decision despite not be stayed by the filing
Respondents.
the pendency of their of an appeal or issuance of
respective MR and an injunctive relief
JUNE 4, 2014 appeal
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI (RULE 45)
MR CA
PETITIONER: Gerardo Villasenor and Rodel Mesa DENIED
RESPONDENT: Ombudsman and Herbert Bautista, as City Mayor of QC PETITION FOR REVIEW
- WON OMB’s orders
Ps, as electrical inspector of the Electrical Division and inspector of the can be implemented SC
Electrical Engineering Office, respectively, were administratively charged pending resolution of DENIED
in connection with the Manor Hotel fire tragedy that occurred in 2001, Villasenor’s MR and
which killed 74 people and injured others. Mesa’s appeal before
CA

PETITIONER COURT RESPONDENT

OMBUDSMAN
APPROVED
INVESTIGATING PANEL’S BEST INTEREST OF THE
JOINT DECSISION
-finding Ps guilty of the
-OMB-ADM-0-01-0376
charges
-Villasenor was ordered
dismissed while Mesa was
suspended for 1yr
MRs DENIED
-separately filed by Ps -note: Villasenor’s MR was
not enumerated as one of
the pleadings resolved
APPEAL CA
-by Mesa PENDING
GRAVE MISCONDUCT DISCUSSION:
PREJUDICIAL TO THE 1. Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17 (2003) provides that an appeal
SERVICE AND GROSS
shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such decision
NEGLIGENCE
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
-vs. Villasenor of course
 Ombudsman vs. Samaniego - appealable decisions of the
VIOLATION OF SEC. 4
OF RA 6713
Ombudsman are immediately executory pending appeal and
-OMB-ADM-00390 may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of
-vs. both Ps an injunctive writ
 The decisions against Ps are plainly appealable decisions which
are immediately executory pending appeal
 Petitioners cannot argue that A.O. 17, which makes appealable
decisions of the Ombudsman immediately executory, is
inapplicable to them because it took effect after the Joint
Decision was issued against them
  Here, the Ombudsman’s approval of the Joint Decision,
the denial of the MRs and the order of implementation
of the Joint Decision all occurred after A.O. 17 had
already become effective
 Also, Rules regulating the procedure of courts are
retroactive in nature and thus applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage; the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are
procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied
retroactively to Ps’ cases which were pending and
unresolved at the time of the passage of A.O. 17
 No vested right is violated by the application of Sec. 7
because R in the administrative case is considered
preventively suspended while his case is on appeal;
further, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an
office
 Therefore, Mesa’s appeal cannot stay the implementation of
the order of suspension against him
 Also, Villasenor’s pending MR cannot stop his order of dismissal
from being executory
 Memorandum Circular No. 01 (2006) of the Office of the
Ombudsman provides, in part, that a decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall
be executed as a matter of course as per Sec. 7, Rule III
of A.O. No. 07, and the filing of a MR or petition for
review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not
operate to stay the immediate implementation of the
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions
 Thus, Villasenor’s filing of MR does not stay the
immediate implementation of the Ombudsman’s order
of dismissal, considering the foregoing provision; no
vested right of Villasenor would be violated as he would
be considered under preventive suspension and entitled
to the salary and emoluments he did not receive in the
event that he wins his eventual appeal
CONCLUSION: The Ombudsman, therefore, did not err in implementing the
orders of dismissal from service and suspension of one year against the
petitioners
HOLASCA V CALUBUSO
administrative matter
Holasca - plaintiff in the ejectment case.
 sought the execution of the decision through Sheriff Pagunsan
 complaint against - (Pagunsan), Sheriff IV,
 Gross Misconduct and Serious Dereliction of Duty
 delay and refusal to implement the writ of execution issued in an
ejectment
 believes that Sheriff Pagunsan’s inaction and delay in evicting the
defendants were due to her unwillingness to advance more money
for the implementation of the writ.
Pagunsan’s Answer
 “he served a Notice to Vacate on the defendants”
 denied receiving ₱1,500.00 from Calibuso
Investigating Judge
 recommended Sheriff Pagunsan’s suspension without pay for one (1)
month
Findings in OCA IPI No. 10-3415-P (Calibuso’s case)
 Calibuso’s actions were merely motivated by pure generosity to help
Holasca
OCA issued its evaluation, report and recommendation
 agreed with the findings offact of the Investigating Judge
 agreed that Sheriff Pagunsan failed to strictly comply with the writ
of execution when he did not expressly order the defendants to
immediately vacate the premises and to pay Holasca. The OCA also
ruled that Sheriff Pagunsan was not only remiss in his
implementation of the writ; he was alsoguilty of dereliction of duty
in the performance of his functions as a sheriff.
CAB
SC:
 recommendations of the OCA in order
 Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice
because they are tasked to execute final judgments of the courts,
which would otherwise become empty victories for the prevailing
party, if left unenforced.20 As agents of the law, sheriffs are
mandated to uphold the majesty of the law, as embodied in the
decision, without unnecessary delay to prevent injury or damage to
the winning party. There is no need for the litigants to "follow-up"
the sheriff’s implementation of the writ.21 Once the writ is placed in
their hands, sheriffs are duty-bound to proceed and see to it that
the execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
 Section 10, Rule 39 (c) and (d)
o provide for the manner a writ for the delivery or the
restitution of real property
 Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules
o requires sheriffs to execute and make a return on the writ of
execution after its implementation.
 Duties of a Sherriff
o to give notice of the writ and demand that the judgment
obligor and all persons claiming under him vacate the
property within three (3) days;
