001. US v.

PABLO explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the
G.R. No. L-11676 | October 17, 1916 | En Banc | Appeal from Judgment of the CFI of Penal Code provisions are deemed to be in force.
Bataan - This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, false testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3,
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant. of the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
TORRES, J. All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent
Digest by Dawn Chua laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use
cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in
Short Version: numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and even
Pablo made a false testimony in order to protect some gambling lords. He was convicted of though they were repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the
perjury under Act. 1697 which was repealed by the Administrative Code, which in turn does not decree which I issued in conformity with them although they were not
provide for any penalty. The Court resolved the matter by ruling that Act No. 1697 did not expressly designated. The council will be informed thereof and will take
expressly repeal the articles of the Penal Code relating to false testimony. Since the account of the importance of the matter.
Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the - The Court thus convicted Pablo of false testimony with the aggravating circumstance
provisions of the Penal Code are also repealed, the Penal Code provisions are deemed to be in of bribery.
force.
Johnson, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Facts: Moreland, J., concurs in the result .
- Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality of Balanga, was ordered by his chief to
raid a jueteng game. When he arrived at the reported gambling den, the players had
already run away. He saw two men leave the lot: Maximo Malicsi and Antonio
Rodrigo. But since he had seen no material proof that the game was being played, he
refrained from arresting them.
- He only found therein Francisco Dato (whom he arrested), a low table, a tambiolo,
and 37 bolas.
- These facts were reported in a memorandum to the chief of police. Malicsi and
Rodrigo were identified as the cabecillas or ringleaders of the gambling operation.
- In consequence, the chief filed a complaint in the court of justice of the peace
charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in
violation of municipal ordinance No. 5.
- The three men were subsequently arrested. The memorandum submitted by Pablo
was used as evidence against them.
- However, during trial, Pablo denied under oath that he had seen Malicsi and Rodrigo
run away.
- Apparently, before trial, Pablo was paid P15 not to testify against Malicsi and Rodrigo.
- Pablo was later on charged with perjury. He was convicted thereof. He comes to this
court on appeal.
- Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards
convicted under Act No. 1697. Previous decisions of the Court have
declared that Act No. 1697 repealed the provisions in the penal code
pertaining to false testimony.
- However, Act No. 1697 has already been repealed by the Administrative
Code (Act No. 2657) which does not provide for any penalty.

Issue:
Given that the Administrative Code does not provide for any penalty against the crime of
perjury, should it go unpunished? NO

Dispositive:
Judgment appealed from reversed. Pablo sentenced to penalty of two years four months and
one day of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas

Reasoning:
- Act No. 1697 did not expressly repeal the articles of the penal code relating to false
testimony. Since the Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not
002. People v. Santiago The silence of Congress regarding those laws amendatory (even laws prior to Act no. 2886) of the
G.R. No. 17584/ March 8, 1922/En Banc/ Appeal to SC said General Order must be considered as an act of approval. Furthermore the SC ratiocinated
Gregorio Santiago – petitioner that, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of the Philippine Islands
People of the Philippines – respondent as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the same is not fatal when,
Decision by J. Romualdez, Digest by Arnel as in the present case, it was not objected to in the court below.

SHORT VERSION: Gregorio Santiago, who was driving a car, ran over a 7-year old child, Porfirio
Parondo, causing his death. Gregorio was charged with the crime of "homicide by reckless
negligence" and was sentenced to one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay the
costs of the trial. He now comes to this SC, questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2886 which
amended Military Order No. 58 (that stated that all public prosecution shall be in the name of the
U.S.).
Facts: Petitioner Gregorio Santiago was driving an automobile at 30 miles an hour on a highway
6 meters wide. He overtook a stationary wagon on one side and, without slowing down, mowed
into two kids playing on a heap of stones on the other side, killing one of the kids instantly.
DISPOSITIVE: Affirms the Lower Court.
a) Section 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same
character as the provisions of a constitution;
b) That the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions; and that
the court a quo did not commit any of the errors assigned.
c) The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, Santiago being furthermore sentenced to the
accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both instances.

Gregorio was charged with the crime of "homicide by reckless negligence" and was sentenced to
one year and one day of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial. The complaint was
filed under Act no 2886 (i.e., instead of U.S. vs Gregorio Santiago, it became People of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio Santiago). Act No. 2886 was promulgated on 24 February 1920 and the
criminal complaint was filed on 10 may 1920.

The defense is now arguing that the said Act was unconstitutional since the Philippine Legislature
was, and is, not authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2
thereof, because its provisions have the character of constitutional law.

ISSUE/HELD: a) WON Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed,
is valid and constitutional? YES.
b) WON the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of the state? NO,
procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of the states, but it is left in
the hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.

RATIO: In pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State has the
authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal
procedure, subject to the principle of equal protection. The SC also held that the power of the
States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories such as the Philippines. By
act of the US Congress their power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to define and
punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.).

The US military government, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to

establish new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58.
The main purpose of GO 58 is limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its
provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. Since the provisions of this General Order have
the character of statutory law, the power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the
question is considered only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886,
the subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.

There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the name to
be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases---which must not be understood as depriving the
Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public crimes
because the government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is
autonomous like Porto Rico and Hawaii (note: at that time, Hawaii is not yet part of the US).
003. LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],
petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to
the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
G.R. No. L-63915 | April 24, 1985 | En Banc | Petition for Mandamus
Escolin, J.
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version:
In this petition for mandamus, Petitioners want the respondent public officials to publish several
presidential issuances. The respondents argue that based on Art. 2 of the CC , publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. The Court held that presidential issuances of
general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned
Facts:
- In this case, the petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent public
officials to publish in the Official Gazette several presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
- Respondent public officials argue that based on Art. 2 of the CC1, publication in the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect,
publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to bring the petition
2. WON publication in the Official Gazette is a condition sine qua non for the effectivity
of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.
Reasoning:
1. YES
- In Severino v. Governor General, the Court held that while the general rule is that a
writ of mandamus should be granted to a private individual only in those cases where
he has some private interest to be subserved independent of that which he holds with
the public at large, and that it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved, when the question is one of public right and
1
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
2
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
relator need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws
2. YES
- Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
- The Court cited Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 (An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette)2 , stating that its clear object is to
give the general public adequate notice of the laws governing them. It is a
requirement of due process. Otherwise the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis
non excusat” would have no basis.
- Publication is all the more important in the case of issuances made by the President
since his activities are not as widely covered by mass media as the legislature.
Publication is thus the only way to inform the people of presidential issuances.
- The wording of Sec. 1 of CA 638 uses the word “shall” which indicates that it imposes
upon the respondent public officials an imperative duty.
- Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.
- Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned
- Question: What about acts enforcing PDs prior to their publication and prior to the
court’s declaration of their invalidity on ground of non-publication?
o It depends on whether rights have already been vested before the law was
declared unconstitutional by the court.
- In this case, none of the PDs in dispute have been implemented or enforced by the
government
Relova, J., concurs. Aquino, J., took no part. Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
1. Fernando, C.J., concurring with qualification
- He doesn’t agree that publication of legislative and presidential issuances should
always be published in the Official Gazette in order to be effective.
- First, he reasons that while publication is essential, there is no such requirement in
the Constitution that legislative and presidential issuances be published in the Official
Gazette.
- Second, declaring matters enforced under the subject unpublished presidential
issuances would set open matters already deemed settled.
- Third, Art. 2, CC expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is
subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." The CC is only a legislative
enactment. It does not and cannot have the force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally
provide for a different rule.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or
classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to
have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
2. Plana, J., concurring with qualification
- The Constitution does not require the publication of laws in the Official Gazette as a
prerequisite to their effectivity.
- He makes two observations about Art. 2, CC:
o Such provision does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it
will take effect.
o Clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for
reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law
may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
- Also with regard to C.A. 638, it only provides for a uniform publication and distribution
of the Official Gazette. It does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws.
o Said law enumerates what should be published in the Official Gazettem
among them ‘important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress” and “all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability.”
- An earlier law of general application cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a
subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take
effect. Only the Constitution can do so.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

3. Melencio-Herrera, concurring
- He adds that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree
becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it
will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity
mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

4. Teehankee, J., concurring

- His point is that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in order to comply with
the constitutional requirements of due process.
- He says that the respondents’ position would nullify and render nugatory Art. 2, CC.
Pesigan v. Angeles
Limitations of Crimes
Aquino
April 30, 1984
Digest by PS Magno

Short Version:
Can’t confiscate carabaos being transported because the law providing such forfeiture wasn’t
published in the Official Gazette yet.

Facts:
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan are carabao dealers. They transported 26 carabaos and a calf from
Sipocot, Cam Sur to Padre Garcia, Batangas.

They had with them the ff.

 A health certificate from the provincial vet of Cam Sur
 A permit to transport large cattle under the authority of the provincial commander
 3 certificates of inspection from the Constabulary

Despite these, the carabaos were confiscated at Basud, Camarines Norte, by Lt. Zenarosa, the
police station commander, and by Dr. Miranda, the provincial vet. This was based on EO 626-A,
providing that “no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another xxx (otherwise, these) shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture xxx”

The Pesigans filed a case against Zenarosa and Miranda for recovery of the carabaos as well as
damages.

RTC ruled against the Pesigans.

CA affirmed.

Issue and Dispositive:

Are the Pesigans bound by EO 626-A? No, it was not yet published during the time they
transported the carabaos.

Ratio:
The confiscation happened on April 2, 1982. EO 626-A was published in the Official Gazette on
June 14, 1982, 2 months after the commission of the act.

NCC 2 provides that laws become only effective, 15 days after publication.
 Laws here include circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties
 Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations, and
make the said penalties binding on persons affected

This rule applies in a case of a violation of EO 626-A because it provides for confiscation and
forfeiture, which makes it a penal sanction.
 The public must first be informed of that provision, through the publication in the
Gazette, before violators of the EO may be bound
 Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having
general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette
o "Every order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to
have general applicability and legal effect."
005. US v. SWEET Concurs with the result of the decision but believes that an offense charged against a military
1 Phil. 18 | September 20, 1901 | Ladd | APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an order of his superior in good faith,
the city of Manila unless the illegality of the order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
LADD, J.
Digest by Lilian Dy

Short Version:
Philip K. Sweet, an employee of the US military, assaulted a prisoner-of-war. Sweet claims that
the military tribunals, NOT the CFI, have jurisdiction over the case. The Court ruled that under
Act 136, the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals (CFI) is unaffected by the
military or other special character of the person brought before them for trial will prevail absent
legislation to the contrary.

Facts:
1. Philip K. Sweet was charged with committing an offense punishable under the Spanish
Penal Code (Art 418) against a prisoner-of-war. The penalty for such an offense is
arresto mayor and a fine of 325 to 3250 pesetas
2. Sweet:
o Offense is punishable under the Spanish Military Code, which gives the military
tribunals jurisdiction over the case (SC: Spanish Military Code no longer in force
and not applicable to US military personnel)
o He was acting in the line of duty (SC: No evidence to prove such fact.)
o Being a military employee, he is exempted from the ordinary
jurisdiction of the civil courts

Issue:
WON the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an employee of the United States
military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction?

Dispositive:
The order of the court below is AFFIRMED with costs to the appellant. The CFI has jurisdiction
over Sweet’s case.

Reasoning:
1. In Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of
First Instance are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of
more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed.
2. No law has been cited limiting the general jurisdiction conferred upon the CFI by Act
No. 136, with respect to US military employees, nor is the SC aware of any such law
or provision.
3. Therefore, the case is therefore open to the application of the general principle that
the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special
character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in
the law of England and America and which must, prevail under any system of
jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary.
4. Sweet’s claim that he was acting under orders of his military superiors may be
available by way of defense, but does not affect the right of the CFI to take
jurisdiction of the case.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Willard, and Mapa, JJ., concur Moreland, J., concurs in the result .

Cooper concurring:
006. Liang v. People J. Puno’s concurring opinion: He basically argued that international officials are entitled to
G.R. No. 125865/26 March 2001/First Division/Motion for Reconsideration on SC Decision immunity only with respect to acts performed in their official capacity, unlike international
Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) – petitioner organizations which enjoy absolute immunity. (This in apparent response to Liang’s insistence that
People of the Philippines – respondent ADB’s absolute immunity extended to him.)
Decision by J. Ynares-Santiago, Digest by Pip (Gagamitin mo na nga na sample yung digest at
format ko Chua, kay Anne Curtis mo pa icre-credit? For shame!)

Short Version: Liang was charged with grave oral defamation. He argued that he was covered
by the absolute immunity of the ADB, where he worked. The Court ruled that his immunity did
not cover the alleged acts of oral defamation, since such could not be considered to be acts
performed in his official capacity.

Facts: Liang was a Chinese national employed as an economist by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Two informations for grave oral defamation were filed against him alleging that on separate
occasions (the 28th and 31st of January of 1994) he uttered defamatory words to Joyce v. Cabal,
a member of the clerical staff of ADB.

In April 1994, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, acting pursuant to advice from
the DFA that Liang enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed the informations against
him. On petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the People, the RTC of Pasig annulled and
set aside the MeTC’s order.

Liang brought a petition for review to the Supreme Court. In January 2000, the Court denied
the petition for review. In so ruling, the Court held that the immunity granted to officers and staff
of the ADB is not absolute. Immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or
oral defamation in the name of duty.

In this MR, Liang again argued that the DFA’s determination of immunity is a political question
to be made by the executive branch of the government and is conclusive upon the courts.
Furthermore, the immunity of international organizations is absolute and extends to all its staff.

Issue: Were the statements allegedly made by Liang uttered while in the performance of his
official functions? NO.

Ruling: MR denied.

Ratio: First, the Court emphasized that its earlier decision did not deny diplomatic immunity at
all. Rather, the Court merely ruled as to whether Liang’s alleged words fell squarely under the
provisions of Section 45(a) of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippines, where officers
and staff for the bank (including experts and consultants performing missions for the bank) enjoy
immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity.

Again, the Court ruled that the slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot be
considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and
personnel. Slander, in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official
capacity.

The issue of whether Liang’s utterances in fact constituted oral defamation is still for the trial
court to determine.

Voting: C.J. Davide, Jr., concurring in J. Puno’s concurring opinion.

Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

008. MIQUIBAS VS. COMMANDING GENERAL
JESUS MIQUIABAS VS COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED
STATES ARMY
G.R. No. L-1988
February 24, 1948
Moran, C.J.
Short Version:
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines. Therefore the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to
try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him
Facts:
1. Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines. He has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things
belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United
States.
2. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by
respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment.
3. This sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review. Thus, a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by petitioner against the Commanding General
Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner
under custody and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in
connection with an offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction.
o Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the
temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the
City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases
o Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within, but
without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which
is not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and
is merely temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of
Manila.
2. The offender is not a member of the armed forces of the United States
 Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the
General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a
"member of the armed forces of the United States" there being no question that the
offended party in this case is the United States.
 Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
Philippines.
 Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered as a
member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the
Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members of the armed
forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement
armed forces do not include civilian employees.
Digested by Lor Saguinsin

Issue:
1. Whether the General Court-Martial appointed by respondent has jurisdiction to try
petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by the petitioner? (NO)

Ruling:
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice
to any criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines.

Ratio:
1. The offense at bar cannot be considered as committed within a base that would bring the case
within the jurisdiction of the general court-martial.
 It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has
jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory.
o But it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or
any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses
committed within certain portions of said territory.
 On March 11, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America, entered into an agreement concerning military bases.
 Under paragraph 1 (a) thereof, the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over
the criminal case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base.
o Paragraph 2, of Article XXI of the agreement, refers to the Port of Manila
Reservation, which will be available for use to the United States armed forces,
also as a temporary quarters and installations, its temporariness not being for
a definite period of time, but "until such time as other arrangements can be
made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two Governments."
 There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed
as placing the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a
permanent base.
009. Gumabon v. Director of Prisons
G.R. No. L-30026 / January 30, 1971 / En Banc / Petition for Habeas Corpus Voting: Dizon, Zaldivar, Concepcion, concur. Castro and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
Mario Gumabon, Blas Bagolbagol, Gaudencio Agapito, Epifanio Padua and Paterno Palmares –
Petitioners
The Director of the Bureau of Prisons – Respondent
Decision by J. Fernando, Digest by Jason Jimenez

Short Version: Petitioners sought release from imprisonment through this petition for habeas
corpus. They were meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other
crimes. They invoked the doctrine in People v. Hernandez which negated the existence of such
an offense, a ruling that was not handed down until after their convictions had become final. Their
petition was granted. Since judicial decisions form part of the legal system of the Philippines, the
conclusion is that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under
the explicit mandate of the RPC as to penal laws having such character even if at the time of their
application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same."

Facts: Petitioner Gumabon was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Other petitioners
were similarly made to suffer the same penalty. Each of them has served more than 13 years.
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez, SC ruled that the information against the accused was not
warranted under Article 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. SC reaffirmed the
ruling in People v. Lava.

Petitioners asserted the deprivation of the constitutional right of equal protection. According to
them, they were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo,
and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very same law under
which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime,
committed under the same law, petitioners were allowed to suffer life imprisonment, while others
suffered only prision mayor.

Petitioners likewise relied on Article 22 of the RPC which requires that penal judgment be given a
retroactive effect. Petitioner Gumabon contended that he has served more than the maximum
penalty that could have been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued
detention being illegal. Hence, this petition for habeas corpus.

