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The chapter on microfinance trends, problems and prospects is divided into three
sections. The first section deals with the history and progress of microfinance in India
and Punjab. The second section is related with the various problems in the growth of
microfinance in India. The third section incorporates the prospects of microfinance
programme.
Section-I
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bank is registered as a co-operative bank and has been providing banking services to
poor women and has also become a viable financial venture.
In the midst of the apparent inadequacies of the formal financial system to cater
to the financial needs of the rural poor, the first major effort to reach these rural poor was
made by NABARD in 1986-87, when it supported and funded an action research project
on ‘Saving and Credit Management of Self-Help Groups’ of Mysore Resettlement and
Development Authority (MYRADA). For this purpose, a grant of Rs. one million was
provided to MYRADA. The encouraging results were yielded. In 1988-89, NABARD
undertook a survey of 43 NGOs spread over eleven states in India to study the
functioning of the SHGs and possibilities of collaboration between the banks and SHGs
in the mobilisation of rural savings and improving the credit delivery to the poor.
Encouraged by the results of field level experiments in group based approach for lending
to the poor, NABARD launched a pilot project of linking 500 SHGs with banks in 1991-
92 in partnership with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for promoting and
grooming self-help groups of socio-economically homogeneous members. In order to
meet their credit requirements, in July 1991 RBI issued a circular to the commercial
banks to extend credit to the SHGs formed under the pilot project of NABARD. During
the project period different NGOs like Association of Sarva Seva Farms (ASSEFA),
Madras; People’s Rural Education Movement (PREM), Behrampur; Professional
Assistance for Development Action (PRADAN), Madurai; and Community
Development Society (CDS), Kerala promoted hundreds of groups. The results were
very encouraging. In February 1992, the launching of pilot phase of the SHG- Bank
Linkage Programme (SHG-BLP) could be considered as a landmark development in
banking with the poor.
In order to further promote this programme RBI issued instructions to banks in
1996 to cover SHG financing as a mainstream activity under their priority sector-lending
portfolio. The programme acquired a national priority from 1999 through Government of
India budget announcements. With the support from both the government and the
Reserve Bank of India, NABARD successfully spearheaded the programme through
partnership with various stakeholders in the formal and informal sector. Since the time of
its origin, NABARD provides policy guidance, technical and promotional support
mainly for capacity building of NGOs and SHGs. Realising the potential in the field of
microfinance, the government allowed various private players to provide microfinance in
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the country. These private microfinance providers, commonly known as MFIs, are
various NGOs, Non-banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) and other registered
companies. Many state governments amended/passed their State Co-operative Acts to
use co-operative societies for providing microfinance. These days many public and
private commercial banks, regional-rural banks, co-operative banks, co-operative
societies, registered and unregistered NBFCs, societies, trusts and NGOs are providing
microfinance by using their branch network and through different microfinance delivery
models.
3.3 Meaning and Function of Microfinance
The Asian Development Bank (2000) defines microfinance as the provision of
broad range of services such as savings, deposits, loans, payment services, money
transfers and insurance to poor and low income households and their micro-enterprises.
This definition of microfinance is not restricted to the below poverty line people but it
includes low income households also.
The Task Force [1] terms microfinance as the provision of thrift, credit and other
financial services and products of very small amounts to the poor in rural, semi-urban or
urban areas for enabling them to raise their income levels and improve living standards.
The Task Force emphasises that microfinance will cover not only consumption and
production loans, but also loans for other credit needs such as housing and shelter [2].
The Micro Financial Sector (Development and Regulation) Bill, (2007) defines
microfinance as the provision of financial assistance and insurance services to an
individual or an eligible client either directly or through a group mechanism for an
amount, not exceeding rupees fifty thousand in aggregate per individual for small and
tiny enterprise, agriculture, allied activities (including for consumption purposes of such
individual); or an amount not exceeding rupees one lakh fifty thousand in aggregate per
individual for housing or other prescribed purposes. The eligible clients which may get
financial assistance under this scheme may be landless labourers and migrant labourers;
artisans and micro-entrepreneurs; disadvantaged cultivators of agricultural land including
oral lessees, tenants, and share croppers; and farmers owning not more than two hectares
of agricultural land.
3.4 Delivery Models of Microfinance
The concept of microfinance involves informal and flexible approach to the credit
needs of the poor. There is no single approach or model that fits in all the circumstances.
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restrictions regarding the utilisation of loan. NABARD is using this model for providing
credit to the tenant farmers, cultivating land either as oral lessees or share croppers, and
small farmers who do not have proper title of their land holding. Many other countries
are also using this model. There were segments within the poor, such as share croppers/
oral lessees/ tenant farmers, who were left out and whose loan requirements were much
larger but who had no collaterals to fit into the traditional financing approaches of the
banking system. To service such clients, Joint Liability Groups (JLGs), an upgradation of
SHG model could be an effective way.
3.4.3 Individual Lending Model
In this method, individuals can get loans without any membership of a group.
