LIABILITY
A. POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including
Article 2183
G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN
VESTIL, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and
TERESITA UY, respondents.
Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.
Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her
parents said she died because she was bitten by a dog of the
petitioners, but the latter denied this, claiming they had nothing
to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils, who were
sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the
court a quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are
now before us. They ask us to set aside the judgment of the
respondent court and to reinstate that of the trial court.
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was
playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late
Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street
in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital,
where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the
forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr.
Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The
following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of
death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that
the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy,"
the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils
rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that
in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial,
Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when
the case was appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in
possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries
caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a
result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof
as submitted by the appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were
ordered to pay the Uys damages in the amount of P30,000.00
for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical and
hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she
is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as
his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other
heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims,
even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for
the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's
heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be
determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was
staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership
of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damages should come from force
majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a
carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the
owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was
dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to
himself.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of
Miranda's house is hardly credible. She said that the
occupants of the house left by her father were related to him
("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out of a
common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which,
however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as
ten of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time
or another although they did not appear to be close kin.8 She
at least implied that they did not pay any rent, presumably
because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding
that she herself did not seem to know them very well.
There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house,
were boarders (or more of boarders than relatives) who paid
the petitioners for providing them with meals and
accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had hired a
maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in
the said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who
was a nursemaid of Purita herself, categorically declared that
the petitioners were maintaining boarders in the house where
Theness was bitten by a dog.10 Another witness, Marcial Lao,
testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the Vestils were
maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although
Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private
respondents submitted documentary evidence of her
application for water connection with the Cebu Water District,
which strongly suggested that she was administering the
house in question. 12
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house,
which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no
doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the
time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing
in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own
house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and
her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly,
according to at least one witness, 14 and used it virtually as a
second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in
the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the
dog. 15 The dog itself remained in the house even after the
death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, when the
incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the
petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were
the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear
showing that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the
death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-
pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for
which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need
not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the
causal connection between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites,
and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which
ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That
Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the
dog is established by the following testimony of Dr. Tautjo:
COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the
second admission?
A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I
referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the father,
because the child was asking for water, the father tried to give
the child water and this child went under the bed, she did not
like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For
this reason, because I was in danger there was rabies, I called
Dr. Co.
Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?
A: Yes, sir. 18
As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the
doctor had the following to say under oath:
A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from
physical, chemical and bacterial means. ... It canbe the result
of infection, now, so if you have any other disease which can
lower your resistance you can also get pneumonia.
Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of
complication which is broncho-pneumonia?
A: Yes.
Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the
witness is know as CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT,
1968 by Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton Chaton.
Now, I invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book
under the title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as
a result of rabies and it says: Once the symptoms, have
appeared death inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as a result of
cardiac or respiratory failure or generalized paralysis. After a
positive diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected
animal if the animal cannot be observed or if the bite is on the
head, give rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in
this statement?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may
die of respiratory failure which leave in the form of bronco-
pneumonia?
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies. 19
On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that
the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death
has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling
in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the
death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death
but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because
she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they
could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is
not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the
possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost"
and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter
either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame
and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law
does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame
ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged
provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three
years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be
faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners
are an implied rejection of their original posture that there was
no proof that it was the dog in their father's house that bit
Theness.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183
of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and
on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the
damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve
the monetary awards except only as to the medical and
hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as
prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that
can bring back to the private respondents the child they have
lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil
damages to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as
above modified. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
B. THINGS THROWN OR FALLING FROM A BUILDING
Article 2193
G.R. No. L-47033 April 25, 1941
JOSE DINGCONG, recurrente-apelante,
vs.
HALIM KANAAN, NASRI KANAAN, y MICHAEL KANAAN,
dedicados al comercio bajo la razon social de "American
Bazar," recurridos-apelados.
Sres. Ezpeleta y Salvosa en representacion del recurrente.
D. Felipe Ysmael en representacion de los recurridos.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
Segun la decision del Tribunal del Tribunal de Apelaciones, los
hermanos Loreto Dingcong y Jose Dingcong son
coarrentadarios de los altos de la casa de Emilia Saenz
situada en la Calle Jose Ma. Basa de la Ciudad de Iloilo,
donde establecieron el Central Hotel, siendo la primera la
dueña y el ultimo su manager. El demandado Francisco
Echevarria ocupo, mediante pago de P30 al mes, el cuarto No.
10 de dicho hotel. Los demandantes acupaban, a su vez los
bajos de este hotel donde tenian establecido su "American
Bazar" dedicado a la compra y venta de articulos y
mencancias. Hacia las once de la noche del 19 de septiembre
de 1933, Echevarria, al retirarse a la cama, dejo abierto
descuidadamente el grifo que daba sobre una palangana
ordinaria sin desague. Como las tuberias del hotel en aquel
tiempo estaban en reparacion, cuando a la media noche el
agua descorrio por las tuberias, se esparcio por el suelo,
traspasandolo y mojando los articulos y mencancias en los
bajos en el establecimiento "American Bazar," causando una
perdida, que el Juzgado de Primera Instancia estimo en
P1,089.61.
Se presento esta accion por Halim Kanaan, Nasri Kanaan y
Michael Kanaan en nombre del nombre del "American Bazar"
contra Loreto Dingcong, Jose Dingcong y Francisco
Echevarria por daños y perjuicios causados a los
demandantes. El Jusgado sobreseyo la causa en cuanto a
Loreto Dingcong por haber fallecido, y condeno a Francisco
Echevarria, absolviendo a Jose Dingcong. Los demandantes
apelaron de esta decision en cuanto absuelve a Jose
dingcong. El Tribunal de Apelaciones, revocando la decision
del Juzgado de Primera Instancia, declaro a Jose Dingcong
responsable y le condeno a pagar a los demandantes el
importe de los daños y perjuicios causados a los mismos
como fue estimado por el Juzgado. Se presenta ahora ante
esta Corte, mediante certiorari, apelacion de esta decision del
Tribunal de Apelaciones.
Siendo Jose Dingcong coarrendatario y manager del hotel,
con completa posesion de los altos de la casa, debe
responder por los daños causados por las cosas que se
arrojaron o cayeron de la misma (articulo 1910 del Codigo
Civil). Francisco Echevarria era huesped del hotel y fue el que
directamente, por su descuido, al dejar abierto el grifo,
permitio que el agua de la tuberia descorriera por el suelo y se
filtrara hacia los bajos, mojando los articulos y mercancias de
los demandantes. Jose Dingcong, por otra parte, no practico la
diligencia de un buen padre de familia para prevenir estos
daños, no obstante de que sabia que podian causarse por
estar entonces en reparacion las tuberias, pues, debiendo
presumir que Echavarria podia usar el grifo no le proveyo de
algun recipiente con desague, y si solo puso debajo del mismo
una palangana que, al llenarse, hizo que el agua se esparciera
por el suelo.
Se confirma la decision apelada, con las costas al apelante.
Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, y Horrilleno, MM., estan conformes.
Moran, M., no tomo parte.

C. DEATH/INJURIES IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT
ARTICLE 1711-12
D. STRICT LIABILITY/PRODUCT LIABILITY
Article 2187
Articles 50-52, 97,99,106-7 consumer act
Sec 11 RA 3720
G.R. No. 110295 October 18, 1993
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) and
MS. LYDIA GERONIMO, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz Law Offices for
petitioner.
Alejandro M. Villamil for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which
had to close down as a consequence of the big drop in its
sales of soft drinks triggered by the discovery of foreign
substances in certain beverages sold by it. The interesting
issue posed is whether the subsequent action for damages by
the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should be
treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden
defects or merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the
petitioner herein which must therefore be filed within six
months from the delivery of the thing sold pursuant to Article
1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the
public respondent, which can be filed within four years
pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private
respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. D-9629. She alleges in
her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City, an
enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke
and Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten
Wonderland and to the public; on or about 12 August 1989,
some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke
and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances or particles; he then went over
her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of some
fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke
bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened
Sprite bottle; she brought the said bottles to the Regional
Health Office of the Department of Health at San Fernando, La
Union, for examination; subsequently, she received a letter
from the Department of Health informing her that the samples
she submitted "are adulterated;" as a consequence of the
discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages, her
sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10
cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in
losses of from P200.00 to P300.00 per day, and not long after
that she had to lose shop on 12 December 1989; she became
jobless and destitute; she demanded from the petitioner the
payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She prayed for
judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as
actual damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages, the amount equal to 30% of the damages awarded
as attorney's fees, and the costs. 2
The petitioner moved to dismiss 3 the complaint on the grounds
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription.
Anent the latter ground, the petitioner argued that since the
complaint is for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the
said Code. In her Comment 4 thereto, private respondent
alleged that the complaint is one for damages which does not
involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is
based on an injury to plaintiff's right which can be brought
within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code;
hence, the complaint was seasonably filed. Subsequent
related pleadings were thereafter filed by the parties. 5
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the
motion to dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply as the existing
administrative remedy is not adequate. It also stated that the
complaint is based on a contract, and not on quasi-delict, as
there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article
1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months
from the delivery of the thing sold.
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been
denied by the trial court in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7the
private respondent came to this Court via a petition for review
on certiorari which we referred to the public respondent "for
proper determination and disposition. 8 The public respondent
docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public
respondent annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and
directed it to conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-
9629. In holding for the private respondent, it ruled that:
Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi-delict, and not for
breach of warranty as respondent contends, the applicable
prescriptive period is four years.
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint
plainly show that it is an action or damages arising from
respondent's act of "recklessly and negligently manufacturing
adulterated food items intended to be sold or public
consumption" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism in legal procedure that
what determines the nature of an action are the facts alleged in
the complaint and those averred as a defense in the
defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445;
Alger Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil
code, the existence of contractual relations between the
parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against
the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the
performance of a contract.
In Singson v. Court of Appeals (23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme
Court ruled:
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by
the one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that)
although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
"contractual both in origin and in nature the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort.
Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law
on Sales was taken, the authorities are one in saying that he
availability of an action or breach of warranty does not bar an
action for torts in a sale of defective goods. 10
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been
denied by the public respondent in its Resolution of 14 May
1993, 11 the petitioner took his recourse under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It alleges in its petition that:
I.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT
ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL PROVISION ON QUASI-
DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW
THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS
BASEDON BREACH OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED
WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
II.CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
OVERRULING PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD PRESCRIBED
UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE. 12
The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint
will reveal that the primary legal basis for private respondent's
cause of action is not Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delict — for the complaint does not ascribe any tortious or
wrongful conduct on its part — but Articles 1561 and 1562
thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under the law
on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation
between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the
application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private
respondent's cause of action arose from the breach of implied
warranties, the complaint should have been filed within six
months room delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 171
of the Civil Code.
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of
breach of the seller's implied warranties, the vendee may,
under Article 1567 of the Civil Code, elect between
withdrawing from the contract or demanding a proportionate
reduction of the price, with damages in either case. She
asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for
rescission nor for proportionate reduction of the price, but for
damages arising from a quasi-delict and that the public
respondent was correct in ruling that the existence of a
contract did not preclude the action for quasi-delict. As to the
issue of prescription, the private respondent insists that since
her cause of action is based on quasi-delict, the prescriptive
period therefore is four (4) years in accordance with Article
1144 of the Civil Code and thus the filing of the complaint was
well within the said period.
We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's
conclusion that the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is
found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article
1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is
supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly
paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless
and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended
to be sold for public consumption."
The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the
warranties against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon
the thing sold are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567
of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and
1566, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the
contract and demanding a proportionate reduction of the price,
with damages either
case. 13
The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract
upon proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on
obligations shall be applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations,
responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all
obligations and any waiver of an action for future fraud is void.
Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in
any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their
obligations and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages. 16
The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon
may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the
pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general
rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability
may itself be deemed to arise fromquasi-delict, i.e., the acts
which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus,
in Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 17 this Court
stated:
We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a
tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery
of damages therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in effect,
reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who,
despite hi first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his
first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the
tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages
from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part,
for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier
is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations. 20
Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller
of injury-causing products may be based on
negligence, 21 breach of warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds
such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. 24Quasi-delict, as
defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, (which is known in
Spanish legal treaties as culpa aquiliana, culpa extra-
contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical
to tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only
negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. 27
It must be made clear that our affirmance of the decision of the
public respondent should by no means be understood as
suggesting that the private respondent's claims for moral
damages have sufficient factual and legal basis.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
E. INTERFERRENCE WITH THE CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
Article 1314
G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
SO PING BUN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISES CORP.
and MANUEL C. TIONG, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari challenges the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated October 10, 1994, and the
Resolution 2dated June 5, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35, except for the award of attorney's
fees, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal of
respondent-appellant So Ping Bun for lack of merit is
DISMISSED. The appealed decision dated April 20, 1992 of
the court a quo is modified by reducing the attorney's fees
awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00. 3
The facts are as follows:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner,
So Pek Giok, entered into lease agreements with lessor Dee
C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease
contracts were premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B
and 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the
areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-year
term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy
the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-
month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the
contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises. In
1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original
members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong,
formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein respondent
corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in
1986. So Pek Giok's grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun,
occupied the warehouse for his own textile business,
Trendsetter Marketing.
On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to
Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter of the 25% increase
in rent effective September 1, 1989. The rent increase was
later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other
lessees' demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessor
implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letters
were new lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned that
failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be
deemed as lack of interest on the lessee's part, and agreement
to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did not
answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not
rescinded.
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to
petitioner which reads as follows:
March 1, 1991
Mr. So Ping Bun
930 Soler Street
Binondo, Manila
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three
decades with your late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late
father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the
warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to
generate your personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a
warehouse immediately for my stocks. Therefore, please be
advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp.
Warehouse. You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the
premises unless you have good reasons that you have the
right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure
to protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to
avoid inconvenience on your part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
MANUEL C. TIONG
President 4
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner
requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor
Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the
death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupying
the premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent.
DCCSI acceded to petitioner's request. The lease contracts in
favor of Trendsetter were executed.
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the
nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and
petitioner. They also claimed damages.
After trial, the trial court ruled:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-
3, inclusive) all dated March 11, 1991, between defendant So
Ping Bun, doing business under the name and style of
"Trendsetter Marketing", and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons,
Inc. over the premises located at Nos. 924-B, 924-C, 930 and
930, Int., respectively, Soler Street, Binondo Manila;
2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by this Court on June 21, 1991;
3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved party,
plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation, the sum of
P500,000.00, for attorney's fees;
4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C.
Tiong is concerned, and the respective counterclaims of the
defendant;
5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of this
lawsuit;
This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek
Hua Enterprising Corporation and defendant Dee C. Chuan &
Sons, Inc. to negotiate for the renewal of their lease contracts
over the premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and
924-C Soler Street, Binondo, Manila, under such terms and
conditions as they agree upon, provided they are not contrary
to law, public policy, public order, and morals.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the above decision
was denied.
On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the
trial court. On motion for reconsideration, the appellate court
modified the decision by reducing the award of attorney's fees
from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two
hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos.
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF
TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT?
II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF P200,000.00 IN
FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct
interpretation of the applicable law on tortuous conduct,
particularly unlawful interference with contract. We have to
begin, obviously, with certain fundamental principles on torts
and damages.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury,
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded
for the damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable in an action for
damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in
the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has
property rights and privileges with respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c)
the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or
unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules. 7
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid
contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is
without legal justification or excuse. 8
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for
the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the
enjoyment by the other of his private
property.9 This may pertain to a situation where a third person
induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a
contract. In the case before us, petitioner's Trendsetter
Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor,
and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of
the latter's property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by
the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference
above-mentioned are present in the instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified
where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his
own financial or economic interest. 10 One view is that, as a
general rule, justification for interfering with the business
relations of another exists where the actor's motive is to benefit
himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive
is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities
believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest
outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that
an individual acts under an economic interest that is
substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and
malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-
protection. 11Moreover justification for protecting one's financial
position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. 12 It
is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful motives. 13
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, 14 we held that where there
was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the
impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested,
and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that
he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. 15
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun
prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his
enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.
Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that,
"Any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party."
Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court
ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual,
moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be
absolved of any liability, including attorney's fees.
It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this
was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable.
We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or
impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was
nothing on record to serve as basis thereof. In that case we
refrained from awarding damages. We believe the same
conclusion applies in this case.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their
economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the
expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein
complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an
obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice.
The business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however,
precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the
legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly
confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the
lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing,
without awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury caused by
petitioner's interference.
Lastly, the recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual
or compensatory damages, is allowed under the
circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code. 16 One such occasion is when the defendant's act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. 17 But we
have consistently held that the award of considerable damages
should have clear factual and legal bases. 18 In connection with
attorney's fees, the award should be commensurate to the
benefits that would have been derived from a favorable
judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of
damages by the trial court calls for appellate review such that
the award if far too excessive can be reduced. 19 This ruling
applies with equal force on the award of attorney's fees. In a
long line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place in
penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to
pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would
throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party
and his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions."20
Considering that the respondent corporation's lease contract,
at the time when the cause of action accrued, ran only on a
month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis,
we find even the reduced amount of attorney's fees ordered by
the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of prevailing
jurisprudence. 21 Consequently, the amount of two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by respondent appellate
court should be reduced to one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award or attorney's
fees in favor of private respondent corporation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION
that the award of attorney's fees is reduced from two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to
costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style
"ACG Express Liner," Petitioner,
vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 164747
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, Petitioner,
vs.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style
"ACG Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and VINCENT
D. TECSON, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated March 16, 2004 as modified
by the Resolution2 dated July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113, which affirmed with
modifications the Decision3 dated May 31, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 85 in Civil
Case No. 98-35332.
The factual antecedents:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of
Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into the
business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After
contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all
over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian
national based in Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing
Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents
appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA
catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. As
such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for sale to
prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger
catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.4
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson,
lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of ACG
Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero
was able to close a deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT
25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated
August 7, 1997.5 Accordingly, the parties executed
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed
catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of
US$1,465,512.00.6 Per agreement between Robinson and
Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the
sale of each vessel.7
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane,
Australia, and on one (1) occasion even accompanied Go and
his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building
of the vessel. He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food,
hotel accommodations, transportation and entertainment
during these trips. He also spent for long distance telephone
calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing
directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis Padua
of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second
catamaran engine from their company which provided the ship
engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go
instructed him to fax the requested quotation of the second
engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then
staying. Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to confirm
the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson
refused to answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to
Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that
Go and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating
for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated
follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go,
Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there
would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express
Liner.
In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero informed
Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson violated his
exclusive distributorship and demanded that they respect the
same, without prejudice to legal action against him and
Robinson should they fail to heed the same.8 Cordero’s lawyer,
Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law firm, also wrote
ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and
misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance with his
lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in breach of Cordero’s
exclusive distributorship appointment.9
Having been apprised of Cordero’s demand letter, Thyne &
Macartney, the lawyer of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to
ACCRA law firm asserting that the appointment of Cordero as
AFFA’s distributor was for the purpose of one (1) transaction
only, that is, the purchase of a high-speed catamaran vessel
by ACG Express Liner in August 1997. The letter further stated
that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship, the
terms of which were contained in a draft agreement which
Cordero allegedly failed to return to AFFA within a reasonable
time, and which offer is already being revoked by AFFA.10
As to the response of Go, Landicho and Tecson to his demand
letter, Cordero testified before the trial court that on the same
day, Landicho, acting on behalf of Go, talked to him over the
telephone and offered to amicably settle their dispute. Tecson
and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive
distributorship with AFFA and to purchase all vessels for ACG
Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years. In an
effort to amicably settle the matter, Landicho, acting in behalf
of Go, set up a meeting with Cordero on June 29, 1998
between 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. at the Mactan Island Resort
Hotel lobby. On said date, however, only Landicho and Tecson
came and no reason was given for Go’s absence. Tecson and
Landicho proposed that they will convince Go to pay him
US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of
20%. And so it was agreed between him, Landicho and
Tecson that the latter would give him a weekly status report
and that the matter will be settled in three (3) to four (4) weeks
and neither party will file an action against each other until a
final report on the proposed settlement. No such report was
made by either Tecson or Landicho who, it turned out, had no
intention to do so and were just buying time as the catamaran
vessel was due to arrive from Australia. Cordero then filed a
complaint with the Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit the
entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on misdeclaration
and undervaluation. Consequently, an Alert Order was issued
by Acting BOC Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel which
in fact arrived on July 17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go and
Robinson had conspired to undervalue the vessel by around
US$500,000.00.11
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-
35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho
liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring
together in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith
and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his
due commissions (balance of unpaid commission from the sale
of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid
commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of
US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary
damages, including ₱800,000.00 representing expenses for
airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills and
entertainment, on account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of
the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed
for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.12
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of
action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of
the distributorship agreement. Said motion was denied by the
trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise
declared in default for failure to file his answer within the period
granted by the trial court.13 As for Go and Tecson, their motion
to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action was
likewise denied by the trial court on February 26,
1999.14 Subsequently, they filed their Answer denying that they
have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Cordero’s
authority as exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the
contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
communicating with Go in connection with the purchase of the
first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making
progress status reports and airing the client’s grievances to his
principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of
Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents
needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. As to the
inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for
AFFA’s other on-going vessel construction, this was merely
requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as
indication that Go was buying a second vessel. Moreover,
Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with
Cordero who had no document to show any such shipbuilding
contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute,
this was due to the malicious demand of Cordero to be given
US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the
alleged undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any
case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his
commission for the sale of the second vessel under the
memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering
the termination of his authority by AFFA’s lawyers on June 26,
1998.15
Pre-trial was reset twice to afford the parties opportunity to
reach a settlement. However, on motion filed by Cordero
through counsel, the trial court reconsidered the resetting of
the pre-trial to another date for the third time as requested by
Go, Tecson and Landicho, in view of the latter’s failure to
appear at the pre-trial conference on January 7, 2000 despite
due notice. The trial court further confirmed that said
defendants misled the trial court in moving for continuance
during the pre-trial conference held on December 10, 1999,
purportedly to go abroad for the holiday season when in truth a
Hold-Departure Order had been issued against
them.16 Accordingly, plaintiff Cordero was allowed to present
his evidence ex parte.
Cordero’s testimony regarding his transaction with defendants
Go, Landicho and Tecson, and the latter’s offer of settlement,
was corroborated by his counsel who also took the witness
stand. Further, documentary evidence including photographs
taken of the June 29, 1998 meeting with Landicho, Tecson and
Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-la’s Mactan Island Resort,
photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his
family, Robinson and Landicho, and also various documents,
communications, vouchers and bank transmittals were
presented to prove that: (1) Cordero was properly authorized
and actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as exclusive
distributor in the Philippines; (2) Cordero spent considerable
sums of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and ACG
Express Liner; and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero
his commissions from each scheduled payment made by Go
for the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA pursuant to
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825.17
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants
Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent
Tecson. As prayed for, defendants are hereby ordered to pay
Plaintiff jointly and solidarily, the following:
1. On the First Cause of Action, the sum total of SIXTEEN
MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED FIFTY TWO AND FORTY THREE CENTAVOS
(P16,291,352.43) as actual damages with legal interest from
25 June 1998 until fully paid;
2. On the Second Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;
3. On the Third Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
4. On the Fourth Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION
PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees;
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.18
Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new
trial, claiming that they have been unduly prejudiced by the
negligence of their counsel who was allegedly unaware that
the pre-trial conference on January 28, 2000 did not push
through for the reason that Cordero was then allowed to
present his evidence ex-parte, as he had assumed that the
said ex-parte hearing was being conducted only against
Robinson who was earlier declared in default.19 In its Order
dated July 28, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for new
trial.20 In the same order, Cordero’s motion for execution
pending appeal was granted. Defendants moved to reconsider
the said order insofar as it granted the motion for execution
pending appeal.21 On August 8, 2000, they filed a notice of
appeal.22
On August 18, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration and on August 21, 2000, the writ of execution
pending appeal was issued.23 Meanwhile, the notice of appeal
was denied for failure to pay the appellate court docket fee
within the prescribed period.24 Defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration and to transmit the case records to the CA.25
On September 29, 2000, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order at the instance of defendants in the certiorari
case they filed with said court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
60354 questioning the execution orders issued by the trial
court. Consequently, as requested by the defendants, the trial
court recalled and set aside its November 6, 2000 Order
granting the ex-parte motion for release of garnished funds,
cancelled the scheduled public auction sale of levied real
properties, and denied the ex-parte Motion for Break-Open
Order and Ex-Parte Motion for Encashment of Check filed by
Cordero.26 On November 29, 2000, the trial court reconsidered
its Order dated August 21, 2000 denying due course to the
notice of appeal and forthwith directed the transmittal of the
records to the CA.27
On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting
aside the trial court’s orders of execution pending appeal.
Cordero appealed the said judgment in a petition for review
filed with this Court which was eventually denied under our
Decision dated September 17, 2002.28
On March 16, 2004, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 affirmed
the trial court (1) in allowing Cordero to present his evidence
ex-parte after the unjustified failure of appellants (Go, Tecson
and Landicho) to appear at the pre-trial conference despite
due notice; (2) in finding that it was Cordero and not Pamana
who was appointed by AFFA as the exclusive distributor in the
Philippines of its SEACAT 25 and other fast ferry vessels,
which is not limited to the sale of one (1) such catamaran to
Go on August 7, 1997; and (3) in finding that Cordero is
entitled to a commission per vessel sold for AFFA through his
efforts in the amount equivalent to 22.43% of the price of each
vessel or US$328,742.00, and with payments of
US$297,219.91 having been made to Cordero, there remained
a balance of US$31,522.09 still due to him. The CA sustained
the trial court in ruling that Cordero is entitled to damages for
the breach of his exclusive distributorship agreement with
AFFA. However, it held that Cordero is entitled only to
commission for the sale of the first catamaran obtained
through his efforts with the remaining unpaid sum of
US$31,522.09 or ₱1,355,449.90 (on the basis of
US$1.00=₱43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum from the
time of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid. As
to the ₱800,000.00 representing expenses incurred by
Cordero for transportation, phone bills, entertainment, food and
lodging, the CA declared there was no basis for such award,
the same being the logical and necessary consequences of the
exclusive distributorship agreement which are normal in the
field of sales and distribution, and the expenditures having
redounded to the benefit of the distributor (Cordero).
On the amounts awarded by the trial court as moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, the CA
reduced the same to ₱500,000.00, ₱300,000.00 and
₱50,000.00, respectively. Appellants were held solidarily liable
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1207 in relation to Articles
19, 20, 21 and 22 of the New Civil Code. The CA further ruled
that no error was committed by the trial court in denying their
motion for new trial, which said court found to be pro forma
and did not raise any substantial matter as to warrant the
conduct of another trial.
By Resolution dated July 22, 2004, the CA denied the motions
for reconsideration respectively filed by the appellants and
appellee, and affirmed the Decision dated March 16, 2004 with
the sole modification that the legal interest of 6% per annum
shall start to run from June 24, 1998 until the finality of the
decision, and the rate of 12% interest per annum shall apply
once the decision becomes final and executory until the
judgment has been satisfied.
The case before us is a consolidation of the petitions for review
under Rule 45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and
Cordero (G.R. No. 164747) in which petitioners raised the
following arguments:
G.R. No. 164703
(Petitioner Go)
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED
THE RULES OF COURT AND PERTINENT
JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS
NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST AND IN NOT
DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE ON THE GROUND OF
LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING HEREIN
PETITIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE BREACH IN THE
ALLEGED EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT
WITH ALUMINIUM FAST FERRIES AUSTRALIA;
III. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT MISAPPLIED
THE LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE IN SOLIDUM
WITH THE CO-DEFENDANTS WITH RESPECT TO THE
CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT;
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONER LIABLE FOR
UNPAID COMMISSIONS, DAMAGES, ATTORNEY’S FEES,
AND LITIGATION EXPENSES; and
V. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ACTED
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HEREIN PETITIONER OF HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT’S DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL.29
G.R. No. 164747
(Petitioner Cordero)
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AWARDING
PETITIONER ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR HIS COMMISSION
FOR THE SALE OF THE SECOND VESSEL, SINCE THERE
IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHICH PROVES
THAT THERE WAS A SECOND SALE OF A VESSEL.
A. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED 7
AUGUST 1997 PROVIDES THAT RESPONDENT GO WAS
CONTRACTUALLY BOUND TO BUY TWO (2) VESSELS
FROM AFFA.
B. RESPONDENT GO’S POSITION PAPER AND COUNTER-
AFFIDAVIT/POSITION PAPER THAT WERE FILED BEFORE
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT
HE HAD INDEED PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL FROM
AFFA.
C. RESPONDENTS ADMITTED IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF
THAT THEY HAD PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS COMMISSIONS
FOR THE PURCHASE OF A SECOND VESSEL, SINCE IT
WAS PETITIONER’S EFFORTS WHICH ACTUALLY
FACILITATED AND SET-UP THE TRANSACTION FOR
RESPONDENTS.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT IMPOSING THE
PROPER LEGAL INTEREST RATE ON RESPONDENTS’
UNPAID OBLIGATION WHICH SHOULD BE TWELVE
PERCENT (12%) FROM THE TIME OF THE BREACH OF
THE OBLIGATION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING
THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
AWARDED TO PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT
CONSIDERING THE BAD FAITH AND FRAUDULENT
CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS IN MISAPPROPRIATING
THE MONEY OF PETITIONER.30
The controversy boils down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether
petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue the
respondents for breach of contract; and (2) whether the
respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his
unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive
distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.
I. Real Party-in-Interest
First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the
real party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one (1) to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes of this provision
are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without
any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the
actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the
action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage
litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound
public policy.31 A case is dismissible for lack of personality to
sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.32
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was
Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of
AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification dated
June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson.33 Petitioner Go
mentions the following documents also signed by respondent
Robinson which state that "Pamana Marketing Corporation
represented by Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero" was actually the
exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June 199734; (2)
certification dated 5 August 199735; and (3) letter dated 5
August 1997 addressed to petitioner Cordero concerning
"commissions to be paid to Pamana Marketing
Corporation."36 Such apparent inconsistency in naming AFFA’s
exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For all
intents and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with
Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the
exclusive distributorship, as with other clients to whom he had
similarly offered AFFA’s fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the
stipulated commissions from each progress payments made
by Go were directly paid by Robinson to
Cordero.37 Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too
aware of Cordero’s authority as the person who was appointed
and acted as exclusive distributor of AFFA, which can be
gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with
copies of bank transmittals everytime Go remits payment to
Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to
the bank account of Cordero in the Philippines as his
commission. Out of these partial payments of his commission,
Cordero would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective
"commission," or "cuts" from his own commission.
Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute the
evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of receipts signed
by them. Said amounts were apart from the earlier expenses
shouldered by Cordero for Landicho’s airline tickets,
transportation, food and hotel accommodations for the trip to
Australia.38
Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised
petitioner Cordero’s lack of personality to sue on behalf of
Pamana,39 and did so only before the CA when they
contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero, who was
appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for AFFA.40 It was
Robinson who argued in support of his motion to dismiss that
as far as said defendant is concerned, the real party plaintiff
appears to be Pamana, against the real party defendant which
is AFFA.41 As already mentioned, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss filed by Robinson.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling
Robinson’s objection over the improper resort to summons by
publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in
personam, notwithstanding that he raised it in a special
appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over his person. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service
of summons upon them in the manner required by law or
through their voluntary appearance in court and their
submission to its authority.42 A party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of said court
based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
court.43
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by
Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the grounds the lack
of "personal jurisdiction," it must be noted that he had earlier
filed a Motion for Time to file an appropriate responsive
pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by
publication.44 Such motion did not state that it was a
conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of
the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by
publication issued by the court and praying for additional time
to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having
acknowledged the summons by publication and also having
invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative
relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted
voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction. He is now estopped
from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.45
II. Breach of Exclusive Distributorship, Contractual Interference
and Respondents’ Liability for Damages
In Yu v. Court of Appeals,46 this Court ruled that the right to
perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and to reap the
profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights
which a party may protect. Thus, injunction is the appropriate
remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is
insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. In that case,
the former dealer of the same goods purchased the
merchandise from the manufacturer in England through a
trading firm in West Germany and sold these in the Philippines.
We held that the rights granted to the petitioner under the
exclusive distributorship agreement may not be diminished nor
rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing
a person or firm to obtain goods for which the exclusive
distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole
authorized distributor.47
In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero
was not paid the balance of his commission by respondent
Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and respondent
Landicho directly dealt with respondent Robinson in Brisbane,
and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the
exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, Cordero was
no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane.
In other words, Cordero had clearly been cut off from the
transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which was
sold through his efforts. When Cordero complained to Go,
Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to
his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive
distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers led by Landicho and
Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising to
pay a certain amount and to purchase high-speed catamarans
through Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and
worse, AFFA through its lawyer in Australia even terminated
his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were
engaged for only one (1) transaction, that is, the purchase of
the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.
Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of
Appeals48 there is no conclusive proof adduced by petitioner
Cordero that they actually purchased a second SEACAT 25
directly from AFFA and hence there was no violation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement. Further, he contends that
the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding them solidarily
liable to Cordero, relying on Articles 1207, 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code despite absence of evidence, documentary or
testimonial, showing that they conspired to defeat the very
purpose of the exclusive distributorship agreement.49
We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there
was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents actually
purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. But this
circumstance will not absolve respondents from liability for
invading Cordero’s rights under the exclusive distributorship.
Respondents clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero
as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA without
advising him and furnishing him with copies of the bank
transmittals as they previously did, and directly dealt with
AFFA through Robinson regarding arrangements for the arrival
of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the
purchase of the second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum
of Agreement which Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a
result of respondents’ actuations, Cordero incurred losses as
he was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of
the first vessel and his exclusive distributorship revoked by
AFFA.
Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred
in holding them solidarily liable for Cordero’s unpaid
commission, which is the sole obligation of the principal AFFA.
It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in the letter dated
August 5, 1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook to pay
commission payments to Pamana on a staggered progress
payment plan in the form of percentage of the commission per
payment. AFFA explicitly committed that it will, "upon receipt of
progress payments, pay to Pamana their full commission by
telegraphic transfer to an account nominated by Pamana
within one to two days of [AFFA] receiving such
payments."50 Petitioner Go further maintains that he had not in
any way violated or caused the termination of the exclusive
distributorship agreement between Cordero and AFFA; he had
also paid in full the first and only vessel he purchased from
AFFA.51
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for
breach of contract because only parties can breach contractual
provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for
breach but for inducing another to commit such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid
contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the
existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person
is without legal justification.52
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed.
Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that Cordero
is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines,
respondents were clearly aware of the contract between
Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence
on record showed that respondents initially dealt with and
recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-
speed catamaran vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as
exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding Contract No.
7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
As to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v.
Court of Appeals53 is instructive, to wit:
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for
the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the
enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may
pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to
renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the
case before us, petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked
DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result
petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter’s
property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate
court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned
are present in the instant case.
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified
where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his
own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a
general rule, justification for interfering with the business
relations of another exists where the actor’s motive is to benefit
himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive
is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities
believe that it is not necessary that the interferer’s interest
outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that
an individual acts under an economic interest that is
substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and
malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
Moreover, justification for protecting one’s financial position
should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is
sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives.
As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was
no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse
behind one’s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather
than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested,
and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that
he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun
prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his
enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes
deliberate wrongful motives or malice in him.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their
economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the
expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein
complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an
obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice.
The business desire is there to make some gain to the
detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however,
precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the
legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of
existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly
confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the
lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing,
without awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury caused by
petitioner’s interference.54 [emphasis supplied.]
Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to
duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.55 In the case of Lagon
v. Court of Appeals,56 we held that to sustain a case for
tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with
malice or must have been driven by purely impure reasons to
injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference cannot
be justified. We further explained that the word "induce" refers
to situations where a person causes another to choose one
course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. As to the
allegation of private respondent in said case that petitioner
induced the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of the original
lease contract with the deceased landowner, we ruled as
follows:
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the
contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him
liable for tortuous interference. x x x
Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of
private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word "induce"
refers to situations where a person causes another to choose
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The
records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own
volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence
their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any
evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming that
private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease
contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable
to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in
purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous
interference was never established.57
In their Answer, respondents denied having anything to do with
the unpaid balance of the commission due to Cordero and the
eventual termination of his exclusive distributorship by AFFA.
They gave a different version of the events that transpired
following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825.
According to them, several builder-competitors still entered the
picture after the said contract for the purchase of one (1)
SEACAT 25 was sent to Brisbane in July 1997 for
authentication, adding that the contract was to be effective on
August 7, 1997, the time when their funds was to become
available. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can
compete with the prices of other builders, and upon mutual
agreement, AFFA agreed to give them a discounted price
under the following terms and conditions: (1) that the contract
price be lowered; (2) that Go will obtain another vessel; (3) that
to secure compliance of such conditions, Go must make an
advance payment for the building of the second vessel; and (4)
that the payment scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated
in the first contract shall still be the basis and used as the
guiding factor in remitting money for the building of the first
vessel. This led to the signing of another contract superseding
the first one (1), still to be dated 07 August 1997. Attached to
the answer were photocopies of the second contract stating a
lower purchase price (US$1,150,000.00) and facsimile
transmission of AFFA to Go confirming the transaction.58
As to the cessation of communication with Cordero, Go
averred it was Cordero who was nowhere to be contacted at
the time the shipbuilding progress did not turn good as
promised, and it was always Landicho and Tecson who, after
several attempts, were able to locate him only to obtain
unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still call
up Robinson regarding any progress status report, lacking
documents for MARINA, etc., and go to Australia for ocular
inspection. Hence, in May 1998 on the scheduled launching of
the ship in Australia, Go engaged the services of Landicho
who went to Australia to see to it that all documents needed for
the shipment of the vessel to the Philippines would be in order.
It was also during this time that Robinson’s request for inquiry
on the Philippine price of a Wartsila engine for AFFA’s then on-
going vessel construction, was misinterpreted by Cordero as
indicating that Go was buying a second vessel.59
We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere
afterthought as these were the very same averments
contained in the Position Paper for the Importer dated October
9, 1998, which was submitted by Go on behalf of ACG Express
Liner in connection with the complaint-affidavit filed by Cordero
before the BOC-SGS Appeals Committee relative to the
shipment valuation of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from
AFFA.60 It appears that the purported second contract
superseding the original Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 and
stating a lower price of US$1,150,000.00 (not
US$1,465,512.00) was only presented before the BOC to
show that the vessel imported into the Philippines was not
undervalued by almost US$500,000.00. Cordero vehemently
denied there was such modification of the contract and
accused respondents of resorting to falsified documents,
including the facsimile transmission of AFFA supposedly
confirming the said sale for only US$1,150,000.00.