Issues:
1. Should the Hernandez ruling be given retroactive effect? YES
2. Is the habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? YES

Ruling: Petition granted

Ratio:
1. The Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect under the explicit
mandate of the RPC (Article 22) as to penal laws having such character even if at the
time of their application a final sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving
the same." The Hernandez case negated the existence of the complex offense for which
the petitioners were convicted.
2. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose,
such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence
is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a sentence
is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the rule being
that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he
has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." The only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of habeas
corpus."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, as Judge,
RTC of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 148 and ANTONIO A. TUJAN, respondents| 1 April 1998|J.
Martinez
Facts
1983: Antonio Tujan was charged with subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law) before
RTC Manila.
Around 7 years later (1990), Tujan was arrested on the basis of the warrant of arrest in the
subversion case. When arrested, an unlicensed .38 caliber special revolver (special edition by
ARMSCOR, PHILS.) and 6 rounds of live ammunition were found in his possession.
Consequently, Tujan was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in
Furtherance of Subversion under PD 1866 before RTC Makati. He was recommended no bail
which was approved by the RTC. Said RTC also directed the continued detention of Tujan at
MIG of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP), Bago Bantay,
Quezon City, while his case is pending.
Tujan filed a motion invoking his right toa PI pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112, ROC and praying his
arraignment be held in abeyance until the PI is terminated.
However, Tujan's counsel, during the hearing of the motion for PI, withdrew the said motion
saying he would file a MQ the information, for which he requested 20 days to do so. The
request was granted.
The MQ was on the ground that Tujan "has been previously in jeopardy of being convicted of
the offense charged" in the criminal case for subversion with RTC Manila, based on Sec. 3(h)
and 7, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Crim Pro.
In support of the motion, Tujan contends that "common crimes such as illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition should actually be deemed absorbed in subversion,". He avers that
"the present case is the twin prosecution" of "the earlier subversion case" and, therefore, he "is
entitled to invoke the constitutional protection against double jeopardy."
Petitioner opposed the MQ, arguing that Tujan was not in jeopardy of being convicted a second
time because: (a) he has not even been arraigned in the subversion case, and (b) the offense
charged against him is for Subversion, punishable under RA 1700; while the present case is for
Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion, punishable under a
different law (PD 1866).
Also, the "absorption rule" does not apply in the present case because illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition is not a necessary means of committing the offense of subversion, nor
is subversion a necessary means of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition."
RTC Makati granted the MQ, stating that the illegal possession was a continuing offense of the
subversion, thus, Tujano was in double jeopardy. The court cited Sec. 1, Rule 117, ROC on MQ,
whih states that MQ may be filed at any time before entering the plea of the accused, thus,
arraignment was not neccessary in filing the MQ.
Issue: Is the accused charged with the same offense in both case which would justify the
dismissal of the second charge on the ground of double jeopardy? YES
Held:
Sec. 1, PD 1866:
Sec. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sales, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose,
or posses any firearms, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearms, the penalty of death
shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the owner, president, manager, director or other responsible officer of any public or
private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the
firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or
persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed
firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
Under the first paragraph of Section 1, the mere possession of an unlicensed firearm or
ammunition is the crime itself which carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. The third paragraph of the same Section makes the use of said
firearm and ammunition "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion" a circumstance to increase the penalty to death. Thus, the
allegation in the Information in the case of illegal firearms, that the unlicensed firearm found in
the possession of Antonio Tujan, "a member of the communist party of the Philippines and its
front organization," was used "in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
subversion" does not charge him with the separate and distinct crime of Subversion in the same
Information, but simply describes the mode or manner by which the violation of Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 was committed so as to qualify the penalty to death.
Thus, there is only one offense charged in the questioned information, that is, the illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by its being used in furtherance of subversion.
There is nothing in PD 1866 which decrees that crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion
are the very acts that are being penalized.
On the other hand, the previous subversion charge before RTC Manila was based on a different
law (RA 1700) Section 3 thereof penalizes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt act
affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive association or organization . . ."
Section 4 of said law further penalizes "such member [of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and/or its successor or of any subversive association] (who) takes up arms against the
Government." Therefore, Tujan could be charged either under PD 1866 or RA 1700.
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act
is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the first criminal action: (a) a valid complaint or
information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the
defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. (Rule 117, ROC)

Tujan's MQ did not actually raise the issue of double jeopardy because it had not arisen yet
since Tujan has not even been arraigned in the subversion charge. Further, the two criminal
charges are not of the same offense as required under Sec. 21.

SC recognizes that RA 1700 and PD 1866 can co-exist. However, the subsequent enactment
of RA 7636 totally repealing RA 1700, substantially changed the present case
wherein the repealing law, being favorable to Tujan, who is not a habitual
delinquent, should be given retroactive effect.

Where, as here, the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act with was penalized
by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated. 30 It
is a recognized rule in this jurisdiction that a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to
try, convict and sentence persons charged with violation of the old law prior to the repeal.

With the enactment of R.A. No. 7636, the charge of subversion against the accused-private
respondent has no more legal basis and should be dismissed.

As regards the other charge of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, qualified by
subversion, this charge should be amended to simple illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition since, as earlier discussed, subversion is no longer a crime.

Moreover, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is now bailable
under RA 8294 which was enacted on June 6, 1997. R.A. 8294 has amended PD 1866, as
amended, by eliminating the provision in said P.D. that if the unlicensed firearm is used in
furtherance of subversion, the penalty of death shall he imposed. Under the new law (R.A. No.
8294), the penalty prescribed for simple illegal possession of firearm (.38 caliber) is now
reduced to prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00). 33 The reduced penalty of imprisonment — which is four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years — entitles the accused-private
respondent to bail. Considering, however, that the accused-private respondent has been
detained since his arrest on June 5, 1990 up to the present (as far as our record has shown), or
more than seven (7) years now, his immediate release is in order. This is so because even if he
were convicted for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the length of his detention
while his case is pending has already exceeded the penalty prescribed by the new law.

Paula P.
PEOPLE vs. BON
People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Bon
October 30, 2006
Tinga, J.
Short version: (Sorry, long case but I tried my best summarizing it here.) Bon was convicted
on 6 counts of qualified rape and 2 counts of attempted rape. He was thus imposed 6 death
penalties and for the attempted rape, 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. However, RA 9346 was enacted, removing the
death penalty. A problem arose because of 2 possible interpretation of the effects of RA 9346.
1. Whether RA 9346 only applies when the penalty is death (i.e. a person convicted of
death will only get reclusion perpetua, but a person convicted and imposed reclusion
perpetua will still get reclusion perpetua as RA 9346 will not apply)
2. Whether RA 9346 had the effect of downgrading the penalties prescribed for felonies
(i.e. if before, the penalty for a consummated felony is death, and for the frustrated
felony, reclusion perpetua, and for the attempted felony, reclusion temporal, and so
on, RA 9346 will downgrade all these penalties accordingly. Thus, if consummated
felony will now have the penalty of reclusion perpetua, frustrated will get reclusion
temporal and so on.)
Court favoured the second interpretation. The first one will result in many absurdities (principal
and accomplice will have the same penalty if principal is convicted of death; person guilty of
consummated crime will have the same penalty as person guilty of frustrated crime.) A statute
should be so construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other
laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system—a
uniform system of jurisprudence.
Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the
accused. If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor
of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial
justice.
FACTS
Eight (8) informations were filed against Bon, charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the
minor daughters of his older brother. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several
instances over a span of 6 years. He was convicted of 8 counts of rape, qualified by the minority
of the victims and the relationship of the victim and Bon, the latter being the former’s relative by
consanguinity within the third degree. Bon was imposed the penalty of 8 death sentences.
CA affirmed 6 of the convictions but downgraded the convictions in 2 cases to attempted rape.
Accordingly, CA reduced the penalties attached to the 2 counts of rape from death for
consummated qualified rape to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
HOW WAS THIS PENALTY DETERMINED? Penalty for an attempted felony is lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. The prescribed penalty for the
consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to
have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the CA for attempted rape.
Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and
a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense."
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with
a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the
range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor.
RA 9346 (Act prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the Philippines) was enacted and
thus, the sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA can no longer be
imposed. Section 2 of the law mandates that, in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
The enactment of RA 9346 has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Bon
was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two
degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that he
should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua,
the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346?
ISSUE: What should be the appropriate penalty for the 2 counts of attempted rape in view of
RA 9346?
REASONING
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts whose
sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not
hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However, nothing in Rep.
Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or
on accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor, among others, were deemed to have been
amended by virtue of RA 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit of the
repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." While this clause may,
given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an
express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws, executive orders and decrees
insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely such enactments which are
inconsistent with RA 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the particular
phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty."
2 schools of thought:
1. It can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of a
minor (among many examples) does not “impose the death penalty,” since none of
 the convicts concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for
attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty
for attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by RA
9346.
2. The operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted rape of a minor
necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty,
in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it
could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all,
the application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the
actual operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of
determining the proper graduated penalty.
If the true intent of RA 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the death penalty to
actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had
Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would have been
no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for actual executions would have
been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific
a fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually intend to limit the
operation of RA 9346 to actual executions only.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Let us test the premise that the legislative intent of RA 9346 was to limit the
prohibition law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without extending any
effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was
punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a principal
for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as an accomplice for having
allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the
crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were convicted by final
judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death penalty, he is sentenced instead
to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower in
degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative" interpretation of RA 9346, the
graduation of penalties remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under
Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y,
as an accomplice, would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining the
graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of principals and
accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature has
the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion. Yet given the drastic effects of
equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched
thought in criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact
such change would have been candid enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law
itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions,
explicates the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at
all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the penalties
for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others.
Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged
for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted in the
imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346
would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X
would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y would have been
sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the lesser
penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the
imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised Penal Code and
established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for
ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in simple
kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the accomplice. Frankly, there is no
rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that
Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and
attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The consummated felony
previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same
time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section,
be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of
course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the
consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be mainly in theory, as we
recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in
their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death," such
as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of
commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty
for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty
two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if
consummated, would have warranted the death penalty.
If it were to be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted
felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced
to reclusion temporal, even though the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a
penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated crime
would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and established
thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion to designate the
criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the
punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory penalties is not only
irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that physical liberties are at
stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate
legislative will, but from oversight.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous
and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act
No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even as a
means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative
amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated
and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale for
graduated penalties.

Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will
have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with
the rest of our penal laws.
Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping for ransom,
would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the
principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be consistent with Article 52
of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to
"death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the principal,
an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be eliminated. Thus, the same standard
would prevail in sentencing principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as
that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having eliminated
the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent
with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified rape would
receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for
qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this "expansive"
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so construed not only to be
consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to
form a complete, coherent and intelligible system—a uniform system of
jurisprudence. "Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the best method of
interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a complete, consistent and
intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-
legislative acts."
There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the
later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of
the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule
emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for
accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly
construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. If the language of the law were
ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the
statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice. The law is tender in favor of
the rights of an individual. It is this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person
of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our Bill of Rights, that
every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Others
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also
effectively classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional contemplation.
Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects other
than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to
certain heinous crimes.The categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does
official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this Court
in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a
general inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of
heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did
not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory
effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but not to the
definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have been
downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law
that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the reduction of civil indemnity and
other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
Conclusion / Summary
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is immediate.
Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part
of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower
than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his
penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead,
prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-standing
penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of
"reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other penal laws.
The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of
an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion perpetua"
and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the
penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next
lower in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the
respective graduated scale." Hence, as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty
two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new ruling,
favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated or
participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see no
choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code states that
"[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal x x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same." Given that we have ruled
that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has
to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346
expressly recognized that its enactment would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it
did to "persons x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this
Act."
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual
served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision
does not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there may be
other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies under law that
could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the
Public Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that frequently assist detainees
possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release of such prisoners who are so
entitled by reason of this ruling.
DISPOSITIVE

By reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, Bon is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the
corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from
two (2) counts consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of
rape, we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole,
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we
downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that
there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor should be
imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral
damages andP10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape. Separately,
the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence in awarding to BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each
count of consummated rape.
013. Pascual v. Board of Examiners 3. The rationale for these principles (Right Against Self-Incrimination vis-à-vis the Right to
28 SCRA 344 (1969)/May 26, 1969/(Division not stated)/Appeal Privacy, Rights of the Accused) is that even though crimes should not go
Arsenio Pascual, Jr. – petitioner-appellee unpunished and that the truth should be revealed, these must not be
Board of Medical Examiners – respondent-appellant achieved at the expense of the respect accorded to the human personality.
Salvador and Enriqueta Gatbonton – intervenors-appellants [Probably the rationale for the strict construction of penal laws against the State]
Decision by J. Fernando, Digest by Jadd Dealino a. Governments should respect the dignity and integrity of its citizens. (citing
Chief Justice Warren in Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).
Short Version: The Spouses Gatbonton filed an administrative complaint for immorality against 4. At the time this decision was written, the current trend was to relate the Right Against
Arsenio Pascual. The Board of Medical Examiners compelled Pascual to take the witness stand for Self-Incrimination with the Right to Privacy.
the complainants. The CFI – Manila granted preliminary injunction, and later prohibited the Board
from compelling Pascual to take the witness stand. The Supreme Court sustained Pascual and
upheld the CFI’s decision, based on the right against self-incrimination in relation to the right to Voting: Reyes, Acting C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
privacy. Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., no part. Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., official leave.
Facts: The Spouses Gatbonton filed an administrative complaint with the Board of Medical
Examiners against Arsenio Pascual, charging him with immorality. The Gatbontons’ counsel
announced that they would present Pascual himself as their first witness. Pascual objected
based on his constitutional right against self-incrimination (being a witness against himself.) The
Board noted his objection but effectively stated that he would take the witness stand anyway
unless he could secure a restraining order. This injunction was granted by the CFI – Manila.

The Board argues that the right against self-incrimination is only available only when a question
resulting in a self-incriminating answer is asked.

The Gatbontons intervened in the petition, additionally arguing that the right against self-
incrimination cannot be asserted in an administrative hearing.

The CFI eventually prohibited the Board from compelling Pascual to take the witness stand for
the complainants.

Issue: Whether Pascual may be compelled to be a witness for the complainants in an

administrative case against himself. NO.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

Ratio:
1. The Court emphasized its ruling in Cabal v. Kapunan (1968), to the effect that in
criminal cases, an accused may refuse to take the witness stand, in addition to
refusing to answer incriminatory questions.
a. This principle also applies in administrative cases where a criminal or penal
aspect is present. In this case, Pascual stands to lose his license to practice
medicine.
b. The American case of Spevack v. Klein (1967) is also cited, where it was
stated that the Right Against Self-Incrimination in their 5th Amendment has
been absorbed by the 14th Amendment (Equal Protection and Due Process),
such that the Right Against Self-Incrimination should not be “watered
down” by making the deprivation of livelihood (in this case, the practice of
medicine) the price of asserting the right.
2. The Court views the Board and the Spouses’ interpretation of the right (that it can only
be claimed once on the witness stand) as a diluted, specific aspect of the right. This
right also includes the Right to Silence.
a. The Court declared in the 1905 case of US v. Luzon that an accused has the
right to remain silent, and this silence is not a presumption of guilt.
b. Taking the witness stand should be done out of the defendant’s own free
will.
14. Manuel v. People
476 SCRA 461/29 November 2005
Decision by J. Callejo, Digest by Roe Anuncio

Short Version: Eduardo Manuel was charged and convicted of bigamy. He brought the case to
the Supreme Court, contending that he should be acquitted because he believed in good faith
that his first wife was already dead when he contracted the second marriage, thereby negating
any intent on his part. The Court ruled that intent is presumed and he was not able to discharge
the burden of proving otherwise.

Facts: Eduardo Manuel was charged with bigamy. The trial court rendered judgment finding
Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. It declared that Eduardo’s belief, that his
first marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife’s 20-year absence, even if true, did
not exculpate him from liability for bigamy. And that even if the private complainant had known
that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the
private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. According to him,
he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.
.
Issue: Was there intent on the part of Eduardo? YES.

Ruling: Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

Ratio: “Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.”

Elements of bigamy: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a
subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. Another view,
however, considers a third element: fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act.

Bigamy is a felony by dolo (deceit). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate
intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent.

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a
felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have
been intentional.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in
a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However,
ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private
complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, but
this he was unable to discharge.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ,
appellant.
Automatic review to the SC bec of the death penalty
May 9, 2003
Digest by: Ces
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
Short version: Delos Santos was charged and convicted for the murder of Rod Flores. He was
sentenced to the death penalty. On automatic review to the SC, he claimed that there was no
proof of his motive because he did not have any previous argument or altercation with Flores.
The SC held that Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the
accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established.
accused at the locus criminis at the time of the incident. The required impossibility does not
exist here.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving
of weight in law. Delos Santos did not present any evidence to show that the prosecution
witnesses, in testifying against him, have improper motive.
The prosecution was able to establish that appellant’s attack on Flores was from behind without
any slightest provocation on his part and that it was sudden and unexpected. Where the victim
was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon to resist it, the
stabbing could only be described as treacherous.

Facts:
Danny delos Santos was charged with murder. The information alleged that “the above-named
accused, armed with a kitchen knife, with intent to kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas, with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said kitchen knife said Rod Flores y
Juanitas, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal
wounds which directly caused his death.”

He pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented witnesses who claimed they saw delos Santos
emerge from behind Flores then he stabbed stab Flores twice. Flores ran but delos Santos ran
after him and stabbed him repeatedly. Delos Santos only ceased stabbing after he saw Flores
dead. The doctor also testified that Flores suffered 21 stab wounds, 11 of which were fatal.

