ATTY.
LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 1
Mecano v. COA
- Revised Admin Code was not repealed by Admin Code of 1987. As
a gen. rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and
not substitute for the first act and will continue so for as the two acts
are the same from the time of first enactment. Thus, before there can
be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the
lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the
old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.
Leveriza v. IAC
- The Civil Aeronautics Administration has the power to execute the
deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the
RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but
because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly
vested in it, which in this case is RA 776.
Luzon Dev’t Bank v. Association of LDB
- Since a voluntary arbitrator performs quasi-judicial functions,
he/she does performs a state function pursuant to a governmental
power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor
Code. Thus, he/she falls in the contemplation of the term
instrumentality. The awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the
rights of parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as
judgments of a court.
Iron & Steel Authority v. CA
- RP is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation proceedings as
party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having
expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of ISA’s statutory term
did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain
proceedings.
Since, in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions, assets
and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into GRP and
hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory
provision having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by
some other entity or agency of the Republic.
Ignacia Balicas v. FFIB
- In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have
to look at the lawfully prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately,
DENR regulations are silent on the specific duties of a senior
environmental management specialist. Internal regulations merely
speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.
The responsibility of monitoring of housing and land development
projects is not lodged with the DENR but with the HLURB which is
the sole regulatory body for housing and development. Hence there
is no legal basis for a government employee under DENR be held
liable for gross neglect of duty pertaining to another agency.
Malaga v. Panachos
- Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) as a chartered institution
as well as instrumentality is covered by PD 1818.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not
integrated within the department framework vested within special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or
controlled corporations.
Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating
under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the
state universities and colleges and then monetary authority of the
State.
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is covered by PD
1818. However, it must be noted that this law was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies.
Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan
- The accused (Project Manager for construction) falls under the non-
career service category of CSC pursuance to the definition of Sec. 2
(b) RA 3019 includes elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary whether in the career service and
non career service. Hence, he is a public officer.
Officer as distinguished from clerk or employee, refers to a person
whose duties, not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the
government. When used with reference to a person having authority
to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise
of governmental power, “officer” includes any government
employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise
that function.
Dela Llana v. Alba
- Abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its
incumbent if it is made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of a valid abolition of the office. There
can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is
in no law occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position.
Crisostomo v. CA
- PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the former PCC into
PUP. What took place was a change in academic status of the
education institution not in its corporate life. But the reinstatement of
Petitioner could not be ordered because PD 1437 had been
promulgated fixing the term of the office of the President of the State
Universities and Colleges into 6 years, renewable for another 6 years
and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms
of incumbent who were not re-appointed.
With the result petitioner’s term was cut short. Hence, the petitioner
became entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of
separation pay.
Viola v. Alunan III
- The creation of additional positions in the National Liga ng mga
Barangay and its chapters is authorized by the LGC pursuant to Sec.
493 “The board shall create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 2
Biraogo v. The Phil. Truth Commission
- There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. Because whatever funds the Congress
has provided for the Office of the President will the very source of
the funds for the truth commission. And thus be subject to auditing
rules and regulations.
The Chief Executive power to create Ad Hoc investigating
Committee is valid. Having been constitutionally granted full control
of the Executive Department, which respondents belong. The
legality of investigation is sustained. However, Petitioners contend
that EO 1 violated the equal protection clause because it does not
apply to all members of the same class such intent of focusing only in
previous administration as the sole subject of PTC. It must be cover
all administrations previous to that former Pres. Arroyo.
Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng ERB v. Commissioner Fe Barin
- Impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure
does not arise in the abolition of an office.
There is no occupant in an abolished office, where there is no
occupant, there is no tenure to speak
CHR Employees Association v. CHR
- CHR is not a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy.
Salary Standardization law, for this purpose, Congress has delegated
to the DBM the power to administer the salary standardization law.
The regulatory power of DBM on matters of compensation is
encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. DBM has the
sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and
POSITION CLASSIFICATION of the National Government (RAC
of 1987 Sec. 3 Chapter I Title 17).
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. Executive Secretary
- AMIN contends that since DAR, NCIP were created by statutes,
they can only be transformed, merged not by mere executive orders
and reorganization of these administrative agencies should be the
subject of statutes.
The Constitution confers, by express provision, the power of control
over executive departments, bureaus and offices in the President
alone.
Pres. Justifies an executive action to carry out re-organization
measures under broad authority of law.
Pursuant to AC of 1987 Sec. 39, states that: The President shall have
continuing authority to re-organize the administrative structure of the
Office of the Pres. And he may take the ff actions:
“Transfer agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
President from other departments or agencies.”