Incidentally, another document filed in said BOC case, the
Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for the Importer dated
November 16, 1998,61 states in paragraph 8 under the
Antecedent facts thereof, that --
8. As elsewhere stated, the total remittances made by herein
Importer to AFFA does not alone represent the purchase price
for Seacat 25. It includes advance payment for the acquisition
of another vessel as part of the deal due to the discounted
price.62
which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that
respondents negotiated for the sale of the second vessel and
that the nonpayment of the remaining two (2) instalments of his
commission for the sale of the first SEACAT 25 was a result of
Go and Landicho’s directly dealing with Robinson, obviously to
obtain a lower price for the second vessel at the expense of
Cordero.
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and
AFFA to enter into another contract directly with ACG Express
Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in
AFFA’s breach of its contractual obligation to pay in full the
commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of
Cordero’s appointment as exclusive distributor. Following our
pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra), such act may not
be deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives. The attendant circumstances,
however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the
bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit themselves
at the expense of Cordero. Respondents furtively went directly
to Robinson after Cordero had worked hard to close the deal
for them to purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25, closely
monitored the progress of building the first vessel sold,
attended to their concerns and spent no measly sum for the
trip to Australia with Go, Landicho and Go’s family members.
But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and
Tecson secretly negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of
a second vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to demand
and receive from Cordero their "commission" or "cut" from
Cordero’s earned commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25.
Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when
Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased
communicating with him, without giving him any explanation.
While there was nothing objectionable in negotiating for a
lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25, which is
not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement, Go,
Robinson, Tecson and Landicho clearly connived not only in
ensuring that Cordero would have no participation in the
contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but also that
Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from
the sale of the first SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge
that it was commission already earned by and due to Cordero.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the
actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho were
without legal justification and intended solely to prejudice
Cordero.
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter.
As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court.63 We see no
compelling reason to reverse the findings of the RTC and the
CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of
the rights of Cordero under the exclusive distributorship
agreement.
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with
fairness, honesty and good faith in securing better terms for
the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the
prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive
distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
As we have expounded in another case:
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible." The object of this article, therefore, is to set
certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s
duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its
antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to
injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right
or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is
violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or
21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising
from a violation of law x x x. Article 21, on the other hand,
states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but
which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is,
the act complained of must be intentional.64
Petitioner Go’s argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot
be held liable solidarily with Robinson for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees awarded to
Cordero since no law or contract provided for solidary
obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit.
Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the
quasi-delict is solidary.65 In Lafarge Cement Philippines, Inc. v.
Continental Cement Corporation,66 we held:
[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always
solidary. We have assiduously maintained this legal principle
as early as 1912 in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held:
x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that
they fail to recognize that the basis of the present action is tort.
They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort
feasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he
participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x
It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all
the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent
and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. x x x
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort
which they commit.1avvphi1 The persons injured may sue all
of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the
whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable
for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that
the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined
with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his
participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of
the others. x x x
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not
be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They
cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for
the whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort
feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against
the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of
the joint tort feasors by agreement generally operates to
discharge all. x x x
Of course, the court during trial may find that some of the
alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not liable.
The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true
even though they are charged jointly and
severally.67 [emphasis supplied.]
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with
contractual relations cannot be held liable for more than the
amount for which the party who was inducted to break the
contract can be held liable.68 Respondents Go, Landicho and
Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of
petitioner Cordero’s commission from the sale of the first
SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso
equivalent, which AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of
the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is
fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may
be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.69On the
other hand, the requirements of an award of exemplary
damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in
addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) that they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that
may be awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act must be
accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.70 The award of exemplary
damages is thus in order. However, we find the sums awarded
by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as reduced
by the CA, still excessive under the circumstances.
Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly caused. Although
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow
be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering
inflicted. Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were
never intended to enrich the claimant at the expense of the
defendant. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages,
since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
Trial courts are given discretion in determining the amount,
with the limitation that it "should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive." Indeed, it must be commensurate to
the loss or injury suffered.71
We believe that the amounts of ₱300,000.00 and ₱200,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages, respectively, would be
sufficient and reasonable. Because exemplary damages are
awarded, attorney’s fees may also be awarded in consonance
with Article 2208 (1).72 We affirm the appellate court’s award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated
March 16, 2004 as modified by the Resolution dated July 22,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the awards of
moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced to
₱300,000.00 and ₱200,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.
F. PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE
Articles 2185,2188,2190-2193
PERSONS LIABLE
A. THE TORTFESOR
Article 2176,2181,2194
G.R. No. L-5932 February 27, 1912
DEAN C. WORCESTER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN OCAMPO, TEODORO M. KALAW, LOPE K.
SANTOS, FIDEL A. REYES, FAUSTINO AGUILAR, ET
AL.,defendants-appellants.
Felipe Agoncillo for appellants.
W. A. Kincaid and Thos. L. Hartigan for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
On the 23rd day of January, 1909, the plaintiff commenced an
action against the defendants in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila, for the purpose of recovering damages
resulting from an alleged libelous publication. The complaint
was in the following language:
COMPLAINT.
I.That the plaintiff as well as the defendants are residents of
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
II.That for a long time before the 30th of October, 1908, the
defendants, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K.
Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, Leoncio G. Liquete ,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were the owners,
directors, writers (redactores), editors (editores) and
administrators of a certain daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," which newspaper
during all the time mentioned in this complaint was published
and circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in
the city of Manila, having a large circulation throughout the
Philippine Islands.
III.That for a long time the defendants have been maliciously
persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said newspaper, until
at last on the 30th of October, 1908, with the malicious
intention of injuring the plaintiff, who on said date was, and still
is a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and
Secretary of the Interior in the Government of the Philippines,
they attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of the plaintiff,
not only as a private person but also as an official of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and with the object of
exposing him to the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the
public, printed, wrote (redactaron), and published in said
newspaper in its ordinary number of the 30th of October, 1908,
a malicious defamation and false libel which was injurious
(injurioso) to the plaintiff, said libel reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and
devour, others to be eaten and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves,
endeavoring to rebel against an order of things which makes
them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former.
At times they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters
and devourers, but in the majority of cases they did not obtain
but a change of name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all the spheres of creation: the
relation between the ones and the others is that dictated by the
appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creatures'
expense.
"Among men it is very easy to observe the development of this
daily phenomenon. And for some psychological reason the
nations who believe themselves powerful have taken the
fiercest and most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the
lion, or the eagle, or the serpent. Some have done so by a
secret impulse of affinity and others in the nature of simulation,
of infatuated vanity, making themselves appear that which they
are not nor ever can be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that
has found the most adepts. And men, collectively and
individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most
rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering of their
fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the
characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure
the skulls of the Igorots and study and civilize them and to
espy in his flight, with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the
large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amidst the lonely
mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks
to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his
own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances, an illegal
slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from
the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to
condemn by virtue of his official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of
the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the
laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is
confined o dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the
fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and less savory,
so as to make it worth the while replacing them with species
coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes
in Mindoro, in Mindanao, and in other virgin regions of the
Archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the
pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the
object is to possess all the data and the key to the national
wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense properties registered under he names
of others.
"Promoting, through secret agents and partners, the sale to the
city of worthless land at fabulous prices which the city fathers
dare not refuse, from fear of displeasing the one who is behind
the motion, and which they do not refuse for their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in-land, with the
prospects of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of
the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same
time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who
affects a petulent omniscience and a vampire who silently
sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and their aim
are never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the booty and the plunder. Others are too
weak to raise a voice of protest. And others die in the
disconsolating destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
IV.That the plaintiff was, on the date of said publication, and
still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands, and to public in general, personally as well as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as
Secretary of the Interior, and the defamation and libel, and the
words, terms and language used in said defamation and libel
were employed by the said defendants with the intention of
indicating the said plaintiff, and that should be understood, as
in effect they were understood, by the public officials of the
Government and the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands in
general, as referring to the plaintiff, by reason of the publicly
known fact that said plaintiff in compliance with his duties in his
position as such member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and as such Secretary of the Interior of the
Philippine Islands, ascended on a previous occasion the
mountains of the Province of Benguet to study the native tribe
known as Igorot, residing in said region; by reason of the
publicly known fact that in the said mountains of Benguet there
exist large deposits of gold, and for the reason that, as
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines, which is
the legislative body of the Philippine Islands, the plaintiff takes
part in the enactment and repealing of laws in said Islands; by
reason furthermore of the fact, publicly known, that the plaintiff,
as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has
had under his direction and control the enforcement of the laws
of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of
Manila relating to the slaughtering of cattle; by reason
furthermore of the fact, publicly known that said plaintiff, as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, had
under his direction and control the Bureau of Science of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and he is generally
known as a man devoted to the study of science; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact that the said plaintiff, as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, at a
previous time, caused the importation into the Philippine
Islands of fish eggs for the purpose of supplying the mountain
streams of the Philippine Islands with fish-hatcheries; by
reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff,
as such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, has
journeyed to and explored the Islands of Mindoro, Mindanao,
and other regions of the Philippine Archipelago; by reason
furthermore of the publicly known fact that said plaintiff, as
such Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands, at one
time investigated and prepared a report for the Civil
Commission of the Philippines in regard to a certain
proposition for the purchase of a parcel of land for the city of
Manila; by reason furthermore of the publicly known fact that
said plaintiff, as member of said Civil Commission of the
Philippines together with the other members of said legislative
body, once opened negotiations with a certain firm engaged in
the hotel business in regard to the location of a prospective
hotel on one of the filled-in lands of the city of Manila.
That said defendants charged said plaintiff with the prostitution
of his office as member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for
personal ends; with wasting public funds for the purpose of
promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the laws of
the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila;
with taking part in illegal combinations for the purpose of
robbing the people; with the object of gain for himself and for
others; and lastly with being "a bird of prey;" and that said
defamation should be understood, as in effect it was
understood, by the public officials of the Government and the
people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the
said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above
specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and
conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are
false and without any foundation whatsoever.
That said defamation and libel were published by the
defendants under a heading in large and showy type, and
every effort made by said defendants to see that said
defamation and libel should attract the attention of the public
and be read by all the subscribers to said newspaper and the
readers of the same.
V.Besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of
the plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing the said libel, did so
with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino people to
believe that the plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt
person, unworthy of the position which he held, and for this
reason to oppose his administration of the office in his charge
as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way they endeavored to
create enormous difficulties for him in the performance of his
official duties, and to make him so unpopular that he would
have to resign his office as member of the Civil Commission of
the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior.
In fact said defendants, by means of said libel and other false
statements in said mentioned newspaper, have been
deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the public in the
plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles in his way in
the performance of his official duties, in consequence of which
the plaintiff has met with a great many difficulties which have
increased to a great extent his labors as a public official in
every one of the Departments.
VI.And for all these reasons the plaintiff alleges: That he has
been damaged and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional
work to which he has been put, by the said defendants, in the
compliance of his duties, both in the past and the future, as
well as for the injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum
of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) Philippine currency, and
besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from the
defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000) Philippine currency, in the way of punitive damages,
as a warning to the defendants.
Wherefore the plaintiff files this complaint, praying the court:
(1) That the defendants be summoned according to law.
(2) That judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay
the damages as above stated, and the costs of the action.
On the 23d of February, 1909, the defendants presented the
following demurrer to the said complaint:
DEMURRER.
Now come the defendants, through their undersigned attorney,
and demur to the complaint filed herein, upon the following
grounds:
First, That the complaint is vague and unintelligible.
Second. That the facts alleged in the complaint do not
constitute a cause or right of action.
Third. That there is another action pending between the
plaintiff and several of the defendants for the same cause; and
Fourth. That some of the defendants have been erroneously
included therein.
Therefore, they respectfully ask the court to dismiss the
complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.
On the 27th of February, 1909, the Honorable Charles S.
Lobingier, judge, overruled said demurrer in the following
decision, to which the defendants duly excepted:
ORDER.
The defendant demur upon several grounds:
(1) The first ground is that the complaint is vague and
unintelligible and this is directed principally to paragraph 2, in
which it is alleged that the defendants were "dueños,
directores, redactores", etc., but it is not alleged that they were
such simultaneously. If this were the sole averment of the
defendants' connection with the alleged libel, the objection
might be well taken, but paragraph 3 of the complaint alleges
that the defendants "imprimieron, redactaron y publicaron",
etc., the article complained of. Under section 2 of Act 277
"every person" who "publishes or procures to be published any
belief is made responsible. (Cf. U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep.,
752.) We think, therefore, that the connection of the
defendants with the publication complained of is sufficiently
charged.
(2) It is also claimed that the facts alleged are not sufficient to
state a cause of action and it is urged in support of this that the
article complained of and which is copied in the complaint, fails
to mention the plaintiff or to show on its face that it refers to
him. It is, however, specifically alleged in paragraph 4 that the
article was intended to refer to the plaintiff and was so
understood by the public, and this allegation is admitted by the
demurrer. Under the rule announced in Causin vs.
Jakosalem (5 Phil. Rep., 155), where the words complained of
do refer to the plaintiff "an action for libel may be maintained
even though the defamatory publication does not refer to the
plaintiff by name."
(3) It is further argued that there is another action pending
between the parties for the same cause. This, it is true, is
made a ground for demurrer by the Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 91 (3), but like all grounds therein mentioned, it must
"appear upon the face" of the pleading objected to, and where
it does not so appear "the objection can only be taken by
answer." (Code C. P., sec. 92.) There is no averment in the
complaint which indicates that there is no another action
pending.
The fourth ground of the demurrer is not one recognized by
law (Code C. P., sec. 91) nor do we find anything in Sanidad
vs. Cabotaje (5 Phil. Rep., 204) which would necessitate any
change in the views already expressed.
The demurrer is, therefore, overruled and defendants are given
the usual five days to answer.
On the 15th day of November, 1909, the defendants presented
their amended answer, which was as follows:
ANSWER.
The defendants in the above-entitled cause, through their
undersigned attorney, by their answer to the complaint, state:
That the defendants deny generally the allegation of the
complaint.
As a special defense, the defendants allege:
First. That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to institute this
action, as it clearly appears from the allegations of the
complaint and which the defendants hereby deny.
Second. That the facts are set out as constituting cause of
action in the complaint, are insufficient to constitute such
cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants.
Third. That the said complaint is manifestly improper, for the
reason that there is now pending in the Court of First Instance
of this city a criminal cause, No. 4295, for the crime of libel
against the defendants herein, Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M.
Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, both actions, criminal and civil,
being based upon the same facts which the plaintiffs herein,
who is also a party to the said criminal action, now alleges as
the basis of his action.
Fourth. That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has
been extinguished for the reason that plaintiff did not expressly
reserve the right to enforce the same in the aforesaid cause
4295, for the crime of libel, after the said criminal cause had
been finally disposed of.
Fifth. That the defendants, Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar,
Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M.
Cansipit, were erroneously included in the complaint for the
simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said criminal
cause No. 4295, for libel, the third was used as a witness for
the prosecution in the said criminal cause, and the others have
no interest, either directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El
Renacimiento" in which it is alleged by the plaintiff the editorial,
which is the basis of the complaint, and which it is claimed to
be libelous, was published.
Wherefore the defendants pray that they be acquitted of the
complaint, with the costs against the plaintiff.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause, the arguments if the respective attorneys, the
Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge, on the 14th of January,
1910, rendered the following decision:
DECISION.
This is a civil action sounding in damages to the amount of
P100,000 for an alleged libel of the plaintiff by the defendants.
The plaintiff is the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, a member of
the Civil Commission of the Philippine Islands, and Secretary
of the Interior of Insular Government. The defendants are
twelve persons designated by name in the complaint and
alleged therein to be the owners, directors, writers
(redactores), editors (editores), and administrators of a certain
daily newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling
Pagsilang," which defendants, as well as the plaintiff, are
residents of the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
It is further alleged in the complaint that for a long time prior to
the 30th of October, 1908, the defendants were the owners,
directors, writers, editors, and administrators of said daily
newspaper, and that said newspaper, during all the time
mentioned in the complaint, was published and circulated daily
in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the city of Manila,
having a large circulation throughout the Philippine Islands.
It is also alleged that for a long time the defendants had been
maliciously persecuting and attacking the plaintiff in said
newspaper, until at last, on said date, with the malicious
intention of injuring the plaintiff who then was still is a member
of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior in the Government of the Philippines, they attacked the
integrity and reviled the reputation of the plaintiff, not only as a
private citizen, but also as an official of the Government of the
Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to the
odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote, printed,
and published in said newspaper in its ordinary number of the
said 30th of October, 1908, a malicious defamation and false
libel, which was injurious to the plaintiff, said libel, as translated
from the Spanish, reading as follows:
"EDITORIAL.
"BIRDS OF PREY.
"On the surface of the globe some were born to eat and
devour, others to be eaten and devoured.
"Now and then the latter have bestirred themselves,
endeavoring to rebel against an order of things which makes
them the prey and food of the insatiable voracity of the former.
At times they have been fortunate, putting to flight the eaters
and devourers, but in a majority of cases they do not obtain
anything but a change of name or plumage.
"The situation is the same in all spheres of creation; the
relation between the ones and the others is that dictated by the
appetite and the power to satisfy it at the fellow-creature's
expense.
"Among men it is easy to observe the development of this daily
phenomenon. And for some psychological reason the nations
who believe themselves powerful have taken the fiercest and
most harmful creatures as emblems; it is either the lion, or the
eagle, or the serpent. Some have done so by a secret impulse
of affinity and others in the nature of simulation, of infatuated
vanity, making themselves appear that which they are not nor
ever will be.
"The eagle, symbolizing liberty and strength, is the bird that
has found the most adepts. And men, collectively and
individually, have desired to copy and imitate the most
rapacious bird in order to triumph in the plundering if their
fellow-men.
"There are men who, besides being eagles, have the
characteristics of the vulture, the owl and the vampire.
"Ascending the mountains of Benguet to classify and measure
the skulls of the Igorots and study and civilize them, and to
espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of prey, where are the
large deposits of gold, the prey concealed amongst the lonely
mountains, to appropriate them to himself afterwards, thanks
to legal facilities made and unmade at will, but always for his
own benefit.
"Authorizing, despite laws and ordinances an illegal
slaughtering of diseased cattle in order to derive benefit from
the infected and putrid meat which he himself was obliged to
condemn by virtue of his official position.
"Presenting himself on all occasions with the wrinkled brow of
the scientist who consumes his life in the mysteries of the
laboratory of science, when his whole scientific labor is
confined to dissecting insects and importing fish eggs, as if the
fish eggs of this country were less nourishing and savory, so
as to make it worth the while replacing them with species
coming from other climes.
"Giving an admirable impulse to the discovery of wealthy lodes
in Mindanao, in Mindoro, and in other virgin regions of the
archipelago, with the money of the people, and under the
pretext of the public good, when, as a strict matter of truth, the
object is to possess all the data and the key to the national
wealth for his essentially personal benefit, as is shown by the
acquisition of immense properties registered under the names
of others.
"Promoting through secret agents and partners, the sale of the
city worthless land at fabulous prices which the city fathers
dare not refuse from fear of displeasing the one who is behind
the motion, and which they do not refuse to their own good.
"Patronizing concessions for hotels on filled-in lands, with the
prospects of enormous profits, at the expense of the blood of
the people.
"Such are the characteristics of the man who is at the same
time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who
gorges himself on the dead and putrid meats, an owl who
affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently
sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves it bloodless.
"It is these birds of prey who triumph. Their flight and aim are
never thwarted.
"Who will detain them?
"Some share in the body and plunder, Others are too weak to
raise a voice to protest. And others die in the disconsolating
destruction of their own energies and interests.
"And then there appears, terrifying, the immortal legend:
"MANE, TECEL, PHARES."
It is alleged, among other things, in paragraph four of the
complaint, that the plaintiff was on the date of said publication,
and still is, well known to the officials of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, and to the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands, and to the public generally, personally as well as a
member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and as a
Secretary of the Interior; and the defamation and libel, and the
words, terms, and language used in said defamation and libel
were employed by the said defendants with the intention of
indicating the said plaintiff, and that they should be
understood, as in fact they were understood, by the public
officials of the Government and the inhabitants of the
Philippine Islands in general, as referring to the plaintiff. (Here
follow the reasons for saying the editorial referred to plaintiff
and why the public understood it as referring to him.)
The said defendants charged plaintiff with the prostitution of
his office as a member of the Civil Commission of the
Philippines and as Secretary of the Interior of said Islands, for
personal ends; with wasting public funds for the purpose of
promoting his personal welfare; and with the violation of the
laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of
Manila; with taking part in illegal combination of the purpose of
robbing the people, with the object of gain for himself and for
others; and lastly, with being a bird of prey, and that said
defamation should be understood, as in effect it was
understood by the public officials of the Government and the
people of the Philippine Islands in general, as charging the
said plaintiff with the conduct, actions and things above
specified; all of which allegations relating to the character and
conduct of the said plaintiff, as above stated, were and are
false and without any foundation whatever. That said
defamation and libel were published by the defendants under a
heading in large and showy type, and every effort was made
by said defendant to see that said defamation and libel should
attract the attention of the public and be read by all the
subscribers to said newspaper and the readers of the same.
In paragraph five of the complaint it is further alleged that,
besides assailing the integrity and reviling the reputation of the
plaintiff, said defendants, in publishing said libel, did so with
the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino to believe that the
plaintiff was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of
the position which he held, and for this reason to oppose of his
administration of the office in his charge as Secretary of the
Interior, and in this way they endeavored to create enormous
difficulties for him in the performance of his official duties, and
to make him so unpopular that he would have to resign his
office as a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines
and Secretary of the Interior. In fact, said defendants, by
means of said libel and other false statements in said
mentioned newspaper, have been deliberately trying to destroy
the confidence of the public in the plaintiff, and to in incite the
people to place obstacles in his way in the performance of his
official duties, in consequence of which said plaintiff has met
with a great many difficulties which have increased to a great
extent his labors as a public official in every one of the
Departments.
And the allegations end with paragraph six, in which the
plaintiff states that for all these reasons has been damaged
and is entitled to an indemnity for the additional work to which
he has been put by said defendants in compliance with his
duties, both in the past and in the future, as well as for the
injuries to his reputation and feelings, in the sum, of P50,000,
and that besides this said amount he is entitled to collect from
the defendants the additional sum of fifty thousand pesos in
the way of punitive damages, as a warning to the defendants.
The complaint concludes with a prayer, among other things,
that judgment be rendered ordering the defendants to pay the
damages as above stated and the costs of the action; and is
dated and signed, Manila, P.I., January 23, 1909, Hartigan and
Rohde, Kincaid and Hurd, attorneys for plaintiff.
A demurrer to this complaint was filed by the defendants,
through their attorney, Sr. Felipe Agoncillo, which demurrer
was heretofore heard and overruled by the Court, and the
defendants required to answer. Accordingly, the defendants
within the prescribed time, filed their answer; and on
November 16, 1909, through their attorney, filed and amended
answer, which is as follows (after stating the case):
The defendants in the above-entitled action, through their
undersigned attorney, answering the complaint, state: That
they make a general denial of the allegations in the complaint,
and as a special defense allege:
"(1) That the plaintiff lacks the necessary personality to
institute the complaint in question, as evidently appears from
the allegations in the same, and which the defendants deny;
"(2) That the facts set forth as a cause of action in the
complaint are insufficient to constitute a cause of action in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants;
"(3) That the said complaint is in every sense contrary to law,
criminal case No. 4295, for libel, against the defendants Martin
Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fidel A. Reyes, in the Court
of First Instance of this city, being still pending, inasmuch as
both causes, criminal and civil, are based upon the same facts
which the plaintiff, who is also interested in said criminal
cause, considers a cause of action;
"(4) That the civil action in the above-entitled cause has been
destroyed as a consequence of the fact that the plaintiff did not
expressly reserve his right to the same in the said mentioned
cause No. 4295 for libel, in order to exercise it after the
termination of said criminal cause:
"(5) That the defendants Lope K. Santos, Faustino Aguilar,
Leoncio G. Liquete, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel
Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit
have been erroneously included in the complaint, for the
simple reason that the first two were acquitted in said cause
No. 4295 for libel, the third was used as a witness by the
prosecution in the same cause, and the latter ones have no
interest, directly or indirectly, in the newspaper "El
Renacimiento," in which the plaintiff presumes, was published
the editorial which forms the basis of the complaint, and which
is said to be libelous; and concluding with a prayer to the court
to dismiss the case, with cost against the plaintiff."
The second paragraph of this "special defense" is nothing
other than a general demurrer to the complaint, which has
been overruled, as already stated.
The first paragraph is not clearly stated, but the court
construes it as meaning a simple denial that the plaintiff is the
person referred to in the alleged libelous article "Birds of Prey,"
which issue is sufficiently raised by the general denial of the
allegations in the complaint.
The third paragraph is not a valid defense in law, for the simple
reason that section 11 of Act 277 of the Philippine
Commission, under which this suit is brought, especially
provides for a separate civil action for damages, as well as for
a criminal prosecution. (See Mr. Justice Johnson's recent
decision.) This third paragraph is therefore without merit; and
the same may be said of the fourth paragraph thereof. As to
paragraph five, it contains no material averment which could
not have been set up and insisted upon under the general
issue.
One part if this so-called special defense is therefore a
demurrer already and adjudicated, another part is covered by
the general issue, and the residue is without merit as a legal
defense, and might have been stricken out.
The defense is therefore tantamount to the general issue only,
there being no special plea that these charges are true, nor
any plea of justification.
The trial of this case on its merits began November 16, and
ended December 10, 1909, and the proceedings and evidence
introduced are to be found in the exhibits and stenographic
notes taken by the court's official reporter. At the trial Judge
Kincaid said Major Hartigan appeared for the plaintiff and
Señores Agoncillo, Cruz Herrera, and Ferrer for the
defendants.
After hearing the testimony and arguments of counsel and a
due consideration of the case, the court finds the following
facts established by the admissions and a decided
preponderance of the evidence:
That the defendants Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio
Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and
Gregorio M. Cansipit, seven in number, are the proprietors and
owners of the said daily newspaper known as "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," and that "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," are one and the same
newspaper, owned, managed, printed and published by the
same persons; that Teodoro M. Kalaw and Lope K. Santos
were the editors in chief of directors of this paper on the 30th
of October, 1908, and that said nine defendants named were
the owners, editors, proprietors, managers and publishers of
said newspaper on said 30th of October, 1908, for a long time
prior thereto, and during all the time mentioned in the
complaint.
As to the defendants, Reyes, Aguilar, and Liquete, they appear
from the evidence to have been editors of said paper, but in
subordinate position to the chief editors or directors, Kalaw and
Santos, and to have acted under the direction of their latter two
defendants.
The court further finds that every essential or material
allegation of the complaint is true substantially as therein
stated, with the exception noted to Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino
Aguilar, and Leoncio G. Liquete, and as may be hereinafter
indicated. The case is therefore dismissed as to these three
defendants.
The only serious contention of the defense is (1) that the
editorial "Birds of Prey" does not refer to a determinate person;
and (2) that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of
the defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw, is responsible for
the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous article
of the damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.
In the opinion of the court this article so indubitably refers to
the plaintiff, and was so easily and well understood by the
readers of said paper as indicating the plaintiff, that it would be
an act of superrogation to elaborately discuss the evidence
adduced in support of or against the proposition. It is as clear
to the court from the evidence adduced as the noonday sun,
that the plaintiff is the identical and only person meant and
referred to in said article "Birds and Prey;" and it requires no
argument to prove that it does mean and refer to him and was
so intended by the writer, and therefore by said nine
defendants, and could not have been otherwise understood by
any intelligent reader or subscriber of said paper, in view of the
reasons assigned in the complaint, which reasons are clearly
disclosed and fully established by the evidence. And it may be
added that much valuable time was needlessly consumed by
the defense at trial in an effort to establish the contrary.
It seems to the court a reflection upon the intelligence of the
subscribers and readers of "El Renacimiento" to contend that
this editorial was not well understood by them as referring to
the plaintiff, and as fully as if his name had been mentioned in
every paragraph thereof. And assuredly the omission of his
name from the editorial has made the libel less hurtful and
disastrous in its results to the reputation and feelings of the
plaintiff.
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show
that none of the twelve defendants were the owners of "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them
had originally contributed their money as a partriotic donation
to the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the
money and property of the paper as trustees for this people,
and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to
philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo and Lichauco
had agreed to contribute to the same ends, but had not done
so.
This proposition in the light of evidence is so preposterous as
to entitle it to little, if any, serious consideration. To ask the
court to believe it is tantamount to asking the court to stultify
reason and common sense. That those seven defendants
named contributed their respective sums of money, as shown
by the evidence, to the foundation of said newspaper in 1901
for their own personal benefit and profit is fully and
unmistakably established. It is equally well established that
Martin Ocampo is and was, not only a part owner, but that he
has been and is still the administrator or business manager of
said newspaper, and that the other six persons named are
shareholders, part owners and proprietors thereof, and were
such on said 30th of October, 1908.
Arcadio Arellano testified positively that Galo Lichauco was
one of the seven founders, and that Lichauco contributed
P1,000. Martin Ocampo testified that Galo Lichauco promised
to contribute an amount which he (the witness) did not
remember but that Lichauco did not keep his promise. (See pp.
107, 108, and 231 of the evidence.)
The other evidence and circumstances strongly corroborate
Arcadio Arellano, and the court is constrained to believe that
Arellano told the truth and Ocampo did not. See Exhibit B-J, a
copy of "El Renacimiento" containing the article "Infamy
Among Comrades," page 87 of the evidence, in which there
was published that these seven persons named are the
shareholders of the paper.
Furthermore, Galo Lichauco failed to appear and testify, so as
to enlighten the court as to which witness, Arellano or
Ocampo, told the truth, or whether chief editor Kalaw had his
authority to publish in said paper, as he did in November 22,
1907, that he, Galo Lichauco, was one of the shareholders.
The presumptions are therefore against Galo Lichauco. See
S.S. Co. vs. Brancroft-Whitney Co. (36 C. C. A., 136 and 153).
It also appears from the evidence that Teodoro M. Kalaw was
the chief editor or director of the Spanish section of said paper,
and that Lope K. Santos was the chief editor or director of the
Tagalog section on said 30th of October, 1908, and that the
Spanish and Tagalog sections are, and then were, one and the
same newspaper, but printed and published in different
languages.
It is alleged that said newspaper has a large circulation
throughout the Philippine Islands, and was published and
circulated daily in the Spanish and Tagalog languages in the
city of Manila. Not only are these allegations true, but it is also
true that said newspaper has a daily circulation and
subscribers in other parts of the world, notably in the United
States and Spain; and it has subscribers numbering in toto not
less than 5,200, and a daily issue of 6,000 copies.
It is also true as alleged, and the court so finds that since the
year 1906 to said 30th of October, 1908, these nine
defendants had been maliciously persecuting and attacking the
plaintiff in their said newspapers, until at last, on said 30th of
October, 1908 with the malicious intention of injuring the
plaintiff, who on said date was and still is a member of the Civil
Commission and Secretary of the Interior in the Government of
the Philippine Islands; and with the object of exposing him to
the odium, contempt, and ridicule of the public, they wrote,
printed, and published in their said newspaper, in its ordinary
number of said 30th of October, 1908, the malicious
defamation and false libel of and concerning the plaintiff,
entitled and herein alluded to as the editorial "Birds of Prey,"
which libel was and is highly injurious to the plaintiff and from
which the plaintiff has sustained serious damage.
This editorial, when properly interpreted and read between the
lines, means, besides other things, and was intended by the
writer to mean and be understood by the readers thereof as
meaning substantially the following:
That the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, was born on the surface
of the globe to eat and devour, like a bird of prey, and that
others, born to be eaten and devoured, are the prey and the
food of the insatiable voracity of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff
had a desire to copy and imitate the most rapacious bird, the
eagle, in order to triumph in plundering his fellowman; that the
plaintiff besides being an eagle, has the characteristics of
the vulture, the owl, and the vampire.
That the plaintiff ascended the mountains of Benguet to
classify and measure the skulls of the Igorots, and study and
civilize them and to espy in his flight with the eye of the bird of
prey the large deposits of gold-the prey concealed amidst the
mountains-and to appropriate them to himself afterwards, and
that to this end the plaintiff had the legal facilities, made and
unmade at his own will, and that this is always done for his
own benefit.
That the plaintiff authorized, inspite of laws and ordinances,
the illegal slaughtering is diseased cattle in order to derive
benefit from the infected and putrid meant which he himself
was obliged to condemn by virtue of his official position; that
while the plaintiff presents himself on all occasions with the
wrinkled brow of the scientist who consumes his life in the
mysteries of the laboratory of science, his whole scientific labor
is confined to dissecting insects and importing fish eggs.
That although the plaintiff gave an admirable impulse to the
discovery of wealthy lodes in Mindanao and Mindoro, and in
other virgin regions of the Archipelago, with the money of the
people, under the pretext of the public good, as a strict matter
of truth his object was to possess all the data and the key to
the national wealth for his essentially personal benefit, and that
this is shown by his acquisition of immense properties
registered under the names of others.
That the plaintiff promoted, through secret agents and
partners, the sale to the city of Manila of worthless land at
fabulous prices, which the city fathers dared not refuse from
fear of displeasing the plaintiff, who was behind the project,
and which they did not refuse for their own good; that the
plaintiff favored concessions for hotels in Manila on filled-in
land; with the prospect of enormous profits, at the expense of
the blood of the people.
That such are the characteristics of the plaintiff, who is at the
same time an eagle that surprises and devours, a vulture that
gorges his self on deed and rotten meats, an owl that affects a
petulant omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of
the victim until he leaves it bloodless. And this libelous article
concludes with the asseveration in substance that the plaintiff
has been "weighed in the balance and found wanting" —
"Mane, Tecel, Phares."
That this editorial is malicious and injurious goes without
saying. Almost every line thereof teems with malevolence, ill
will, and wanton and reckless disregard of the rights and
feelings of the plaintiff; and from the very nature and the
number of the charges therein contained the editorial is
necessarily very damaging to the plaintiff.
That this editorial, published as it was by the nine defendants,
tends to impeach the honesty and reputation of the plaintiff and
publishes his alleged defects, and thereby exposes him to
public hatred, contempt, and ridicule is clearly seen by a bare
reading of the editorial.
It suffices to say that not a line is to be found in all the
evidence in support of these malicious, defamatory and
injurious charges against the plaintiff; and there was at the trial
no pretense whatever by the defendants that any of them are
true, nor the slightest evidence introduced to show the truth of
a solitary charge; nor is there any plea of justification or that
the charges are true, much less evidence to sustain a plea.
In the opinion of the court "Birds of Prey," when read and
considered in its relation to and connection with the other
articles libelous and defamatory in nature, published of and
concerning the plaintiff by these nine defendants anterior and
subsequent to the publication of this article, and having
reference to the same subject matter as shown by the
evidence, is one of the worst libels of record. It is safe to say
that in all the court reports to the Philippine Islands, or of
Spain, or the United States, there is not to be found a libel
case in which there is a more striking exemplification of the
spirit of hatred, bad faith, evil motive, mischievous intent,
actual malice, nefarious purpose, base malignity, or gross
malevolence.
It is proper to observe also that since the beginning of this
attack on the plaintiff in the year 1906 down almost to the
present time, so far from there being any apology, retraction,
or effort to repair the injury already done as far as lay in the
power of the defendants, the persecution, wrong, and tortious
injury to the plaintiff had been steadily kept up and persisted in,
without the slightest abatement of the malevolent spirit.
There has been neither retraction, apology, nor reparation; per
contra, the libel has been repeated, reiterated, and
accentuated, and widely and extensively propagated by these
nine defendants through the columns of their said paper and
otherwise; and it appears from the evidence that especial effort
has been made by these same defendants to give as much
publicity as possible to the libelous and defamatory words
used of and concerning the plaintiff in said editorial.
Through their instrumentality and persistency in asserting and
reasserting its truth, this diabolical libel has been spread
broadcast over the Philippine Islands and to other parts of the
world. In said criminal case No. 4295 some of these nine
defendants pleaded the truth of the charges; and in Exhibit A-
Q is to be found this language: "The defense will adduce its
evidence demonstrating the truth of every one of the facts
published."
In their said paper of the 11th of January, 1909, there is
published statement:
"The brief period of time allowed us by the court, at the request
of the counsel, to gather evidence which we are to adduce in
our effort to demonstrate the truth of the accusation that we
have formulated in the article which is the subject of the
agitation against us, having expired, the trial of the case
against our director had been resumed." (See pp. 63 and 67 of
the evidence.)
And about the same time they also declared in their said paper
that "there is more graft than fish in the rivers of Benguet." And
this in the year of our Lord 1909! the persecution having begun
in 1905; thus indicating that there is to be no "let-up" or
cessation of the hostile attitude toward the plaintiff or the
vilification of his name and assaults upon his character, much
less a retraction or an apology, unless drastic means and
measures are made use of to the end that there may be no
further propagation of the libel, or asseveration, or reiteration
of its truth.
This article "Birds of Prey" charges the plaintiff with
malfeasance in office and criminal acts, and is therefore
libelous per se. It in substance charges the plaintiff with the
prostitution of his office as a member of the Civil Commission
of the Philippine Islands and Secretary of the Interior of said
Islands for personal ends. It is charged also substantially that
plaintiff in his official capacity wasted the public funds for the
purpose of promoting his own personal welfare, and that he
violated the laws of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances
of the city of Manila.
In its essence he is charged with taking part in illegal
combinations for the purpose of robbing the people with the
object of gain for himself and for others; with being a bird of
prey, a vulture (buzzard), an owl, and a vampire that sucks the
blood of the victim (meaning the people) until he leaves it
bloodless, that is to say, robs the people, until he leaves them
wretched and poverty-stricken, deprived of all worldly
possessions; and lastly, that he, the plaintiff, like Belshazzar,
has been weighed in the balance and found wanting as a high
Government functionary; all of which charges are false and
malicious and without and foundation whatever in fact, as the
evidence fully demonstrates.
It is also a matter of fact, and the court so finds, that said
defamation was written and published that it might be
understood, and it was understood, by the public officials of the
Government and the people of the Philippine Islands in
general, and wherever else said newspaper may have
circulated and been read, as charging the plaintiff with the
tortious and criminal acts and conduct charged in said editorial
as hereinbefore specified and interpreted.
The court finds it also true that, besides assailing the integrity
and reviling the reputation of the plaintiff, said nine defendants,
in publishing said libel, did so with the malicious intention of
inciting the Filipino people to believe that the plaintiff was
despotic and corrupt and unworthy of the position which he
held, and for this reason to oppose his administration of the
office in his charge as Secretary of the Interior, and in this way
they endeavored to create enormous difficulties for him in the
performance of his official duties, and to make him so
unpopular that he would have to resign his office as a member
of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the
Interior.
It is also true that the said nine defendants, by means of said
libel, and other like false statements in their said newspaper,
have been deliberately trying to destroy the confidence of the
public in the plaintiff and to incite the people to place obstacles
in his way in the performance of his official duties, in
consequence of which the plaintiff has met with many
difficulties which have greatly increased his labors as a public
official.
It further appears from the evidence that not only has an effort
been made by these nine defendants to give as much publicity
as possible to the charges, but in order that said defamation
should attract the attention of the public, they published the
same under a heading in large, bold and showy type, so that it
might be easily seen and read by all the subscribers and
readers of said paper.