Delos Santos denied the accusation and claimed that he was at his auntie’s house at the time of
the crime and that he was around 40 meters away from the scene of the crime. He claimed that
he and Flores met but did not greet each other and that there was no altercation between them.

The trial court found delos guilty of the crime of murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. The court took into account the brutality in the manner by which the life of the victim
was taken. He was sentenced to death by legal injection.

The case was brought to the SC by automatic review. Delos Santos claims that there was no
evidence that he had a motive to kill Flores, considering that they had not previous heated
argument or altercation.

Issue (relevant to topic): Whether the lack of motive is relevant

Ratio:
No it is not. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused
is positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In People
vs. Galano, the SC ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense. It
becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some
doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In this case, the prosecution witnesses (De
Leon and Tablate) positively identified the accused.
The fact that the statements of the witnesses were taken 2 months after the incident is
immaterial. It is but natural for witnesses to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding
particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the cruelty of the
perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to
the witnesses.

The court disregarded his defense of alibi. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the
GUIYAB v. PEOPLE
October 20, 2005
Quisumbing, J.

Short version: Joey Guiyab was convicted of homicide by the TC and CA based on the testimony
of witness Joseph Madriaga. Madriaga testified that Guiyab and a Juan Sanchez attacked him
and his companion Rafael Bacani, the victim, with a knife. SC believed Madriaga’s positive
identification of Guiyab.

FACTS
Prosecution Evidence: On December 12, 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., victim Rafael
Bacani and witness Joseph Madriaga were in front of the Community Center in Tumauini. Juan
Sanchez kicked them. They posed for a fight but Joey Guiyab said “You try and you will see”
while holding a knife. Madriaga hit Sanchez with a stone, and so Guiyab chased him. According
to Madriaga, Guiyab failed to catch him so Guiyab instead attacked Bacani, stabbing him once on
the right chest. Bacani was brought to the hospital and died a day after. SP04 Romeo Tumolava
also testified that he saw Guiyab near the Community Center at the night of the incident.

Defense Evidence: According to Guiyab, he was not at Tumauini Cultural and Sports
Center at the time the incident happened. He was farming until 5:00 p.m. at Sitio Bayabo, Camasi,
and slept at around 9:00 p.m. in their house. This was corroborated by his neighbor Domingo
Gumaru, and his parents, Silvino and Vicenta Guiyab.

Both the TC and CA found Guiyab guilty. Guiyab appealed to the SC, alleging his
identification was tainted, since his name was only fed to the witness Madriaga.

Issue: WON the identification of the petitioner was tainted with conjecture and speculation.- NO

Held: The SC found Madriaga’s identification of Joey Guiyab credible. Even if he did not know
the name of Guiyab prior to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court when he was
asked to point out the person responsible for the stabbing. Besides, Madriaga maintained that
although he did not know Guiyab by name, he knew him by his face as part of the community.
There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a
positive identification of a felon by a prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first
know the former personally. The witness need not have to know the name of the accused for so
long as he recognizes his face. “Knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his
name. Hence, the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just
because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The weight of the eyewitness account is
premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because
he knew his name.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 27, 2001
and the Resolution dated February 26, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23703,
which sustained the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding petitioner JOEY GUIYAB guilty
of Homicide and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of prision mayor medium to
reclusion temporal minimum or from eight (8) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months, and to PAY the heirs of Rafael Bacani P50,000.00 as death indemnity, plus
P30,000.00 for actual damages and P18,000.00 for funeral expenses, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, are AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
017. People vs. Temblor The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally
G.R. No. L-66884/ May 28, 1988 binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and
Defendant-appellant: Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald” demeanor and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence as in the case at
Decision by Grino-Aquino; Digest by: Luisa Mauricio bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal
Temblor’s alibi
SHORT VERSION: While Cagampang and wife Victoria were manning a store adjacent to their Temblor: from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been
house, Temblor came and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay Camagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they
opening a pack of cigarettes, Temblor shot Cagampang. Temblor and another man demanded spent the night drinking over dog as pulutan until 8:00 o'clock in the morning of the following
from Victoria to bring out Cagampang’s firearm which she did. Temblor took Cagampang’s .38 day, December 31, 1980.
caliber revolver and fled. Temblor was charged with murder. CFI and SC found him guilty. One Court: alibi does not lie
of Temblor’s contentions was that he lacked motive for killing Cagampang. But the court held The prosecution presented a Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company's Personnel
that he had enough motive (he was NPA and NPA had an agaw-armas campaign) and that, Officer and the NALCO Daily Time Record of Silverio Perol, showing that Perol was not at home
moreover, proof of motive is not essential in this case because Victoria positively identified drinking with Temblor and his father but was at work on December 30, 1980 from 10:50pm up
Temblor as the person who shot her husband. to 7am the next day.
Temblor’s self-serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail over the positive
FACTS: identification made by the prosecution witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him
At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, Julius Cagampang (Cagampang), of the crime.
his wife Victoria and their two children were in the store adjacent to their house in Brgy. Talo- Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be acceptable as a defense, it is
ao, Agusan del Norte. Accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald arrived and asked to buy a half- not enough that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be
pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the crime. Here it was admitted that Perol's house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio
head. Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot, shouted her husband's name Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved road in a matter of 15 to 20 minutes.
"Jul"! Lack of motive
Two persons barged into the interior of the store through the main door and Temblor: he did not have a motive for killing Cagampang.
demanded that Victoria brings out her husband’s firearm. "Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You Court: untenable.
let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused fired two more shots at the fallen victim. Temblor’s knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive enough to kill
Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the maleta where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave him as killings perpetrated by members of the New People's Army for the sole purpose of
the suitcase to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber acquiring more arms and ammunition for their group are prevalent. It is known as the NPA's
revolver, and fled. "agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not essential when the culprit has been
Some months after the incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police positively identified.
station by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and Identified the accused as the man
who killed her husband.
Temblor and his companions, admitted members of the NPA (New People’s Army)
were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong. Temblor
surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in
August, 1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on
November 26, 1981. Temblor was later on charged with the crime of murder.
CFI: found him guilty of Murder, reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties under
Article 41 and 42 RPC and to indemnify the heirs of the victim.
He appealed.
ISSUE: WON TEMBLOR IS GUILTY OF MURDER – YES
RULING: Judgment appealed affirmed in all respects, Temblor guilty.
RATIO
Identity of the accused
Temblor: Victorina did not know him by name. hence, the identity of the accused was not
established
Court: untenable.
Temblor was positively identified by Victorina who recognized him because she was
less than a meter away from him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt
flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside.
Her testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness — a tricycle driver,
Claudio Sabanal — who was a long-time acquaintance of Temblor and who knew him as
"Ronald." He saw Temblor in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of
December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots coming from inside the store, and saw the people
scampering away.
018. PEOPLE v. HASSAN
L-68969/ January 22, 1988 / Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Zamboanga Vr
XIII/
Defendant-apellant- Usman Hassan
Decision by: Sarmiento, J.
Digest by: Sai Bautista
Short Version: Hassan was convicted of murder on the bases of the testimony of a lone
witness for the prosecution and the sloppiness of the investigation conducted by the police
investigator of the Zamboanga City Police Station. The Supreme Court found that guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. As a general rule, motive is not essential in order to arrive at
a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, procedurally, however, for purposes of
complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty must stem from proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the accused plays a pivotal role towards his
acquittal. This is especially true where there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit as when
'the identification is extremely tenuous
Facts: Usman Hassan was accused of murder for stabbing to death one Ramon Pichel, Jr. Jose
Samson, lone witness for the prosecution testified that he was with the victim at about 7:00 pm
of July 23, 1981 when they went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone
in Zamboanga City and that while he was selecting mangoes, he saw assailant stab the victim,
who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or three meters from
the fruit stand; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon from behind "only once" and that after the
stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. RTC of Zamboanga convicted Hassan
based on this testimony and testimony of Police Corporal Rogelio P. Carpio regarding the
investigation conducted by the police.
not even subjected to any testing at all to determine the presence of human blood which could
be typed and compared with the blood type of the deceased. Court also emphasized the fact
that accused was found sitting on his pushcart with a companion after the incident. If he were
the assailant, he would have fled.
~ A day after the killing of Ramon Pichel, Jr., a similar stabbing took place at Plaza Pershing
near the place of the earlier incident, with the suspect in that frustrated homicide case being a
certain Benhar Isa, 'a notorious and a deadly police character" in Zamboanga City, with a long
record of arrests. There was no attempt on the part of Corporal Carpio, or any other police
officer, to investigate or question Benhar Isa in connection with the killing of Pichel, Jr which
could have produced the link to the resolution of Usman's guilt or innocence.
Court found that there was total absence of motive ascribed to Usman for stabbing Ramon, a
complete stranger to him. While, as a general rule, motive is not essential in order to
arrive at a conviction, because, after all, motive is a state of mind, procedurally,
however, for purposes of complying with the requirement that a judgment of guilty
must stem from proof beyond reasonable doubt, the lack of motive on the part of the
accused plays a pivotal role towards his acquittal. This is especially true where there
is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit as when 'the Identification is extremely
tenuous," as in this case.
Accused AQUITTED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Issue: WON accused should be found guilty for the crime of murder- NO!

Ruling: Evidence for the Prosecution in its entirety does not satisfy the quantum of proof-
beyond reasonable doubt- required to convict an accused person.
Ratio: (Relevant part:MOTIVE) In evaluating the worth of the testimony of the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution against the denial and alibi of the accused, value judgment must
not be separated from the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence. In this case,
testimony of the lone eye witness and evidence introduced by the police are weak and
unconvincing
~The testimony of Jose Samson, the lone eyewitness, that he saw the assailant stab the
deceased "from behind on his chest" only once contradicted the expert testimony of the medico-
legal officer of the NBI officer who identified two stab wounds, one at the front portion of the
chest and third rib, and another located at the left arm posterior aspect. The medical expert also
concluded from the nature and location of the chest wound that it was inflicted on the victim
while the alleged accused was in front of him."
~The procedure adopted by the police investigators was a confrontation between Jose Samson,
Jr. and Usman. Corporal Carpio testified that Usman was alone when he was brought to Samson
for confrontation in the funeral parlor. However, on cross-examination he stated that the
accused was identified by Samson in a "police line-up”. Court considered the confrontation
arranged by the police investigator between eyewitness and the accused as violation to the right
of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a crime especially
at its most crucial stage — the identification of the accused.
~Also, the rest of the investigation of the crime and the preparation of the evidence for
prosecution were done haphazardly. Statement of Hassan was taken by the investigator only
two days after the murder of Ramon Pichel, Jr. and sworn only two days after it had been taken.
The fruit vendor—from whom Samson and the deceased were buying mangoes was not
investigated. Nor was the arresting officer, companion of Corporal Carpio presented. The knife
and its scabbard, which were confiscated by Carpio from Hassan at the time of his arrest, were
019. US VS. AH CHONG
March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
SUMMARY: Ah Chong, was employed as a cook and the deceased Pascual Gualberto was
employed as a house boy at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province. It is a
detached house located some 40 meters from the nearest building. One evening, after having
gone to bed, Ah Chong was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out
twice, ―Who is there,‖ but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
leaped from his bed & called out again, ―If you enter the room I will kill you.‖ But at that
precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed against the door (as support
to the lock)& believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife and struck the
intruder who turned out to be his roommate Pscual. He asked for help immediately after seeing
Pascual wounded. Pascual died the day after. He admitted having stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was a ladron (burglar). They had an
agreement that when either returned at night he should knowck and acquaint the other of his
identity. Trial Court found Ah Chong guilty of the crime of assassination. SC reversed the
conviction and acquitted Ah Chong because of the mistake of fact and absence of negligence
on his part given the circumstances of the case. There is no criminal intent which is a requite
of the crime committed
FACTS: The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook and the deceased Pascual Gualberto
was employed as a house boy or muchacho at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal
Province. It is a detached house located some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August
1908, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building.. This porch was covered by
a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished
with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small
hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure
means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small
window, which, like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were
no other openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, Ah Chong, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed
and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the
door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to
the heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and Ah Chong,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter
the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the
chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant
thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, Ah
Chong struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual.
Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded condition,
followed by Ah Chong, who immediately recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual
was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds. Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and
as Ah Chong alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow
for his personal protection. Ah Chong also claims that they had an understanding that when either
returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.
Ah Chong was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.At the trial in the court below the
defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck
the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-
defense.
ISSUE: Whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the
facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed
the act?
RULING: No. There is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance
or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption
of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a
conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs
criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that
which he intended to commit.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:
xxx xxx xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following
attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Under these provisions there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to complete
exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who
forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant
believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to
resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding
defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he
persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small
room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings defendant
would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an
assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and
deliver the first blow.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended
to commit.

Spanish jurist Pacheco: A voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and
roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there
can be no crime; the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were
expressly set out in the definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the
code of 1870, because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being
implied and included in the word "voluntary."
The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential
element of the various crimes and misdemeanors.
Legal maxims.:
 Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless
his intention were so”;
 Actus me incito factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my
act;"
Moral science and moral sentiment: no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he
did from an upright mind, destitute of every form of evil.
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine
of abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), However Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance
or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). Since evil
intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the
act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; The guilt of
the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him.
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent
peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view
of all the circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time,
he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more
than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them
to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling
into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the
imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the property under
his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with
the costs of both instance de oficio.
020. PEOPLE v. OANIS
G.R. No. L-47722 | July 27, 1943 | En Banc | Appeal from a decision of the CFI
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES-- plaintiff-appellee,
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
MORAN, J.
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version:
Oanis was a police officer while Galanta was a corporal of the Constabulary who were ordered to
capture the fugitive Balagtas. In the process, they shot a man in the room of Balagtas’ rumored
paramour. The man was sleeping with his back towards the door. They claim that they acted in
innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties. Court ruled that The
theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact does not apply in this case as it
applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. It is also required that
the defendant had no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him. In this case, no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, the appellants had ample time and
opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves.
Facts:
- Oanis was the chief of police of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. He and fellow defendant
corporal Galanta of the Constabulary were ordered by their superior to capture the
escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas dead or alive, together with the bailarina Irene.
- Inquiries yielded the information that Irene was in her room with her paramour. There
they found a man sleeping with his back towards the door. Without confirming who
the man was, they shot at him with their revolvers.
- It later turned out that the man was not Balagtas, but an innocent citizen named
Serapio Tecson.
- When asked by the provincial inspector, both Oanis and Galanta admitted to shooting
the man.
- They were convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence in the lower court
- The appellants contend that they acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest
performance of their official duties, and that they honestly believed that Tecson was
Balagtas.
Issue:
WON Oanis and Galanta should be absolved from liability for killing Tecson on the ground of
mistake of fact. NO.
Dispositive:
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of
murder with the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio
Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with costs.
Reasoning:
- The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact applies only
when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness.
- The Court compared the present case with US v. Ah Chong, and gave another
example:
o In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was
awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is
there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill
you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
turned out to be his room-mate.
o A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who
was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life. He
 was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real,
that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property
were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
 In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed
without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having
no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had
no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared
to him, and such facts justified his act of killing.
o In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited,
found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants
had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if
any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim
was unarmed.
Other stuff:
- The Court also ruled that the appellants committed criminal negligence, as the killing
was intentional. Since Tecson was killed in his sleep, the crime committed is murder
with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating
circumstance of fulfilling a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
o There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one:
 (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right; and
 (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office.
- In the instance case, only the first requisite is present. The second requisite is
wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due
performance of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or
alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered.
- The appellants have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without
making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
- According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
Separate Opinions:
1) PARAS, J., dissenting:
- His point was that the appellants undoubtedly followed the order to get Balagtas dead
or alive.
- As Balagtas was a fugitive criminal, with revolvers in his possession and a record that
made him extremely dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were
justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive.
- Conscious of the fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants
did not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such prudence.
2) HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:
- The doctrine laid down by US v. Ah Chong should be applied in this case.
- Brigida Mallari, the person whom the appellants met upon arriving at the house of
Irene Requinea, supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was
upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the wanted criminal.
Oanis said: If you are Balagtas stand up," But the supposed criminal showed his
intention to attack the appellants, a conduct easily explained by the fact that he
should have felt offended by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was
peacefully lying down with his mistress.
- In such predicament, it was nothing but human on the part of the appellants to
employ force and to make use of their weapons in order to repel the imminent attack
by a person who, according to their belief, was Balagtas
- In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness on the part of the accused, who having
no time to make a further inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to them and act immediately.
021. Ivler v. Honesto-San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716 /November 17, 2010/Second Division/Petition for Review of Orders of Pasig RTC
Jason Ivler y Aguilar – petitioner
Pasig MTC Br. 71 Judge Maria Rowena Modest-San Pedro, and Evangeline Ponce – respondent
Decision by J. Carpio, Digest by Arnel
Short Version: A vehicular collision between Jason Ivler and spouses Nestor and Evangeline
Ponce in 2004 (yes, before the infamous 2009 road rage incident involving then Azy Ignacio’s
long-time boyfriend-nag-tsismis?) resulted in slight physical injuries for Evangeline and the death
of Nestor. Ivler was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries. This
petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-
silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second
prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property arising from
the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
Facts:
Following a vehicular collision in 8 August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce
(respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s
vehicle.
Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of
PUBLIC CENSURE. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence. MTC denied quashal. Ivler elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in criminal case, including his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings
and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of
the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Issues:

1) WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent? NO.
2) WON petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death
of respondent Ponce’s husband? YES.
Ratio:
On Petition for Certiorari
The RTC dismissed Ivler’s petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner
for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without reaching the
merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing
to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, Ponce calls the Court’s attention to
jurisprudence holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property. The OSG moved
not to file a comment as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party.
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms
of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to
Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court
of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.
On Double Jeopardy
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense,
with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Ivler adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of
reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing
quasi-offenses.
The cases cited by the SC uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The SC declares that for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection
of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the
beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects
qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).
OBITER: If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a
single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses.
This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule
of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should
cushion the effect of this ruling.
Dispositive: SC grants the petition and reverses the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May
2006 of the Pasig RTC, Branch 157. SC also dismisses the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
against Ivler pending with the Pasig MTC, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
022. PEOPLE v. BUAN
G.R. No. L-25366 | March 29, 1968 | En Banc | Direct appeal by accused from an Order of the
CFI |
People – plaintiff-appellee
Jose Buan – accused appellant
Decision by: Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.
Digest by: KY Bautista
Short version: Buan (bus driver) hit a jeepney, injuring the jeep passengers and damaging the
jeep. He was charged with “slight phys inj through reckless imprudence” but was acquitted by
the Justice of the Peace. An Info for “serious phys inj and damage to property through reckless
imprudence” was filed with the CFI. Accused moved to quash as he was already acquitted in the
Justice of the Peace. SC agrees with accused saying that once convicted/acquitted of a specific
act of reckless imprudence, he may not be prosecuted again for that same act. The law
penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
Facts:
 Accused Buan was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company along
MacArthur Highway in Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence, he
struck a passenger jeep.
 The jeep turned turtle. Jeep passengers were injured.
o 6 – slight phys inj (med attendance 5-9 days)
o 3 – serious phys inj (med attention 30-45 days)
o Damaged jeep – P1,395
 In the Guiguinto Justice of the Peace Court, charge against accused: “slight phys inj
through reckless imprudence.” He was tried and acquitted.
 Prior to this acquittal, Prov Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the CFI the info in the present
case: “serious phys inj and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.”
 Accused was arraigned but moved to quash the info: that he had already been
acquitted of the same offense.
 CFI denied. MR denied.
 Accused appealed to the SC.
Issue: W/N the second case placed the appellant (accused) twice in jeopardy -- Yes
Ruling: CFI Bulacan directed to quash and dismiss the charge.
Ratio:
  Once convicted/acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, he may not be
prosecuted again for that same act.
 The essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under RPC 365 lies
in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony.
 The law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result. The gravity of
the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty.
 As the careless act is single, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
 Ppl v. Silva (1962): where the result of the same vehicular accident one man died, two
seriously injured, three suffered slight physical injuries, the acquittal for “slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence” was a bar to “homicide through
reckless imprudence”
 Ppl v. Diaz (1954): dismissal of “reckless driving” barred “damage to property through
reckless imprudence” (which was based on the same negligent act)
Voting:
 Ppl v. Belga (nd): dismissal of info “physical inj through reckless imprudence” bars
“damage to property through reckless imprudence” and “multiple physical injuries”
arising from the same collision
But SolGen argues: the charge for “slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence” could
not be joined with the accusation for “serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence”
because RPC 48 allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies.
Ppl v. Diaz (1954) already answered this: This may be true. But the prosecution was not obliged
to first prosecute for slight phys inj through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the
lesser offense (but accused was acquitted), the prosecuting attorney is not in a position to press
the more serious charge which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence.
 Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., took no part.
Calimutan v. People
Culpa distinguished from Dolo
Chico-Nazario
Feb. 9, 2006
Digest by PS Magno
Short Version:
Calimutan threw a stone at the victim’s back. The victim died because of trauma to his spleen.
The lower courts convicted him of homicide, but the SC reduced it to reckless imprudence.
Facts:
Calimutan and Bulalacao were walking from the market. The victim, Cantre, and the witness,
Sanano, were walking from a drinking spree from a videoke bar. When the 2 parties met, Cantre
punched Bulalacao because Cantre suspected Bulalacao to be the one throwing stones at Cantre’s
house. Bulalacao was able to run away. During the frenzy, Calimutan went behind Cantre’s back
and threw a stone (the size of a fist) at Cantre’s lower abdomen.
After the scuffle, the parties went home, Cantre fell ill and complained of backaches. By nighttime,
he was sweating profusely and his body felt numb. He tried to eat, but subsequently vomited the
same. He died later that night.
Cantre was examined by Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer. Her Post-Mortem Report stated
that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning.
Cantre’s family was not satisfied with this report, and they exhumed Cantre’s body, and allowed
NBI Dr. Mendez to examine the same. His report stated that there was a laceration of the spleen,
and that the cause of death was a traumatic injury of the abdomen.
At the trial, witness Sanano and Dr. Mendez were presented as the prosecution’s witnesses. The
defense sole witness was Calimutan himself.
The RTC convicted Calimutan of homicide. The CA affirmed the same.
Hence this petition.
Issue and Dispositive:
Is Calimutan guilty of homicide? No. Only of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Ratio:
Focus is on the issue of culpa and dolo:
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular:
 intentional felonies, and
 culpable felonies
These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of
malicious intent of the offender —
 In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious.
o The act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)
o The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the
intention to cause an injury to another.
 In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious.
o The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice."
o The wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or
lack of skill.
xxx this Court cannot xxx attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much
less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this Court cannot sustain the
conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide xxx
Instead, this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under RPC 365 xxx
 Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Circumstances noted by the Court that lead to their decision:
 It was a chance encounter between the 2 parties. There was no plan or premeditation
about any act.
 The victim Cantre was the original aggressor.
 Cantre was a larger and older man (5’9, and 26 years old) as compared his victim,
Bulalacao (5’0, and 15 years old)
 Calimutan only sought to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of Cantre when he
picked up the stone.
 That Calimutan threw the stone at Cantre’s back does not automatically imply treachery.
 He probably did so “in the midst of the fray, and (threw the stone) rashly and
impulsively”
 It was a brief scuffle
Further, the prosecution was not able to establish that Calimutan did the act with the specific
intent of killing, or even harming Cantre. Calimutan’s intention was to protect Bulalacao
Other issue (not really important):
There was an issue re. the conflicting findings of the 2 doctors who performed autopsies on the
Cantre.
 1st doctor: Ulanday (found that the COD was food poisoning) – she admitted that she
did not perform an autopsy as pervasive as the one conducted by the other doctor,
because she did not slice open the head and body, but merely made an incision in the
stomach, and tried to figure out the circumstances surrounding the death through her
hand.
 2nd doctor: Mendez (found that the COD was traumatic injury to the abdomen) – NBI
doctors are trained to perform more invasive autopsies, and thus he was able to perform
a more thorough analysis of the victim.
Either way, the defense admitted the expertise of Mendez.
024. ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560 | November 19, 2001 | EN BANC | PETITION to declare Republic Act No. 7080
(An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA No. 7659
unconstitutional.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner
SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
BELLOSILLO, J.
Digest by Lilian Dy

Short Version:
Joseph Estrada is being prosecuted for Plunder under RA 7080. He challenges the
constitutionality of the statute for the following reasons:
a. it suffers from the vice of vagueness (use of the words combination and series in Sec
1 par d and Sec 2)3
b. it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions (Sec 4)4
c. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under
The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. (Sec 4)
The Court held that the Plunder Law is constitutional.
a. It is not vague. (uses plain and ordinary meaning in the dictionary, can be understood
by the common man.)
b. The law does not lower the standard of evidence. Based on the deliberations of
Congress, each element must still be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
c. The Plunder Law is not mala prohibitum . Just because it is a special law. Mens rea
must still be present. Moreover, its predicate or constitutive crimes are male in se,
therefore the plunder is also male in se.
Facts:
3. Former President Joseph Estrada is being prosecuted for under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
4. The Ombudsman filed 8 separate informations which allege among others, the
following acts committed by Joseph Estrada:
 As President, connived / conspired with co-accused who are members of his
family, relatives by consanguinity or affinity, business associates,
subordinates…by taking undue advantage of his official position… willfully,
unlawfully and criminally… to accumulate ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of
4.097B++ thereby unjustly enriching himself… at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Rep of the Philippines…. through ANY OR
3
Section 1. x x x x (d)“Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business, enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him
directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence
to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
o Protection of Illegal gambling or Jueteng kickbacks (545M)
o Misappropriating Tobacco Excise Tax allocated for Ilocus Sur (150M of
200M)
o For directing the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation in
the amount of 1.102B++ and 744M++ respectively and collecting
commission of 189.7M++ for the transaction. Commission was deposited in
EPCI Bank under account of “Jose Velarde”
o Unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of more
or less 3.233B++ and depositing the same under the account of “Jose
Velarde”
5. President Estrada challenges the constitutionality of the Plunder Law
a. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
o bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series”
o these omissions render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of
his fundamental right to due process.
b. it dispenses with the “reasonable doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions
o the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of
plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts
showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy
c. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable
under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are purportedly clear
violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50.000.000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as
provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare
any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor
of the State (italics supplied).
4
Section 4. Rule of Evidence.—For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy (italics supplied).
Issue:
1. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so,
whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
2. Whether the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
3. Whether the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process
Dispositive:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as
amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Reasoning:
5. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent.
According to Justice Mendoza in his concurring opinion, “Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.” It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.”
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal
Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea
is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent.
The crime of plunder is classified as a heinous crime.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg.
22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness
of the acts.
6. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Sec 2 prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity.
a. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
b. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity
or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
c. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute
will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,7
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to
those words
Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words “combination” and “series:”
Combination—the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series—a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words “combination” and “series” to be understood in
their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d),
e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a “series”, there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d),
say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or
distinctive meaning for “combination” and “series,” it would have taken greater pains
in specifically providing for it in the law.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects—it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of
the Government muscle.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether
the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice
7. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in
his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and
unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the
crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth.
To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with
having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not
 prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2)
of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of
the proof of the predicate acts.
All the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition
in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and “pattern” is not one of them.
Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Justice Mendoza, Concurring Opinion
Main opinion quoted Justice Mendoza’s opinion (almost verbatim) regarding the issue of Plunder
as malum in se
The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
to penal statutes.
Void for vagueness doctrine: a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law
Overbreadth Doctrine: a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the
State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
In any case, the Plunder Law is neither vague nor overbroad.
Davide, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Quisumbing, concur with Justice Mendoza
Justice Panganiban, Separate Concurring Opinion
Without being facetious, may I say that, unlike the act of discharging a gun, the acts mentioned
in Section 1(d)—bribery, conversion, fraudulent conveyance, unjust enrichment and the like—
cannot be committed sans criminal intent. And thus, I finally arrive at a point of agreement with
petitioner: that the acts enumerated in Section l(d) are by their nature mala in se, and most of
them are in fact defined and penalized as such by the Revised Penal Code. Having said that, I
join the view that when we speak of plunder, we are referring essentially to two or more
instances of mala in se constituting one malum prohibitum. Thus, there should be no difficulty if
each of the predicate acts be proven beyond reasonable doubt as mala in se, even if the
defense of lack of intent be taken away as the solicitor general has suggested. In brief, the
matter of classification is not really significant, contrary to what petitioner would have us
believe. The key, obviously, is whether the same burden of proof—proof beyond reasonable
doubt—would apply.
Justice Kapunan, Dissenting Opinion
I respectfully disagree with the majority that “ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters” are provided in the law to resolve these basic questions. Even men steeped in the
knowledge of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes plunder.
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the
assailed law in its entirety. It is that which would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without the existence a “pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy” to acquire ill-gotten wealth,
a person committing several or even all of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be
convicted for plunder, but may be convicted only for the specific crimes committed under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.
Re Mala in Se
The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code, e.g. malversation, estafa, bribery and other crimes committed by public officers. As such,
they are by nature mala in se crimes. Since intent is an essential element of these crimes, then,
with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which, under R.A. No. 7659, is
one of the heinous crimes as pronounced in one of its whereas clauses.
The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special
law does not necessarily make the same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not essential,
although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special laws. For there is a marked
difference between the two. According to a well-known author on criminal law: There is a
distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft,
rape, homicide, etc., and those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by
statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous
condemnation of its members; while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society.
Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a
limitation on police power. Additionally, lack of mens rea or a clarifying scienter requirement
aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
Justice Pardo, Dissenting Opinion
Votes to grant the petition. The case should be remanded to the Ombudsman to amend the
information to charge only a single offense instead of a multiplicity of offenses.
Justice Ynares-Santiago, Dissenting Opinion
In the crime of plunder, it is enough that the acts defining malversation or bribery are described.
The court then proceeds to determine whether the acts fall under the prohibitory terms of the
law. Criminal intent no longer has to be proved. The criminal intent to commit the crime is not
required to be proved. The desire to benefit particular persons does not have to spring from
criminal intent under the special law creating the crime of plunder. In malversation or bribery
under the Revised Penal Code, the criminal intent is an important element of the criminal acts.
Under the Plunder Law, it is enough that the acts are committed. Thus, even if the accused can
prove lack of criminal intent with respect to crimes mala in se, this will not exonerate him under
the crime mala prohibita. This violates substantive due process and the standards of fair play
because mens rea is a constitutional guarantee under the due process clause.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Dissenting Opinion
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional. Albeit the legislature did not directly lower the degree of
proof required in the crime of plunder from proof beyond reasonable doubt to mere
preponderance of or substantial evidence, it nevertheless lessened the burden of the
prosecution by dispensing with proof of the essential elements of plunder.
When Section 4 of R.A. No. 7080 mandates that it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to
prove each and every criminal act done by the accused, the legislature, in effect, rendered the
enumerated “criminal acts” under Section 1 (d) merely as means and not as essential elements
of plunder. This is constitutionally infirmed and repugnant to the basic idea of justice and fair
play. As a matter of due process, the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. The State may
not specify a lesser burden of proof for an element of a crime. With more reason, it should not
be allowed to go around the principle by characterizing an essential element of plunder merely
as a “means” of committing the crime. For the result is the reduction of the burden of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that without plurality of overt or criminal acts, there can be no crime of plunder,
due process of law demands that the terms “combination” and “series” be defined with
exactitude in the law itself.

