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US v.

Dorr
The defendants charged with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel
against the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902,
under the caption of "A few hard facts."

ARTICLE:
"It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil Commission, through its ex-insurgent
office holders, and by its continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the military
rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a protectorate over a set of men who
should be in jail or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the appointment of one Tecson as justice
of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Islands,
reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during the struggle, at the
risk of their lives, aided the Americans."

ISSUE: whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292, above cited.

DECISION: NO
The article in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for
unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people
against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of Act No. 292
we are unable to discover anything in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce
anything like what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with
a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.

ISSUE #2: what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act," it is made an offense
to "write, print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing,
uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing against the Government with
intent to defame the said Government, or to excite against them or either or any of them the hatred of
the good people of the United States," etc.

DECISION:
The term "government" would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the existing political
system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government — the Houses of Congress
and the Executive — which are also specially mentioned.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system. The form of government by
a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute
by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the
wisdom of their policy.

US v. Abad
 The defendant was convicted of the violation of section 8 of Act No. 292, the law defining and
punishing treason and sedition. He is the author of the Tagalog drama "Tanikalang Guinto"
(The Chain of Gold).

STORY:
The heroine, Liwanag, is promised in marriage to the hero, K. Ulayaw. Maimbot, who has given
consent to this promise of marriage. During the progress of the play he withdraws his consent,

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forbids K. Ulayaw to come to his house, and by Liwanag to abandon her lover. He takes into his
employ Nagtapon, a brother of K. Ulayaw, whom he directs to act as a spy upon the movements of
Ulayaw. Another of the characters in the play is Dalita, the mother of K. Ulayaw and Nagtapon.
Nagtapon disowns her, and she dies in the first act. The gifts of Maimbot to Liwanag not producing
any result, her resorts to harsher measures, binds her to a tree, and places Nagtapon as a watch over
her. K. Ulayaw, searching for her, finds her in this condition, and is killed by Nagtapon. The play ends
with the translation of Liwanag to the heavens.

 It is claimed by the Government, however, that it was intended to represent the relations
between the Government of the United States and the Philippines
 The word "independence" or "independent" occurs five times in the course of the play, but
always in connection with the marriage of Liwanag and K

DECISION: ACQUITTED
That the public did not understand the play as meaning what the Government claims it means is
apparent from the testimony of some of the Government’s own witnesses.

The defendant, the author, he had read in a newspapers that all plays should be submitted for
examination to the division of information. He thereupon took his play to the office of John F. Green.
It was returned to him the next day, with authority to present it. However it may be, it is apparent
that the play was not considered seditious by the authorities of Manila.

US v. Apurado

The appellants in this case were convicted of the crime of sedition as defined in section 5 of Act No.
292 of the Philippine Commission

"All persons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force or outside of legal
methods any of the following objects are guilty of sedition

"2. To prevent the Insular Government, or any provincial or municipal government or any
public official, from freely exercising its or his duties or the due execution of any judicial or
administrative order.

Some 500 residents crowded into the municipal council chamber and demanded the dismissal from
office of the municipal treasurer, the municipal secretary, and the chief of police, and the substitution
of new officials.
The council acceded to their wishes and drew up a formal document setting out the reasons for its
action, which was signed by the councilors present and by several of the leaders of the crowd;
Petitioner: desiring the dismissal of the above-mentioned officials because they believed that they
should not be permitted to hold office in the municipality on account of their outspoken allegiance to
one of the factions into which the town was at that time divided.

DECISION: ACQUITTED
Not only were the individual members of the crowd wholly unarmed, the assembly merely desired to
petition for the removal of several municipal officials; and in proof of the fact that they had no
intention of committing a breach of the peace, the members of the crowd raised their jackets to prove
that they were carrying no weapons.

If the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct as an excuse
to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the
right to assemble would become a delusion and the attempt to exercise it in the most peaceable
manner would expose all those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited

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punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities.

US v. Cabola
Charged with the crime of violating section 4 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, enacted
for the purpose of punishing those who should enter into a conspiracy to destroy the Government of
the United States in the Philippine Islands.

Celedonio Ramos and Inocencio Torio appealed to this court

Pedro Cabola and others organized a Katipunan Society, which had for its object the destruction by
force of the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands and the establishment of
another government in the form of a military organization.

DECISION: GUILTY

Pedro Cabola made revolutionary and seditious speeches; and that many of the defendants signed a
document or documents seditious in character, their clearly indicated purpose being the destruction
of the Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands. Several of the defendants confessed
their guilt to the public officials.

Celedonio Ramos, he was present at a meeting at which Pedro Cabola made an inflammatory and
seditious speech and resolved to construct in an isolated place a shelter for soldiers who should be
furnished with guns and ammunition. Ramos was elected to the office of military president.

Inocencio Torio was a member of the Katipunan Society and knew of its seditious and revolutionary
character; he was present at the said meeting when Pedro Cabola pronounced the seditious
discourse; that he was a captain in the organization; and that he signed a document admittedly of a
revolutionary and seditious character.

US v. Perfecto
Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents had
disappeared from his office. Philippine Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of
the steps taken to discover the guilty party. The day following the convening, newspaper La Nacion,
edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto said:

“there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the persons in charge of the
investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in order to succeed in their
undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of official concealment.

It was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant
Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

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Appellant's main proposition was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in force
because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
because inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

ISSUE: W/N Art. 256 is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American Government.

DECISION: NO, ACQUITTED


Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the principles of the American character and
system of government. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States
established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of proportion to the gravity of the
offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception, as opposed to the American conception of
the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated.
Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon
American principles.
The American system of government never does it place around the individual who happens
to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
.

Espuelas v. People
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was convicted for a violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code
which punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people againts the lawful authorities or to
disturb the peace of the community.

Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at
the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when he was merely standing on a
barrel. Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers throughout the Philippines and abroad,
for their publication with a suicide note or letter:
“My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not
pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in
Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our
government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas”

DECISION: GUILTY
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.

Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the
confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction
of the very government itself

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government officials and to submit
his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the
market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered,
and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up.

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Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking
persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere
effort to persuade

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President
Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government
but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof."

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to
the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than
those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.

People v. Nabong
This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance Ignacio Nabong,
guilty of the offense of sedition under section 8 of Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692

The appellant had been retained to defend one Juan Feleo against a charge of sedition that had been
preferred against him. Feleo was in those days a recognized leader of the communists in Nueva Ecija,
and was related by marriage to the appellant.

Nabong, had refused to accompany Major Gallardo and his companions on their trip to Santa Rosa,
arrived in time to participate in the meeting of communists. At this meeting the red flag was
displayed, contrary to the promise that Feleo had made to Major Gallardo; and upon learning of this
fact, Major Gallardo, and several Constabulary officers, repaired to the place where the meeting was,
and upon arrival they found Feleo making a speech seditious nature. Major Gallardo caused him to be
arrested and removed from the place. At the same time the red flag which was being displayed on the
platform was removed.

Seeing Nabong present, Major Gallardo told him that the disturbance would have been avoided if he
(Nabong) had followed the suggestion made to him at Cabanatuan by Major Gallardo not to display
the flag.

Nabong who delivered a speech and criticized the members of the Constabulary, using words
substantially to the following effect:
“They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the Constabulary are bad because
they shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug. — In view of this, we ought to be united to
suppress that abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own government, the
government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on their sides.”

DECISION: GUILTY
The language used by the appellant clearly imported an overthrow of the Government by violence.
The word "overthrow" could not have been intended as referring to an ordinary change by the
exercise of the elective franchise.

It was the purpose of the speaker to incite his hearers to the overthrow of organized government by
unlawful means. The words also suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies, thereby tending to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities and the order of the Government, in violation of
section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission.

It is suggested in the appellant's brief that incompatible with that portion of section 3 of the Jones
Law which declares that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. It is a
fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured
by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility,

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whatever one may choose, or unrestricted or unbridled license that gives immunity for every
possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.

The act which is the subject of this prosecution was committed prior to the coming into effect of the
Revised Penal Code; but the penalty provided for this offense in article 142 in relation with article
139 of said Code is greater than that imposed by the trial court, and by this court, under section 8 of
Act No. 292. It results that nothing beneficial to the appellant is revealed in the new Code.

People v. Evangelista
Crisanto Evangelista and Abelardo Ramos, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with
a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292

A parade was to be held, but as the permit for the parade had been revoked, a Constabulary officer
appeared with his soldiers at the place to prevent the holding of the parade.

The appellant, Crisanto Evangelista held a conversation with the Constabulary officer about the
permit and its revocation, after which Evangelista was allowed by the Constabulary officer to say a
few words to the people for the purpose of informing them that the parade could not be held.

But instead of telling the people to retire, he raised his fist, which the people approved by shouting
"mabuhay", and then said:

"Comrades or brethren, the municipal president, Mr. Aquino, has allowed us to hold the parade, but
for reason unknown to me, the permit has been revoked. This shows that the big ones are
persecuting and oppressing us, who are small, which they have no right to do." Then shouts were
heard from the audience saying, "Let us fight them".

Soldiers made use of a water pump and dispersed them. There were found on the body of Crisanto
Evangelista the permit issued by the municipal president and its revocation.

They further claimed that the people were peaceful, but the trial court found the facts as above
stated, and the appellant's brief does not point out any data or reason why the finding of the trial
court should not be upheld.

DECISION: GUILTY
It must be noted that the disorder took place several months after the inauguration of the Communist
Party and after the communists had already filled the minds of their followers with their revolting
ideas in several meetings.

That the said utterances were really inciting is shown by the fact that the mass did actually advance
against them, and the latter had to use force in order to enforce the law. In the instant case, there was
an inducement to fight, an actual though unexpected fight and resistance against the authorities. It
was simply the practical expression and repetition of the previous instigations to overthrow the
government, made by the communist leaders before.

Schenck v. US

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This is an indictment in three counts to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, by causing and
attempting to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces and to obstruct the recruiting
and enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with the German
Empire.

Defendants willfully conspired to have printed and circulated a document to cause such
insubordination and obstruction.

It is argued that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that the defendant Schenck was concerned
in sending the documents. According to the testimony, Schenck said he was general secretary of the
Socialist party, and had charge of the Socialist headquarters from which the documents were sent. He
identified a book found there as the minutes of the Executive Committee of the party. The book
showed a resolution that 15,000 leaflets should be printed on the other side of one of them in use, to
be mailed to men who had passed exemption boards, and for distribution. Schenck personally
attended to the printing.

It intimated that enlistment was exercise of oppressive power in its worst form. It said "Do not
submit to intimidation," The other and later printed side of the sheet was headed "Assert Your
Rights." It stated reasons for alleging that anyone violated the Constitution when he refused to
recognize "your right to assert your opposition to the draft,"

"If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is
the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain."

ISSUE: whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.

DECISION: GUILTY
We do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.

When a nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that, if an actual obstruction of
the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced.

The statute of 1917, in § 4, punishes conspiracies to obstruct, as well as actual obstruction. If the act
(speaking, or circulating a paper), its tendency, and the intent with which it is done are the same, we
perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.
Abrams v. US
The first of these leaflets says that the President's cowardly silence about the intervention in Russia
reveals the hypocrisy of the plutocratic gang in Washington. It intimates that "German militarism
combined with allied capitalism to crush the Russian evolution " -- goes on that the tyrants of the
world fight each other until they see a common enemy -- working class enlightenment, militarism
and capitalism combined, to crush the Russian revolution. It says that there is only one enemy of the
workers of the world: capitalism;

The other leaflet says that America together with the Allies will march for Russia to help the Czecko-
Slovaks in their struggle against the Bolsheviki, and that this time the hypocrites shall not fool the
Russian emigrants and friends of Russia in America. It tells the Russian emigrants that they now must
spit in the face of the false military propaganda by which their sympathy and help to the prosecution
of the war have been called forth, and says that, with the money they have lent or are going to lend,
"they will make bullets not only for the Germans, but also for the Workers Soviets of Russia,"

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It then appeals to the same Russian emigrants at some length not to consent to the "inquisitionary
expedition to Russia," and says that the destruction of the Russian revolution is "the politics of the
march to Russia."

OPINION:
But, as against dangers peculiar to war, the principle of the right to free speech is always the same. It
is only the present danger of immediate evil or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in
setting a limit to the expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.

I do not see how anyone can find the intent required by the statute in any of the defendants' words.
The second leaflet is the only one that affords even a foundation for the charge.The only object of the
paper is to help Russia and stop American intervention there against the popular government -- not
to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on.

resistance to the United States means some forcible act of opposition to some proceeding of the
United States in pursuance of the war. intent must be the specific intent that I have described. No
such intent was proved or existed in fact.

We should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that
an immediate check is required to save the country. I wholly disagree with the argument of the
Government that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force. History
seems to me against the notion. I had conceived that the United States, through many years, had
shown its repentance for the Sedition Act of 1798, by repaying fines that it imposed

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Gitlow v. New York
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for the statutory
crime of criminal anarchy.

LAW
The contention here is that the statute, by its terms and as applied in this case, is repugnant to the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its material provisions are:
 "§ 160. Criminal anarchy defined. Criminal anarchy is the doctrine that organized
government should be overthrown by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive
head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means. The
advocacy of such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony."
 "§ 161. Advocacy of criminal anarchy. Any person who:"
 "1. By word of mouth or writing advocates, advises or teaches the duty, necessity or
propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized government by force or violence, or by
assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by
any unlawful means; or,"
 "2. Prints, publishes, edits, issues or knowingly circulates, sells, distributes or publicly
displays any book, paper, document, or written or printed matter in any
 Page 268 U. S. 655
 form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that organized government
should be overthrown by force, violence or any unlawful means"
 "Is guilty of a felony and punishable"
 by imprisonment or fine, or both.

The first charged that the defendant had advocated overthrowing government by force, violence and
unlawful means by writings entitled "The Left Wing Manifesto"; the second, that he had printed,
published and distributed a certain paper called "The Revolutionary Age," containing the writings

The defendant is a member of the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, a dissenting branch or
faction of that party formed in opposition to its dominant policy of "moderate Socialism."

Extracts from the Manifesto condemned the dominant "moderate Socialism" for its recognition of the
necessity of the democratic parliamentary state and advocated the necessity of accomplishing the
"Communist Revolution" by a militant and "revolutionary Socialism", based on "the class struggle"

DEFENDANT: "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the liberty of speech and
of the press, and 2nd, that while liberty of expression "is not absolute," it may be restrained "only in
circumstances where its exercise bears a causal relation with some substantive evil, consummated,
attempted or likely," and as the statute "takes no account of circumstances," it unduly restrains this
liberty and is therefore unconstitutional.

ISSUE: whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case by the state courts, deprived the
defendant of his liberty of expression in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

DECISION:
The Manifesto, plainly, is neither the statement of abstract doctrine nor, as suggested by counsel,
mere prediction. It advocates mass action which shall foment industrial disturbances and, through
political mass strikes and revolutionary mass action, overthrow and destroy organized
parliamentary government. It concludes with a call to action. It is the language of direct incitement.

Freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish, without responsibility.

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"Manifestly, the legislature has authority to forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended
to overthrow the government without waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the
success of the plan advocated. If the State were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger
became certain, then its right to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the
overthrow of the government, when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the
enforcement of the law."