In full view of all the evidence, therefore, it is clearly seen that
every essential allegation of the complaint is true substantially
as therein claimed, and that the whole of the said editorial
relating to the misconduct and bad character of the plaintiff is
false and without the slightest foundation in fact. Not a scintilla
of evidence was introduced in support of any injurious charge
made therein against the plaintiff, to say nothing of the
plaintiff's evidence that each and every charge of malfeasance
therein contained is false, and without reference to whether a
failure to plead the truth admits the falsity of the charge.
The evidence shows no "special" or "actual pecuniary
damage," and none is alleged in the complaint. Two other
kinds of damages, however are claimed, to wit, general
damages for injuries to the feelings and reputation of the
plaintiff and additional work to which he has been put by the
conduct of the defendants, which are laid in the sum of
P50,000, and "punitive," exemplary, or vindictive damages, "as
a warning to the defendants," or as expressed in Act 277 of the
Philippine Commission, as a just punishment to the libelers
and an example to others," which are laid in the same sum of
P50,000.
The nine defendants being liable to the plaintiff for damages,
the next question to be decided is what amount of damages
should be awarded the plaintiff for the injury to his reputation
and feelings and his being a proper case for punitive damages,
the further question is, what sum shall be awarded as a just
punishment to these nine libelers and as an example to others.
In neither of these cases is there any precise measure of
damages.
In determining the amount to be awarded in the first instance it
is proper to consider the previous character, influence,
reputation, standing, official position, hope of advancement,
prospect of promotion, and social status of the plaintiff and his
family, and all the circumstances connected with the case.
The plaintiff is a man in the prime of life, holding, as he has
held for the last ten years an important, responsible, lucrative,
high and exalted position of trust and honor in the service of
the Government of the United States, in the Philippine Islands,
without a blotch on his family escutcheon, so far as the
evidence shows, and with an untarnished reputation as a man,
as a citizen, and as a Government official.
He is a man of honesty, integrity, and high socialposition; a
man of learning, famous as a scientist, and scientific
achievements and scholarly attainments, a man of industrious
habits, genuine worth, and intellectual force. He has read,
studied, traveled and learned much, and is an author of merit
and distinction. He was for a long while a professor in one of
the largest and most renowned institutions of learning in the
world; he is a man of vast experience, broad and liberal views,
and an extensive acquaintanceship, not only in the Philippine
Islands, but in the United States and other countries of the
world. He was well and favorably received by the people
wherever he journeyed previous to this atrocious libel upon his
integrity and reputation.
He has discharged the duties of his lofty official position in a
manner that reflects credit upon himself as well as the
Government which he represents, and apparently with entire
satisfaction to all of his superiors in office and the people
generally; and but for this pernicious, outrageous, and highly
reprehensible assault upon his good name, fame and
reputation, there were prospects of promotion to higher
honors. And so far as his personal and private record is
concerned it was without a blemish anterior to the time when
these unfounded and dastardly aspersions were cast upon it
by these nine defendants.
Indeed, it is only necessary to advert to the testimony of the
defense itself to ascertain that the plaintiff is an honorable
man, and without a stain upon his character, officially or
otherwise. It would be interesting to note here in parallel
columns and compare the charges made in "Birds of Prey" and
the testimony of one of the witnesses for the defendants.
Felipe Buencamino, an intelligent witness for the defense, in
his testimony (p. 240) when asked the question, Do you know
Mr. Worcester?" he answers, "Yes, sir: I know him as
an honorable man. I also know him as an honest, honorable
public official." In answer to another question he says, "As I
have said, I know Mr. Worcester as a private citizen and as a
public official, and my opinion of him is that of honorable man
and an upright official." And no other witness testified anything
to the contrary.
"A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches and
loving favor rather than silver of gold."
"Who steals my purse steals trash;
xxx xxx xxx
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor indeed."
The enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a
constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or property.
It is one of those rights necessary to human society that
underlie the whole scheme of human civilization.
"The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the highest
rewards of a well-spent life vouchsafed to man in this
existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth, and their
possession the solace of later years. A man of affairs, a
business man, who has been seen and known of his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many years, and who
has developed a great character and an unblemished
reputation, has secured a possession more useful, and more
valuable than lands, or houses, or silver, or gold . . .
"The law recognizes the value of such a reputation, and
constantly strives to give redress for its injury. It imposes upon
him who attacks it by slanderous words, or libelous publication,
a liability to make full compensation for the damage to the
reputation, for the shame and obloquy, and for the injury to the
feelings of the owner, which are caused by the publication of
the slander or the libel.
"It goes further. If the words are spoken, or the publication is
made, with the intent to injure the victim, or with the criminal
indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as a
jury (in this case the judge), in view of all the circumstances of
the particular case adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as
an example to the public, to deter others from committing like
offenses, and as a punishment for the infliction of the injury.
"In the ordinary acceptance of the term, malice signifies ill will,
evil intent, or hatred, while it is legal signification is defined to
be "a wrongful act done intentionally, without legal
justification." (36 C. C. A., 475.)
Surely in the case at bar there was a wrongful or tortious act
done intentionally and without the semblance of justification or
excuse, or proof that the libelous charges against the plaintiff
were "published and good motives and justifiable ends."
But the Legislature and the highest judicial authority of these
Islands have spoken in no uncertain words with regard to the
rights of the plaintiff in this case; and we need not necessarily
turn to the law of libel elsewhere, or the decision of the courts
in other jurisdictions to ascertain or determine his rights.
In sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 11 of the Libel Law (Act 277,
Philippine Commission) is to be found the law of these Islands
especially applicable to this case. Section 1 thereof defines
libel. Section 2 provides that every person who willfully and
with a malicious intent to injure another publishes, or procures
to be published, any libel shall be punished as therein
provided. Section 3 provides that an injurious publication is
presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable motive for
making it is shown. Section 4 provides, among other things,
that in all criminal prosecutions the truth may be given in
evidence; but to establish this defense, not only must the truth
of the matter charged as libelous be proven, but also that it
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends; and
the presumptions, rules of evidence, and special defenses are
equally applicable in civil and criminal actions, according to
section 11 of said Act.
Section 6 is as follows:
"Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or
serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any
words contained in any part of such book or number of each
newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the
same."
And section 11 provides as follows:
"In addition to such criminal action, any person libeled as
hereinbefore set forth shall have a right to a civil action against
the person libeling him for damages sustained by reason of
such libel, and the person so libeled shall be entitled to recover
in such civil action not only the actual pecuniary damages
sustained by him, but also damages for injury to his feelings
and reputation, and in addition such punitive damages as the
court may think will be a just punishment to the libeler and an
example to others. Suit may be brought in any Court of First
Instance having jurisdiction of the parties. The presumptions,
rules or evidence and special defenses provided for in this
chapter for criminal prosecutions shall be equally applicable in
civil actions under this section."
"The proprietor of a printing plant is responsible for publishing
a libel. According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of
the United States, the printer of a publication containing
libelous matter is liable for the same." (Mr. Justice Torres, in
U.S. vs. Ortiz, 8 Phil. Rep., 757.) But said section 6 plainly
fixes the liability of editors and proprietors of newspapers, and
is clear enough for all the purposes of this case.
Mr. Justice Carson (5 Phil. Rep. 1551), speaking for our
Supreme Court, says:
"When there is an averment in the complaint that the
defamatory words used refer to the plaintiff, and it is proven
that the words do in fact refer to him and are capable of
bearing such special application, an action for libel may be
maintained even though the defamatory publication does not
refer to the plaintiff by name."
And Mr. Justice Willard (12 Phil. Rep., 4282), for the same high
authority, says:
"In an action for libel damages for injury to feelings and
reputation may be recovered though no actual pecuniary
damages are proven.
"Punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the tort is
aggravated by evil motive, actual malice, deliberate violence or
oppression."
That is to say, if there is evil motive, or actual malice or
deliberate violence, or oppression then punitive damages, or
"smart money," may be recovered.
And Justice Carson (U.S. vs. Sedano, 14 Phil., Rep., 338),
also says:
"Actual or express malice of an alleged libelous publication
may be inferred from the style and tone of the publication.
"The publication of falsehood and calumny against public
officers and candidates for public office is specially
reprehensible and is an offense most dangerous to the people
and to the public welfare.
"The interest of society require that immunity should be
granted to the discussion of public affairs, and that all acts and
matters of a public nature may be freely published with fitting
comments and strictures; but they do not require that the right
to criticise public officers shall embrace the right to base such
criticism under false statements of fact, or attack the private
character of the officer, or to falsely impute to
him malfeasance or misconduct in office."
And there are almost numberless English and American
authorities in perfect harmony with these decisions of our
Supreme Court too numerous indeed to be cited here; and it is
not necessary.
Among the leading cases, however, in the United States, is
that of Scott vs. Donald (165 U.S., 58) and cases therein cited.
In this case the court says: "Damages have been defined to be
the compensation which law will allow for an injury done, and
are said to be exemplary and allowable in excess of the actual
loss when the tort is aggravated by evil motive, actual malice,
deliberate violence or oppression," which is in entire harmony
with Justice Willard's decision hereinbefore cited.
And quoting from the decision in Day vs. Woodworth (13
Howard, 371) the same high court says:
"In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and
malicious, or gross or outrageous, courts permit juries (here
the court) to add to the measured compensation of the plaintiff
which he would have been entitled to recover, had the injury
been inflicted without design or intention, something further by
way of punishment or example, which has sometimes been
called "smart money." "
It thus clearly appears that the facts established in the case at
bar are more than sufficient to bring it within the rule of law
here laid down by the highest judicial authority.
Section 11 of the Libel Law expressly allows general damages;
and Mr. Justice Willard, in Macleod vs. Philippine Publishing
Company,3 says:
"The general damages which are allowed in actions of libel are
not for mental suffering alone, but they are allowed for injury to
the standing and reputation of the person libeled, and the
common law of England and America presumed that such
damages existed without proof thereof from the mere fact of
publication of the libel."
In Day vs. Woodworth, the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized the power of a jury in certain actions in tort to
assess against the tort feasor punitive damages. Where the
injury has been inflicted maliciously or wantonly, and with
circumstances of contumely, or indignity, the judge or jury, as
the case may be, is not limited to the ascertainment of a simple
compensation for the wrong committed against the aggrieved
person.
"The public position of the plaintiff, as an officer of the
Government, and the evil example of libels, are considerations
with the jury (here the judge) for increasing damages."
(Tillotson vs. Cheetham, 3 Johns, 56.)
"The character, condition and influence of the plaintiff are
relevant on the matter of the extent of damages."
(Littlejohn vs. Greely, 22 How. Prac., 345; 13 Abb. Prac., 41,
311.)
"Where the publication is libelous, the law presumes that it was
made with malice — technical, legal malice, but not malice in
fact — and the amount of damages depends in a large degree
upon the motives which actuated the defendants in its
publication; and in such cases the law leaves it to the jury
(here the judge) to find a return such damages as they think
right and just, by a sound, temperate, deliberate, and
reasonable exercise of their functions as jurymen."
(Erber vs. Dun. (C. C.) 12 Fed., 526.)
"Actions of libel, so far as they involve questions of exemplary
damages, and the law of principal and agent, are controlled by
the same rules as are other actions of tort. The right of a
plaintiff to recover exemplary damages exists wherever a
tortious injury has been inflicted recklessly or wantonly, and it
is not limited to cases where the injury resulted from personal
malice or recklessness of the defendant. It follows that the
owner of a newspaper is as responsible for all the acts of
omission and commission of those he employs to edit it and
manage its affairs, as he would be if personally managing the
same.' (Malloy vs. Bennett, (C. C.) 15 Fed., 371.)
"The fact that a publication, libelous per se, was made without
any attempt to ascertain its correctness is sufficient to justify a
finding that defendant committed libel client with a wanton
indifference, and with actual malice sufficient to sustain
exemplary damages." (Van Ingen vs. Star Co., 1 App. Div.,
429, 37 N.Y., 114.)
"The court is not authorized to set aside a verdict for $45,000
in an action for libel, where it appears that plaintiff was
persistently persecuted in the columns of defendant's
newspaper, and that he and his family were held up to public
contempt and ridicule, and defendants withdraw from the case
after failing to establish a plea of justification." (Smith vs. Times
Co., (Com. p. 1) 4 Pa. Dist. Rep., 399.)
"In considering the amount with the defendant shall pay, on
this account (exemplary damages) the turpitude of his conduct
and his financial ability are only considered; and such
consideration is not in view of the injury or distress of the
plaintiff, but in behalf of the public; the wrongful act is regarded
as an indication of the actor's vicious mind — an overt deed of
vindictive or wanton wrong, offensive and dangerous to the
public good. This is the view of those damages which generally
prevails." (Sutherland on Damages, vol. 2, p. 1092. title
Exemplary Damages.)
"Punitive damages are recoverable not to compensate the
plaintiff, but solely to punish the defendant. This legal motive
would suffer defeat if punitive damages could not be given for
a malicious attack on a reputation too well established to
receive substantial injury at the hands of a libeler." (Judge
Bond in Ferguson vs. Pub. Co., 72 Mo. App., 462.)
It may be suggested that the reputation of the plaintiff in this
case is too well established to be seriously affected by the
defamatory words used of and concerning him in "Birds of
Prey," but it would not be proper to gravely consider this
suggestion.
The conditions in these Islands are peculiar. The minds,
thoughts, and opinions of the people are easily molded, and
the public is credulous and perhaps frequently too ready to
believe anything that may be said in derogation of an American
official, especially when it is published and vouched for by the
editorial and business management and proprietors if a
newspaper of the prominence, pretensions, circulation and
influence if "El Renacimiento," which paper is everlastingly
proclaiming in its columns that it is being conducted and
published solely in the interests of the Filipino people — pro
bono publico. There is stronger disposition to give credence to
what is said in a newspaper here in the Islands the elsewhere,
and when abuse, vilification, and defamation are persistently
practiced for a period of several years, without modification or
retraction, but with renewed emphasis, the people naturally
come to believe in its verity and authenticity.
It is apparent from the evidence that as an effect of the
persecution of the plaintiff by "El Renacimiento" and the libel
published in its columns, the minds of the major part of the
Filipino people have been poisoned and prejudiced against the
plaintiff to such an extent that he is regarded by these people
as odious, dishonest, unscrupulous and tyrannical.
It may be that his reputation has not suffered so severely with
those of his own race, but when it is considered that his
vocation has tenfold more to do with the Filipinos than with his
own people, that his official duties place him in constant
contact with them, and that his success in his chosen career is
largely dependent upon their good will and support, it is
manifest that the damage to his reputation has been very great
and that a large sum of money should be awarded to indemnify
him, as far as money can indemnify, for the loss of his good
name with the Filipino people.
The plaintiff came to the Philippine Islands when a young man,
full of hope and ambition. Since his arrival he has devoted
himself incessantly and indefatigably to the uplifting of the
inhabitants of the Archipelago and to the faithful performance,
as far as he was able, of the pledges and promises of the
Government to the Filipino people. The duties of his particular
office were such as brought him in more immediate and
constant contract with the people than any other official of the
same category in these Islands.
It is clearly shown that the plaintiff faithfully endeavored to
perform, and did efficiently perform, all of these duties, doing
everything that he could in an unselfish and disinterested
manner of the welfare and development of the country and its
people, knowing full well that his career, as well as his
advancement, depended largely upon the good will of these
people, and that by incurring their censure or displeasure he
would have little hope of success in his chosen work.
Imagine, therefore, the chagrin, disappointment, mortification,
mental suffering, and distress, and perturbation of spirit that
would necessarily be occasioned him when he discovered that
through the nefarious, studied, and practiced persecution of
the paper in question, these high hopes were blasted, and that,
instead of having gained the respect and gratitude of the
people for the assiduous labors devoted to their uplifting, they
had been made to believe that, instead of being a benefactor,
he was a vampire that was sucking their life blood, a corrupt
politician who was squandering the money wrung from the
people by means of taxation, in schemes for his own personal
aggrandizement and enrichment.
That instead of developing the mineral wealth of the Islands he
was taking up all the rich veins and appropriating them in the
names of subservient tools, to his own personal use, benefit
and profit. That instead of protecting the people from disease,
he was, by means of infected meat and for his own personal
gain, spreading contagion among them.
That he united in his person all the bad qualities of the vulture,
the eagle, and the vampire; that, in short, he was a "bird of
prey," with all that is implied in that term in its worst
acceptation; that he was a corrupt tyrant, who never lost an
opportunity to do the people hurt; that instead of wishing them
well and seeking their advancement, he was their enemy, who
never lost an opportunity to degrade and humiliate them; that
instead of preferring them for office and positions of official
trust, he treated them with all sorts of contempt and
indifference.
It is difficult to appreciate the feelings of a refined soul in its
contemplation of a result so disastrous, so unjust, and so
unmerited.
It is furthermore shown that when the plaintiff came to these
Islands a young scientist he had already won fame in his own
country; that he is a fellow of the important scientific
associations in the world. His election as a fellow or member of
these scientific bodies shows that his labors in the Philippines
were the object of solicitude by the prominent scientific and
learned men not only of his own race, but in many other
civilized countries of the world. Important results were
evidently expected of him by them, and it can not be doubted
that they expected of him of life honestly devoted to the
conscientious discharge of his duties as a trusted public
functionary of the American Government in the Philippine
Islands.
And yet he is falsely denounced in the columns of said
newspaper to his fellows of these societies as a man who is so
absolutely corrupt, so inordinately selfish and avaricious that
he has not considered for a moment the duties incumbent
upon him; that he has been oblivious to every obligation of
trust and confidence, and that he is unworthy of the respect of
honest men.
One witness testified that he read this libel in the public library
of the city of Boston. It is furthermore shown that copies of this
paper went to Spain, England, and to different parts of the
United States; and inasmuch as the plaintiff is a man of
prominence in the scientific world, it is to be inferred that his
fellows became more or less aware of these heinous charges.
Thus we find that the plaintiff is here confronted with
disappointed ambition and frustrated hopes, and placed in the
humiliating attitude of having to explain to his fellows that the
charges are untrue, of adducing evidence to clear himself,
perhaps never with complete success, of the stain that has
been cast upon his reputation by the libelous and defamatory
declarations contained in "Birds of Prey."
In view of the foregoing findings of fact and circumstances of
the case and the law applicable thereto,
It is the opinion of the court, and the court so finds, that the
plaintiff has sustained damages on account of wounded
feelings and mental suffering and injuries to his standing and
reputation in the sum of thirty-five thousand (P35,000) pesos,
and that he is entitled to recover this sum of the nine
defendants named, as being responsible for having written,
printed, and published said libel; and that the plaintiff is entitled
to recover of them the further sum of twenty-five thousand
(P25,000) pesos, as punitive damages, which the court thinks
will be a just punishment to these nine libelers and an example
to others.
Wherefore, it is so ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff,
Dean C. Worcester, have and recover of the defendants,
Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, the
sum of sixty thousand (P60,000) pesos, and the costs of suit,
for which execution may issue.
It is ordered. At Manila, P.I., this 14th day of January , 1910.
From said decision the defendants appealed and made the
following assignments of error in this court:
I.The court erred in overruling our motions for suspension of
this case, in its present state, until final judgment should be
rendered in criminal case No. 4295 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, pending appeal in the Honorable Supreme
Court, for libel based also on the editorial, "Birds of Prey."
II.The court erred in admitting as evidence mere opinion
adduced by counsel for the plaintiff with the intention of
demonstrating to whom the editorial, alleged to the libelous,
refers.
III.The court erred in giving greater preponderance to the
opinions of the witnesses for the plaintiff than to the expert
testimony of the defense.
IV.The court erred in declaring the editorial on which the
complaint is based to be libelous per se and to refer
necessarily to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester.
V.The court erred in declaring the defendants Martin Ocampo,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto,
Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco to be owners of "El
Renacimiento."
VI.The court erred in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 3 presented
by counsel for the defendants.
VII.The court erred in rendering judgment against the
defendants.
VIII.The court erred in sentencing the defendants jointly "and
severally" to pay to the plaintiff, Dean C. Worcester, the sum of
P60,000.
IX.The court erred in not ordering that execution of the
judgment to be confined to the business known as "El
Renacimiento" and to the defendant Teodoro M. Kalaw,
without extending to property of the alleged owners of said
newspaper which was not invested therein by them at its
establishment.
X.The court erred in granting damages to the plaintiff by virtue
of the judgment rendered against the defendants.
XI.The court, finally, erred in granting to the plaintiff punitive
damages against the alleged owners of "El Renacimiento,"
admitting the hypothesis that said editorial is libelous per
se and refers to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester.
The theory of the defendants, under the first assignment of
error, is that the civil action could not proceed until the
termination of the criminal action, relying upon the provisions
of the Penal Code in support of such theory. This court,
however, has decided in the case of Ocampo et al. vs. Jenkins
(14 Phil. Rep., 681) that a judgment in a criminal prosecution
for libel, under the provisions of Act 277 of the Civil
commission, constitutes no bar or estoppel in a civil action
based upon the same acts or transactions. The reason most
often given for this doctrine is that the two proceedings are not
between the same parties. Different rule as to the competency
of witnesses and the weight of evidence necessary to the
findings in the two proceedings always exist. As between civil
and criminal actions under said Act (No. 277) a judgment in
one is no bar or estoppel to the prosecution of the other. A
judgment in a criminal cause, under said Act, can not be
pleaded as res adjudicata in a civil action. (Stone vs. U.S., 167
U.S., 178; Boyd vs. U.S., 616 U. S., 616, 634; Lee vs. U.S.,
150 U.S., 476, 480; U.S. vs. Jaedicke, 73 Fed. Rep., 100;
U.S. vs.Schneider, 35 Fed. Rep., 107;
Chamberlain vs. Pierson, 87 Fed. Rep., 420;
Steel vs. Cazeaux, 8 Martin (La.), 318, 13 American Decisions,
288; Betts vs. New Hartford, 25 Conn., 185.)
In a criminal action for libel the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the defendant, beyond a
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the
plaintiff to sustain his cause by a preponderance of evidence
only. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins (supra); Reilly vs. Norton, 65 Iowa,
306; Sloane vs. Gilbert, 27 American decisions, 708; Cooley
on Torts, sec. 208; Greenleaf on Evidence, 426; Wigmore on
Evidence, secs. 2497, 2498.)
With reference to the second assignment of error above noted,
we find that this court has already decided the question raised
thereby, in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep.,
1).
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff called several
witnesses for the purpose of showing that the statements
made in said alleged libelous editorial were intended to apply
to the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior.
The defendants duly objected to these questions and excepted
to the ruling of the court admitting them.
In the case of Russell vs. Kelley (44 Cal., 641, 642) the same
question was raised and the court, in its decision, said:
The rule laid down in 2 Stockey on Slander (p. 51) is that the
application of the slanderous words to the plaintiff and the
extrinsic matters alleged in the declaration may be shown by
the testimony of witnesses who knew the parties and
circumstances and who can state their judgment and opinion
upon the application and meaning of the terms used by the
defendant. It is said that where the words are ambiguous on
the face of the libel, to whom it was intended to be applied, the
judgment and opinion of witnesses, who from their knowledge
of the parties and circumstances are able to form a conclusion
as to the defendant's intention and application of the libel is
evidence for the information of the jury.
Mr. Odgers, in his work on Libel and Slander (p. 567), says:
The plaintiff may also call at the trial his friends or others
acquainted with the circumstances, to state that, in reading the
libel, they at once concluded it was aimed at the plaintiff. It is
not necessary that all the world should understand the libel. It
is sufficient if those who know the plaintiff can make out that he
is the person meant. (See also Falkard's Stockey on Libel and
Slander, 4th English edition, 589.)
The correctness of this rule is not only established by the
weight of authority but is supported by every consideration of
justice and sound policy. The lower court committed no error in
admitting the opinion of witnesses offered during the trial of the
cause. One's reputation is the sum or composite of the
impressions spontaneously made by him from time to time,
and in one way or another, upon his neighbors and
acquaintances. The effect of a libelous publication upon the
understanding of such persons, involving necessarily the
identity of the person libeled is of the very essence of the
wrong. The issue in a libel case concerns not only the sense of
the publication, but, in a measure its effect upon a reader
acquainted with the person referred to. The correctness of the
opinion of the witnesses as to the identity of the person meant
in the libelous publication may always be tested by cross-
examination. (Enquirer Co. vs. Johnston, 72 Fed. Rep., 443;
2nd Greenleaf on Evidence, 417; Nelson vs. Barchenius, 52
Ill., 236; Smith vs.Miles, 15 Vt., 245; Miller vs. Butler, 6
Cushing (Mass.), 71.)
It is true that some of the courts have established a different
rule. We think, however, that a large preponderance of the
decisions of the supreme courts of the different States is in
favor of the doctrine which we have announced here.
We are of the opinion that assignments of error Nos. 3, 4, and
7 may fairly be considered together, the question being
whether or not the evidence adduced during the trial of the
cause in the lower court shows, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the said editorial was libelous in its character.
Here again we find that this question has been passed upon by
this court in the case of U. S. vs. Ocampo et al. (18 Phil. Rep.,
1), and we deem it unnecessary to discuss this question again,
for the reason that the evidence adduced in the present cause
was practically the same, or at least to the same effect, as the
evidence adduced in the cause of U.S. vs. Ocampo et al. It is
sufficient here to say that the evidence adduced during the trial
of the present cause shows, by a large preponderance of the
evidence, that said editorial was one of the most pernicious
and malicious libels upon a just, upright and honorable official,
which the courts have ever been called upon to consider.
There is not a scintilla of evidence in the entire record,
notwithstanding the fact that the defendants from time to time
attempted to make a show of proving the truthfulness of the
statements made in said editorial, which in any way reflects
upon the character and high ideals of Mr. Dean C. Worcester,
in the administration of his department of the Government.
With reference to the fifth assignment of error, to wit: That the
court erred in holding that the defendants, Martin Ocampo,
Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Felipe Barretto,
Gregorio M. Cansipit, and Galo Lichauco, were the proprietors
of "El Renacimiento," the lower court said:
Much time was consumed also in adducing evidence to show
that none of the twelve defendants were the owners of "El
Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang," but that six of them
had originally contributed their money as a patriotic donation to
the Filipino people, and that Martin Ocampo simply held the
money and property of the paper as trustee for this people,
and that the paper was being devoted exclusively to
philanthropic and patriotic ends, and that Galo Lichauco had
agreed to contribute to the same ends but had not done so.
"This proposition," said the lower court, "in the light of the
evidence, is so preposterous as to entitle it to little, if any,
serious consideration. To ask the court to believe it is
tantamount to asking the court to stultify reason and common
sense. That those seven defendants named contributed their
respective sums of money, as shown by the evidence, to the
foundation of said newspaper in 1901, for their own personal
benefit and profit, is fully and unmistakably established. It is
equally well established that Martin Ocampo is and was, not
only a part owner, but that he has been and is still the
administrator or business manager of said newspaper, and
that the other six persons named are shareholders, part
owners and proprietors thereof and were such on the said 30th
of October, 1908."
Examining the evidence adduced during the cause in the lower
court, we find, sometime before the commencement of the
present action and before any question was raised with
reference to who were the owners of the said newspaper, that
the defendant, Arcadio Arellano, in the case of United
States vs. Jose Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338), testified upon that
question as follows:
Q. Who are the proprietors of "El Renacimiento"?
A. I, Martin Ocampo, Gregorio Mariano (Cansipit), Mr.
Barretto, and Galo Lichauco.
Q. Who else?
A. No one else.
Q. And Rafael Palma — is not so?
A. No, sir; Manuel Palma, the brother of Rafael Palma.
During the trial of the present cause, Arcadio Arellano testified
that his declarations in other cause were true.
It also appears from the record (Exhibit B-J) that in the month
of November, 1907, long before the commencement of the
present action, "El Renacimiento," in reply to an article which
was published in "El Comercio," published the following
statement:
They (it) say (s) that this enterprise" (evidently meaning the
publication of "El Renacimiento") "is sustained by Federal
money; that we are inspired by Federal personages. We
declare that this, besides being false, is calumnious. The
shareholders of this company are persons well known by the
public, and never at any moment of their lives have they acted
with masks on--those masks for which "El Comercio" seems to
have so great an affection. They are, as the public knows:
Señores Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano,
Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio
Cansipit.
Arcadio Arellano also testified during the trial of the present
cause that he contributed P750 to the establishment of "El
Renacimiento;" that Martin Ocampo contributed the sum of
P500; that Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto and Angel Jose
contributed the sum of P250 or P500 each; that Galo Lichauco
contributed the sum of P1,000 and that Manuel Palma
contributed P3,000.
During the trial of the present cause Arcadio Arellano, Martin
Ocampo, and Angel Jose testified as witnesses, relating to the
ownership of the newspaper called "El Renacimiento." They
testified that whatever money they gave for the purpose of
establishing said newspaper, was given as a donation, and
that they were neither the owners nor coowners of said
periodical. The defendants, Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, did not testify as
witnesses during the trial of the cause in the lower court. No
reason is given for their failure to appear and give testimony in
their own behalf. The record does not disclose whether or not
the declarations of Arcadio Arellano, in the case of U.
S. vs. Sedano (14 Phil. Rep., 338) at the time they were made,
were called to the attention of Manuel Palma, Galo Lichauco,
Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio Cansipit, as well as the reply to
"El Comercio," above noted. Proof of said declarations and
publication was adduced during the trial of the cause in the
present case, and the attorney of these particular defendants
well knew the purpose and effect of such evidence, if not
disputed; but, notwithstanding the fact that said declarations
and publication were presented in evidence, and
notwithstanding the fact that the attorney for the defendants
knew of the purpose of such proof, the defendants, Palma,
Lichauco, Barretto, and Cansipit, were not called as witnesses
for the purpose of rebutting the same. It is a well settled rule of
evidence, that when the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer evidence of
all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the
circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer
such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if produced,
instead of rebutting would support the inferences against him,
and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.
(Railway Company vs. Ellis, C. C. A. Reports, vol. 4, p. 454;
Commonwealth vs. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 295;
People vs.McWhorter 4 Barb. (N. Y.), 438.)
Lord Mansfield, in the case of Blatch vs. Archer (Cowper, 63,
65) said:
It is certainly a maxim that all the evidence is to be weighed
according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to
have produced, and in the power of the other side to have
contradicted.
Mr. Starkey, in his valuable work on evidence (vol. 1, p. 64),
lays down the rule that:
The conduct of a party in omitting to produce evidence in
elucidation of the subject matter in dispute, which is within his
power and which rests peculiarly within his own knowledge,
frequently offers occasion for presumptions against him, since
it raises the strong suspicion that such evidence, if adduced,
would operate to his prejudice. (Pacific Coast et al.
Co. vs. Bancroft-Whitney Co., 36 C. C. A. Reports, 136, 153.)
At the time of the said declarations of Arcadio Arellano in the
case of Sedano and at the time of the said publication in reply
to "El Comercio," there was no reason for stating anything
except the truth: neither does there seem to have been any
reason for publishing the fact that the defendants were the
owners of "El Renacimiento" unless it was true.
At the time there seemed to be no reason to have it appear
that they were donors and public benefactors only. They
seemed to be proud of the fact that they were the owners. The
editors, publishers, and managers of "El Renacimiento," at the
time the reply to "El Comercio" was published, seemed to be
anxious to announce to the public who its owners were. It ("El
Renacimiento") had not then realized that it belonged to no
one; that it had been born into the community without
percentage; that it had been created a terrible machine for the
purpose of destroying the good character and reputation of
men without having any one to respond for its malicious
damage occasioned to honorable men; that it was a cast-off,
without a past or the hope of a future; that it was liable to be
kicked and buffetted about the persecuted and destroyed
without any one to protect it; that its former friends and
creators had scattered hither and thither and had disappeared
like feathers before a cyclone, declaring, under oath, that they
did not know their offspring and were not willing to recognize it
in public. It seems to have been a Moses found in the
bulrushes, destined by its creators to be a great good among
the Filipino people, in teaching them to respect the rights of
persons and property; but, unlike its Biblical prototype, it
became, by reason of its lack of parentage, an engine of
destruction let loose in the State, to enter the private abode of
lawabiding citizens and to take from them their honor and
reputation, which neither it nor the State could restore. To rob
a man of his wealth is to rob him of trash, but to take from him
his good name and reputation is to rob him of that which does
not make the robber richer and leaves the person robbed poor
indeed.
The appellants tried to make it appear that the money which
they gave for the establishment of "El Renacimiento" was a
pure donation. They claim that it was a donation to the Filipino
people. They do not state, however, or attempt to show what
particular persons were to manage, control, and direct the
enterprise for which the donation was made. A donation must
be made to definite persons or associations. A donation to an
indefinite person or association is an anomaly in law, and we
do not believe, in view of all of the facts, that it was in fact
made. A donation must be made to some definite person or
association and the donee must be some ascertained or
ascertainable person or association.
A donation may be made for the benefit of the public, but it
must be made, in the very nature of things, to some definite
person or association. A donation made to no person or
association could not be regarded as a donation in law. It could
not be more than an abandonment of property. Of course
where a donation is in fact made, without reservation to a
particular person or association, the donor is no longer the
owner of the thing donated nor responsible, in any way, for its
use, provided that the object, for which the donation was
made, was legal. A person does not become an owner or part
owner of a church, for example, to the construction of which he
has made a donation; neither is he responsible for the use to
which said edifice may be applied. No one disputes the fact
that donations may be made for the public use, but they must
be made to definite persons or associations, to be
administered in accordance with the purpose of the gift.
We can not believe, in the light of the whole record, that the
defendants and appellants, at the time they presented the
defense that they were donors simply and not owners, had a
reasonable hope that their declarations as to said donation,
given in the manner alleged, would be believed by the court.
After a careful examination of the evidence brought to this
court and taking into consideration the failure of the other
defendants to testify, we are of the opinion that a
preponderance of such evidence shows that the defendants,
Martin Ocampo, Manuel Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose,
Galo Lichauco, Felipe Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, were
the coowners of the newspaper known as "El Renacimiento,"
at the time of the publication of the said alleged libel.
With reference to the sixth assignment of error above noted, to
wit: That the lower court committed an error in not admitting in
evidence the judgment of acquittal of the defendant, Lope K.
Santos, rendered in the criminal cause, we are of the opinion
that the refusal to admit said evidence in the civil cause was
not an error. The fact that the evidence in the criminal cause
was insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was guilty of the
crime charged, in no way barred the right of the person injured
by said alleged libel to maintain the present civil action against
him. (Ocampo vs. Jenkins, 14 Phil. Rep., 681.) The criminal
action had to be sustained by evidence showing the culpability
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, while in the civil
action it is sufficient to show that the defendants injured the
plaintiff by the alleged libelous publication, by a preponderance
of the evidence only. (Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 426;
Cooley on Torts, 208; Reilley vs. Norton, 65 Iowa, 306;
Sloane vs. Gilbert, 23 Am. Dec., 708.)
In the case of Steel vs. Cazeaux (8 Martin, La., 318; 13
American Decisions, 288), the supreme court of Louisiana
said:
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution can not be
given in evidence in a civil action.
In the case of Betts et al. vs. New Hartford (25 Conn., 180) Mr.
Justice Ellsworth said (in a case where a judgment in a
criminal case was offered in evidence):
A conviction in a criminal case is not evidence of facts upon
which the judgment was rendered, when those facts come up
in a civil case, for this evidence would not be material; and so
the law is perfectly well settled. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence,
secs. 536, 524; 1 Phillips on Evidence, 231;
Hutchinson vs. Bank of Wheeling, 41 Pa. St., 42;
Beausoleil vs. Brown, 12 La. Ann., 543; McDonald vs. Stark,
176 Ill., 456, 468.)
While we believe that the lower court committed no error in
refusing to admit the sentence acquitting Lope K. Santos in the
criminal case, we are of the opinion, after a careful
examination of the record brought to this court, that it is
insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos was responsible, in
any way, for the publication of the alleged libel, and without
discussing the question whether or not the so-called Tagalog
edition of "El Renacimiento" and "El Renacimiento" constituted
one and the same newspaper, we find that the evidence is
insufficient to show that Lope K. Santos is responsible in
damages, in any way, for the publication of the said alleged
libel.
The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of
error together, and claim that the lower court committed an
error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the
defendants and in allowing an execution against the individual
property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and
Commercial Codes in support of their contention. The difficulty
in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize
that the basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to
recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is
not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates,
but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants
might have been sued separately for the commission of the
tort. They might have been sued jointly and severally, as they
were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law
Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a tort, the
plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of
the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the tort
is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey,
Common Law Pleadings, 86.) It is not necessary that the
cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an
example, in a case of assault and battery committed by various
persons, under the common law all are principals. So also is
the person who counsels, aids or assists in any way he
commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided
or assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a
crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or
committed the actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)
It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are
all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission
of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their
benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent
and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16
Ill., 313 (63 Am. Dec., 312 and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill.,
67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb.
(N. Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90;
Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)
Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort
which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or
any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage
caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole
damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others
who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as
defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in
the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the others.
(Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343;
Pitcher vs. Bailey, 8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term
Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505;
Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio, 1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann.,
449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9
Johnson (N. Y.), 294.)
Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not
be apportioned among them, except among themselves. They
can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for
the full amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639;
Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417; Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337;
Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)
A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort
feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might exist against
the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of
one of the joint tort feasors by agreement, generally operates
to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33;
Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290;
Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn.,
447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs.Hitchcock, 20
Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)
Of course the courts during the trial may find that some of the
alleged joint tort feasors are liable and that others are not
liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while
condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And this is true
even though they are charged jointly and severally.
(Lansing vs. Montgomery, 2 Johnson (N. Y.), 382;
Drake vs. Barrymore, 14 Johnson, 166; Owens vs. Derby, 3
Ill., 126.)
This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine
Commission. Section 6 provides that:
Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the
publication of any words in any part . . . or number of each
newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.
In our opinion the lower court committed no error in rendering
a joint and several judgment against the defendants and
allowing an execution against their individual property. The
provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes cited by the
defendants and appellants have no application whatever to the
question presented in the present case.
The tenth assignment of error above noted relates solely to the
amount of damages suffered on account of wounded feelings,
mental suffering and injury to the good name and reputation of
Mr. Worcester, by reason of the alleged libelous publication.
The lower court found that the damages thus suffered by Mr.
Worcester amounted to P35,000. This assignment of error
presents a most difficult question. The amount of damages
resulting from a libelous publication to a man's good name and
reputation is difficult of ascertainment. It is nor difficult to
realize that the damage thus done is great and almost
immeasurable. The specific amount the damages to be
awarded must depend upon the facts in each case and the
sound discretion of the court. No fixed or precise rules can be
laid down governing the amount of damages in cases of libel. It
is difficult to include all of the facts and conditions which enter
into the measure of such damages. A man's good name and
reputation are worth more to him than all the wealth which he
can accumulate during a lifetime of industrious labor. To have
them destroyed may be eminently of more damage to him
personally than the destruction of his physical wealth. The loss
is immeasurable. No amount of money can compensate him
for his loss. Notwithstanding the great loss which he, from his
standpoint, sustains, the courts must have some tangible basis
upon which to estimate such damages.