025. Padilla v. Dizon
Administrative Case No. 3086/23 February 1988/EN BANC
Alexander Padilla – complainant
Hon. Baltazar Dizon (Presiding Judge, RTC Pasay Br. 113) – respondent
Per Curiam, Digest by Pip
Short Version: Judge Dizon acquitted Lo Chi Fai for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960
because the accused apparently had no criminal intent to violate the Circular. Commissioner of
Customs Padilla filed an administrative complaint against Judge Dizon for gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law as a result of the decision. The Court dismissed Judge Dizon from
serving, finding that he was indeed incompetent/ignorant and his actions constituted grave
misconduct, since proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses
punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.
Facts: Alexander Padilla was Commissioner of Customs in August 1987 when he filed a complaint
against Judge Dizon for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision due to gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law in the case of People of the Philippines v. Lo Chi Fai. In that case, the
accused was acquitted of the offense of smuggling foreign currency out of the country.
In his answer, the judge recited his “commendable record as a fearless prosecutor” from
December 1962 until he was appointed as an RTC judge in February 1983. In essence, he argued
that his length of service as prosecutor and judge “is tangible proof that would negate the
allegations of the petitioner (sic)5” whereas “the latter did not last long in the service for reasons
only known to him.” The judge also questioned why the case against him was only filed a year
after the decision involved and construed it as a clear indication of malice and ill-will. He also
asserted that his decision was based on “fundamental principles and the foundation of rights and
justice”, and that whatever errors therein were committed in good faith. He then asked for
dismissal of the petition (sic).6
So what was the case that got him in trouble all about?
In People v. Lo Chi Fai, Lo Chi Fai was a tourist who was caught by a Customs
guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency
and foreign exchange instruments out of the country. At the time of his apprehension
aboard a PAL flight bound for Hong Kong in July 1986, he was carrying 380 foreign
exchange currency and instruments amounting to $355,349.57. The currency and
instruments were in various denominations (Yen, Swiss Franc, Aussie Dollar, HFL
Guilder, French France, US Dollar, etc. etc.) and he was carrying them without any
authority as provided by law. He was able to exhibit two currency declarations which
he was supposed to have accomplished upon arrival in Manila in previous trips.
An information was filed against Lo Chia Fair for violation of Section 6 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960, which provides that—
“No person shall take out or transmit or attempt to take out or
transmit foreign exchange in any form, out of the Philippines directly,
through other persons, through the mails or through international carriers
except when specifically authorized by the Central Bank or allowed
under existing international agreements or Central Bank
regulations.
5
Should be “complainant”, hahahaha.
“Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of
foreign exchange brought in by them. For purposes of establishing the
amount of foreign exchange brought in or out of the Philippines, tourists and
non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00
or its equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the Central Bank at points of entries upon
arrival in the Philippines.”
The penal sanction was provided by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1883, which labels the
act above as blackmarketing of foreign exchange punished by reclusion temporal
(minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine no less than
P50,000.00.
Lo Chi Fai attempted to prove at trial that he was a businessman from Kowloon
and he had come to the Philippines was to invest in business and play in the casino.
When he came to the Philippines he tried to declare US and Japanese currency, but the
Central Bank representative refused to accept his declaration until he could get a
confirmation as to the source of the money. He also testified that his business
associates, as per their agreement to invest in some business with him, started putting
money for this purpose in a common fund. Every time one of them came to the
Philippines, they would declare the money being brought in and all declarations were
then handed to Lo Chia Fai. He also testified on cross-examination that the reason he
was going back to Hong Kong, bringing with him all the money intended to be invested
in the Philippines, was because of the fear of his group that the “revolution” taking place
in Manila might become widespread.
Judge Dizon acquitted Lo Chi Fai, ruling that the fact that the latter had in his
possession the foreign currencies when he was about to depart from the Philippines did
not by that act alone make him liable for violation of Section 6. Judge Dizon ruled that
what was imperative was the purpose for which he was bringing foreign currencies out
of the country. He accepted Lo Chi Fai’s explanation and defense. And then he went
and wrote this—
“Yes, simply reading the provisions of said circular will, readily show that the
currency declaration is required for the purpose of establishing the amount
of currency being brought by tourist or temporary non-resident visitors into
the country. The currency declarations, therefore, is already (sic) intended to
serve as a guideline for the Customs authorities to determine the amounts
actually brought in by them to correspond to the amounts that could be
allowed to be taken out. Indeed, this Court is amazed and really has its
misgivings in the manner currency declarations were made as testified to by
the Central Bank employees. Why the Bureau of Customs representative
never took part in all these declarations testified to by no less than five (5)
Central Bank employees? Seemingly, these employees are the favorites of
these travellers. It is the hope of this Court that the authorities must do
something to remedy the evident flaw in the system for effective
implementation of the questioned Central Bank Circular No. 960.”
Issue: Was Judge Dizon guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law for acquitting
Lo Chi Fai? YES.
6
Again, should be “complaint”. In fact, the Court kept putting “should be complaint” all over its
decision, hahaha.
Ruling: Judge dismissed from service.
Ratio: As a general rule, a judge cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith.
In this case, Judge Dizon showed gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding
that the prosecution needed to establish that Lo Chi Fai had criminal intent to violate Central Bank
Circular No. 960. He should have known that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea)
is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. There
was no denying that Lo Chi Fai should have been found guilty of the offense because the facts
confirm that he had in his possession about $355,349.57 without any specific authority from the
Central Bank as required by law.
The Court took Judge Dizon to task for swallowing “such a fantastic tale, although totally
irrelevant to the matter of the criminal liability of the accused, hook, line, and sinker.” It apparently
escaped the judge that the number of foreign currency instruments and amounts that Lo Chi Fai
was caught with did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused
at trial. It also flew over the judge’s head that Lo Chi Fai in effect admitted that he was a carrier
of foreign currency for other people. This, and the totality of circumstances in this case
made the story concocted by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the
findings of Judge Dizon to be obviously contrived in favor of the acquittal of the
accused, thereby negating his claim that he rendered the decision in good faith. His
acts in this case amounted to grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound
and fair administration of justice.
Voting: C.J. Teehankee, Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento Cortes, and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Narvasa, JJ., no part.
027. PEOPLE V. SALEY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANTONINE B. SALEY a.k.a. ANNIE B. SALEY,
G.R. No. 121179
July 2, 1998
Vitug, J.
Short Version:
Appellant was charged guilty of illegal recruitment and estafa. Conviction for these
various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa.
Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires criminal intent to warrant
conviction.
Facts:
1. Appellant was indicted in eleven separate informations for estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(1), of the Revised Penal Code. For the violation of Article 38, in relation
to Article 39, of the Labor Code, five separate informations were also instituted
against appellant on various dates.
2. Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges of illegal recruitment and estafa. The
criminal cases filed were raffled off to two (2) branches of the Regional Trial Court of
Benguet; later, however, the cases were consolidated at the instance of the
prosecution.
3. The defense posited the theory that appellant merely assisted the complainants in
applying for overseas employment with duly accredited travel agencies for and from
which she derived a commission.
a. According to the 37-year-old appellant, she used to be the liaison officer of
the Friendship Recruitment Agency from 1983 to 1986. In that capacity, she
would submit to the POEA "contracts for processing job orders for
applicants" and assist applicants prior to their departure at the airport.
b. When the licensed agency closed in 1986, she went to Baguio where she
engaged in the purchase and sale of vegetables and flowers. Even then,
however, she would not hesitate extending help to applicants for overseas
employment by recommending licensed agencies which could assist said
applicants in going abroad. She named the Dynasty Travel and Tours and
the Mannings International as such licensed agencies.
4. The trial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged. It found implausible appellant's claim that she was merely an
agent of Dynasty Travel and Tours and/or Maritess Tapia and Carol Cornelio.
5. Appellant Antonine B. Saley, a.k.a. Annie B. Saley, seeks a reversal of the verdict
finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of eleven counts of estafa punishable
under the Revised Penal Code and six counts of illegal recruitment, one committed in
large scale, proscribed by the Labor Code.
Issue:
1) Whether the trial court had erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses and in finding her guilty of the crimes charged? (NO)
Ruling:
The Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal
recruitment, illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED.
Ratio:
1. The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant, indeed, violated the law against illegal
recruitment.
 Art. 38 (a) of the Labor Code considers illegal any recruitment activity "undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority."
 Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur:
o That the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable
one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
o That the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34. 46
 Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established beyond any discernible
shadow of doubt that appellant is indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts.
 Being neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit, appellant must suffer under
Article 39(c) of the Labor Code the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years
nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00 nor more than
P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court.
 In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application of
the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an accused cannot be
considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special laws.
2. Defendant is also guilty of estafa.
 Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code does not bar the punishment
of the offender for estafa.
o Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where criminal intent of the
accused is not necessary for conviction while estafa is malum in se which
requires criminal intent to warrant conviction.
  Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person. Clearly, these elements have sufficiently
been shown in the cases under review.
 It would appear that of the seven complainants for illegal recruitment in large scale,
only five of them filed separate charges of estafa against appellant. Accordingly,
appellant was only and could only be held liable for five counts of estafa arising from
the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.
Digest by: Lor Saguinsin
028. People v. Simon
G.R. No. 93028 / July 29, 1994 / En Banc
People – Plaintiff-Appelle
Martin Simon y Sunga – Respondent
Decision by J. Regalado, Digest by Jason Jimenez
Short Version: For selling 3.8 grams of marijuana, the trial court convicted Simon for violation
of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and imposed a
penalty of life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty
to 6 months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional, as the
maximum. RA 6425, as now amended by RA 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under
the RPC in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. While RA
6425, as amended, is a special law, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those
provided for in the RPC lucidly reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions on
penalties for felonies under the RPC the corresponding application to said special law, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in the special law.
Facts: In November 1988, accused Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of
RA 6425, as amended under an indictment alleging that he sold 4 tea bags of marijuana (total of
3.8 grams) to a Narcotics Comman poseur-buyer in consideration of P40. Simon denied the
accusation. The trial court rendered judgment convicting Simon for said violation and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
Simon prays the reversal of judgment.
RA 6425, as amended, was further amended by RA 7659 effective December 31, 1993. Under
the amendatory law, Simon in fact stands to be convicted for the sale of only 2 tea bags of
marijuana.
Section 4 of RA 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000 upon any person who shall unlawfully
sell, administer, deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug.
That penalty, according to the amendment to Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is
involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is
less, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
Issues:
1. Should the patently favorable provisions of RA 7659 be given retroactive effect to entitle
Simon to the lesser penalty, pursuant to Article 22 of the RPC? YES
2. What is the correct penalty to be imposed? 6 months of arresto mayor, as the minimum,
to 6 years of prision correccional, as the maximum (not life imprisonment)
Ruling: Judgment of conviction affirmed
Ratio:
1. Although RA 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in
substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the RPC, it has long been settled that
by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies
to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws. The
execution in said article would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since
habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.
2. There is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where
the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where
the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The penalty to be imposed where the
quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph
shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua.
This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts should
be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.
Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence
covered by the imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph of Section 20,
as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range
"depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said
second paragraph constitutes a complex one composed of three distinct penalties, that
is, prision correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the
Code provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe as the maximum period.
By way of exception to Article 77 of the RPC and to subserve the purpose of Section 20
of RA 7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal
imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the drug involved. Since each
component penalty of the total complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as
determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying circumstances can
be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty.
If the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion
temporal. Considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar,
the penalty of prision correccional is consequently indicated. Prision correccional has a
duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three
periods as provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of
the Code.
Although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special
law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the RPC in its technical
nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects
under the system of penalties native to said Code. The imposable penalty under
RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium
period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the RPC, there being no attendant mitigating or
aggravating circumstance.
Where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference
or relation to those under the RPC, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for
the application of penalties under said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions
 based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of
special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
While modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the
corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower than prision
correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second
paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an independent principal penalty,
and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat
quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have
efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect
law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to
Congress.
Voting: Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias “Roling,”
ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES and EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused,
ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias “Roling” and ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, accused-appellants.|
31 August 1998| J. Panganiban
Procedural History:
 The RTC convicted Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of 2 counts of murder
and 3 counts of frustrated murder. Penalty for murder: 14yrs 8mos 1 day -17yrs 4mos
1day, indemnity of 50,000; Penalty for frustrated murder: 8 yrs - 14yrs 8mos,
indemnity of 20,000
 Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. Penalty for murder:
reclusion perpetua; Penalty for frustrated murder: 10yrs-17yrs 4mos; Indemnity
affirmed
o Case elevated to Supreme Court for review
Facts: (from testimony of Edwin Santos, a survivor)
Edwin Santos went to a small gathering at the house of Maj. Tiempo. He saw that the accused
were also there. Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio
Oliveros and Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of Stephen Lim at Mansueto Compound,
Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu upon request of Lim.
Edwin Santos, Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo (driver) also went riding in an owner-
type jeep, in order to bring back the group [as] soon as the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his
home.
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. When they
arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire.
Edwin Santos looked at the direction where the gunfire came, and saw [the] persons [who] fired
at the jeep. He identified accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo
Beronga as the persons who fired at the vehicle.
Santos immediately informed Maj. Tiempo of the incident and the victims were brought to the
hospital.
Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores testified
about the shooting and identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the car that is
behind the jeep. He positively identified Sabalones as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen
fired at the car, driver Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan
Tiempo’s house from which they have escaped death.
Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones and Beronga denied their
presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous witnesses who
stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired watching over
his brother’s wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and was
fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from
place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The
defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses arguing that the place
where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.
Issues: (1) WON the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible. (2) WON the alibis are
acceptable. (3) WON correct penalty was imposed.
Prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible.
RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There was
positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in gunfire. The
place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no
bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is binding though to the
co-accused because it is used as circumstantial evidence corroborated by one witness. The
inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility of testimony.
Aberratio Ictus ( Mistake of blow)
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in “conjecture” in ruling that there
was aberratio ictus in this case.
This allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that the trial
court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush,
not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court
did err in explaining the motive of the appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion above, that the
guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on
the extrajudicial statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These
pieces of evidence sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of
having killed the recently slain Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to
retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the victims’ vehicles which they mistook to
be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact
that they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court has held that
“mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused
zeroes in on his intended victim
The case is better characterized as error in personae or mistake in the identity of the
victims, rather than aberratio ictus which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at
one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.
Alibis not acceptable.
It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by positive identification. Using the case of
People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from
the scene of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.
Correct penalty not imposed.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period, to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua
for murder. The CA erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated
murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is next lower in degree
than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony because there are no mitigating or
aggravating conspiracy between the two accused..

Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the circumstances that the crime was done
at night time and that the accused hid themselves among the bamboo. Evident premeditation is
also an aggravating circumstance [the accused had planned to kill the victim some days before].
Supreme Court Judgment: Decision is affirmed. Penalty is modified.
Murder: Reclusion perpetua; indemnity of 50,000
Frustrated Murder: 8yrs-14yrs 8mos; indemnity to be paid should be the actual
damages (hospital bills)
US vs. BAUTISTA
United States vs. Francisco Bautista et al
November 3, 1906
Carson, J.
Short version: Bautista, de Guzman and Puzon were convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the
US govt in Manila. They were in fact found to have been involved in several meetings where the
conspiracy to overthrow the government was made. Puzon, in particular, was found to have
been appointed as a brigadier-general of the revolution army. However, Puzon asserted that he
only accepted the position (1) without the intention of taking further action and (2) in order not
to vex his friend who offered the position. Puzon’s counsel contended that the constitutional
provision requiring the testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession
in open court, to support a conviction for the crime of treason should be applied.
Court denied appeal. The crime of conspiring to commit treason is a separate and distinct
offense from the crime of treason. In holding that Puzon was a conspirator, the Court
considered that a genuine conspiracy was shown to have existed in this case, and it was proven
that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in that conspiracy.
FACTS
Francisco Bautista, Aniceto de Guzman and Tomas Puzon were convicted in CFI Manila of the
crime of conspiracy to overthrow, put down and destroy by force the Government of the United
States in the Philippine Islands, as defined and penalized in Section 4 of Act No. 292 of the
Philippine Commission.
During the latter part of 1903, a junta was organized and a conspiracy entered into by a number
of Filipino residents in Hongkong for the purpose of overthrowing the US gov’t in the Philippines
by force of arms and establishing in its stead a government to be known as the Republica
Universal Democratica Filipina. Prim Ruiz was recognized as the titular head of this conspiracy
and Artemio Ricarte as the chief of the military forces to be organized.
On December 1903, Ricarte secretly came to Manila from Hongkong. After his arrival, he held a
number of meetings in Manila and the adjoining provinces whereat was perfected the conspiracy
hatched in Hongkong. At these meetings, new members were taken into the conspiracy and
plans were made for the enlistment of an army and the raising of money by national and private
loans. To this end, bonds were issued and commissions as officers in the revolutionary army
were granted to a number of conspirators. The conspirators did in fact take the field and offered
armed resistance to the constituted authorities in the Philippines, only failing in their design of
overthrowing the government because of their failure to combat successfully with the officers of
the law who were sent against them and of the failure of the people to rise en masse in
response to their propaganda.
Tomas Puzon; teacher of primary and secondary schools:
 United with the conspirators thru Jose Munoz, a prime leader of the movement
 Puzon held several conferences with Munoz whereat plans were made for the coming
insurrection
 In one conference, Munoz offered Puzon a commission as brigadier-general of the
signal conference. Puzon assured Munoz that he had things in readiness, meaning
thereby that he had duly organized in accordance with the terms of his commission.
Puzon appealed his conviction, saying that:
:
 he had never united himself with the conspirators
 He had accepted the appointment as brigadier-general with no intention of ever
taking any further action in the matter and merely because he did not wish to vex his
friend Munoz by refusing to do so.
 When Munoz offered him the appointment as brigadier-general, he did so in a joking
tone and Puzon did not know that Ricarte was in Manila organizing the conspiracy.
ISSUE: Whether Puzon is guilty of conspiracy in view of his claims that he only took on the role
of brigadier-general with no intention of taking further action --- YES, conspiracy is different
from treason
REASONING
Puzon’s claims on appeal cannot be accepted as true in view of a written statement signed by
Puzon at the time he was first arrested, which reads in part:
Q. Are you a part of his new revolution presided over by Ricarte? - A. Yes,
sir.
Q. What is the employment ( empleo) which you have in this organization,
and who is it who invited you to join it? - A. J. R. Muñoz, who is general of
division of this new organization, spoke to me with much instance, asking me
to accept employment as brigadier-general, chief of signal corps, to which I,
on account of his request and in view of the fact that the said Muñoz is a
friend of mine from my youth, acceded; nevertheless I have organized
absolutely nothing in respect to this matter.
Q. Did you accept the employment and did they give you any commission for
it? - A. Yes, sir; I accepted said employment and although they gave me an
order to organize in my brigade I did not do it, because I had neither the
confidence nor the will.
Q. If you didn't have faith in the said authorization nor the will to carry out
what was intrusted to you, why did you accept employment as general of the
brigade? - A. I accepted it on account of friendship and not to vex a friend,
but I never have the intention of fulfilling the obligations.
Puzon, when on the stand in his own behalf, did not deny that he made this statement, but he
attempted to explain it away by saying that when he made it he was so excited that he did not
know just what he was saying. He does not allege that improper means were taken to procure
the confession, and it was proven at the trial that it was freely and voluntarily made and not the
result of violence, intimidation, threat, menace, or promise of reward or leniency. Puzon appears
to be an intelligent man and was for eighteen years a school-teacher and later a telegraph
operator under the Spanish Government, and during the insurrection he held a commission as
an officer in the signal corps of the revolutionary army. His confession is clear and intelligible
and in no way supports his pretense that he was so excited as not to know what he was saying
when he made it, and its truth and accuracy in so far it inculpates him is sustained by other
evidence of record in this case.
Puzon contended that the acceptance or possession of an appointment as an officer
of the military forces of the conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against
him, citing several US cases.
The Court, however, found the case at hand to be distinguished from such cited cases by the
fact that the record clearly disclose that the accused actually and voluntarily accepted the
appointment in question and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by such
acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused
accepted the appointment is taken into consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations
with the conspirators.
US vs. Reyes: Accused was charged with treason. Court found that mere acceptance of a
commission by the defendant, nothing else being done by him or by his companions, was not an
“overt act” of treason within the meaning of the law.
US vs. Nunez et al: Accused were charged with brigandage. Court held that aside from the
possession of commissions in an insurgent band, there was no evidence to show that it they had
committed the crime and, "moreover, that it appeared that they had never united with any party
of brigands and never had been in any way connected with such parties unless the physical
possession of these appointments proved such relation," and that it appeared that each one of
the defendants "were separately approached at different times by armed men while working in
the field and were virtually compelled to accept the commissions."
US vs. dela Serna et al: The mere possession of an appointment (as colonel of the pulajanes),
when it is not shown that the possessor executed some external act by the virtue of the same,
does not constitute sufficient proof of guilt of the defendant.
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators might appoint a person in no wise connected
with them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope that such person would afterwards
accept the commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is even possible that such an
appointment might be forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into the possession of
the person thus nominated, and that such appointment might be found in his possession, and,
notwithstanding all this, the person in whose possession the appointment was found might be
entirely innocent of all intention to join the conspiracy, never having authorized the conspirators
to use his name in this manner nor to send such a commission to him.
But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have existed as in this case, and it is
proven that the accused voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in that
conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be taken into consideration as
evidence of his relations with the conspirators.
Counsel for Puzon contend that the constitutional provision requiring the testimony of at least
two witnesses to the same overt act, or confession in open court, to support a conviction for the
crime of treason should be applied in this case, but this court has always held, in conformance
with the decisions of the Federal courts of the United States, that the crime of conspiring to
commit treason is a separate and distinct offense from the crime of treason, and that
this constitutional provision is not applicable in such cases.
Judgment affirmed.
032. People v. Vengco
127 SCRA 242/January 31, 1984/First Division/Appeal
The People of the Philippines – plaintiff-appellee
Constantino Leneses alias Alex Remonte and Leon David – defendants-appellants
Edgardo Vengco, Rogelio Encarnacion, Romeo Soliba, defendants
Decision by J. Relova, Digest by Jadd Dealino
Short Version: Edwin Vengco and two other men stabbed Charlie Celadena, who was being
restrained by two other men. Leneses, David, Vengco, Encarnacion, and Soliba were all charged
with Murder. Conspiracy was alleged in the Information. The CFI – Manila Branch 20 found all of
them guilty and sentenced Leneses and David (appellants) to reclusion perpetua. The Supreme
Court decided against Leneses and David, affirming the CFI’s decision with a modification as to
the civil liability, based on the finding of conspiracy among the accused.
Facts: In the evening of August 24, 1967, Celadena got off a taxi. A group of five persons,
including Vengco and David, were 30 meters away from Celadena. Rolando Quiane invited
Celadena to go to his apartment so that Celadena could avoid Vengco’s group, as there had been
a recent incident involving Vengco chasing and throwing bottles at Celadena. Celadena refused
this offer. Later, two men restrained Celadena while Vengco and two other men stabbed Celadena.
This incident was seen and testified to by several witnesses (Quiane as regards previous incident
between Vengco and Celadena as well as the invitation to Celadena to go to the apartment; Go
Hong, another neighbor, as regards Vengco’s act of stabbing, and Leneses and three other persons
moving away from the place of the incident, while carrying a dagger, ice pick, and another pointed
weapon; and Purita Delgado, a person inside of Celadena’s sister’s house, corroborating the
incident where Celadena was being held by two men while being stabbed.)
Vengco, Encarnacion, Soliba, Leneses, and David were all charged for the Murder of Celadena.
The CFI – Manila (Branch 20) found them guilty.
Leneses argues that he was dead drunk throughout the evening of August 24, 1967.
David denies being part of the group; he was walking away as the incident occurred.
Issue: Whether Leneses and David are guilty of Murder. YES.
Ruling: Judgment affirmed with modification.
Ratio:
5. The Court gives full faith and credit to the clear and positive testimony of the witnesses,
especially since no improper motive is shown for them to testify against the accused.
6. The Court saw David’s hiding in Cavite as a circumstance indicative of his guilt.
a. David’s explanation of being afraid of Vengco was not appreciated. The Court
said that if he was innocent, he would not have gone into hiding, would have
told the authorities of what happened, and would testify in court against the
others.
7. The Court finds the testimonies sufficient.
a. There are neither inconsistencies nor contradictions.
b. The testimony of just one witness, if credible, positive, and satisfactory to the
court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict (citing People v.
Agrana).
c. The positive identification of Leneses defeats his weak defense of alibi.
Leneses has failed to present clear, positive, and convincing proof of his alibi.
8. This case involves Murder qualified by Abuse of Superior Strength.
a. The Court took into account the commission, manner of perpetration, and
abuse of superior strength.
b. The conspiracy was shown by the conduct of the accused.
i. The manner of their assault, and their conduct sometime before,
and immediately after, show an agreement to kill.
ii. The rule is that “if it is proven that two or more persons
 aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
although apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among them is
proven” (citing Underhill)
1. Reworded: A conspiracy may be inferred even though no
actual meeting is proven, if it is shown that there is a
closeness of personal association and concurrence of
sentiment between two or more persons whose
apparently-independent acts are actually connected and
cooperative to accomplish the same unlawful object.
9. The proper penalty is reclusion temporal.
a. There are no generic aggravating circumstances.
i. Nighttime, evident premeditation, and treachery were not
sufficiently proven by the prosecution.
b. There are no mitigating circumstances.
c. The penalty is reclusion temporal to death for Murder.
Voting: Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
33. People v. Valdez
159 SCRA 153/25 March 1988
Accused: Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio
Decision by J. Feliciano, Digest by Roe Anuncio
Short Version: Valdez and Orodio were charged with and convicted by the trial court of
murder, thereby being sentenced to death. On automatic review, the SC discussed the argument
of the OSG that the guilt of Orodio was not proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution
because conspiracy was not sufficiently proven, it only having been alleged that he was seen
running away with Valdez after the gunshot. SC confirms the guilt of Orodio, taking into account
all the circumstances enumerated below.
Facts: Eleno Maquiling was having dinner with his family at their house when he was shot to
death. Witnesses thereafter saw Valdez and Orodio running away from the bushes outside the
house, Valdez carrying a shotgun. Valdez and Orodio were charged with and convicted by the
trial court of murder for the shooting of Eleno, thereby being sentenced to death. The case was
brought to the SC for automatic review. The Court discussed the argument put forward by the
OSG that accused-appellant Simplicio Orodio should be acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence
to sustain this conviction either as a principal or an accomplice. According to the OSG, the
prosecution did not adduce any evidence establishing the aforesaid alleged conspiracy between
Valdez and Orodio to commit the crime charged.
Issue: Was there conspiracy? YES.
Ruling: RTC decision affirmed.
Ratio: Circumstances evidencing conspiracy: 1) Orodio was present with Valdez at the time
Eleno Maquiling was killed; 2) he was in the company of a man running with a shotgun, at
approximately 8:00 o'clock in the evening, immediately after the fatal shooting, just outside the
Maquilings house where he had no business being if he were not acting in concert with Danilo
Valdez; 3) he was a close friend (barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of whom the
deceased victim had Identified as probably responsible should any untoward event befall the
victim; 4) Orodio completely failed to explain what he was doing with Danilo Valdez the night of
the killing; 5) both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Their common
alibi remained uncorroborated. The prosecution had adequately proven the conspiracy.
Both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio Orodio are liable as co-conspirators since any act of a co-
conspirator becomes the act of the other regardless of the precise degree of participation in the
act.
034. People v Escober
G.R. No. L-69564/January 29, 1988/En banc/Automatic review to the SC
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
Juan Escober y Geralde, Macario Punzalan, Jr., y Guevarra, Richard Doe, Peter Doe and Juan
Doe, accused
Juan Escober y Geralde, accused-appellants
Decision by Fernan, J. Digest by Ces
Short version: Escober and Punzalan were accused and convicted of the crime of robbery with
homicide and sentenced to death. Escober worked as a security guard of an electrical supply
shop. While on duty, Punzalan and the 3 other unidentified men entered the premises. Punzalan
was a look out while the others killed the 2 children of the owners and stole P5,000.00. The SC
acquitted Escober, because all he did was open the gate when the others knocked, which was in
itself not a criminal act. There was no proof that he was aware of their plans to rob the place
and kill the inhabitants. The existence of conspiracy between the accused and the actual killers
must be shown, and the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to
support a finding of the presence of the conspiracy. Punzalan was not acquitted and his
conviction was affirmed by the SC. Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence
of or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the
robbery are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide.
Facts:
 4 of the accused (Richard Doe, Peter Doe, Juan Doe, and Punzalan) knocked at the little
door of the gate of the Bee Seng Electrical Supply, where Escober worked as a security
guard.
 Escober knew one of them, because he had previously worked as a security guard also in
that same establishment. Thus, he opened the door. Punzalan waited outside while the 3
others went inside.
 Lina Chua (mother of the victims), went outside and saw the accused. She shouted why
the gate was opened, and her a gunshot.
 A shot had been fired in the direction of Escober but we was not shot.
 Vicente Chua (father of the victims) was inside the bathroom when heard the gunshot. He
hurried outside and saw his son Irvin lying on the sofar while his daughter Tiffany was
lying on the floor, both mortally wounded. Beside Tiffany, he saw a scissor blade full of
blood. The items in the office were scattered, and he discovered that the P5,000.00 he
kept in one of the drawers was lost.
 The victims were brought to the hospital but were pronounced dead upon arrival.
 Punzalan was identified as an accused by Lina Chua, through a police line-up.
 Escober and Punzalan were convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, and sentenced to death.
o The RTC did not believe any of Escober’s defenses. It believed that the shot was fired
by Escober himself avoid suspicion. Also, it did not believe that Escober merely
opened the gate because he was throwing out the garbage.
Issue: Whether Escober’s and Punzalan’s involvement in the conspiracy has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt
Held/Ratio:
1) With regard to Escober: NO. He was acquitted by the SC
a. He only opened the gate when the other accused knocked. That by itself is an
innocent gesture.
b. The worse that could be attributed to him is lack of better judgment or laxity in the
performance of his duties as a security guard.
c. He and one of the other accused were previously co-employees. That makes it less
surprising that Escober would open the gate for him.
d. The gun-firing could not have been a ritual to avoid suspicion. The SC that he would
be the stupidest person alive if he allowed that, since being shot by a gun is too risky.
2) With regard to Punzalan: YES. His conviction was affirmed.
a. His defense was that the 3 other accused fetched him on the premise of merely
drinking beer and then brought him along to the scene of the crime.
b. But this is too incredible because the other accused would not have risked bringing an
eyewitness to the scene of the crime.
c. Also, he fled with the other accused from the scene of the crime and failed to report
the crime to the police.
d. He stayed outside while the rest the others went inside and actually stole the money
and killed the victims.
e. Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of
a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are
also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared
that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
f. This was not proven on the part of Punzalan. Thus, his conviction was affirmed.
Extra: Punzalan contended that he was denied his rights to remain silent and to counsel during
custodial investigation, the preliminary investigation, and trial on the merits.
Held:
1) The police did not take sufficient efforts to truly inform Punzalan of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel during the custodial investigation. Thus, the waiver in Punzalan’s
extrajudicial statement (which was also taken without counsel) cannot be considered
intelligently made. Thus, it is considered inadmissible in evidence.
2) Punzalan also did not have counsel during this preliminary investigation. Still, such
irregularity should have been raised before the trial court. The absence of a proper PI also
does not impair the validity of the information or the jurisdiction of the court. Such PI
could actually be waived. Still, during trial, Punzalan was properly defended by his counsel
de oficio. Thus, there was no prejudicial error to warrant nullification of the proceedings.
GUIYAB v. PEOPLE
October 20, 2005
Quisumbing, J.
Short version: Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado (victim group) got into a
scuffle with Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes(accused group). The accused
group the victim group to one of their houses. The victim group waited awhile before they went
home. Unbenknowst to them, the accused group were waiting outside and started beating them
again. Punzalan kicked the victim Hierro and Elijorde placed himself on top of Hierro and
stabbed him. Hierro died. TC and CA convicted both, SC acquitted Punzalan of murder because
it found no conspiracy.
FACTS
Eric Hierro, Benjamin Visbal and Rodel Contemplado were drinking in the house of the
latter. Hierro and Visbal went out to buy mango at a sari-sari store when they saw accused
Gilbert Elijorde, Reynaldo Punzalan and Edwin Menes. When Menes approached Hierro, the latter
warned Menes, “Don’t touch me, my clothes will get dirty.”
Menes punched Hierro on the face, followed by Elijorde and Punzalan. Hierro and Visbal
ran for their live and went to Contemplado’s house. After some three minutes, Hierro went out
to go home together with Visbal and the latter’s wife. They noticed the accused Elijorde, Punzalan
and Menes waiting for them. Punzalan kicked Hierro. Hierro ran away pursued by
Elijorde. Elijorde stabbed Hierro at the back. When Hierro fell down, Elijorde placed himself on
top of Hierro who was now raising his arms defensively and pleading, “Maawa na kayo, huwag
ninyo akong patayin, wala akong kasalanan sa inyo.”, but Elijorde stabbed him with a knife on
the chest and fled. Visbal and his wife brought Hierro to the hospital where he died of multiple
stab wounds in the thorax penetrating the aorta and vena cava.
Only Elijorde and Punzalan were arrested successfully. TC and CA found both guilty of
murder qualified by treachery.
Issues:
I. WON Punzalan is guilty of murder through conspiracy- NO
II. WON aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of strength
should be considered against Elijorde- ONLY TREACHERY
Held:
I. Punzalan is not guilty of murder through conspiracy. Conspiracy must be proved as
indubitably as the crime itself through clear and convincing evidence, not merely by conjecture.
Conspiracy exists where at the time of commission of the crime, the perpretrators’ actions
impliedly showed unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of
the victim. Complicity is usually proved by acts done in concert, i.e., acts which yield the
reasonable inference that the doers were acting with a common intent or design.
Here, The only act of Punzalan was kicking Hierro, which was not even proven to have
hurt the latter. Punzalan was not proven to have known that Elijorde had a knife in his possession
or that he planned on killing Hierro. Neither can Punzalan be considered an accomplice. The
following requisites must concur: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation
between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous knowledge of the criminal act intended. It is thus
required in order to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice
that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. There
is no evidence to show that Punzalan knew that Elijorde was going to stab Hierro.
Punzalan must be absolved from all responsibility for the killing of Hierro. At the time
Elijorde intervened, Punzalan had already desisted from acts of aggression. He did nothing to
assist Elijorde in the immediate commission of the murder. The act of kicking by Punzalan prior
to the actual stabbing by Elijorde was evidently done without knowledge of the criminal design on
the part of the latter as that design had not yet been revealed.
II. As to Treachery and abuse of superior strength
There was treachery in this case. Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the
crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make. After the first fight, the victim did not expect that the accused
would persist in inflicting harm upon him who, unaware of the impending danger, proceeded home
with his friends. Unfortunately, Elijorde was waiting for him and pursued him to his end. After
stabbing Hierro at the back, Elijorde persistently chased his unarmed prey to his eventiual death.
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery; hence, it cannot be
appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance when treachery is already present.
As to evident premeditation
No sufficient evidence exists to show that the following requisites of evident
premeditation were present: (a) the time when the offender decided to commit the crime; (b)
an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination to commit it; and, (c) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will
had he desired to hearken to its warnings.
There is no evidence that the Elijorde resolved to kille the victim prior to the night of
the commission of the crime. The time interval of three minutes between the first and the
second assault on Hierro is too brief to have enabled Elijorde to think about what he intended to
do with Hierro.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Accused GILBERT
ELIJORDE y DE LA CRUZ is found GUILTY of MURDER and is accordingly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. Accused REYNALDO PUNZALAN y ZACARIAS is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and
is ordered RELEASED FROM CUSTODY IMMEDIATELY unless legally held for another cause. In
this regard, the Director of Prisons is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within
five (5) days from receipt hereof. Accused ELIJORDE is solely held responsible for the payment
to the heirs of the victim Eric Hierro the amounts of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P35,000.00
for actual damages and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
036. LI VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 127962/ April 14, 2004
Kingston Li – petitioner
Tinga, J.
Short version A brawl ensued between the Li group and the Arugay group. Li hit Arugay with a
baseball bat on the right shoulder. Arugay hacked Li with a bolo on his right temple, wrist and
shoulder rendering Li unconscious. Afterwards, a certain Sangalang (part of the Li group)
stabbed Arugay several times which caused his death. Li was charged with homicide. RTC found
Li guilty because there was conspiracy between Li and Sangalang. SC reversed saying there
could not have been conspiracy between Li and Sangalang when Sangalang stabbed Arugay
because Li was unconscious at that time. SC convicted Li of slight physical injuries instead.
Facts
STORY OF THE PROSECUTION (based on the testitomies of Tan and Dela Camara)
Arugay was watching television at home with his sisters (Cristy and Baby Jane) and
his girlfriend (Dela Camara) and Baby Jane’s boyfriend (Tan). When suddenly, they head a noise
outside. They saw Li and Eddie Boy Sangalang taking a bath completely naked outside their
house. Arugay yelled at them “pare bastos kayo, ba’t kayo nakahubad?”. Li shouted back
“putang ina!” and Sangalang yelled “putang ina mo, lumabas ka, papatayin kita!”
Arugay went out of the house where he was met by Li who was carrying a baseball
bat. Li struck Arugay on the head with the back, ran back to his house, went back out with a
knife and stabbed Arugay once.
A brawl ensued among all the parties. During the commotion, Dela Camara saw
Sangalang stab Arugay.
STORY OF THE DEFENSE
Li was watching tv at his home with his friend Ricky Amerol when they heard objects
being thrown at the house. They peeked and saw Arugay and Dela Camara in front of the gate
throwing stones and bottles towards them. Annoyed, Li opened the door asking, “Pare, ano ba
problema mo? Wala naman kaming kasalanan sa ’yo.” Arugay and his girlfriend just kept on
stoning the house and hurling invectives at Li. Arugay kicked the gate and ran towards his own
house across the street.
Li saw Arugay coming out of his house armed with 2 kitchen knives so Li got a
baseball bat. Arugay attacked him with a knife but Li managed to avoid Arugay’s thrusts and hit
Arugay with the baseball bat on the right shoulder. Arugay got a two-foot long bolo and tried to
hit Li. Arugay was able to make contact with Li’s right temple and right wrist and right shoulder.
Li passed out. Upon regaining consciousness, Li tried to crawl back to his house but Ronald Tan
hit him at the back of his left ear with a baseball bat. Eventually, Li managed to get back to the
house and was brought to the Makati Medical Center.
Arugay suffered multiple stab wounds. Li was charged with Homicide.
RTC found Li guilty of said crime. They held that it was Li who hit first with a baseball
bat Arugay in the brawl. Arugay then retaliated hacking Li on the head rendering Li unconscious.
Sangalang then stabbed Arugay several times. RTC held that though Li did not stab Arugay, Li
was in conspiracy with Sangalang.
CA affirmed in toto but for a different reason. The court did not rule on the conspiracy
but instead held that there was a possibility that Li had stabbed Arugay.
Issue: WON conspiracy existed between Li and Sangalang – no there was none
Ruling acquitted of the charge of Homicide but found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries.
Ratio
Li could not have stabbed Arugay. Li was slashed on the head with a bolo. In such a
condition, it is highly improbable that he was capable of inflicting the fatal stab wounds on
Arugay. Moreover, it could not be established that Li was ever armed with a knife.
The first blow was struck by Li, who had armed himself with a baseball bat and used
the same to hit Arugay on the left upper arm. This unprovoked assault by Li establishes at least
some degree of criminal culpability on his part. Arugay then armed himself with a bolo which he
used to inflict an incised wound on the head of Li. After Li had fallen, Sangalang, himself armed
with a knife, fatally stabbed Arugay at least four times. Tan had picked up the baseball bat
dropped by the wounded Li and struck Li on the head with the bat. Thus, Sangalang alone had
stabbed Christopher Arugay.
Proving conspiracy is a dicey matter, especially difficult in cases such as the present
wherein the criminal acts arose spontaneously, as opposed to instances wherein the participants
would have the opportunity to orchestrate a more deliberate plan.
Spontaneity alone does not preclude the establishment of conspiracy, which after all,
can be consummated in a moment’s notice – through a single word of assent to a proposal or
an unambiguous handshake. Yet it is more difficult to presume conspiracy in extemporaneous
outbursts of violence; hence, the demand that it be established by positive evidence.
Direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy since it is by its nature often planned
in utmost secrecy and it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be inferred
from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design.
Complicity may be determined by concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime
and the form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal
wound.
However, caution dictates a careful examination of the established facts before
concluding, as the RTC did, that an implied conspiracy had been established. An implied
conspiracy must still be based on facts established by positive and conclusive evidence. The
weight of factual evidence necessary to prove conspiracy is the same as required to establish
criminal liability – proof beyond reasonable doubt
Based on facts of the case, the Court is hard put to conclude that Sangalang and Li
had acted in concert to commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could very well be
construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li was
struck on the head by Arugay. From such a spontaneous reaction, a finding of conspiracy cannot
arise
 As Li lay incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he had
any further participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang, whose previous participation was
not conclusively established, emerged into the fray. Sangalang stabbed Arugay to death. Verily,
it cannot be assumed that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much
more in coordination with each other.
037. Teves v. Sandiganbayan
447 SCRA 309/December 17, 2004/En Banc/Petition for review
Edgar Teves and Teresita Teves - petitioners
Sandiganbayan - respondent
Decision by C.J. Davide, Jr. Digest by Sai Bautista
Short Version: Edgar Teves was the Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental. Teresita is Edgar’s wife.
They are being sued for violation of Sec. 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