This is a straightforward credit lending model in which micro-loans are given directly to
the borrowers. In this model, the financial institutions have to make frequent and close
contact with individual clients to provide credit products customised to the specific needs
of the individual. It is most successful for larger, urban-based, production-oriented
businesses. The model is followed by many financial institutions like the Association for
the Development of Micro-Enterprises (ADEMI) in Dominican Republic, Bank Rakyat
Indonesia, Senegal Egypt, Self-Employment Women’s Association in India, etc.
3.4.4 The Group Approach
The group approach delegates the entire financial process to the group rather than
to the financial institutions. All financial activities like savings, getting loans, repayment
of loans and record keeping are managed at the group level. In this method, 10-20
members are organised to form a group. These group members make regular savings of
fixed amount in a common fund. The amount and frequency of savings is mutually
decided by the group members. After the successful working of such a group for some
months the group is linked to a financial institution for getting credit. The financial
institutions issue loan in the name of group and whole group is considered responsible
for repayment. The amount of loan depends upon the total accumulated amount of saving
of the group. Group members themselves decide about the criteria of dividing the loan
among the group members. With this loan the whole group may jointly start a micro-
enterprise or the members may start their individual businesses. An individual may
also use his loan for consumptive purpose or meeting other priority needs. The peer
pressure in the group helps the timely repayment of loan. These type of group based
credit delivery methods help to empower the group members because they remain
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involved in various group activities. They visit the bank, market and hold group meetings
which help them to increase self-confidence. In India, the group based credit delivery
method known as SHG-BLP is a predominant method of providing microfinance.
Programme Hubungan Bank Danksm (PHBK) project in Indonesia and the Chikola
groups of K-REP in Kenya are also using such group based credit delivery models.
3.4.5 Village Banking Model
This village banking model is an expansion of the group approach. This model
was developed in Bolivia during the mid 1980s by the Foundation for International
Community Assistance (FINCA), a non-profit microfinance organisation. In this model,
a Village Bank is developed by grouping 30 to 100 low-income individuals who seek to
improve their lives through self-employment activities. The bank is financed by internal
mobilisation of members' saving fund as well as loans provided by the sponsoring MFIs.
The MFIs lend capital to the bank, which then lends the money to its members. Members
themselves run the village bank, they choose their members, elect their own officers,
establish their own by-laws, distribute loans to individuals and collect savings and
payments. Loan amounts are linked to the aggregate amount saved by individual bank
members. Loans are repaid weekly in small installments. Thus, village banks have a high
degree of democratic control and independence. The model is used by various MFIs like
Co-operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) in Guatemala; Save the
Children in El Salvador; Burkina Faso in Bolivia, Mali, and Ghana; Freedom from
Hunger and Catholic Relief Services in Thailand and Benin, Opportunity International,
Consultative Group for Assisting the Poor (CGAP), etc.
3.4.6 Credit Unions and Co-operatives
A credit union is a democratic, not-for-profit financial co-operative. It is owned
and governed by its members, who are at the same time the owners and the customers of
their co-operative society. Co-operatives are often created by persons belonging to the
same local or professional community or sharing a common interest. Co-operatives
generally provide their members with a wide range of banking and financial services.
Members participate in all the major decisions and democratically elect officers from
among themselves to monitor the administration of the co-operative. Loans are granted
only to the members. SANASA Development Bank of Sri Lanka is an example of rural
credit co-operative which is successfully working as a microfinance service provider.
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comprising 20,571 rural and 12,283 semi-urban branches of commercial banks, 14,142
branches of the Regional Rural Banks and 12,128 branches of district level co-operative
banks. Besides this, there are almost 92,000 co-operative credit societies at the village
level. On an average, there is at least one retail credit outlet for about 4,700 rural people
[2]. These banks used to provide loans directly to SHGs. The commercial banks and
regional rural banks also provide their credit facilities to MFIs for its on-lending to
groups. This is helpful in widening the range of lending institutions.
3.5.3 Microfinance Institutions
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) are the organisations or associations of
individuals that provide financial services to the poor. In India, there is a wide range of
such organisations with diverse legal forms, varying significantly in size, outreach,
mission and credit delivery methodologies. Figure 3.1 represents the hierarchy of
financial institutions for the microfinance disbursement.
Following the guidelines of RBI all scheduled commercial banks including RRBs
give bulk loans (classified as a priority sector) to MFIs for on-lending to groups and
other small borrowers. At present, both public and private banks are extending
considerable loans to MFIs at interest rate ranging from 8 to 11 per cent per annum.
Legal Forms of MFIs
The MFIs are an extremely heterogeneous group registered as Non-Banking
Financial Companies (NBFCs), societies, trusts and co-operatives. On the basis of their
legal forms, the MFIs in India can be broadly subdivided into three categories: Non-
profit making, Mutual benefit making and profit making MFIs as shown in Table 3.2.
The table exhibits that the number of registered MFIs in India are estimated to be
around 700-800 as no published data is available on private MFIs operating in the
country. Majority of the MFIs are operating on small-scale with clients ranging between
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500 to 1500 per MFI and not more than 10 MFIs have an outreach of 1 lakh
microfinance clients.