Bagaoisan v. Nat’l Tobacco Administration
- A public office is either created by the constitution, by statute, or by
authority of law. Where the office was created by Congress, it may
be abolished by them. The EXCEPTION, is as far as bureaus,
agencies, or offices in the executive department, the Pres. Power of
control may justify him to inactivate the function of a particular
office and grant him the broad authority to carry out re-organization
measures.
Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration -
Administration v. CSC
-EO 649 authorized the re-organization of LRC into NALTDRA. It
abolished all the positions and required new appointments to be
issued to all employees of the NALTDRA.
Law mandates from the moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in LRC are deemed “NON-EXISTENT.” After Abolition,
there is No Occupant, No Tenure to Speak. Its requirement of BAR
membership for Deputy Register of Deeds is valid reorganization
measure. Reorganization should be carried in good faith for the
purpose to make bureaucracy more efficient.
Sinon v. CSC
- CSC departed from its power which is limited only to “REVIEW”
and hence encroached upon the appointing power exclusively lodged
in the appointing authority.
Under RA 6656 Sec. 6, In order that the best qualified and most
deserving persons shall be appointed in any re-organization, there
shall be created a placement committee in each department or agency
to assist the appointing authority in placement of personnel.
Placement committee was charged with the duty of exercising the
discretionary functions as the appointing authority.
Purposes of Re-organization – is the process of restructuring the
bureaucracy’s organizational and functional set-up to make it more
viable in terms of economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and make it
more responsive to the needs of its public clientele as authorized by
law.
Domingo v. DBP
- Re-organization is recognized a valid ground for separation of Civil
Service Employees, subject “ONLY” to the condition it be done in
good faith.
Constitution and Sec. 33 and 34 of EO 81 and Sec. 9 of RA 6656
states that “all those not appointed in the implementation of said re-
organization shall be deemed separated from service.”
Appointment in the Civil Service shall be made only according to the
Merit and Fitness requiring Public Officers and Employees to serve
with the highest degree.
There is no violation of due process even no hearing was conducted
as long as the party was given a chance to present his evidence and
defend himself.
Eugenio v. CSC
- CESB was created by PD 1 on Sept. 1, 1974. Therefore, CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolish by the legislature. Creation and
Abolition of Public Officer is primarily a legislative function.
Legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of
CESB. CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity
Larin v. Executive Secretary
- The reorganization in this case was found to be in bad faith, such as
when the EO abolished the Intelligence and Investigation Office and
at the same time creating Intelligence and Investigation Service to do
same functions of the abolished office.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 3
Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. v. SEC
- The Commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its
rule against double listing. It suggests that the power is 'necessary for
the execution of the functions vested in it.' It argues that said rule was
approved by the Department Head before the War and it is not in
conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the
Department, by itself, adds no weight in a judicial litigation.
The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the
rule which results in discrimination and violation of constitutional
rights. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has such
powers as expressly granted to him by statute, and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of the
Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against
double listing.
Kilusang Bayan, etc. v. Domingues
- Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the
power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote
to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take
refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give
him that right.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be
inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-
laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which
directors and officers are to be removed. We cannot concede to the
proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that the Secretary’s
power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted
to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative
includes the “milder authority of suspending officers and calling for
the election of new officers.” Firstly, neither suspension nor
cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of incumbent directors
and officers, otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated.
Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as postulated,
there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted.
Senator Robert Jaworski v. PAGCOR
- A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to
corporations. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which
the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting
the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the
business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and
the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are
almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language.
Herein, PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it
passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE. While PAGCOR is
allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or
share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another
entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view
of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest,
inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been
expressly authorized to do so.
Radio Communications of the Phils. v. NTC
- Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D.
No. I insofar as it amends the Public Service Law (CA No. 146, as
amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its
provisions. In the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a precondition
before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it
desires to operate.
The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the
then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the
petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San
Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio
telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman,
Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity
appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public
respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable
public utility regulations.
The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in
nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to
amendment, alteration, or even repeal by the legislature when the
common good so requires.
Matienzo v. Abellera
- It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or
commission has a certain power, the authority given should be
liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was
created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full
implementation of the legislative intent should be upheld as germane
to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the
appropriate means are deemed given.
Cooperative Development Authority v. Dolefil Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries
- The CDA is devoid of any quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate
intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as regards
the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of
cooperatives. The authority to conduct hearings or inquiries and the
power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by the CDA
only in the performance of its administrative functions under R.A.
No. 6939.
Laguna Lake Dev. Authority v. CA
- LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the
LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said
charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is
basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special
law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of
police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna
Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants
powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue
purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting
Laguna de Bay.