relation to the issuance of a business permit/license for Edgar’s cockpit. The Sandiganbayan
convicted the spouses for the possession of pecuniary interest in the business enterprise but
absolved them of the charge in relation to the issuance of a business permit/license. The Supreme
Court acquitted Teresita on the ground that conspiracy was not sufficiently shown by the
prosecution.
Facts: Edgar and Teresita Teves are married. In 1983, Edgar registered for the operation of a
cockpit. This was renewed in 1989. By January of 1990, he turned over the management of the
cockpit to Teresita. However, Edgar was also the Mayor of Valencia during 1988 to 1998. Thus,
the Spouses were charged7 with violating Sec. 3(h)8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
for Edgar’s alleged unlawful intervention in the issuance of a business license/permit for his
cockpit.
The Sandiganbayan convicted the spouses for possessing a pecuniary interest in the cockpit, but
absolved of the charge of causing the issuance of a business permit/license.
On a petition for review of the Sandiganbayan’s decision, the spouses argue that they were
convicted for a crime other than the offense charged (Compare Footnote 1 in relation to Footnote
2), violating their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
Also, they assert that it was not shown that Edgar was the operator and licensee from 1989 to
1992. Finally, the existence of a conspiracy was disputed by the spouses.
The Sandiganbayan maintains that Edgar’s interest continued up to and beyond 1992, as he
merely turned over the management of the cockpit. The charge of having a pecuniary interest is
necessarily included in the charge of intervention in the issuance of its business license/permit.
7
The Information reads: That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto,
in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Edgar Y. Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros
Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused
Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the issuance of the
appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor
of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y. Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest
therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and
accused Teresita Teves.
Issues:
1) Whether Edgar Teves can be held liable for intervening in his official capacity for the
issuance of a business permit/license. NO.
2) Whether Edgar can be held liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in the cockpit.
YES.
3) Whether Teresita can be held liable as a conspirator. NO.
Ruling: Decision modified, Teresita acquitted.
Ratio:
10. Edgar cannot be held liable for the charge of intervening in relation to the issuance of
a business permit/license for his cockpit.
a. The Court enumerated the essential elements of a violation of Sec. 3(h) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
i. The accused is a public officer;
ii. Having a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction;
iii. Such public officer either:
1. intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in
connection with such interest; or
2. is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution
or by any law.
b. In this case, no intervention can be ascribed to Edgar as he cannot be said
to have intervened in his official capacity.
i. He is charged for an act that occurred at or about February 4 of
1992.
ii. The law governing the issuance of cockpit licenses is the Local
Government Code of 1991. Under this law, the Mayor is not a part
of the Sangguniang Bayan, which has the authority to issue the
license. This is contrary to the previous governing law (BP 337)
where the Mayor is the presiding officer.
11. Edgar can be held liable for having a proscribed pecuniary interest in the cockpit.
a. Based on the second sub-element of the third element of Sec. 3(h), Edgar is
liable.
b. The law that prohibits Edgar from having such pecuniary interest is the Local
Government Code. Sec. 89(a)(2).9
c. The essential ingredients of having a proscribed pecuniary interest and of
intervention in one’s official capacity in relation to that interest are the same,
such that the variance doctrine applies.10
8
In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following
x x x constitute[s] corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
Directly or indirectly having financing or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction
in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
9
It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to hold
such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit.
10
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
 12. Teresita cannot be held liable as a conspirator. No conspiracy was proved.
a. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime, with
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
b. Direct evidence is not necessary, an inference is sufficient based on
conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all
taken together, showing a community of criminal design. (Citing
Leacroz v. Sandiganbayan).
i. Marriage to an errant spouse is not conspiracy by itself.
(citing Leacroz v. Sandiganbayan.)
ii. Intentional participation aimed at the furtherance of a
common design must be shown.
iii. A conspirator must be shown to perform an overt act that
contributes to the execution of the planned crime, except
where the accused is the mastermind.
iv. There must be active participation in the actual
commission, or moral assistance. (citing Pecho v. People).
c. In this case, the Anti-Graft Law has specific provisions as regards private
individuals.
i. Sec. 4(b) of that law provides that it is unlawful for a person to
knowingly induce or cause a public official to commit the offenses.
ii. Here, it was not shown how Teresita induced or caused Edgar to
commit the offenses.
iii. Edgar was already the owner of the cockpit as early as 1983. He
transferred the management on January 1990, before the
effectivity of the Local Government Code.
1. After this transfer, it was Teresita who applied for the
renewal of the registration, referring to herself as the
Owner/Licensee and Operator/Manager. She also listed
herself as the Duly-Licensed Person in the Philippine
Gamefowl Commission’s list.
2. Teresita is not a public official so she is not prohibited
from holding an interest in the cockpit.
13. As regards the penalty, the Local Government Code prevails over the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as the LGC is the specific law and the latter is the general law.
Also, the LGC was enacted subsequent to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Voting: Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Tinga, J.,
dissents.
Dissent (Tinga):
1) Disagrees that possession of a prohibited interest is necessarily included in a public
official’s intervention in relation to that interest.
2) The Information is not sufficient for a conviction for another crime aside from the
intervention in procuring a business license/permit.
038. PEOPLE vs. LAMAHANG
August 3, 1935
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
RECTO, J.
Mica Maurinne M. Adao
Facts were too short to provide for a short version.
FACTS: At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling, caught
accused Lamahang in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of
cheap goods. At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another
Chinaman. The accused had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another
from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under
custody.
CFI found him guilty of attempted robbery and sentenced him to suffer 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional and to an additional penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor for
being a habitual delinquent, with the accessory penalties of the law.
ISSUE: Does the act committed constitute attempted robbery?
RULING: No. It is attempted trespass to dwelling.
The attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the
offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The
attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is
ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's
store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the
wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did
not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of
imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere
beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like
the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon
its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the
Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its
complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by
external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically
and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence
another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown
that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal
property belonging to another. In the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. From the fact established and stated in the
decision, that the accused on the day in question was making an opening by means of an iron bar
on the wall of Tan Yu's store, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion that his evident
intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its owner. That his final
objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cause physical injury to the
inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the record to justify a concrete finding.
In offenses not consummated, as the material damage is wanting, the nature of the action
intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature
of the acts executed (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their
very nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing
the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they
are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that
is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent as well as a punishable act,
must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted nor frustrated
alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form part of those constituting the latter.
crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense which
said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertained from the
facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instances of injustice, that the
mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular
injury.
The fact under consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted
trespass to dwelling. Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, this offense is committed
when a private person shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will. The accused
may be convicted and sentenced for an attempt to commit this offense in accordance with the
evidence and the following allegation contained in the information: "... the accused armed with
an iron bar forced the wall of said store by breaking a board and unfastening another for the
purpose of entering said store ... and that the accused did not succeed in entering the store due
to the presence of the policeman on beat Jose Tomambing, who upon hearing the noise produced
by the breaking of the wall, promptly approached the accused ... ." Under the circumstances of
this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is presumed. Against the accused must be taken
into consideration the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and former convictions, —
inasmuch as the record shows that several final judgments for robbery and theft have been
rendered against him — and in his favor, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. The
breaking of the wall should not be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance
inasmuch as this is the very fact which in this case constitutes the offense of attempted trespass
to dwelling.
The penalty provided by the Revised Penal Code for the consummated offense of trespass to
dwelling, if committed with force, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine not exceeding P1,000 (art. 280, par. 2); therefore the penalty corresponding to attempted
trespass to dwelling is to degrees lower (art. 51), or, arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods. Because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating
circumstance the penalty must be imposed in its maximum period. Pursuant to article 29 of the
same Code, the accused is not entitled to credit for one-half of his preventive imprisonment.
Wherefore, the sentence appealed from is revoked and the accused is hereby held guilty of
attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the aforesaid aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one day of arresto mayor, with the
accessory penalties thereof and to pay the costs.
PEOPLE v. DIO (1984)
Article 6. xxx There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
FACTS: Crispulo Alega with his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti, went to a restaurant in Pasay City
Public Market. While they were walking up the stairs, Remedios, who was arms-length ahead,
looked back, and saw Danilo Tobias twisting the neck of her boyfriend while Hernando Dio was
holding his two hands. The two of them tried to divest Crispulo of his Seiko wristwatch but when
he resisted, Tobias stabbed him on the left side of his chest. Crispulo ran and fell down and expired
when he reached the front of Pasay Commercial Bank, with his watch still strapped to his wrist.
Autopsy revealed that Crispulo died because of the stab wound.
Dio was captured. An information for robbery with homicide was filed and the trial court imposed
the death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether Dio is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide (Art. 294 of
RPC)? Otherwise stated, was there only an attempted robbery?
RATIO: There was only an attempted robbery. Tobias and Dio were unsuccessful in their criminal
venture of divesting the victim of his wrist watch so as to constitute the consummated crime of
robbery. Moreover, the killing of Crispulo may be considered as merely incidental to and an
offshoot of the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated because of
the resistance offered by the deceased. Hence, this case would properly come under the provision
of Art. 297 of the RPC: When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a
homicide is committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall
deserve a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.
040. People v. Trinidad
GR No. 79123-25/ 9 January 1989/ Second Division/ Appeal
People of the Philippines - plaintiff-appellee
Emeliano Trinidad - accused-appellant
Decision by J. Melencio-Herrera, Digest by Joeyboy Lacas
Short Version: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa.
While the three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano Trinidad
asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte. Tan, the driver at that time, suddenly heard two gunshots -
- Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the head. Trinidad had used his carbine
in killing the two victims. Tan was able to get off the car and hail a jeepney passing by. However,
he noticed that Trinidad was also seated at the back of the said jeepney. Tan immediately got off
the jeepney, followed by Trinidad. When the jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung
to its side, but Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from
the jeep and fortunately a Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him
board a bus for Butuan. Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the
shooting of Tan.
Facts: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa. While the
three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano Trinidad asked for a
ride to Agusan del Norte. Trinidad, a member of the Integrated National Police, was in uniform
and had two firearms, a carbine and a .38 caliber revolver.
Tan was driving the car at that time, and he was instructed by Trinidad to slow down
because they were treading dangerous territory. Tan suddenly heard two gunshots -- Soriano and
Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the
two victims. Tan was able to get off the car and hail a jeepney passing by. However, he noticed
that Trinidad was also seated at the back of the said jeepney. Tan immediately got off the jeepney,
followed by Trinidad. When the jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but
Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and
fortunately a Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for
Butuan.
Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the shooting of Tan, and
he was found guilty by the RTC. On appeal, Trinidad claims that the RTC erred in convicting him
of the crime of frustrated murder.
Issues: W/N Trinidad is correct in contending that he can only be convicted of attempted
murder? YES
Ruling: Trinidad should only be held criminally liable for attempted murder.
Ratio: Trinidad had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was
unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of causes
other than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in
motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.
Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound
inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only ATTEMPTED murder,
the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the
death (citing, People v. Pilones)
Voting: Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, concur.
041. People v. Campuhan
G.R. No. 129433/30 March 2000/En Banc/Automatic Review by SC
People of the Philippines – petitioner
Primo Campuhan – respondent
Decision by J. Belosillo, Digest by Angelo Zantua
Short Version: The Supreme Court held that Primo was only guilty of attempted rape.
The decision in People v Orita was reiterated in this case. There is consummated rape when all
the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to
do, having performed all the acts necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. Perfect
penetration was not essential. Any slight penetration of the female organ, even without rupture
of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, is consummated rape.
Attempted rape –there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution
were performed as the offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts.
However, the touching of the organs must be in relation to, or as an essential part of, the
process of penetration, and not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. Where entry into the
labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been established, there is only attempted rape.
Facts:
25 April 1996 – at around 4pm, Ma. Corazon, mother of 4-year old Crysthel, went down from
the second floor of their house to prepare chocolate drinks for her 2 children. She met her
brother’s helper, Primo, who was preparing the small plastic bags filled with water to placed in
the freezer upstairs. Corazon rushed upstairs after hearing one of her daughters cry, "Ayo'ko,
ayo'ko!"
She then saw Primo inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose underwear was
already removed, while Primo’s short pants were down to his knees. As per Corazon, Primo was
forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. She cursed the accused and boxed him several times.
Primo was able to flee the house but was later caught.
As per the physical examination of Crysthel, there was no evident sign of extra-genital physical
injury; her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.
Primo’s defense was that Crysthel wanted to ride on his back when they fell down on the floor.
When Corazon saw them at this state, she accused him of raping Crysthel.
27 May 1997 - Primo Campuhan was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced to death;
hence the automatic review under Art. 335 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659.
Issue: WON Primo’s acts constitute attempted rape or consummated rape? Attempted rape.
Ruling: RTC Decision modified into attempted rape.
Ratio: Reasons for holding that it is attempted rape rather than consummated: When Primo was
caught with his pants down, the normal reaction would be to pull up his pants. This was more
than enough opportunity to stop or even conceal his evil act. Crysthel testified that she resisted
the sexual advances by putting her legs close together. Corazon also testified that Primo has not
yet achieved erection when she saw him.The medico-legal officer found that there was no
medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact.
Voting: Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.
042. Rivera vs. People
GR No. 166326/ 25 January 2006/ First Division/ Petition for Review on Certiorari R45
Esmeraldo, Ismael, Edgardo Rivera - petitioners
People of the Philippines - respondent
Decision by J. Callejo, Sr., Digest by Joeyboy Lacas
Short version: Rodil, complainant, had a heated verbal altercation with co-acccused Edgardo
Rivera. The following day, when Rodil went to a store to buy food, Edgardo along with his brothers
Ismael and Esmeraldo, ganged up on Rodil. Ismael and Esmeraldo mauled Rodil with fist blows,
while Edgardo hit Rodil three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Fortunately, policemen
arrived which forced the Rivera brothers to flee. Rodil was then brought to the hospital. An
Infomation was filed in RTC Cavite, charging the Rivera brothers of attempted murder.
Facts: Ruben Rodil and the Rivera brothers are neighbors. One fine day, a heated verbal
altercation ensued between Rodil and Edgardo Rivera. The following day, Rodil went to a store
near his house in Imus Cavite, tagging along his three year old daughter. Suddenly, in an
unexpected manner, the Rivera brothers (Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo) emerged from their
house and ganged up on Rodil.
Ismael and Esmeraldo mauled Rodil with fist blows which caused the latter to fall to the
ground. While in that helpless position, Ruben was hit three times with a hollow block on the
parietal area by Edgardo. When policemen on board a mobile car arrived, the Rivera brothers fled
to their house. Rodil was then brought to the hospital for treatment. According to the medical
certificate, Rodil sustained only a superficial wound in the parietal area.
An Infomation was filed in RTC Cavite, charging the Rivera brothers of attempted
murder. RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused guilty of FRUSTRATED murder. However,
the CA modified the RTC decision, finding all the accused guilty of ATTEMPTED murder. Hence,
the accused filed to the SC the instant petition for review under R45, insisting that the prosecution
failed to prove intent to kill on their part. More importantly, accused aver that based on the medical
certificate, Rodil only suffered a superficial wound in the parietal area; hence, accused should be
criminally liable only for physical injuries.
Issues
a. W/N prosecution was able to prove intent to kill on the part of the accused? YES
b. W/N the accused should be held liable for attempted murder, and not merely physical injuries?
YES (topical)
Ruling: Petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Ratio
a. Prosecution was able show that the accused had the intent to kill the victim. Evidence to prove
intent to kill may consist in the means used, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained
by the victim. In the case at bar, Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled Rodil with fist blows. Even as
Rodil fell to the ground, unable to defend himself, Edgardo still hit him on the parietal area of the
head three times with a hollow block.
b. Accused are criminally liable for attempted murder. That the head wounds sustained by Rodil
were merely superficial and could not have produced his death does not negate the criminal
liability for attempted murder.
Article 6 RPC defines an attempt to commit a felony: “There is an attempt when the offender
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.”
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out
to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense...It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step
towards the consummation of the design. The act done need not constitute the last proximate
one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the
intended crime. The overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the
offense.
In the case at bar, the accused, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling
the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block, just narrowly missing the middle portion
of Rodil’s head.
Voting: Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-Nazario, concur.
VELASCO v. PEOPLE (2006)
Article 6. xxx There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
FACTS: Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of his house
when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Thereafter, Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the
tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol.
Velasco missed with his first shot but the second one hit Maramba at the upper arm, causing him
to stumble on the ground. Maramba stood up and ran, while the Velasco continued firing at him
but missed.
Velasco was later apprehended. He was charged with the crime of Attempted Murder.
Subsequently, the trial court convicted him as charged. The CA, on appeal, affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether Velasco only committed the crime of attempted homicide? (Velasco maintains
there was no sudden firing because the victim testified he was observing him for a period of ten
seconds before the latter finally drew his .45 caliber pistol and fired at him. After the first shot,
the victim was able to run away.)
RATIO: There was an attempted murder since the essential elements of treachery are
present. First, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself. It was
clearly established that Maramba, while washing his jeep, was suddenly fired upon by Velasco for
no reason at all. The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left Maramba
with no option but to run for his life. And second, the accused consciously and deliberately adopted
the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The swift and unexpected
attack was to make sure that Maramba will have no chance to defend himself. Though Maramba
was looking at him, the former was not forewarned by any outward sign that an attack was
forthcoming. It was only after the first shot that he felt his life was in danger.
Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to
produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, Velasco committed
an attempted felony. He failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Maramba then sustained
a wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where
the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only
attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that
would have brought about death.
044. Baleros v. People
G.R. No. 138033/22 February 2006/Second Division/Petition for Review on Certiorari, Rule 45
Renato Baleros Jr. – petitioner
People of the Philippines – respondent
Decision by J. Garcia, Digest by Al Mohammadsali
Short Version: While Malou was sleeping in her room, Baleros went in. He covered Malou’s
face with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects. She woke up and struggled
but could not move because she was tightly held and pinned down. She kicked him and
squeezed his sex organ. She was able to get out of the room and woke up her helper, and she
called the guard on duty and ask for help from her neighbors. Baleros was later charged and
convicted of attempted rape. The Supreme Court acquitted him of attempted rape but convicted
him of light coercion.
Facts: Malou is a student and she was in her room in a boarding house. Baleros went inside the
building on the pretense that he would visit a tenant who is his friend. Later, he discreetly went
to Malou’s room.
He covered Malou’s face with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects. This
awakened Malou. She struggled but could not move because she was tightly held and pinned
down on the bed. She kicked him and got her right hand free to squeeze his sex organ causing
him to let her go. She was able to get out of the room and woke up her helper, and she called
the guard on duty and said "may pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako”. She was able to
ask for help from her neighbors. Baleros escaped through a window in Malou’s room.
Later, investigation showed that it was Baleros who came into Malou’s room. He was charged
with and eventually convicted of attempted rape by the RTC. He appealed to the CA, which
affirmed his conviction in toto. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Is Baleros guilty of attempted rape? No.
Ruling: Petition granted, petitioner acquitted of rape but convicted of light coercion.
Ratio: Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and
does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention
to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to
its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.
It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of
any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part.
Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape,
they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any
human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would
unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried
while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she
filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed.
Voting: Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, JJ., concur.
045. People v. Erinia
G.R. No. L-26298/20 January 1927/En Banc/Appeal from CFI Manila
People of the Philippines – petitioner
Julian Erinia – respondent
Decision by J. Ostrand, Digest by Angelo Zantua
Short Version: The court held that there was only attempted rape as the entry of the labia was
not proven.
Facts:
CFI Manila convicted Erinia of consummated rape.
The victim was 3 years and 11 months old. The evidence is conclusive that Erinia endeavored to
have carnal intercourse with the victim. However, there may be some doubt whether there was
successful penetration before Erinia was disturbed by the timely intervention of the victim’s
mother and sister.
The physical exam done a few hours after the crime only yielded a slight inflammation of the
exterior parts of the organ, indicating that an effort had been made to enter the vagina. When
the physician testified, he expressed doubts as to whether there was an entry. The mother
testified in having found her child’s genital organ covered with a sticky substance.
Issue: WON there was an attempted rape or consummated rape? Attempted rape.
Ruling: CFI Decision modified into attempted rape.
Ratio:
The court did not agree with the suggestion that penetration was impossible because the child
was of such tender age. That since rape was impossible of consummation, the offense should
only be abusos deshonestos. While it is probably true that a complete penetration was
impossible, such penetration is not essential to the commission of the crime. Penetration of the
labia is sufficient.
Citation of Kenny vs. State ([Tex. Crim. App.], 79 S. W., 817; 65 L. R. A., 316) where the
offended party was a child of 3 years and 8 months. Several physicians testified that the labia of
a child of that age can be entered by a man's male organ to the hymen. The defendant was
found guilty of the consummated rape.
Since there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim, the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape.
The court also held that the sticky substance cannot be considered conclusive evidence of
penetration.
Voting: Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm – dissenting
Consummated rape according to the evidence, the findings of CFI, and SC decisions. The case is
on all fours with the case of Kenney vs. State (65 L. R. A., 316) previously cited.
046. People v. Orita
G.R. No. 88724/3 April 1990/First Division/Appeal to the Supreme Court from RTC Decision
Ceilito Orita –Appellant
People of the Philippines – Appellee
Decision by J. Medialde, Digest by Al Mohammadsali
Short Version: When Cristina arrived home, Orita poked a knifed at her and forced her to go
to her room. There, Orita undressed himself and made Cristina undress herself. He made her lie
down and he went on top of her. He was still holding the knife, when he inserted his penis into
her vagina. He could not fully penetrate her. Then, Cristina managed to break free and run
away. Orita was later charged with rape, but convicted of frustrated rape. The Supreme Court
ruled there was no frustrated stage of rape and Orita was convicted of rape.
Facts: Cristina, 19, arrived home from a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house
when somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized Orita who was a
frequent visitor of another boarder.
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. With his left
arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant
dragged complainant up the stairs. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered
complainant's room.
Upon entering the room, Orita pushed Cristina who hit her head on the wall. With one hand
holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered complainant to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off her bra, pants and panty.
He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and
insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said
position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered
her as she kept on moving.
Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a
small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his
hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping and she dashed out to the next room
and locked herself in. Orita pursued her and climbed the partition. When she saw him inside the
room, she ran to another room. Orita again chased her. She fled to another room and jumped
out through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in front of
the boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the
building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the building
opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying. The first policeman
to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her.
Orita was later charged with committing rape before the RTC, but was convicted for frustrated
rape. On appeal to the CA, the judgment was modified in that Orita was convicted of rape.
Issue: Is Orita guilty of rape or frustrated rape? He is guilty of rape.
Ruling: Appeal denied, RTC decisions modified to convict Orita of rape.