(i) Non-profit Making MFIs
The non-profit making MFIs include NGOs and non-profit making companies.
The table provides that a large number of NGOs have undertaken the task of financial
intermediation without any profit. Majority of these are registered as trusts or societies.
These NGOs are not formally regulated and they are prohibited by RBI from taking
collected savings of their clients or deposits from the public. The bye-laws of these
institutions are generally restrictive in allowing any commercial operations. The
companies registered under Section-25 of the Companies Act are also non-profit
companies. The activities of these companies are restricted to charity or other social
purposes. Section-25 companies are formally recognised and regulated by the RBI.
These companies, being non-profit in character, can not take group savings of their
clients.
(ii) Mutual Benefit MFIs
The mutual benefit MFIs are the Mutually Aided Co-operative Societies
(MACS). These are registered under the State Co-operative Societies Act and are not
regulated by RBI.
(iii) For Profit MFIs
For profit MFIs include Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs). The MFIs
in India which are larger in size belong to this category. These companies are registered
under the Companies Act, 1956; and are regulated by RBI. These companies can deposit
the savings of their clients with them. NBFCs, along with Section-25 companies, account
for about 80 per cent of microfinance outreach in India, both in terms of clients served as
well as loan portfolios. Some of the large NBFCs in the field of microfinance are:
Sanghamitra, BASIX, SHARE Microfin Ltd., Indian Association for Savings and Credit
(IASC), Cashpor, etc.
3.6 Microfinance Delivery Models in India
In India, microfinance is provided through the SHG-Bank Linkage Model (SHG-
BLM) and Microfinance Institution (MFI) Model. The SHG-BLM developed by
NABARD is widely prevalent throughout the country. In this model, the informal SHGs
are credit linked with the formal banking system. On the other hand, MFI model is used
by the various MFIs which emerge to reach the rural poor people in the areas not served
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by the formal banking sector. These MFIs provide financial services to the individuals or
to the groups like SHGs, JLGs and Grameen groups.
Self-Help Groups (SHGs) and their Functioning
SHGs are small, informal and homogeneous groups of 10 to 20 members each.
These groups are formed by the bank officials, NGOs and various other institutions at the
village level. Members of almost equal economic and social status are chosen to
minimise any mutual conflict. Each such group is given a name and each group has a
head, cashier and secretary, democratically elected by the group members to manage the
group affairs. The members are encouraged to make a voluntary thrift on regular basis.
The group members mutually decide about the amount and frequency for individual
savings to be deposited in the group account. They use this pooled resource to make
small interest bearing loans to their members within the group. This process, known as
inter-loaning, gradually builds financial discipline among the group members and they
learn to handle resources of a size that is much beyond their individual capacities. The
SHG members begin to understand that resources are limited and have a cost. Once the
groups show this mature financial behaviour (generally after six months of group
formation), banks are encouraged to provide loan to the SHG in certain multiples (three
to four times) of their accumulated savings. The bank loans are given without any
collateral and at specified interest rates. Banks find it easier to lend money to the groups
rather than providing small funds to individual members. The peer pressure ensures
timely repayments and replaces the collateral for the bank loans. Generally, the banks
charge between 9-10 per cent rate of interest per annum from the SHGs. The group
members themselves decide the terms of loans and the criteria of dividing the loan
among the group members. If only some of the group members use the whole loan then
they have to pay interest to the group account also. The rate of interest is mutually
decided by the group members. The group gets the second loan from the bank only after
repaying the first loan successfully and so on. The conceptual thinking behind SHG
initiative is that the mutual help within the participants of the programme can be a
powerful vehicle in the upward socio-economic transition of the poor.
3.6.1 SHG-Bank Linkage Model
SHG-Bank Linkage Model (SHG-BLM) is developed in India to provide
microfinance with the help of vast rural network of the formal financial sector. In this
model, the informal SHGs are credit linked with the formal financial institutions. The
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SHG-BLM has emerged as a dominant model in terms of number of borrowers and loans
outstanding. This model is flexible, independence creating, and imparts freedom of
saving and borrowing according to the requirements of group members. Due to
widespread rural bank branch network, the SHG-BLM is very suitable to the Indian
context. Microfinance movement started in India with the introduction of SHG-Bank
Linkage Programme (SHG-BLP). The programme uses SHGs as an intermediation
between the banks and the rural poor to help in reducing transaction costs for both the
banks and the rural clients. Banks provide the resources and bank officials/NGOs/
government agencies organise the poor in the form of SHGs. Under this programme,
loans are provided to the SHGs with three different methodologies:
Model I: SHGs Formed and Financed by Banks: In this model, banks
themselves take up the work of forming and nurturing the groups, opening their savings
accounts and providing them bank loans.
Model II: SHGs Formed by Agencies Other than Banks, but Directly
Financed by Banks: In this model, NGOs and other formal agencies in the field of
microfinance facilitate organising, forming and nurturing of SHGs and train them in
thrift and credit management. The banks directly give loans to these SHGs.