Syquia v. Board of Power
- The Board of Power and Waterworks has exceeded its jurisdiction.
Petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity
without permit or franchise. The complaint by the tenant give rise to a
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the
applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and
not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by
the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 4
Globe Wireless v. Public Service Commission
- The Public Service Act vested in the Public Service Commission
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their
franchises, equipment and other properties. However, Section 5 of
RA 4630, the legislative franchise under which petitioner was
operating, limited respondent Commission’s jurisdiction over
petitioner (Globe) only to the rate which petitioner may charge the
public. The negligence imputed to public respondent had nothing
whatsoever to do with the subject matter of very limited jurisdiction
of the Commission over petitioner. Thus, PSC has jurisdiction to
discipline and impose fine upon petitioner,
Phil. Assoc. of Lawyers v. Agrava
- The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent
Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
The practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and
application of other laws and legal principles.
Furthermore, the Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or
quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the
bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed
to practice before the said office, without further examination or
other qualification.
Guevarra v. Comelec
- Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted
in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to
a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did
not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not
exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law,
for such power is inherently judicial in nature.
Ang Tibay v. CIR
- For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
Sec. of Justice v. Lantion
- The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of
the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence
over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when
they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state.
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board
- There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB.
VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB
was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized
agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the
[VRB].”
U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho
- Regarding the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a
legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which
the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in
all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of
the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the
electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in
form and substance, it is a law in all its details in present, but which
may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Ynot v. IAC
- The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due
process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of
the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other
does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are
being transferred before they can be confiscated.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on
judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative
powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited
discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Marcos v. Manglapus
- The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres.
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization
caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 5
Cariño v. CHR
- The CHR is not competent to try human rights violation cases
involving civil and political rights. It has no judicial power. It can
only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil
and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the
merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred
from proceeding with the trial.
Rizal Empire Insurance Corp v. NLRC
- Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations
Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its
resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for
having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are
clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it is
an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative regulations
and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to
great respect
US v. Barrias
- The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty
different from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed
to do so, then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to
legislate penalties. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is,
that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to anybody or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must
remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be
made until the constitution itself is changed. The power to whose
judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been
entrusted can not relieve itself of the responsibility by choosing other
agencies upon which the power shall be developed, nor can its
substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of any other
body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another.
People v. Vera
- Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers: Corollary of separation of
powers doctrine. - This rule which follows as a necessary corollary of
the doctrine of separation of powers prohibits the delegation of
legislative power, the vesting of judicial officers with non-judicial
functions, as well as the investing on non-judicial officers with
judicial powers. Any attempt at such delegation is unconstitutional
and void.
The distinction is between a delegation of power to make the law,
which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, which
delegationis void; and the delegation of authority or discretion as to
the execution of a law to be exercised under, and in pursuance of the
law, to which delegation no objection can be made.
The legislature may delegate its authority to make findings of fact,
and the fact-finding power may be conferred for putting into effect,
suspending, or applying the law. But where delegation to a fact-
finding body empowers it to create the conditions which constitute
the fact, the delegation is invalid.
The test of completeness has been said to be whether the provision is
sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to know his rights and
obligations thereunder.
Maceda v. Macaraig
- For delegation to be constitutionally valid, the law must be
complete in itself and must set forth sufficient standards.
Certain aspects of the taxing process that are not really legislative in
nature are vested in administrative agencies. In this case, there really
is no delegation, to wit: a) power to value property; b) power to
assess and collect taxes; c) power to perform details of computation,
appraisement or adjustment; among others.
Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA
- "Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
As stated by the Court in Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, "the conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or spirit of the law." It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency, like the PPA, has no
discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty is to enforce
it. Therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular and a
law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.
Rabor v. CSC
- It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is
that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
Araneta v. Gatmaitan
- Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is unlawful to
take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and b.) it
authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was
complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its
legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard
for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen.
concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
Distinction bet:
Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves discretion of what law
shall be
Execution of Law – authority or discretion as to its execution has to
be exercised under and in pursuance of law.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 6
Edu v. Ericta
- To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of
legislative power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and
definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate
its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it,
and what is the scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that
may indeed be the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward
Delegation to Administrative Agencies. The legislature must declare
a policy and fix a standard in enacting a statute conferring
discretionary power upon an administrative agency, but the agency
may be authorized to "fill up the details" in promoting the purposes
of the legislation and carrying it into effect. When the legislature laid
down the fundamentals of a law, it may delegate to administrative
agencies the authority to exercise such legislative power as is
necessary to carry into effect the general legislative purpose. The
rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode of proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
BPI Leasing v. CA
- BLC attempts to convince the Court that RR 19-86 is legislative
rather than interpretative in character and hence, should retroact to
the date of effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret. A legislative
rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to implement
a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An
interpretative rule, on the other hand, is designed to provide
guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of
enforcing. The Court finds the questioned RR to be legislative in
nature. Section 1 of RR 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated
pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC (now Section 244), an express
grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the NIRC. Verily, it cannot be disputed that RR 19-86
was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of
Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged
by BLC.
