(113)

PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO

HERRERA,respondents.G.R. No. L-77691August 8, 1988SARMIENTO,J .:
Facts:The private respondent own several parcels of land located in Quezon City for
which he is the registered owner. He secured loans from L and R corporations and
executed deeds of mortgage over the parcels of land for the security of the same. Upon
the maturity of said loans, the firm initiated an extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
in question after private respondent failed to pay until maturity. The private respondent
filed a complaint for injunction over the said foreclosure and for redemption of the
parcels of land. Two years after the filing of the petition, private respondent and L and R
corporation entered into a compromise agreement that renders the former to be insured
another year for the said properties. Included in the stipulations were the attorney’s fees
amounting to Php 100,000.00. The private respondent however, remained to be in
turmoil when it came to finances and was apparently unable to pay and secure the
attorney’s fees, more so the redemption liability. Relief was discussed by petitioner and
private respondent executed a document to redeem the parcels of land and to register
the same to his name. Allegations were made by the private respondent claiming the
parcels of land to his name but without prior notice, the properties were already
registered under the petitioner’s name. The private respondent calls for a review and for
the court to act on the said adverse claim by petitioner on said certificates for
theproperties consolidated by the redemption price he paid for said properties. The
private respondent filed asuit for the annulment of judgment in the Court of appeals
which ruled over the same.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner is on solid ground on the acquisition over the said properties.
Held:
By Atty. Canlas’ own account, due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no
financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption
price of his mortgaged properties and petitioner’s P100,000.00 attorney’s fees awarded
in the Compromise Judgment, a development that should have tempered his demand
for his fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his
client, in opposition to his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to his
clients. The court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner’s efforts partaking of a
shakedown of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak
well of his fidelity to his oath to “delay no man for money”
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent’s own shortcomings. In
condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private
respondent has not settled his liability for paymentof the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas
alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The
parties must then set off their obligations against the other.

In re SOTTO (115)
January 21, 1949
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente
Sotto, who was required by theirCourt to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt to court for having issued a written statement inconnection with the decision of
this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, as published in the ManilaTimes
and other daily newspapers of the locality.“As author of the Press Freedom Law
(Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo,
reporterof a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
divulge the source of a news published in his paper, Iregret to say that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence theincompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the
wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberatelycommitted during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of theSupreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures,
which as its objects the complete reorganization of theSupreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly,
so that even thedeaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times ofCayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory
of the PhilippineJudiciary.”In his answer, Sotto does not deny the authenticity of the
statement. He contends that SC has no power to imposecorrectional penalties upon the
citizens, and that SC can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, tobe
promulgated by Congress and approved by the Chief Executive. Sotto also alleges that
the statements he madewas in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution and that he had no intention ofoffending any of the majority of the
honorable members of the SC. The case was set for hearing or oral argumentbut it was
postponed since Sotto did not appear at the date set for hearing, the case was
submitted for decision.
ISSUE: SHOULD SOTTO BE PUNISHED FOR CONTEMPT?
YES.The Rules promulgated by this court does not punish an act which was not
punishable under the law and the inherentpowers of the court as an act of contempt.
That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superiorstatue, is a
doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort. The
power of inflictingpunishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded
as an essential element of judicial authority,it is possessed as a part of the judicial
authority granted to courts created by the Constitution. In the case of In re Kelly, the SC
held that “The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pendingcause,
respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct
the administration ofjustice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Any
publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon theupon court, the parties, the officers of the
court, the counsel, etc., with reference to the suit, or tending to influencethe decision of
the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable. The summary power to commit
and punishfor contempt tending to obstructe or degrade the administration of justice, as
inherent in courts as essential to theexecution of their powers and to the maintenance of
their authority is a part of the law of the land.”Mere criticism or comment on the
correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the courtin a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may
enlighten the court andcontribute to the correction of an error if committed. Had Sotto
limited himself to statement that the SC decision iswrong or that our construction of the
intention of the law is not correct because it is different from what he, asproponent of
the original bill, had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated.However,
Sotto did not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which is
still pending. Henot only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the
presentation of a bill reorganizing the SupremeCourt and reducing the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices fromeleven to
seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who
according to hisstatement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the
final decision of said case by this Court,and thus embarrass or obstruct the
administration of justice. Sotto also attacked the honesty and integrity of thisCourt.The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people mayobtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people losetheir confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of the SC and believe that they cannot expect justicetherefrom,
they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be theresult.

In re: Almacen, GR No. L-27654 (116)

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in
said civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing
party of said motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said
motion. Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals
denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial court with regard to the motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional.
He then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of
title as he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members
of the high court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client
was made to pay P120k without knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of
the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb.”

The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted
to wait for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his
lawyer’s certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked
that he may be permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him . . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.”
Almacen was however unapologetic.

ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed
because the Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every
petition they reject otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its
constitutional duties. The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved.” It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court’s denial. For
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.

On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said
criticisms as uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts
of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has
always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to
courts.

In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should

have known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of
the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the
court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen
was suspended indefinitely.

Zaldivar Vs. Sandiganbayan (117)

170 SCRA 1
G.R. No. 79690-707
February 1, 1989
Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the
respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The
Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as
Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he
however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an
investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were
unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been
approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on
Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to
refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court
because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked
to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent
saying that the SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice
system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the
small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not
be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the
media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves
in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little
later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue
involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from
this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from
the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech.
Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible
tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of
"visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the
Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme
Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction
of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil
 of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the
courts, which has some implications to the society.