We cannot hold that the present statute is an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the police power
of the State unwarrantably infringing the freedom of speech or press, and we must and do sustain its
constitutionality.

Whitney v. California
Miss Whitney was convicted of the felony of assisting in organizing, in the year 1919, the Communist
Labor Party of California, of being a member of it, and of assembling with it. These acts are held to
constitute a crime because the party was formed to teach criminal syndicalism. The claim is that the
statute, as applied, denied to Miss Whitney the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

LAW:
 Criminal Syndicalism Act are:
 "Section 1. The term 'criminal syndicalism' as used in this act is hereby defined as any
doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission
 Page 274 U. S. 360
 of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning willful and malicious physical
damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or
control, or effecting any political change."
 "Sec. 2. Any person who: . . . 4. Organizes or assists in organizing, or is or knowingly becomes
a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or
assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism"
 "Is guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment."

The mere act of assisting in forming a society for teaching syndicalism, of becoming a member of it,
or of assembling with, is given the dynamic quality of crime. The accused is to be punished not for
contempt, incitement, or conspiracy, but for a step in preparation, which, if it threatens the public
order at all, does so only remotely. The novelty in the prohibition introduced is that the statute aims,
at association with those who propose to preach it.

But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental, they are not absolute. Their
exercise is subject to restriction required in order to protect the State from destruction or from
serious injury. That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist unless speech
would produce a clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil which the State may seek to
prevent.

The legislature must obviously decide whether a danger exists which calls for a protective measure.
But where a statute is valid only in case certain conditions exist, the enactment of the statute cannot
alone establish the facts which are essential to its validity. Prohibitory legislation has repeatedly
been held invalid, because unnecessary, where the denial of liberty involved was that of engaging in a
particular business.

To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result, that the danger apprehended is imminent, that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one.

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Only an emergency can justify repression. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It
is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by
showing that there was no emergency justifying it.

. The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the State.

I am unable to assent to the suggestion in the opinion of the Court that assembling with a
political party, formed to advocate the desirability of a proletarian revolution by mass action
at some date necessarily far in the future, is not a right within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the present case, however, there was other testimony which tended to establish the
existence of a conspiracy, on the part of members of the International Workers of the World, to
commit present serious crimes, and likewise to show that such a conspiracy would be furthered by
the activity of the society of which Miss Whitney was a member. Under these circumstances, the
judgment of the state court cannot be disturbed.

Dennis v. US
Petitioners were indicted in July, 1948, for violation of the conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act

LAW
 Sections 2 and 3 of the Smith Act, 54 Stat. 671, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 10, 11 (see present 18
U.S.C. § 2385), provide as follows:
 "SEC. 2.(a) It shall be unlawful for any person --"
 "(1) to knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability,
or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government;"
 "(2) with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United
States, to print, publish, edit, issue, circulate, sell, distribute, or publicly display any written
or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or
propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or
violence;"
 "(3) to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the United States
by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such society,
group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof."
 "(b) For the purposes of this section, the term 'government in the United States' means the
Government of the United States, the government of any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States, the government of the District of Columbia, or the
 Page 341 U. S. 497
 government of any political subdivision of any of them."
 "SEC. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to attempt to commit, or to conspire to commit,
any of the acts prohibited by the provisions of this title."

The indictment charged the petitioners with willfully and knowingly conspiring (1) to organize as the
Communist Party of the United States of America a society, group and assembly of persons who teach
and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and
violence, and (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of
overthrowing and destroying the Government of the United States by force and violence.

ISSUE: whether the means which it has employed conflict with the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution

11
DECISION: NO
Certainly those who recruit and combine for the purpose of advocating overthrow intend to bring
about that overthrow. We hold that the statute requires as an essential element of the crime proof of
the intent of those who are charged with its violation to overthrow the Government by force and
violence. An intent to overthrow the Government by advocacy thereof is equally susceptible of proof.

We reject any principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparation for revolution, which
principle, carried to its logical conclusion, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it is not
within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended to overthrow the Government by force and
violence

The very language of the Smith Act negates the interpretation which petitioners would have us
impose on that Act. Congress did not intend to eradicate the free discussion of political theories,
rather Congress was concerned with the very kind of activity in which the evidence showed these
petitioners engaged.

Although no case subsequent to Whitney and Gitlow has expressly overruled the majority opinions in
those cases, there is little doubt that subsequent opinions have inclined toward the Holmes-Brandeis
rationale.

In this case, we are squarely presented with the application of the "clear and present danger" test.
We first note that many of the cases in which this Court has reversed convictions by use of this or
similar tests have been based on the fact that the interest which the State was attempting to protect
was itself too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech.

Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase as follows:
"In each case, [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."

We adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive
as any other we might devise at this time. It takes into consideration those factors which we deem
relevant, and relates their significances

It is thus clear that he reserved the question of the existence of the danger for his own determination,
and the question becomes whether the issue is of such a nature that it should have been submitted to
the jury.

We hold that the statute may be applied where there is a "clear and present danger" of the
substantive evil which the legislature had the right to prevent. Bearing, as it does, the marks of a
"question of law," the issue is properly one for the judge to decide.

We hold that §§ 2(a)(1), 2(a)(3) and 3 of the Smith Act do not inherently, or as construed or
applied in the instant case, violate the First Amendment and other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
or the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. Petitioners intended to overthrow the
Government of the United States as speedily as the circumstances would permit. Their conspiracy to
organize the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the
United States by force and violence created a "clear and present danger" of an attempt to overthrow
the Government by force and violence. They were properly and constitutionally convicted for
violation of the Smith Act.

12
Brandenburg v. Ohio
The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute for "advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform" and for "voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the
doctrines of criminal syndicalism."

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First (
(congress pass now law abridging free speech) and Fourteenth Amendments (EPC) to the United
States Constitution, but the intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his conviction without
opinion. The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal "for the reason that no substantial
constitutional question exists herein." It did not file an opinion or explain its conclusions. Appeal was
taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction.

The appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan "rally"
reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events broadcast on the local station
and on a national network.

One film showed 12 hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms. They were gathered around a
large wooden cross, which they burned. Scattered phrases could be understood that were derogatory
of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews.

Another scene on the same film showed the appellant, in Klan regalia, making a speech. The speech,
in full, was as follows:
 " We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be
some revengeance taken."

The second film showed six hooded figures one of whom, appellant, repeated a speech, the possibility
of "revengeance" was omitted, and one sentence was added: "Personally, I believe the nigger should
be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel."

ISSUE: W/N the Ohio statute goes against the consti

DECISION: YES

The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid the use of
force or of law violation except where directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action.

 "the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to
force and violence is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to
such action."

A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our
Constitution has immunized from governmental control.

Measured by this test, Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained. The Act punishes
persons who "advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety" of violence "as a means of
accomplishing industrial or political reform"; or who publish or circulate or display any book or
paper containing such advocacy; or who "justify" the commission of violent acts "with intent to
exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism"; or who

13
"voluntarily assemble" with a group formed "to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal
syndicalism."

Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports
to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely
to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be
supported, and that decision is therefore overruled.
Reversed.

NAACP v. Patterson
 The question presented is whether Alabama, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, can compel petitioner to reveal to the State's Attorney General the
names and addresses of all its Alabama members and agents, without regard to their
positions or functions in the Association.
 The judgment of contempt was based upon petitioner's refusal to comply fully with a court
order requiring in part the production of membership lists.
 Petitioner's claim is that the order, in the circumstances shown by this record, violated rights
assured to petitioner and its members under the Constitution .
 Alabama has a statute, similar to those of many other States, which requires a foreign
corporation, except as exempted, to qualify before doing business by filing its corporate
charter with the Secretary of State and designating a place of business and an agent to
receive service of process.
o The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is a nonprofit
membership corporation organized under the laws of New York.
 In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama brought an equity suit in the State Circuit Court,
Montgomery County, to enjoin the Association from conducting further activities within, and
to oust it from, the State.
o Among other things, the bill in equity alleged that the Association had opened a
regional office and had organized various affiliates in Alabama; had recruited
members and solicited contributions within the State; had given financial support
and furnished legal assistance to Negro students seeking admission to the state
university, and had supported a Negro boycott of the bus lines in Montgomery to
compel the seating of passengers without regard to race
 Petitioner demurred to the allegations of the bill and moved to dissolve the restraining order
o It contended that its activities did not subject it to the qualification requirements of
the statute and that, in any event, what the State sought to accomplish by its suit
would violate rights to freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
o petitioner produced substantially all the data called for by the production order
except its membership lists, as to which it contended that Alabama could not
constitutionally compel disclosure, and moved to modify or vacate the contempt
judgment, or stay its execution pending appellate review

DECISION:
1. we reject respondent's argument that the Association lacks standing to assert here
constitutional rights pertaining to the members, who are not, of course, parties to the
litigation.
a. If petitioner's rank-and-file members are constitutionally entitled to withhold their
connection with the Association despite the production order, it is manifest that this
right is properly assertable by the Association.

14
b. To require that it be claimed by the members themselves would result in
nullification of the right at the very moment of its assertion.
c. Petitioner is the appropriate party to assert these rights, because it and its
members are, in every practical sense, identical.
2. Petitioner argues that, in view of the facts and circumstances shown in the record, the effect
of compelled disclosure of the membership lists will be to abridge the rights of its rank-and-
file members to engage in lawful association in support of their common beliefs.
a. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of
beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.
b. Compelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of
particular beliefs is of the same order. Inviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.
c. Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that, on past occasions, revelation
of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations
of public hostility.
3. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the
initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes
hold.
a. Petitioner has not objected to divulging the identity of its members who are
employed by or hold official positions with it. It has urged the rights solely of its
ordinary rank-and-file members.
4. Whether there was "justification" in this instance turns solely on the substantiality of
Alabama's interest in obtaining the membership lists.
a. Without intimating the slightest view upon the merits of these issues, we are unable
to perceive that the disclosure of the names of petitioner's rank-and-file members
has a substantial bearing on either of them.
b. As matters stand in the state court, petitioner (1) has admitted its presence and
conduct of activities in Alabama since 1918; (2) has offered to comply in all respects
with the state qualification statute, although preserving its contention that the
statute does not apply to it, and (3) has apparently complied satisfactorily with the
production order, except for the membership lists, by furnishing the Attorney
General with varied business records, its charter and statement of purposes, the
names of all of its directors and officers, and with the total number of its Alabama
members and the amount of their dues.
5. We hold that the immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association
claims on behalf of its members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their
lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as to come
within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Shelton v. Tucker
 An Arkansas statute compels every teacher, as a condition of employment in a state-
supported school or college, to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every
organization to which he has belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five
years.
o At issue in these two cases is the validity of that statute under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution
o "Act 10 provides in substance that no person shall be employed or elected to
employment as a superintendent, principal or teacher in any public school in
Arkansas, or as an instructor, professor or teacher in any public institution of higher
learning in that State until such person shall have submitted to the appropriate
hiring authority an affidavit listing all organizations to which he at the time belongs

15
and to which he has belonged during the past five years, and also listing all
organizations to which he at the time is paying regular dues or is making regular
contributions, or to which within the past five years he has paid such dues or made
such contributions. The Act further provides, among other things, that any contract
entered into with any person who has not filed the prescribed affidavit shall be void;
that no public moneys shall be paid to such person as compensation for his services,
and that any such funds so paid may be recovered back either from the person
receiving such funds or from the board of trustees or other governing body making
the payment. The filing of a false affidavit is denounced as perjury, punishable by a
fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, and, in
addition, the person filing the false affidavit is to lose his teaching license."
 It is urged here, as it was unsuccessfully urged throughout the proceedings in both the
federal and state courts, that Act 10 deprives teachers in Arkansas of their rights to personal,
associational, and academic liberty, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action. In considering this contention, we deal with two
basic postulates.

DECISION:
1. First. There can be no doubt of the right of a State to investigate the competence and
fitness of those whom it hires to teach in its schools, as this Court before now has had
occasion to recognize.
2. Second. It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose his every associational tie
is to impair that teacher's right of free association, a right closely allied to freedom of
speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the foundation of a free society.
a. The statute does not provide that the information it requires be kept
confidential. Each school board is left free to deal with the information as it
wishes.
b. The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.
3. The scope of the inquiry required by Act 10 is completely unlimited. The statute
requires a teacher to reveal the church to which he belongs, or to which he has given
financial support. It requires him to disclose his political party, and every political
organization to which he may have contributed over a five-year period. It requires him
to list, without number, every conceivable kind of associational tie -- social, professional,
political, avocational, or religious. Many such relationships could have no possible
bearing upon the teacher's occupational competence or fitness.
a. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.
4. The unlimited and indiscriminate sweep of the statute now before us brings it within the
ban of our prior cases. The statute's comprehensive interference with associational
freedom goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate
inquiry into the fitness and competency of its teachers. The judgments in both cases
must be reversed.

Victoriano v. Elizalde
 Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect
known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958.
o As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
(hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective
bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
 Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment
for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
 Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was
not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a

16
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the
representative of the employees."
o Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization".
 Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962
 Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate
Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a
member.
 The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service.
 From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law,
assigning the following errors:
o I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional.
o II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the
sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof
 Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a
labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting
affiliation with any labor organization"4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect
from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto"5 ;
and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful
associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious
to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6
 Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing
the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective
bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer
from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a
condition of employment;
 Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those
religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions
 Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision
that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's
exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be
determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect
 Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of
laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by
exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni
Cristo",
 Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision
regarding the promotion of social justice.
 Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective
bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is
declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers
would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with
labor organizations. 13

17
DECISION: DISMISSED
1. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act 3550, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they
refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to
join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of
its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining
Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as
a condition for employment for all permanent employees workers".
a. It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation
of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a
broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details
b. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted
for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to
secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be
legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in
harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30
c. What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its
purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general
welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects
which prohibit their members from joining labor unions
3. Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in
violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
a. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual
or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of
advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of
their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by
reason of union security agreements.
b. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose
reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or
all religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to
require that religious exercise be preferentially aided.
c. We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with
the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of
religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security
agreements.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political
right, is not well taken.
a. We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act
No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution.
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation,
inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other
workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the
denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws.
a. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a

18
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that
every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
b. Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident
from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said
religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have
adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed
shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other
workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare
of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the
welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act
prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood.
a. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not
necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion
of the state be benefited thereby.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No.
3350 is not called for — in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable
a. . The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members
of the religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is
really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with
the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined
from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a
mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity
of a statute is to be measured.
8. In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's
dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job.
Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of
course to the prevailing party.

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC


 The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System
Act.
 Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006.
 The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base.
 Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and
under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and
violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by
this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
 COMELEC Chairman decision:
o Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even
assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization,
it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the
nation as a whole.

19
 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners
application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position,
we required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed
its Comment on February 2, 2010.[
 Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
 In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

DECISION: We grant the petition.


1. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each
province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in
the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group.[22] Ang Ladladalso represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization
with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
a. Against this backdrop (many associated groups), we find that Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever
found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani.
2. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
a. Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom,
what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious
matters.[24]Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality
b.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects.
3. Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and
homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally
accepted public morals.
a. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals
have not been convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
b. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

20
c. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest
of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the
notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality
will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
d. As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than
a tool to further any substantial public interest.
4. Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall
any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts have never interpreted the
provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
a. Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
b. The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient
reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief.
c. From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is
equally burdensome.Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same
basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
d. We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special
or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect,
and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today.
5. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to
persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.
a. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere
must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state
interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace
b. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal
fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent
to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration
the values of other members of the community.
6. Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and
promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR.
GRANTED.

Roberts v. US Jaycees
 In the decision under review, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that, by
requiring the United States Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota
Human Rights Act violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the organization's
members.

21
 The United States Jaycees (Jaycees), founded in 1920 as the Junior Chamber of Commerce, is
a nonprofit membership corporation, incorporated in Missouri with national headquarters
in Tulsa, Okla.
o The objective of the Jaycees, as set out in its bylaws, is to pursue
 "such educational and charitable purposes as will promote and foster the
growth and development of young men's civic organizations in the United
States, designed to inculcate in the individual membership of such
organization a spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest, and as a
supplementary education institution to provide them with opportunity for
personal development and achievement and an avenue for intelligent
participation by young men in the affairs of their community, state and
nation, and to develop true friendship and understanding among young
men of all nations."
o The bylaws define a local chapter as
 "[a]ny young men's organization of good repute existing in any community
within the United States, organized for purposes similar to and consistent
with those"
o New members are recruited to the Jaycees through the local chapters, although the
state and national organizations are also actively involved in recruitment through a
variety of promotional activities.
 In 1974 and 1975, respectively, the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees began
admitting women as regular members. Currently, the memberships and boards of directors
of both chapters include a substantial proportion of women. As a result, the two chapters
have been in violation of the national organization's bylaws for about 10 years.
 In December, 1978, the president of the national organization advised both chapters that a
motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a forthcoming meeting of the
national board of directors in Tulsa. Shortly after receiving this notification, members of
both chapters filed charges of discrimination with the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights
 After an investigation, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights
found probable cause to believe that the sanctions imposed on the local chapters by the
national organization violated the statute, and ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held
before a state hearing examiner.

DECISION:
1. An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress
of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed
a. Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational,
religious, and cultural ends
b. By requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full voting members, the Minnesota Act
works an infringement of the last type. There can be no clearer example of an
intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation
that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a regulation may
impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that brought
them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not
to associate.
2. The right to associate for expressive purposes is not, however, absolute. Infringements on
that right may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests,
unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly
less restrictive of associational freedoms.

22
3.We are persuaded that Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against
its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have
on the male members' associational freedoms.
4. By prohibiting gender discrimination in places of public accommodation, the Minnesota Act
protects the State's citizenry from a number of serious social and personal harms
a. this Court has frequently noted that discrimination based on archaic and overbroad
assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces individuals
to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual
abilities.
b. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the
benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and cultural life.
5. Nor is the state interest in assuring equal access limited to the provision of purely tangible
goods and services
a. A State enjoys broad authority to create rights of public access on behalf of its
citizens.
b. This expansive definition reflects a recognition of the changing nature of the
American economy and of the importance, both to the individual and to society, of
removing the barriers to economic advancement and political and social integration
that have historically plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women.
c. In applying the Act to the Jaycees, the State has advanced those interests through
the least restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed, the Jaycees has failed to
demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members'
freedom of expressive association.
d. There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that admission of women as
full voting members will impede the organization's ability to engage in these
protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.
6. Jaycees relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and
perspectives of men and women.
a. Although such generalizations may or may not have a statistical basis in fact with
respect to particular positions adopted by the Jaycees, we have repeatedly
condemned legal decisionmaking that relies uncritically on such assumptions.
b. acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods,
services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling
interest to prevent -- wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit
7. The state court's articulated willingness to adopt limiting constructions that would exclude
private groups from the statute's reach, together with the commonly used and sufficiently
precise standards it employed to determine that the Jaycees is not such a group, establish
that the Act, as currently construed, does not create an unacceptable risk of application to a
substantial amount of protected conduct.
REVERSED

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale


 Petitioners are the Boy Scouts of America and the Monmouth Council, a division of the Boy
Scouts of America
 The Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to
instill.
 Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose adult membership in the Boy Scouts
was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned that he is an avowed homosexual and gay rights
activist
 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey's public accommodations law requires
that the Boy Scouts readmit Dale.
 This case presents the question whether applying New Jersey's public accommodations law
in this way violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association.

23
 Dale became a Boy Scout in 1981 and remained a Scout until he turned 18. By all accounts,
Dale was an exemplary Scout. In 1988, he achieved the rank of Eagle Scout, one of Scouting's
highest honors.
 He quickly became involved with, and eventually became the copresident of, the Rutgers
University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. In 1990, Dale attended a seminar addressing the
psychological and health needs of lesbian and gay teenagers. A newspaper covering the
event interviewed Dale about his advocacy of homosexual teenagers' need for gay role
models. In early July 1990, the newspaper published the interview and Dale's photograph
over a caption identifying him as the copresident of the Lesbian/ Gay Alliance.
 Later that month, Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council Executive James Kay
revoking his adult membership. Dale wrote to Kay requesting the reason for Monmouth
Council's decision. Kay responded by letter that the Boy Scouts "specifically forbid
membership to homosexuals."
 In 1992, Dale filed a complaint against the Boy Scouts in the New Jersey Superior Court. The
complaint alleged that the Boy Scouts had violated New Jersey's public accommodations
statute and its common law by revoking Dale's membership based solely on his sexual
orientation.
o New Jersey's public accommodations statute prohibits, among other things,
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation

DECISION:
1. Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the group to express
those views, and only those views, that it intends to express. Thus, "[f]reedom of association
... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."
a. The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a
significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.
b. But the freedom of expressive association, like many freedoms, is not absolute. We
have held that the freedom could be overridden "by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."
2. To determine whether a group is protected by the First Amendment's expressive
associational right, we must determine whether the group engages in "expressive
association."
a. The First Amendment's protection of expressive association is not reserved for
advocacy groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of
expression, whether it be public or private.
b. Thus, the general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear: "[T]o instill values in young
people." Ibid. The Boy Scouts seeks to instill these values by having its adult leaders
spend time with the youth members, instructing and engaging them in activities like
camping, archery, and fishing
c. Given that the Boy Scouts engages in expressive activity, we must determine
whether the forced inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.
3. We must then determine whether Dale's presence as an assistant scoutmaster would
significantly burden the Boy Scouts' desire to not "promote homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior."
a. Here, we have found that the Boy Scouts believes that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not
"promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
b. As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would have interfered
with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a particular point of view, the
presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the
Boy Scout's choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.

24
4. First, associations do not have to associate for the "purpose" of disseminating a certain
message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An association
must merely engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to
protection.
5. Second, even if the Boy Scouts discourages Scout leaders from disseminating views on sexual
issues-a fact that the Boy Scouts disputes with contrary evidence-the First Amendment
protects the Boy Scouts' method of expression.
6. Third, the First Amendment simply does not require that every member of a group agree on
every issue in order for the group's policy to be "expressive association."
a. The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but not
the other. The fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the
housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views
receive no First Amendment protection.
7. Having determined that the Boy Scouts is an expressive association and that the forced
inclusion of Dale would significantly affect its expression, we inquire whether the application
of New Jersey's public accommodations law to require that the Boy Scouts accept Dale as an
assistant scoutmaster runs afoul of the Scouts' freedom of expressive association. (YES)
a. Dale contends that we should apply the intermediate standard of review enunciated
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968), to evaluate the competing interests.
i. But New Jersey's public accommodations law directly and immediately
affects associational rights, in this case associational rights that enjoy First
Amendment protection. Thus, O'Brien is inapplicable.
b. The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not
justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association. That being the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the
State from imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law.
8. We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy Scouts' teachings
with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a
tenet of an organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the
organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the
organization's expressive message.

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.


 The issue in this case is whether Massachusetts may require private citizens who organize a
parade to include among the marchers a group imparting a message the organizers do not
wish to convey.
o We hold that such a mandate violates the First Amendment.
 As early as 1737, some people in Boston observed the feast of the apostle to Ireland, and
since 1776 the day has marked the evacuation of royal troops and Loyalists from the city
 The tradition of formal sponsorship by the city came to an end in 1947, however, when
Mayor James Michael Curley himself granted authority to organize and conduct the St.
Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade to the petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council, an unincorporated association of individuals elected from various South Boston
veterans groups.
 Every year since that time, the Council has applied for and received a permit for the parade,
which at times has included as many as 20,000 marchers and drawn up to 1 million
watchers.
 In 1992, a number of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendants of the Irish immigrants joined
together with other supporters to form the respondent organization, GLIB, to march in the
parade as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual
individuals, to demonstrate that there are such men and women among those so descended,
and to express their solidarity with like individuals who sought to march in New York's St.
Patrick's Day Parade

25
o Although the Council denied GLIB's application to take part in the 1992 parade,
GLIB obtained a state-court order to include its contingent, which marched
"uneventfully" among that year's 10,000 participants and 750,000 spectators
 In 1993, after the Council had again refused to admit GLIB to the upcoming parade, the
organization and some of its members filed this suit against the Council, the individual
petitioner John J. "Wacko" Hurley, and the city of Boston, alleging violations of the State and
Federal Constitutions and of the state public accommodations law, which prohibits "any
distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of ... sexual orientation ... relative to the
admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement."
 We granted certiorari to determine whether the requirement to admit a parade contingent
expressing a message not of the private organizers' own choosing violates the First
Amendment. 513 U. S. 1071 (1995). We hold that it does and reverse.

DECISION:
1. Hence, we use the word "parade" to indicate marchers who are making some sort of
collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way. Indeed, a parade's
dependence on watchers is so extreme that nowadays, as with Bishop Berkeley's celebrated
tree, "if a parade or demonstration receives no media coverage, it may as well not have
happened."
a. Parades are thus a form of expression, not just motion, and the inherent
expressiveness of marching to make a point explains our cases involving protest
marches.
b. The protected expression that inheres in a parade is not limited to its banners and
songs, however, for the Constitution looks beyond written or spoken words as
mediums of expression.
c. But a private speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by combining
multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes to isolate an exact message as
the exclusive subject matter of the speech
d. GLIB marched behind a shamrock-strewn banner with the simple inscription "Irish
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston." GLIB understandably seeks
to communicate its ideas as part of the existing parade, rather than staging one of its
own.
2. Petitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of
GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council
has approved to march. Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own
parade unit carrying its own banner.
a. Although the state courts spoke of the parade as a place of public accommodation
once the expressive character of both the parade and the marching GLIB contingent
is understood, it becomes apparent that the state courts' application of the statute
had the effect of declaring the sponsors' speech itself to be the public
accommodation.
b. Under this approach any contingent of protected individuals with a message would
have the right to participate in petitioners' speech, so that the communication
produced by the private organizers would be shaped by all those protected by the
law who wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their own.
i. But this use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of protection
under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message.
3. one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak
may also decide "what not to say,"
a. Indeed this general rule, that the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies
not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to statements
of fact the speaker would rather avoid

26
b. Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communication
it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to shape
its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.
c. But whatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a
particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's
power to control.
4. Parades and demonstrations, in contrast, are not understood to be so neutrally presented or
selectively viewed. Unlike the programming offered on various channels by a cable network,
the parade does not consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted
together for individual selection by members of the audience.
5. Without deciding on the precise significance of the likelihood of misattribution, it
nonetheless becomes clear that in the context of an expressive parade, as with a protest
march, the parade's overall message is distilled from the individual presentations along the
way, and each unit's expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.
6. Massachussets General Laws 272:98:
a. When the law is applied to expressive activity in the way it was done here, its
apparent object is simply to require speakers to modify the content of their
expression to whatever extent beneficiaries of the law choose to alter it with
messages of their own. But in the absence of some further, legitimate end, this object
is merely to allow exactly what the general rule of speaker's autonomy forbids.
b. Our tradition of free speech commands that a speaker who takes to the street corner
to express his views in this way should be free from interference by the State based
on the content of what he says.
7. In other words, although the association provided public benefits to which a State could
ensure equal access, it was also engaged in expressive activity; compelled access to the
benefit, which was upheld, did not trespass on the organization's message itself. If we were
to analyze this case strictly along those lines, GLIB would lose.
a. Assuming the parade to be large enough and a source of benefits (apart from its
expression) that would generally justify a mandated access provision, GLIB could
nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent with its own message
just as readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest views
were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing members.
8. Disapproval of a private speaker's statement does not legitimize use of the Commonwealth's
power to compel the speaker to alter the message by including one more acceptable to
others.

Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue


 Minnesota has imposed a sales tax on most sales of goods for a price in excess of a nominal
sum
 Minnesota also enacted a tax on the "privilege of using, storing or consuming in Minnesota
tangible personal property."
 Like the classic use tax, this use tax protects the State's sales tax by eliminating the residents'
incentive to travel to States with lower sales taxes to buy goods, rather than buying them in
Minnesota
 The appellant, Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., "Star Tribune," is the publisher of a morning
newspaper and an evening newspaper (until 1982) in Minneapolis.
o exemption from the sales and use tax provided by Minnesota for periodic
publications
 Star Tribune instituted this action to seek a refund of the use taxes it paid from January 1,
1974, to May 31, 1975. It challenged the imposition of the use tax on ink and paper used in
publications as a violation of the guarantees of freedom of the press and equal protection in
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

DECISION:

27
1. Clearly, the First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of the press. It is beyond
dispute that the States and the Federal Government can subject newspapers to generally
applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems.
2. By creating this special use tax, which, to our knowledge, is without parallel in the State's tax
scheme, Minnesota has singled out the press for special treatment. We then must determine
whether the First Amendment permits such special taxation. A tax that burdens rights
protected by the First Amendment cannot stand unless the burden is necessary to achieve an
overriding governmental interest
3. When the State singles out the press, though, the political constraints that prevent a
legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are weakened, and the threat
of burdensome taxes becomes acute. That threat can operate as effectively as a censor to
check critical comment by the press, undercutting the basic assumption of our political
system that the press will often serve as an important restraint on government
a. Further, differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic of the
press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of
expression, and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional.
4. The main interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of revenue. Of course that
interest is critical to any government. Standing alone, however, it cannot justify the special
treatment of the press, for an alternative means of achieving the same interest without
raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly available: the State could raise the
revenue by taxing businesses generally,
5. Complexities of factual economic proof always present a certain potential for error, and
courts have little familiarity with the process of evaluating the relative economic burden of
taxes. In sum, the possibility of error inherent in the proposed rule poses too great a threat
to concerns at the hart of the First Amendment, and we cannot tolerate that possibility.
a. Minnesota, therefore, has offered no adequate justification for the special treatment
of newspapers.
6. Minnesota's ink and paper tax violates the First Amendment not only because it singles out
the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers. The effect of the $100,000
exemption enacted in 1974 is that only a handful of publishers pay any tax at all, and even
fewer pay any significant amount of tax.
7. We have long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can
restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. E.g., Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
a. A tax that singles out the press, or that targets individual publications within the
press, places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action. Since Minnesota has
offered no satisfactory justification for its tax on the use of ink and paper, the tax
violates the First Amendment, [Footnote 17] and the judgment below is
8. Reversed.