ABAKADA v. Purisima
- R.A. 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in
carrying out the provisions of the law under Sec 2 and 4 of the said
Act. Moreover, the Court has recognized the following as sufficient
standards: “public interest,” “justice and equity,” “public
convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In
this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is
infused with public interest.
Board of Trustees of GSIS v. Velasco
- If an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated like
an employee on approved vacation leave without pay, then it is only
fair and reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee who was
preventively suspended, more so considering that preventive
suspension is not a penalty. An employee who was preventively
suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the
time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative
case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed.
Also, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive suspension and
without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents
should have been reinstated and, after serving the same number of
days of their suspension, entitled to the grant of step increment.
Cruz v. Youngberg
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made (Wilmington and
Zanesville Railroad Co. vs. Commissioners of Clinton County). In
the present case, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative power.
People v. Maceren
- The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for
in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or
administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to
carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative
officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which
conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid
precise of the rule-making power.
Bautista v. Juinio
- The disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a
problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness
is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less
infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to
liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those
adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if
they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant
to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a
specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the
suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is
valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.
Maceda v. ERB
- Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a
provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to
make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the
application. The provisional increase is akin to a temporary
restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that “the
ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision,”
except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. The Court
suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the
presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since, despite its
being a quasi-judicial body, it is still “ an administrative body under
the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the
President under the established principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies,” especially on a matter as transcendental as
oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 7
Phil. Consumers Foundation v. DECS
- Power granted to the educational department to regulate the
educational system includes the power to prescribe school fees. In the
absence of a statue stating otherwise, this power include the power to
prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested
with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be
considered lodged with the DECS.
CIR v. CA
- Executive Order No. 41 is quite explicit and requires hardly
anything beyond a simpleapplication of its provisions. If, as the
Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not beenintended
to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed
(administratively) prior to 22 August 1986,the law could have simply
so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion
isunavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to
be in the nature of a general grantof tax amnesty subject only to the
cases specifically excepted by it. It might not be amiss to recall
thatthe taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years
immediately preceding the 1986revolution during which time there
had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for
civilDisobedience , most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the
martial law regime. It should beunderstandable then that those who
ultimately took over the reigns of government following
thesuccessful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not
a confined, tax amnesty.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila v. Board of Transportation
- The Supreme Court held that there is no violation of constitutional
rights. The State, inthe exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,good order, safety
and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to
comfort,safety and welfare of society. Presidential Decree No. 101
granted the Board of Transportationthe power to fix just and
reasonable standards, classification, regulations,
practices,measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed,
observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
The Board of Transportations reason for enforcing the
Circularinitially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city,
compared to those of other places, aresubjected to heavier
trafficpressureand more constant use and considering that traffic
conditionsare not the same in every city, a substantial distinction
exists so that infringement of the equalprotection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed.
US v. Panlilio
- The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or
body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not
penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense
punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such
violation.
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor
- Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is withinthe
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability
and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
Ople v. Torres
- The AO is invalid because it involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by and admin order.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of
administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents.
To this end, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and
offices under his control to enable him to discharge his duties
effectively.
PSDSA v. De Jesus
- The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV,
and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely
reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155.
Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and
responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and
district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both
teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A
school head is a person responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The
division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation
of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools and learning centers.
Conte v. COA
- The said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement
benefit that has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws
particularly R.A. No. 660. It is simply beyond dispute that the SSS
had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan and
in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render
them nugatory. Hence, SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby illegal, void
and no effect.
Smart Communications Inc. v. NTC
- Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power
of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
 ATTY. LONGID- DALUMPINES ADMIN MIDTERMS AJINGCO. DDAVID 8


Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission
- The delegation made in the presidential decree is valid. Philracom
did not exceed its authority. And the issuances are fair and
reasonable.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as
expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest.

This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another. This rule however admits of recognized
exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative
agencies.

However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a

showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard—the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which
defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
Philracom was granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every
aspect of the conduct of horse racing, including the framing and
scheduling of races, the construction and safety of race tracks, and
the security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already complete in itself.