Model III: SHGs Financed by Banks Using Other Agencies as Financial
Intermediaries: This is the model where the NGOs take on the additional role of
financial intermediation along with the formation of group. In areas where the formal
banking system faces constraints, the NGOs are encouraged to form groups and to
approach a suitable bank for bulk loan assistance. This method is generally used by most
of the NGOs having small financial base.
Table 3.3 shows the SHGs linked to banks and the amount of loans disbursed
under the three models. It shows that the microfinance programme in India is dominated
by Model II. It is found that up to March 2006, 20.1 per cent of the total credit linked
SHGs are formed under Model I; and these groups are provided 14.4 per cent of the total
bank loans disbursed under the programme. Approximately seventy-four per cent of the
total SHGs are formed under Model II. These groups are provided 80.7 per cent of the
total loans. The share of Model III is relatively small. Approximately six per cent of the
total SHGs financed with 4.9 per cent of the total loan fall under this category.
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Table 3.3: Model-wise Bank Linkage of SHGs in India (up to March 2006)
2004 2005 2006
Model Number Bank Number Bank Number Bank
Type of SHGs Loans (in of SHGs Loans (in of SHGs Loans (in
('000) Rs. Crore) ('000) Rs. Crore) ('000) Rs. Crore)
Table 3.5 shows the number of individuals who are provided microfinance loans
under the SHG-BLM as well as the MFI model. It is important to note that in some of the
southern states the microfinance programme has reached the saturation point; and the
MFIs are competing to find the new eligible clients. In this situation, same individuals
are getting loans under both the models from different MFIs. So, the table also shows the
data adjusted for this overlap. The table reveals that up to March 2007, 48.06 million
individuals are covered under the microfinance programme out of which 79.11 per cent
are formed under SHG-BLM and 20.89 per cent under the MFI model. The programme
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outreach increases to 59.21 million by March 2008. But the data adjusted for the overlap
shows that 54.87 million individuals are covered under the microfinance programme by
March 2008.
38.02 45.20
SHG-BLM 7.18
(79.11) (76.34)
10.04 14.01
MFI Model 3.97
(20.89) (23.66)
48.06 59.21
Total 11.15
(100) (100)
Total Adjusted
44.97 54.87 9.90
for Overlap
Source: Srinivasan (2009)
Note: The figures given in parentheses indicate percentages of people covered under microfinance
programme.
Table 3.6 shows the region-wise spread of microfinance programme under SHG-
BLM and MFI models. The table shows that up to March 2008 approximately 45 million
people are provided with microfinance under SHG- BLM and 14 million under the MFI
model. Perusal of table shows that the programme is mainly concentrated in the southern
region. Approximately 48 per cent and 55 per cent of the people who are provided
microfinance under these two models belong to the southern region of India. However
the spread of the programme is limited in the north and north-eastern region. Out of the
total microfinance outreach in India approximately 5 per cent and 3 per cent of the
clients belong to north and north-eastern region, respectively. The spread of the
microfinance programme is shown separately for the Punjab state. The table shows that
the programme outreach is very limited in Punjab and there are just 0.2 per cent of the
total microfinance clients of India. The table also shows that in Punjab the microfinance
programme is expanded only through the SHG-BLM and there are no MFI clients.
Therefore, the present study is concentrated mainly on the SHG bank linkage programme
of Punjab.
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2007-08. One of the reasons may be that the programme has rapidly expanded in the
southern states of India and has reached a saturation point in some of these states.
Figure 3.2 shows the progress of SHG-BLP in India from 1999 to 2008. A least
square trend line is used to graphically represent the trend of total number of SHGs under
this model. The linear trend line indicates that there is steady increase in the number of
credit linked SHGs over a period of 10 years. The value of R2 is 0.9155, which
represents a good fit of the line to the data.
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2
R = 0.9155
800
700
No. of SHGs (in '000) 600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1992-99
1999-00
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
Year
share of southern states in the number of groups linked to the banks is declining, while
the share of other regions is improving. The table further provides that over the time
period from 2001-08 there is a positive growth of the SHG-BLP in all the regions, except
the southern part. The share of southern states in the total credit linked SHGs is 48.2 per
cent in 2008 as compared to 71.2 per cent in 2001. In the year 2008, the share of northern
region in the total credit linked SHGs was 6.6 per cent, share of north-eastern region was
3.4 per cent and the share of eastern, central and western regions was 19.3, 11.7 and 10.8
per cent respectively.
North-
477 1,490 4,069 12,278 34,238 62,517 91,754 1,19,857
eastern
(0.2) (0.3) (0.6) (1.1) (2.1) (2.8) (3.1) (3.4)
Region
Figure 3.3 exhibits the percentage of credit linked SHGs for different regions
over three time periods, i.e. 2002, 2005 and 2008. The figure highlights that the
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percentage share of SHGs in all the regions is almost increasing, while the percentage
share of the southern part is decreasing.
The table reveals that 55 per cent of the total credit linked SHGs received loans
from commercial banks, 31 per cent from RRBs and the remaining 14 per cent from the
co-operative banks up to March 2007. Commercial banks contributed 63 per cent of the
total amount of loans disbursed to the SHGs, while RRBs and co-operative banks shared
approximately 28 per cent and 9 per cent of the total loans amount.