In re Vicente Sotto
 This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto,
who was required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the
decision of this Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as
published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
o As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to
suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years,
I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the

28
members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As
it is now constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said
loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today
is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who
were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
 In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and
intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he
therein contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon
this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, "this Court has no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and
that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has
to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive.
o Respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no
intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high
Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not
attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.'

DECISION:
1. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of
the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if
well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence
the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
a. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our
decision is wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct,
because it is different from what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a
law had intended, his criticism might in that case be tolerated
2. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration of justice, for in his above-quoted statement he says:
a. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these
last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as
its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the
Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.
3. It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be
protected to its fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen
should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an
unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary.
a. In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of
contempt of this Court by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby
sentenced to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this
judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
b. The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show
cause to this Court why he should not be disbarred
4. In all said statements the respondent misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge
against him for contempt of court. He says that the cause is for criticizing the decision of this
Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of the press, when in truth and in fact he
is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final disposition of said case through
intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So ordered.

29
In the matter of allegations contained in the columns of Mr. Amado Macasaet published in
Malaya
 articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a
newspaper of general circulation of which he is the publisher
 The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the
Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and
21, 2007, reproduced as follows:
 The succeeding two articles, however, gave an indication that the supposed bribery
happened in the Supreme Court. Respondent Macasaet, in his September 19, 2007 article,
wrote, among others, that I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the
lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court
 Similarly, in his September 20, 2007 article, respondent said that Cecilia had a duty to save
the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.
 From the foregoing series of articles, respondent Macasaet has painted a clear picture: a
Chinese-Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime supposedly left P10 million in
five different boxes with the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which was
picked up by Cecilia Muoz Delis who was forthwith fired for opening one of the boxes.
 In her affidavit, Delis stated that she had nothing to do with, nor did x x xhave any
knowledge of such alleged attempted bribery,[10] and that she executed her affidavit to allow
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago to defend her honor
 The following day, September 26, 2007, Newsbreak posted its on-line article
entitled Supreme Court Orders Malaya Publisher to Explain Stories with a banner headline
 Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the
Committee recommended
o WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this Honorable
Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect contempt within
the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

DECISION:
1. Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort
the nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are misleading or without factual or
legal basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the
judiciary and threaten the doctrine of judicial independence.
a. Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable
consequences.[44] First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining insulated
from the personal and political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus
placing judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust criticism of the judiciary will
erode the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial
independence and the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution
are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy.
2. Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and
philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable to be overridden by important
countervailing interests
3. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous attacks which
demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in
furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing but damage the integrity of the High
Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the
doctrine of judicial independence.
4. To allow respondent to use press freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the
reputation of the Court and that of innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery
of this liberty.
5. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and fishing expeditions in
the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of

30
the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the orderly
administration of justice.
6. However, such assertions of having acted in the best interest of the Judiciary are belied by
the fact that he could have caused the creation of an investigating panel to look into such
allegations in a more rational and prudent manner.
7. In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as fatally
defective for patent denial of due process[89] because when the witnesses the Committee
summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the
witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right
a. First, the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus,
the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests onMacasaet, not on the
Committee. Suffice it to say that the Dissenting Opinion which cites People
v. Godoy as to the criminal character of a contempt proceeding
b. Second, assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his
witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due process of law was
violated.
c. Third, the Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to cross-examine the
witnesses against respondent, for and in his behalf.Otherwise, the Court will be
acting as his counsel, which is absurd.
Given the gravity of respondent Macasaets improper conduct, coupled with the recalcitrant manner
in which he responded when confronted with the reality of his wrongdoing, a penalty of fine in the
amount of P20,000.00 would be right and reasonable.

Perez v. Estrada
 This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for
permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan.
 The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that
there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the
freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair
trial 

 that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the
people and the press because the people 

 On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV
and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice
rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will
only pave the way for so- called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive
demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision 


DECISION: motion for recon DENIED. 



 Considering the significance of the trial before the 
Sandiganbayan of former President
Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there
should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. 

 The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.
Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. 

 The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4 

 No comment shall be included in the documentary except annotations which may be
necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The audio-visual recordings shall be
made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case
may be. 


31
 Reasons for the recording:
o First, the hearings are of historic 
significance. They are an
affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no man, but he is under
God and the law." 
o Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. 
o
Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the
people. 
o Above all, there is the need to keep audio- visual records of the hearings for
documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the 

 proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights
and sounds of events.
o At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it
may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of,
televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public
showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan.
o By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and
radio broadcast will be avoided.
o Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served
by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
 Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary.
 This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as
permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character
 No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary
record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for
its accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be
averted.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine. (b) cameras shall be installed and the movement
of TV crews shall be regulated; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings
before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former
President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court; (f) simultaneously with the
release of the audio- visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia


 In March, 1976, one Stevenson was indicted for the murder of a hotel manager who had been
found stabbed to death
 Stevenson was tried in the same court for a fourth time beginning on September 11, 1978.
Present in the courtroom when the case was called were appellants Wheeler and McCarthy,
reporters for appellant Richmond Newspapers, Inc. Before the trial began, counsel for the
defendant moved that it be closed to the public
 trial judge then announced: "[T]he statute gives me that power specifically, and the
defendant has made the motion." He then ordered "that the Courtroom be kept clear of all
parties except the witnesses when they testify." Tr., supra, at 4-5. [Footnote 2] The record
does not show that any objections to the closure order were made by anyone present at the
time, including appellants Wheeler and McCarthy.
 Stevenson pointed out that this was the fourth time he was standing trial. He also referred to
"difficulty with information between the Jurors," and stated that he "didn't want information
to leak out," be published by the media, perhaps inaccurately, and then be seen by the jurors.

32

The criminal trial which appellants sought to attend has long since ended, and there is thus
some suggestion that the case is moot. This Court has frequently recognized, however, that
its jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated by the practical termination of a contest which is
short-lived by nature.

DECISION:
1. historical evidence demonstrate conclusively that, at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open
a. Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the enforcement
of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the
fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done -- or even the urge for retribution.
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in
the dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any
covert manner."
2. People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult
for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. When a criminal trial is
conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity both for understanding the system in
general and its workings in a particular case
3. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in
centuries past, we are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.
4. We hold that the right to attend criminal trials [Footnote 17] is implicit in the guarantees of
the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and "of the press could be
eviscerated."
5. All of the alternatives admittedly present difficulties for trial courts, but none of the factors
relied on here was beyond the realm of the manageable. Absent an overriding interest
articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public.

Reversed

Borjal v. CA
 In this petition for review, we are asked to reverse the Court of Appeals in "Francisco
Wenceslao v. Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven," CA-G.R. No. 40496, holding on 25 March
1996 that petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are solidarily liable for damages for
writing and publishing certain articles claimed to be derogatory and offensive to private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao.
o Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators
of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine
Star, a daily newspaper
o Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of
its Editorial Board
o Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the
column Jaywalker.
 Private respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman,
business consultant and journalist by profession
 Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on
different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous
activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private
respondent.
o Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine
Star insisting that he was the organizer alluded to in petitioner Borjals columns

33
o Thereafter, private respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC)
against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused petitioner Borjal of using
his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations firm
o On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action
for damages based on libel subject of the instant case
 The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his
articles are privileged in character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal
Code which state -
o Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
o 1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and,
o 2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature,
or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

DECISION:
1. The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as
the organizer of the conference.
a. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA
Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of
seminars and conferences."
b. Neither did the FNCLT letterheads[12] disclose the identity of the conference
organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and
Spokesman and not as a conference organizer.
2. Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354
of The Revised Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are
neither private communicationsnor fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
a. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. To be sure, the
enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise
privileged.
b. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal
code but in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and
of the press.
3. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of the press
a. To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged
offending publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged
communications implicit in the freedom of the press.
b. privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of public opinion. This
closely adheres to the democratic theory of free speech as essential to collective
self-determination
4. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable
a. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it
must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition

34
5. The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would
lead to self-censorship
a. In the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview
of the New York Times ruling
6. Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even
falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any
scheme of truly free expression and debate.
7. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the master, of the
citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the
ordinary citizen

Petition granted.

In re Emil Jurado
 Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months (from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other journalists
had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same time,
anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the
mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts.
 What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who
will judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices, their spouses and children and
grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel
accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the
trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm.
 This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court decision favorable to the public
utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. The seed of
the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27,
1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was
sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.
 The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate
the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the
public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a
resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility
company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination
of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

ISSUE: WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published writings.

DECISION: NO
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right
of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made
with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right,
constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.” The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,” “one of the
most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.”
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing
statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by
becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which

35
embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required
from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary
cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation.
For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from
becoming judges.
The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and
for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to
be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between
these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm, which requires those, who,
invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable
judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the
statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he
says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by
publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth
thereof.
Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw intelligence or reports he
received surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover, some of his reports were completely
untrue because he did not bother to make any further verification.

ISSUE #2:
WON the court has the power to cite him for contempt.

HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other
persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is
"necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of
justice." Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case.
Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of
the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being
required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other
colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing
in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee.
The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer
for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct
the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its
functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened is that
there have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements
branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating
those reports or assuming responsibility for their publication.
Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether a journalist, or as a member of the
bar — he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a
similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as
a
journalist.
This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited,
he is open to sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary
in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and
prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has
nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate liability.
Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of
those of whom he wrote.
They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the
administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed

36
himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or
the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

Chavez v. Gonzales
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the
parties to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President
Arroyo. On 6 June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang
Palace, where he played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of
conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as
President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact disc had been “spliced” to
make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.

However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs
was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession
of the genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.

On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the
Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters
group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing
commitment to press freedom

On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
“acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following
grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the
NTC acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.

ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release
of 11 June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

DECISION: NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected


expression. There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule
has no exception.
1.Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the
present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit

2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment


Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of
expression is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights.
Freedom of expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances.
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because
the Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however,
courts have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.

37
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction
to only four categories of expression, namely:
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression.
Any content-based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A
protected expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can
be no prior restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the
ratification of treaties, on the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the
Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-
neutral even if it burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the
time, place or manner of the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the
expression. Courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.
However, any such prior restraint on unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier.
First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional. Second, the government bears a heavy
burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent
punishment. Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are
disseminated to the public. Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be
subject to subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected
expression does not warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent
punishment, civilly or criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.

However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent


punishment, logically it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus,
since profane language or “hate speech” against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent
punishment in this jurisdiction, such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.

If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is
subject to subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected
expression before prior restraint on such expression can be justified.

The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government


action imposing prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security – is the clear and present
danger test. The expression restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing
about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must
be grave and imminent.

3. Government Action in the Present Case


The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or
broadcasting of the Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television
stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the
Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to radio and TV stations.” Second, the
Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent investigation may establish that the tapes
contain false information or willful misrepresentation.

38
The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to prevent in imposing prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci
Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and imminent character,
that the State has a right and duty to prevent.

The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful.
The NTC also concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be
established that the Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful misrepresentation.”
Clearly, the NTC admits that it does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or
willful misrepresentation.

4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case

The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint
because it is directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might
contain “false information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is
an admission that the restraint is content-based.

5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case


The airing of the Garci Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a
presidential candidate had allegedly improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right
after the close of voting in the last presidential elections. In any event, public discussion on all
political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide open.

The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior
restraint on protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of
course, if the courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the
security of the State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be
subject to prior restraint. However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of
the Garci Tapes involves national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security
of the State.

6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint

In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be
subject to prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the
Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the
factual and legal issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of
bringing about a substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the
prior restraint.

8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint

The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and
television stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected
expression. Whether the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling
effect is the same: the threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and
television stations that have invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market development
suddenly face suspension or cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

39
Newsounds Broadcasting Network Inc. v. Dy
 Bombo Radyo Philippines (Bombo Radyo) operates several radio stations under the AM and
FM band throughout the Philippines. These stations are operated by corporations organized
and incorporated by Bombo Radyo, particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting
Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS).
 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations, management office
and transmitters on property located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
 Both stations successfully secured all necessary operating documents, including mayors
permits from 1997 to 2001
 Maximo, however, required petitioners to submit either an approved land conversion papers
from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted
from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from
the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
o Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from 1996 to
2001
 On 16 January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayors permit for the
year 2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved
o respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to
petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or void,
o January of that year, petitioners filed their respective applications for their 2004
mayors permit, again with the DAR Order attached to the same. A zonal clearance
was issued in favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13 January 2004, respondent
Meer claimed that no record existed
 respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy issued a Closure Order dated 24 March 2004, stating therein
that since petitioners did not have the requisite permits
o Petitioners initiated two separate actions with the Court of Appeals following the
rulings of the RTC. On 13 December 2004, they filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, docketed as CA G.R. No. 87815, raffled to the Fourteenth Division. [29] This
petition imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for denying their
application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, petitioners also
filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, this time in connection with the denial of their
petition for mandamus.
 Certiorari lies in both instances

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to free expression of the petitioners was violated by respondents by the
closure of the station.
HELD:
Yes. The right to free expression of the petitioner was violated by the respondents.
 Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents,
we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as
an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press.
 circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-
based restraint
o Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified
immediately before the May 2004 elections
o All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents
to ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-based
 Attached to the petition itself was the Closure Order dated 13 February 2004 issued
by respondents against petitioners.[58] There was no better evidence to substantiate
the claim that petitioners faced the live threat of their closure.
o At the moment the petition was filed, there was no basis for the RTC to assume that
there was no actual threat hovering over petitioners for the closure of their radio
stations.

40
o At that point, petitioners radio stations were not merely under threat of
closure, they were already actually closed. Petitioners constitutional rights
were not merely under threat of infringement, they were already definitely
infringed.
 Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the respondents
that the Cauayan City government had previously erred when it certified that the property
had been zoned for commercial use
 That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is clear enough.
 The circumstances of this case dictate that respondents’ closure of petitioners’ radio stations
is clearly tainted with ill motives. It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo
Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that
appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.
Bombo Radyo is a rival station of DWDY who is also owned by the family DY. Also, in an
article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated February 2004, respondent Dy was
quoted as saying that he will "disenfranchise the radio station." Such statement manifests
and confirms that respondents’ denial of petitioners’ renewal applications on the ground
that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove
petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latter’s voice.
 Therefore the right to free expression of the petitioners’ constitutional right to press
freedom was blatantly violated by the respondents.
 REMEDY:
o petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction that would
have prevented the closure of the radio stations. In addition, we hold that the writ of
mandamus lies. Mandamus lies as the proper relief whenever a public officer
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office
o We deem the amount of P4 Million reasonable under the circumstances.
o We likewise deem the amount of P500 Thousand in attorneys fees as suitable under
the circumstances.

Guingguing v. CA
FACTS:
• Cirse Choy Torralba, a broadcast journalist with two radio programs airing in Visayas and
Mindanao, filed a criminal complaint for libel against Segundo Lim and petitioner,
Guinguing for causing the publication of records of his criminal cases as well as
photographs of his arrest. 

• The criminal records and photos were published by means of a one-page advertisement
paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by
petitioner. 