In discussing the elements of damages in a case of libel, the
Honorable James C. Jenkins, who tried the present case in the
court below, correctly said that, "The enjoyment of a private
reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession
of life, liberty or property. It is one of those rights necessary to
human society, that underlie the whole scheme of human
civilization. The respect and esteem of his fellows are among
the highest rewards of a wellspent life vouchsafed to man in
this existence. The hope of it is the inspiration of youth and its
possession is a solace in later years. A man of affairs, a
business man, who has been seen known by his fellowmen in
the active pursuits of life for many years, and who has
developed a great character and an unblemished reputation,
has secured a possession more useful and more valuable than
lands or houses or silver or gold. The law recognizes the value
of such a reputation and constantly strives to give redress for
its injury. It imposes upon him who attacks it by slanderous
words or libelous publications, the liability to make full
compensation for the damage to the reputation, for the shame,
obloquy and for the injury to the feelings of its owner, which
are caused by the publication of the slander or libel. The law
goes further. If the words are spoken or the publication is
made with the intent to injure the victim or with criminal
indifference to civil obligation, it imposes such damages as the
jury, in view of all the circumstances of the particular case,
adjudge that the wrongdoer ought to pay as an example to the
public and to deter others from doing likewise, and for
punishment for the infliction of the injury."
As was said above, the damages suffered by Mr. Worcester to
his good name and reputation are most difficult of
ascertainment. The attorney for the appellants, in his brief,
lends the court but little assistance in reaching a conclusion
upon this question. The appellants leaves the whole question
to the discretion of the court, without any argument whatever.
After a careful examination, we are of the opinion that part of
the judgment of the lower court relating to the damages
suffered by the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, should be
modified, and that a judgment should be rendered in favor of
Mr. Dean C. Worcester and against the defendants, jointly and
severally, for the sum of P15,000, with interest at 6 per cent
from the 23d of January, 1909.
With reference to the eleventh assignment of error above
noted, to wit: That the court erred in imposing punitive
damages upon the defendants, we are of the opinion, after a
careful examination of the evidence, and in view of all of the
facts and circumstances and the malice connected with the
publication of said editorial and the subsequent publications
with relation to said editorial, that the lower court, by virtue of
the provisions of Act No. 277 of the Philippine Commission,
was justified in imposing punitive damages upon the
defendants.
Section 11 of Act No. 277 allows the court, in an action for
libel, to render a judgment for punitive damages, in an amount
which the court may think will be a just punishment to the
libeler and an example to others.
Exemplary damages in civil actions for libel may always be
recovered if the defendant or defendants are actuated by
malice. In the present case there was not the slightest effort on
the part of the defendants to show the existence of probable
cause or foundation whatever for the facts contained in said
editorial. Malice, hatred, and ill will against the plaintiff are
seen throughout the record. The said editorial not only
attempted to paint the plaintiff as a villain, but upon every
occasion, the defendants resorted to ridicule of the severest
kind.
Here again we find difficulty in arriving at a conclusion relating
to the damages which should be imposed upon the defendants
for the purpose of punishment. Upon this question the courts
must be governed in each case by the evidence, the
circumstances and their sound discretion. Taking into
consideration the fact that some of the defendants have been
prosecuted criminally and have been sentenced, and
considering that fact as a part of the punitive damages, we
have arrived at the conclusion that the judgment of the lower
court should be modified, and that a judgment should be
rendered against the defendants, jointly and severally, and in
favor of the plaintiff, the Honorable Dean C. Worcester, in the
sum of P10,000, as punitive damages, with interest at 6 per
cent from the 23d day of January, 1909.
Therefore, after a full consideration of all the facts contained in
the record and the errors assigned by the appellants in this
court, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the lower
court should be modified and that a judgment should be
rendered in favor of Dean C. Worcester and against the
defendants Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Manuel
Palma, Arcadio Arellano, Angel Jose, Galo Lichauco, Felipe
Barretto, and Gregorio M. Cansipit, jointly and severally, for the
sum of P25,000 with interest at 6 per cent from the 23d of
January, 1909, with costs, and that a judgment should be
entered absolving Lope K. Santos from any liability under said
complaint. So ordered.
Artcle 2184 CC
G.R. No. L-9010 March 28, 1914
J. H. CHAPMAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JAMES M. UNDERWOOD, defendant-appellee.
Wolfson & Wolfson for appellant.
Bruce, Lawrence, Ross & Block for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
At the time the accident occurred, which is the basis of this
action, there was a single-track street-car line running along
Calle Herran, with occasional switches to allow cars to meet
and pass each other. One of these switches was located at the
scene of the accident.
The plaintiff had been visiting his friend, a man by the name of
Creveling, in front of whose house the accident happened. He
desired to board a certain "San Marcelino" car coming from
Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that
the car was approaching, he immediately, and somewhat
hurriedly, passed from the gate into the street for the purpose
of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one,
the entrance being from the front or the rear flatform. Plaintiff
attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could
not reached it without extra exertion, stopped beside the car,
facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come
abreast of him in order to board. While in this position he was
struck from behind and run over by the defendant's
automobile.
The defendant entered Calle Herran at Calle Peñafrancia in his
automobile driven by his chauffeur, a competent driver. A
street car bound from Manila to Santa Ana being immediately
in front of him, he followed along behind it. Just before
reaching the scene of the accident the street car which was
following took the switch — that is, went off the main line to the
left upon the switch lying alongside of the main track.
Thereupon the defendant no longer followed that the street car
nor went to the left, but either kept straight ahead on the main
street-car track or a bit to the right. The car which the plaintiff
intended to board was on the main line and bound in an
opposite direction to that in which the defendant was going.
When the front of the "San Marcelino" car, the one the plaintiff
attempted to board, was almost in front of the defendant's
automobile, defendant's driver suddenly went to the right and
struck and ran over the plaintiff, as above described.
The judgment of the trial court was for defendant.
A careful examination of the record leads us to the conclusion
that the defendant's driver was guilty of negligence in running
upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an oncoming car
upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, in common out to board the
car, was not obliged, for his own protection, to observe
whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had
only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew
that, according to the law of the road, no automobile or other
vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the
car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as
they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon
that side of the street car.
The defendant, however, is not responsible for the negligence
of his driver, under the facts and circumstances of this case.
As we have said in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil.
Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of persons in
article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant
would be responsible.
Although in the David case the owner of the vehicle was not
present at the time the alleged negligent acts were committed
by the driver, the same rule applies where the owner is
present, unless the negligent act of the driver are continued for
such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct his driver to desist
therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or other
vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the
law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such
acts. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to
drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an
hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a
reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible,
both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts
of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden
act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner,
by his acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
In the case before us it does not appear from the record that,
from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to
the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give
the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver.
Instead, it appears with fair clearness that the interval between
the turning out to meet and pass the street car and the
happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient
to charge defendant with the negligence of the driver.
Whether or not the owner of an automobile driven by a
competent driver, would be responsible, whether present or
not, for the negligent acts of his driver when the automobile
was a part of a business enterprise, and was being driven at
the time of the accident in furtherance of the owner's business,
we do not now decide.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Trent, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and
the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE
ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T.
CAEDO, as guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-
appellants.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.
De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for
defendants-appellants
MAKALINTAL, J.:
As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial
Caedo and several members of his family were injured they
filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants.
The judgment, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Rizal
on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following
disposition:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment,
one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu
Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to
plaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual
damages; P48,000.00 for moral damages; P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with
costs against the defendants. The counterclaim of the
defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered dismissed,
for lack of merits.
On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to
include an additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the
plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the case to us in view of the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who
was responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant
Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai,
solidarily liable with him? On the first question the trial court
found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held his
employer solidarily liable with him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March
24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the
vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury
car on his way from his home in Quezon City to the airport,
where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for
Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three
daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the
Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the
wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack
Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling
at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the road
and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers
per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48
to 56 kilometers). Their headlights were mutually noticeable
from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same
direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista.
The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and
held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when
he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is the
first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was
provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should
have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he
claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have
been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must
have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable
while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from
the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or
stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was
clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so the
curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along
as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided
with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the
Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the
Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to
take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would
be in line with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them
in any case. It was a risky maneuver either way, and the risk
should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving
at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu
Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him,
and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of
the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the
clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side was
insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the
wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo,
confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the
collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but
was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show
that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder
of the road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable
to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held
liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next
question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the
Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law
is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the
driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present
is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by
the exercise of due diligence. The rule is not new, although
formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It was
expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374,
where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless
the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length
of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An
owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits
his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The
owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up
the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour,
without any effort to stop him, although he has had a
reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible,
both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts
of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden
act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner,
by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory
is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the
master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his
own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury
or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael
Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and
before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co.
in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he
had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to
his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be
sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the
accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing
a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger
but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was
not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and
open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no
reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He
had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He
became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car
was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it
earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at
the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he
could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass
the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car
was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe
Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver
accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was
that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the
other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a
thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due
diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil
Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners
are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as
are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain from
driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive
for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed
with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to
appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different
situations that are continually encountered on the road. What
would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the
part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how
to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say,
of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of
driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own
a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning
of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of
his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a
minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be
fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to
require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of
professional drivers by car owners who, by their very
inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be
effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily
with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next question refers to
the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award
of P48,000 by way of moral damages is itemized as follows:
1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00
2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00
3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00
4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00
5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00
6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court
should have granted them also actual or compensatory
damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they
sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that the
amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and
should be reduced. We find no justification for either side. The
amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs
by reason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical
treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual
damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and
suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and
constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual,
damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:
MARCIAL T. CAEDO:
A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions,
chest wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib
has a double fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal
disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture,
skull.
JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left;
(4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.
EPHRAIM CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital
EILEEN CAEDO:
A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral
aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee,
anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.
ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower
lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasolabial region;
(4) leg, lower third, anterior.
MARILYN CAEDO:
A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3
right; (2) arm, lower third
C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower
1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D,
D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the
above-mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral damages
granted by the trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the
sense of declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from
liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant
Rafael Bernardo, with costs against the latter.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-62988 February 28, 1985
FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO
R. LUNA, JR., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JOSE E.
DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA, respondents.
Ezequiel S. Consulta for petitioners.
David M. Castro for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the defunct Court of
Appeals. The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who
was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on
January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the go-kart
driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota
car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no
driver's license.
In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna
against Luis dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the
Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 81078,
rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the
defendants Luis dela Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly
and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as
unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his
companionship, with legal interest from the date of this
decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and
the costs of suit. (Record on Appeal, p. 35.)
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals
which in a decision dated May 22, 1979, affirmed in totothat of
the trial court. (Rollo, p. 48.) However, upon a motion for
reconsideration filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of
Appeals, in a resolution dated June 19, 1981, modified its
judgment thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered in this case is hereby
modified insofar as the judgment ordering the defendants to
pay, jointly and severally, the sum of P 1,650,000.00 to
plaintiffs with legal interest from July 5, 1973, is concerned. In
lieu thereof, defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R.
Luna, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of
the complaint until the whole amount shall have been totally
paid.
The rest of the other dispositions in the judgment a quo stand.
(Rollo, pp. 33-34.)
Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate
court's decision.
In G.R. No. 57362, the petition for review of Jose and Luis dela
Rosa was denied for lack of merit on October 5, 1981.
Subsequently, they informed that the decision sought to be
reviewed was not yet final because the Lunas had a pending
motion for reconsideration. For prematurity, this Court set
aside all previous resolutions. On February 16, 1983, acting
upon the motion and manifestation of the petitioners, they were
required to file an amended petition within thirty days from
notice. On June 20, 1983, this Court resolved: "For failure of
the petitioners to file an amended petition as required, this
case is hereby DISMISSED and the dismissal is final."
The instant case — G.R. No. 62988 — is the separate appeal
of the Lunas. Their petition contains the following prayer:
1. That the petition be given due course;
2. That after notice and hearing, judgment be rendered, setting
aside or modifying the RESOLUTION of respondent Court of
Appeals dated June 19, 1981, attached as Annex "A" to the
petition, only insofar as it reduced the unearned net earnings
to P450,000.00, s• as to affirm the trial court's finding as to the
unearned net earnings of the deceased in the amount of
P1,650,000.00;
3. Ordering that the award of attorney's fees shall also be with
interest, at the legal rate. (Rollo, p. 27.)
On June 27, 1983, the petition was given due course. (Rollo,
pp. 122-123.)
In the light of the foregoing, the resolution stated:
It thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to
the award for unearned net earnings — should the award be
P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally
adjudged; and whether the award for attorney's fees shall also
be with interest at the legal rate.
The Court takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as
early as January 18, 1970, and that until now the process of
litigation is not yet over. In the meantime the value of the
Philippine peso has been seriously eroded so that the heirs of
the deceased may ultimately have a greatly depreciated
judgment. In the interest of justice, the private respondents are
hereby ordered to PAY to the petitioners within thirty (30) days
from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased;
(P12,000.00 as compensatory damages; P50,000.00 for the
loss of his companionship with legal interest from July 3, 1973;
and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Still to be resolved shall be the following: whether the award
for unearned net earnings shall be increased to
P1,650,000.00; and whether the award for attorney's fees shall
also be with interest at the legal rate. The costs will be
adjudged as a matter of course. (Rollo, p. 123.)
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when
required to explain they said that they had no cash money.
Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of
execution but the attempt of the special sheriff to enter the
private respondent's premises so that he could make an
inventory of personal properties was thwarted by guards and
this Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary
to assist in enforcing the writ of execution. The execution
yielded only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis dela
Rosa is now of age, married with two children, and living in
Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is
said: "His compensation is hardly enough to support his family.
He has no assets of his own as yet." (Rollo, p. 208.)
1. On the amount of the award.
The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors,
namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have
lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was
P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income
less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses.
This is what the trial court said on Luna's life expectancy:
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at
age 33 the life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years,
and under the Commissioner Standard Ordinary, used by our
domestic insurance companies since 1968 for policies above
P5,000.00 his life expectancy was 38.51 years. Dr. Vicente
Campa, medical director of San Miguel Corporation, testified
that he was the regular physician of Roberto Luna since his
marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He said that except for a
slight anemia which he had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna
was of good health. Allowing for this condition, he could
reasonably expect to have a life expectancy of 30 years.
(Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals in sustaining the trial court's conclusion
said:
We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the
deceased had a life expectancy of thirty years. At the time of
Luna's death, he was only thirty-three years old and in the best
of health. With his almost perfect physical condition and his
sound mind, the expectation that he could have lived for
another thirty years is reasonable, considering that with his
educational attainment, his social and financial standing, he
had the means of staying fit and preserving his health and
well-being. That he could have lived at least until the age of
sixty-three years is an assessment which is more on the
conservative side in view of the testimony of Dr. Vicente
Campa that the general life expectancy nowadays had gone
up to seventy years. (Rollo, p. 45.)
The Court of Appeals likewise sustained the trial court in
respect of Luna's annual income and expense. This is what the
trial court said:
Roberto Luna was 33 years old when he died, and was
survived by his wife Felina Rodriguez-Luna, and two children,
Roberto Jr., 13 years, and Jose, 12 years. His wife was 35
years old at the time. He declared a gross income of
P16,900.00 for 1967 (Exhibit I), P29,700,000 for 1968 (Exhibit
H) and P45,117.69 for 1969 (Exhibit G). He had investments in
various corporations amounting to P136,116.00 (Exhibits K, M,
M-1, N, N-1 to N-3, O, O-1, P, Q and R) and was the president
and general manager of Rodlum Inc.; general manager of
Esso Greenhills Service Center; Assistant manager of Jose
Rodriguez Lanuza Sons; director of Steadfast Investment
Corporation; chairman and treasurer of Greenhills Industrial
Corporation; vice-president of Oasis, Inc.; director of Nation
Savings Association; director of Arlun Taxi; and treasurer of
National Association of Retired Civil Employees.
... . His income tax returns show an increase in his income in
the short period of three years. It is reasonable to expect that it
would still go higher for the next fifteen years and reach a
minimum of P75,000.00 a year. The potential increase in the
earning capacity of a deceased person is recognized by the
Supreme Court. ... the court believes that the expected gross
earnings of Roberto Luna should be fixed in the sum of
P75,000.00 a year for the period of his life expectancy of 30
years, but deducting his personal expenses which, because of
his business and social standing the court in the amount of
P20,000.00 a year, in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court. (Record on Appeal, pp. 32-34.)
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas,
the Court of Appeals took into account the fact "that the
deceased Roberto R. Luna had been engaged in car racing as
a sport, having participated in tournaments both here and
abroad;" it said that Luna's habit and manner of life should be
"one of the factors affecting the value of mortality table in
actions for damages;" and, consequently, concluded that Luna
could not have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the
30-year life expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Further on the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
ruled in respect of Luna's annual personal expenses:
... . Considering the escalating price of automobile gas which is
a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing, We
should increase that amount to P30,000.00 as the would be
personal expenses of the deceased per annum. (Rollo, p. 33.)
The Court of Appeals then determined the amount of the
award thus: P75,000.00 annual gross income less P30,000.00
annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10
years of life expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when
by its resolution of June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life
expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and increased his annual
personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We
sustain the petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, in reducing Luna's life expectancy from
30 to 10 years said that his habit and manner of life should be
taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing
as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky
activity tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had
engaged in car racing is not based on any evidence on record.
That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct
statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a
dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low
powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four
wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court of
Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial court
which it had previously affirmed.
Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net
annual income of the deceased by increasing his annual
personal expenses but without at the same time increasing his
annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual
personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating
price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's
social standing" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it
would not be unreasonable to suppose that his income would
also increase considering the manifold sources thereof.
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original
decision.
2. Attorney's fees — with or without interest at the legal rate.
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the petitioners in the
sum of P50,000.00. This award was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision of May 22, 1979. The resolution of June
19, 1981, reaffirmed the award. The two decisions as well as
the resolution do not provide for interest at the legal rate to be
tacked to the award.
The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be
with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the
complaint. There is merit in this prayer. The attorney's fees
were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-delict case
and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil
Code.) As with the other damages awarded, the interest
should accrue only from the date of the trial court's decision.
The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, L-24803, May
26,1977; 77 SCRA 98, where it was held that Article 2180 of
the Civil Code applied to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since
Reginald had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of
Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his son. It is
now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age
and that as a matter of equity the liability of his father should
be subsidiary only.
We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this
case because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis
dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
Moreover, he does not have any property either in the
Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to
support his family.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
June 19, 1981, is hereby set aside; its decision dated May 22,
1979, is reinstated with the sole modification that the award for
attorney's fees shall earn interest at the legal rate from July 5,
1973, the date of the trial court's decision. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Quasi-tort: definition
Article 58, PD no 603
Articles 216,218,219,221,236, FC
Articles 101-103,RPC
Sec. 6 RA 9344
Articles 2180-2182 CC
1. Parents
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO,
RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC;
and CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10
years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing
injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No.
3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting
parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo,
Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he
was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this
case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V]
against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted
and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad
acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses
Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T
before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This
petition for adoption was grunted on, 18 November 1982, that
is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting
parents, namely the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto
Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents,
parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the
mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners'
complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7
December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on
14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration followed by a supplemental motion for
reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however,
that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the motion
shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall
state the time and place of hearing — both motions were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28
April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order
dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed the notice at
appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond
the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for
mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision
dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988
and 6 June 1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition,
ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again
contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages caused by the
acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution of this
Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not
petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may
still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may
still take cognizance of the case even through petitioners'
appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the
effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned
may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting
parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter,
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological
parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial
court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13,
Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of
Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt
and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court
held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time
and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper
which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service
of the motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and
place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the
instant. Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be
served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application
of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat
the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before
the trial court, and the motion (and supplemental motion) for
reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court
held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of
appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be
applied in a very rigid technical sense, rules of procedure are
used only to help secure not override, substantial justice. if d
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made their aim
would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary
act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a
cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of
the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
...
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives
with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
person herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is
frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of
"imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a
person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also
for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain
relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties
and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of
the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was
explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in
the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from
negligence, whether of act or omission, it is competent for the
legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to
limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom
such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that liability,
without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts
or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who
are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has
elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with certain well-
defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can
be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care
in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in
the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a
position of dependency with respect to the person made liable
for their conduct. 7 (Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon
the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated
child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents
were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural
duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and
control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon
parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction
in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority.
The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the
presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with
an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in
respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor
Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain
that because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption
court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was
vested in the latter as adopting parents as of the time of the
filing of the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had
shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend
that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report
of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child
placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the
court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care
for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has
been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be
entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition
was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is
thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36
should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents,
except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural
parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have
been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was
filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil
Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child
is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor
child living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly
insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious
act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought
to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded
as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect
may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a
tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the
United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result,
moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a
little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the
part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at
the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the
conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be
finally granted unless and until the adopting parents are given
by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six
months to assess their adjustment and emotional readiness for
the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally
vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption,
precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case,
the trial custody period either had not yet begun or bad already
been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural
parents, not the adopting parents.

Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the
suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal
by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable
parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No.
SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners'
complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED
and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against
respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her
father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for plaintiffs-appellees.
Luis G. Torres and Abraham E. Tionko for defendant-
appellant.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided
by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to
the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of
Appeals, which certified the same to us since the facts are not
in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in
Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them,
together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the
school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort
found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly
worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that
she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment
the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit
her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10,
the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related
the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor
for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on
July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the
hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the
parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical
efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf
of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa
Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00
as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent
for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another
under the specific facts related above and the applicable
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly Articles 2176 and
2180 thereof, which read:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is
the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission,
there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby.
When the act or omission is that of one person for whom
another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable
under Article 2180, in the different cases enumerated therein,
such as that of the father or the mother under the
circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious,
although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied
the causative act or omission. The presumption is
merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the
clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last
paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility
treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage."
Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of
defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the
defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence
contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection
with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially
when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated
measure applicable; and when the law simply refers to "all the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every
individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of
such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be
inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage
by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way
remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to
foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the
contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send
her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to
be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far
as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an
innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which
no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to
anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's
character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing
and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and
sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is
at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has
no legal sanction enforceable in court, but only the moral
compulsion of good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
2. Guardians
Articles 216 and 218, FC
Articles 2180-2181 CC
3. Teachers and Heads of Institution
Articles 218-219, FC
Article 2180-2181, CC
AQUINAS SCHOOL, G.R. No. 184202
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,ABAD, and MENDOZA, JJ.
SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA
S. INTON, on their behalf and on
behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS
S. INTON, and SR. MARGARITA Promulgated:
YAMYAMIN, OP,
Respondents. January 26, 2011
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------ x
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the private schools liability for the
outside catechists act of shoving a student and kicking him on
the legs when he disobeyed her instruction to remain in his
seat and not move around the classroom.
The Facts and the Case
In 1998 respondent Jose Luis Inton (Jose Luis) was a
grade three student at Aquinas School (Aquinas). Respondent
Sister Margarita Yamyamin (Yamyamin), a religion teacher
who began teaching at that school only in June of that year,
taught Jose Luis grade three religion class.
On July 14, 1998, while Yamyamin was writing on the
blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went over to a
classmate to play a joke of surprising him. Yamyamin noticed
this and sent Jose Luis back to his seat. After a while, Jose
Luis got up again and went over to the same classmate. This
time, unable to tolerate the childs behavior, Yamyamin
approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several
times. She also pulled and shoved his head on the classmates
seat. Finally, she told the child to stay where he was on that
spot of the room and finish copying the notes on the
blackboard while seated on the floor.
As a result of the incident, respondents Jose and
Victoria Inton (the Intons) filed an action for damages on behalf
of their son Jose Luis against Yamyamin and Aquinas before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case
67427. The Intons also filed a criminal action against
Yamyamin for violation of Republic Act 7610 to which she
pleaded guilty and was sentenced accordingly.
With regard to the action for damages, the Intons
sought to recover actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as
well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his
mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias
personal claims but ruled in Jose Luis favor, holding
Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees
of P10,000.00 plus the costs of suit.[1]
Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA).[2] They asked the CA to increase the
award of damages and hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin. Finding that an employer-employee relation
existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin, the CA found them
solidarily liable to Jose Luis. The CA, however, declined to
increase the award of damages.[3] Jose Luis moved for partial
reconsideration but this was denied. Aquinas, for its part,
appealed directly to this Court from the CA decision through a
petition for review on certiorari.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or
not the CA was correct in holding Aquinas solidarily liable with
Yamyamin for the damages awarded to Jose Luis.
The Courts Ruling
The CA found Aquinas liable to Jose Luis based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code upon the CAs belief that the
school was Yamyamins employer. Aquinas contests this.
The Court has consistently applied the four-fold test
to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship: the employer (a) selects and engages the
employee; (b) pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him;
and (d) has control over his work. Of these, the most crucial is
the element of control. Control refers to the right of the
employer, whether actually exercised or reserved, to control
the work of the employee as well as the means and methods
by which he accomplishes the same.[4]
In this case, the school directress testified that
Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters
under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis
to its students. Aquinas insists that it was not the school but
Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her for the task
of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the
way bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion
in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite
evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins
teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school
directress testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error
for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of
taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside catechists are
allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be
said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of
improper conduct towards the students by their religion
teacher.
First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates,
and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach religion.
Second, there is no question that Aquinas
ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious
congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training,
the school had reason to assume that she would behave
properly towards the students.
Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the
schools Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the
standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning
that June of 1998.[5]
Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the
course she was to teach[6] to ensure that she was really
catechizing the students.
 And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting
Yamyamin to classroom evaluation.[7] Unfortunately, since she
was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas
did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At
any rate, it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as
soon as the school learned of the incident.[8] It cannot be said
that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.
Regarding the Intons plea for an award of greater
amounts of damages, the Court finds no justification for this
since they did not appeal from the decision of the CA. The
Intons prayed for the increase only in their comment to the
petition. They thus cannot obtain from this Court any
affirmative relief other than those that the CA already granted
them in its decision.[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the
petition, SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV 88106 dated August 4, 2008,
and HOLDS petitioner Aquinas School not liable in damages to
respondent Jose Luis Inton.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA,
SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN
JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO
JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO
DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru
his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking
forward to the commencement exercises where he would
ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and
friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies
were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though,
fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience.
On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their
school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate,
Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all
his expectations and his life as well. The victim was only
seventeen years old. 1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence
. 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents,
filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the
high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics
teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents. The complaint against the students
was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in
the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation,
loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
.3 On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision
was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved
.4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts
and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held
that the students were not in the custody of the school at the
time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that
there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any
event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury. 5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to
the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its
auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate.
On the implications and consequences of these facts, the
parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to
show his physics experiment as a prerequisite to his
graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the
private respondents. The private respondents submit that
Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose
of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in
their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which
the petitioners consider important because of an earlier
incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the
school and at least one of the private respondents. It is not
denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio
Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban
an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making
a report to the principal or taking any further action .6 As
Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter
fired the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that
this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from
Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had
not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however,
that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that
killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the
interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked
by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The
pertinent part of this article reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in
connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v.
Capuno 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v.
Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed in this opinion for a
better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a
Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor.
After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over its wheel
and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the
death of two of its passengers. Dante was found guilty of
double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate
civil action flied against them, his father was held solidarily
liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article
2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year
old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo
on June 29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as
it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a
school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom
Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented,
arguing that it was the school authorities who should be held
liable Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1)
teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and
trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of
arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not
"teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an
elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor blade
during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon
City, and the parents of the victim sued the culprits parents for
damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in
another obiter (as the school itself had also not been sued that
the school was not liable because it was not an establishment
of arts and trades. Moreover, the custody requirement had not
been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the
student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influences on the pupil supersede those
of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the
other members of the court concurred in this decision
promulgated on May 30, 1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-
year old student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the
laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the
wrongdoer — who was already of age — was not boarding in
the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were
held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared through
Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the
students) remain in their custody" — means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is
nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach,
the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court,
and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it
relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other
members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in
answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of
age were covered by the provision since they were equally in
the custody of the school and subject to its discipline.
Dissenting with three others,11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted
that the rule should apply only to torts committed by students
not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco
parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice
Reyes' dissent in the Exconde Case but added that "since the
school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question
as to the applicability of the cited codal provision to academic
institutions will have to await another case wherein it may
properly be raised."
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought to be
held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a
school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the
question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and
trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to
be "in its custody."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has
come to the conclusion that the provision in question should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the
student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student,
following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception
to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be
liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who
shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula
singulis"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and
students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to
the word "apprentices."
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed
by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil
Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones.
What substantial difference is there between them insofar as
concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It
cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit
a tort to the detriment of third Persons, so long as they are in a
position to exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In
my opinion, in the phrase "teachers or heads of establishments
of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the
words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only
"heads of establishments." The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used
in the Italian and French Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have
incurred in the exercise of their authority, it would seem clear
that where the parent places the child under the effective
authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should
be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason/that the parent is not supposed to
interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under
instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by
their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected
from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is
teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases
is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head
of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by
any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed
in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher
or the school head. All other circumstances being the same,
the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the non-
academic school would be held liable, and simply because the
latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance
should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only
of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem
to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply
because the school is academic in nature and for increasing
such vigilance where the school is non-academic. Notably, the
injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or
its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any
student regardless of the school where he is registered. The
teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by
simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school
where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the
school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the
academic school is to be held answerable for the torts
committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only
who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts
and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical
school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead
of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that
historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised
a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally
and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of
their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such
a master and so was personally involved in the task of
teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and
so came under his constant control, supervision and influence.
By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only administrative
duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing
with the students. The head of the academic school had then
(as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the
acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades,
because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present
in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the
corresponding diminution of the direct and personal contract of
their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains
unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be
interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original
mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges
in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the
responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-
extensive with the period when the student is actually
undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by
the respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners
themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear
that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v.
Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding
with the school authorities, it does signify that the student
should be within the control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury.
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-
terminous with the semester, beginning with the start of
classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the
time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period
before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court,
the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and
within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or
has already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the
discipline of the school only upon the start of classes
notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered
and thus placed himself under its rules. Neither should such
discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes
notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of
reports, term papers, clearances and the like. During such
periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority
of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether
from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of
the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even
if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still
within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-
charge who must answer for his students' torts, in practically
the same way that the parents are responsible for the child
when he is in their custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one
designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative
superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific
classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be
physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does
not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers
more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the
injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent
shag be held responsible if the tort was committed within the
premises of the school at any time when its authority could be
validly exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by
this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school
itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to
answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof
under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it
may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the
head of the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for
the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant
can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself
from the liability imposed by Article 2180, which also states
that:
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
Persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will
be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the
law does not require that the offending student be of minority
age. Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still
a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act
of the student under him regardless of the student's age. Thus,
in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the
head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was
already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent
more favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by
Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the
school may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in
view of the increasing activism among the students that is
likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school
premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it
should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the
school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of
due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or
the teacher in its employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in
selecting the head or its teachers and the appropriate
supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the
pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations for the maintenance
of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact,
these measures are effected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce
those rules upon the students. Ms should bolster the claim of
the school that it has taken adequate steps to prevent any
injury that may be committed by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it
would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for
the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the
school premises and presumably under his influence. In this
respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher
the same measure of responsibility imposed on the parent for
their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously,
the parent can expect more obedience from the child because
the latter's dependence on him is greater than on the teacher.
It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the
child's support and sustenance whereas submission to the
teacher's influence, besides being coterminous with the period
of custody is usually enforced only because of the students'
desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more las
discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held
to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort
committed by the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question,
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice even if he is already of age — and therefore less
tractable than the minor — then there should all the more be
justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence
in preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no
longer liable for the student's acts because he has reached
majority age and so is no longer under the former's control,
there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the
teacher's responsibility for the acts of the student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at
the following conclusions:
1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had
formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit
his physics report for what is important is that he was there for
a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere
savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the
school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought
him in the custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-
in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising
only a general authority over the student body and not the
direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in
charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student
was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school
that day in connection with his physics report did not
necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino
Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge,
there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing
discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the
rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-
observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot
be considered against him because he was not supposed or
required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that
the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-
charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort
was committed, it has not been established that it was caused
by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the
contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had
exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school
regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the
dean of boys who should be held liable especially in view of
the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the
same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting
the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from
the school, it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of
Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article
because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the
tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none
of them has been found to have been charged with the custody
of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of
his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the
record and in the light of the principles herein announced that
none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by
Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the latter's
death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
on April 13, 1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic
circumstances here related, we nevertheless are unable to
extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their
grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991
ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS.
FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO LACANDULA,
BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS,
CONNIE ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH
DIVISION and DR. ROMULO CASTILLO and LILIA
CADIZ, respondents.
Jose C. Flores, Jr. for petitioners.
Jovito E. Talabong for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision * of the Court of
Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby affirmed,
with the following modifications: (1) Exemplary damages in the
amount of P20,000.00 are hereby awarded to plaintiffs, in
addition to the actual damages of P30,000.00, moral damages
of P20,000.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P15,000.00
awarded to plaintiffs in the decision under appeal; (2) St.
Francis High School, represented by the Spouses Fernando
Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, and Benjamin Illumin, are
hereby held jointly and severally liable with defendants Connie
Arquio, Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas and Patria Cadis for the
payment to plaintiffs of the abovementioned actual damages,
moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, and
for costs; and (3) Defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones are
hereby absolved from liability, and the case against them,
together with their respective counterclaims, is hereby ordered
dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (p. 60, Rollo)
The complaint alleged that Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman
student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted
to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's parents,
respondents spouses Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz
Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join
but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the
picnic, with the directive that he should go back home after
doing so. However, because of persuasion of the teachers,
Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand,
were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently
drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to
her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him
ashore failed. He was brought to a certain Dr. Luna in Sariaya,
Quezon and later to the Mt. Cannel General Hospital where he
was pronounced dead on arrival.
Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 8834, in the Regional Trial Court, Branch LVIII
of Lucena City, against the St. Francis High School,
represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario
Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers:
Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones,
Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for Damages which respondents
allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old son,
Ferdinand Castillo. Contending that the death of their son was
due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper
diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's
drowning, respondents prayed of actual, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and expenses for litigation.
The trial court found in favor of the respondents and against
petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro
and Cadiz, ordering all of them jointly and severally to pay
respondents the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages,
P20,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs. The court a quo reasoned:
Taking into consideration the evidence presented, this Court
believes that the defendant teachers namely: Connie Arquio,
Luisito Vinas, Tirso de Chaves, Yoly Jaro, Nida Aragones and
Patria Cadiz had failed to exercise the diligence required of
them by law under the circumstances to guard against the
harm they had foreseen. (pp. 2930, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had
already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them
from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late,
they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students. (p.
30, Rollo)
The students, young as they were then (12 to 13 years old),
were easily attracted to the sea without aforethought of the
dangers it offers. Yet, the precautions and reminders allegedly
performed by the defendants-teachers definitely fell short of
the standard required by law under the circumstances. While
the defendants-teachers admitted that some parts of the sea
where the picnic was held are deep, the supposed lifeguards
of the children did not even actually go to the water to test the
depth of the particular area where the children would swim.
And indeed the fears of the plaintiffs that the picnic area was
dangerous was confirmed by the fact that three persons during
the picnic got drowned at the same time. Had the defendant
teachers made an actual and physical observation of the water
before they allowed the students to swim, they could have
found out that the area where the children were swimming was
indeed dangerous. And not only that, the male teachers who
according to the female teachers were there to supervise the
children to ensure their safety were not even at the area where
the children were swimming. They were somewhere and as
testified to by plaintiffs' witness they were having a drinking
spree. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed the case against
the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora
Cadorna. Said the court a quo:
As shown and adverted to above, this Court cannot find
sufficient evidence showing that the picnic was a school
sanctioned one. Similarly no evidence has been shown to hold
defendants Benjamin Illumin and Aurora Cadorna responsible
for the death of Ferdinand Castillo together with the other
defendant teachers. It has been sufficiently shown that
Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in
fact he did not join it. On the other hand, defendant Aurora
Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she
was not amongst those allegedly invited by defendant Connie
Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo
belongs. (p. 30, Rollo)
Both petitioners and respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals. Respondents-spouses assigned the following errors
committed by the trial court:
1. The lower court erred in not declaring the defendant St.
Francis High School and its administrator/principal Benjamin
Illumin as equally liable not only for its approved co-curricular
activities but also for those which they unreasonably failed to
exercise control and supervision like the holding of picnic in the
dangerous water of Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
2. The lower court erred in not declaring the St. Francis High
School and principal Benjamin Illumin as jointly and solidarily
liable with their co-defendants-teachers Rosario Lacandula, et
als., for the tragic death of Ferdinand Castillo in a picnic at
Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon, last March 20, 1982.
3. The lower court erred in not declaring higher amount for
actual and moral damages for the untimely and tragic death of
Ferdinand Castillo in favor of plaintiffs-appellants against all
the defendants. (pp. 56-57, Rollo)
The Court of Appeals ruled:
We find plaintiffs-appellants' submission well-taken.
Even were We to find that the picnic in question was not a
school-sponsored activity, nonetheless it cannot be gainsaid
that the same was held under the supervision of the teachers
employed by the said school, particularly the teacher in charge
of Class I-C to whom the victim belonged, and those whom
she invited to help her in supervising the class during the
picnic. Considering that the court a quo found negligence on
the part of the six defendants-teachers who, as such, were
charged with the supervision of the children during the picnic,
the St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin
Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 taken together with the
1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
They cannot escape liability on the mere excuse that the picnic
was not an "extra-curricular activity of the St. Francis High
School." We find from the evidence that, as claimed by
plaintiffs-appellants, the school principal had knowledge of the
picnic even from its planning stage and had even been invited
to attend the affair; and yet he did not express any prohibition
against undertaking the picnic, nor did he prescribe any
precautionary measures to be adopted during the picnic. At the
least, We must find that the school and the responsible school
officials, particularly the principal, Benjamin Illumin, had
acquiesced to the holding of the picnic.
Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant
school principal must be found jointly and severally liable with
the defendants-teachers for the damages incurred by the
plaintiffs as a result of the death of their son. It is the rule that
in cases where the above-cited provisions find application, the
negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage
gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the
owner and/or manager of the establishment (in the present
case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and while this
presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by
clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and/or supervision of the employee or employees
causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-
teachers). The record does not disclose such evidence as
would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and
absolve the St. Francis High School and its principal from
liability under the above-cited provisions.
As to the third assigned error interposed by plaintiffs-
appellants, while We cannot but commiserate with the plaintiffs
for the tragedy that befell them in the untimely death of their
son Ferdinand Castillo and understand their suffering as
parents, especially the victim's mother who, according to
appellants, suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of the
tragedy, We find that the amounts fixed by the court a quo as
actual damages and moral damages (P30,000.00 and
P20,000.00, respectively) are reasonable and are those which
are sustained by the evidence and the law.