The SHG bank linkage has become a part of business for all the 27 public sector
and 20 private sector commercial banks. NABARD data of SHG-BLP up to March 2006
shows that State Bank of India credit linked the highest number of SHGs (3,92,494),
followed by Andhra Bank (1,13,466) and Indian Bank (96,460), (not shown in the table).
The regional rural banks also finance SHGs in a significant way. All the 159 RRBs in the
country are participating in the SHG-BLP. Maximum number of SHGs have been linked
by Pandiyan Grameen Bank in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry (45,672) followed by
Srivishakha Grameen Bank (35,875) and Nagarjuna Grameen Bank (27,879) both in
Andhra Pradesh. Up to March 2006, as many as 337 central co-operative banks were
involved in SHG-BLP. Maximum number of SHGs have been linked by Hooghly Co-
operative Bank (18,015) in West Bengal followed by South Canara Co-operative Bank
(10,851) and Hassan Co-operative Bank (10,389) both in Karnataka.
3.7.3 Recovery Status of Bank Loans
The success of any scheme is gauged from the criteria of the recovery status of
bank loans. If the members of the scheme are net gainers then they will like to return
loans at regular intervals in order to gain more funds. Table 3.10 shows the recovery
status of the banks loans given to the SHGs as reported by 290 and 329 commercial
banks, RRBs and co-operative banks by the end of March 2007 and 2008 respectively.
The data up to March 2008 clearly shows that 46.5 per cent of the banks reported above
95 per cent loan recovery rate. Approximately, twenty-one per cent of the banks showed
the loan recovery rate between 80 to 94 per cent. About twenty-three per cent of the
banks recovered 50 to 79 per cent of the loans given to SHGs under the microfinance
programme and just 8.8 per cent of the banks reported that the loan recovery rate is less
than 50 per cent. Therefore, it can be said that recovery of loans given under
microfinance programme is very good, which is quite essential for programme
sustainability. It may also be interpreted that the microfinance scheme is working well
for both SHG members as well as the funding institutions.
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Table 3.12: District-wise Credit Linked SHGs in Punjab (up to March 2006)
The various institutions which provide finance through SHG-BLP in Punjab are
commercial, regional rural and co-operative banks. Table 3.14 shows the share of
different financial institutions in financing the SHGs in Punjab.
It is found that up to March 2006, 51 per cent of the total credit linked groups
were provided finance through commercial banks, 12 per cent through RRBs, and 37 per
cent through co-operative banks. The share of commercial banks in the total amount of
loan disbursed in Punjab is 51 per cent as compared to 14 per cent and 35 per cent of
RRBs and co-operative banks respectively. In 2007, 56 per cent of the total SHGs were
financed by commercial banks and the loans given to these SHGs were 55 per cent of the
total loans up to March 2007. RRBs and co-operative banks financed 12 per cent and 32
per cent of the total credit linked SHGs with 14 per cent and 31 per cent share in the total
amount of loans given up to March 2007.
NABARD data up to March 2006 shows that in Punjab three RRBs, Faridkot-
Bathinda Grameen Bank, Malwa Grameen Bank and Punjab Grameen Bank are involved
in financing SHGs. Out of total 560 credit linked SHGs, maximum number of SHGs
have been linked to Punjab Grameen Bank (407) followed by Malwa Grameen Bank
(110) and Faridkot-Bathinda Grameen Bank (43) (not shown in the table). On the other
hand, nineteen co-operative banks are involved in financing the SHGs and they have
linked total 1,700 SHGs up to March 2006. Out of these 1,700 groups the maximum
number of groups (345) have been financed by co-operative bank of Fatehgarh Sahib
followed by Faridkot (302) and Jalandhar (215).
3.8.2 Penetration of Microfinance in Punjab
The present study also analyses the progress of the microfinance programme in
Punjab vis-à-vis India. For this purpose, a Microfinance Penetration Index (MPI) and a
Microfinance Poverty Penetration Index (MPPI) have been calculated. MPI measures the
population outreach and MPPI measures the poverty outreach of microfinance in the
state in comparison to the whole country. MPI is calculated by dividing the percentage
share of the state in the total microfinance outreach in India with the percentage share of
the state in the total population of India. MPPI is calculated by dividing the percentage
share of the state in total microfinance outreach with the percentage share of the poor
population. If the value of index is equal to 1, it indicates that the microfinance outreach
is proportional to the population and poverty outreach in the country. But the score less
than 1, shows the poorer performance of the state in the population and poverty outreach.
Table 3.15 shows that the calculated values of MPI and MPPI for Punjab are 0.09 and
0.28 respectively. These low values show that in Punjab the penetration of microfinance
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Table 3.16 shows the ranking of some of the states on the basis of MPI and
MPPI. The table shows that Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa and
Himachal Pradesh find a place among the top 5, while the states such as Jammu &
Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand have very
low penetration of microfinance with the index score being 0.35 or less. Therefore, there
is a need for some innovative measures to be undertaken to enhance the coverage of
microfinance programme in these states.