• Choy Torralba asserted that he has been acquitted and that the cases referred to in
the publication had already been settled. 

• He sought the conviction of Lim and Guinguing for libel and claims that such publication
placed him in public contempt and ridicule and was designed to degrade and malign
his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist. 

• The trial court and the Court of Appeals found the publication indeed libelous declaring
that malice, the most important element of libel, was present in this case every
defamatory publication prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and
publisher towards the person subject thereof. 

-Lim, in his defense, claimed that complainant was allegedly making scurrilous attacks against
him and his family over the airwaves. Since Lim had no access to radio time, he opted for paid
advertisements via newspaper to answer the attacks, as a measure of self-defense.

41
o Lim also argued that complainant, as a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a
position almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to
absorb the thrust of public scrutiny.
- The lower courts also ruled that publication of calumny even against
public officers or candidates for public office, according to the trial court, is an offense
most dangerous to the people. 

- It deserves punishment because the latter may be deceived thereby and
reject the best and deserving citizens to their great injury. Thus, petitioner prayed for
reversal of the judgment against him contending that his conviction by the lower courts
constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the publication in the instant case is indeed libelous

RULING: PETITIONER IS ACQUITTED


- The lower courts applied the strict letter of the law. However, this Court is compelled to delve
deeper into the issue considering that changes in the factual milieu evoked a change in the judgment
applicable.
- Under the law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause thedishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. 

- Thus, the elements of libel are: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or
condition to another; (b)publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and, (d) existence of malice. However, in order to protect the constitutional guarantee of free
speech, additional rules were applied to libel cases involving public figures. 

- Originally, truth was not a defense in criminal libel. 


TORRALBA IS A PUBLIC FIGURE 



- Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd v. Capulong defined a public figure as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the
public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a 'public’ person.
- There should be little controversy in holding that complainant is a public
figure. He is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large
portion of the Visayas and Mindanao. 

- The newspaper in question, the Sunday Post, is particularly in
circulation in the areas where complainant’s broadcasts were aired. 
NO ACTUAL
MALICE 

- It is clear that there was nothing untruthful about what was published
in the Sunday Post. The criminal cases listed in the advertisement as pending against the
complainant had indeed been filed 

- The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of
complainant to which his listening public has a very legitimate interest. Complainant hosts a
public affairs program, one which he himself claimed was imbued with public character
since it deals with “corruptions in government, 

- corruptions by public officials, irregularities in government in comrades.”

- By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave the public a
legitimate interest in his life. 

- It cannot be helped if the commentary protected by the Bill of Rights 

is accompanied by excessive color or innuendo. Certainly, persons in possession of truthful facts are
not obliged to present the same in bland fashion.
- As adverted earlier, the guarantee of free speech was enacted to protect not only polite
speech, but even expression in its most unsophisticated form.

42
GMA Network Inc. v. Bustos
In February 1988, a certain Abello and over 200 other unsuccessful examinees in the August
1987 physicians’ licensure examinations, filed a Petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila to compel the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) and the board of medical
examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. They alleged that mistakes in the counting of
the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the
examinations. Rey Vidal, a news writer and reporter of GMA Network, Inc., covered the filing of the
said petition. After securing a copy of the petition, he drafted and narrated the news report for the
ten o’clock evening news edition of GMA’s Channel 7 Headline News.
Jesus G. Bustos, et al., former chairman and members of the Board of Medicine of the PRC
which conducted the examinations, filed a damage suit against Vidal and GMA Network, claiming,
inter alia, that the latter, in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth and
simultaneous visual presentation on GMA’s Channel 7 of an unrelated and old footage showing
physicians wearing black armbands. According to them, Vidal and GMA Network made use of the said
footage to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining
unsuccessful examinees, when the same actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors
and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with
hospital management.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages, holding that the news report was
privileged, being but a narration of the allegations contained in and the circumstances attending the
filing of the Petition for Mandamus. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which, while
regarding the text of the news report as a qualifiedly privileged communication, nevertheless held
that the insertion of the unrelated 1982 PGH picket film footage, “without the words file video,” was
evidence of malice.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the televised news report on the filing of the Petition for Mandamus is
libelous;

2.) Whether or not the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel
of the PGH in their 1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED.

The news report is qualifiedly privileged communication, being a “fair and true report
without any comment or remarks.”

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not
actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. The mala or bona fides of the author is of no
moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. In qualifiedly or conditionally
privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is
conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact. To this kind belongs “private
communications” and “fair and true report without any comment or remarks” falling under and
described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The enumeration under this
provision is not an exclusive list of conditionally privileged communications as the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press has expanded the privilege to include fair
commentaries on matters of public interest.
The news telecast in question is a qualifiedly privileged matter, the same being only a
narration of the contents of the Petition for Mandamus, devoid of any comment or remark. What
Vidal and GMA Network did was simply to inform the public of the said petition filed against the then

43
Board of Medicine. It was clearly within Vidal’s job to keep the public abreast of recent developments
in government institutions, which he was assigned to cover.

The insertion of the 1982 video footage is not malicious.

Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the identifying character-generated words
“file video” appeared to have been superimposed on screen, purposely to prevent misrepresentation
so as not to confuse the viewing public. At any rate, the absence of the said accompanying words
would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the news report is concerned.
The video footage, standing without accompanying sounds or voices, was meaningless, or, at least,
conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. Even assuming arguendo that the film footage contained
demeaning features, the showing thereof was actually accompanied or simultaneously voiced over by
the narration of the news report lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition. There was nothing in
the news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create another news story beyond
what was reported.
The subject news report was clearly a fair and true report. Thus, Vidal and GMA Network are
entitled to the protection and immunity of the rule on privileged matters under Art. 354, par. 2 of the
RPC, and can not be held liable for damages. Their failure, perhaps even their indisposition, to obtain
and telecast the side of the former Board of Medicine, is not an indicia of malice. For, although every
defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters
considered privileged. The privilege destroys the presumption.

44
Everson v. Board of Education
 A New Jersey statute authorizes its local school districts to make rules and contracts for the
transportation of children to and from schools.
 The appellee, a township board of education, acting pursuant to this statute, authorized
reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for the bus transportation of their
children
o Part of this money was for the payment of transportation of some children in the
community to Catholic parochial schools
 The appellant, in his capacity as a district taxpayer, filed suit in a state court challenging the
right of the Board to reimburse parents of parochial school students
o contended that the statute and the resolution passed pursuant to it violated both the
State and the Federal Constitutions.
 The only contention here is that the state statute and the resolution, insofar as they
authorized reimbursement to parents of children attending parochial schools, violate the
Federal Constitution in these two respects, which to some extent overlap.
o First. They authorize the State to take by taxation the private property of some and
bestow it upon others to be used for their own private purposes. This, it is alleged,
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
o Second. The statute and the resolution forced inhabitants to pay taxes to help
support and maintain schools which are dedicated to, and which regularly teach, the
Catholic Faith. This is alleged to be a use of state power to support church schools
contrary to the prohibition of the First Amendment which the Fourteenth
Amendment made applicable to the states.

DECISION:
1. The New Jersey statute is challenged as a "law respecting an establishment of religion." The
First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth commands that a state
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. . . ."
a. The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the
evils it was designed forever to suppress, have been several times elaborated by the
decisions of this Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states
by the Fourteenth.
b. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion
2. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion.
3. we cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised
funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under
which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools.
a. Of course, cutting off church schools from these services so separate and so
indisputably marked off from the religious function would make it far more difficult
for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First
Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be
their adversary

45
4. It appears that these parochial schools meet New Jersey's requirements. The State
contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied,
does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless
of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools.
Rosenberger v. Rector
 University of Virginia, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth for which it is named and
thus bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, authorizes the payment of outside
contractors for the printing costs of a variety of student publications
o It withheld any authorization for payments on behalf of petitioners for the sole
reason that their student paper "primarily promotes or manifests a particular
belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality."
 All CIO's may exist and operate at the University, but some are also entitled to apply for
funds from the Student Activities Fund (SAF).
 The student activities that are excluded from SAF support are religious activities,
philanthropic contributions and activities, political activities, activities that would jeopardize
the University's tax-exempt status
 Petitioners' organization, Wide Awake Productions (WAP), qualified as a CIa. Formed by
petitioner Ronald Rosenberger and other undergraduates in 1990, W AP was established
"[t]o publish a magazine of philosophical and religious expression,"
o The paper's Christian viewpoint was evident from the first issue, in which its editors
wrote that the journal "offers a Christian perspective on both personal and
community issues, especially those relevant to college students at the University of
Virginia.
 Having no further recourse within the University structure, W AP, Wide Awake, and three of
its editors and members filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia, challenging the SAF's action as violative of Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983
o They alleged that refusal to authorize payment of the printing costs of the
publication, solely on the basis of its religious editorial viewpoint, violated their
rights to freedom of speech and press, to the free exercise of religion, and to equal
protection of the law.

DECISION:
1. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or
the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.
2. We conclude, nonetheless, that here, as in Lamb's Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the
proper way to interpret the University's objections to Wide Awake. By the very terms of the
SAF prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for
disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints
a. The University declares that the student groups eligible for SAF support are not the
University's agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility.
Having offered to pay the third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers who
convey their own messages, the University may not silence the expression of
selected viewpoints.
b. The government cannot justify viewpoint discrimination among private speakers on
the economic fact of scarcity.
3. We have held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the
government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to
recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.
4. It does not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to grant access to its
facilities on a religionneutral basis to a wide spectrum of student groups, including groups
that use meeting rooms for sectarian activities, accompanied by some devotional exercises.
a. it follows that a public university may maintain its own computer facility and give
student groups access to that facility, including the use of the printers, on a religion
neutral, say first-come-first-served, basis. If a religious student organization

46
obtained access on that religion-neutral basis and used a computer to compose or a
printer or copy machine to print speech with a religious content or viewpoint, the
State's action in providing the group with access would no more violate the
Establishment Clause than would giving those groups access to an assembly hall.
5. The viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University's regulation required public
officials to scan and interpret student publications to discern their underlying philosophic
assumptions respecting religious theory and belief. That course of action was a denial of the
right of free speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which
could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. There is no
Establishment Clause violation in the University's honoring its duties under the Free Speech
Clause.

Sherbert v. Verner
 Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was discharged by her South
Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. [
 When she was unable to obtain other employment because, from conscientious scruples, she
would not take Saturday work, [Footnote 2] she filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act
o "[i]f . . . The has failed, without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when
offered him by the employment office or the employer. . . ."
 The appellee Employment Security Commission, in administrative proceedings under the
statute, found that appellant's restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought
her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail

DECISION:
1. Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct
prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore,
the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional
challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no
infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any
incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a
"compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate.
2. We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden
on the free exercise of appellant's religion. We think it is clear that it does.
a. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
b. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday
worship.
3. Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate
a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her
constitutional liberties.
4.
We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility
provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's
First Amendment right.
a. No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case. The appellees
suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by
unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not
only dilute the unemployment compensation fund, but also hinder the scheduling by
employers of necessary Saturday work.

47
5. reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions
which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.
6. The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Wisconsin v. Yoder
 Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion,
and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church.
 Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law required them to cause their children to
attend public or private school until reaching age 16, but the respondents declined to send
their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they completed the eighth grade.
 On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were
charged, tried, and convicted of violating the compulsory attendance law in Green County
Court, and were fined the sum of $5 each.
o respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish
communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or
private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that, by
sending their children to high school, they would not only expose themselves to the
danger of the censure of the church community, but, as found by the county court,
also endanger their own salvation and that of their children
o Amish beliefs require members of the community to make their living by farming or
closely related activities. Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades
and determines the entire mode of life of its adherents.
 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, sustained respondents' claim under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and reversed the convictions

DECISION:
1. There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its
citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.
a. Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and
interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children
b. in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade
against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate
religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise
of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause.
2. Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction,
shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.
3. The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling contravenes the basic religious
tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child.
a. The impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish
religion is not only severe, but inescapable
4. A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion
5. We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest in its system of compulsory
education is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must
give way.
a. Amish in this case is persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of
formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-established program of
informal vocational education would do little to serve those interests.

48
b. Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by the majority, this record strongly shows
that the Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our
society,
c. It is neither fair nor correct to suggest that the Amish are opposed to education
beyond the eighth grade level. What this record shows is that they are opposed to
conventional formal education of the type provided by a certified high school
because it comes at the child's crucial adolescent period of religious development
6. Contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, our holding
today in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child, as
contrasted with that of the parents. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for
failing to cause their children to attend school
a. The State's argument proceeds without reliance on any actual conflict between the
wishes of parents and children.
7. Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applicability of the State's compulsory
school attendance statutes or to limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable
standards that, while not impairing the free exercise of religion, provide for continuing
agricultural vocational education under parental and church guidance by the Old Order
Amish or others similarly situated

Bob Jones University v. United States


 Bob Jones University is a nonprofit corporation located in Greenville, S.C.
o giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy
Scriptures."
o Bob Jones University is not affiliated with any religious denomination, but is
dedicated to the teaching and propagation of its fundamentalist Christian religious
beliefs. It is both a religious and educational institution
o ts teachers are required to be devout Christians, and all courses at the University are
taught according to the Bible. Entering students are screened as to their religious
beliefs, and their public and private conduct is strictly regulated by standards
promulgated by University authorities.
 The sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and
marriage. To effectuate these views, Negroes were completely excluded until 1971
o From 1971 to May, 1975, the University accepted no applications from unmarried
Negroes, [Footnote 5] but did accept applications from Negroes married within their
race.
 IRS formally notified the University of the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention
to challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in their
admissions policies.
 After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption through administrative means, the
University instituted an action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the school's
tax-exempt status
 Since its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian Schools has maintained a racially
discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. [Footnote 6]
Goldsboro has for the most part accepted only Caucasians
o Thereafter, Goldsboro filed a suit seeking refund of that payment, claiming that the
school had been improperly denied § 501(c)(3) exempt status
 We granted certiorari in both cases, 454 U.S. 892 (1981), [Footnote 9] and we affirm in each.