Balaoing vs. Calderon 221 SCRA 533 (118)

FACTS:
1. SEVERAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST BALAOING.
1. BALAOING vs. JUDGE DOJILLO
i. Balaoing was required to show why he should not be disciplinarily dealt for
suppressing certain material facts of which he was charged with knowledge and for
having engaged in forum-shopping.
ii. Balaoing’s motion for reconsideration was denied, his explanation was
declared unsatisfactory and he was severely censured for having instituted a patently
unfounded and frivolous admin action and warned that the commission of same conduct
will be dealt more severely.
2. BALAOING vs. JUDGE MALIWANAG
i. Grave misconduct for failure and regusal to issue corresponding write of
action (pending appeal) prayed for by complainant in his motion in civil case, ZABALA
vs. BUENO.
ii. Balaoing’s use of unsavory, defamatory and offensive language against
Judge brought dismissal to the complaint, 1-year suspension and P1000 fine for
violation of canons.
3. 2 MORE COMPLAINTS: CALDERON AND MALIWANAG.
i. BALAOING: filed complaint against CALDERON for grave abuse of
authority and malicious delay in administration of justice.
1. CALDERON does not follow the Circular and merely treats it as directory; practice of
Judge to automatically grant postponements and deferment of hearing of cases to a
later hour whenever his OIC makes a manifestation in open court that a certain lawyer
or party called up requesting that his case be postponed.
2. Judge drinks a lot and fraternizes openly.
3. Delayed cases:
a. Allowed defendants to keep postponing hearings more than 1 year.
b. Cahoots with deputy sheriff, unlawfully prevented implementation of writ of Possession.
4. Charged both CALDERON AND OIC, MANIAGO with misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and malicious delay in admin of justice.
5. OIC MANIAGO alleges BALAOING calling her notorious, swindler, insane.
ii. CALDERON: Balaoing won a foreclosure case and became the highest
bidder in the public auction, Certificate of Sale was issued and registered.
1. He prevented the writ of Possession dude to prejudice.
a. Gavilan’s widow (former owner), Alice and children were residing in the properties;
period to redeem the properties had not yet expired.
2. When redemption period elapsed, he issued write of possession but up to present time,
Balaoing has not yet taken possession and showed his disinterest.
iii. MALIWANAG denied BALAOING allegation, judgment is based on equity
and justice against injustice by a lawyer on the unlearned and poor couple from Baguio.
 ISSUE:
WON Balaoing’s admin complaints hold merit? NO.
Is Balaoing guilty of gross misconduct? YES.

HELD:
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS DISMISSED. BALAOING DISBARRED.
1. CANON 11: Lawyer shall observe and maintain respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
1. Rule 11.03: Lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before Courts.
2. Rule 11.04: Lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by record or
have no materiality to the case.
2. Complaints are based on his personal interpretation of the law and not on material
allegations of fact, substantiated by evidence.

Tiongco VS. Aguilar 240 SCRA 533 (119)

Facts:
1.
Atty. Jose Tiongco was charged for
violating Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
He characterized the decision of
respondent Judge as “having been crafted in order to fool the
winning party”; as a “hypocritical judgment in plaintiff’s favour”; one
with “perfidious character.”
2.
Tiongco described respondent as a liar, perjurer or blasphemer

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Yiongco violated Canon 11.
Ruling:
1.
The duty contemplated in Canon 11 is closely entwined with his vow
in the lawyer’s oath “to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good
fidelity to the courts,” his duty under Sectio
n 20(b) of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court “to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers,” and his duty under the first
canon “to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for
the sake of temporary incu
mbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.
2.
The use of unnecessary /offensive and abusive/abrasive and
offensive language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates
or promotes distrust in judicial administration
or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the
members of the Court and to degrade the administration of justice by
the Court.
3.
Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in
making the false and maliciou
s insinuation against this Court. Such
could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what
he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who seems to
be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with
law and justice
whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion
and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views.
4.
Tiongco was ordered to pay fine of Php 5,000 plus warnin

Lacson vs Ca GR. No. 113591(120)

Facts:
Atty. Fortes' assertions in the motion for reconsideration that the petition was denied
wholly on technically; that the Court's peremptory denial disregarded the purpose of
judicial proceedings, which is to seek the truth; that the Court upheld the fake and
falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons; and, worse, that the Members of the Court did
not read the petition or that if they did, they simply refused to understand the arguments
"in order not to blur [their] preconceived resolution of this case," are patently unfounded
and malicious. His sole purpose was to show and prove his clients that he was all the
time correct and this Court dismally wrong not only for veering away from the true
purpose of judicial proceedings and suppressing the truth and upholding and illegal title,
but, worse, for not even reading the petition or if it did, for not understanding it in order
to hide its prejudgment of the case. In so doing upon a matrix of false and unfounded
premises, Atty. Fortes did an immeasurable disservice to this Court by putting it into
dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminishing public confidence or promoting
distrust in the Court, and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them
without violating their duty to render justice.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty Fortes liable for contempt of court
Held:
A lawyer should seek to preserve thepublic’s faith in the courts. It is his
dutynot to conceal the truth from the court normislead it. The courts will not be able
tou p h o l d justice if they rely on
f a l s e submissionsa n d representationsoflawyers. It has been said of a lawyer
thatas an officer of the court, it is his swornand moral duty to help build and
notdestroy unnecessarily that high esteema n d r e g a r d t o w a r d s t h e c o u r t s
s o essential to the proper administration ofj u s t i c e .