Section-II
members because they are seen as a bad credit risk. Kirkpatrick & Maimbo (2002) and
Mosley (2001) also found various organisational problems, such as saving requirements,
the minimum amount of the loan that needs to be accepted etc. which restrict the poor
people to join the microfinance programme. Many critics concluded that microfinance
does not reach the poorest of the poor (Scully, 2004), or that the poorest are deliberately
excluded from microfinance programmes (Simanowitz, 2001).
In spite of the various institutional barriers, various psychological problems
relating to the poor people restrict them to join the programme. The extreme poor often
lack self-confidence so they hesitate to join a group where they have to deal with the
other group members, bank officials and other promoting institutions. The core poor are
generally too risk averse to borrow for investment in the future. They will therefore
benefit only to a very limited extent from microfinance schemes.
3.9.2 Regional Disparity
It has been observed that the microfinance programme is mainly run by formal
financial institutions with the help of SHGs. As a result, microfinance programme is
progressing in those areas of the country where there is tremendous growth of formal
financial institutions. Microfinance institutions were expected to reach those areas where
the formal banking system failed to reach and the poor people have to depend on the
money-lenders in order to meet their financial requirements. But actually, many big
MFIs are activate in those states where the banking network is very strong. In the
southern states, such as Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala, the spread
of SHG bank linkage programme as well as the MFI programme is very large. But the
north and north-eastern region is almost neglected. Table 3.17 shows that in the southern
India the spread of commercial bank branch network is the highest (27.94 per cent) and
these states cover 48.15 per cent of the country’s total SHG members and 54.77 per cent
of the MFI members. So, approximately 50 per cent of the total microfinance programme
beneficiaries belong to these four south Indian states. In contrast to this, in the north-
eastern region of India, bank branch network is very limited and the coverage of
microfinance programme is just 2.93 per cent. The table also shows the region-wise
branch network and the microfinance members covered under SHG-Bank Linkage and
MFI model in these different regions. The table reveals that the microfinance activity had
expanded in those regions where the banking network is strong.
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Table 3.17: Branch Network, SHGs and Microfinance Delivered (As on 31.03.08)
No. of Number of Members
S.
Region Bank SHG MFI
No. Total
Branches Members Members
1. North-eastern Region 2,051 15,58,141 1,75,589 17,33,730
(2.67) (3.45) (1.25) (2.93)
2. Western Region 11,839 48,69,293 15,85,681 64,54,974
(Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa) (15.40) (10.77) (11.27) (10.89)
Eastern Region
3. (Orissa, West Bengal, Bihar, 13,017 87,38,613 34,75,622 1,22,14,235
(16.93) (19.33) (24.70) (20.60)
Jharkhand, A&N)
Northern Region
4. (HP, Rajasthan, Punjab, 13,175 29,99,620 1,13,102 31,12,722
(17.13) (6.63) (0.80) (5.25)
Haryana, J&K, Delhi)
Central Region
5. (UP, MP, Chattisgarh, 15,328 52,74,191 10,14,202 62,88,393
(19.93) (11.67) (7.21) (10.61)
Uttarakhand)
6. Southern Region(AP, Kerala, 21,481 2,17,72,543 77,04,449 2,94,76,992
TN, Karnataka, Pondicherry) (27.94) (48.15) (54.77) (49.72)
Total 76,891 4,52,13,545 1,40,68,645 5,92,82,190
(100) (100) (100) (100)
Source: Srinivasan (2009) and Report on the Working of RBI [3].
Note: The figures given in parentheses indicate percentages.
Figure 3.4 shows the region-wise percentages and trend lines related to bank
branch network and the microfinance programme outreach under SHG bank linkage and
MFI model.
60
50
Percentage
40
30
20
10
0
North- Western Eastern Northern Central Southern
Eastern
Region
The figure highlights that all the three trend lines are upward sloping which
indicate region-wise positive trend of bank branch network as well as the microfinance
programme outreach under both the models. Karl Pearson coefficient of correlation is
calculated to find out the relationship between the bank branch network and the
microfinance programme outreach. The value of correlation coefficient between bank
branch network and microfinance programme outreach under SHG-Bank Linkage and
MFI model is 0.788 and 0.729 respectively. The positive and high values of these
correlation coefficients show that spread of microfinance programme is highly positively
correlated with the spread of bank branch network.
3.9.3 Limited Spread in Poorer States
The coverage of microfinance programme is comparatively low in the states
which have a larger share of the poor. Table 3.18 shows the seven poorest states of India
and the microfinance outreach in these states.
