Title: Whether RA 7662 is unconstitutional on the ground that it encroaches the power of the SC to

promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, thus violating the doctrine of
separation of powers

MY MAIN ARGUMENT: Albeit the wordings of the Constitution relate only to the power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, it necessarily
follows that the power also extends to admission to Law Schools. In relation to Sec. 5, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, bar candidates must have, satisfactorily shown that they have regularly studied
law for four years in a duly accredited law school. Ergo, it is conceded that for a person to be
admitted to the bar, it is an indispensable requirement that one must have been admitted to and
completed Bachelor of Laws. By granting the Legal Education Board the capacity to promulgate
rules as to the eligibility of a student to enter law school, it naturally thwart his right to be a
member of the bar; a right which is inherently Judicial and within the acumen and grasp of the
Supreme Court.

•Sec 5, par 5, Article 8 1987 Constitution

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by Supreme Court with the Congress, more so with the Executive.
(Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil 76 1999)

On the other hand, the legislature, in exercise of its police power may enact laws regulating the practice of
law to protect the public and promotes the public welfare. But the legislature may not pass a law that will
control the SC in the performance of its function to decide who may enjoy the privilege of practicing law
and any law of that kind is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise of legislative power. (In re Cunanan, 94
Phil 534) - (Laws to improve the quality of education through law can be passed by legislature as a
valid execise of police power)

•Bar Matter no. 803

•Meaning and scope ng admission to the practice of law - gusto kong maprove natin na yung
supervision of legal education ay sakop ng admission to the practice of law. Pwede natin tong
maprove kung SC ba ang gumawa ng uniform set of mandatory subjects na dapat i-offer ng isang
law school. Kasi kung sa SC galing yan edi supervision of Legal education is within the meaning of
admission to the practice of law. Or iba pang grounds pero wala pa akong naiisip ngayon. Baka pag
nakatulog ako hahah
The admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. xxx And it
becomes more indisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolution the petition of
these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified. (In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534)

Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions. (In re
Cunanan, 94 Phil 534)

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in the Supreme Court. Had Congress found that this
Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power
granted to it. xxx. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or
reinstate directly attorneys at law, or determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. (In re
Cunanan, 94 Phil 534)

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. (In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534)

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court,
because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in is exercise. xxx

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of
the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. (Separate Opinions, LABRADOR, J., In re
Cunanan, 94 Phil 534)

The act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule-making
power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit
members thereof, xxx.

History from which the constitutional provision is based:

From the case of In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 534

The judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous
possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." And it becomes more indisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be
revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that
Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote
the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications
of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an
attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

xxx

xxx

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent,
and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of
sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as
to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility of the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to
the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption
of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235,
"constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent
element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that
 it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial
power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and
made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and independent of one another. xxx. (p. 450)

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate
of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar xxx He
becomes an "officer of the court", and like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if
cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys
under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that
end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is
accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the
exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of
such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this
respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good
moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)

It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for
admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of
the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature;
and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in
performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

 Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point.
Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

•Section1, Article 6- legislative power

•On 2001, the Bar Matter regarding the proposal of the SC to amend RA 7662 was released (ito
yung pinost ni Irene. Eto pwedeng ibato ng pro-LEB. Kung babasahin niyo yung buo non at
iintindihin, parang gusto ng SC yung idea ng LEB ngalang it proposed to the legislature to amend
RA 7662 to erase the constitutional infirmities. So pwedeng gawing argument ng kabila na kahit
yung SC gusto yung idea ng LEB And it even made a Bar Matter to propose its amendment. Ang
tanong, will the act of making this bar matter constitute a ratification, on the part of the SC, of the
the RA 7662? No, kasi wala namang power ang SC to ratify a law for it to be valid by means of a
bar matter)
•Assuming arguendo that RA 7662 was amended by the Congress in consonance with the proposed
amendment in the Bar Matter, RA 7662 is still unconstitutional (kasi nga dapat in the first place,
LEB should have been created by the SC and not by the legislature through a law)