However, We believe that exemplary or corrective damages in
the amount of P20,000.00 may and should be, as it is hereby,
imposed in the present case by way of example of correction
for the public good, pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
(pp. 57-59, Rollo)
On the other hand, petitioners-teachers assigned the following
errors committed by the trial court:
1. ". . . in finding the defendants Connie Arquio, Tirso de
Chavez, Luisito Vinas, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro and Patria
Cadiz guilty of negligence and jointly and severally liable for
damages such finding not being supported by facts and
evidence.
2. ". . . in dismissing the counterclaim interposed by the
defendants. (p. 59, Rollo)
On this score, respondent Court ruled:
The main thrust of defendants-appellants appeal is that
plaintiffs, the parents of the victim Ferdinand Castillo, were not
able to prove by their evidence that they did not give their son
consent to join the picnic in question. However, We agree with
the trial court in its finding that whether or not the victim's
parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial
to the determination of the existence of liability on the part of
the defendants for the damage incurred by the plaintiffs-
appellants as a result of the death of their son. What is
material to such a determination is whether or not there was
negligence on the part of defendants vis-a-visthe supervision
of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found
by the trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been
satisfactorily established by the evidence, as already pointed
out.
However, We sustain defendants-appellants insofar as two of
the defendants-teachers, Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, are
concerned. As to them, the trial court found:
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida
Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the drowning incident had
already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them
from their liability. In fact, it could be said that by coming late,
they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students.
The evidence shows that these two defendants had
satisfactorily explained why they were late in going to the
picnic site, namely, that they had to attend to the entrance
examination being conducted by the school which is part of
their duty as teachers thereof. Since they were not at the picnic
site during the occurrence in question, it cannot be said that
they had any participation in the negligence attributable to the
other defendants-teachers who failed to exercise diligence in
the supervision of the children during the picnic and which
failure resulted in the drowning of plaintiffs' son. Thus, We may
not attribute any act or omission to the two teachers, Yoly Jaro
and Nida Aragones, as to make them liable for the injury
caused to the plaintiffs because of the death of their son
resulting from his drowning at the picnic. Accordingly, they
must be absolved from any liability.
As to the second assigned error raised by defendants-
appellants, We agree with the court a quo that the
counterclaim must be dismissed for lack of merit. (pp. 59-
60, Rollo)
Hence, this petition.
The issues presented by petitioners are:
A) Whether or not there was negligence attributable to the
defendants which will warrant the award of damages to the
plaintiffs;
B) Whether or not Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New
Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar;
C) Whether or not the award of exemplary and moral damages
is proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar.
(pp. 81-82, Rollo)
In the resolution of January 16, 1989, We gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If at all petitioners are liable for negligence, this is because of
their own negligence or the negligence of people under them.
In the instant case however, as will be shown hereunder,
petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of
the negligence of those under them.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any
negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses,
parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the
excursion.
Testimony of Dr. Castillo on cross exam. by Atty. Flores
Q Now, when your son asked you for money to buy food, did
you not ask him where he will bring this?
A I asked him where he was going, he answered, I am going to
the picnic, and when I asked him where, he did not answer, sir.
Q And after giving the money, you did not tell him anything
more?
A No more, sir.
Q And after that you just learned that your son join the picnic?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you came to know of it after the news that your son was
drowned in the picnic came to you, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q From 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 12:00 o'clock noon of
March 20, 1982, you did not know that your son join the
picnic?
A No, sir, I did not know.
Q Did you not look for your son during that time?
A I am too busy with my profession, that is why I was not able,
sir.
Q You did not ask your wife?
A I did not, sir.
Q And neither did your wife tell you that your son join the
picnic?
A Later on after 12:00, sir.
Q And during that time you were too busy that you did not
inquire whether your son have joined that picnic?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, pp. 16-17, hearing of April 2, 1984 witness Romulo
Castillo)
The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the
picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a sign of
consent for his son to join the same. Furthermore.
Testimony of Dr. Lazaro on cross examination:
Q How did you conduct this mental and physical examination?
A I have interviewed several persons and the patient herself
She even felt guilty about the death of her son because she
cooked adobo for him so he could join the excursion where her
son died of drowning.
Q Why were you able to say she was feeling guilty because
she was the one who personally cooked the adobo for her
son?
A It was during the interview that I had gathered it from the
patient herself. She was very sorry had she not allowed her
son to join the excursion her son would have not drowned. I
don't know if she actually permitted her son although she said
she cooked adobo so he could join. (Emphasis Supplied)
(TSN, p. 19, hearing of April 30, 1984, Dr. Lazaro — witness).
Respondent Court of Appeals committed an error in applying
Article 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering petitioner school
liable for the death of respondent's son.
Article 2180, par. 4 states that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may
be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or
omission which caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the performance of his
assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the
actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened not within the school premises, not on a school day
and most importantly while the teachers and students were
holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the
beginning that the incident happened while some members of
the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having a picnic at
Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head
or its principal, Benjamin Illumin because this picnic is not a
school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity.
As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by
petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the
students and their teachers does not in any way or in any
manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the
same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in
law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. If we were
to affirm the findings of respondent Court on this score,
employers wig forever be exposed to the risk and danger of
being hailed to Court to answer for the misdeeds or omissions
of the employees even if such act or omission he committed
while they are not in the performance of their duties.
Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-
teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-
spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section
where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward
incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and
Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters
who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
Moreover, even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified
that "the defendants (petitioners herein) had life savers
especially brought by the defendants in case of emergency."
(p. 85, Rollo) The records also show that both petitioners
Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the
child.
Testimony of Luisito Vinas on cross examination,
Q And when you saw the boy, Ferdinand Castillo, you
approached the boy and claim also having applied first aid on
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were applying the so called first aid, the
children were covering you up or were surrounding you?
A Yes, sir.
Q You were rattled at that time, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q You mean you were in calm and peaceful condition?
A Yes, sir.
Q Despite the fact that the boy was no longer responding to
your application of first aid?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have never been disturbed, "nababahala" in the
process of your application of the first aid on the body of
Ferdinand Castillo?
A No, sir, because we were attending to the application of first
aid that we were doing, sir.
Q After you have applied back to back pressure and which you
claimed the boy did not respond, were you not disturb
anyway?
A I was disturbed during that time, sir.
Q For how many minutes have you applied the back to back
pressure?
A From 9 to 11 times, sir.
Q You mean 9 to 11 times of having applied the pressure of
your body on the body of Ferdinand Castillo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please describe how you applied a single act of
back to back pressure?
A This has been done by placing the boy lay first downwards,
then the face was a little bit facing right and doing it by
massaging the back of the child, sir." (TSN, pp. 32-35, hearing
of July 30, 1984)
Testimony of Tirso de Chavez on direct examination
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Who actually applied the first aid or artificial respiration to
the child?
A Myself, sir.
Q How did you apply the first aid to the guy?
A The first step that I took, with the help of Mr. Luisito Vinas,
was I applied back to back pressure and took notice of the
condition of the child. We placed the feet in a higher position,
that of the head of the child, sir.
Q After you have placed the boy in that particular position,
where the feet were on a higher level than that of the head,
what did you do next?
A The first thing that we did, particularly myself, was that after
putting the child in that position, I applied the back to back
pressure and started to massage from the waistline up, but I
noticed that the boy was not responding, sir.
Q For how long did you apply this back to back pressure on
the boy?
A About 10 seconds, sir.
Q What about Mr. Vinas?
A Almost the same a little longer, for 15 seconds, sir.
Q After you noticed that the boy was not responding, what did
you do?
A When we noticed that the boy was not responding, we
changed the position of the boy by placing the child facing
upwards laying on the sand then we applied the mouth to
mouth resuscitation, sir. (pp. 92-93, Rollo)
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages
may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at
bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral
damages.
Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant's wrongful act or omission.
Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioners are
not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages
can be assessed against them.
While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their consent
to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the
petitioners were already relieved of their duty to observe the
required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the
safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were
able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.
Hence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes
baseless.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision dated
November 19, 1987, finding petitioners herein guilty of
negligence and liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo and
awarding the respondents damages, is hereby SET ASIDE
insofar as the petitioners herein are concerned, but the portion
of the said decision dismissing their counterclaim, there being
no merit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,
GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES
DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution denying
reconsideration, holding petitioner liable for damages arising
from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who
had joined a campaign to visit the public schools
in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin
Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos
filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby
ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa
Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity
for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual
damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related
expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys
fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00)
for moral damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James
Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein
plaintiffs the amount of damages above-stated in the event of
insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog
City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the
commission of the tort and who was under special parental
authority of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from
paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged
against defendants St. Marys Academy, and subsidiarily,
against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any
liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier
discussed in this decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-
206).
From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995,
defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of
the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day,
Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a
Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on
their way to Larayan Elementary School,
Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II
then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly,
the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result
the jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sustained from the accident.[2]
In due time, petitioner St. Marys academy appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals.[3]
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated
a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but
otherwise affirming the decision a quo, in toto.[4]
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed
a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May
22, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the
petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
award of moral damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy
liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles
218[7] and 219[8] of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner
was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a
teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
have special parental authority over a minor child while under
their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its
administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to
field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by
the school or its teachers.[9]
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under
custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority
are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under
their supervision, instruction, or custody.[10]
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was
the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.[11]
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it
must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening
efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the
proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the
proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[12]
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the
negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death
of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel
spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits
establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of
the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but
the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos,
parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute
the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated
that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence
to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article
219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of
respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had
possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle
and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at
the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there
intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[13]
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be
held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendants wrongful act or omission.[14] In this case, the
proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to
petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for
the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering
petitioner to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos
must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part
of damages is the exception rather than the rule.[15] The power
of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification.[16] Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the
petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered
owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never
denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was
being driven on the highways or streets.[17] Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the
respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision of the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial
court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial court for
determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner
St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. Owners and Managers of Establishments
G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX
PANGALANGAN, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J.
BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA, defendants-appellees.
Angel A. Sison for plaintiffs-appellants.
Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan
appealed on pure questions of law from the order of the Court
of First Instance of Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against
Archimedes J. Balingit.

The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the
manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together
with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for damages in
an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the
manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of
the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and
Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit
and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda
drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas,
Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan,
which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a
result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the
bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine
days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to
P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their
answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on
the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no
cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court
dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its
driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is
whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of
an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores de un
establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil
Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident
from which the damage arose.
We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the
manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context
of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the
Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer".
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or
quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager
of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may
be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer,
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la
responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida en el num 3.0 del (art.)
1903, el director de un periodico explotado por una sociedad,
porque cualquiera que sea su jerarquia y aunque Ileve la
direccion de determinadas convicciones politicas no por eso
deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la
Empresa" (Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated
December 6, 1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Español
5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Española 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief,
injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in their
complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is
merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital
stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had
subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their
subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo
Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25
and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should
be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and
Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same
civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was
not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on
the basis of the pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality
separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in
this appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and
which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule
46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case
is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be
permitted to change his theory on appeal because, to permit
him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse party (2 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of dismissal is affirmed.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
5. Employers
G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992
ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, respondents.
Roberto M. Cabangis for petitioner.
Benjamin R. Reonal for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
This case turns on the proper application of the familiar rule
that he who alleges must prove his allegation.
Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license
plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o'clock in the morning of May
11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a
Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal.
The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco
subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but
the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him for damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging inter alia that he
was liable to it in the sum of P17,352.00 plus attorney's fees
and litigation costs as the employer of Nestor Martin. The
petitioner's main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his
employee.
After the plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that no evidence had been
adduced to show that Nestor Martin was his employee. The
motion was denied. The case was considered submitted for
decision with the express waiver by the defendant of his right
to present his own evidence. The defendant thus did not rebut
the plaintiff's allegation that he was Nestor Martin's employer.
In the decision dated August 27, 1985, Judge Eutropio Migriño
held in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him the amount claimed,
with 12% interest, and P4,000.00 attorney's fees, plus costs.1
The decision was seasonably elevated to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed it in toto on February 22, 1988, 2 prompting this
petition for review.
The petition has merit.
It is important to stress that the complaint for damages was
filed by the private respondent against only Ernesto Martin as
alleged employer of Nestor Martin, the driver of the car at the
time of the accident. Nestor Martin was not impleaded. The
action was based on tort under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
providing in part that:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-
employee relationship although it is not necessary that the
employer be engaged in any business or industry. It differs in
this sense from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, which
requires that the employer be engaged in an industry to be
subsidiarily liable for the felony committed by his employee in
the course of his employment.
Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the
employer under Article 2180 is liable for the torts committed by
his employees within the scope of their assigned task. But it is
necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer
liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his
assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee as allowed in that
article. 3
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was adduced by
the plaintiff to show that the defendant was the employer of
Nestor Martin at the time of the accident. The trial court merely
presumed the existence of the employer-employee relationship
and held that the petitioner had not refuted that presumption. It
noted that although the defendant alleged that he was not
Nestor Martin's employer, "he did not present any proof to
substantiate his allegation."
As the trial court put it:
There is no need to stretch one's imagination to realize that a
car owner entrusts his vehicle only to his driver or to anyone
whom he allows to drive it. Since neither plaintiff nor defendant
has presented any evidence on the status of Nestor Martin, the
Court presumes that he was at the time of the incident, an
employee of the defendant. It is elementary that he who makes
an allegation is required to prove the same. Defendant alleges
that Nestor Martin was not his employee but he did not present
any proof to substantiate his allegation. While it is true plaintiff
did not present evidence on its allegation that Nestor Martin
was defendant's employee, the Court believes and so holds,
that there was no need for such evidence. As above adverted
to, the Court can proceed on the presumption that one who
drives the motor vehicle is an employee of the owner thereof.
A presumption is defined as an inference as to the existence of
a fact not actually known, arising from its usual connection with
another which is known, 4 or a conjecture based on past
experience as to what course human affairs ordinarily take. 5 It
is either a presumption juris, or of law, or a presumption
hominis, or of fact. 6
There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts
below from the particular facts presented to them by the
parties. Such deduction is not among the conclusive
presumptions under Section 2 or the disputable presumptions
under Section 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. In other
words, it is not a presumption juris.
Neither is it a presumption hominis, which is a reasonable
deduction from the facts proved without an express direction of
law to that effect. 7 The facts proved, or not denied, viz., the
ownership of the car and the circumstances of the accident,
are not enough bases for the inference that the petitioner is the
employer of Nestor Martin.
In the modern urban society, most male persons know how to
drive and do not have to employ others to drive for them
unless this is needed for business reasons. Many cannot
afford this luxury, and even if they could, may consider it an
unnecessary expense and inconvenience. In the present case,
the more plausible assumption is that Nestor Martin is a close
relative of Ernesto Martin and on the date in question borrowed
the car for some private purpose. Nestor would probably not
have been accommodated if he were a mere employee for
employees do not usually enjoy the use of their employer's car
at two o'clock in the morning.
As the employment relationship between Ernesto Martin and
Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was necessary for the
plaintiff to establish it by evidence. Meralco had the burden of
proof, or the duty "to present evidence on the fact in issue
necessary to establish his claim" as required by Rule 131,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was
fatal to its action.
It was enough for the defendant to deny the alleged
employment relationship, without more, for he was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat. 8 This Court has consistently applied
the ancient rule that "if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a
satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense." 9
The case of Amor v. Soberano, 10 a Court of Appeals decision
not elevated to this Court, was misapplied by the respondent
court in support of the petitioner's position. The vehicle
involved in that case was a six-by-six truck, which reasonably
raised the factual presumption that it was engaged in business
and that its driver was employed by the owner of the vehicle.
The case at bar involves a private vehicle as its license plate
indicates. No evidence was ever offered that it was being used
for business purposes or that, in any case, its driver at the time
of the accident was an employee of the petitioner.
It is worth mentioning in this connection that in Filamer
Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 11 the owner of the jeep
involved in the accident was absolved from liability when it was
shown that the driver of the vehicle was not employed as such
by the latter but was a "working scholar" as that term is defined
by the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 12 He
was assigned to janitorial duties. Evidence was introduced to
establish the employment relationship but it failed nonetheless
to hold the owner responsible. Significantly, no similar
evidence was even presented in the case at bar, the private
respondent merely relying on its mere allegation that Nestor
Martin was the petitioner's employee. Allegation is not
synonymous with proof.
The above observations make it unnecessary to examine the
question of the driver's alleged negligence or the lack of
diligence on the part of the petitioner in the selection and
supervision of his employee. These questions have not arisen
because the employment relationship contemplated in Article
1860 of the Civil Code has not been established.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent court is REVERSED, and Civil Case No. 48045 in
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151, is DISMISSED,
with costs against the respondent. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medidialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 66207 May 18, 1992
MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR., represented by his judicial
guardian VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of
Branch LXI, Regional Trial Court of Region III, Angeles
City, and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES,
represented by its President, respondents.
Mariano Y. Navarro for Republic Central Colleges.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil
complaint for damages against private respondent Republic
Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc.
and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard, as defendants.
The complaint alleged that:
. . . on 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the
plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises of the
defendant, REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, as he was and
is still a regular enrolled student of said school taking his
morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who
was on said date and hour in the premises of said school
performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed
security guard under the employment, supervision and control
of his employer-defendant R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC.,
headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, without any provocation, in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner, with intent to kill, attack, assault, strike and shoot the
plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly
weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have
caused plaintiff's death were it not for the timely medical
assistance given to him. The plaintiff was treated and confined
at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's
opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular
classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his
usual work for a duration of from three to four months before
his wounds would be completely healed. 1
Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss,
contending that the complaint stated no cause of action
against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any
liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner student for the
reason that private respondent school was not the employer of
the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was
not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private
respondent school further argued that Article 2180, 7th
paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said
paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts
and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon
was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
In an order dated 29 November 1983, respondent Judge
granted private respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding
that security guard Jimmy Solomon was not an employee of
the school which accordingly could not be held liable for his
acts or omissions. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
without success.
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended
that respondent trial judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article
2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil
Code and granted the school's motion to dismiss.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond
for damage inflicted by one against another by fault or
negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but
also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law
responsible. Among the persons held vicariously responsible
for acts or omissions of another person are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
xxx xxx xxx
The first paragraph quoted above offers no basis for holding
the Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security
guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner Soliman, Jr.
Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy
Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L.
Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or
customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns
the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the
employer of such guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the
employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security
agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of
security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be
assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose
premises or property are protected by the security guards. The
fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to
the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render
the client responsible as an employer of the security guards
concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions.
Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than
requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into with the security agency. There being no
employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and
Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious
liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard
Solomon.
Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil
or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an
employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other above-
quoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly
not available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central
Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
The relevant portions of the other Articles of the Civil Code
invoked by petitioner are as follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority:
(2) Teachers and professors;
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard to
apprentices;
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding article shall
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.
Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor
and student are fixed by government regulations and those of
each school or institution. In no case shall corporal punishment
be countenanced. The teacher or professor shall cultivate the
best potentialities of the heart and mind of the pupil or student.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held
the owner and president of a school of arts and trades known
as the "Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila,
responsible in damages for the death of Dominador Palisoc, a
student of Institute, which resulted from fist blows delivered by
Virgilio L. Daffon, another student of the Institute. It will be
seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly
within the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but
those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in the
instant case.
Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made
responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person by the
child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In
the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who
committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to
petitioner, was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the
Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon.
Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the
petitioner's claim as one based wholly and exclusively on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial
judge was correct. Does it follow, however, that respondent
Colleges could not be held liable upon any other basis in law,
for or in respect of the injury sustained by petitioner, so as to
entitle respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint
in respect of itself?
The very recent case of the Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) v. Court of Appeals, 5 requires us to
give a negative answer to that question.
In PSBA, the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was
not applicable where a student had been injured by one who
was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not
exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same
time, however, the Court stressed that an implied contract may
be held to be established between a school which accepts
students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students
who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in
obligations for both parties:
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment,
there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with.
For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with
an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with
the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide
by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules
and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in"
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the
realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to
prevent the breakdown thereof. 6
In that case, the Court was careful to point out that:
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school
and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence
in providing proper security measures. This would be for the
trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a
contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only
because of the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence
of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless
the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed
by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually
a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its
students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous
student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila
where there have been reported several incidents ranging from
gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent
trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security
measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual
or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside
school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its
contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person,
time and place. 7
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's
motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and both the Court
of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial court's order. In the
case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed
by respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's
cause of action was based, and could have been based, only
on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states,
acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at
the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or other
legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error
when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of
action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to
dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice,
allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an
obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of respondent
Colleges.
In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this
Court, and in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage
of justice, and putting aside technical considerations, we
consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error
correctible by this Court in the instant case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT DUE
COURSE to the Petition, to TREAT the comment of
respondent Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Order dated 29 November 1983. This case is
REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings
consistent with this Resolution.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-12986 March 31, 1966
THE SPOUSES BERNABE AFRICA and SOLEDAD C.
AFRICA, and the HEIRS OF DOMINGA ONG, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., MATEO BOQUIREN and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.
Ross, Selph, Carrascoso and Janda for the respondents.
Bernabe Africa, etc. for the petitioners.
MAKALINTAL., J.:
This case is before us on a petition for review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed that of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dismissing petitioners' second amended
complaint against respondents.
The action is for damages under Articles 1902 and 1903 of the
old Civil Code. It appears that in the afternoon of March 18,
1948 a fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner
of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while
gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank
where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire spread to
and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal
properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them
petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and
Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and
the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on
the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised
due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of
their employees.
The first question before Us refers to the admissibility of
certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police and
Fire Departments and by a certain Captain Tinio of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. Portions of the first two reports are
as follows:
1. Police Department report: —
Investigation disclosed that at about 4:00 P.M. March 18,
1948, while Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a
tank truck, plate No. T-5292 into the underground tank of the
Caltex Gasoline Station located at the corner of Rizal Avenue
and Antipolo Street, this City, an unknown Filipino lighted a
cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main
valve of the said underground tank. Due to the gasoline fumes,
fire suddenly blazed. Quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling
off the gasoline hose connecting the truck with the
underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. However, the
flames scattered due to the hose from which the gasoline was
spouting. It burned the truck and the following accessorias and
residences.
2. The Fire Department report: —
In connection with their allegation that the premises was (sic)
subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette
stand, the complainants furnished this Office a copy of a
photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted
herewith. it appears in this picture that there are in the
premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to
information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes
and matches, installed between the gasoline pumps and the
underground tanks.
The report of Captain Tinio reproduced information given by a
certain Benito Morales regarding the history of the gasoline
station and what the chief of the fire department had told him
on the same subject.
The foregoing reports were ruled out as "double hearsay" by
the Court of Appeals and hence inadmissible. This ruling is
now assigned as error. It is contended: first, that said reports
were admitted by the trial court without objection on the part of
respondents; secondly, that with respect to the police report
(Exhibit V-Africa) which appears signed by a Detective
Zapanta allegedly "for Salvador Capacillo," the latter was
presented as witness but respondents waived their right to
cross-examine him although they had the opportunity to do so;
and thirdly, that in any event the said reports are admissible as
an exception to the hearsay rule under section 35 of Rule 123,
now Rule 130.
The first contention is not borne out by the record. The
transcript of the hearing of September 17, 1953 (pp. 167-170)
shows that the reports in question, when offered as evidence,
were objected to by counsel for each of respondents on the
ground that they were hearsay and that they were "irrelevant,
immaterial and impertinent." Indeed, in the court's resolution
only Exhibits J, K, K-5 and X-6 were admitted without
objection; the admission of the others, including the disputed
ones, carried no such explanation.
On the second point, although Detective Capacillo did take the
witness stand, he was not examined and he did not testify as
to the facts mentioned in his alleged report (signed by
Detective Zapanta). All he said was that he was one of those
who investigated "the location of the fire and, if possible,
gather witnesses as to the occurrence, and that he brought the
report with him. There was nothing, therefore, on which he
need be cross-examined; and the contents of the report, as to
which he did not testify, did not thereby become competent
evidence. And even if he had testified, his testimony would still
have been objectionable as far as information gathered by him
from third persons was concerned.
Petitioners maintain, however, that the reports in themselves,
that is, without further testimonial evidence on their contents,
fall within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which provides
that "entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just
mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or
by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it
was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1957] p. 398).
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the
reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not
within the personal knowledge of the officers who conducted
the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts, however,
acquired by them through official information? As to some facts
the sources thereof are not even identified. Others are
attributed to Leopoldo Medina, referred to as an employee at
the gas station were the fire occurred; to Leandro Flores, driver
of the tank truck from which gasoline was being transferred at
the time to the underground tank of the station; and to
respondent Mateo Boquiren, who could not, according to
Exhibit V-Africa, give any reason as to the origin of the fire. To
qualify their statements as "official information" acquired by the
officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the
statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts
stated but must have the duty to give such statements for
record.1
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the
reporting officers through official information, not having been
given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
The next question is whether or not, without proof as to the
cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur should apply so as to presume negligence on the part
of appellees. Both the trial court and the appellate court
refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the grounds
that "as to (its) applicability ... in the Philippines, there seems
to he nothing definite," and that while the rules do not prohibit
its adoption in appropriate cases, "in the case at bar, however,
we find no practical use for such doctrine." The question
deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine
has actually been applied in this jurisdiction, in the case
of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. (CA-
G.R. No. 3240-R, September 20, 1949), wherein the decision
of the Court of Appeals was penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes now a member of the Supreme Court.
The facts of that case are stated in the decision as follows:
In the afternoon of May 5, 1946, while the plaintiff-appellee and
other companions were loading grass between the
municipalities of Bay and Calauan, in the province of Laguna,
with clear weather and without any wind blowing, an electric
transmission wire, installed and maintained by the defendant
Philippine Power and Development Co., Inc. alongside the
road, suddenly parted, and one of the broken ends hit the head
of the plaintiff as he was about to board the truck. As a result,
plaintiff received the full shock of 4,400 volts carried by the
wire and was knocked unconscious to the ground. The electric
charge coursed through his body and caused extensive and
serious multiple burns from skull to legs, leaving the bone
exposed in some parts and causing intense pain and wounds
that were not completely healed when the case was tried on
June 18, 1947, over one year after the mishap.
The defendant therein disclaimed liability on the ground that
the plaintiff had failed to show any specific act of negligence,
but the appellate court overruled the defense under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The court said:
The first point is directed against the sufficiency of plaintiff's
evidence to place appellant on its defense. While it is the rule,
as contended by the appellant, that in case of noncontractual
negligence, or culpa aquiliana, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to establish that the proximate cause of his injury was
the negligence of the defendant, it is also a recognized
principal that "where the thing which caused injury, without
fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of
care."
And the burden of evidence is shifted to him to establish that
he has observed due care and diligence. (San Juan Light &
Transit Co. v. Requena, 244, U.S. 89, 56 L. ed. 680.) This rule
is known by the name of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction
speaks for itself), and is peculiarly applicable to the case at
bar, where it is unquestioned that the plaintiff had every right to
be on the highway, and the electric wire was under the sole
control of defendant company. In the ordinary course of
events, electric wires do not part suddenly in fair weather and
injure people, unless they are subjected to unusual strain and
stress or there are defects in their installation, maintenance
and supervision; just as barrels do not ordinarily roll out of the
warehouse windows to injure passersby, unless some one was
negligent. (Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & Co. 722; 159 Eng. Reprint
299, the leading case that established that rule).
Consequently, in the absence of contributory negligence
(which is admittedly not present), the fact that the wire
snapped suffices to raise a reasonable presumption of
negligence in its installation, care and maintenance.
Thereafter, as observed by Chief Baron Pollock, "if there are
any facts inconsistent with negligence, it is for the defendant to
prove."
It is true of course that decisions of the Court of Appeals do not
lay down doctrines binding on the Supreme Court, but we do
not consider this a reason for not applying the particular
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the case at bar. Gasoline is a
highly combustible material, in the storage and sale of which
extreme care must be taken. On the other hand, fire is not
considered a fortuitous event, as it arises almost invariably
from some act of man. A case strikingly similar to the one
before Us is Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al., 171
So. 447:
Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of
Hammon which in the year 1934 was leased to the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline filling station. On October
8, 1934, during the term of the lease, while gasoline was being
transferred from the tank wagon, also operated by the Shell
Petroleum Corporation, to the underground tank of the station,
a fire started with resulting damages to the building owned by
Jones. Alleging that the damages to his building amounted to
$516.95, Jones sued the Shell Petroleum Corporation for the
recovery of that amount. The judge of the district court, after
hearing the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a
recovery and rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed this judgment,
on the ground the testimony failed to show with reasonable
certainty any negligence on the part of the Shell Petroleum
Corporation or any of its agents or employees. Plaintiff applied
to this Court for a Writ of Review which was granted, and the
case is now before us for decision.1äwphï1.ñët
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana held:
Plaintiff's petition contains two distinct charges of negligence
— one relating to the cause of the fire and the other relating to
the spreading of the gasoline about the filling station.
Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff's
building by the fire, no witnesses were placed on the stand by
the defendant.
Taking up plaintiff's charge of negligence relating to the cause
of the fire, we find it established by the record that the filling
station and the tank truck were under the control of the
defendant and operated by its agents or employees. We
further find from the uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff's
witnesses that fire started in the underground tank attached to
the filling station while it was being filled from the tank truck
and while both the tank and the truck were in charge of and
being operated by the agents or employees of the defendant,
extended to the hose and tank truck, and was communicated
from the burning hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the
building owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further
circumstance of defendant's failure to explain the cause of the
fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has
evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases
in which the doctrine may be successfully invoked and this, we
think, is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
absence of explanation by defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care. (45 C.J. #768, p. 1193).
This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely
approved and adopted by the courts of last resort. Some of the
cases in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine has been applied
are the following, viz.: Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25
So. 977; Hebert v. Lake Charles Ice, etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35
So. 731, 64 L.R.A. 101, 100 Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis v.
Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115 La. 63, 38 So. 892; Bents v. Page,
115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with
equal force here. The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees.
A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the
neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have
known how the fire started were appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever.
It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
In the report submitted by Captain Leoncio Mariano of the
Manila Police Department (Exh. X-1 Africa) the following
appears:
Investigation of the basic complaint disclosed that the Caltex
Gasoline Station complained of occupies a lot approximately
10 m x 10 m at the southwest corner of Rizal Avenue and
Antipolo. The location is within a very busy business district
near the Obrero Market, a railroad crossing and very thickly
populated neighborhood where a great number of people mill
around until gasoline ever be the acivities of these people or
lighting a cigarette cannot be excluded and this constitute a
secondary hazard to its operation which in turn endangers the
entire neighborhood to conflagration.
Furthermore, aside from precautions already taken by its
operator the concrete walls south and west adjoining the
neighborhood are only 2-1/2 meters high at most and cannot
avoid the flames from leaping over it in case of fire.
Records show that there have been two cases of fire which
caused not only material damages but desperation and also
panic in the neighborhood.
Although the soft drinks stand had been eliminated, this
gasoline service station is also used by its operator as a
garage and repair shop for his fleet of taxicabs numbering ten
or more, adding another risk to the possible outbreak of fire at
this already small but crowded gasoline station.
The foregoing report, having been submitted by a police officer
in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own
personal observation of the facts reported, may properly be
considered as an exception to the hearsay rule. These facts,
descriptive of the location and objective circumstances
surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question,
strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more
stringent measures of caution than those which would satisfy
the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
There is no more eloquent demonstration of this than the
statement of Leandro Flores before the police investigator.
Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone
and without assistance, was transferring the contents thereof
into the underground storage when the fire broke out. He said:
"Before loading the underground tank there were no people,
but while the loading was going on, there were people who
went to drink coca-cola (at the coca-cola stand) which is about
a meter from the hole leading to the underground tank." He
added that when the tank was almost filled he went to the tank
truck to close the valve, and while he had his back turned to
the "manhole" he, heard someone shout "fire."
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the
neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission
on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a
concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping
over it. As it was the concrete wall was only 2-1/2 meters high,
and beyond that height it consisted merely of galvanized iron
sheets, which would predictably crumple and melt when
subjected to intense heat. Defendants' negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with
respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended
answer to the second amended complaint that "the fire was
caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority,
or permission of answering defendant, passed through the
gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the
premises." No evidence on this point was adduced, but
assuming the allegation to be true — certainly any unfavorable
inference from the admission may be taken against Boquiren
— it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision of the
Supreme Court of Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the
present case, states the rule which we find acceptable here. "It
is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or
agent, owe a degree of protection to the public proportionate to
and commensurate with a danger involved ... we think it is the
generally accepted rule as applied to torts that 'if the effects of
the actor's negligent conduct actively and continuously operate
to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and
substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third
person's innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial
factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liability.' (Restatement of the Law of Torts, vol. 2, p. 1184,
#439). Stated in another way, "The intention of an unforeseen
and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer
from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly
and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the
resulting injury." (MacAfee, et al. vs. Traver's Gas Corporation,
153 S.W. 2nd 442.)
The next issue is whether Caltex should be held liable for the
damages caused to appellants. This issue depends on
whether Boquiren was an independent contractor, as held by
the Court of Appeals, or an agent of Caltex. This question, in
the light of the facts not controverted, is one of law and hence
may be passed upon by this Court. These facts are: (1)
Boquiren made an admission that he was an agent of Caltex;
(2) at the time of the fire Caltex owned the gasoline station and
all the equipment therein; (3) Caltex exercised control over
Boquiren in the management of the state; (4) the delivery truck
used in delivering gasoline to the station had the name of
CALTEX painted on it; and (5) the license to store gasoline at
the station was in the name of Caltex, which paid the license
fees. (Exhibit T-Africa; Exhibit U-Africa; Exhibit X-5 Africa;
Exhibit X-6 Africa; Exhibit Y-Africa).
In Boquiren's amended answer to the second amended
complaint, he denied that he directed one of his drivers to
remove gasoline from the truck into the tank and alleged that
the "alleged driver, if one there was, was not in his employ, the
driver being an employee of the Caltex (Phil.) Inc. and/or the
owners of the gasoline station." It is true that Boquiren later on
amended his answer, and that among the changes was one to
the effect that he was not acting as agent of Caltex. But then
again, in his motion to dismiss appellants' second amended
complaint the ground alleged was that it stated no cause of
action since under the allegations thereof he was merely acting
as agent of Caltex, such that he could not have incurred
personal liability. A motion to dismiss on this ground is deemed
to be an admission of the facts alleged in the complaint.
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the
equipment therein, but claims that the business conducted at
the service station in question was owned and operated by
Boquiren. But Caltex did not present any contract with
Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their relationship at
the time of the fire. There must have been one in existence at
that time. Instead, what was presented was a license
agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this case, since
it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year
period it was intended to operate. This so-called license
agreement (Exhibit 5-Caltex) was executed on November 29,
1948, but made effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover
the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This retroactivity
provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion
that it was designed precisely to free Caltex from any
responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the clause
that Caltex "shall not be liable for any injury to person or
property while in the property herein licensed, it being
understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an
employee, representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex)."
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren
can hardly be considered an independent contractor. Under
that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal
sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment
therein. He could sell only Caltex Products. Maintenance of the
station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other
words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer
his rights as licensee without the consent of Caltex. The
license agreement was supposed to be from January 1, 1948
to December 31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by
Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex could at any
time cancel and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren
ceased to sell Caltex products, or did not conduct the business
with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex. Termination of
the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but
not to Boquiren. These provisions of the contract show the
extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The control was
such that the latter was virtually an employee of the former.
Taking into consideration the fact that the operator owed his
position to the company and the latter could remove him or
terminate his services at will; that the service station belonged
to the company and bore its tradename and the operator sold
only the products of the company; that the equipment used by
the operator belonged to the company and were just loaned to
the operator and the company took charge of their repair and
maintenance; that an employee of the company supervised the
operator and conducted periodic inspection of the company's
gasoline and service station; that the price of the products sold
by the operator was fixed by the company and not by the
operator; and that the receipts signed by the operator indicated
that he was a mere agent, the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the operator was an agent of the company and not an
independent contractor should not be disturbed.
To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are
not bound to rely upon the name or title given it by the
contracting parties, should thereby a controversy as to what
they really had intended to enter into, but the way the
contracting parties do or perform their respective obligations
stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and inquired into,
and should such performance conflict with the name or title
given the contract by the parties, the former must prevail over
the latter. (Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Firemens'
Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 100 Phil. 757).
The written contract was apparently drawn for the purpose of
creating the apparent relationship of employer and
independent contractor, and of avoiding liability for the
negligence of the employees about the station; but the
company was not satisfied to allow such relationship to exist.
The evidence shows that it immediately assumed control, and
proceeded to direct the method by which the work contracted
for should be performed. By reserving the right to terminate the
contract at will, it retained the means of compelling submission
to its orders. Having elected to assume control and to direct
the means and methods by which the work has to be
performed, it must be held liable for the negligence of those
performing service under its direction. We think the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. (Gulf Refining
Company v. Rogers, 57 S.W. 2d, 183).
Caltex further argues that the gasoline stored in the station
belonged to Boquiren. But no cash invoices were presented to
show that Boquiren had bought said gasoline from Caltex.
Neither was there a sales contract to prove the same.
As found by the trial court the Africas sustained a loss of
P9,005.80, after deducting the amount of P2,000.00 collected
by them on the insurance of the house. The deduction is now
challenged as erroneous on the ground that Article 2207 of the
New Civil Code, which provides for the subrogation of the
insurer to the rights of the insured, was not yet in effect when
the loss took place. However, regardless of the silence of the
law on this point at that time, the amount that should be
recovered be measured by the damages actually suffered,
otherwise the principle prohibiting unjust enrichment would be
violated. With respect to the claim of the heirs of Ong
P7,500.00 was adjudged by the lower court on the basis of the
assessed value of the property destroyed, namely, P1,500.00,
disregarding the testimony of one of the Ong children that said
property was worth P4,000.00. We agree that the court erred,
since it is of common knowledge that the assessment for
taxation purposes is not an accurate gauge of fair market
value, and in this case should not prevail over positive
evidence of such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled
to P10,000.00.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and
respondents-appellees are held liable solidarily to appellants,
and ordered to pay them the aforesaid sum of P9,005.80 and
P10,000.00, respectively, with interest from the filing of the
complaint, and costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 117944. February 7, 1996]
RICHARD LI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA.
LOURDES VALENZUELA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to
recover damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by
her in a vehicular accident in the early morning of June 24,
1990. The facts found by the trial court are succinctly
summarized by the Court of Appeals below:
This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for
serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
Plaintiffs version of the accident is as follows: At around 2:00 in
the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No.
FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home
at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling
along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading
towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake
Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she
stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify
whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having
been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat
and that she cannot reach her home in that cars condition, she
parked along the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, put on her
emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to
open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of
her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the
name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the
impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of
the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the
ground. She was pulled out from under defendants car.
Plaintiffs left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with
only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body.
She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where
she was found to have a traumatic amputation, leg, left up to
distal thigh (above knee). She was confined in the hospital for
twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
The expenses for the hospital confinement (P 120,000.00) and
the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by
defendants from the car insurance.
In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the
amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses
amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected
earnings.
Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on
his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was
raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic
was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner
portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of
Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly confronted, in the
vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the
opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright lights.
Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to
avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped
plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was midnight
blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device,
and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that
the left rear portion of plaintiffs car was protruding as it was
then at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the right
lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed
the testimony of plaintiffs witness that after being bumped the
car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car
parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for
damages, alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as
she was not a licensed driver.
The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the
vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three cars
involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiffs car was
near the sidewalk; this witness did not remember whether the
hazard lights of plaintiffs car were on, and did not notice if
there was an early warning device; there was a street light at
the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters
away. It was not mostly dark, i.e. things can be seen (p. 16,
tsn, Oct. 28, 1991).
A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after
plaintiff alighted from her car and opened the trunk
compartment, defendants car came approaching very fast ten
meters from the scene; the car was zigzagging. The rear left
side of plaintiffs car was bumped by the front right portion of
defendants car; as a consequence, the plaintiffs car swerved
to the right and hit the parked car on the sidewalk. Plaintiff was
thrown to the windshield of defendants car, which was
destroyed, and landed under the car. He stated that defendant
was under the influence of liquor as he could smell it very well
(pp. 43, 79, tsn., June 17, 1991).
After trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs
submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross
negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial,
Inc., Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages
pursuant to Article 2180. It ordered the defendants to jointly
and severally pay the following amounts:
1. P41,840.00, as actual damages, representing the
miscellaneous expenses of the plaintiff as a result of her
severed left leg;
2. The sums of (a) P37,500.00, for the unrealized profits
because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga
restaurant three (3) weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990;
(b) P20,000.00, a month, as unrealized profits of the plaintiff in
her Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the
date of this judgment; and (c) P30,000.00, a month, for
unrealized profits in plaintiffs two (2) beauty salons from July,
1990 until the date of this decision;
3. P1,000,000.00, in moral damages;
4. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages,
5. P60,000.00, as reasonable attorneys fees; and
6. Costs.
As a result of the trial courts decision, defendants filed an
Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing
testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No. 804367 (People vs.
Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as
depicted by the pieces of glass/debris from the parties cars,
appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
The trial court denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an
appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision
rendered March 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals found that
there was ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial
courts finding that the plaintiffs car was properly parked at the
right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendants
car.[1]Dismissing the defendants argument that the plaintiffs
car was improperly parked, almost at the center of the road,
the respondent court noted that evidence which was supposed
to prove that the car was at or near center of the right lane was
never presented during the trial of the case.[2] The respondent
court furthermore observed that:
Defendant Lis testimony that he was driving at a safe speed
of 55 km./hour is self serving; it was not corroborated. It was in
fact contradicted by eyewitness Rodriguez who stated that he
was outside his beerhouse located at Aurora Boulevard after
A. Lake Street, at or about 2:00 a.m. of June 24, 1990 when
his attention was caught by a beautiful lady (referring to the
plaintiff) alighting from her car and opening the trunk
compartment; he noticed the car of Richard Li approaching
very fast ten (10) meters away from the scene; defendants car
was zigzagging, although there were no holes and hazards on
the street, and bumped the leg of the plaintiff who was thrown
against the windshield of defendants car, causing its
destruction. He came to the rescue of the plaintiff, who was
pulled out from under defendants car and was able to say
hurting words to Richard Li because he noticed that the latter
was under the influence of liquor, because he could smell it
very well (p. 36, et. seq., tsn, June 17, 1991). He knew that
plaintiff owned a beerhouse in Sta. Mesa in the 1970s, but did
not know either plaintiff or defendant Li before the accident.
In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was
liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of
Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Lis employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner
Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral
damages to P500,000.00. Finding justification for exemplary
damages, the respondent court allowed an award of
P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorneys fees
and the other damages. The Court of Appeals, likewise,
dismissed the defendants counterclaims.[3]
Consequently, both parties assail the respondent courts
decision by filing two separate petitions before this Court.
Richard Li, in G.R. No. 117944, contends that he should not be
held liable for damages because the proximate cause of the
accident was Ma. Lourdes Valenzuelas own negligence.
Alternatively, he argues that in the event that this Court finds
him negligent, such negligence ought to be mitigated by the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 115024, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela assails the respondent courts decision insofar as it
absolves Alexander Commercial, Inc. from liability as the
owner of the car driven by Richard Li and insofar as it reduces
the amount of the actual and moral damages awarded by the
trial court.[4]
As the issues are intimately related, both petitions are
hereby consolidated. It is plainly evident that the petition for
review in G.R. No. 117944 raises no substantial questions of
law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are
factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals finding Richard Li grossly negligent in driving the
Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early
morning hours of June 24, 1990. This we will not do. As a
general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
binding and conclusive upon us, and this Court will not
normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of
fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence
on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[5]
In the first place, Valenzuelas version of the incident was
fully corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio
Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just
across the scene of the accident. On trial, he testified that he
observed a car being driven at a very fast speed, racing
towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue.[6] Rodriguez
further added that he was standing in front of his
establishment, just ten to twenty feet away from the scene of
the accident, when he saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her
against the windshield of the defendants Mitsubishi Lancer,
from where she eventually fell under the defendants car.
Spontaneously reacting to the incident, he crossed the street,
noting that a man reeking with the smell of liquor had alighted
from the offending vehicle in order to survey the
incident.[7] Equally important, Rodriguez declared that he
observed Valenzuelas car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk,[8] contrary to Lis allegation that Valenzuelas car was
close to the center of the right lane. We agree that as between
Lis self-serving asseverations and the observations of a
witness who did not even know the accident victim personally
and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar
to his testimony to the investigator immediately after the
incident, the latters testimony deserves greater weight. As the
court emphasized:
The issue is one of credibility and from Our own examination of
the transcript, We are not prepared to set aside the trial courts
reliance on the testimony of Rodriguez negating defendants
assertion that he was driving at a safe speed. While Rodriguez
drives only a motorcycle, his perception of speed is not
necessarily impaired. He was subjected to cross-examination
and no attempt was made to question his competence or the
accuracy of his statement that defendant was driving very fast.
This was the same statement he gave to the police investigator
after the incident, as told to a newspaper report (Exh. P). We
see no compelling basis for disregarding his testimony.
The alleged inconsistencies in Rodriguez testimony are not
borne out by an examination of the testimony. Rodriguez
testified that the scene of the accident was across the street
where his beerhouse is located about ten to twenty feet away
(pp. 35-36, tsn, June 17, 1991). He did not state that the
accident transpired immediately in front of his establishment.
The ownership of the Lambingan sa Kambingan is not
material; the business is registered in the name of his mother,
but he explained that he owns the establishment (p. 5, tsn.,
June 20, 1991).
Moreover, the testimony that the streetlights on his side
of Aurora Boulevard were on the night the accident transpired
(p. 8) is not necessarily contradictory to the testimony of Pfc.
Ramos that there was a streetlight at the corner of Aurora
Boulevard and F. Roman Street (p. 45, tsn., Oct. 20, 1991).
With respect to the weather condition, Rodriguez testified that
there was only a drizzle, not a heavy rain and the rain has
stopped and he was outside his establishment at the time the
accident transpired (pp. 64-65, tsn., June 17, 1991). This was
consistent with plaintiffs testimony that it was no longer raining
when she left Bistro La Conga (pp. 10-11, tsn., April 29, 1991).
It was defendant Li who stated that it was raining all the way in
an attempt to explain why he was travelling at only 50-55 kph.
(p. 11, tsn., Oct. 14, 1991). As to the testimony of Pfc. Ramos
that it was raining, he arrived at the scene only in response to
a telephone call after the accident had transpired (pp. 9-10,
tsn, Oct. 28, 1991). We find no substantial inconsistencies in
Rodriguezs testimony that would impair the essential integrity
of his testimony or reflect on his honesty. We are compelled to
affirm the trial courts acceptance of the testimony of said
eyewitness.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez
we note that Lis testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the
accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a version,
obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any
and all liability in the incident. Against Valenzuelas
corroborated claims, his allegations were neither backed up by
other witnesses nor by the circumstances proven in the course
of trial. He claimed that he was driving merely at a speed
of 55 kph. when out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon lancer
right in front of him, which was (the) plaintiffs car. He alleged
that upon seeing this sudden apparition he put on his brakes to
no avail as the road was slippery.[9]
One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give
credence to Lis disingenuous and patently self-serving
asseverations. The average motorist alert to road
conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the
visibility of the street, and the road conditions on a principal
metropolitan thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the
road if he were alert - as every driver should be - to those
conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. Physiological fight or flight[10] mechanisms are at work,
provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.[11] Lis failure to react in a manner
which would have avoided the accident could therefore have
been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he
was driving at a very fast speed as testified by Rodriquez; and
2) that he was under the influence of alcohol.[12] Either factor
working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he would
have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuelas car, rather
than be in a situation forcing him to suddenly apply his brakes.
As the trial court noted (quoted with approval by respondent
court):
Secondly, as narrated by defendant Richard Li to the San Juan
Police immediately after the incident, he said that while driving
along Aurora Blvd., out of nowhere he saw a dark maroon
lancer right in front of him, which was plaintiffs car, indicating,
again, thereby that, indeed, he was driving very fast, oblivious
of his surroundings and the road ahead of him, because if he
was not, then he could not have missed noticing at a still far
distance the parked car of the plaintiff at the right side near the
sidewalk which had its emergency lights on, thereby avoiding
forcefully bumping at the plaintiff who was then standing at the
left rear edge of her car.
Since, according to him, in his narration to the San Juan
Police, he put on his brakes when he saw the plaintiffs car in
front of him, but that it failed as the road was wet and slippery,
this goes to show again, that, contrary to his claim, he was,
indeed, running very fast. For, were it otherwise, he could have
easily completely stopped his car, thereby avoiding the
bumping of the plaintiff, notwithstanding that the road was wet
and slippery. Verily, since, if, indeed, he was running slow, as
he claimed, at only about 55 kilometers per hour, then, inspite
of the wet and slippery road, he could have avoided hitting the
plaintiff by the mere expedient or applying his brakes at the
proper time and distance.
It could not be true, therefore, as he now claims during his
testimony, which is contrary to what he told the police
immediately after the accident and is, therefore, more
believable, that he did not actually step on his brakes, but
simply swerved a little to the right when he saw the on-coming
car with glaring headlights, from the opposite direction, in order
to avoid it.
For, had this been what he did, he would not have bumped the
car of the plaintiff which was properly parked at the right
beside the sidewalk. And, it was not even necessary for him to
swerve a little to the right in order to safely avoid a collision
with the on-coming car, considering that Aurora Blvd. is a
double lane avenue separated at the center by a dotted white
paint, and there is plenty of space for both cars, since her car
was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-
coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao.[13]
Having come to the conclusion that Li was negligent in
driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer, the next
question for us to determine is whether or not Valenzuela was
likewise guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car
alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points out, is
a no parking zone.
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has
suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection. [14] Based on the foregoing
definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner
Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection
was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no
parking zone. We cannot agree.
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize
that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be
held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an
individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of
impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous
situations and does not require the same standard of
thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by
unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions.[15] Under the
emergency rule adopted by this Court in Gan vs Court of
Appeals,[16] an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence.[17]
Applying this principle to a case in which the victims in a
vehicular accident swerved to the wrong lane to avoid hitting
two children suddenly darting into the street, we held, in Mc
Kee vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[18] that the driver therein,
Jose Koh, adopted the best means possible in the given
situation to avoid hitting the children. Using the emergency rule
the court concluded that Koh, in spite of the fact that he was in
the wrong lane when the collision with an oncoming truck
occurred, was not guilty of negligence.[19]
While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which
reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately weigh a
threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of
an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the
suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful
care, but by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night
will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both
convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley
where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be
hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency
(simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-
parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a
threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case,
Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora
Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire.
To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did
what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent
court:
She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire
was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked along
the sidewalk, about 1 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona
Car.[20] In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the
investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that
Valenzuelas car was parked very close to the sidewalk.[21] The
sketch which he prepared after the incident showed
Valenzuelas car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a
convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane
of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the
testimony of witness Rodriguez.[22]
Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did
exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency
and could not be considered to have contributed to the
unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the
amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency
which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora
Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that
she had taken all reasonable precautions.
Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence
ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the
accident. Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct
which creates an undue risk of harm to others.[23] It is the
failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.[24] We stressed, in Corliss vs.
Manila Railroad Company,[25] that negligence is the want of
care required by the circumstances.
The circumstances established by the evidence adduced
in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly
negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis
that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a
heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street
slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to
show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these
conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing
conditions on the road were significantly lessened. As Prosser
and Keaton emphasize:
[U]nder present day traffic conditions, any driver of an
automobile must be prepared for the sudden appearance of
obstacles and persons on the highway, and of other vehicles at
intersections, such as one who sees a child on the curb may
be required to anticipate its sudden dash into the street, and
his failure to act properly when they appear may be found to
amount to negligence. [26]
Lis obvious unpreparedness to cope with the situation
confronting him on the night of the accident was clearly of his
own making.
We now come to the question of the liability of Alexander
Commercial, Inc. Lis employer. In denying liability on the part
of Alexander Commercial, the respondent court held that:
There is no evidence, not even defendant Lis testimony, that
the visit was in connection with official matters. His functions
as assistant manager sometimes required him to perform work
outside the office as he has to visit buyers and company
clients, but he admitted that on the night of the accident he
came from BF Homes Paraaque he did not have business
from the company (pp. 25-26, tsn, Sept. 23, 1991). The use
ofthe company car was partly required by the nature of his
work, but the privilege of using it for non-official business is a
benefit, apparently referring to the fringe benefits attaching to
his position.
Under the civil law, an employer is liable for the negligence of
his employees in the discharge of their respective duties, the
basis of which liability is not respondeat superior, but the
relationship of pater familias, which theory bases the liability of
the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant (Cuison v. Norton and Harrison Co., 55 Phil. 18).
Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of
his employee, the act or omission which caused damage must
have occurred while an employee was in the actual
performance of his assigned tasks or duties (Francis High
School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341). In defining an
employers liability for the acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks, the Supreme Court has held that
this includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of
the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer
at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage (Filamer
Christian Institute vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 212 SCRA
637). An employer is expected to impose upon its employees
the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any
act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their
employer (at p. 645).
In light of the foregoing, We are unable to sustain the trial
courts finding that since defendant Li was authorized by the
company to use the company car either officially or socially or
even bring it home, he can be considered as using the
company car in the service of his employer or on the occasion
of his functions. Driving the company car was not among his
functions as assistant manager; using it for non-official
purposes would appear to be a fringe benefit, one of the perks
attached to his position. But to impose liability upon the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, earlier quoted,
there must be a showing that the damage was caused by their
employees in the service of the employer or on the occasion of
their functions. There is no evidence that Richard Li was at the
time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of the
companys business or its interests, or at least for its benefit.
The imposition of solidary liability against defendant Alexander
Commercial Corporation must therefore fail.[27]
We agree with the respondent court that the relationship
in question is not based on the principle of respondeat
superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant,
but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls
upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement
with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater
familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code,[28] we are of the opinion that Lis employer, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
First, the case of St. Francis High School vs. Court of
Appeals[29] upon which respondent court has placed undue
reliance, dealt with the subject of a school and its teachers
supervision of students during an extracurricular activity.
These cases now fall under the provision on special parental
authority found in Art. 218 of the Family Code which generally
encompasses all authorized school activities, whether inside or
outside school premises.
Second, the employers primary liability under the
concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to
Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasi-delictual or tortious in
character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is
introduced showing that the employer exercised the required
amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employers burden is overcome. The question of
diligent supervision, however, depends on the circumstances
of employment.
Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has
exercised diligent supervision of its employee during the
performance of the latters assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not expected to
exercise supervision over either the employees private
activities or during the performance of tasks either
unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees
tasks. The case at bench presents a situation of a different
character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with
either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
It is customary for large companies to provide certain
classes of their employees with courtesy vehicles. These
company cars are either wholly owned and maintained by the
company itself or are subject to various plans through which
employees eventually acquire their vehicles after a given
period of service, or after paying a token amount. Many
companies provide liberal car plans to enable their managerial
or other employees of rank to purchase cars, which, given the
cost of vehicles these days, they would not otherwise be able
to purchase on their own.
Under the first example, the company actually owns and
maintains the car up to the point of turnover of ownership to
the employee; in the second example, the car is really owned
and maintained by the employee himself. In furnishing vehicles
to such employees, are companies totally absolved of
responsibility when an accident involving a company-issued
car occurs during private use after normal office hours?
Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which
provide cars under the first plan, require rigorous tests of road
worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In
other words, like a good father of a family, they entrust the
company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee
to whom the car has been given full use of the said company
car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or
menace to himself, the company or to others. When a
company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its
employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good
father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.
In the ordinary course of business, not all company
employees are given the privilege of using a company-issued
car. For large companies other than those cited in the example
of the preceding paragraph, the privilege serves important
business purposes either related to the image of success an
entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in
general, or for practical and utilitarian reasons - to enable its
managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to
reach clients conveniently. In most cases, providing a
company car serves both purposes. Since important business
transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the
unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the
business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the
private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car,
the managerial employee or company sales agent. As such, in
providing for a company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the companys image, a company owes a
responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a
company issued car are able to use the company issue
capably and responsibly.
In the instant case, Li was an Assistant Manager of
Alexander Commercial, Inc. In his testimony before the trial
court, he admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did
not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he
was required quite often to perform work outside the office,
visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with
company clients.[30] These meetings, clearly, were not strictly
confined to routine hours because, as a managerial employee
tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients,
meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related
functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander
Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li - as well as the
corporation - to put up the front of a highly successful entity,
increasing the latters goodwill before its clientele. It also
facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the
former with a convenient mode of travel.
Moreover, Lis claim that he happened to be on the road
on the night of the accident because he was coming from a
social visit with an officemate in Paraaque was a bare
allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It
was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemates place, the same could give rise to speculation that
he and his officemate had just been from a work-related
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work
related strategies.
In fine, Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or
not the company took the steps necessary to determine or
ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it
gave full and unlimited use of a company car.[31] Not having
been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it
should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to
Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater
familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former
for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during
the accident.
Finally, we find no reason to overturn the amount of
damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the
amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages,
while the said damages are not intended to enrich the plaintiff
at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless
be commensurate to the suffering inflicted. In the instant case
we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages from
an amount of P 1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of
Appeals was not justified considering the nature of the
resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
As a result of the accident, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower extremity at
the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this,
Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory
functions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the
art prosthetic technology. Well beyond the period of
hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will be required
to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing.
These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements
and months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and
therapy. During her lifetime, the prosthetic devise will have to
be replaced and re-adjusted to changes in the size of her lower
limb effected by the biological changes of middle-age,
menopause and aging. Assuming she reaches menopause, for
example, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted to respond to
the changes in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease in
calcium levels observed in the bones of all post-menopausal
women. In other words, the damage done to her would not
only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently
changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her
body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require
corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All
of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the
surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would
be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological
pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing
of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device,
however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable
amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the
lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The
resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental
and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this
Courts discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of
P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord
with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis
grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early
morning hours of the accident.
 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision
of the court of Appeals is modified with the effect of
REINSTATING the judgment of the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED.
6. State
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-
appellant.
Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avanceña for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court
of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in
limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to
P5,000, instead of P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and
(2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to
two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed
by plaintiff in his complaint."
The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the
trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the
plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in
holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is liable
for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
collision, even if it be true that the collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment
against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by
the record, are as follows:
It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when
the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the
western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side
thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon
crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the
southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital
ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning
toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it
would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by
the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and
unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street,
into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any
whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who
was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the
post place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so
severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined
him on the very same day that he was taken to the General
Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal
region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his
head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely
unconscious.
The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the
skull and that the grey matter and brain was had suffered
material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which
was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so
weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope
that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that
the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it
might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to
infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr.
Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of
an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak
and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head
revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain
and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a
light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This
latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to
do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to
use his money for mathematical calculations.
According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses,
the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the
accident was excellent, and that after having received the
injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had
undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility,
energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the
accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings
and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he
had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of
his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had
before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the
highest parts of the building.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the
efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the
partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because
he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations
on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental
faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the
construction of the Uy Chaco building."
We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the
trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was
due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and
which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the
award awarded for permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the
amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the
plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We
find nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing
the amount of the first. As to the second, the record shows,
and the trial court so found, that the plaintiff's services as a
contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however,
limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the
plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think
there was error, because it was clearly established that the
plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of six months.
The mere fact that he remained in the hospital only two months
and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months
was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the
whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages
sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is
P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort
committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the
inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable
for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:
An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the
Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the
Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit.
Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the
Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages
resulting from a collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth,
nineteen hundred and thirteen;
Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident
nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any,
to which the claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-
General recommended that an Act be passed by the
Legislature authorizing Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts
against the Government, in order that said questions may be
decided: Now, therefore,
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the
Philippine Legislature, that:
SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the
Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the
amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is
entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to
appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said
Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, February 3, 1915.
Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply
waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to
the plaintiff? If only the former, then it cannot be held that the
Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or
extended the defendant's liability to any case not previously
recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot
be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted
that the instant case is one against the Government. As the
consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was
entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into
the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the
Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any,
to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . .
. ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said
questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the
accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur,
who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we
have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to
hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If
not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been
"modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the
United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts
of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of
Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the
torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs,
except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is
well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not
undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers
or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses,
which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen
vs. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick,
9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers vs. States, 20 How.,
527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff
sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries
received on account of the negligence of the state officers at
the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for
the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred industries; to
disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the
industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material
interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by
the public school system. In passing upon the question of the
state's liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents,
the court said:
No claim arises against any government is favor of an
individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laches, or
unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents.
(Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86
N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal.,
690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn
vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency,
sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals
to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either
fort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity
from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to
any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy
to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any
lawful defense.
In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets),
decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the
bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George
Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County,
Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court or courts and in such
form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling
and determining all controversies which he may now have with
the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorized officers and
agents, relative to the mill property of said George
Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on the
Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the
lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the
waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the
county of Waukesha, Wisconsin.
In determining the scope of this act, the court said:
Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature
admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its
officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand
between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does,
or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity
from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the
purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate.
Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the
court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from
well established principles of law, or that the amount of
damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the
door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature
had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so
long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not
have left so important a matter to mere inference, but would
have done so in express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs.
Commonwealth, 152 Mass., 28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)
In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act
of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on
contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by the
state board of examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms
and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against
the state in any of the courts of this state of competent
jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The
rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits, except
as herein otherwise provided.
And the court said:
This statute has been considered by this court in at least two
cases, arising under different facts, and in both it was held that
said statute did not create any liability or cause of action
against the state where none existed before, but merely gave
an additional remedy to enforce such liability as would have
existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman vs.
State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin vs. State,
121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the
superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the
commonwealth, whether at law or in equity," with an exception
not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute
the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152
Mass., 28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create
against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of
liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal
where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated.
In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the
canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York,
jurisdiction of claims for damages for injuries in the
management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained,
Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the
state can be made liable for injuries arising from the
negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some
positive statute assuming such liability."
It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to
extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching
the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers,
agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil
Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by
the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding
article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this
paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third
person causes to another by his fault or negligence is based,
as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that
the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part
in the act or omission of the third party who caused the
damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such
provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered
by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their
office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be
presumed on the part of the state in the organization of
branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of
service serves the general weal an that of private persons
interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state,
therefore, no relations of a private nature governed by the civil
law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a
judicial person capable of acquiring rights and contracting
obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur.
Civ., 24.)
That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the
obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas
in the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle
is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission
causes damage to another through fault or negligence, shall
be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to
acts or omissions of the persons who directly or indirectly
cause the damage, the following articles refers to this persons
and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain
fixed relations of authority and superiority over the authors of
the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence
of such relations the evil caused by their own fault or
negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives
way to proof, however, because, as held in the last paragraph
of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases
when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid
the damage, and among these persons, called upon to answer
in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition
to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the
state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency
of a special agent, doubtless because and only in this case,
the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of
objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the
general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the
damage that is occasioned to private parties by orders or
resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches
of the central administration acting in the name and
representation of the state itself and as an external expression
of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet
said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to
have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive
official, acting in the exercise of his powers, in proceedings to
enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the
owner of the property which they hold in sublease.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to
the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special
agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one
who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign
to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official) so that in representation of the state and being bound
to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to
him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who
is an employee of the acting administration and who on his
own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in
and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by
law and the regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18,
1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code
and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the
18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the
state is limited to that which it contracts through a special
agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to
perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which
gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on
acts or omissions imputable to a public official charged with
some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding
and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by
erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain,
July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the
Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its
agents, officers and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903,
supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must
be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the
Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount
of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained
by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by
legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests
solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 70547 January 22, 1993
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and HONORIO
CABARDO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and BALIWAG
TRANSIT, INC., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Leopoldo Sta. Maria for private respondents.
MELO, J.:
The imputation of culpa on the part of herein petitioners as a
result of the collision between its strain, bound for Manila from
La Union, with a Baliwag transit bus at the railroad crossing on
the road going to Hagonoy, Bulacan on August l0, 1974, is the
subject of the petition at bar directed against the judgment of
affirmance rendered by respondent court, through the Fourth
Civil Cases Division (Sison, Bidin (P), Veloso, JJ.), vis-a-vis
the decretal portion handed down by the court of origin in:
1. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiff the amount of P179,511.52 as actual damages.
2. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiff P436,642.03 as reimbursement for the damages
paid by the plaintiff to death, injury and damage claimants.
3. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50, 000.00 to the
plaintiff.
4. Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P5, 000.00.
5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay
the plaintiff interest at the legal rate on the above amounts due
the plaintiff from August 10, 1974 until fully paid.
6. Ordering the defendants to pay the cost of this suit.
7. Ordering the dismissal of the defendants'
counterclaim for lack of factual and legal basis. (p. 101, Record
on Appeal; p. 103. Rollo.)
Culled from the text of the assailed disposition are the facts of
the case at bar which are hereunder adopted verbatim:
The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of
defendant Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from
San Fernando, La Union and bound for Manila and a
passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad
crossing at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30
in the afternoon of August 10, 1974, got stalled and was hit by
defendant's express train causing damages to plaintiff's bus
and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three
(53) others suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff alleging that the
proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer,
Honorio Cirbado, in operating its passenger train in a busy
intersection without any bars, semaphores, signal lights,
flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train
that would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action
for Damages against defendants. The defendants, in their
Answer traversed the material allegation of the Complaint and
as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by
the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's
bus driver, Romeo Hughes.
At the pre-trial conference held on June 23, 1976, the parties
agreed on a partial stipulation of facts and issues which as
amplified at the continuation of the pre-trial conference, on July
12, 1976, are as follows:
1 That plaintiff is a duly constituted corporation
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
engaged in the business of transportation and operating public
utility buses for the public with lines covering Manila, Caloocan
City, Quezon City, Malabon, Rizal, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Nueva Ecija, and particularly from Manila to Hagonoy, Bulacan
and return in the month of August, l974 passing thru the town
of Calumpit Bulacan, temporarily while the bridge at Hagonoy,
Bulacan was under construction;
2 That defendant Philippine National Railways is a
purely government owned and controlled corporation duly
registered and existing virtue of Presidential Decree No. 741,
with capacity to sue and be sued, and is likewise engaged in
transporting passengers and cargoes by trains and buses and
that, it operates a train line between San Fernando, La Union
and Manila particularly Passenger Express Train with Body
No. 73, passing along the intersection of Barrio Balungao,
Calumpit, Bulacan, in going to San Fernando, La Union from
Manila and return;
3. That on August 10, 1974, at about 1:20 o'clock in the
afternoon, a Baliuag Transit Bus with Body No. 1066 and Plate
No. XS-929 PUB-Bulacan '74 was driven by its authorized
driver Romeo Hughes and PNR Train No. 73 was operated by
Train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado and at
the railroad intersection at Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan,
said passenger train No. 73 hit and bumped the right mid
portion of the plaintiff's passenger bus No. 1066, while the rear
portion of said bus was at the railroad track and its direction
was towards Hagonoy, Bulacan at about 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon;
4. That at the time of the collision there was a slight
rainfall in the vicinity of the scene of the accident and that there
was at said intersection no bars, semaphores, and signal lights
that would warn the public of the approaching train that was
about to pass through the intersection and likewise there was
no warning devices to passing trains showing that they were
about to pass an intersection in going to Manila from San
Fernando, La Union and back;
5. That on account of said collision, the Baliuag Transit
Bus with Body No. 1066 driven by Romeo Hughes was
damaged and eighteen (18) of its passengers died and the rest
who were more than fifty three (53) passengers suffered
physical injuries;
6. That after the investigation the Chief of Police of
Calumpit, Bulacan, filed a criminal case of Reckless
Imprudence Causing Multiple Homicide with Multiple Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property against Romeo Hughes y
Parfan, driver of the Baliuag Transit bus docketed under Crim.
Case No. 2392; while the train Engineer Honorio Cabardo alias
Honorio Cirbado was not included as an accused in said case,
although his train No. 73 was the one that hit and bumped the
right rear portion of the said bus;
7. That immediately after the said accident Major
Manuel A. Macam, Chief of the Municipal Police of Calumpit,
Bulacan, together with some of his policemen conducted an
investigation of the accident;
8. That at the railroad crossing in Calumpit, Bulacan
where the accident took place there is no railroad crossing bar,
however, during the pre-war days there was a railroad crossing
bar at said intersection; that, however, there was only one sign
of railroad crossing "Stop, Look and Listen" placed on a
concrete slab and attached to a concrete post existing at the
approach of the railroad track from the Highway going towards
Hagonoy, Bulacan and that after the said railroad track there
was a designated jeep parking area at the right side in the
direction from the Highway to Hagonoy Bulacan;
9. That the train No. 73 driven by Train Engineer
Honorio Cabardo alias Honorio Cirbado stopped after passing
the railroad crossing at a distance of about 50 meters from the
said intersection after the collision on August, 1974;
10. That the expected time of arrival of said Train No. 73
in Manila was 2:41 P.M. and its departure time from San
Fernando, La Union was 9:00 A.M. and its expected arrival at
Calumpit, Bulacan was 1:41 P.M. with no stop at Calumpit,
Bulacan.
SIMPLIFICATION OF ISSUES
11. That the principal issue in the instant case is who
between the driver Romeo Hughes of Baliuag Transit,
Incorporated and the train engineer Honorio Cabardo alias
Honorio Cirbado of the Philippine National Railways was
negligent or whether or not both are negligent; that likewise
which of said companies was negligent at said railroad
intersection;
12. That another additional issue is whether the Baliuag
Transit Incorporated has exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. (pp.
85-87, Record on Appeal). ( Annex A, Petition; pp. 79-82,
Rollo)
In addition, respondent court deemed it necessary to reflect
the salient findings of the case for damages as formulated by
the trial court:
Posed for resolution are the following issues: Who between the
driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit Incorporated and
Honorio Cabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine National
Railways was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicles, or whether or both were negligent? Could either of
the companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine
National Railways be held accountable for the collision
because of negligence?
The defendants presented several statements or affidavits of
alleged witnesses to the collision, specifically Exhibits 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19; the Court is at a loss as
to why the persons who gave the said statements were not
presented as witnesses during the trial of the
case, as aptly said, the statements are hearsay evidence
(Azcueta v. Cabangbang, — 45 O.G. 144); at most they be
taken as proof only of the fact that statements of said persons
were taken and that investigation was conducted of the
incident; the Court cannot consider the averments in said
statements as testimonies or evidence of truth.
Defendants endeavored to show that the proximate and
immediate cause of the collision was the negligence of the bus
driver because the driver did not make a stop before
ascending the railtrack; he did not heed the warning or
shoutings of bystanders and passengers and proceeded in
traversing the railtrack at a fast speed; that the bus driver was
in fact violating Section 42(d) of R.A. 4136, otherwise known
as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code for failure to
"stop, look, and listen" at the intersection, before crossing the
railtrack; that it is incumbent upon him to take the necessary
precautions at the intersection because the railroad track is in
itself a warning; and the bus driver ignored such a warning and
must assume the responsibility for the result of the motion
taken by him (U.S. v. Mananquil, 42 Phil. 90)
Except the testimony of the train engineer Cabardo, there is no
admissible evidence to show that indeed, the bus driver did not
take the necessary precaution in traversing the track. Note that
he first noticed the bus when it was only 15 meters away from
him; he could not have possibly noticed the position of the bus
before negotiating the track.
On the other hand, it was shown by plaintiff that the bus driver
Romeo Hughes took the necessary precautions in traversing
the track.
The bus driver had stopped before traversing the track and in
fact asked the conductor to alight and made a "Look and
Listen" before proceeding; the conductor had done just that
and made a signal to proceed when he did not see any
oncoming train. (TSN, October 2l, 1976, p. 4); plaintiff's bus
drivers and conductors are enjoined to observe such a
precautionary measure in seminars conducted by the
company. (TSN, September 23, 1976. pp. 26-27).
The evidence disclosed that the train was running fast because
by his own testimony, the train engineer had testified that
before reaching the station of Calumpit the terrain was
downgrade and levelled only after passing the Calumpit bridge
(TSN, July 28, 1976, p. 14 ); the tendency of the train, coming
from a high point is to accelerate as the gravity will necessarily
make it so, especially when it is pulling seven coaches loaded
with goods and passengers.
Moreover, upon impact, the bus loaded with passengers was
dragged and thrown into a ditch several meters away; the train
had stopped only after the engine portion was about 190
meters away from the fallen bus; several passengers were
injured and at least 20 died; such facts conclusively indicate
that the train was speeding, because if it were moving at
moderate speed, it would not run some 190 meters after
impact and throw the bus at quite a distance especially so
when it is claimed that the train's emergency brakes were
applied.
Further, the train was an express train; its departure was 9:00
A.M. at San Fernando, La Union and expected in Manila at
2:41 P.M.; the collision occurred at 1:30 P.M. or 4 1/2 hours
after it left La Union; surely, the train could have not negotiated
such a distance in so short a time if it were not running at fast
speed.
It may be argued that a railroad is not subject to the same
restrictions to the speed of its train as a motorists (Mckelvey v.
Delaware L. and W.R. Co. 253 App. D.V. 109, 300 NYS 1263
); but it does not follow that a train will be permitted to run fast
under all conditions at any rate of speed it may choose. It must
regulate its speed with proper regard for the safety of human
life and property (Johnson v. Southern Pacific Company (Cal.
App. 288 p. 81), considering the surrounding circumstances
particularly the nature of the locality (Atchinson, T. and SFR
Co. v. Nicks (Arts) 165 p. 2d 167).
Cabardo's route included the passage over the said
intersection; he could have noticed that it is a very busy
intersection because the crossroad leads to the Calumpit
Poblacion as well as to the neighboring town of Hagonoy;
there was a parking lot by the side of the track whereat
passengers board jeepneys for the neighboring barrios and
towns; stalls abound in the vicinity and bystanders congregate
nearby. A prudent train operator must, under the
circumstances, slacken his speed almost for the protection of
motorists and pedestrians, not only when a collision is
inevitable but even if no hindrance is apparent on the way;
Moreover, there was an intermittent rain at the time of the
collision (see stipulation of facts and photographs); the
condition of the weather was such that even if for this reason
alone, the train engineer should have foreseen that danger of
collision lurked because of poor visibility of slippery road; he
should have taken extra precaution by considerably slackening
its speed. This he failed to do even if the nature of his job
required him to observe care exercised by a prudent man.
Contributory negligence may not be ascribed to the bus driver;
it was evident that he had taken the necessary precautions
before passing over the railway track; if the bus was hit, it was
for reasons beyond the control of the bus driver because he
had no place to go; there were vehicles to his left which
prevented him in swerving towards that direction; his bus
stalled in view of the obstructions in his front where a sand and
gravel truck stopped because of a jeep maneuvering into a
garage up front. All the wheels at the bus have already passed
the rail portion of the track and only the rear portion of the bus'
body occupied or covered the railtrack. This was evident
because the part of the bus hit by the train was the rear since
the bus fell on a nearby ditch. Otherwise, if the bus was really
hit in mid-body, the bus could have been halved into two
because of the force of the impact.
The stipulation of facts between the parties show that there
was no crossing bar at the railroad intersection at Calumpit,
Bulacan at the time of collision (par. 8, Stipulation of Facts);
the plaintiff contended and the defendants did not deny, that
there were no signal lights, semaphores, flagman or
switchman thereat; the absence of such devices, the plaintiff
argues constitute negligence on the part of the Philippine
National Railways.
A railroad is not required to have a gate (crossing bar) or a
flagman, or to maintain signals at every intersection; only at
such places reasonably necessary; what is considered
reasonably necessary will depend on the amount of travel
upon the road, the frequency with which trains pass over it and
the view which could be obtained of trains as they approach
the crossing, and other conditions (Pari v. Los Angeles, Ry.
Corporation (Cal A2d) 128 p2d 563; Swdyk v. Indiana Harbor
Belt R. Co. 148 F. 2d 795, and others).
As has been amply discussed, the crossroad at the
intersection at Calumpit is one which is a busy thoroughfare; it
leads to the Poblacion at Calumpit and other barrios as well as
the town of Hagonoy; the vicinity is utilized as a parking and
waiting area for passengers of jeepneys that ply between the
barrios, clearly, the flow of vehicular traffic thereat is huge. It
can be said also that, since there is no other railtrack going
North except that one passing at Calumpit, trains pass over it
frequently;
A portion of the intersection is being used as a parking area
with stalls and other obstructions present making it difficult, if
not impossible, to see approaching trains (see photographs).
The failure of the Philippine National Railways to put a cross
bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores is
evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the
public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it,
because public safety demands that said devices or
equipments be installed, in the light of aforesaid jurisprudence.
In the opinion of this Court the X sign or the presence of
"STOP, LOOK, LISTEN" warnings would not be sufficient
protection of the motoring public as well as the pedestrians, in
the said intersection;
The parties likewise have stipulated that during the pre-war
days, there was a railroad crossing bar at the said intersection
(Par-8, Stipulation of Facts). It appears that it was a self
imposed requirement which has been abandoned. In a case it
was held that where the use of a flagman was self imposed,
the abandonment thereof may constitute negligence. (Fleming
v. Missouri and A. Ry. Co. 198 ARDC 290, 128 S.W. 2d 286
and others; cited in Sec. 1082 SCRWARTZ, Vol. 2). Similarly,
the abandonment by the PNR of the use of the crossing bar at
the intersection at Calumpit constitutes negligence, as its
installation has become imperative, because of the prevailing
circumstances in the place.
A railroad company has been adjudged guilty of negligence
and civilly liable for damages when it failed to install
semaphores, or where it does not see to it that its flagman or
switchman comply with their duties faithfully, to motorist injured
by a crossing train as long as he had crossed without
negligence on his part (Lilius vs. MRR, 39 Phil. 758).
(Decision, pages 94-100, R A.; pp. 83-89, Rollo).