DECISION:
1. Under that view, to qualify for a tax exemption pursuant to § 501(c)(3), an institution must
show, first, that it falls within one of the eight categories expressly set forth in that section,
and second, that its activity is not contrary to settled public policy

49
a. Section 501(c)(3) provides that "[c]orporations . . . organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable . . . or educational purposes" are entitled to tax
exemption. Petitioners argue that the plain language of the statute guarantees them
tax-exempt status.
b. Congress used the list of organizations in defining the term "charitable
contributions." On its face, therefore, § 170 reveals that Congress' intention was to
provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable purposes.
c. Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage
the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or
supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.
2. There can thus be no question that the interpretation of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) announced by
the IRS in 1970 was correct. That it may be seen as belated does not undermine its
soundness. It would be wholly incompatible with the concepts underlying tax exemption to
grant the benefit of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory educational entities, which
"exer[t] a pervasive influence on the entire educational process."
a. Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and however
sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public
policy.
b. Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a
public benefit within the "charitable" concept discussed earlier
c. Guided, of course, by the Code, the IRS has the responsibility, in the first instance, to
determine whether a particular entity is "charitable" for purposes of § 170 and §
501(c)(3). [Footnote 22] This in turn may necessitate later determinations of
whether given activities so violate public policy that the entities involved cannot be
deemed to provide a public benefit worthy of "charitable" status.
3. Clearly an educational institution engaging in practices affirmatively at odds with this
declared position of the whole Government cannot be seen as exercising a "beneficial and
stabilizing influenc[e] in community life,"
4. Petitioners contend that, even if the Commissioner's policy is valid as to nonreligious private
schools, that policy cannot constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial
discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs.
a. As to such schools, it is argued that the IRS construction of § 170 and § 501(c)(3)
violates their free exercise rights under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. This contention presents claims not heretofore considered by this
Court in precisely this context.
b. The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. As discussed in461 U.
S. supra, the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education
c. That governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax
benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs
5. Petitioner Bob Jones University, however, contends that it is not racially discriminatory. It
emphasizes that it now allows all races to enroll, subject only to its restrictions on the
conduct of all students, including its prohibitions of association between men and women of
different races, and of interracial marriage.
a. Although a ban on intermarriage or interracial dating applies to all races, decisions
of this Court firmly establish that discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation and
association is a form of racial discrimination,

Employment Division v. Smith


 Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of a "controlled substance"
unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner.
 Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs with a private drug
rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a
ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members

50
 When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division for unemployment
compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been
discharged for work-related "misconduct"
 On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that respondents' religiously inspired use of
peyote fell within the prohibition of the Oregon statute, which "makes no exception for the
sacramental use" of the drug
 It then considered whether that prohibition was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and
concluded that it was not.
 The court therefore reaffirmed its previous ruling that the State could not deny
unemployment benefits to respondents for having engaged in that practice.
o We again granted certiorari

DECISION:
1. The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all
"governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such."
2. We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with
an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary,
the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that
proposition.
a. Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
b. "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."
c. Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable
conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the
conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that,
and decline to do so now. There being no contention that Oregon's drug law
represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious
beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have
adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls.
i. "Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a
stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding
duty fixed by a democratic government."
3. We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast
majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. The
government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful
conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development."
a. Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents' proposal by requiring a
"compelling state interest" only when the conduct prohibited is "central" to the
individual's religion.
4. If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied across the
board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded.
a. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required
religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind
5. Because respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because
that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny
respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the
drug.

51
Zorach v. Clauson
 New York City has a program which permits its public schools to release students
during the school day so that they may leave the school buildings and school
grounds and go to religious centers for religious instruction or devotional exercises.
 The churches make weekly reports to the schools, sending a list of children who
have been released from public school but who have not reported for religious
instruction.
o All costs, including the application blanks, are paid by the religious
organizations.
 Appellants, who are taxpayers and residents of New York City and whose children
attend its public schools
o Their argument, stated elaborately in various ways, reduces itself to this:
the weight and influence of the school is put behind a program for religious
instruction; public school teachers police it, keeping tab on students who
are released; the classroom activities come to a halt while the students who
are released for religious instruction are on leave; the school is a crutch on
which the churches are leaning for support in their religious training;
without the cooperation of the schools, this "released time" program would
be futile and ineffective
DECISION:
1. whether New York, by this system, has either prohibited the "free exercise" of religion or has
made a law "respecting an establishment of religion" within the meaning of the First
Amendment.
a. It takes obtuse reasoning to inject any issue of the "free exercise" of religion into the
present case. No one is forced to go to the religious classroom, and no religious
exercise or instruction is brought to the classrooms of the public schools.
b. The present record indeed tells us that the school authorities are neutral in this
regard, and do no more than release students whose parents so request. If, in fact,
coercion were used, if it were established that any one or more teachers were using
their office to persuade or force students to take the religious instruction, a wholly
different case would be presented.
2. . The First Amendment, however, does not say that, in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in
which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
a. We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We
guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a
variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary
b. ut we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government
to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective
scope of religious influence.
c. Our individual preferences, however, are not the constitutional standard. The
constitutional standard is the separation of Church and State. The problem, like
many problems in constitutional law, is one of degree.
3. In the McCollum case, the classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force of the
public school was used to promote that instruction. Here, as we have said, the public schools
do no more than accommodate their schedules to a program of outside religious instruction.
We follow the McCollum case. [Footnote 8] But we cannot expand it to cover the present
released time program unless separation of Church and State means that public institutions
can make no adjustments of their schedules to accommodate the religious needs of the
people. We cannot read into the Bill of Rights such a philosophy of hostility to religion.

52
Abington School District v. Schempp
 The Facts in Each Case: No. 142. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by law, 24 Pa. Stat. 15-
1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960) Dec. 17, 1959, requires that "At least ten
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening of each public
school on each school day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending
such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or guardian." Th
o The Schempp family, husband and wife and two of their three children, brought suit
to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that their rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are, have been, and
will continue to be violated unless this statute be declared unconstitutional as
violative of these provisions of the First Amendment.
o They sought to enjoin the appellant school district, wherein the Schempp children
attend school, and its officers and the [374 U.S. 203, 206] Superintendent of Public
Instruction of the Commonwealth from continuing to conduct such readings and
recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public schools of the district pursuant to the
statute
 On each school day at the Abington Senior High School between 8:15 and 8:30 a. m., while
the pupils are attending their home rooms or advisory sections, opening exercises [374 U.S.
203, 207] are conducted pursuant to the statute. The exercises are broadcast into each
room in the school building through an intercommunications system and are conducted
under the supervision of a teacher by students attending the school's radio and television
workshop
o Edward Schempp testified at the second trial that he had considered having Roger
and Donna excused from attendance at the exercises but decided against it for
several reasons, including his belief that the children's relationships with their
teachers and classmates would be adversely affected
DECISION:
1. The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus stems from a recognition
of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of
governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to
the end that official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed behind the
tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.
a. This the Establishment Clause prohibits. And a further reason for neutrality is found
in the Free Exercise Clause, which recognizes the value of religious training,
teaching and observance and, more particularly, the right of every person to freely
choose his own course with reference thereto, free of any compulsion from the state.
2. The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution
a. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion
b. The Free Exercise Clause, likewise considered many times here, withdraws from
legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise
c. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction
between the two clauses is apparent - a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is
predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so
attended.
3. Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we find that the States are
requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses from the Holy
Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in unison.

53
4. The short answer, therefore, is that the religious character of the exercise was admitted by
the State. But even if its purpose is not strictly religious, it is sought to be accomplished
through readings, without comment, from the Bible.
5. The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious exercises and such
exercises are being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees and
petitioners. 9 Nor are these required exercises mitigated by the fact that individual students
may absent [374 U.S. 203, 225] themselves upon parental request, for that fact furnishes no
defense to a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause.
a. Further, it is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be relatively
minor encroachments on the First Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is
today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words
of Madison, "it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties."
b. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected
consistently with the First Amendment
6. While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of
free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the
State to practice its beliefs.

Lee v. Weisman
 School principals in the public school system of the city of Providence, Rhode Island, are
permitted to invite members of the clergy to offer invocation and benediction prayers as
part of the formal graduation ceremonies for middle schools and for high schools.
o The question before us is whether including clerical members who offer prayers as
part of the official school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, provisions the Fourteenth Amendment makes
applicable with full force to the States and their school districts.
 Deborah Weisman graduated from Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public school in
Providence, at a formal ceremony in June 1989.
o For many years it has been the policy of the Providence School Committee and the
Superintendent of Schools to permit principals to invite members of the clergy to
give invocations and benedictions at middle school and high school graduations.
o Acting for himself and his daughter, Deborah's father, Daniel Weisman, objected to
any prayers at Deborah's middle school graduation, but to no avail.
o The school principal, petitioner Robert E. Lee, invited a rabbi to deliver prayers at
the graduation exercises for Deborah's class
 The principal gave Rabbi Gutterman the pamphlet before the graduation and advised him
the invocation and benediction should be nonsectarian.
o The parties stipulate that attendance at graduation ceremonies is voluntary
 Four days before the ceremony, Daniel Weisman, in his individual capacity as a Providence
taxpayer and as next friend of Deborah, sought a temporary restraining order in the United
States District Court for the District of Rhode Island to prohibit school officials from
including an invocation or benediction in the graduation ceremony
o Daniel Weisman filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction
barring petitioners, various officials of the Providence public schools, from inviting
the clergy to deliver invocations and benedictions at future graduations.

DECISION:
1. . The government involvement with religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point of
creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school.
Conducting this formal religious observance conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer
exercises for students, and that suffices to determine the question before us.
a. The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does
not supersede the fundamentallimitations imposed by the Establishment Clause. It

54
is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so."
b. The State's involvement in the school prayers challenged today violates these
central principles.
2. . The potential for divisiveness is of particular relevance here though, because it centers
around an overt religious exercise in a secondary school environment where subtle coercive
pressures exist and where the student had no real alternative which would have allowed her
to avoid the fact or appearance of participation.
3. Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the "Guidelines for Civic Occasions,"
and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian. Through these means the principal
directed and controlled the content of the prayers.
a. The school's explanation, however, does not resolve the dilemma caused by its
participation. The question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make
the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that
enterprise at all when the object is to produce a prayer to be used in a formal
religious exercise which students, for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.
4. It must not be forgotten then, that while concern must be given to define the protection
granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever, these same Clauses exist to protect
religion from government interference
5. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of conscience and worship that has close
parallels in the speech provisions of the First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a
specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise
counterpart in the speech provisions.
a. A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and conscience
which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.
b. The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high
school graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on
attending students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during
the invocation and benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as
real as any overt compulsion.
c. What matters is that, given our social conventions, a reasonable dissenter in this
milieu could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or
approval of it.
6. But the embarrassment and the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by
arguing that these prayers, and similar ones to be said in the future, are of a de
minimis character.
7. Law reaches past formalism. And to say a teenage student has a real choice not to attend her
high school graduation is formalistic in the extreme. True, Deborah could elect not to attend
commencement without renouncing her diploma; but we shall not allow the case to turn on
this point. Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is
one of life's most significant occasions
a. It is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens
to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-
sponsored religious practice.
8. No holding by this Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to
participate in a religious exercise. That is being done here, and it is forbidden by the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

55
Stone v. Graham
 Kentucky statute require the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments, purchased with
private contributions, on the wall of each public classroom in the State.
 Petitioners claiming that this statute violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment, sought an injunction against its enforcement.

DECISION:
1. This Court has announced a three-part test for determining whether a challenged state
statute is permissible under the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution:
a. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
b. If a statute violates any of these three principles, it must be struck down under the
Establishment Clause. We conclude that Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of
the Ten Commandments in public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose,
and is therefore unconstitutional.
2. The Commonwealth insists that the statute in question serves a secular legislative purpose,
observing that the legislature required the following notation in small print at the bottom of
each display of the Ten Commandments:
a. "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as
the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the
United States."
b. Under this Court's rulings, however, such an "avowed" secular purpose is not
sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment. In Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963), this Court held unconstitutional the daily reading of
Bible verses and the Lord's Prayer in the public schools, despite the school district's
assertion of such secular purposes as
c. "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our
times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature."
3. The preeminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly
religious in nature.
a. If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have any effect at all, it will be
to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and obey,
the Commandments. However desirable this might be as a matter of private
devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establishment Clause.
b. It does not matter that the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are financed by
voluntary private contributions, for the mere posting of the copies under the
auspices of the legislature provides the "official support of the State . . . Government"
that the Establishment Clause prohibits.
c. Nor is it significant that the Bible verses involved in this case are merely posted on
the wall, rather than read aloud as in Schempp and Engel

Epperson v. Arkansas
 This appeal challenges the constitutionality of the "anti-evolution" statute which the State of
Arkansas adopted in 1928 to prohibit the teaching in its public schools and universities of
the theory that man evolved from other species of life.
o The statute was a product of the upsurge of "fundamentalist" religious fervor of the
twenties. The Arkansas statute was an adaptation of the famous Tennessee "monkey
law" which that State adopted in 1925.
o The Arkansas law makes it unlawful for a teacher in any state supported school or
university "to teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended
from a lower order of animals," or "to adopt or use in any such institution a textbook
that teaches" this theory.

56
o Violation is a misdemeanor and subjects the violator to dismissal from his position.
 The present case concerns the teaching of biology in a high school in Little Rock. According
to the testimony, until the events here in litigation, the official textbook furnished for the
high school biology course did not have a section on the Darwinian Theory.
o Then, for the academic year 1965-1966, the school administration, on
recommendation of the teachers of biology in the school system, adopted and
prescribed a textbook which contained a chapter setting forth "the theory about the
origin . . . of man from a lower form of animal."
 Susan Epperson, a young woman who graduated from Arkansas' school system and then
obtained her master's degree in zoology at the University of Illinois, was employed by the
Little Rock school system in the fall of 1964 to teach 10th grade biology at Central High
School
 She instituted the present action in the Chancery Court of the State, seeking a declaration
that the Arkansas statute is void and enjoining the State and the defendant officials of the
Little Rock school system from dismissing her for violation of the statute's provisions
 At the outset, it is urged upon us that the challenged statute is vague and uncertain, and
therefore within the condemnation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

DECISION:
1. In any event, we do not rest our decision upon the asserted vagueness of the statute. On
either interpretation of its language, Arkansas' statute cannot stand. It is of no moment
whether the law is deemed to prohibit mention of Darwin's theory or to forbid any or all of
the infinite varieties of communication embraced within the term "teaching." Under either
interpretation, the law must be stricken because of its conflict with the constitutional
prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.
a. The overriding fact is that Arkansas' law selects from the body of knowledge a
particular segment which it proscribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to
conflict with a particular religious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation
of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious group.
2. Today's problem is capable of resolution in the narrower terms of the First Amendment's
prohibition of laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.
a. While study of religions and of the Bible from a literary and historic viewpoint,
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, need not collide
with the First Amendment's prohibition, the State may not adopt programs or
practices in its public schools or colleges which "aid or oppose" any religion
b. This prohibition is absolute. It forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or
prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma.
3. The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry
with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or
doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.
a. there is no doubt that the motivation for the law was the same: to suppress the
teaching of a theory which, it was thought, "denied" the divine creation of man.
4. Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to
excise from the curricula of its schools and universities all discussion of the origin of man.
The law's effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its
supposed conflict with the Biblical account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the
mandate of the First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendments to the Constitution.

57
Edwards v. Aguillard
 The Creationism Act forbids the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless
accompanied by instruction in "creation science."
 No school is required to teach evolution or creation science. If either is taught, however, the
other must also be taught.
o The theories of evolution and creation science are statutorily defined as "the
scientific evidences for [creation or evolution] and inferences from those scientific
evidences."
 Appellees, who include parents of children attending Louisiana public schools, Louisiana
teachers, and religious leaders, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in District Court,
seeking an injunction and declaratory relief
 Louisiana officials charged with implementing the Act, defended on the ground that the
purpose of the Act is to protect a legitimate secular interest, namely, academic freedom.
 Appellees attacked the Act as facially invalid because it violated the Establishment Clause
and made a motion for summary judgment.