Ratio: The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to
causes independent of the perpetrator's will.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he
has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated.
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not
essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia
or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient
to warrant conviction. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the
crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage
in rape can ever be committed.
Voting: Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
047. PEOPLE v. LISTERIO
G.R. No. 122099 | July 5, 2000 | First Division | Appeal from Decision of the RTC
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO and SAMSON DELA TORRE y ESQUELA, accused,
AGAPITO LISTERIO y PRADO, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Digest by Dawn Chua
Short Version:
Listerio and 4 others attacked the Araque brothers with lead pipes and blades. This resulted in
Jeonito Araque dying while Marlon fell unconscious. Listerio was convicted of murder and
attempted homicide in the lower court. With regard to the conviction of attempted homicide,
such was based on the medico-legal’s testimony that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon
were fatal. SC ruled that Listerio was guilty of frustrated homicide. Listerio et al. fled the scene
when Marlon fell unconscious, thinking he was dead. All acts of execution which would produce
the felony of homicide were performed but by some extraneous reason, Marlon did not die.
Facts:
- Listerio, dela Torre and 3 others attacked Marlon and Jeonito Araque with lead pipes
and bladed weapons while they were on their way to collect money from a certain
Tinio.
- Jeonito was stabbed three times while Marlon was hit on the head with a lead pipe
and stabbed. The assailants then fled. Jeonito died on the spot, while Marlon was
brought to the hospital.
- Listerio was and convicted of murder and attempted homicide. Dela Torre escaped
during the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and he was not tried in
absentia.
- The reason Listerio was indicted for attempted homicide by the trial court was based
on the medico-legal’s testimony that none of the wounds sustained by Marlon Araque
were fatal.
Issues:
WON Listerio is guilty of attempted or frustrated homicide. Frustrated homicide.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1.] the award of P5,000.00 to Marlon Araque by way of moral damages in Criminal Case No. 91-
5843 is DELETED;
2.] Accused-Appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 91-5843
of Frustrated Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of
Prision Correccional, as minimum to Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as
maximum.
After finality of this Decision, the records shall be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, which is directed to render judgment based on the evidence against Samson dela Torre y
Esquela.
Reasoning:
- It is not the gravity of the wounds inflicted which determines whether a felony is
attempted or frustrated but whether or not the subjective phase in the commission of
an offense has been passed.
o By subjective phase is meant "[t]hat portion of the acts constituting the
crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime
and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts,
should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward, the phase
is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of
the offender over which he has control – that period between the point
where he begins and the point where he voluntarily desists. If between
these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of
his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and
it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the
last act, it is frustrated."
- A felony is frustrated when:
o 1.] the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony;
o 2.] the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator’s will.
- On the other hand, in an attempted felony:
o 1.] the offender commits overt acts to commence the perpetration of the
crime;
o 2.] he is not able to perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony; and
o 3.] his failure to perform all the acts of execution was due to some cause or
accident other than his spontaneous desistance.
- The distinction between an attempted and frustrated felony was lucidly differentiated
thus in the leading case of U.S. v. Eduave:
o The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony
is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous
cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of crime and the
moment when all the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which
should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause
apart from his voluntary desistance.
- On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely
passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he
was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated
by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did
all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a
consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
 - Intent to kill determines whether the infliction of injuries should be punished as
attempted or frustrated murder, homicide, parricide or consummated physical injuries.
o Homicidal intent must be evidenced by acts which at the time of their
execution are unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim by
adequate means.
- The intent to kill of the appellants who were armed with bladed weapons and lead
pipes can hardly be doubted given the prevailing facts of the case.
- It also cannot be denied that the crime is a frustrated felony not an attempted offense
considering that after being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head as a result of
which he lost consciousness and fell, Marlon’s attackers apparently thought he was
already dead and fled.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
048. U.S. v Adiao
G.R. No. L-13785 / October 8, 1918/ En Banc/ Appeal from the decision of CFI of Manila
United States –plaintiff-appellee
Tomas Adiao – defendant-appellant
Decision by J. Malcolm, Digest by Arnel
Short Version: It’s about the theft of a leather belt. The defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs
inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese named T.
Murakami, and hid the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by other customs
employees. He was charged with theft but convicted of a lesser offense of frustrated theft. He
now appeals.
Facts:
Customs Inspector Tomas Adiao, apparently took a fancy at a leather belt of a Japanese national
and hid it at his desk. Before he could take it out of the customs office, the said belt was later
found by other customs employees.
Adiao was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with the crime of theft. He was
found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft.
He appealed to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he was found guilty of
the crime of frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Not satisfied, he still appeals to the SC.
Issue:
WON Adiao is guilty of the crime of frustrated theft? NO, he is guilty of theft, not just frustrated
theft.
Ratio:
The SC is of the opinion that the crime can not properly be classified as frustrated, as this word
is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the offender performed all of the acts
of execution necessary for the accomplishment crime of theft.
From the facts of the case in the lower court:
Not decisive - The fact that the defendant was under observation during the entire transaction
and that he was unable to get the merchandise out of the Custom House
Decisive - all the elements of the completed crime of theft are present.
The court cited several cases where the crime of theft was considered as consummated, even if
the object was found near the place it was stolen from. “The accused . . . having materially taken
possession of the money from the moment he took it from the place where it had been, and
having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts
necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of making use of the
thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the elements of the
consummated crime. (Decision of the SC of Spain, June 13, 1882.)”
The SC also considered that Adiao took advantage of his public position, an aggravating
circumstance (with no mitigating circumstance), and thus imposed the maximum degree of
penalty. (Nalintikan na.)
Dispositive: Judgment is reversed and the defendant and appellant is sentenced to three months
and one day of arresto mayor, with the costs of all instances against Adiao. And yes, the leather
belt shall be returned to the lawful owner, T. Murakami.
049. PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-23916 | October 14, 1925 | En Banc | Appeal |
People – plaintiff-appellee
Domingo Hernandez – accused appellant
Decision by: Ostrand, J.
Digest by: KY Bautista
Short version: A 70-year old man had carnal knowledge of a 9 year old girl but the trial court
only convicted him of frustrated rape because there was no rupture of the hyman. SC says no,
there was consummation of the crime of rape because it has already be held in numerous cases
that any penetration, w/n reaching the hymen, is sufficient to constitute the crime. It is enough
if the woman's body is entered; and it is not necessary to show to what extent penetration of
the parts has taken place
Facts:
 Accused is a 70-year old man. Offended party is a 9-year old girl. No question as to
guilt; evidence showed that both were living in the same house and taking advantage
of the absence of the other inhabitants, he had intercourse with her by force and
intimidation.
 In the Info: Defendant Hernandez is accused of raping 12-year old Conrada Jocson,
intimidating and forcing her with a knife. He held this knife should she not accede to
his wish then had carnal knowledge of Jocson. The following aggravating
circumstances existed: 1) accused is the husband of the grandmother of Jocson; 2)
grave abuse of confidence: the offended and the accused lived in the same house
 He admits this but says he was intoxicated and did not know what he was doing.
o Witness accounts say that he did not show signs of intoxication during or
after the crime.
 Trial Court: only frustrated rape, sentenced to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor
(no consummated rape without a complete penetration of the hymen)
Issue: W/N there was a consummation of the crime --- Yes
Ruling: Judgment appealed from is modified: defendant guilty of the consummated crime of
rape and, in view of the aggravating circumstances, the penalty imposed is increased to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
law.
Ratio:
State v. Johnson:
  finding the hymen intact is not always proof that no rape has been committed,
nor virginity; for the case are not rare where the hymen had to be removed after
impregnation and in order to permit delivery
 Any penetration, w/n reaching the hymen, is sufficient to constitute the crime;
"scientific and anatomical distinctions as to where the vagina commences are
worthless in a case of rape; it is enough if the woman's body is entered; and it
is not necessary to show to what extent penetration of the parts has taken
place; whether it has gone past the hymen, into what is anatomically called the
hymen, or even so far as to touch the hymen.

Ppl v. Rivers:
 while the rupturing of the hymen is not indispensable to a conviction, there must be
proof of some degree of entrance of the male organ "within the labia of Pudendum."

Numerous cases: entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture or laceration of
the vagina, is sufficient to warrant conviction of the consummated crime of rape

Physician (who examined her immediately after the crime): found the labia and the opening of
the vagina inflamed together with an abundance of semen. Hymen was intact.

From the evidence: accused lay on top of her for over 15 mins and continued his efforts of
penetration; she testifies that the accused succeeded in a partial penetration and that she felt
intense pain.

Thus, crime must be regarded as consummated.

Voting: Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ.,
concur.