o to enforce the writ by removing the judgment obligor and
all persons claiming under the latter;
o to remove the latter’s personal belongings in the property
as well as destroy, demolish or remove the improvements
constructed thereon upon special court order;
o to execute and make a return on the writ within 30 days
from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it
is satisfied in full or until its effectivity expires.
 we find that Sheriff Pagunsan was remiss in performing his mandated
duties
 Writ of Execution issued - February 4, 2009.
 Sheriff served the Writ on February 11, 2009
o giving the defendants three (3) daysor until February 14,
2009
 records would show that Sheriff Pagunsan did not return
 Holasca and Calibuso who made the follow-ups
 Sheriff Pagunsan did not answer her calls, or respond to her text
messages.
o failed to collect the money judgment in favor of Holasca
o purely a ministerial duty
o guilty of Gross Inefficiency.
TABINO v TABINO
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Proc. 518 allowed a maximum area of 300 square meters for disposition
(FORT BONI)
Petitioner Mauricio
his brother, respondent Lazaro M. Tabino
Lot 3 was awarded to respondent,
 filed an ejectment case against Mauricio – MTC
MTC – dismissed
RTC – agreed
Respondent filed his Petition for Review – CA: reversed and set aside
SC: Respondent is correct in arguing that petitioners may not raise the
issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and forum-shopping, after
having voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the MeTC and
the RTC trying the ejectment case... Moreover, petitioners in the instant
Petition pray for the reinstatement of the MeTC Decision;as such, they
cannot be allowed to simultaneously attack and adopt the proceedings or
actions taken by the lower courts.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that the appellate court erred in ordering
petitioners to vacate the premises. With the pendency of the DENR Protests
– Case Nos. 2004-821 and 2005-939 – respondent’s claim of possession and
his right to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue. If the ejectment
case – Civil Case No. 85043 – is allowed to proceed without awaiting the
result of the DENR Protests, then a situation might arise where the existing
structures thereon would have to be demolished. If petitioners’ position, as
affirmed by the DENR, is further upheld with finality by the courts, then it
would mean that respondent had no right to occupy or take possession of the
subject lots, which thus negates his right to institute and maintain the
ejectment case; and an injustice would have occurred as a consequence of
the demolition of petitioners’ residence and other permanent
improvements on the disputed lots.
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the
mere filing before the regional trial court (R TC) of another action raising
ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of
equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from
the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgrnent.36
In light of the developments in the DENR Protests, the Court cannot in good
conscience order the petitioners to vacate the premises at this point. The
better alternative would be to await the outcome of these Protests, before
any action is taken in the ejectment case.
Juanario G. Campit v. Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga
as represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga
G.R. No. 195443; September 17, 2014
BRION, J.:
FACTS
An agricultural land is occupied by respondents Isidra B. Gripa, Pedro
Bardiaga, and Severino Bardiaga, represented by his son Rolando Bardiaga,
but covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) issued in petitioner’s name.
The petitioner claimed to have bought the property in 1977 from Jose
Campit, his father. Respondents Isidra Gripa, Pedro Bardiaga and Severino
Bardiaga (as represented by his son, Rolando Bardiaga) claimed to be the
rightful owners of the subject property, as earlier adjudged by the court in
two civil cases in June 12, 1961 (Civil Case No. 11858) and August 8, 1978
(Civil Case No. 15357) respectively and has become final and executory on
July 19, 1979. The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the petitioner
and his father Jose because they were obtained through the
misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather, Isidro Campit.
Respondents wanted to divide the subject property among themselves, but
despite their formal demand, the petitioner continuously refused to
surrender his title to the property to them, or to the Register of Deeds. An
action for annulment and cancellation of title (Civil Case No. 18421) was filed
by respondents.
Campit opposed aforesaid action and argued that the 1978 decision which
declared his title null and void, could no longer be enforced because its
execution was already barred by the Statute of Limitations since it was
never executed within 10 years from the date of finality of the judgment on
July 19, 1979.
ISSUES
1. Is the petitioner correct in assailing that his title must prevail since
the decision which declared his title null and void was never executed?
2. Is the petitioner correct that his title must prevail because under the
Torrens system of registration, a certificate of title is an indefeasible and
incontrovertible proof of ownership of the person, in whose favor it was
issued, over the land described therein?
RULING
1. No. A matter adjudged with finality by a competent court having
jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter already constitutes res
judicata in another action involving the same cause of action, parties and
subject matter.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive as to the rights
of the parties and their privies and constitutes as an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.
Thus, the validity of petitioner’s title, having been settled with finality in Civil
Case No. 15357, could no longer be reviewed in the present case. The August
8, 1978 decision in Civil Case No. 15357, however, was not executed or
enforced within the time allowed under the law. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, a final and executory judgment may be executed by the