On the aspect of whether the Philippine National Railways
enjoys immunity from suit, respondent court initially noted that
an exculpation of this nature that was raised for the first time
on appeal may no longer be entertained in view of the
proscription under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of
Court, apart from the fact that the lawyer of petitioner agreed to
stipulate inter alia that the railroad company had capacity to
sue and be sued. This being so, respondent court continued,
PNR was perforce estopped from disavowing the prejudicial
repercussion of an admission in judicio. Even as the laws
governing the creation and rehabilitation of the PNR were
entirely mute on its power to sue and be sued, respondent
court nonetheless opined that such prerogative was implied
from the general power to transact business pertinent or
indispensable to the attainment of the goals of the railroad
company under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 4156 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6366:
Sec. 4 General Powers — The Philippine National Railways
shall have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such
business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation;
and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation law.
in conjunction with Section 2(b) of Presidential Decree No.
741:
(b) To own or operate railroad transways, bus lines,
trucklines, subways, and other kinds of land transportation,
vessels, and pipelines, for the purpose of transporting for
consideration, passengers, mail and property between any
points in the Philippines;
Thus, respondent court utilized the doctrine of implied powers
announced in National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, Sr.
and Philippine Airlines, Inc. (91 Phil. 203 [1952]), to the effect
that the power to sue and be sued is implicit from the faculty to
transact private business. At any rate, respondent court
characterized the railroad company as a private entity created
not to discharge a governmental function but, among other
things, to operate a transport service which is essentially a
business concern, and thus barred from invoking immunity
from suit.
In brushing aside petitioners' asseveration that the bus driver
outraced the train at the crossing, respondent court observed
that the bus was hit by the train at its rear portion then
protruding over the tracks as the bus could not move because
another truck at its front was equally immobile due to a jeep
maneuvering into a nearby parking area. Under these tight
conditions, respondent court blamed the train engineer who
admitted to have seen the maneuvering jeep at a distance
(TSN, July 28, 1976, page 18) and had the last clear chance to
apply the brakes, knowing fully well that the vehicles following
the jeep could not move away from the path of the train. Apart
from these considerations, it was perceived below that the train
was running fast during the entire trip since the train stopped
190 meters from the point of impact and arrived at Calumpit,
Bulacan earlier than its expected time of arrival thereat.
Moreover, respondent court agreed with the conclusion
reached by the trial court that the absence of a crossing bar,
signal light, flagman or switchman to warn the public of an
approaching train constitutes negligence per the
pronouncement of this Court in Lilius vs. Manila Railroad
Company (59 Phil 758 [1934]).
Concerning the exercise of diligence normally expected of an
employer in the selection and supervision of its employees,
respondent court expressed the view that PNR was remiss on
this score since it allowed Honorio Cabardo, who finished only
primary education and became an engineer only through sheer
experience, to operate the locomotive, not to mention the fact
that such plea in avoidance was not asserted in the answer
and was thus belatedly raised on appeal.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but respondent court was far
from persuaded. Hence, the petition before Us which, in
essence, incorporates similar disputations anent PNR's
immunity from suit and the attempt to toss the burden of
negligence from the train engineer to the bus driver of herein
private respondent.
The bone of contention for exculpation is premised on the
familiar maxim in political law that the State, by virtue of its
sovereign nature and as reaffirmed by constitutional precept, is
insulated from suits without its consent (Article 16, Section 3,
1987 Constitution). However, equally conceded is the legal
proposition that the acquiescence of the State to be sued can
be manifested expressly through a general or special law, or
indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation for
the purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters
into a contract (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1991 edition,
page 33; Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition,
1962, page 34). When the State participates in a covenant, it is
deemed to have descended from its superior position to the
level of an ordinary citizen and thus virtually opens itself to
judicial process. Of course, We realize that this Court qualified
this form of consent only to those contracts concluded in a
proprietary capacity and therefore immunity will attach for
those contracts entered into in a governmental capacity,
following the ruling in the 1985 case of United States of
America vs. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487 [1985]; cited by Cruz, supra
at pages 36-37). But the restrictive interpretation laid down
therein is of no practical worth nor can it give rise to herein
petitioner PNR's exoneration since the case of Malong vs.
Philippine National Railways (138 SCRA 63, [1985]); 3 Padilla,
1987 Constitution with Comments and Cases, 1991 edition,
page 644), decided three months after Ruiz was promulgated,
was categorical enough to specify that the Philippine National
Railways "is not performing any governmental function" (supra,
at page 68).
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en banc,
declared:
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, as a
common carrier, was not immune from suit under Act No.
1510, its charter.
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741,
provides that the PNR is a government instrumentality under
government ownership during its 50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It
is under the Office of the President of the Philippines. Republic
Act No. 6366 provides:
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. — The Philippine
National Railways, being a factor for socio-economic
development and growth, shall be a part of the infrastructure
program of the government and as such shall remain in and
under government ownership during its corporate existence.
The Philippine National Railways must be administered with
the view of serving the interests of the public by providing them
the maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest utility
by the public, the economy of operation must be ensured so
that service can be rendered at the minimum passenger and
freight prices possible.
The charter also provides:
Sec. 4. General powers. — The Philippine National Railways
shall have the following general powers:
(a) To do all such other things and to transact all such
business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation;
and
(b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers to
Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad
corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every
corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its corporate
name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law provides that
every corporation has the power to sue and be sued in any
court.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends (Justice
Holmes in Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d
834).
The public service would be hindered, and public safety
endangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit
at the instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in
the use and disposition of the means required for the proper
administration of the Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall.
152, 19 L. ed. 129). (at pp.
65-66).
To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR for the purpose of
engaging in transportation, Malong continued to hold that:
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from
its predecessor, the Manila Railroad Company. The PNR did
not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the
operation of Articles 1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on
common carriers.
The correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether
corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity
from suit is determined by the character of the objects for
which the entity was organized." (Nat. Airports Corp. vs.
Teodoro and Phil. Airlines, Inc., 91 Phil. 203, 206; Santos vs.
Santos, 92 Phil. 281, 285; Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. USA, 104 Phil.
593).
Suits against State agencies with respect to matters in which
they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental
capacity are not suits against the State (81 C.J.S. 1319).
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which
they have assumed to act in a private or nongovernmental
capacity, and various suits against certain corporations created
by the State for public purposes, but to engage in matters
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the State.
The latter is true, although the State may own the stock or
property of such a corporation, for by engaging in business
operations through a corporation the State divests itself so far
of its sovereign character, and by implicating consents to suits
against the corporation. (81 C.J.S. 1319).
The foregoing rule was applied to State Dock Commissions
carrying on business relating to pilots, terminals and
transportation (Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey vs. U.S., 27
Fed. 2nd 370) and to State Highways Commissions created to
build public roads and given appropriations in advance to
discharge obligations incurred in their behalf (Arkansas State
Highway Commission vs. Dodge, 26 SW 2nd 879 and State
Highway Commission of Missouri vs. Bates, 296 SW 418, cited
in National Airports case).
The point is that when the government enters into a
commercial business it abandons its sovereign capacity and is
to be treated like any other private corporation (Bank of the
U.S. vs. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 6 L ed. 244, cited in
Manila Hotel Employees Association vs. Manila Hotel
Company, et al., 73 Phil. 374, 388). The Manila Hotel case
also relied on the following rulings:
By engaging in a particular business through the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.
When the State acts in its proprietary capacity, it is amenable
to all the rules of law which bind private individuals.
There is not one law for the sovereign and another for the
subject, but when the sovereign engages in business and the
conduct of business enterprises, and contracts with individuals,
whenever the contract in any form comes before the courts,
the rights and obligation of the contracting parties must be
adjusted upon the same principles as if both contracting
parties were private persons. Both stand upon equality before
the law, and the sovereign is merged in the dealer, contractor
and suitor (People vs. Stephens, 71 N.Y. 549).
It should be noted that in Philippine National Railways vs.
Union de Maquinistas, etc., L-31948, July 25, 1978, 84 SCRA
223, it was held that the PNR funds could be garnished at the
instance of a labor union.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged
negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for
damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject
to the obligations of persons engaged in that private
enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.
Thus, the National Development Company is not immune from
suit. It does not exercise sovereign functions. It is an agency
for the performance of purely corporate, proprietary or
business functions (National Development Company vs.
Tobias, 117 Phil. 703, 705 and cases cited therein; National
Development Company vs. NDC Employees and Workers'
Union, L-32387, August 19, 1975, 66 SCRA 18l, 184).
Other government agencies not enjoying immunity from suit
are the Social Security System (Social Security System vs.
Court of Appeals,
L-41299, February 21, 1983, 120 SCRA 707) and the
Philippine National Bank (Republic vs. Philippine National
Bank, 121 Phil. 26). (at pp. 66-68).
We come now to the question of whether respondent court
properly agreed with the trial court in imputing negligence on
the part of the train engineer and his employer.
It was demonstrated beyond cavil in the course of the pre-trial
hearings held for the purpose of stipulating on crucial facts that
the bus was hit on the rear portion thereof after it crossed the
railroad tracks. Then, too the train engineer was frank enough
to say that he saw the jeep maneuvering into a parking area
near the crossing which caused the obstruction in the flow of
traffic such that the gravel and sand truck including the bus of
herein private respondent were not able to move forward or to
take the opposite lane due to other vehicles. The unmindful
demeanor of the train engineer in surging forward despite the
obstruction before him is definitely anathema to the conduct of
a prudent person placed under the same set of perceived
danger. Indeed:
When it is apparent, or when in the exercise of reasonable
diligence commensurate with the surroundings it should be
apparent, to the company that a person on its track or to get on
its track is unaware of his danger or cannot get out of the way,
it becomes the duty of the company to use such precautions,
by warnings, applying brakes, or otherwise, as may be
reasonably necessary to avoid injury to him. (65 Am. Jur.,
Second Edition. p. 649).
Likewise, it was established that the weather condition was
characterized with intermittent rain which should have
prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution. Also,
the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival
thereat, indicating that the train was travelling more than the
normal speed of 30 kilometers per hour. If the train were really
running at 30 kilometers per hour when it was approaching the
intersection, it would probably not have travelled 190 meters
more from the place of the accident (page 10, Brief for
Petitioners). All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered
the concrete and yes, correct conclusion that the train engineer
was negligent who, moreover, despite the last opportunity
within his hands vis-a-vis the weather condition including the
presence of people near the intersection, could have obviated
the impending collision had he slackened his speed and
applied the brakes (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809
[1918]).Withal, these considerations were addressed to the
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, was in a better
position to assign weight on factual questions. Having resolved
the question of negligence between the train engineer and the
bus driver after collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion
reached thereafter thus commands great respect especially so
in this case where respondent court gave its nod of approval to
the findings of the court of origin (Co vs. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 198; 206 [1991]); Amigo vs. Teves, 50 O.G. 5799;
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth edition, page
353).
What exacerbates against petitioners' contention is the
authority in this jurisdiction to the effect that the failure of a
railroad company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to
post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing
train amounts to negligence (Lilius vs. Manila Railroad
Company, 59 Phil. 758 [1934]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision of respondent court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
FLORENTINA A. GUILATCO, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAGUPAN, and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Nolan R. Evangelista for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a civil action 1 for recovery of damages filed by the
petitioner Florentina A. Guilatco, the following judgment was
rendered against the respondent City of Dagupan:
xxx
(1) Ordering defendant City of Dagupan to pay plaintiff
actual damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P8,054.00
as hospital, medical and other expenses [Exhs. H to H-60], P
7,420.00 as lost income for one (1) year [Exh. F] and P 450.00
as bonus). P 150,000.00 as moral damages, P 50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P 3,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
litigation expenses, plus costs and to appropriate through its
Sangguniang Panglunsod (City Council) said amounts for said
purpose;
(2) Dismissing plaintiffs complaint as against defendant
City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco; and
(3) Dismissing the counterclaims of defendant City of
Dagupan and defendant City Engr. Alfredo G. Tangco, for lack
of merit. 2
The facts found by the trial court are as follows: 3
It would appear from the evidences that on July 25, 1978,
herein plaintiff, a Court Interpreter of Branch III, CFI--Dagupan
City, while she was about to board a motorized tricycle at a
sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the
control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) accidentally fell
into a manhole located on said sidewalk, thereby causing her
right leg to be fractured. As a result thereof, she had to be
hospitalized, operated on, confined, at first at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, from July 25 to August 3, 1978 (or for a
period of 16 days). She also incurred hospitalization,
medication and other expenses to the tune of P 8,053.65 (Exh.
H to H-60) or a total of P 10,000.00 in all, as other receipts
were either lost or misplaced; during the period of her
confinement in said two hospitals, plaintiff suffered severe or
excruciating pain not only on her right leg which was fractured
but also on all parts of her body; the pain has persisted even
after her discharge from the Medical City General Hospital on
October 9, 1978, to the present. Despite her discharge from
the Hospital plaintiff is presently still wearing crutches and the
Court has actually observed that she has difficulty in
locomotion. From the time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up
to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court
interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion in going up the
stairs of her office, located near the city hall in Dagupan City.
She earns at least P 720.00 a month consisting of her monthly
salary and other means of income, but since July 25, 1978 up
to the present she has been deprived of said income as she
has already consumed her accrued leaves in the government
service. She has lost several pounds as a result of the
accident and she is no longer her former jovial self, she has
been unable to perform her religious, social, and other
activities which she used to do prior to the incident.
Dr. Norberto Felix and Dr. Dominado Manzano of the
Provincial Hospital, as well as Dr. Antonio Sison of the Medical
City General Hospital in Mandaluyong Rizal (Exh. I; see also
Exhs. F, G, G-1 to G-19) have confirmed beyond shadow of
any doubt the extent of the fracture and injuries sustained by
the plaintiff as a result of the mishap. On the other hand,
Patrolman Claveria, De Asis and Cerezo corroborated the
testimony of the plaintiff regarding the mishap and they have
confirmed the existence of the manhole (Exhs. A, B, C and
sub-exhibits) on the sidewalk along Perez Blvd., at the time of
the incident on July 25, 1978 which was partially covered by a
concrete flower pot by leaving gaping hole about 2 ft. long by 1
1/2 feet wide or 42 cms. wide by 75 cms. long by 150 cms.
deep (see Exhs. D and D-1).
Defendant Alfredo Tangco, City Engineer of Dagupan City and
admittedly ex-officio Highway Engineer, City Engineer of the
Public Works and Building Official for Dagupan City, admitted
the existence of said manhole along the sidewalk in Perez
Blvd., admittedly a National Road in front of the Luzon
Colleges. He also admitted that said manhole (there are at
least 11 in all in Perez Blvd.) is owned by the National
Government and the sidewalk on which they are found along
Perez Blvd. are also owned by the National Government. But
as City Engineer of Dagupan City, he supervises the
maintenance of said manholes or drainage system and sees to
it that they are properly covered, and the job is specifically
done by his subordinates, Mr. Santiago de Vera (Maintenance
Foreman) and Engr. Ernesto Solermo also a maintenance
Engineer. In his answer defendant Tangco expressly admitted
in par. 7-1 thereof, that in his capacity as ex-officio Highway
Engineer for Dagupan City he exercises supervision and
control over National roads, including the Perez Blvd. where
the incident happened.
On appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan, the appellate
court 4 reversed the lower court findings on the ground that no
evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that
the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez
Boulevard. 5
The city contends that Perez Boulevard, where the fatal
drainage hole is located, is a national road that is not under the
control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Hence, no
liability should attach to the city. It submits that it is actually the
Ministry of Public Highways that has control or supervision
through the Highway Engineer which, by mere coincidence, is
held concurrently by the same person who is also the City
Engineer of Dagupan.
After examination of the findings and conclusions of the trial
court and those of the appellate court, as well as the
arguments presented by the parties, we agree with those of
the trial court and of the petitioner. Hence, we grant the
petition.
In this review on certiorari, we have simplified the errors
assigned by the petitioner to a single issue: whether or not
control or supervision over a national road by the City of
Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for
damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from
injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of
roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision.
It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to
belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach.
The article only requires that either control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street. 6
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in
the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City
Engineer who has the following duties:
Sec. 22. The City Engineer--His powers, duties and
compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in
charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He
shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos
per annum. He shall have the following duties:
xxx
(j) He shall have the care and custody of the public
system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water
supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the
same, in accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall
inspect and regulate the use of all private systems for
supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private
sewers, and their connection with the public sewer system.
xxx
The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out,
construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys
and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be
legislated by the Municipal Board . 7 Thus the charter clearly
indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over
the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable
for damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due
to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the
charter, can not be used to exempt the city, as in the case at
bar.8
The charter only lays down general rules regulating the liability
of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular
to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings
and other public works." 9
The City Engineer, Mr. Alfredo G. Tangco, admits that he
exercises control or supervision over the said road. But the city
can not be excused from liability by the argument that the duty
of the City Engineer to supervise or control the said provincial
road belongs more to his functions as an ex-officio Highway
Engineer of the Ministry of Public Highway than as a city
officer. This is because while he is entitled to an honorarium
from the Ministry of Public Highways, his salary from the city
government substantially exceeds the honorarium.
We do not agree.
Alfredo G. Tangco "(i)n his official capacity as City Engineer of
Dagupan, as Ex- Officio Highway Engineer, as Ex-Officio City
Engineer of the Bureau of Public Works, and, last but not the
least, as Building Official for Dagupan City, receives the
following monthly compensation: P 1,810.66 from Dagupan
City; P 200.00 from the Ministry of Public Highways; P 100.00
from the Bureau of Public Works and P 500.00 by virtue of
P.D. 1096, respectively." 10 This function of supervision over
streets, public buildings, and other public works pertaining to
the City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman
and a Maintenance Engineer.11 Although these last two
officials are employees of the National Government, they are
detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence receive
instruction and supervision from the city through the City
Engineer.
There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises
control or supervision over the public works in question.
Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article
2198 of the Civil Code is clear.
Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the
petitioner in the amount of P 10,000.00 should be reduced to
the proven expenses of P 8,053.65 only. The trial court should
not have rounded off the amount. In determining actual
damages, the court can not rely on "speculation, conjecture or
guess work" as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss,
the award of actual damages becomes erroneous. 12
On the other hand, moral damages may be awarded even
without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination
of the amount is discretionary on the court.13 Though
incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the
nature of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered but which for some reason can not be proven.
However, in awarding moral damages, the following should be
taken into consideration:
(1) First, the proximate cause of the injury must be the
claimee's acts.14
(2) Second, there must be compensatory or actual
damages as satisfactory proof of the factual basis for
damages.15
(3) Third, the award of moral damages must be
predicated on any of the cases enumerated in the Civil Code.
16
In the case at bar, the physical suffering and mental anguish
suffered by the petitioner were proven. Witnesses from the
petitioner's place of work testified to the degeneration in her
disposition-from being jovial to depressed. She refrained from
attending social and civic activities.17
Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P 150,000.00 is
excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her
only during her treatment which lasted for one year. Though
evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the
award of damages,18 the moderating hand of the law is called
for. The Court has time and again called attention to the
reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages
without basis,19 resulting in exhorbitant amounts.20
Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the
discretion of the trial court 21 under preceding jurisprudence,
the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P
20,000.00.
As for the award of exemplary damages, the trial court
correctly pointed out the basis:
To serve as an example for the public good, it is high time that
the Court, through this case, should serve warning to the city
or cities concerned to be more conscious of their duty and
responsibility to their constituents, especially when they are
engaged in construction work or when there are manholes on
their sidewalks or streets which are uncovered, to immediately
cover the same, in order to minimize or prevent accidents to
the poor pedestrians.22
Too often in the zeal to put up "public impact" projects such as
beautification drives, the end is more important than the
manner in which the work is carried out. Because of this
obsession for showing off, such trivial details as misplaced
flower pots betray the careless execution of the projects,
causing public inconvenience and inviting accidents.
Pending appeal by the respondent City of Dagupan from the
trial court to the appellate court, the petitioner was able to
secure an order for garnishment of the funds of the City
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, from the then
presiding judge, Hon. Willelmo Fortun. This order for
garnishment was revoked subsequently by the succeeding
presiding judge, Hon. Romeo D. Magat, and became the basis
for the petitioner's motion for reconsideration which was also
denied. 23
We rule that the execution of the judgment of the trial court
pending appeal was premature. We do not find any good
reason to justify the issuance of an order of execution even
before the expiration of the time to appeal .24
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision and resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
trial court, dated March 12, 1979 and amended on March 13,
1979, is hereby REINSTATED with the indicated modifications
as regards the amounts awarded:
(1) Ordering the defendant City of Dagupan to pay the
plaintiff actual damages in the amount of P 15,924 (namely P
8,054.00 as hospital, medical and other expenses; P 7,420.00
as lost income for one (1) year and P 450.00 as bonus); P
20,000.00 as moral damages and P 10,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
The attorney's fees of P 3,000.00 remain the same.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT G.R. No. 150304
and Engineer RAMIR J. TIAMZON,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,Sandoval-Gutierrez,- versus - Corona,
Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ
Promulgated:FULGENCIO DACARA,*Respondent. June 15,
2005
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The review of cases under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are
glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or weigh
evidence all over again. Under the circumstance, the factual
findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial
courts will be conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of
the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal or
certiorari. Finally, this Court reiterates the principle that moral
damages are designed to compensate the claimant for actual
injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
Hence, absent any definite finding as to what they consist of,
the alleged moral damages suffered would become a penalty
rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the February 21, 2001 Decision[2]
and the October 9, 2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 29392. The challenged Decision
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated June
29, 1990 in Civil Case No. Q-88-233 should be AFFIRMED,
with costs against the appellants.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the facts in this manner:
Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of 87
Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while
driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street
diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then
being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result,
Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the
vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it
hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record,
p. 22), which however, yielded negative results. Consequently,
Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO),
for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint
(Record, p. 1) for damages against the Quezon City and Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon
City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO
prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00 actual or
compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages,
P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorneys
fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him.
In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses
(Record, p. 11), defendants admitted the occurrence of the
incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with
a moun[d] of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint
with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the
incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short,
defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing
the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid
accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into
the diggings was precisely because of the latters negligence
and failure to exercise due care.[5]
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
101, Quezon City, rendered its Decision[6] dated June 29,
1990. The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein
respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence
of herein petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code,[7]
the latter were held liable as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the
quantum of evidence presented by the plaintiff which tilts in
their favor elucidating the negligent acts of the city government
together with its employees when considered in the light of
Article 2189, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages,
P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and other costs of
suit.[8]
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had
observed due diligence and care in installing preventive
warning devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had
failed to exercise prudence by driving too fast to avoid the
diggings. Moreover, the lower court allegedly erred in using
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, which supposedly applied only
to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for
damage to property.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA agreed with the RTCs finding that petitioners
negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered
by respondent.[9] Noting the failure of petitioners to present
evidence to support their contention that precautionary
measures had indeed been observed, it ruled thus:
x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to
show that they placed sufficient and adequate precautionary
signs at Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers
to life and limb under the circumstances. Contrary to the
testimony of the witnesses for the [petitioners], namely Engr.
Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito and Eduardo Castillo, that
there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light
could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was
ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and
adequacy of said contention.[10]
Further upholding the trial courts finding of negligence on the
part of herein petitioners, the CA gave this opinion:
x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of
[petitioners] was clear based on the investigation report of Pfc.
William P. Villafranca stating to the effect that the subject
vehicle rammed into a pile of earth from a deep excavation
thereat without any warning devi[c]e whatsoever and as a
consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost control of his driven car
and finally turned-turtle causing substantial damage to the
same. As a defense against liability on the basis of quasi-
delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant
case.[11]
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has
been no death or physical injury, the CA ruled in the
affirmative:
x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to
death or personal injury only as argued by appellants in the
case at bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an
act that damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the
act or result of inflicting on a person or thing something that
causes loss, pain, distress, or impairment. Injury is the most
comprehensive, applying to an act or result involving an
impairment or destruction of right, health, freedom, soundness,
or loss of something of value.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of
law/substance contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence
when it affirmed the award of moral damage suit (sic) the
amount of P10,000.00.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of
law/substance contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence
when it affirmed the award of exemplary damage sin (sic) the
amount of P5,000.00 and attorneys fee in the [a]mount of
P10,000.00.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic)
had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to hold that
respondents son in the person of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was
negligent at the time of incident.[14]
Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for
moral and exemplary damages presuppose that their
negligence caused the vehicular accident, we first resolve the
question of negligence or the proximate cause of the incident.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Negligence
Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that
they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the
public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver
(Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondents car was overspeeding,
and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of
the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury
in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise.[15] Proximate cause is determined from
the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent.[16]
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual
issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical
or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an
ample showing that they lacked any basis for their
conclusions.[17] The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in
their factual ascertainment that petitioners negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their
findings and substituting these with our own. The function of
this Court is limited to the review of the appellate courts
alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again
the factual evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.[18] Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to
an exception to this rule.[19] They have not sufficiently
demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual
review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of
the accident was aptly discussed in the lower courts finding,
which we quote:
Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident
of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of
Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the
existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the
base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a
reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have
served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during
the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.
Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that
there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light
could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was
ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate
precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed
signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that
according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity
is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident.
Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a
particular set of events is transfixed by the attending
circumstances so that the greater the danger known or
reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care
required to be observed.
The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code
capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to
the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the
control and supervision over the same. Failure of the
defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the
subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which
renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the
law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the
responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and
bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability
would deem just and equitable.[20] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at
the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the
accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum
limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with light traffic, when not
designated through streets, as provided under the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus,
petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic
regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article
2185[21] of the Civil Code.[22]
These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any
time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they
brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136
in their Motion for Reconsideration[23] of the CA Decision
dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to
raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law,
theories or arguments not brought out in the original
proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.[24] To
consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the
proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play,
justice, and due process.[25]
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts findings, which
are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly
point to petitioners negligence as the proximate cause of the
damages suffered by respondents car. No adequate reason
has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in
the instances specified in Article 2219[26] of the Civil Code.
Although the instant case is an action for quasi-delict,
petitioners contend that moral damages are not recoverable,
because no evidence of physical injury were presented before
the trial court.[27]
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof
of the following requisites: (1) an injury -- whether physical,
mental, or psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant;
(2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a
wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the
award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219.[28]
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be
recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission
caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral
damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury.[29]
This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang[30] as follows:
x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries, as an instance when moral damages
may be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts
not resulting in physical injuries are excluded, excepting of
course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art.
2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the
chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondents
son Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified
that he suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car
overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the
open without any warning device whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate
courts, however, that no other evidence (such as a medical
certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to
prove Fulgencio Jr.s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus,
there was no credible proof that would justify an award of
moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect
to the claim of respondent that his moral sufferings were due to
the negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the trial court,
which summarizes the testimony of respondents four
witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding
moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury unjustly inflicted on a person.[31] Intended for the
restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante,
the award of moral damages is designed to compensate
emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of
emotional or moral injury, competent and substantial proof of
the
suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this
approximation are definite findings as to what the supposed
moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such
damages would become a penalty rather than a compensation
for actual injury suffered.[32]
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages
cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil[33] or a criminal
case[34] -- in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar
injury.[35] The award of moral damages must be solidly
anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually
experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations
do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof.[36]
Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages
Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorneys fees
are not recoverable. Allegedly, the RTC and the CA did not
find that petitioners were guilty of gross negligence in the
performance of their duty and responsibilities.[37]
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of
right.[38] While granting them is subject to the discretion of the
court, they can be awarded only after claimants have shown
their entitlement to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages.[39] In the case before us, respondent sufficiently
proved before the courts a quo that petitioners negligence was
the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his
right to actual or compensatory damages. He has adduced
adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages caused his
car. The question that remains, therefore, is whether
exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to
compensatory damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-
delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.[40] Gross negligence means
such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the
persons at fault must have been conscious of the probable
consequences of their carelessness, and that they must have
nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury
to the person or property of others.[41] The negligence must
amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or
property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the
Decisions of both the CA and the trial court. We quote from the
RTC Decision:
Sad to state that the City Government through its
instrumentalities have (sic) failed to show the modicum of
responsibility, much less, care expected of them (sic) by the
constituents of this City. It is even more deplorable that it was
a case of a street digging in a side street which caused the
accident in the so-called premier city.[42]
The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners
negligence was clear, considering that there was no warning
device whatsoever[43] at the excavation site.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners
of any adverse consequence of their failure to install even a
single warning device at the area under renovation.
Considering further that the street was dimly lit,[44] the need
for adequate precautionary measures was even greater. By
carrying on the road diggings without any warning or barricade,
petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard for public safety.
Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound to happen
due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the
circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of
gross negligence on their part.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good. The award of these damages is meant to be a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions.[45] Public policy
requires such imposition to suppress wanton acts of an
offender.[46] It must be emphasized that local governments
and their employees should be responsible not only for the
maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the
public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with
adequate precautionary measures.
Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public
interest; their very existence is justified only by public service.
Hence, local governments have the paramount responsibility of
keeping the interests of the public foremost in their agenda.
For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present
petitioners are the very parties responsible for endangering the
public through such a rash and reckless act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED. No costs.
[G.R. No. 125183. September 29, 1997]
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, assailing and seeking to reverse and
set aside: a) the decision dated November 23, 1995 of the
Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b) the
resolution dated May 28, 1996 denying reconsideration of said
decision.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1716 reserving for Municipal
Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of land of
the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-
mentioned proclamation was occupied by squatters, the
Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in
Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said
squatters. Only after resettling these squatters would the
municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal
government center on the subject land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the
Municipality of San Juan started to develop its government
center by constructing the INP Building, which now serves as
the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the
site to house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and
the Office of the Municipal Prosecutors. Also constructed
thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the Municipal
High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already
convened on July 26, 1987, former President Corazon Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation No.
1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as
follows:
PROCLAMATION NO. 164
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED
FEBRUARY 17, 1978, WHICH RESERVED FOR
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER SITE
PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY
OF SAN JUAN, METROPOLITAN MANILA, ISLAND OF
LUZON, BY EXCLUDING FROM ITS OPERATION THE
PARCELS OF LAND NOT BEING UTILIZED FOR
GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES PURPOSES BUT
ACTUALLY OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES AND DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO
DISPOSITION UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources and by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do
hereby amend Proclamation No. 1716, dated February 17,
1978, which established for municipal government center site
purposes certain parcels of land mentioned therein situated in
the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, by excluding from
its operation the parcels of land not being utilized for
government center site purposes but actually occupied for
residential purposes and declaring the land so excluded,
together with other parcels of land not covered by
Proclamation No. 1716 but nevertheless occupied for
residential purposes, open to disposition under the provisions
of the Public Land Act, as amended, subject to future survey,
which are hereunder particularly described as follows :
Lot 1 (Port.) Psu-73270
Lot 4 (Port.) Psd-74 and Psd-810
Lot 5 (Port.) Psu-73270
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the year
of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
By the President :
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Acting Executive Secretary
(Rollo, pp. 148-151.)
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association, Inc., one of herein private respondents, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region
(Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer
for restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer
of San Juan and the Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin
them from either removing or demolishing the houses of the
association members who were claiming that the lots they
occupied have been awarded to them by Proclamation No.
164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court
dismissed the petition, ruling that the property in question is
being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for government
purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No.
164 is absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in
a decision dated July 17, 1991. This decision became final and
the said judgment was duly entered on April 8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment,
private respondents hired a private surveyor to make
consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in question,
submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) in connection with their
application for a grant under Proclamation No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private
respondents, petitioner municipality filed a petition for
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and
private respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners
Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality,
enjoining the DENR from disposing and awarding the parcels
of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present
recourse.
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that
ultimately, the central question and bone of contention in the
petition before us boils down to the correct interpretation of
Proclamation No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No. 1716.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of
Appeals by hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of
the fact that an earlier judgment, which had become final and
executory, had already settled the respective rights of the
parties under Proclamation No. 164. This notwithstanding,
petitioner reiterates the reasons why the court had previously
ruled in favor of petitioners rights over the subject property
against the claims of private respondents.
We find good legal basis to sustain petitioners position on
the issue of res judicata insofar as the particular area covered
by Proclamation No. 164, which was the subject matter of the
earlier case, is concerned.
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former
judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between
the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter,
and cause of action (Mangoma vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 21 [1995]).
The existence of the first three elements can not be
disputed. As to identity of parties, we have ruled that only
substantial identity is required and not absolute identity of
parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682
[1966]). The addition of public respondent DENR in the second
case will thus be of no moment. Likewise, there is identity of
cause of action since the right of the municipality over the
subject property, the corresponding obligation of private
respondents to respect such right and the resulting violation of
said right all remain to be the same in both the first and the
second actions despite the fact that in the first action, private
respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action, they
were the respondents.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res
judicata only extends to such portion of land covered by
Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not be
automatically segregated from the land covered by
Proclamation No. 1716. It does not include those portions
which are outside the coverage of Proclamation No. 1716.
Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
would be justified upon the above premise and our discussion
may properly end here. However, there exists a more basic
reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has
reference to a fundamental and gross error in the issuance of
Proclamation No. 164 on October 16, 1987 by then President
Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise
of legislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6
introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of
legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of
legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution of February
1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power
under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she
issued her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the
Provisional Constitution, or more popularly referred to as the
Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the
Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise
legislative power until a legislature is elected and convened
under a new constitution. Then came the ratification of the
draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987
Constitution. When Congress was convened on July 26, 1987,
President Aquino lost this legislative power under the Freedom
Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending Proclamation
No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative
power was already solely on Congress.
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the
attention of petitioner as well as the courts before which this
case has already passed through, this Court cannot help
noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of Proclamation No.
164. Because this unauthorized act by the then president
constitutes a direct derogation of the most basic principle in the
separation of powers between the three branches of
government enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply
close our eyes and rely upon the principle of the presumption
of validity of a law.
There is a long standing principle that every statute is
presumed to be valid (Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734
[1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978]). However,
this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted
by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is
clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive
branch. For this Court to allow such disregard of the most
basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of
presumption of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its
sacred duty to uphold and defend the Constitution. Thus, also,
it is in the discharge of this task that we take this exception
from the Courts usual practice of not entertaining constitutional
questions unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon,
and adequately argued.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No.
164 was an invalid exercise of legislative
power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent Department
of Environment and Natural Resources is hereby permanently
ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Romero,
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
EDUARDO VARELA, G.R. No. 171705
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA, et al
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 17 August 2005
Decision[1] and 27 February 2006 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73212. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the 20 June 2001 Decision[3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Negros Occidental, Judicial
Region 6, Branch 60, Cadiz City in Civil Case No. 547-C.
The Facts
Petitioner Eduardo G. Varela (Varela) was the mayor of Cadiz
City. He created a reorganization committee. On 22
September 1998, he submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cadiz City the committees Proposed
Reorganizational Structure and Staffing Pattern of Cadiz
City. On the same day, 22 September 1998, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod approved without modification and without hearing
the proposal. The Sangguniang Panlungsod passed
Resolution No. 98-112 authorizing and appropriating funds for
the reorganization of the city government. Resolution No. 98-
112 declared all positions in the city government vacant,
except elective positions and positions in the city and assistant
city treasurer. On 15 October 1998, Varela signed Resolution
No. 98-112.
On 10 November 1998, Varela gave notices of termination to
the city government employees, informing them that their
employment would end at the close of business hours on 31
December 1998. The employees opposed and questioned the
legality of Resolution No. 98-112. Varela ignored them.
Varela created a placement committee with City Administrator
Philip G. Zamora, Delina, Negosa, Jimmy Navarro, Jerry
Batislaon and Napud as members. The committee allegedly
met three times.
On 31 December 1998, Varela again gave notices of
termination to the city government employees, informing them
that their employment would end at the close of business
hours on 31 December 1998. On 4 January 1999, the
employees tried to report for work but were barred from
entering their offices.
Among those laid off was Community Affairs Officer IV Ramon
Borromeo (Borromeo). His department, the special services
department, was replaced by the community and barangay
affairs division. The head of the community and barangay
affairs division performed the same functions as the head of
the special services department. Three new positions were
created in the community and barangay affairs division. The
three new positions were given to Oscar Magbanua
(Magbanua), Moises Seoren (Seoren), and Santos Ortega
(Ortega). Magbanua, Seoren and Ortega were political
supporters of Varela and defeated barangay captain
candidates.
Around half of the 101 employees of the city health department
were laid off. Those laid off were the same ones who filed a
case, involving the magna carta for health workers, against
Varela. They were also perceived not to have voted for Varela
as mayor.
On 12 January 1999, Ma. Daisy G. Revalez and 40 other city
government employees filed with the RTC a
complaint[4] against Varela for the declaration of nullity of
Resolution No. 98-112 and for damages. In a motion[5] dated
29 January 1999, 47 other city government employees
intervened. In the complaint, the employees stated that, due to
the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental
torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation.[6]
The RTCs Ruling
In its 20 June 2001 Decision, the RTC declared Resolution No.
98-112 void and ordered Varela to pay the government
employees P10,000 each for moral damages, P200,000
attorneys fees, P20,000 litigation expenses, and court
appearance fees at P3,000 per hearing. The RTC found that
Varela acted in bad faith. The Court held:
There is no question that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cadiz City is the legislative arm of the
local government unit and as such it possesses the
power to enact the questioned resolution. Plaintiffs
however challenge the manner Res. 98-112 was
enacted, and the indecent haste that accompanied its
passage. The proposal emanated from the office of
defendant mayor and in a short time after its
submission the measure was passed. The requisite
deliberations, if at all there was one, could hardly be
considered adequate and could best be described as
perfunctory. The minutes of the SP say it all. The
deliberations reflected a lackluster effort and a
wimpish attempt by the members of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to justify the grant to the mayor of
legislative authority to carry out the
reorganization. There absolutely was no public
hearing. The proposal coming as it did from the
mayor, was a fait accompli, a done deal in a
manner of speaking. x x x
xxxx
Careful examination of the evidence submitted by
the defendant, however, would reveal a
systematic effort to purge the city government of
personnel who opposed the mayor politically, or
disagreed with him in his policies. Furthermore,
perusal of the minutes of the deliberations of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod reveals that the City of
Cadiz was not in dire financial straits necessitating
radical measures like mass lay-off of personnel. x x x
x x x The City of Cadiz as of 1998, was not in
financial extremis. It had the money, the
resources to fund the salaries of personnel. x x
x [Varela] even ignored the concern of a city
councilor who said that at that time (1998) the City
already lacked the required personnel, and so
why abolish certain positions? The defendant
mayor simply gave the assurance that they can
create any position when the need arises and the
city has the money. This statement betrayed the
real intentions of the defendant insofar as the
reorganization is concerned.
x x x The Mayor did not even explain what basic
services would be affected. As a matter of fact, the
office hardest hit and greatly affected by the mass
layoff was the health services department where 50
or so of the 101 personnel complement were laid
off. Does it mean that the delivery of health services
is the least of the priorities of Cadiz City? Or does it
mean that health service from the point of view of the
defendant city mayor is not a basic service? The truth
of the matter is that the health workers of Cadiz
filed a case against the mayor for his refusal to
implement provisions of the Magna Carta for
Health Workers. Talk of vindictiveness. The poor
health workers laid off were on the receiving end
of the ire of the defendant mayor.There seemed to
be no rhyme or reason to the reorganization
scheme.
xxxx
Was the reorganization of the Cadiz City government
under Res. 98-112, done in good faith? The testimony
of Ramon Borromeo, which is uncontradicted, will
show the true intent of the reorganization, and
whether or not it was done in good faith:
Q (Atty. Lobrido) What about your position,
Mr. Witness?
A My position as Community Affairs Officer
was abolished but instead an Executive
Assistant IV was made under
the Division Head of the Community and
Barangay Affairs Division.
Q What is the function of the Community
and Barangay Affairs Unit?
A It performs the same function as
that of the Community
Affairs Unit of which I am
the Division Head as
Community Affairs Officer
IV.
Q Considering that you were laid off who
took over your function?
A The Executive Assistant IV, but
considering that the position is coterminous
with that of the mayor, the appointment of
Executive Assistant IV was disapproved by
the Civil Service Commission as head of the
Community Affairs Unit and the
present situation as of now is that the
community Affairs and Barangay Unit is
without a division head and that three new
positions were created.
Q Who were appointed to the three new
positions you mentioned a while ago?
A Those appointed are
Oscar Magbanua,
Moises Seoren,
and Santos Ortega.
Q Why do you know these three persons?
A Because they are supporters of the
defendant city mayor and also because they
are barangay captains who were defeated in
the last barangay elections. (TSN-Cerbo, pp.
8-10, May 3, 2000).
From the afore-quoted testimony it is clear that the
abolition of the office of Mr. Borromeo in the
guise of reorganization was not done in good
faith. The abolition was done for political reasons,
(Arao vs. Luspo, L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA
722). As stated in Urgello, if the abolition merely
resulted in placing another person or appointee with a
different designation or name but substantially the
same duties, then it will be considered a device to
unseat the incumbent. Clearly the reorganization is
not genuine and it is nothing but a ruse to defeat the
constitutionally protected right of security of tenure.
xxxx
Since all the offices of the personnel of Cadiz City
were declared vacant, and notices of initial
termination sent on November 10, 1998, the
placement Committee barely had twenty (20) days to
submit a final report to defendant mayor. With 741
personnel to be reevaluated and screened, plus other
new applicants, the committee did not have enough
time to do their work as envisioned.The Committee
had to screen and evaluate all applications to about
649 positions included in the new
plantilla. Notwithstanding time constraints, the
Committee did not meet until November 17, barely
two (2) weeks from their deadline. Subsequently they
met three (3) times. On their first meeting, the report
states, the placement Committee merely agreed to
ask the defendant mayor to turn over to the
Committee all the application letters. Nothing by way
of screening or evaluation was done that day. On the
second meeting November 18, the applications were
lumped in bundles or files, and segregated by
department. Then they suggested to borrow the
qualification standards from the Human Resource
Management Office. Due to time constraints, it was
suggested that the screening should start
immediately, and they agreed to meet November 19,
1998. As of the second meeting the screening and
evaluation had barely began. On November 19, 1998
the committee met with Mr. Zamora suggesting that
qualification standards be used mainly eligibility
performance rating, education and attainment,
experience and awards and training received. Mr.
Napud suggested that the department heads be
interviewed. As of November 19, the committee had
not started its deliberations and screening, but lo and
behold Mr. Zamora came up with a complete list in
time for the last meeting. On November 29, 1998, Mr.
Zamora presented to the members of the committee
the list of employees selected by the Placement
Committee.Then the list was submitted to the
mayor. These were reflected in Minutes of the
meeting of the Placement Committee.
On the other hand, what did Mr. Zamora say about
the deliberations of the Placement Committee in his
capacity as chairman. His testimony is very
instructive.
Q (Atty. Lobrido) And when was the first
meeting?
A I think November 17, 1998.
Q What transpired during the first meeting?
A I cannot remember.
Q After November 18, 1998 meeting, was
there other meeting of the placement
committee?
A Yes, sir.
Q When was that?
A On November 19, 1998.
Q And what transpired during that meeting
on November 19, 1998?
A I cannot remember.
It seems incredulous that Mr. Philip Zamora,
designated to represent defendant mayor, would not
be able to recall what transpired during the
deliberations of the placement committee. Unless it is
shown that Mr. Zamora suffered severe bouts of
amnesia, it would be the height of tomfoolery to
accept that he would not be able to recall the
significant highlights of the meetings. Which can only
lead this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the
minutes (Exhibits 15 to 15-C) were fabricated and
contrived, and done after the fact. x x x
x x x Why would Philip Zamora present a list of
employees selected to members of the Placement
Committee and tell them this is the result of their
evaluation? Were not the members of the committee
the ones who evaluated and selected the
employees? The logical manner that should have
taken place would be that the committee members
themselves would submit the list to the chairman
telling him that this was the result of their evaluation
and screening and they were ready to submit the list
to the mayor. As it appears the list was a done deal, a
fait accompli, and the members were merely told to
put their imprimatur to it. The truth of matter however,
as can be gleaned from Mr. Zamoras testimony, is
that no meetings were ever conducted by the
placement committee. Which explains Mr. Zamoras
memory lapses. Nothing of the sort happened. What
happened was that the minutes were hastily produced
as an afterthought and later passed on as the real
thing. The entire proceedings was [sic] a sham, a
rigmarole intended to put a stamp of legitimacy to
what otherwise was a well calculated, well
planned scheme to rid Cadiz City of employees
who were the political opponents of the defendant
mayor. The ploy was to use the law as a subterfuge
to defeat the security of tenure clause of the
constitution. On top of this masquerade, the
defendant city mayor did not show any
compunction or any hesitation to ram the
reorganization down the throats of plaintiffs who
resisted the move and they actually
complained. He did not give them the benefit of
the doubt, nor listened to their plea for justice. He
simply ran roughshod over all of them discarding
any pretense to uphold due process of law. It was
shocking no less to the 166 plaintiffs who
become [sic] sacrificial lambs in the altar of
political convenience and expediency. This is
anathema in a democratic system where the rule of
law reigns supreme.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
Cadiz City Chief Executive Salvador G. Escalante,
Jr., through the Office of the City Legal Officer, filed
with the RTC a motion[8] to clarify who between
Varela, in his personal capacity, and Cadiz City was
liable for the payment of moral damages, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses and court appearance
fees. In its 26 July 2001 Order,[9] the RTC held that, it
is the municipal corporation which is liable for the acts
of its officers committed while in the performance of
official duties.[10]
Cadiz City, through the Office of the City Legal Officer,
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its 17 August 2005 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the RTCs 20 June 2001 Decision. The Court
of Appeals held that Varela was personally liable for the
payment of moral damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and court appearance fees. It reduced the amounts of
attorneys fees and litigation expenses from P200,000
to P100,000 and from P20,000 to P10,000, respectively, and
deleted the award of court appearance fees. The Court of
Appeals held that:
OUR jurisprudence is replete with cases involving the
issue of whether or not a public officer may be held
liable for damages in the performance of their [sic]
duties, to quote:
A public official is by law not immune from
damages in his personal capacity for acts
done in bad faith which, being outside the
scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for
official actions.
Settled is the principle that a public official
may be liable in his personal capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice and in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction.
In addition, Book I, Chapter 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 provides, to quote:
Section 38. Liability of Superior Officers. (1)
A public officer shall not be civilly liable for
acts done in the performance of his official
duties, unless there is a clear showing
of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. x x
x are the allegations in the complaint. It is settled
In the case at bar, the court a quo found that bad
faith attended the performance of the official acts of
the original defendant, Eduardo G. Varela. x x x
WE find no reason to disturb the finding of bad
faith by the court a quo considering that the same
was amply supported by evidence.[11]
Hence, the present petition.
The Issue
Varela raises as issue that, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE PETITIONER
PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF DAMAGES,
ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES AS THE
PETITIONER WAS SUED IN HIS OFFICIAL, AND NOT IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY.[12]Varela states that:
All the proceedings in the lower court show beyond
question that the petitioner was charged in his official
capacity as then mayor of the real party-defendant,
the respondent City of Capiz.
This is expressly shown by the very title, caption and
allegations of private respondents complaint dated
January 12, 1999. The fact that petitioner was sued in
his representative and official capacity was not
contested, and, in fact, admitted by the parties.[13]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Varela was sued in his personal capacity, not in his official
capacity. In the complaint, the employees stated that, due to
the illegal acts of the Defendant, Plaintiffs suffered mental
torture and anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation. The State can
never be the author of illegal acts.
The complaint merely identified Varela as the mayor of Cadiz
City. It did not categorically state that Varela was being sued in
his official capacity. The identification and mention of Varela as
the mayor of Cadiz City did not automatically transform the
action into one against Varela in his official capacity. The
allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the cause
of action.
In Pascual v. Beltran,[14] the Court held that:
[I]n the case at bar, petitioner is actually sued in
his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal,
the State, can never be the author of any wrongful
act. The Complaint filed by the private respondent
with the RTC merely identified petitioner as
Director of the Telecommunications Office, but
did not categorically state that he was being sued
in his official capacity. The mere mention in the
Complaint of the petitioners position as Regional
Director of the Telecommunications Office does
not transform the action into one against
petitioner in his official capacity. What is
determinative of the nature of the cause of action
that the nature of a cause of action is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and
the law to govern it is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filling [sic] the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.[15] (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The
Court AFFIRMS the 17 August 2005 Decision and 27 February
2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
73212.
G.R. No. 73928 August 31, 1987
JOSE E. GENSON, petitioner,
vs.
SPS. EDUARDO ADARLE and SHERLITA MARI-ON, and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for review which seeks to set aside the
decision in CA-G.R. No. 00783 on the ground that the findings
of the respondent Court of Appeals are based on
misapprehension of facts and conflict with those of the trial
court and that the conclusions drawn therefrom are based on
speculations and conjectures.
Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public
auction of junk and other unserviceable government property
located at the compound of the Highway District Engineer's
Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo Adarle was
hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away scrap
iron from the said compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or
about 312.00 a month.
On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a
Saturday and a non-working day, while the private respondent
was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck
inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of
the payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised,
the bucket suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion
of his head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle was rushed
to the St. Anthony Hospital, Roxas City. According to the
medical certificate issued by the attending physician, the
private respondent suffered the following injuries:
1) Comminuted fracture of the vertebral body of 13 with
extreme Kyphosis of the segment by x-ray.
2) Cord compression 2nd to the injury with paralysis of the
lower extremity, inability to defecate and urinate. (E Exh. A,
Exhibits for the plaintiff-appellant, Original Records.)
The medical certificate also reported that:
The patient recovered the use of his urinary bladder and was
able to defecate 2 months after surgery. He is paralyzed from
the knee down to his toes. He can only sit on a wheel chair.
The above residual damage is permanent 2nd to the injury
incurred by Mr. Adarle, he is still confined in the Hospital.
(idem)
While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the
action below for damages against Arbatin, his employer;
Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario Marcelino, the
civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District Engineer.
During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense
that he had no knowledge of or participation in the accident
and that, when it happened, he was not present in the
government compound. Apart from the fact that it was a
Saturday and a non-working day, he was in Iloilo. As part of his
evidence, the petitioner presented a memorandum directed to
a certain Mr. Orlando Panaguiton ordering the latter to take
charge of the district until his return (Exh. 1).
The trial court found that, with the exception of the petitioner,
all of the defendants were present at the Highway's compound
when the accident occurred. However, it still adjudged the
petitioner liable for damages because the petitioner was
supposed to know what his men do with their government
equipment within an area under his supervision.
Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision
finding all the defendants liable for damages under Articles
1172 and 2176 of the New Civil Code. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this court orders the defendants to pay to
plaintiff the amounts stated in the complainant's prayer as
follows:
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
the sum of 312.00 monthly from September 8, 1979 until his
release from the hospital.
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P7,410.63 for hospital expenses up to January 14,
1980 and an additional amount for further hospitalization until
the release of plaintiff from the hospital;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
the sum of at least P100,000.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, considering that plaintiff Eduardo Adarle is totally
incapacitated for any employment for life;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages and another sum for
exemplary damages which we leave to the sound discretion of
the Honorable Court;
Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. (pp. 129- 130,
Original Records).
The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the trial court and further
ordered the defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary damages.
Defendant Candelario Marcelino was, however, absolved from
liability.
In its decision, the appellate court ruled:
That payloader owned by the Government, as found by the
lower court, should not have been operated that Saturday,
September 8, 1979, a Saturday, a non-working holiday. There
is no official order from the proper authorities authorizing
Arbatin and plaintiff to work and Buensalido to operate the
payloader on that day inside the Highway compound.
Thereabouts, we can logically deduce that Arbatin and plaintiff
went to the compound to work with the previous knowledge
and consent of Highway District Engineer Jose E. Genson.
And allowed him, probably upon the request of Arbatin. We
have noted that Genson testified that his office does not
authorize work on Saturdays.
Genson testified that he was in Iloilo from September 9 and 10,
1979. The accident occurred on September 8, in the morning.
In his answer, Genson did not allege his presence in Iloilo on
September 9 and 10 ... .
We fully concur with the lower court's conclusions regarding
the physical presence of appellants inside the compound on
that fateful day, pursuant to a previous understanding with
Arbatin for plaintiff to work on the scrap iron and for Buensalido
to operate the payloader inside the compound. Arbatin and
plaintiff would not go to the compound on that Saturday, if
there was no previous understanding with Genson and
Buensalido.
The liability of Genson is based on fault, intentional and
voluntary or negligent (Eleano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 106; Jimena v.
Lincallo, 63 O.G. 11,15, 8 C. A.R. 2567). He gave permission
to Arbatin, plaintiff and Buensalido to work on Saturday, a non-
working day, in contravention of his office' rules and
regulations outlawing work on Saturdays.. (pp. 29-30, Rollo)
In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the
appellate court committed a palpable error when it ruled that
the petitioner was present when the accident happened and
that he had given permission to the other defendants to work
on a Saturday, a non-working day. The petitioner argues that
considering these were the facts relied upon by the said court
in holding that he was negligent and thus liable for damages,
such a conclusion, is without basis.
The petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in
not holding that the suit against the petitioner was, in effect, a
suit against the government and, therefore, should be
dismissed under the principle of non-suability of the state.
As regards the petitioner's second contention, we hold that the
petitioner's Identification as the Highway District Engineer in
the complaint filed by the private respondent did not result in
the said complaint's becoming a suit against the government or
state.
In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that "the fact that
the duties and positions of the defendants are indicated does
not mean that they are being sued in their official capacities,
especially as the present action is not one against the
Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar
happened on a non-working day and there was no showing
that the work performed on that day was authorized by the
government. While the equipment used belongs to the
Government, the work was private in nature, for the benefit of
a purchaser of junk. As we have held in the case of Republic v.
Palacio (23 SCRA 899,906).
xxx xxx xxx
the ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract, and
it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State
is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of
such agent's regular duties (Merritt v. Insular
Government, supra; Rosete v. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453)
There being no proof that the making of the tortious
inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can
be made liable therefor.
Therefore, the defense of the petitioner that he cannot be
made liable under the principle of non-suability of the state
cannot be sustained.
With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that the
appellate court based its conclusions on an erroneous finding
of fact, we agree with him that the appellate court's finding that
he was present within the premises when the accident
happened is not supported by evidence indisputably showing
that he was indeed there.
Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's
presence when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr.
Adarle, any liability on his part would be based only on his
alleged failure to exercise proper supervision over his
subordinates (See Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263, 267-268).
According to the trial court, Mr. Genson authorized work on a
Saturday when no work was supposed to be done. It stated
that the petitioner should know what his men do with their
government equipment and he should neither be lax nor
lenient in his supervision over them.
The petitioner contends that:
1. No evidence on record exists that Genson gave authority to
Adarle and Arbatin, either verbally or in writing, to enter the
work inside the Highways Compound on September 8, 1979;
2. Genson never knew or met Arbatin until the trial of the case.
This fact was never denied by Arbatin nor rebutted by Adarle.
How then could Genson have ordered or allowed Arbatin to
enter the Highways Compound with Adarle?
3. Adarle himself repeatedly admitted that Arbatin, his
employer, gave him the instructions to enter the compound,
thus:
Q. Now particularly on September 8, 1979, did Arbatin ask you
to go to the compound in the Highway?
A. Yes sr.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did he say that to you?
A. We went to the Highway compound for many times already
and that was the time when I met the incident.
Q. The particular day in question September 8. 1979, did you
see Arturo Arbatin and he asked you to go the compound on
that day?
A. That date was included on the first day when "he instructed
us to gather scrap iron until that work could be finished." (pp.
25-26, tsn., October 10, 1980) (Emphasis supplied)
Q. Who told you to work there?
A. "Through the instruction of Arturo Arbatin" (pp. 32, tsn., Oct.
10, 1980) (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 12-13, Rollo).
Insofar as work on a Saturday is concerned, and assuming Mr.
Genson verbally allowed it, we see nothing wrong in the
petitioner's authorizing work on that day. As a matter of fact, it
could even be required that the hauling of junk and
unserviceable equipment sold at public auction must be
done on non-working days. The regular work of the District
Engineer's office would not be disturbed or prejudiced by a
private bidder bringing in his trucks and obstructing the smooth
flow of traffic and the daily routine within the compound.
Obviously, it would also be safer for all concerned to effect the
clearing of the junk pile when everything is peaceful and quiet.
There is no showing from the records that it is against
regulations to use government cranes and payloaders to load
items sold at public auction on the trucks of the winning bidder.
The items were formerly government property. Unless the
contract specifies otherwise, it may be presumed that all the
parties were in agreement regarding the use of equipment
already there for that purpose. Of course, it would be different
if the junk pile is in a compound where there is no equipment
for loading or unloading and the cranes or payloaders have to
be brought there.
There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant"
doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not working
overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the district
engineer can be considered an "employer" for purposes of tort
liability who may be liable even if he was not there. No
evidence was presented to show that an application for
overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district
engineer's office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume
that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to
earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer and that his
presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely
private arrangement. From the records of this case, we are not
disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his
subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their office
premises can be held liable for everything that happens on that
day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin brought his
own payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but
we are not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The
issue before us is subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a
government employee who is moonlighting on a non-working
day.
This Court ruled in Dumlao v. Court of Appeals (114 SCRA
247, 251):
Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice and in bad faith, (Mindanao realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6
SCRA 814) or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
(the Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-11844,
August 31, 1960) The question, therefore, is whether petitioner
did act in any of the manner aforesaid.
Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the
respondent Court of Appeals, he was not sued in his personal
capacity, but in his official capacity. Neither was malice or bad
faith alleged against him in the complaint, much less proven by
the evidence, as the respondent court made no such finding of
malice or bad faith.
Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the
evidence it would indeed be correct to say that petitioner was
sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was
imputed to him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and
gross indifference in the performance of his official duties.
Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is
more was not convincingly proven.
According to the respondent court, "Genson and Buensalido
divested themselves of their public positions and privileges to
accomodate an acquaintance or probably for inordinate gain."
(p. 31, Rollo).
There is no showing from the records that Genson received
anything which could be called "inordinate gain." It is possible
that he permitted work on a Saturday to accomodate an
acquaintance but it is more plausible that he simply wanted to
clear his compound of junk and the best time for the winning
bidder to do it was on a non-working day.
At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence
on the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of
Buensalido and Arbatin.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
against Jesus Genson is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
NATURE OF LIABILITY: JOINT OR SOLIDARY?
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
FELIX LANUZO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SY BON PING and SALVADOR MENDOZA, defendants-
appellants.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Appeal certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 as it involves
pure legal questions.
On November 25, 1969, a Complaint for damages was
instituted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil
Case No. 6847) by plaintiff Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon Ping,
the owner and operator of a freight truck bearing Plate No. T-
57266, and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. As alleged therein,
at about five o'clock in the afternoon of July 24, 1969, while
Salvador Mendoza was driving the truck along the national
highway in the Barrio of San Ramon, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
and because of his reckless negligence, we rammed into the
residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result, the house
and store were completely razed to the ground causing
damage to plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. Plaintiff
averred that by reason thereof he became destitute as he lost
his means of livelihood from the store which used to give him a
monthly income of P300.00.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that another
action, Criminal Case No. 4250 for Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence, was pending in the Municipal
Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same parties for
the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that
he had made an express reservation in the criminal case to
institute a civil action for damages separate and distinct from
the criminal suit.
The lower Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On August 13, 1970, the trial Court rendered a default
judgment in plaintiff's favor, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (a) ordering the
defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P13,000.00 as damages, resulting to the loss of the store
including the merchandise for sale therein, the residential
house of mixed materials, furnitures, clothing and households
fixtures; (b) ordering the said defendants to pay jointly and
severally P300.00 monthly from July 24, 1969 which
represents plaintiff's monthly income from his store until the
whole amount of P13,000.00 is fully paid; and (c) for attorney's
fees an amount equivalent to 20% of the total amount claimed
by the plaintiff, plus the costs of this suit.
Defendants' "Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial and
To Set Aside Order of Default" was denied.
Upon elevation by the defendants of the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 48399-R) they urged that the civil action
was prematurely instituted in view of Rule 111, section 3,
providing in part that "after the criminal action has been
commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."
Additionally, they contended that even assuming their liability,
the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in holding
them jointly and severally liable.
On February 20, 1980, the Court of Appeals certified the case
to this instance on pure questions of law.
We start from the fundamental premise, clearly enunciated as
early as the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 2 that:
A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa-
extracontractual. The same negligent act causing damages
may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extracontractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to
enforce.
Plaintiff's reservation before the Municipal Court in the criminal
case of his right to institute a civil action separately is quoted
hereunder in full:
UNDERSIGNED offended party in the above-entitled case
before this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
1. That this action which was commenced by the Chief of
Police included in the complaint the claim of the undersigned
for civil liability;
2. That the undersigned is reserving his right to institute the
civil action for damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 6847 of
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, against accused
herein and his employer;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that reservation be
made of record therein and that the civil aspect of the above-
entitled case be not included herein.
xxx xxx xxx 3
The terms of plaintiff's reservation clearly and unmistakably
make out a case for quasi-delict. This is also evident from the
recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee
relationship between the appellants, alleging that damages to
the house and store were caused by the fact that Salvador
Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly, with gross
negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic rules
and regulations and without regard to the safety of persons
and property", and praying that appellants be held jointly and
solidarity liable for damages. These are, basically, what should
be alleged in actions based on quasi-delict. 4
As it is quite apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present
claim for damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from
proceeding with this independent civil suit. The institution of a
criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil
action based on quasi-delict. 5 And the separate civil action
for quasi-delict may proceed independently and regardless of
the result of the criminal case, 6 except that a plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or commission of the
defendant. 7
The civil action referred to in Sections 3(a) and (b) of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
institution of the criminal action, is that arising from delict, and
not the civil action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
We come now to the subject of liability of the appellants herein.
For his own negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned
and operated by his employer, the driver, Salvador Mendoza,
is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the
other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also
primary and direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which
explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
For failure of the appellant Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal
presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision
of this employee, 8 he is likewise responsible for the damages
caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver) Salvador
Mendoza, and his liability is primary and solidary.
... What needs only to be alleged under the aforequoted
provision (Article 2180, Civil Code) is that the employee
(driver) has, by his negligence (quasi-delict) caused damage to
make the employer, likewise, responsible for the tortious act of
the employee, and his liability is, as earlier observed, primary
and solidary 9
But although the employer is solidarity liable with the employee
for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement from
his employee (driver) for whatever amount the employer will
have to pay the offended party to satisfy the latter's claim. 10
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed.
Costs against defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974
PRIMA MALIPOL, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem
of her minor children, LYDIA MALIJAN, JOSEFINA MALIJAN,
TEODORA MALIJAN, and SEBASTIAN MALIJAN, plaintiffs-
appellees, vs. LILY LIM TAN and ERNESTO LABSAN,
Defendants-Appellants.
Edgardo Moncada for plaintiffs-appellees.
Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan for defendants-appellants.

ZALDIVAR, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Appeal on questions of law from the decision dated July 1,
1966, a judgment by default, and from the order dated October
10, 1966, of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in its Civil
Case No. 1732 which denied defendants-appellants' motion to
lift the order of default and for a new trial and which considered
the judgment by default as standing with full force and
effect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the evening of February 6, 1965, at about 8:35 o'clock,
Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking with his companion
Leonardo Amante on the shoulder of the road in Barrio San
Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and
was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the
ground Malijan was run over by the tanker's right wheel that
got detached from its axle. Malijan's companion, with the aid of
the barrio captain, brought Malijan to the San Pablo City
Hospital where he died that same night, the cause of death
being "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to
vehicular accident."chanrobles virtual law library
The gasoline tanker with Plate No. T-52573, series of 1964,
driven at the time of the accident by herein appellant Ernesto
Labsan, was being used in connection with the gasoline
business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim
Tan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Representations and demands for payment of damage having
been ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying
that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly and severally, the
damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the
mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased
Pantaleon Malijan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Appellants were duly served with summons on May 19, 1966,
but they failed to file their answer within the reglementary
period. Upon appellees' motion of June 8, 1966 the trial court,
in an order dated June 10, 1966, declare the appellants in
default, and appellees were permitted to present their evidence
in the absence of the appellants. The trial court rendered a
decision, dated July 1, 1966, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as
supported by the evidence to be reasonable and justified,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants. The defendant driver, Ernesto Labsan,
is ordered (1) to pay the sum of P2,100.00 to the plaintiffs for
expenses for hospitalization, medical treatment, vigil and burial
of Pantaleon Malijan; (2) to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of
P6,000.00 for the death of said victim; (3) to pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 for the loss of earnings of said
deceased for a period of five years; (4) to pay to the plaintiffs
the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages; (5) to pay to the
plaintiffs the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00
for incidental and litigation expenses; and (6) to pay the costs
of the suit. Should Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the
foregoing damages, they shall be paid for by defendant Lily
Lim Tan, who by law, being the owner and operator of the
gasoline tanker that featured in the accident, is subsidiarily
liable.
Copy of the decision was received by the appellees August on
23, 1966.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
A motion for execution was filed on August 26, 1966 by
appellees but the trial court held its resolution in abeyance until
September 22, 1966 when the judgment would become
final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 21, 1966 appellants filed a verified motion to lift
the order of default and for a new trial, alleging that they were
deprived of their day in court when the order of default was
issued and a decision rendered after; that they had good and
valid defenses, namely: (a) that the accident which gave rise to
the case was due to force majeure; (b) that appellant Ernesto
Labsan was without fault in the accident that gave rise to the
case; and (c) that appellant Lily Lim Tan had exercised the due
diligence required of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. Finding said motion to be without merit, the trial court
denied the same on October 10, 1966. Hence, this appeal
wherein appellants made assignment of errors, as follows:
(a) The trial court erred in finding that appellants took the
complaint for granted by reason of the fact that appellants
referred to their lawyer the complaint for answer only after the
lapse of eleven (11) days from receipt thereof ;chanrobles
virtual law library
(b) The trial court erred in not holding that the mistake
committed by the late Atty. Daniel Chavez in giving the wrong
date of receipt by appellants of the summons and the
complaint to Atty. Romulo R. de Castro on June 10, 1966 due
to the abnormal mental condition of the late Atty. Daniel
Chavez on June 10, 1966 which thereafter resulted in the
commission of suicide by the latter on June 17, 1966,
constitutes the mistake and accident in law which warrant the
relief from default and the granting of the new trial;chanrobles
virtual law library
(c) The trial court erred in not holding that the fact that
appellants, through Atty. Romulo R. de Castro, filed on June
10, 1966 a motion for extension of time to file answer, and
thereafter actually did file their answer to the complaint on
June 20, 1966 wherein they alleged good, valid and
meritorious defenses against the claim of plaintiffs in the
complaint, should warrant favorable consideration of
appellants' motion to lift order of default and for new trial;
andchanrobles virtual law library
(d) The trial court erred in not holding that the fact that
appellants' motion to lift order of default and for new trial.
1. In support of their first assignment of error, counsel
for appellants contends that the finding of the trial court, that
the appellants took the complaint for granted when they
referred the complaint to their lawyer only on the eleventh day
after receipt thereof, was unwarranted, because appellants
had 15 days from receipt of the summons and complaint to
answer and their lawyer, the late Atty. Daniel Chavez, after the
complaint was referred to him on the eleventh day, had still
four days to file the answer, which he could very well do
inasmuch as he was well acquainted with the facts because he
was the lawyer of appellant Ernesto Labsan in Criminal Case
No. 2200 of Court of First Instance of Batangas for homicide
thru reckless imprudence - which case arose from the very
accident subject of appellees' complaint; that appellant Lily Lim
Tan, furthermore, had instructed her employee, Eleuterio
Dizon, to handcarry the summons and to deliver it to nobody
except to Atty. Chavez; that Atty. Chavez, in a distance
telephone conversation with appellant Lily Lim Tan, assured
the latter that he would attend to the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
We do not find merit in the contention of counsel for
appellants. It is within the sound discretion of the court to set
aside an order of default and to permit a defendant to file his
answer and to be heard on the merits even after the
reglementary period for the filing of the answer has expired,
but it is not error, or an abuse of discretion, on the part of the
court to refuse to set aside its order of default and to refuse to
accept the answer where it finds no justifiable reason for the
delay in the filing of the answer. In the motions for
reconsideration of an order of default, the moving party has the
burden of showing such diligence as would justify his being
excused from not filing the answer with the reglementary
period as provided by the Rules of Court, otherwise these
guidelines for an orderly and expeditious procedure would be
rendered meaningless. 1 Unless it is shown clearly that a party
has justifiable reason for the delay the court will not ordinarily
exercise its discretion in his favor. 2chanrobles virtual law
library
In the instant case, We agree with the trial court that appellants
have not shown that they exercised such diligence as an
ordinary prudent person would exercise, to have the answer
filed within the reglementary period. Appellant Lily Lim Tan
admitted in her affidavit 3 that she received the summons and
copy of the complaint on May 19, 1966, and that having read
the complaint she found out that she was being sued, together
with her driver, for damages in connection with the accident of
February 6, 1965 at Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The damages
asked in the complaint amounts to P36,600.00. The summons
required them to answer the complaint within 15 days from
receipt thereof, and warned them that should they fail to
answer within said period the plaintiffs would take judgment
against them for the relief demanded in the complaint. The
damages demanded was not a negligible sum, and appellant
Lily Lim Tan, who is a business woman, should have
considered the matter a serious one. Ordinary prudence would
dictate that she should concern herself about the matter, that
she should refer said complaint with the least possible delay to
her lawyer. But, for reasons she did not explain, she referred
the complaint to her lawyer only after the lapse of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof, i.e., on May 30, 1966. She should have
considered that four days might not be sufficient time for her
lawyer to prepare and file the
answer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants, however, contend that their lawyer, Atty. Chavez,
could very well prepare the answer within the remaining four
days of the reglementary period, for he was conversant with
the facts of the case. Be that as it may, the fact was that Atty.
Chavez failed to file the answer. Because Atty. Chavez
assured her, in their long distance telephone conversation that
he would take care the complaint, appellant Lily Lim Tan took
for granted that the answer would be filed on time. Said
appellant should have checked before the expiration of the
period for filing the answer whether the complaint was really
taken care of, or not. But this, appellant Lily Lim Tan failed to
do, and this is another instance showing her lack of concern
over the complaint. There was, therefore, no showing of due
diligence on the part of appellants which would excuse their
failure to file their answer on time. There is no showing either
that the other appellant, Ernesto Labsan, had taken any step to
have an answer filed in his behalf - evidently he was relying on
his employer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
2. In support of the second assignment of error,
appellants contend that the facts show that on June 10, 1966,
Atty. Chavez, who was then acting strangely, endorsed the
summons and complaint to Atty. Romulo R. de Castro; that
upon inquiry by Atty. de Castro from Atty. Chavez the latter
informed him that the summons was served on appellants on
May 30, 1966; that appellant Lily Lim Tan, who was assured by
Atty. Chavez in their long distance telephone conversation that
the complaint would be attended to, could not, by the exercise
of ordinary diligence, have foreseen, and avoided, the
circumstance that at the time she referred the summons to
Atty. Chavez, the latter was already in an abnormal condition
which later resulted in his committing suicide on June 17,
1966; that it was Atty. Chavez's abnormal condition and his
having given to Atty. de Castro the wrong date of the receipt of
the summons by the appellees that caused the delay in the
filing of the answer; that said circumstances constituted
mistake and accident which entitled appellants to relief from
default and a grant of new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Appellants' contention that the delay in filing the answer was
due to mistake and accident is
untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The mistake, according to appellants, consisted in Atty.
Chavez's having told Atty. de Castro on June 10, 1966 that
appellants received the summons and complaint on May 30,
1966. Even if Atty. Chavez had told Atty. de Castro the correct
date, that is, that appellants received the summons on May 19,
1966, the answer could not have been filed on time by Atty. de
Castro, because the reglementary period for filing the answer
expired on June 3, 1966, and it was already June 10, 1966,
when the complaint was endorsed by Atty. Chavez to Atty. de
Castro.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The accident, according to appellants' counsel, consisted in
Atty. Chavez's being in an abnormal condition at the time the
complaint was given to him on May 30, 1966. This claim of
appellants is not supported by the
record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The record does not show that Atty. Chavez was suffering from
an abnormal mind on May 30, 1966. His actuations on May 30
were those that could be expected of a normal person. Atty.
Chavez asked the employee of appellant Lily Lim Tan about
the date when his employer received the summons and
complaint, and because the employee could not give him the
desired information Atty. Chavez placed a long distance
telephone call to appellant Lily Lim Tan to ask about said date.
This action of Atty. Chavez showed that he was very much
aware that the reglementary period within which the answer
should be filed was to be computed from the date of the receipt
of the summons and the complaint. It also showed that Atty.
Chavez knew the easiest and the most practical means to get
the information that he needed - that was by a long distance
telephone call to his client, Lily Lim Tan. These actuations of
Atty. Chavez showed that he knew the importance of the
matter at hand, and he was exercising the ordinary and
reasonable care over the interests of his client. These specific
actions of Atty. Chavez indicated that as of May 30, 1966 he
had a sound mind.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
It is claimed by appellants that on June 10, 1966 Atty. Chavez
endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro, and told the latter
that the summons and complaint were received by the
appellants on May 30, 1966. It is further claimed by appellants
that this information given by Atty. Chavez - that the summons
and complaint were received by the appellants on May 30,
1966 - was the mistake that caused the delay of the filing of
the answer. But it should be noted that on June 10, 1966 when
Atty. Chavez endorsed the complaint to Atty. de Castro and
informed the latter that the summons and complaint were
received by the appellants on May 30, 1966, the period within
which the answer should be filed had already expired - the
expiry date being June 3, 1966. There is no showing that
between May 30, when Atty. Chavez received the summons
and complaint from the employee of Lily Lim Tan, and June 3,
1973 Atty. Chavez was incapacitated to file the answer. And so
it is clear that before the case was endorsed to Atty. de Castro,
the appellants were already in default. The failure to file the
answer on time may well be attributed to the mistake or
"negligence of Atty. Chavez. The appellants are bound by the
mistakes, and may suffer by the negligence, of their lawyer. In
fact, on June 8, 1966, or two days before Atty. Chavez
endorsed the case to Atty. de Castro, the appellees had filed a
motion in court to declare the defendants (now the appellants)
in default. The moves taken by Atty. de Castro - in filing a
motion for extension of time to file an answer on June 10,
1966, and in finally filing an answer on June 20, 1966 - were
already late.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The fact that Atty. Chavez committed suicide on June 17, 1966
does not necessarily prove that he was abnormal, incompetent
or insane on May 30, 1966. Although there is a judicial
declaration that a sane man would not commit suicide,
cognizance is nevertheless taken of the fact that
circumstances at some given time may impel a person to
commit suicide. 4 The probative value of suicide in determining
the sanity of a person is dependent on the factual situation in
each case. Such matters as the reasons for the act of self-
destruction, the circumstances indicating the person's state of
mind at the time, and other pertinent facts must be considered.
The appellants had not indicated to the trial court any
circumstance from which the trial court could form an opinion
of the mental condition of Atty. Chavez before he committed
suicide. The trial court, therefore, did not err when it did not
favorably consider the claim of the appellant that their failure to
file their answer to the complaint was due to accident or
mistake, as contemplated in Section 3 of Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
3. In support of the third assignment of error, appellants
argue that acting on the wrong information given by Atty.
Chavez, Atty. Romulo de Castro filed on June 10, 1966 a
motion for an extension of 20 days within which to file an
answer and that he did file the answer with good, valid and
meritorious defenses on June 20, 1966; that on June 27, 1966
when appellees were allowed to present their evidence ex-
parte, the motion for extension of time and the answer already
formed part of the records of the case; that inasmuch as the
late filing of the answer was due to accident and mistake, and
appellants had good, valid, and meritorious defenses, the
motion to lift the order of default and for new trial should have
been favorably considered by the court. 5chanrobles virtual
law library
Let it be noted that the lower court rendered its decision on
July 1, 1966, and the appellees received notice of said
decision on August 23, 1966. The decision would have
become final on September 22, 1966. On September 21, 1966
the appellants filed their motion to lift the order of default and
for new trial. The motion of the appellants therefore, was in the
nature of a motion for a new trial based on fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence under paragraph (a) of
Section 1 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 2 of
said Rule 37 the moving party must show that he has a
meritorious defense. The facts constituting the movant's good
and substantial defense, which he may prove if the petition
were granted, must be shown in the affidavit which should
accompany the motion for a new trial. 6 In the instant case, the
motion to lift the order of default and for new trial as well as the
affidavit of merits accompanying the motion did not contain
clear statements of the facts constituting a good and valid
defense which the appellants might prove if they were given a
chance to introduce evidence. The allegations in the motion
that defendants have good and valid defenses, namely: that
the accident which gave rise to the case was force majeure;
that defendant Ernesto Labsan is absolutely without fault in the
accident that gave rise to the case; and that defendant Lily Lim
Tan has exercised due diligence required of a good father of a
family to prevent damage 7, are mere conclusions which did
not provide the court with any basis for determining the nature
and merit of the probable defense. An affidavit of merit should
state facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence the trial court correctly denied the motion to set aside
order of default and for new
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We must, however, point out a flaw in the decision of the lower
court. It is stated in the decision appealed from that the driver,
Ernesto Labsan, was primarily liable for the payment of
damages adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan,
being the owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that
figured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only
in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay. This is not
correct. The action in the instant case was brought not to
demand civil liability arising from a crime. The complaint
makes no mention of a crime having been committed, much
less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of a
crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto
Labsan was the authorized driver of the truck that figured in
the accident, which truck was operated by appellant Lily Lim
Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in
the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly
and solidarily liable for damages. The instant action, therefore,
was based, as the complaint shows, on quasi delict. 8 Under
Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the
liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise for damages caused by their employees is primary
and direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer, however, can
demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount
which he paid under his liability. 10 The employer, appellant
Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not
subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the
lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of
appellant Lily Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant
Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the damages that she would
have to pay to appellees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, dated July 1, 1966, as modified in accordance with
the observations We made in the preceding paragraph, and
the order, dated October 10, 1966, denying appellants' motion
for the lifting of the order of default and for new trial, in Civil
Case No. 1732, are affirmed. Costs against defendants-
appellees.
It is so ordered.