Legislative power is the power of lawmaking, the framing and enactment of laws. It includes the power of
appropriation, taxation, expropriation.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. The legislative body
possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by
usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress xxx (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192, 212) Except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common interest. (Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil 948 as cited in
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270)

NOTE: The 1987 Constitution granted the power to the Supreme Court the power promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of the admission to the practice of law and the Integrated Bar.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of
any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is consistent with it is a nullity. Thus, when a
law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot
be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or similar law or provision. A law of
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstance
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion. (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency Inc v.
Cabiles, G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2015)

•EXCEPTION- it cannot pass a law to reform legal education because it does not have power to
supervise admission to the practice of law (including supervision of law schools and legal education)
•Concept of separation of powers
•RA 7662
Sec. 2
Sec. 3 (I think pwede naman yung provision na ito. The tenor of the provision is that LEB merely
promote Legal Education. They do not modify, add, restrict or limit admission to the practice of
law/Law school.)
Sec. 4
Sec. 7

NOTE: The comment section refers to the legal basis why I think it is unconstitutional.

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of
legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-
making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility
and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the
administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require
proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship
and continuing legal education. Commented [PV1]: See comment PV2.

Section 4. Legal Education Board; Creation and Composition. - To carry out the purpose of this Act,
there is hereby created the Legal Education Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, attached solely for
budgetary purposes and administrative support to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall preferably be a former justice of the Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals, and the following as regular members: a representative of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP); a representative of the Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS); a
representative from the ranks of active law practitioners; and, a representative from the law students' Commented [PV2]: LEGAL BASIS:
sector. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, or his representative, shall be Doctrine of Separation of Powers
an ex officio member of the Board.
The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must
discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority
With the exception of the representative of the law students' sector, the Chairman and regular members of conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of
the Board must be natural-born citizen of the Philippines and members of the Philippine Bar, who have powers, neither the Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
been engaged for at least ten (10) years in the practice of law, as well as in the teaching of law in a duly encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of the government.
(Philippine Coconut Federation, Inc. v. Republic, 600 SCRA 102)
authorized or recognized law school.
Commented [PV3]: LEGAL BASIS:

Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board
shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Act;
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein
enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size
of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities,
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the xxx the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
NOTE: Albeit the wordings of the Constitution relate only to the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
admission to the practice of law, it necessarily follows that the
power also extends to admission to Law Schools. In relation to
Sec. 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, bar candidates must have,
satisfactorily shown that they have regularly studied law for
four years in a duly accredited law school. Ergo, it is conceded
that for a person to be admitted to the bar, it is an indispensable
requirement that one must have been admitted to and completed
Bachelor of Laws. By granting the Legal Education Board the
capacity to promulgate rules as to the eligibility of a student to
enter law school, it naturally thwart his right to be a member of
the bar; a right which is inherently Judicial and within the
acumen and grasp of the Supreme Court.
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission
to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be
prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student
shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group
anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a
total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for
such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a
new member of the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board
may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the
attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
Commented [PV4]: LEGAL BASIS:
Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. - All applicants
for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding
sections shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four
years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law
school or university, officially approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied
by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as
evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the
court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has
satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or
university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial
law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics. (Rule 138, SEC. 5, Rules of Court)
Sec. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course,
the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts
or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and
economics. (Rule 138, SEC. 6, Rules of Court)
NOTE: The Supreme Court prescribes in the Rules of Court the
academic qualifications for admission to the bar. R.A. 7666 grants
LEB the authority to include additional requirements.
Commented [PV5]: LEGAL BASIS:
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Rule 138-A
SECTION 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who
has successfully completed 3rd year of the regular four-year
prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law
school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court xxx. (Rule 138-A, SEC. 1, Rules of Court)
NOTE: The Supreme Court approves the Legal Education Program
of Law Schools.
Commented [PV6]: LEGAL BASIS:
Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. -
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. (Rule 138, SEC. 2, Rules of Court)
NOTE: In addition to Sec. 5-6, Rule 138, these are the only
requirements for admission to the bar. In effect, LEB includes law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar.