On the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious States of Mind

Author(s): David H. Finkelstein

Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr., 1999), pp. 79-100
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 36, Number 2, April 1999

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN

CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS STATES
OF MIND

David H. Finkelstein

Yes, I preferred the elderly and discontented doctor, surrounded by friends and cherishing hon?
est hopes; and bade a farewell to the liberty, the comparative youth, the light step, leaping
impulses and secret pleasures, that I had enjoyed in the disguise of Hyde. Imade this choice
perhaps with some unconscious reservation, for I neither gave up the house in Soho, nor de?
stroyed the clothes of Edward Hyde, which still lay ready inmy cabinet.

?Robert Louis Stevenson, "The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde"

An this passage from Stevenson's famous yield a set of conditions that an adequate
story, Dr. Jekyll recalls a choice that he account of the distinction between con?
made but failed to live by?a resolution to scious and unconscious mentality ought to
never again transform himself into Edward meet. I'll then offer what I take to be such
Hyde. Jekyll remarks that he "made this an account, and I'll show that it both meets
choice perhaps with some unconscious res? the conditions of adequacy and helps us to
ervation." What work does the word answer a number of questions that would
"unconscious" do in this sentence? When appear puzzling without it.
is a reservation (or an intention or a fear)
Perhaps I should add that my aim is not
rightly said to be unconscious? My aim in to try to convince a reader who is uncom?
what follows is to explain what it is that fortable with talk about unconscious states
distinguishes an unconscious state of mind of mind that it's all right to describe a per?
from a conscious one. My procedure will son as, for example, unconsciously jealous
be as follows. I am going to present sev? of his brother. We do characterize people
eral tempting, but ultimately as subject to a wide range of unconscious
unsatisfactory, views concerning that by mental states, and I'm going to take it for
virtue of which a state of mind should be granted that we are often in doing
justified
characterized as either unconscious or con? so. I aim to elucidate what we mean by such
scious. My criticisms of these views will characterizations. I will not, however, be

79
 80 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

assuming that dreams are the royal road to of his conversation with his therapist. But
the unconscious or that little boys are un? we canimagine that Harry holds no such
consciously afraid of castration or anything conscious belief. When asked about his
else that
is distinctively Freudian or psy? future, Harry says, "Oh, I'm sure that even?
choanalytic. We should remember that tually someone will fall in love with me,
Freud was not the first to speak of uncon? even though my therapist has convinced me
scious states of mind (as is evidenced not that unconsciously I believe it's impossible
only by such storiesas "The Strange Case that anyone should." This is a perfectly
of Dr Jekyll and Mr. Hyde"?which was intelligible remark. What Harry's therapist
first published in 1886?but also by 19th has made him aware of is not that he is in
century theoretical writings about the na? some way unlovable, but only that he un?
ture of the human mind1) consciously believes this to be so. The very
simple view, however, cannot allow for the
I. The Very Simple and Not-so-simple wants to say
intelligibility of what Harry
Views about himself. to the
According very
simple view, if someone is aware that he
Let's begin by considering a very simple
believes such-and-such, then his belief is
way of understanding what itmeans to say
conscious. But, in our example, Harry is
that someone's mental state is either con?
aware of his unconscious belief that no one
scious or unconscious. The
view might be
could fall in love with him.
put as follows: "Your mental state is con?
The is too simple;
view
very simple it's
scious if you know that you are in it. Your
not faithful to the way we use the words
mental state is unconscious if you don't
"conscious" and "unconscious." There is,
know that you're in it. To say that you, for
however, a use of these words to which
example, unconsciously believe that no one
something like the very simple view is
could ever fall in love with you is to say: faithful. The case of Harry demonstrates
(1) that you believe that no one could ever
that there is a distinction to be drawn be?
fall in love with you and (2) that you don't
tween two uses of the word "conscious"
know?you're unaware of the fact?that you or "unconscious." First, there is a relatively
believe this. Call this the very simple view.2
unpuzzling use that is generally in place
A bit of reflection reveals that the very
when the word "conscious" or "uncon?
simple view is unsatisfactory. Imagine scious" is followed by the word "of or
someone?call him Harry?who says: "My "that." Imight say, "Until the lights came
therapist tells me that I unconsciously be?
on, I had been unconscious of the person
lieve no one could ever fall in love with
in the seat next to me." Or: "Lois suddenly
me, and she'sgenerally right about such became conscious that she was the only
things, so I suppose I must have this be?
patent attorney in the room." In such con?
lief." Let's imagine that Harry's therapist
texts, the word "conscious" means,
is right about him, and that Harry is justi?
roughly, aware. The corresponding use of
fied in believing that she's right about him.
"unconscious" means unaware. the
Among
Harry is, then, aware of his belief that no
things Imight become aware, or conscious,
one could ever fall in love with him. Ac?
c/are my own states of mind. But to say
cording to the very simple view, we should
that I am conscious of, for example, my
say that Harry's belief that no one could
fear of abandonment is not to say either
ever fall in love with him went from being
that I conscious/^ fear abandonment or?
unconscious to being conscious as a result
what amounts to the same thing?that my
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 81

fear of abandonment is conscious. Describ? mechanism?the mechanism by which I

as "conscious of unconsciously ordinarily find out about my own states of
ing Harry
believing that no one could ever fall in love mind. It is tempting to refer to this mecha?
with him" (or "conscious of his uncon? nism as 'inner
sense,' but perhaps we
scious belief that no one could ever fall in should just call it 'mechanism M.' What it
love with him") seems to involve a contra? means for one of my mental states to be
diction only if we confuse two senses of conscious (i.e., for me to be conscious/y
the word "conscious." thing It's one to be angry, sad, or whatever) is that I'm aware

consciously angry or jealous or believing of it via mechanism M. What it means for

such-and-such and quite another to be con? one of my mental states to be unconscious
scious of one's own anger or jealousy or is that?although Imay be aware of it?I
belief. We can think of this fact as providing am not aware of it via mechanism M." I'll
us with our first constraint on an adequate call this the not-so-simple view.
account of the distinction between conscious It is a good deal more difficult to state a
and unconscious mentality. decisive objection to the not-so-simple
view than to its very simple progenitor. I
Constraint 1 :An account of the distinction
conscious and unconscious mental? present what, I think, amounts to such an
between
the difference between: elsewhere,3 but the argument is
ity should respect objection
too lengthy to rehearse here. In the next
(a) someone's conscious/y believing or be? of paragraphs, I'll merely offer a
couple
afraid, i.e., a belief or a
ing conscious/y reason to be suspicious of the not-so
fear's conscious, rather than un?
being reason the
simple view?a that suggests
conscious;
direction that I'll be taking later in the pa?
AND per. Let us return to the case of Harry who

consciously believes that someone will

(b) someone's being conscious of her own eventually fall in love with him, even
belief or fear, i.e., conscious that she
though he is aware of his unconscious be?
believes or fears such-and-such.
lief that no one could. The fact that, in this
A variation on the very simple view example, Harry's conscious and uncon?
might appear to meet Constraint 1. The scious beliefs contradict helps each other
view that I have inmind
could be expressed us to see the inadequacy of the very simple
as follows: "The problem with the very view. But the need to distinguish between
simple view is that it doesn't take into ac? what someone is aware of believing and
count the fact that there are various kinds what he consciously believes does not de?
of knowledge. If my knowledge that I be? pend on there being a flat-out contradiction
lieve p is based only upon the testimony between his conscious and unconscious
of my therapist, then?while Imay be said beliefs. To see this, consider a variation on
to be conscious of my belief that p?I can? the example. that Harry says: "I
Imagine
not be said to conscious/y believe p. The unconsciously believe that no one could
kind of self-knowledge that the word 'con? ever fall in love with me," whereupon he's
sciously' picks out is not knowledge by asked whether anyone could fall in love
testimony. What it means for me to con? with him. He answers, "Maybe; I'm not
sciously believe that/? (or to be consciously sure." Here too, Harry's belief that no one
hopeful or afraid, etc.) is that I know my could fall in love with him is an uncon?
mental state via a particular cognitive scious one of which he is aware.
 82 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

So, Harry's conscious opinions need not to be suspicious of the not-so-simple view
quite contradict his unconscious belief that is that it doesn't look like it will help us
no one could ever fall in love with him. come to grips with what would be prob?
Nevertheless, there would seem to be lematic in such an utterance. According to
something wrong with
Harry's saying, "I the not-so-simple view, a belief's being
unconsciously believe that no one could unconscious lies in the fact that the sub?
ever fall in love with me; moreover, no one ject doesn't know about it via a particular
could ever fall in love with me." If Harry cognitive mechanism. But now, while there
is willing to assert that no one could ever would seem to be something wrong with
fall in love with him, then it's not right for most imaginable utterances of the form, "I
him to say that he believes this uncon? unconsciously believe
that/?; moreover,/?,"
sciously. We might think of this point in it's not at all clear what, if anything, would
connection with Moore's paradox. Moore be wrong with someone's saying, "My
pointed out that it would be absurd for knowledge that I believe
/? is not based on
someone to utter a sentence of the form, "I cognitive mechanism M; moreover /?."
believe that p, and it is not the case that Thus, the not-so-simple view leaves
/?." A number of writers have since noted Eroom's paradox looking like a mystery.
that Moore's point does not hold for self Again, I don't claim that this constitutes
ascriptions of unconscious In other
belief. anything like a decisive objection to the
words, there's nothing wrong with saying, not-so-simple view. Nonetheless, I do think
"I unconsciously believe that p, and it is it provides us with a reason to seek another
not the case that/?." I'm calling something account of unconscious mentality?one
further to your attention: that, prima facie, that helps us to make sense of Eroom's
there does seem to be something wrong paradox.
with saying, "I unconsciously believe that According to both the very simple and
/?, and it is the case that /?" (even though, the not-so-simple views, unconscious and
as with Moore's paradox, both conjuncts conscious are, as it were, epistemic no?
might be true).4 When we consider uncon? tions: on either view, to say that a mental
scious mental states, we find not only the state is unconscious is to say that the sub?
failure of Moore's paradox, but, as it were, ject lacks some sort of knowledge that he
the inversion of it. We might call this would enjoy were the mental state con?
Eroom's paradox. scious. Perhaps the difficulties that I have
Although I won't call it a constraint on raised for the two views suggest that this
any satisfactory account of the difference is not the best way to think about the dif?
between conscious and unconscious men? ference between conscious and
tality, it does seem reasonable to expect unconscious mental states. In what follows,
that such an account would shed light on I'll try to show that there is a better way to
Eroom's paradox. In other words, it's rea? think about this difference?one according
sonable to expect that if we come to to which conscious and unconscious are
understand what distinguishes unconscious not epistemic notions.
states of mind from conscious ones, we'll Moore's paradox indicates that our state?
also understand what would be wrong with ments about the world and our
saying, "I unconsciously believe that my self-ascriptions of conscious hang belief
brother has ruined my bid for reelection; together in a particular way. Eroom's para?
moreover, he has ruined it." And a reason dox indicates that our statements about the
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 83

world and our

self-ascriptions of uncon? It's a mistake to understand such represen?
scious belief come apart in a particular tations as akin to unconscious attitudes and
way. What Eroom's paradox starts to bring emotions. It will help to introduce some of
out, I think, is that when we speak of the themes that will be important later in
someone's believing something uncon? the paper if I say a little bit here about the

sciously, we are characterizing, not an character of this mistake.

epistemic lack, but rather, a certain kind Let's stay with the example of edge
of rupture in the way that a person's be? maps. According to David Marr's theory
liefs (as expressed in his claims about the of visual cognition and many theories that
world) and his self-ascriptions of belief have come in its wake, at an early stage in

ordinarily hang together. This

paper can be visual processing, a provisional map of the
understood as an attempt to shed light on edges in the visual field is computed.6 This
the kind of rupture that this is. is thought by some to occur in what are
called the ocular dominance columns lo?
II. "Unconscious Mental cated in striate visual cortex.7
Representations" Given suitable circumstances, you might
want to say, "A set of my ocular dominance
I have distinguished between two ways
columns believes that edges X and Y meet."
in which we use the words "conscious" and
But it would be courting confusion if you
"unconscious": it's one thing to say that
were to call such a "belief one of your
someone's or jealousy
fear is conscious
beliefs?conscious or unconscious. To see
rather than unconscious (i.e., that he is
the sort of confusion that would be invited
conscious/y afraid or conscious/y jealous),
by this way of speaking, it helps to know
and quite another thing to say that some?
that each eye feeds information to a sepa?
one is conscious of (i.e., aware of) his own
rate set of ocular dominance columns, and
fear or jealousy. Now, there are other ways
each of the two sets computes its own edge
in which we use the words "conscious" and
map. To the extent that your two sets of
"unconscious" that I won't be concerned
ocular dominance columns (the one domi?
with. For example, we sometimes speak of nated by your left eye and the one
someone's being "knocked unconscious."
This to the "conscious
dominated by your right eye) can be de?
usage is connected
scribed as
"thinking" or "believing"
of locution. A person who is knocked un?
anything at all, their "beliefs" sometimes
conscious is not conscious of anything.5
contradict each other. In such a case, there
I do want to devote a few paragraphs to
is no good reason to identify one of these
saying a little bit about a potentially con?
"beliefs," rather than the other, as what you
fusing use of the word "unconscious" that
believe.
common unconsciously
has become in certain circles.
But the real problem with characterizing
Cognitive scientists sometimes character?
a state of a set of ocular dominance col?
ize (what they call) mental representations umns as one of your beliefs does not lie in
as unconscious. A cognitive psychologist the fact that you have two sets of ocular
who was interested in visual object recog?
dominance columns. It lies, rather, in the
nition might say, "When you read a book, fact that a set of ocular columns
dominance
while you are thinking about what the au?
is not the sort of thing that can have a full
thor is saying, you are also constructing an
blooded belief. If we choose to speak of a
edge map?an unconscious mental repre? set of ocular dominance columns as hav?
sentation of the edges in your visual field."
ing beliefs at all, the content of such
84 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

"beliefs" is extremely thin. In striate vi? to distinguish unconscious mental states

sual cortex, there aren't even any from subpersonal informational states

object-representations. A set of ocular which (I want to say) are not conscious

dominance columns has no
idea, if you because they are not genuinely mental. But
will, that what it's mapping are the edges the themes of this discussion?that uncon?
of objects* Your beliefs, both conscious scious mental states are the states of a
and unconscious, about edges (or anything person and that they make sense only in
else) make sense in light of what you know light of a person's other attitudes and emo?
about the world, which is a great deal. The tions?will figureprominently throughout
"beliefs" of a set of ocular dominance col? the rest of the paper.
umns are not your beliefs.
III. The Unconscious as a Quasi
The "beliefs" of a set of ocular domi?
nance columns could be compared to the Person
states of an immune system. An immunolo
If we accept that anything subject to full
gist might say that what causes juvenile
blooded mental states must have the sort
diabetes is the immune system's mistak? of complexity that a person has, we may
enly "thinking" that the insulin-producing
be tempted to draw the conclusion that
cells in the pancreas are viruses. The "be?
unconscious mental states should be
liefs" of a set of ocular dominance columns
thought of as belonging, not to a mere
are no more yours than are the "beliefs" of
subpersonal information processor, but to
your immune system.
an, as it were, inner person. A number of
Indeed, the states of a set of ocular domi?
considerations reinforce this conclusion.
nance columns, like those of an immune
Earlier, we saw that a person may be con?
system, may be said to be beliefs?even
scious of his belief that /? without
beliefs with very thin content?only in the
conscious/y believing /??indeed while
most metaphorical of senses. This is con?
consciously believing that not-/?. How are
nected to the fact that we feel no inclination
we to make sense of the idea that I might
to ascribe fear, joy, or anger to a set of ocu?
be conscious of a mental state that I'm not
lar dominance columns.9 Genuine beliefs
consciously in? One familiar example of
fit, in a way to be discussed shortly, into a occurs when I attend to
this phenomenon
coherent pattern of actions and other men?
another person's state of mind. I may be
tal states of various types. Even a dog's
conscious of your belief that juggling is a
beliefs make sense
in light of his expres?
high art form without myself consciously
sions of fear, anger, dissatisfaction, and joy.
believing this (or believing it at all). This
(Under the right circumstances, Fido's joy?
suggests that we might make use of an in?
ful barking might make manifest his belief
terpersonal model in order to understand
that one of his friends is at the door.) The
how it is that I may be conscious of my
informational states that are ascribed to
in cognitive
own unconscious belief that/?. If we think
items pictured psychological of my unconscious mental states as, in
flow-charts do not have this character; they some sense, the beliefs of a quasi-indepen?
do not figure in a life in anything like the
dent agent, then itmight start to make sense
way that an organism's beliefs do.
that Imay be conscious of my unconscious
The only lesson I would have you draw
mental states.
from this little discussion of cognitive neu
This strategy for understanding uncon?
ropsychology is that we should take care
scious mentality gains further appeal when
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 85

we notice that there are other ways in inner space not with analogues of Boylean
which my unconscious states of mind seem corpuscles but with analogues of persons?
to be like the mental states of another per? internally coherent clusters of belief and
son. First, I can think of my unconscious desire. Each of these quasi persons is, in the
Freudian picture, a part of a single unified
beliefs as false or crazy, just as I can think
causal network, but not of a single person
of your beliefs as false or crazy. And sec?
(since the criterion for individuation of a
ond, I don't speak with first-person
person is a certain minimal coherence among
authority about either
your states of mind
its beliefs and desires). (F&MR, pp. 147-148)
or about my unconscious states of mind.
Freud found that the propositional attitudes
Thus, for a number of reasons, it is tempt?
he wanted to attribute to people were
ing to think of my unconscious mental
wildly inconsistent with one another. He
states as, in some sense, the mental states
wanted to say that a. boy may, for example,
of another person. In a paper called "Freud
both believe and strongly disbelieve that
and Moral Reflection," Richard Rorty
his father is liable to castrate him. Freud
credits Freud with discovering that uncon?
accounted for this sort of inconsistency by
scious mental states should be understood
distinguishing between conscious and un?
in this way?as the states of what Rorty
conscious attitudes.
Rorty thinks that the
calls a "quasi person."101 should say at the
way to understand what Freud was doing
outset that I don't think the account of un?
in so dividing up mental states is to see him
conscious mentality that Rorty attributes
as populating inner space with analogues
to Freud is particularly faithful to Freud's
of persons. According to this view, which
writings. For this reason, I am going to re?
Rorty himself endorses, a human being
fer to it as Rorty's account. The merit of
constitutes a single causal network, but two
Rorty's account is that he tries to take very
separate rational networks. Rorty writes,
seriously the idea that unconscious mental
"The same human body can play host to
states are the states of something like a
two or more persons" (F&MR, p. 147).
separate person. It will help us to see just
we try to see things Rorty credits Donald Davidson with in?
what goes wrong when
spiring this way of understanding what
this way.
Freud had to teach us. In "Mental Events,"
According to Rorty, the difference be?
Davidson writes:
tween Freud and Hume is that Freud

grasped the idea that the existence of an There is no assigning beliefs to a person one
intentional state presupposes a more or less by one on the basis of his verbal behaviour,
states. his or other local no matter
consistent network of other mental choices, signs
how and evident, for we make sense of
This led him
to posit the existence of more plain

than one coherent network of mental states particular beliefs only as they cohere with
other beliefs, with preferences, with inten?
within what we think of as a single per?
tions, hopes, fears, expectations, and the rest.
son?different quasi persons who share a
. . . The content of a propositional attitude
body. Rorty writes:
derives from its place in the pattern.11
The mechanization of the self that Hume
According to Davidson, propositional at?
suggested, and that associationist psychol? titudes derive their contents from a.pattern
ogy developed, amounted to little more than
that is revealed when we interpret one an?
a transposition into mentalistic terminology
other as
of a rather crude physiology of perception agents.

and contrast, Freud

What kind of a pattern is this? It's a ra?
memory. By populated
tional pattern?a network of states and
86 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

events that owe their location in the net? take to be its other mental states and its
work to their rational (rather than, e.g., actions according to what Davidson calls
spatial or causal) relations to one another. "the constitutive ideal of rationality."12 We
The items in such a pattern?the beliefs, interpret the actions and mental states of a

preferences, hopes, fears, and actions of a quasi person holistically so as to render

person?hang together rationally. On them rationally intelligible. mental The

Davidson's picture, a person's proposi? states of a single quasi person are thus un?
tional attitudes and actions may be said to derstood to bear rational, internal relations
bear internal, rational relations to one an? to one another. What we don't do is treat
other. A particular propositional attitude is the two quasi persons together?the human
what it is by virtue of its rational relations being as a whole?as a single rationally
to other attitudes and actions. coherent agent. This is to say, we don't in?
Rorty takesthis approach to understand? terpret the mental states on one side of the
ing propositional attitudes for granted, only partition line so as to be rationally coher?
he understands a single human body to ent with those on the other side. The
contain two independent networks of relations between mental states on one side
propositional attitudes?two separate quasi of the line and those on the other side are
persons. Given Rorty's view, we might pic? (like the relation between Smith's inten?
ture what we'd pretheoretically call "a tion to hit Jones and
subsequent Jones's
human mind" as follows: feeling of pain) causal, but not internal. Ac?

cording to Rorty, the intentional states that

we want to attribute to a human being don't
exhibit the minimal coherence that is a crite?
rion for the individuation of a single person.
Along with Rorty's picture of the uncon?
scious as a quasi person, there is a
corresponding picture of the sort of self
knowledge that can be gained through
psychoanalysis. Rorty writes:

Self-knowledge will be a matter of getting

with one or more crazy
acquainted quasi
people, listening to their crazy accounts of
how things are, seeing why they hold the
crazy views they do, and learning something
from them. (F&MR, p. 150)

Figure 1 Rorty refers to this kind of self-knowledge

as "the aim of psychoanalytic treatment"
(F&MR, p. 150). The aim is, in other
In this figure, C is the conscious mind,
words, to learn the views of a quasi person
and UC is the unconscious mind. Stars
with whom one shares one's body. He goes
represent mental states. C and UC are quasi
on to say:
persons, i.e., rationally coherent networks
The point of psychoanalysis ... is to find
of mental states, separated in the diagram by
new self-descriptions whose adoption will
a vertical partition line. We assign mental
enable one to alter one's behavior. Finding
states to a quasi person in light of what we
out the views of one's unconscious about
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 87

one's past is a way of getting some additional conscious. Freud was concerned to give us
suggestions about how to describe (and a technique, not just for finding out about
change) oneself in the future. (F&MR, p. 153) unconscious mental states, but for lifting
One needn't know much
about psycho? repressions?a technique by which some
to understand that something has of a person's unconscious mental states
analysis
gone wrong in these passages. If the point might be made conscious.13
of undergoing were to Rorty's mischaracterization of the sort of
psychoanalysis
about how one that is the goal of psycho?
gather useful suggestions self-knowledge
and change
describe oneself, then analysis is not unrelated to his view of what
might
at least traditional would unconscious mental states are. If we un?
analysis, analysis,
not take the form that it does?with the derstand my unconscious mental states as
so little. Here the states of another person who shares this
analyst saying Rorty might
that an unconscious mind body with me, then it is natural to think
reply analysand's
is liable to provide better suggestions than that an unconscious mental state can come
his analyst could; hence itmakes sense for to consciousness only in the sense that I?
the analyst to keep most of her sugges? that is, the conscious mind in this
tions to herself. But this would be an odd body?come to be aware
of it.
to in of the Here, someone might reply that Rorty's
thing say light passage
above in which describes basic position leaves open the possibility
quoted Rorty
that my unconscious mind do more
the unconscious as providing "crazy ac? might
counts of how are." Moreover, than inform me of its views and feelings:
things
even if Rorty represented the unconscious "Let's say that you unconsciously believe
as a wise and sober quasi person, his posi? that your father is insane. During the course
tion would miss the point of psychoanalysis. of your analysis, your unconscious mind
A distinction I discussed earlier, between might convince you (i.e., convince your
conscious to believe this. In such a
being conscious of a mental state and be? mind)
in it, is here relevant. Rorty case, you would not merely come to be
ing conscious/y
characterizes as if its aim aware of what your unconscious mind
psychoanalysis
were to make the analysand conscious of thought about your father; you would come
what he unconsciously thinks and feels to believe the same thing consciously.
about things. In analysis, I (or anyway, my Thus, given Rorty's basic framework, we
conscious come to be aware of the can make sense of the fact that mental
mind)
of states go from being unconscious to being
thoughts and feelings my unconscious
mind via a funny sort of conversation. But conscious."

aware of, e.g., one's unconscious But this attempt to save Rorty's view will
becoming
a far more not work. If my unconscious mind were to
anger at one's mother represents
modest than that of mak? convince my consciousmind that my fa?
therapeutic goal
I might be made ther was insane, then at the end of the day,
ing the anger conscious.
aware of the factthat I am unconsciously both my unconscious mind and my con?
at mother via the testimony of scious mind would believe that my father
angry my
on Rorty's view, via the was insane. There would be two quasi
my therapist?or
of a inside people inside me who were in perfect
testimony quasi person my body.
Either the result would be my becom? agreement about my father. Given such a pic?
way,
ture, it would make sense for me to say, "I
ing conscious of my unconscious anger.
This is not the same as the anger's both consciously and unconsciously believe
becoming
 88 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

that my father is insane." But we don't talk as you would pity someone whose body
this way about our beliefs. To say that had been inhabited by a demon.
someone unconsciously believes some? But I do seem to be responsible, at least

thing is at least to say that she doesn't to some degree, when I act on my uncon?
believe that very thing consciously. scious desires. Imagine that because I
When a mental state that was uncon? unconsciously want to harm my cousin
scious becomes conscious, it seems as Larry, I, as it were, "forget" to pick him up
if some sort of barrier is broken down at the airport when he comes to town. If
or removed. A mental state that was in Larry were to find out
that my stranding
some sense blocked no longer is, and no him at the airport was motivated by an un?
mental state can be both blocked and conscious desire to do him harm, he would
unblocked. It will be a while before we not think: "Oh well, that's just my cousin's
understand the sense in which an uncon? unconscious. My cousin isn't the slightest
scious mental state is blocked. But we bit responsible. He means me no harm."
can already see that Rorty's account fails No; Larry would blame me for leaving him
to capture what might be called the gram? at the airport. That is, he would blame the
mar of our talk about an unconscious unitary person who unconsciously wanted
mental state's becoming conscious. to do him (This is not to say that it
harm.
Here, let's set down a second constraint on would no difference
make to Larry whether
an adequate account of the distinction be? I was acting on a conscious or an uncon?
tween conscious and unconscious mentality. scious desire to do him harm. The point is

Constraint 2: An account of the distinction

not that we take people to be as respon?
between conscious and unconscious mental? sible for their behavior?or responsible in

ity should help us to understand what it is just the same way?when they act on un?
for an unconscious mental state to become conscious desires as when they act on
conscious. conscious ones. It is, rather, that we don't
respond to someone whom we take to have
While Rorty's account of unconscious
acted on an unconscious desire as if he
mental states satisfies Constraint 1, it does
were split into two people, only one of
not satisfy this second constraint.
I have been arguing that Rorty's account whom had acted at all.)

states no On Rorty's view, my body is shared by

of unconscious mental leaves
two independent quasi people, and there is
room for an adequate understanding of the
no, as
it were, overall person of whom
sort of self-knowledge that psychoanaly?
these two quasi people are parts. If I suf?
sis (or maturity) makes possible. But there
fered from multiple personality disorder,
is another sort of problem with his posi?
act on our unconscious this might be an appropriate way to de?
tion. We sometimes
scribe me. A multiple's various selves
desires. Given Rorty's view, acting on an
really can seem to be so separate from one
unconscious desire is tantamount to hav?
another that it doesn't make sense to blame
ing one's body temporarily taken over by
one of them for the doings of another. But
someone else. If the person writing these
this is not how it is with me. When I act on
words is my conscious self, then my un?
my unconscious desires, the actions are
conscious self is someone else. If my body
mine in a way that Eve Black's actions
acts on its (his?) intentions, / am not re?
were not Eve White's. This suggests a third
sponsible and should not be held
constraint on an adequate account of the
accountable. I should, rather, be pitied?
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 89

distinction between conscious and uncon? real question about who is speaking, i.e.,
scious mentality: about which quasi person in Jill's body is

Constraint 3: An account of the distinction expressing its belief. In such a circum?

between conscious and unconscious mental? stance, however, there simply would be no
mental but that Jill's remark was an ex?
ity should represent my unconscious question
states as my mental states. pression of what she consciously believed.

Rorty doesn't
provide such an account; he on Rorty's
IV. A Variation View
represents my unconscious mental states
as belonging to someone else who happens We can use the case of Jill in order to
to share a body with me. introduce a variation on Rorty's view of
Let us consider one last difficulty for unconscious mental states. On
Rorty's
Rorty's view, a difficulty that will help view, Jill's mind could be represented as
steer us toward a better view. Imagine shown in Figure 2 on the following page.
someone?call her Jill?who consciously Both Jill's unconscious mind and her con?
believes that her father is rather fond of scious mind hold the belief that Jill's father
her husband Jack, while unconsciously is alive. Given Rorty's conception of un?
believing the truth: that her father dislikes conscious mentality, this belief needs to
Jack intensely. Now, it makes sense to at? appear on both sides of the partition line.
tribute either one of these beliefs?indeed Now, consider a different picture of Jill's
any belief?to Jill only against the back? mind: Figure 3 on the following page.
drop of other beliefs that rationally cohere Here, the partition line is shortened, and
with it. Rorty is well aware of this.14 But there are stars on either side
immediately
something that Rorty doesn't seem to no? of it. There are other stars around the pe?
tice is that even where a conscious and an riphery of the circle. The stars on the
unconscious belief are in direct contradic? immediate left of the partition line repre?
tion?as they are in Jill's case?the two sent unconscious mental states. All other
beliefs typically presuppose many the of stars in the figure represent conscious men?
same background beliefs.15 In order for Jill tal states. Between a mental state pictured
to think either that her father is fond of Jack on the immediate left of the partition line
or that her father dislikes Jack, she must and a mental state on the immediate right
believe that her father is alive, that he of the line there are no internal, rational
knows of Jack's existence, etc. Rorty relations. We don't make sense of such
would to say, "Jill's conscious
have mind mental in light of each other as we
states
and her unconscious mind both believe that normally make sense of a person's mental
her father is alive. Jill believes that he's states in light of his other mental states.
alive both consciously and unconsciously." We try to make mental
don't states out to
We've already seen that such a statement be consistent across the partition line. Re?
would be inconsistent with the ways in lations across the partition line are, as it
which we
actually speak about conscious were, causal.
merely
and unconscious beliefs. But there is a fur? So far, all that's been said about the par?
ther point to be made here. Imagine that, tition line in this figure could be said about
in order to correct someone who is under the line that separates Rorty's two quasi
the misapprehension that her father has persons in Figure 2. The partition line in
recently died, Jill says, "My father is still Figure 3 is different from the one in Fig?
alive." On Rorty's view, there should be a ure 2 in that the items immediately on
90 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

Belief that father Belief that father

dislikes Jack is fond of Jack

Belief that father

Belief that father
is alive
is alive

Figure 2

Belief that father

Belief that father
is fond of Jack
dislikes Jack

Belief that father is alive

Figure 3
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 91

either side of it share a background of men? provides no explanation of what distin?

tal states. The stars around the periphery guishes unconscious mental states from
of the circle represent conscious mental conscious ones. Figure 3 will prove, how?
states that bear internal, rational relations ever, to be a step in the direction of such
to mental states on both sides of the parti? an explanation.
tion line. Thus, Jill's belief that her father
is alive need not be represented twice in V Expression and Self-ascription

Figure 3. This belief is part of the back?

which we make sense both Rorty follows Davidson in being sensi?
ground against tive to the way our talk about a person's
of her conscious belief that her father is
psychology makes sense only as the propo?
fond of Jack and her more accurate uncon?
sitional attitudes of a person are understood
scious belief that her father dislikes Jack.
to hang together rationally. Now accord?
Jill's belief that her father is alive need only
ing to Davidson, it's not only the
be represented once because Figure 3
propositional attitudes of a person that
doesn't represent Jill as divided into two
must be seen as hanging together rationally
completely separate persons. Overall, Jill
if we are to understand her as having a
is represented as exhibiting a fair degree
mind at all. Our actions must hang together
of rational coherence, even though there
rationally with our beliefs and desires. In
is, in her mind, a local region of incoher?
order to understand someone as acting at
ence. Figure 3 represents a unitary person,
all, or as having propositional attitudes at
a person with certain mental states that are
all, we need to see her actions as making
rationally cut off from certain other men?
sense in light of her beliefs and desires.
tal states, but a unitary person nonetheless.
Our beliefs and desires bear internal rela?
Obviously, in interpreting Figure 3, I
tions, not only to eachother, but to the
have been, in effect, suggesting a way of
actions that they rationalize.
refining Rorty's story about unconscious to Davidson
Thus, according and Rorty,
mental states. None of the objections that
if we are to see a thing as a person, we must
I raised earlier against Rorty's view cut
view it as having beliefs, desires, and ac?
against this refinement of it. Nonetheless,
tions that hang together rationally. But
it would be a mistake to claim that Figure
what makes the story of a thing intelligible
3 satisfactorily elucidates the distinction
as the story of a person is not merely that
between conscious and unconscious men?
the thing has a set of propositional attitudes
tality. The figure fails us at a critical point: and actions that can be understood to be
nothing in itmakes clear by virtue of what
rationally coherent. Davidson tends to fo?
the stars on the immediate left of the parti?
cus on one way in which mental states and
tion line?rather than, say, those on the
behavior?the inner and the outer?must
immediate right?represent unconscious
hang together if we're to have mental states
mental states. Figure 3 illustrates how a
in view at all: actions must be rationalized
single person can be understood to believe
both that her father is fond of her husband by belief-desire pairs. But mental states
and behavior need to hang together in ways
and that her father dislikes her husband.
that are not captured by the thought that
The figure does not show why we should
our attitudes rationalize our actions.
think of either of these beliefs as uncon?
Here, we should consider the notion of
scious rather than conscious. Useful as Figure
expression. Our actions are said to express
3 might be for representing irrationality, it
the beliefs and desires that rationalize
92 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

them. If a man runs after a bus because he I have been talking about expressive re?
doesn't want to be late for work, then his lations that are not reason-relations. The

running expresses his desire to be on time. examples considered thus far have in?
But now notice that, often, a mental state volved mental states that are expressed
is said to be expressed by a bit of behavior non-linguistically. Of course, we often ex?
that it does not rationalize. There are ex? press what we think and feel in what we

pressive relations between the inner and the say. express my anger at someone
Imight
outer that are not reason-relations. To take by insulting him, or my gratitude by thank?
a simple example, when someone ex? ing him. Now, one kind of linguistic
presses his joy by smiling, his smile is not expression takes the form of self-ascrip?
rationalized by his joy. Given the way that tion or avowal. I say, "I'm angry at you,"
Davidson understands reasons, smiling and in so doing, I express my anger. It is a
isn't something that one typically does for distinctive feature of mental state avowals

any reason. Still, someone's joy and his that they allow a person both to say that he

expressions of joy?like his reasons and is in a certain mental state and to express
the actions that express them?make sense that mental state. When I say that some?

together, in light of one another. The ra? one else

is happy, I don't express the
tional relation that, as Davidson points out, happiness. When I smile, I express my hap?
obtains between reasons and actions is a piness, but I don't say anything about it.

special case of what we might think of as a When I avow that I'm happy, however, I
more generic internal relation?a hanging both say that I'm happy and, thereby, ex?
together relation?that obtains between press my happiness.16
mental states and behavior. The word "ex? Although state self-ascriptions
mental

pression" picks out this more generic typically express that which they are as?
internal relation. criptions of, they don't always. If Harry
Consider another
example of a bit of be? says, "My therapist has convinced me; I'm
havior that expresses a state of mind but is unconsciously angry at my mother," he
not rationalized by it. A writer gets frus? does not, thereby, express his anger at his
trated with her work and decides to get mother. He expresses his belief ih^i he's
away from her computer for a while. She angry at his mother, but he doesn't express
leaves her apartment and, in leaving, slams his anger. This is not to say that Harry's
the door. Her door closing is an intentional unconscious anger at his mother goes com?
action. It expresses her desire that her pletely unexpressed; his therapist probably

apartment not be robbed while she is would not have come to the conclusion that

gone?a desire which, along with certain he was angry at his mother unless he occa?
beliefs about her neighborhood, rational? sionally expressed his anger in one way or
izes the action. But the way she closes the another, e.g., by refusing to visit her. But
door, her slamming it, expresses something while Harry is able to express his uncon?
else: her frustration at her work. Her door scious anger, he is unable to express it

slamming isn't rationalized by her frustra? simply by ascribing it to himself.

tion, but it expresses it nonetheless. When I want to claim that it's a defining char?
we express our states of mind, we make them acteristic of our unconscious mental states
manifest in behavior to which they are inter? that we lack the ability to express them

nally, though not always rationally, related. simply by self-ascribing them. Like all
mental states, the unconscious ones may
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 93

be expressed in our behavior. But what is what accounts for Eroom's paradox? What
distinctive about unconscious mental states is the problem with an utterance of the
is that we're unableto express them sim? form, "P; moreover, I unconsciously be?

ply by self-ascribing them. If Jill lieve that p." On my view, a mental state's

unconsciously believes that her father being unconscious lies in a subject's lack?
doesn't like her husband, she might
express ing the ability to express it simply by
this belief in any number of ways. But not self-ascribing it. Thus, if Jill were to say,

by saying, "I believe that my father doesn't "My father is alive; moreover, I uncon?
like my husband." Jill might utter these sciously believe that
he's alive," her
words. She might say: "Well
you've con? utterance would be true just in case her
vinced me. The only way to make sense of father were alive and she lacked the abil?
my behavior is by taking me to have this ity to express her belief that he's alive by
crazy unconscious belief. Unconsciously, self-ascribing it. What would be
strange
I believe that my father doesn't like my about such an utterance is that anyone who
husband." Here, Jill expresses her opinion is in a position to sincerely assert that her
that she has a particular unconscious be? father is alive should be able to express her
lief, but she doesn't express the belief that he was alive by self-ascribing
unconscious belief; she doesn't express the it. If a person lacks the ability to express
belief that her father dislikes her husband. her belief that p by self-ascribing it, then
(Indeed, she expresses the opposite opin? she cannot sincerely assert that p either.
ion.) The point may be put as follows: Second, in what sense is your relation to
Someone's mental state is conscious if she one of your own unconscious mental states
has an ability to express it simply by self like your relation to the mental state of

ascribing it. If she lacks such an ability another? According to the view recom?
with respect to one of her mental states, it mended here, the answer lies in this:
is unconscious. Whether you say that another
person is
Of course, what this means for our un? angry or that you are unconsciously angry,
derstanding of the distinction between you are engaged in, as it were, mere de?
conscious and unconscious mentality de? scription; you do not thereby express the
pends on how we think about expression anger about which you are talking.
and expressive abilities. Part of what I've Earlier, I noted that we don't speak with
been trying to do in this paper (especially first-person authority about our own un?
in this section, but really since I began talk? conscious mental states. I should point out
ing about rational, internal relations that what I've offered here is the begin?
between attitudes and actions in ?111) is to ning of an explanation of first-person
provide an elucidation?or, at least, the authority. A central feature of the phenom?
beginning of an elucidation?of the notion enon of first-person authority is that we
of expression.1718 Such an elucidation to? seem able to responsibly ascribe conscious
gether with the point that I put in italics mental states to ourselves without
needing
at the end of the last paragraph may be any evidence in support of the ascriptions.
said to constitute an account of the dis? The explanation of this lies in the fact that
tinction between conscious and there is an important respect in which a
unconscious mental states. typical self-ascription of, for example, hap?
We are now in a position to address a piness is like a smile. Just as you might
number of issues that arose earlier. First, smile and thereby express your happiness
94 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

without needing any evidence in support one's state of mind by self-ascribing it is

of the claim that you are happy, you can not a sufficient condition for the state's
say, "I'm so happy," and thereby express being conscious. And lacking such an abil?
your happiness without needing any such ity is not a necessary condition for the
evidence. By contrast, when you report state's being unconscious."
someone else's mental state, or your own Reply: I said that someone's state of mind
unconscious mental state, you don't ex? is conscious if and only if she has an abil?
press the mental state in question, so you ity to express it simply by ascribing it to

require evidence supporting your claim herself. The sort of ability that's at issue is
about it; you don't speak with first-person one a person
that enables to express her

authority.19 state of mind in a self-ascription of it,

Finally, the above considerations put us where what matters?what carries the ex?
in a position to address an issue that did pressive force?isn't her tone of voice
(or
not come up earlier, namely, why it is that whether is tapping her foot, or what
she
the conscious/unconscious distinction she is wearing, or to whom she happens to
doesn't seem to get a foothold when we be speaking), but simply the fact that she
are talking about the mental states of non is giving voice to her sincere judgment
linguistic animals. We often speak about, about her own state of mind. That some?
e.g., what our dogs want and believe, but one might manage to express her anger in
we don't characterize these attitudes as ei? a self-ascription of it via a clipped tone of
ther conscious or unconscious. We don't voice doesn't show that she has the relevant
say things like, "Fido
unconsciously sort of expressive ability. When I am con?
wanted to go outside," or, "Fifi consciously sciously angry, I can say in a neutral tone
believed that there was a squirrel in that of voice, "I'm furious," and thereby ex?
tree." This, I think, is because expression press my state of mind.
in the form of mental state
self-ascriptions Objection 2: "Imagine someone?call
is never an option for dogs. It is only in him Harpo?who is consciously angry at
the context of a linguistic life that itmakes his brother but has a phobia about avow?
sense to distinguish attitudes and emotions ing anger; he cannot bring himself to say

according to whether or not they can be aloud that he's

angry, even when he is

expressed in self-ascriptions of them. alone. He won't write that he's angry either.
Let us now consider a couple of objec? If he is asked whether he's angry, he'll deny
tions. Responding to these will help to it. Although Harpo is consciously angry,
clarify the main point. he is unable to express his anger in a self

Objection 1: "Imagine that I occasion? ascription of it. That we can imagine such
anger at my a person demonstrates that having the abil?
ally express my unconscious
father by speaking in a peculiar, clipped ity to express a mental state simply by
tone of voice. One day, while speaking in self-ascribing it is not a necessary condi?
this tone of voice, I say, 'My therapist tells tion for the state's being conscious. And
me that I'm unconsciously angry at my fa? the absence of this sort of ability is not a
ther, I suppose
and she must be right.' sufficient condition for the state's being

Through my tone of voice, I express my unconscious."

anger at my father in a self-ascription of Reply: A person may be said to have an

it, even though the anger is unconscious. ability, even though she is, for some rea?
What this case shows is that, pace the view son, prevented from exercising it at a
set out here, having an ability to express particular moment. A major league pitcher
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 95

might have the ability to throw a 90 m.p.h. partition line marks the absence of inter?

pitch even though he is, at the moment, nal, rational relations between certain
handcuffed, and so not in a position to do mental states and certain other mental
so. A tenor who has the ability to hit a high states. In Figure 4, the partition line marks
C might not do so for a period of time be? the absence of expressive relations between
cause of a neurotic fear that should he hit mental states and their self-ascriptions.
a note above A, he'll die on the spot. Such The fact that a mental state is partitioned
a person would have an ability to hit a C off from expressive self-ascription need not
even while he was afraid to exercise it. mean that it cannot be self-ascribed at all.
One way to answer the Harpo objection What it means for a star to lie behind the
would be to say that, as Harpo has been partition line in Figure 4 is that if the men?
described, he does have the ability to ex? tal state it represents is self-ascribed, the
press his anger merely by self-ascribing it, self-ascription not
willbe an expression of

only he is afraid to exercise it. To thus that mental state. Figure 4 represents a per?

imagine Harpo is different from imagin? son who lacks the ability to express some of

ing him without this ability. To see this, his mental states in self-ascriptions of them.
let us imagine that in addition to his con? In Figure 5, I have combined Figures 3
scious anger at his brother, Harpo is and 4 to produce a picture of Jill (the
unconsciously angry at his mother. We can woman who consciously believes that her
understand the difference between the father is fond of her husband, Jack, while
character of Harpo's anger toward his unconsciously believing that her father dis?
brother and that of his anger toward his likes Jack). Figure 5 ismeant to retain what
mother to lie in this: If Harpo didn't have is right in Figure 4, while also illustrating
a phobia about admitting that he was an? the fact that a person's unconscious men?

gry?if he were happy to engage in sincere tal states fail to hang together rationally
discussions concerning the whole range of with some of her conscious mental states.
his feelings?he could
express anger his As they are represented in this figure, Jill's
at his brother merely by self-ascribing it, unconscious mental states are rationally
but he could not express his anger at his related to one another. For this reason, it
mother in the same way. makes sense to think of the area between
the two partition lines as constituting a kind
VI. Conclusion of subdivision of mind?something we

might call "the unconscious." Even so, the

Let us return to Figure 3 which, as I in?
unconscious is not a person.
dicated earlier, might be used to illustrate
Let's now look again at our three con?
certain forms of irrationality, but fails as
straints on an account of the distinction
an explanation of the distinction between
between conscious and unconscious men?
conscious and unconscious mentality. We
can now produce a more tality. First, such an account should respect
satisfactory fig?
the difference between someone's being
ure. First, we need to add marks outside
conscious/y afraid
(hopeful, expectant,
the circle to represent various forms of
behavior?behavior that ex? angry,.. .) and someone's being conscious
expressive . . .).
states which are represented of her fear (hope, expectation, anger,
presses mental
On the account that I've suggested, when
by the stars inside the circle. Second, we
I am consciously afraid, I'm able to express
need to shift the partition line to the pe?
my fear by self-ascribing it. Imay be con
riphery of the circle. In Figure 3, the
96 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

UC

* * *

Figure 4

Belief that father

Self-ascription of belief
that father dislikes Jack
dislikes Jack

Belief that father

is fond of Jack

Belief that father

is alive

Figure 5
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 97

scious of the fact that I'm afraid without there are different sorts of knowledge, which
this ability. are far from equivalent psychologically. . . .
having
an account of the distinction If the doctor transfers his knowledge to the
Second,
men? patient as a piece of information, it has no
between conscious and unconscious
result. . . .The knows after this what
should us to understand what it patient
tality help sense of his
he did not know before?the
is for an unconscious mental state to be?
symptom; yet he knows it just as little as he
come conscious. On my account, an
did. Thus we learn that there is more than
unconscious mental state becomes con?
one kind of ignorance.20
scious when a person who was once unable
Freud expresses an important insight in this
to express her mental state by self-ascrib?
passage. It's one thing for me to know that
ing it gains the ability to do so.
an account of the distinction be? I, for example, unconsciously fear my fa?
Finally,
ther and quite another thing for my fear to
tween conscious and unconscious
become conscious. This insight goes want?
mentality should represent my unconscious
ing in both the very simple view and in
mental states as my mental states. On the
Rorty's view. What I've tried to do in this
account I have suggested, this constraint
is satisfied. unconscious mental states paper is to say how it is that "Knowledge
My
as the states is not always the same as knowledge." The
are not represented either of
sort of self-knowledge that is a goal of psy?
another person with whom I share a body,
or as the states of a subpersonal choanalytic treatment is, on my view, not
compo?
nent in my architecture. really a kind of knowledge at all, but rather
cognitive
a certain sort of expressive ability. The im?
According to the view put forward here,
portant distinction to which Freud is calling
unconscious attitudes and emotions are
our attention in this passage turns out to
states of the unitary person who expresses
be a distinction between merely knowing
them. / express my unconscious mental
that one is in a particular mental state and
states in my actions?actions for which I
having the ability to express one's mental
am to a certain extent responsible. I lack
state simply by self-ascribing it.
the ability to express my unconscious men?
Philosophers of mind have, on the whole,
tal states in self-ascriptions of them, but I
tended to view the distinction between con?
express them nonetheless.
scious and unconscious states of mind as
Freud writes:
an epistemic matter?a matter of whether,
From what I have so far said a neurosis would
or how, a subject knows something. Such
seem to be the result of a kind of ignorance?
views cannot do justice to the kind of rup?
a not knowing about mental events that one
. . .Now
ture in a human life that is signaled by the
to know of. it would as a rule
ought
word "unconscious." To have an uncon?
be very easy for a doctor experienced in
to guess what mental had scious mental state is not essentially a
analysis impulses
remained unconscious in a particular matter of being ignorant of something; it's
patient.
So it ought not to be very difficult, either, a matter of being unable to do something?
for him to restore the patient by communi? of being unable to express one's state of
cating his knowledge to him and so mind in a particular way.21
his . . .
remedying ignorance.
Indiana University
If only that was how things happened! We
came upon discoveries in this connection for
which we were at first Knowl?
unprepared.
edge is not always the same as
knowledge:
98 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

NOTES

1. See, e.g., SirWilliam Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. 1 (New York: Sheldon
and Co., 1858), p. 242:

of an unconscious action or passion of the mind . . . has been established as a

[T]he supposition gravely
conclusion which the ph nomena not only warrant, but enforce.

2. Colin McGinn endorses the very simple view when he writes:

This . . . raises the interesting of what makes a propositional attitude unconscious. . . . For a
problem
desire (say) to be unconscious is for its possessor not to know or believe that he has that desire. ("Action
and its Explanation," in Philosophical Problems inPsychology, ed. Neil Bolton [New York: Methuen &
Co., 1979], p. 37)

3. In a paper called "Detection, Expression, and First-Person Authority," which I'm currently
preparing for publication.
4. This point should not be overstated. It is possible to imagine a situation in which a sentence of
the form, "I unconsciously believe that/?; moreover/?," would be intelligible. Imagine that Harry's
mother, who is a terrible driver, drives Harry to work every morning. Harry wishes that he were
able to drive himself because he thinks it's dangerous to be a passenger in his mother's car. He
believes that his mother's inept driving is liable to result in his being injured or killed in a car
accident. One day, Harry's psychoanalyst convinces him that he unconsciously believes that his
mother means to murder him by poisoning his well water. In this situation, Harry could say, "I
unconsciously believe that my mother is liable to harm me; moreover my mother is liable to harm
me. I believe that she's liable to harm me both unconsciously and consciously."