prevailing party as a matter of right by mere motion within five (5) years
from the entry of judgment, failing which the judgment is reduced to a mere
right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a
regular court within ten (10) years from finality of the judgment.
It appears that no motion or action to revive judgment was ever filed by the
respondents - the prevailing party in the earlier civil case to execute and
enforce the August 8,1978 decision. The title to the subject property,
therefore, remained registered under the petitioner’s name. As the
petitioner argued, his title had already become incontrovertible since the
Torrens system of land registration provides for the indefeasibility of the
decree of registration and the certificate of title issued upon the expiration
of one (1) year from the date of entry of the registration decree.
We cannot, however, allow the petitioner to maintain his title and benefit
from the fruit of his and his predecessors’ fraudulent acts at the expense of
the respondents who are the rightful owners of the subject property. The
Torrens system of registration cannot be used to protect a usurper from the
true owner, nor can it be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to
permit one to enrich oneself at the expense of others.15
2. No. Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the
registered owner can still be compelled under the law to reconvey the
property registered to the rightful owner under the principle that the
property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered. The party seeking to recover title to
property wrongfully registered in another person’s name must file an action
for reconveyance within the allowed period of time.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the
property. There is, however, an exception to this rule where the filing of such
action does not prescribe, i.e. when the plaintiff is in possession of the
subject property, the action, being in effect that of quieting of title to the
property, does not prescribe.
In the present case, the respondents, have always been in possession of the
subject property.
xxx Of course, the defendant-appellant (petitioner herein) has a certificate of
title in his favor. But it cannot be denied that he has never been in possession
of the subject property. Neither did he exercise acts of ownership over the
said land since the time he allegedly purchased it from his father in 1977.
Similarly, the defendant-appellant was not able to show that his predecessor-
in interest, Jose Campit, claimed ownership or was ever in possession of the
said land. The defendant-appellant has admitted that he has paid realty tax
covering the subject land only once when he applied for the issuance of title
in his favor.
The continuous possession of the subject premises by the plaintiffs-
appellees has not been denied or disputed by the defendants-appellants. The
possession in the concept of an owner by the plaintiffs-appellees has also
been confirmed by witness Charlie Martin.
Considering that the action for annulment and cancellation of title filed by
the respondents is substantially in the nature of an action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust, combined with the fact that the
respondents have always been in possession of the subject property, we shall
treat Civil Case No. 18421 as an action to quiet title, the filing of which does
not prescribe. Thus, we find the respondents’ filing of Civil Case No. 18421 to
be proper and not barred by the time limitations set forth under the Rules of
Court in enforcing or executing a final and executory judgment.
ATTY. RICO PAOLO R. QUICHO, representing Bank of Commerce,
Complainant,
vs.
BIENVENIDO S. REYES, JR., Sheriff IV, Branch 98, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Respondent.
Alias Writ of Execution issued by RTC
 validity of which was then pending determination in the Court of
Appeals (CA)
 Pending its resolution, Atty. Quicho sought the relief of Reyes as
Sheriff of RTC, whom he claimed exceeded his authority in the
enforcement of the Alias Writ of Execution on December 9, 2010 at
the main office of BOC
Atty. Quicho alleged
 BOC was given the option to choose which property to be
surrendered to satisfy the judgment
 Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
o if the judgment obligor could not pay the judgment debt in
cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment
acceptable to the judgment oblige, he still had the option to
choose which of his properties he could offer to satisfy the
obligation.
Reyes denied the charges against him
 “he did not violate any law when he refused to accept BOC’s offer of
a property located in Paranaque City to satisfy the judgment debt.”
 “law was silent on a real estate property being offered as a form of
payment.”
  He used acetylene torch to gain access to the bank’s main vault as he
was left with no other option but to use reasonable force to get the
cash inside
 He only levied the computers and monitors, and left the two (2)
servers in order not to affect the banking operations.

OCA

 found sufficient grounds to hold Reyes administratively liable

 recommended
o Sheriff Reyes be found GUILTY of Grave Abuse of Authority r

SC: adopted OCA’s recommendation

Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court – procedure

(1) to first make a demand from the obligor for the immediate payment of
the full amount stated in the writ of execution and of all lawful fees;

(2) to receive payment in the form of cash, certified bank check payable to
the obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter;

(3) to levy upon the properties of the obligor, not exempt from execution, if
the latter cannot pay all or part of the obligation;

(4) give the obligor the opportunity to exercise the option to choose which
property may be levied upon;

(5) in case the option is not exercised,

 to first levy on the personal properties of the obligor, including the

garnishment of debts due the obligor and other credits, i.e., bank
deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other
personal properties not capable of manual delivery or in the
possession or control of third parties; and

(6) to levy on real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to

answer for the judgment