3. WWF Production 18
4. RDT Production/Consumption 24
5. Shantidhan Production/Consumption 13
Banks and MFIs extend reasons for charging high rates of interest. Banks lose
heavily in providing small loans to the poor. The banks do not want to make small loans
due to high transaction cost. For example, a Rs. 2,000 loan involves the same transaction
cost as a Rs. 1,00,000 loan. The wages of bank employees are much higher than that
under microfinance programme of MFIs. Therefore, banks prefer to give loans to MFIs
(classified as a priority sector lending), which they then lend to the poor. This raises
interest costs. On the other hand, many MFIs in India have small business size and the
transaction costs for handling small amounts of credits are also high. This increases the
cost of borrowings for the poor people. These institutions depend on borrowings from
commercial financial institutions and donors grant/equity. Moreover, these institutes are
not allowed to mobilise deposits from the public. This restriction coupled with
borrowings at a high rate make them helpless. Besides the higher cost of funds, the cost
of management / transaction costs are also high since the scale of operations poses a
limitation to bring any reduction. In view of the MFIs philosophy of delivering credit
almost at the doorstep combined with higher costs of funds as well as transaction costs,
many of the MFIs may not reach breakeven point if they charge less than 24 per cent.
According to some registered NBFCs like SKS [5] and Sulaxmi Finance Private Limited
[6]:
‘The field staff managers perform village surveys before entering a village,
conduct interviews with potential members, train members on credit discipline, travel to
villages by motorbike every week to collect interest and disburse loans, and follow-up to
ensure the loans are being used for their intended purpose. These personnel and
administration costs easily amount to 11 per cent of total cost structure. In addition, the
cost of lending from commercial banks is anywhere from 10-12 per cent. The
combination of this personnel/administration costs, the cost of lending, a 1-2 per cent
loan loss provision (due to default or writing off a loan), and 1-2 per cent profit used to
expand operations, translates to an interest that appears high’
Therefore, for their sustainability, MFIs tend to cover their costs by charging high
interest rates from the borrowers.
3.9.5 Low Depth of Outreach
Another problem faced by the microfinance programme is the depth of services
provided. Though the outreach of the programme is expanding, large number of people
are provided with microfinance services but the amount of loans is very small. The
average loans per member in both MFIs and SHGs are between Rs. 3,500 and 5,000
(Srinivasan, 2009). Table 3.21 shows the average value of loans per SHG member for
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various years. This amount is not sufficient to fulfil the financial needs of the poor
people. The duration of the loans is also short. The small loan size and short duration do
not enable most borrowers to invest it for productive purposes. They, generally, utilise
these small loans to ease their liquidity problems.
Average Loan
Size per SHG 28,558.88 36,180.45 42,620.34 50,912.08 61,678.18 63,906.62
(in Rs.)
Average Loan
Size per member* 2,039.92 2,584.31 3,044.31 3,636.57 4,405.58 4,564.76
(in Rs.)
Source: NABARD Data.
* Average size of an SHG in India is 14 members.
taking care of the needs of the poor, are setting their development goals and business
interests. In recent past, some erring MFIs in Andhra Pradesh have been charged with
exploiting the poor with usurious interest rates and intimidating the borrowers by forced
loan recovery practices, the combined effect of which forced the debt-ridden poor to
suicide.
Therefore, there is a need for regulating the varied number of microfinance
providers which are influencing the lives of millions of poor people. The regulation
would, therefore, help in improving the growth of MFIs in an orderly approach.
According to Mahajan and Nagasri (1999) the need for regulation and supervision of
microfinance organisations arises from several considerations like protecting the interest
of small savers, ensuring proper terms of credit, instilling financial discipline and having
a proper reporting and supervision system. Regulation and supervision may ensure that
MFIs are run prudently and cases of poor people losing their money due to fraud or
incompetence are minimised.
3.9.7 Lack of Insurance Services
Poor people are vulnerable to financial shocks. A small change in their earning
patterns due to natural calamities, health problems, death of earning member etc. can
push them to destitute. So, a provision of insurance under the microfinance programme is
very essential to help the poor to cross the poverty line. But, in reality, the current
microfinance programme in India is just focused on regular saving and micro-credit.
SHG-BLP developed by NABARD is also providing saving and credit services mainly
and the provision of insurance is very less. However, some of the MFIs have started
providing insurance services but the efforts are still at an experimental stage. A research
report by Invest India Market Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (IIMS, 2007) indicates that the
penetration of life insurance is only 12 per cent among the rural poor and 19 per cent
among the urban low-income population. The penetration ratio for insurance in India was
estimated at 4.80 in 2006, whereas for Asia it was 6.60 and for Europe at 8.30
(Srinivasan, 2009). So, in India the provision of insurance services is at the initial stage
and this integral part of the microfinance programme is still neglected.
3.9.8 Binding of Saving, Meetings and Regular Payments
The uniqueness of the SHG-BLP is the fundamental requirements of the
programme, such as compulsory savings, group meetings, regular repayments etc. But
these requirements also lead to the exclusion of the core poor from joining the
95
microfinance programme. Poor people who generally do not have a regular source of
income are required to save before getting a loan. These loans are to be repaid regularly
in fixed instalments. But due to their irregular and seasonal nature of jobs, poor people
face difficulties while repaying the loans. It is also found that the initial group loans are
utilised for essential non-productive purposes rather than for generating incomes which
leads to repayment difficulties. Weekly or fortnightly group meetings are made
mandatory, so, the rural poor people who generally earn their livelihood through
domestic labour and daily wage earning find it difficult to attend group meetings
regularly.
Section-III
programme, SHGs may be linked with the post offices for disbursement of credit to rural
poor by utilising the vast network of post offices in rural areas. NABARD has launched a
pilot project of this type in Tamil Nadu.
3.10.2 Reducing Regional Disparity
As discussed in the problems, the spread of microfinance programme is unequal
among various regions of India and there is limited spread in the poorer states. So, there
is ample scope to spread microfinance programme in the unreached areas including the
poorer states. However, taking a step in this direction NABARD has recently identified
13 states to scale up the microfinance programme in these states in order to reduce the
regional disparity. These priority states are Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Gujarat, Himachal
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh,
Uttaranchal and West Bengal. These states accounted for 70 per cent of India's poor and
were not effectively reached by the microfinance programme. Special efforts by
NABARD resulted in an increase in the number of SHGs credit linked in these states
from 3,97,464 as on March 2004 to 17,64,856 as on March 2008 as shown in Table 3.22.
The growth rate in these states is higher as compared to the growth at national level but it
is not increasing as compared to the previous years. Therefore some other measures can
be taken to eradicate the regional disparities in the coming future.
RBI to collect savings from their members and raise public funds. As these institutions
do not publish their annual financial reports, it is difficult to determine their financial
health. Therefore, the formal financial institutions also hesitate to provide loans to these
institutions. As a result, they face paucity of funds which becomes a hurdle in expanding
the microfinance programme. To tackle this problem, some schemes may be adopted to
provide support and help for the capacity building of MFIs for the expansion of
microfinance programme.
3.10.4 Regulation of MFIs
Currently, various entities such as co-operative societies, mutual benefit societies
or mutually aided societies etc. are engaged in the activity of microfinance. They are
guided by different laws under which they are registered. Lack of a single regulatory
authority restricts the orderly growth of microfinance sector. Keeping in view all the
regulatory problems, the Government of India has proposed legislation and formulated a
bill for the development and regulation of microfinance sector. This bill is under
consideration of the Parliament. This bill will provide all the regulatory powers to
NABARD; and all the MFIs will come under a single formal statutory framework. In
case of any offence by microfinance organisations, the redressal mechanism and
settlement of disputes have also been discussed in this bill. The legislation, however, is
yet to be enacted.
3.10.5 Insurance Services
In India, the penetration of insurance services among rural poor people is very
limited and there is a great potential for the same. Moreover, poor are very much
vulnerable to the natural uncertainties and insurance is necessary for them. The network
used for microfinance programme can be used to tap the potential of insurance in rural
markets. Non-Government Organizations, Microfinance Institutions and Self-Help
Groups can be used as micro-insurance agents. They can offer target specific insurance
products at a relatively lower cost, for a lower coverage of amount. It may be envisaged
that micro-insurance would facilitate penetration of insurance to rural and remote areas.
However, some of the NGOs are providing accident, life and crop insurances in India but
such type of services need to be expanded.
3.10.6 Flexibility in the Programme
Some main features of the microfinance programme include compulsory savings,
regular group meetings, record maintenance etc. These bindings lead to the exclusion of
98
core poor from joining the microfinance programme. Therefore, in order to expand the
outreach of the programme to the poorer people, there is a need to introduce more
flexible system such as the one adopted in Bangladesh, where even the beggars are
provided with micro-loans by the Grameen Bank. These beggars do not make any
compulsory saving and do not attend any group meeting. A Project in Orissa enables the
poor to save in kind and raise resources against such savings and provide access to self-
managed, participative food security system. Under this project, SHG members can save
and get credit both in cash and in kind depending on their convenience. Such flexibilities
in the microfinance programme may increase the access and affordability of the rural
poor.
3.10.7 Technical Innovations
In order to improve the quality of microfinance services some technical
innovations may be introduced. A number of electronic devices are being used in
different countries to expand the outreach and to improve the microfinance functioning.
Some of these devices are mobile phones, ATMs, processor cards, computers etc.
Mobile phone provides the rural poor borrowers with the communication facility.
ATMs are helpful to facilitate saving, payment and loan transactions in the remote rural
areas where it is difficult to open bank branches. Processor cards are used to keep the
record of group activities such as savings, loans and other financial transactions. It helps
to reduce paper work and saves time for the bank officials. A computer with an operator
helps the illiterate group members to maintain the records of group financial activities.
These computers can also be used to provide important information related to weather
conditions, crop inputs, product prices, land records etc. in the villages. Though some of
such projects have been started by NABARD on pilot basis, but there is enough scope to
use such innovative techniques in microfinance sector in India.
Notes
[1] Task Force was a group of senior government officials and prominent microfinance
practitioners. It was constituted by NABARD in 1999 to make a conceptual policy
framework for sustainable growth of microfinance in India.
[2] Microfinance Scenario in the Country, NABARD, Available at: http://www.nabard.org/
pdf/publications/reports/mF_Scenario_in_the_Country.pdf [Accessed on 12.10.2008].
99
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