In the face of this example, it is natural to respond that, even so, Harry doesn't really believe the
same thing about his mother both consciously and unconsciously. His conscious belief is that
she's liable to harm him by involving him in a car accident while his unconscious belief is that

she's liable to harm him by deliberately poisoning his well water. Where it makes sense for
someone to utter a sentence of the form, "I unconsciously believe that p; moreover (or "I
/?"
believe that p both consciously and unconsciously"), we find that the contents of the conscious
and unconscious beliefs in question can be further specified so as to display a difference between
them. Notice that this is not true for sentences of the form, "My friend believes thatp; moreover
/?," (or "My friend and I both believe that /?"). My friend and I can be in, as it were, perfect
agreement about p.

5. In his "Two Concepts of Consciousness," Philosophical Studies 49 (1986): 329-359, David

M. Rosenthal writes: "Intuitively, a mental state's being conscious means just that it occurs in
our stream of consciousness" (336). If this sentence is faithful to any non-philosophical use of
the word "conscious," it's not a use with which I'm concerned in this paper. Pace Rosenthal, to

characterize someone's mental state as conscious is not ordinarily to commit oneself to the claim

that it somehow in her current stream of consciousness. To see this, consider a case in
figures
which a question arises whether or not a mental state is conscious.
concerning particular Imagine
that your cousin, Helen, says to you: son wants to kill me. he tried to run me over
"My Today,
with his car. I need to hide out at your house for a while." Later, speaking on the phone with a
friend, you say, "Do you remember my cousin, Helen?the one with the devoted son, Roger?
Now trying to kill her." Your friend replies, "Do you mean that now she con?
she thinks he's
sciously thinks Roger wants to do her in, or are you talking about some unconscious belief of
hers?" In answering this question, you would not need to concern yourself with the question of
what, if anything, was in Helen's stream of consciousness while you were on the phone
speaking
 DISTINCTIONBETWEENCONSCIOUSAND UNCONSCIOUS STATESOFMIND / 99

with your friend. With Helen asleep on your couch, you could answer truthfully, "I'm talking about
what she consciously believes now about Roger. Her conscious belief is that he wants her dead."

A related point: Iwon't be concerned in this paper with questions about what it's like to be this or
that, or to be in this or that state. (I won't be worrying about what Ned Block calls "phenomenal
consciousness." [See his "A Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,"#e/i?zv/c>ra/ and Brain
Sciences 18 (1995): 227-287.])

6. See David Marr, Vision (New York: Freeman Press, 1982).

7. See David H. Hubel, Eye, Brain, and Vision (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1988).
8. The drawings of edge maps that appear in cognitive psychology texts can, for this reason, be
misleading. A drawing of an edge map looks like an object. In Marr's Vision, there's one that
looks like a teddy bear. But as far as a set of ocular dominance columns is concerned, there aren't
any teddy bears; there aren't even any objects with edges. (Thanks to Jacob Feldman for pointing
this out to me.)

9. For an illuminating discussion of the way in which being subject to emotions distinguishes
genuine subjects of belief from mere information processors, see Bennett Helm, "The Signifi?
cance of Emotions," American Philosophical Quarterly 31, no. 4 (October 1994): 319-331.

10. Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection" in Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philo?
sophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Hereafter this will be
cited as F&MR.

11. Essays on Actions & Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 221.
12. Essays on Actions & Events, p. 223.
13. This is not to say that whenever an analysand's suffering is due to an unconscious state of
mind, the aim (or even, an aim) of psychoanalytic treatment is to make the state of mind con?
scious. If a patient suffers because he unconsciously believes some crazy claim (e.g., that if he
were to succeed in business, he would thereby murder his father) the goal of analysis is not to
bring him to consciously believe this claim (even for a little while). Lifting a repression is not
a matter of making an unconscious state of mind conscious. If an analysand
always unconsciously
believes that/7?where p is inconsistent with much of what he consciously believes?then lifting
the repression associated with the belief that p will probably not result in a conscious belief that p.

14. He writes:

One can only attribute a belief to something if one simultaneously attributes lots of other true
mostly
and mostly consistent beliefs. (F&MR, p. 147)

15. John Heil makes a similar point in his "Minds Divided," Mind 98 (October 1989): 571-583.
16. There is a tendency amongst analytic philosophers to assume that assertion and expression
are, in a way, mutually exclusive, i.e., to assume that an assertion to the effect that the is
speaker
in a particular mental state cannot express that very mental state. This (whose preva?
tendency
lence may be due, in part, to the influence of emotivism in ethics) can be seen in, e.g., the following
from David M. Rosenthal's "Thinking that One Thinks" (in Consciousness, ed. M. Davies and G.
W. Humphreys [Oxford: Basil Blackwell], 1993):

I can communicate my suspicion that the door is open either by expressing my suspicion or by explicitly
about it. . . . In I suspect I report, rather than express,
telling you saying something, my suspicion. (200)
 100 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

In his paper, "Expressing" (in Philosophy in America, ed. M. Black [Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Uni?
versity Press, 1967]), William P. Alston rightly rejects this assumption:

I can express my enthusiasm for your plan just as well by saying "I'm very enthusiastic about your
as I can by "What a tremendous plan!" "Wonderful," or "Great!" I can express at
plan," saying disgust
X just as well by saying "I'm disgusted," as by
saying "How revolting!" "Ugh." or ap? I can express
as well by saying "I completely approve of what you are doing" as I can by saying "Swell," or
proval
"Good show." And I can express annoyance as well by saying "That annoys me no end" as by saying
"Damn."

This shows that expressing and asserting are not mutually exclusive in the way commonly supposed. (16)

17.1 offer a more extended elucidation in "Wittgenstein's 'Plan for the treatment of psychologi?
cal concepts'," which I'm currently preparing for publication.

18. I have discovered three other writers who point out that while it is possible for someone to
ascribe an unconscious belief to himself, he does not thereby express the belief. These are Arthur
Collins ("Unconscious Belief," The Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 20 [October 16, 1969]: 667
680), Georges Rey ("Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception," in
Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. B. P. McLaughlin and A. O. Rorty [Berkelely: The Univer?
sity of California Press, 1988]), and Richard Moran ("Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution,
and Undoing," European Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 2 [August 1997]: 141-161). Although a
discussion of the views set out in these papers will have to await another occasion, I'll say this
for now: While I'm sympathetic with a good deal of what these writers have to say, it seems to
me that all of them understand the notion of expression too much in terms of a distinctive feature
of belief self-ascription, viz., that when someone expresses his belief by saying, "I believe that
/?," he thereby commits himself to the truth of the claim that/7. While this is a noteworthy feature
of one kind of expression of one kind of mental state, if we understand the very notion of expres?
sion too much in terms of it, we lose our grip on what unconscious beliefs have in common with
unconscious fears, wishes, and revulsions.

19. In both 'Plan'" and "Detection," I argue that is not a

"Wittgenstein's first-person authority
kind of epistemic authority at all. It should not be understood as anything like the sort of author?
ity with which an eye-witness speaks about what she has seen. We speak with authority about our
conscious mental states, not because we know them so well, but because our of
self-ascriptions
them are of them.
expressions

20. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York, W. W. Norton and Co: 1966), pp. 280
281, my emphasis.

21. I am very grateful to James Conant, Gary Ebbs, Martha Farah, Samantha Fenno, Kimberly
Keller, Irad Kimhi, John McDowell, and Thomas Ricketts for helpful conversations about the
material presented in this paper. In addition, I am indebted to Robert Almeder as well as to this
two anonymous referees for incisive comments on an earlier draft.
paper's