DECISION:
1. The Establishment Clause forbids the enactment of any law "respecting an establishment of
religion."
a. The Court has applied a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation
comports with the Establishment Clause.
i. First, the legislature must have adopted the law with a secular purpose.
ii. Second, the statute's principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.
iii. Third, the statute must not result in an excessive entanglement of
government with religion.
b. State action violates the Establishment Clause if it fails to satisfy any of these
prongs.
2. The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and the
children's susceptibility to peer pressure
3. Therefore, in employing the three-pronged Lemon test, we must do so mindful of the
particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and secondary schools. We
now turn to the evaluation of the Act under the Lemon test.
a. Lemon's first prong focuses on the purpose that animated adoption of the Act. "The
purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion."
b. A governmental intention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a law
to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promotion of
religion in general
c. If the law was enacted for the purpose of endorsing religion, "no consideration of
the second or third criteria [of Lemon] is necessary."
i. In this case, appellants have identified no clear secular purpose for the
Louisiana Act.
d. The goal of providing a more comprehensive science curriculum is not furthered
either by outlawing the teaching of evolution or by requiring the teaching of
creation science.
4. It is equally clear that requiring schools to teach creation science with evolution does not
advance academic freedom. The Act does not grant teachers a flexibility that they did not
already possess to supplant the present science curriculum with the presentation of
theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life.
5. The Act forbids school boards to discriminate against anyone who "chooses to be a creation
scientist" or to teach "creationism," but fails to protect those who choose to teach evolution
or any other non-creation-science theory, or who refuse to teach creation science.

58
6. Moreover, the Act fails even to ensure that creation science will be taught, but instead
requires the teaching of this theory only when the theory of evolution is taught
a. Thus we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Act does not serve to
protect academic freedom, but has the distinctly different purpose of discrediting
"evolution by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching of
creationism. . . ."
b. The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was clearly to advance the
religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind. [Footnote 11] The
term "creation science" was defined as embracing this particular religious doctrine
by those responsible for the passage of the Creationism Act.
7. In this case, the purpose of the Creationism Act was to restructure the science curriculum to
conform with a particular religious viewpoint. Out of many possible science subjects taught
in the public schools, the legislature chose to affect the teaching of the one scientific theory
that historically has been opposed by certain religious sects.
a. Creationism Act is designed eitherto promote the theory of creation science which
embodies a particular religious tenet by requiring that creation science be taught
whenever evolution is taught or to prohibit the teaching of a scientific theory
disfavored by certain religious sects by forbidding the teaching of evolution when
creation science is not also taught.
b. The Establishment Clause, however, "forbids alike the preference of a religious
doctrine orthe prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular
dogma."
c. Because the primary purpose of the Creationism Act is to advance a particular
religious belief, the Act endorses religion in violation of the First Amendment.
8. The plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their context and the
contemporaneous legislative history, can control the determination of legislative purpose
a. Moreover, in determining the legislative purpose of a statute, the Court has also
considered the historical context of the statute
b. and the specific sequence of events leading to passage of the statute
9. The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it seeks to
employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals therefore is
10. Affirmed.

Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District


 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District involved a policy under which “students will be made
aware of gaps/problems in Darwin's theory and of other theories of evolution including, but
not limited to, intelligent design.”:
o The Pennsylvania Academic Standards require students to learn about Darwin's
Theory of Evolution and eventually to take a standardized test of which evolution is
a part.
o Because Darwin's Theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence is
discovered. The Theory is not a fact. Gaps in the Theory exist for which there is no
evidence. A theory is defined as a well-tested explanation that unifies a broad range
of observations.
o Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from
Darwin's *709 view. The reference book, Of Pandas and People, is available for
students who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent
Design actually involves.
o With respect to any theory, students are encouraged to keep an open mind. The
school leaves the discussion of the Origins of Life, to individual students and their
families. As a Standards-driven district, class instruction focuses upon preparing
students to achieve proficiency on Standards-based assessments.

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 Pursuant to the policy, the school district drafted a disclaimer that teachers were required to
read in class prior to teaching evolution.
 The disclaimer stated that the school only taught evolution because it was mandated by the
state, and that Intelligent Design (ID) is an alternative explanation of the origins of life that
differs from evolution.
 Further, the disclaimer provided that if students were interested in ID, the school could
provide a reference book on the subject.
 Parents and teachers sued the district, arguing that the disclaimer impermissibly promoted
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
 The district contended that ID is not a religious theory; it is a theory independent of
creationism that does not specifically promote God as the creator, though it does provide
that some unidentified force created humankind.
 The Pennsylvania District Court disagreed and found that the district’s policy impermissibly
advanced religion.
o First, the court applied the Endorsement Test, which asks whether government
action conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval to a reasonable, objective
observer.
 The court surveyed the history of ID and creationism and found the content
of both theories so similar that an objective adult or student in the Dover
school system would perceive the district’s promotion of ID to be overtly
religious.
 Further, the court found that since ID is basically the theory of creationism
under different terms, it was not a science, but a religious belief.
 Thus, the policy failed the Endorsement Test.
o Next, the court applied the test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which asks
whether the purpose and effect of government action is to advance religion.
 The court found numerous instances in which individuals indicated that the
purpose of the policy was to explicitly advance religion; the superintendent
of the board and its members had repeatedly discussed ways to teach
creationism, and the board contacted certain proponents of creationism
who ultimately suggested ID as a viable alternative.
 Regarding the effect of the policy, since the court already concluded that ID
was not a science but a religious belief, the only possible effect of the
disclaimer could be to advance that religious belief. Because the disclaimer
policy failed both the Endorsement Test and the Lemon test, the court
concluded the policy violated the Establishment Clause.

Lynch v. Donnelly
 We granted certiorari to decide whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
prohibits a municipality from including a creche, or Nativity scene, in its annual Christmas
display.
 Pawtucket, R.I., erects a Christmas display as part of its observance of the Christmas holiday
season
o The Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations traditionally
associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus house,
reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers,
cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy
bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS,"
and the creche at issue here
o creche, which has been included in the display for 40 or more years, consists of the
traditional figures, including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds,
kings, and animals,

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 Respondents, Pawtucket residents and individual members of the Rhode Island affiliate of
the American Civil Liberties Union, and the affiliate itself, brought this action in the United
States District Court for Rhode Island, challenging the city's inclusion of the creche in the
annual display.

DECISION: crèche did not.


1. In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the
objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the
other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not
possible.
a. In our modern, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings
rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolutist approach in
applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic, and has been uniformly rejected by
the Court.
b. Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that
confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith -- as
an absolutist approach would dictate -- the Court has scrutinized challenged
legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.
2. The Establishment Clause, like the Due Process Clauses, is not a precise, detailed provision
in a legal code capable of ready application. The purpose of the Establishment Clause "was to
state an objective, not to write a statute."
a. In the line-drawing process, we have often found it useful to inquire whether the
challenged law or conduct has a secular purpose, whether its principal or primary
effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and whether it creates an excessive
entanglement of government with religion
b. The District Court plainly erred by focusing almost exclusively on the creche. When
viewed in the proper context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent that, on
this record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of the creche
is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind of subtle governmental
advocacy of a particular religious message
c. The city, like the Congresses and Presidents, however, has principally taken note of
a significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World. The
creche in the display depicts the historical origins of this traditional event long
recognized as a National Holiday.
3. Here, whatever benefit there is to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote, and
incidental; display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than
the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as "Christ's
Mass," or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported
museums.
4. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that this Court has not held that political
divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct. And we decline to
so hold today.
a. We are satisfied that the city has a secular purpose for including the creche, that the
city has not impermissibly advanced religion, and that including the creche does not
create excessive entanglement between religion and government.
5. We hold that, notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city of Pawtucket
has not violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. [Footnote 13]
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

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Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union
 Since 1981, the county has permitted the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, to
display a creche in the county courthouse during the Christmas holiday season
 During the 1986-1987 holiday season, the creche was on display on the Grand Staircase from
November 26 to January 9. App. 15, 59. It had a wooden fence on three sides, and bore a
plaque stating: "This Display Donated by the Holy Name Society."
 At least since 1982, the city has expanded its Grant Street holiday display to include a
symbolic representation of Chanukah, an 8-day Jewish holiday that begins on the 25th day of
the Jewish lunar month of Kislev. App. 138.
o Chanukah, like Christmas, is a cultural event as well as a religious holiday. Id. at 143.
Indeed, the Chanukah story always has had a political or national, as well as a
religious, dimension: it tells of national heroism in addition to divine intervention.
o Chanukah, like Christmas, is a winter holiday; according to some historians, it was
associated in ancient times with the winter solstice.
o On December 22 of the 1986 holiday season, the city placed at the Grant Street
entrance to the City-County Building an 18-foot Chanukah menorah of an abstract
tree-and-branch design. The menorah was placed next to the city's 45-foot
Christmas tree, against one of the columns that supports the arch into which the
tree was set.
 respondents, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union and seven
local residents, filed suit against the county and the city, seeking permanently to enjoin the
county from displaying the creche in the county courthouse and the city from displaying the
menorah in front of the City-County

DECISION: Creche is unconsti, but the menorah isn’t.


1. Thus, it has been noted that the prohibition against governmental endorsement of religion
"preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or
a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.
a. Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to
take a position on questions of religious belief or from "making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."
b. Dissent in Lynch: They simply reached a different answer: the dissenters concluded
that the other elements of the Pawtucket display did not negate the endorsement of
Christian faith caused by the presence of the creche. They viewed the inclusion of
the creche in the city's overall display as placing "the government's imprimatur of
approval on the particular religious beliefs exemplified by the creche."
2. Accordingly, our present task is to determine whether the display of the creche and the
menorah, in their respective "particular physical settings," has the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religious beliefs.
a. The floral decoration surrounding the creche cannot be viewed as somehow
equivalent to the secular symbols in the overall Lynchdisplay. The floral frame, like
all good frames, serves only to draw one's attention to the message inside the
frame.
b. Furthermore, the creche sits on the Grand Staircase, the "main" and "most beautiful
part" of the building that is the seat of county government. App. 157. No viewer
could reasonably think that it occupies this location without the support and
approval of the government.
3. But the Establishment Clause does not limit only the religious content of the government's
own communications. It also prohibits the government's support and promotion of religious
communications by religious organizations.
a. Thus, by prohibiting government endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause
prohibits precisely what occurred here: the government's lending its support to the
communication of a religious organization's religious message.

62
4. In sum, Lynch teaches that government may celebrate Christmas in some manner and form,
but not in a way that endorses Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny County has transgressed
this line. It has chosen to celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of endorsing a
patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ.
a. The display of the creche in this context, therefore, must be permanently enjoined.
5. Moreover, the menorah here stands next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.
While no challenge has been made here to the display of the tree and the sign, their presence
is obviously relevant in determining the effect of the menorah's display. The necessary result
of placing a menorah next to a Christmas tree is to create an "overall holiday setting" that
represents both Christmas and Chanukah -- two holidays, not one.
a. Simply put, it would be a form of discrimination against Jews to allow Pittsburgh to
celebrate Christmas as a cultural tradition while simultaneously disallowing the
city's acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous cultural tradition
6. Accordingly, the relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is whether the
combined display of the tree, the sign, and the menorah has the effect of endorsing both
Christian and Jewish faiths, or rather simply recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah
are part of the same winter holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our society
a. Of the two interpretations of this particular display, the latter seems far more
plausible, and is also in line with Lynch
b. In the shadow of the tree, the menorah is readily understood as simply a recognition
that Christmas is not the only traditional way of observing the winter holiday
season. In these circumstances, then, the combination of the tree and the menorah
communicates not a simultaneous endorsement
c. but instead, a secular celebration of Christmas coupled with an acknowledgment of
Chanukah as a contemporaneous alternative tradition.
d. Here, the mayor's sign serves to confirm what the context already reveals: that the
display of the menorah is not an endorsement of religious faith, but simply a
recognition of cultural diversity.
7. the constitutionality of its effect must also be judged according to the standard of a
"reasonable observer
a. When measured against this standard, the menorah need not be excluded from this
particular display. The Christmas tree alone in the Pittsburgh location does not
endorse Christian belief; and, on the facts before us, the addition of the menorah
"cannot fairly be understood to" result in the simultaneous endorsement of Christian
and Jewish faiths.
b. Lynch v. Donnelly confirms, and in no way repudiates, the longstanding
constitutional principle that government may not engage in a practice that has the
effect of promoting or endorsing religious beliefs. The display of the creche in the
county courthouse has this unconstitutional effect. The display of the menorah in
front of the City-County Building, however, does not have this effect, given its
"particular physical setting."

Taruc v. Dela Cruz


 petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in
Socorro, Surigao del Norte
 Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and
parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality
o Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr.
Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz denied their request. It
appears from the records that the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged
to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs
o On June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers
proceeded to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.

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o On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church for
reasons of:
o (1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;
o (2) inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother
of Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del
Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19,
1996; and
o (3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety
and fear among the general membership.
 Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of the
above decision. In his letter to Bishop de la Cruz, the Obispo Maximo opined that
Fr. Florano should step down voluntarily to avert the hostility and enmity
among the members of the PIC parish in Socorro but stated that:
o I do not intervene in your diocesan decision in asking Fr. Florano to
vacate Socorro parish.
 Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz
before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr.
Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the
Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC

ISSUE: whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution.

DECISION: We rule that the courts do not.


Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically provides that:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and
the laws and canons, of said institution/organization
a. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to
just church regulations. In the words of Justice Samuel F. Miller[5]:
2. we enunciated the doctrine that in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations,
there is one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
3. We would, however, like to comment on petitioners claim that they were not heard before
they were expelled from their church. The records show that Bishop de la Cruz pleaded with
petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical to the best interests of PIC. They were
also warned of the consequences of their actions

P denied.

Re: Requeust of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts of Iligan City


 several Muslim employees in the different courts in the said city request that they be allowed
to enjoy the following privileges:
o 1. to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch break or coffee
breaks during the month of Ramadan;
o 2. to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim
Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.
 Judge Salazar expressed his conformity with the first request, i.e., allowing them to hold
office from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of Ramadan. However,

64
he expressed some misgivings about the second request, i.e., excusing them from work from
10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire calendar year.
 Muslim employees invoke Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 291 [1] as amended by P.D. No.
322[2] enacted by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The avowed purpose of P.D. No. 291
was to reinforce national unity by recognizing Muslim holidays and making them part of our
national holidays
 Section 3 of the same law, as amended by P.D. No. 322, further provides that:
o Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of Ramadan, all Muslim
employees in the national government, government-owned or controlled
corporations, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities shall
observe office hours from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in
the afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that there shall
be no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the employee who is not fasting
is not entitled to the benefit of this provision.
 CSC prescribes the adoption of a flexible working schedule to accommodate the Muslims
Friday Prayer Day subject to certain conditions, e.g., the flexible working hours shall not
start earlier than 7:00 a.m. and end not later than 7:00 p.m
o However, to compensate for the lost hours, they should be required to observe
flexible working schedule which should start from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from
2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. every Friday

DECISION:
1. The recommendation of the Court Administrator with respect to the matter of allowing the
Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
without break during the month of Ramadan is well taken. The same has statutory basis in
Section 3 (a) of P.D. No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322
2. The Court, however, is constrained to deny for lack of statutory basis the request of the
Muslim employees to be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday to
allow them to attend the Muslim Prayer Day
a. The Court is not unmindful that the subject requests are grounded on Section 5,
Article III of the Constitution:
b. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof. The exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil and political rights.
3. there is no such basis to excuse them from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday,
the Muslim Prayer Day, during the entire calendar year.
a. the need of the State to prescribe government office hours as well as to enforce
them uniformly to all civil servants, Christians and Muslims alike, cannot be
disregarded
b. To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused from work from 10:00
a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year
would mean a diminution of the prescribed government working hours.
c. Further, this would encourage other religious denominations to request for similar
treatment.
d. In fine, the remedy of the Muslim employees, with respect to their request to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday during the entire
calendar year, is legislative, which is to ask Congress to enact a legislation expressly
exempting them from compliance with the prescribed government working hours.
4. ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to:
a. GRANT the request to allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold office
hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without break during the month
of Ramadan pursuant to Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 291, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 322; and

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b. 2DENY for lack of legal basis the request that the Muslim employees in the Judiciary
be excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday, the Muslim Prayer
Day, during the entire calendar year.

Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila v. Judge Veneracion


 A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920, a letter[6]dated February 8, 1999 was referred to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) by the Ombudsman.[7] It contained allegations of misconduct and
tardiness against respondent Judge Veneracion by the Concerned Trial Lawyers of Manila
 Complainants assailed the apparent reluctance of Judge Veneracion to grant petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage despite their alleged merit
o Instead, he would lecture litigants in open court that the declaration of nullity of
marriage was not the proper remedy.
o Complainants were often harassed whenever respondent would force them to read
and interpret verses from the Bible. There were occasions when he would castigate
them for their failure to give the interpretation he wanted.
 Judge Veneracion vehemently denied the allegation that he was against the granting of
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage despite their merit. He alleged that from the
time he was designated as presiding judge of Branch 47, RTC Manila, not more than two such
cases filed in his sala were dismissed for lack of merit.
o Judge Veneracion maintained that the person who sent the letter-complaint did not
represent the concerned trial lawyers of Manila.He only represented himself. The
docket books of his sala revealed that only Atty. Simbillo had consistently
withdrawn cases for declaration of nullity of marriage every time these were raffled
to his sala.
 Respondent judge did not deny that he read verses from the Bible during hearings of
annulment, adoption and criminal cases. This was meant to share the word of God with those
who came before his court and who were in a quandary about their purpose in life. He only
wished to remind litigants in these cases that God had given them a manual to serve as a
guide in conducting their lives.

DECISION:
1. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct[20] provides:
a. SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. (emphasis ours)
2. In this canon, judges are given the freedom to express their beliefs as long as it does not
interfere with their judicial functions.Respondent judges practice of reading verses from the
Bible during hearings was an exercise of his religious freedom. We would have preferred
that he refrained from such practice.Nevertheless, we hesitate to castigate him lest we
trample on this right.
3. We cannot ignore the sincere words of appreciation in the numerous letters that have been
sent to respondent judge, all alluding to his practice of reading verses from the Bible. The
outpouring of kind words cannot be mere exaggeration.They were sincerely extended by
persons previously lost but who had since found their way in life through respondent judges
guidance.
a. there was no compulsion involved whenever respondent judge questioned litigants
as to whether they read the Bible or not. He did not impose his religious convictions
on them but merely suggested the benefits of reading the Bible.
4. Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court classifies as a less serious charge the undue delay in
rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case. [32] The penalty for
such infraction is suspension from office for not less than one nor more than three months or
a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.[33]

66
5. Considering that respondent judge has already retired after suffering a stroke, we impose
upon him a fine of P11,000, to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement
benefits.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) DISMISSING for lack of merit the charge of misconduct and tardiness against Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1920; and
2) Finding Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion LIABLE for gross inefficiency in A.M. No. RTJ-01-1623 for
which he is hereby FINED P11,000to be deducted from the amount withheld from his retirement
benefits.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals


 Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program
entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every
Sunday.
o The program presents and propagates petitioners religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128.The Board classified the
series as X or not for public viewing on the ground that they offend and constitute an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.
o Petitioner moved for reconsideration[11] praying: (a) for the deletion of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the Board to be
perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its
program. The respondent Board opposed the motion.[12] On March 7, 1993, the trial
court granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It ordered:[13]
 Court of Appeals[15]reversed the trial court. It ruled that: (1) the respondent board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the
respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the
exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials
constitute an attack against another religion. It also found the series indecent, contrary to
law and contrary to good customs.

ISSUE:
(1) first, whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program Ang Iglesia
ni Cristo, and (2) second, assuming it has the power, whether it gravely abused its discretion when it
prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason
that they constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law and
good customs.

1. The first issue can be resolved by examining the powers of the Board under P.D. No. 1986
a. The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all television
programs. By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to approve, delete
x x x and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x
television programs x x x.
b. We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond
review by the respondent Board.Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to
prevent
c. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free
exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational

67
exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise
destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. The respondent appellate court agreed and even held that the said attacks are indecent,
contrary to law and good customs.
a. We reverse the ruling of the appellate court.
b. Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV
series for attacking other religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of
the evidence, especially Exhibits A, A-1, B, C, and D will show that the so-called
attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other
religions.
c. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioners freedom of speech and interferes with its
right to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to differ
as delineated in the benchmark case of Cantwell v. Connecticut
d. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner
but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may
be.Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion
by protecting it against an attack by another religion
e. The ground attack against another religion was merely added by the respondent
Board in its Rules.[21] This rule is void for it runs smack against the hoary doctrine
that administrative rules and regulations cannot expand the letter and spirit of the
law they seek to enforce.
f. Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to
apply the clear and present danger rule
i. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by
the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to
justify the conclusion

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is
affirmed insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV
program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and is reversed and set aside insofar as it sustained the action
of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.

Estrada v Escritor
 Estrada vs. Escritor
 AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

 FACTS:

 Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro
Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC
of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with
Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s
husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the
judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is
not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor,
Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain
employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

 Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch
Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in
conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on
July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the
congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for

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a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses
since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import
of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor
and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in
Watch Tower Central Office.

 ISSUE:

 Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and
immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

 HELD:

 A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in
mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

 The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives
room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

 The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among
its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of
the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is
so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of
the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

 In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is
within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her
conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional
encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a
passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling
state interest” test.

 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity
(a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and
practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override
respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing
should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of
this Decision.

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Estrada v. Escritor
 The Facts
 Complainant Alejandro Estrada filed with Judge Jose F. Caoibes Jr., presiding judge of Branch
253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, a sworn Letter- Complaint dated July 27,
2000. Estrada requested an investigation of Respondent Soledad Escritor, the court
interpreter, for living in with a man not her husband, with whom she had a child.
Complainant believed that she was committing an immoral act that tarnished the image of
the court. He contended that she should therefore not be allowed to remain employed in the
court, as it might appear to be condoning her act.
 Consequently, respondent was charged with committing “disgraceful and immoral conduct”
under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Section 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.
During the trial, she testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999, she was already a
widow; her husband had died in 1998. Admittedly, more than twenty years ago, she started
to have a live-in arrangement with Luciano Quilapio Jr., with whom she had a son. At the
time, she alleged, her husband who was then still alive was himself living with another
woman.
 As a member of the religious sect known as Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and
Bible Tract Society, however, respondent asserted that her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio was in conformity with their religious beliefs and had the approval of their
congregation. In fact, after ten years of living with him, she executeda “Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness” on July 28, 1991. The declaration allowed Jehovah’s Witnesses like
her, who had been abandoned by their spouses, to enter into marital relations with someone
else. It thus made the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the
world, except in countries where divorce was allowed.
 As laid down by the tenets of their faith, the members required that at the time of the
declaration, the couple could not secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital
relationship because of legal impediments. Only couples who had been baptized and in good
standing could execute the declaration, which required the approval of the elders of the
congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
respective spouses’ commission of adultery were investigated before the declarations were
executed.
 Escritor and Quilapio made their declarations in the usual and approved form prescribed by
Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by the elders of the congregation where the declarations
were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
 Moreover, the congregation believed that once all legal impediments for the couple were
lifted, the validity of the declarations ceased, and the couple were obliged to legalize their
union. In this case, although Escritor was widowed in 1998 -- a fact that, on her part, lifted
the legal impediment to marry -- her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their
declarations remained valid.
 In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation was concerned, there was nothing immoral
about the conjugal arrangement between the couple, and they remained members in good
standing in the congregation.

The Issue
 The issue was whether Soledad Escritor could be held administratively liable for committing
an act that was within the ambit of her right under the religion clauses (Article III, Section 5)
of the Constitution.
 The first Decision dated August 4, 2003, remanded the Complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). It also ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in
the case, so that the OSG could (1) examine the sincerity and centrality of the claimed
religious belief and practice of respondent; (2) present evidence of the State’s “compelling
interest” to override her religious belief and practice; and (3) show that the means the State
adopted in pursuing its interest was the least restrictive of her religious freedom.

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The Court’s Ruling
The Court found Escritor not administratively liable.
 At the outset, it was clarified that the Decision dated August 4, 2003, constituted the law of
the case. Thus, the only issue left to be resolved was the factual basis of the Complaint,
specifically the sincerity and centrality of the religious belief and practice claimed by
respondent. The resolution of this issue would allow the government to present evidence on
the State’s compelling interest to override her religious belief and practice.
 The Court reiterated the fact that, upon its finality, the Decision had to settle the question of
what approach should be taken in construing the religion clauses; that is, the proper test
applicable in determining claims of exemption based on freedom of religion. With respect to
the intent and framework underlying those clauses in our Constitution, applicable was the
benevolent neutrality or accommodation test, whether mandatory or permissive. In
deciding respondent’s plea for exemption based on the “Free Exercise Clause,” however, the
compelling-state-interest test was applicable.
 The Court nevertheless revisited the highlights of the earlier Decision; in particular the Old
World antecedents and the development of the religion clauses in the context of American
jurisprudence.

Two Opposing Strains in U.S. Jurisprudence


 There are two opposing strains with regard to the religion clauses in U.S. jurisprudence. The
first is the rule of strict neutrality/strict separation. It is anchored on the Jeffersonian
premise that a “wall of separation” must exist to protect the State from the Church. This
approach is rigidly read. From the State, religious institutions cannot receive aid, whether
direct or indirect. Neither can it adjust its secular programs to alleviate the burdens they
have placed on believers.
 A milder version of this view has been adopted in Everson v. Board of Education, whose
emphasis is on the State’s neutrality in its relations with groups of religious believers and
nonbelievers. This view does not espouse any hostility to religion, but simply holds that
religion may not be used as basis for classification for purposes of governmental action,
whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations. In other
words, only secular criteria may be the basis of the government’s action. The only dilemma
arising from this view however is that, while ideal, Church and State cannot be totally
separate.
 The benevolent neutrality rule, on the other hand, recognizes that religion plays an
important role in public life. Hence, the accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote any of its favored forms, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their
respective religions without hindrance. The purpose is to remove a burden from, or facilitate
a person s or an institution’s exercise of, religion.
 The Court also discussed three seminal cases reflecting U.S. jurisprudence on Free Exercise:
Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith. Sherbert held that when a law of general application infringed
religious exercise, albeit incidentally, the State interest sought to be promoted must be so
paramount and compelling as to override the free exercise claim. Otherwise, the Court itself
would carve out the exemption. In Yoder, on the other hand, the U.S. Court again ruled that
religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding any criminal penalty imposed by the law
of general application.
 The two cases laid out the following doctrines: (a) Free Exercise Clause claims were subject
to the heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test, if the government substantially
burdened the exercise of religion; (b) this test governed cases, whether the burden was
direct (the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty) or indirect (as when the
exercise of religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government benefit).
 These doctrines were supplemented by Smith. The case involved a challenge by native
Americans to an Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance.
Specifically, certain individuals challenged the State’s determination that their religious use

71
of peyote, which had resulted in their dismissal from employment, was a misconduct
disqualifying them from receipt of unemployment compensation benefits.
 Thus, Smith changed the test for the Free Exercise Clause. The strict/heightened scrutiny and
the compelling justification approaches were abandoned in the evaluation of laws burdening
religion; no matter how much they burdened religion, neutral laws of general applicability
only had to meet the rational basis test.
Types of Accommodation Under the Free Exercise
Clause
 A Free Exercise claim may result in three kinds of accommodation: (a) that which is found to
be constitutionally compelled or required by the Free Exercise Clause; (b) that which is
discretionary or legislative, or not required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless
permitted by the Establishment Clause; and (c) that which is prohibited by the religion
clauses.
 In a nutshell, mandatory accommodation results when the court finds that accommodation
is required by the Free Exercise Clause; that is, when the court itself carves out an
exemption. This accommodation occurs when all three conditions of the compelling interest
test are met: a statute or government action has burdened the claimant’s free exercise of
religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerity of the religious belief; the State has failed to
demonstrate a particularly important or compelling governmental goal in preventing an
exemption; and the State has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive means.
 In these cases, the court finds that the injury to religious conscience is so great and the
advancement of public purposes incomparable, that only indifference or hostility can explain
a refusal to make exemptions. Thus, if the State’s objective can be served as well, or almost
as well, by granting an exemption to those whose religious beliefs are burdened by the
regulation, the court must grant the exemption.
 In permissive accommodation, the court finds that the State may, but is not required to,
accommodate religious interests.
 Lastly, there is prohibited accommodation when the court finds no basis for a mandatory
accommodation, or it determines that legislative accommodation runs afoul of the
Establishment or the Free Exercise Clause. In this case, the court finds that establishment
concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests.

Religion Clauses in the Philippine Context


 After a survey of illustrative cases, the Court concluded that the Philippine Constitution
mandated that the test be construed in the following manner:
 First, while the religion clauses of the U.S. are the precursors to those of the Philippines, the
benevolent neutrality/accommodation approach in the latter jurisdiction was more
pronounced and given more leeway.
 Second, the whole purpose of the accommodation theory, including the notion of mandatory
accommodation, was to address the “inadvertent burdensome effect” that an otherwise
facially neutral law would have on religious exercise. Just because the law was criminal in
nature should not bring it out of the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause.
 Third, the Court deemed that there was wisdom in accommodation, which was the recourse
of minority religions likewise protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Mandatory
accommodations were considered particularly necessary to protect their adherents from the
inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which included ignorance and indifference, as well as
overt hostility to the minority.
 Fourth, exemption from penal laws on account of religion was not entirely an alien concept.
Neither would it be applied for the first time, as an exemption of that nature -- albeit by a
legislative act -- had already been granted to Moslem polygamy and the criminal law on
bigamy.
 Finally, the Court considered the language of the religion clauses vis-à-vis the other elements
of the Bill of Rights. It noted that, unlike other fundamental rights -- like those pertaining to
life, liberty or property -- the religion clauses were stated in absolute terms, unqualified by

72
the requirement of “due process,” “unreasonableness,” or “lawful order.” Only the right to
free speech was comparable in its absolute grant.
 Given the unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in that language, a claim of exemption
based on the Free Exercise Clause could not be simply dismissed by the Court, solely on the
premise that the law in question was a general criminal law.
 The point was that if the burden was great and the sincerity of the religious belief was not in
question, adherence to the benevolent neutrality/accommodation approach required that
the Court make an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright. The Decision
emphasized, however, that the adoption of the benevolent neutrality/ accommodation
approach did not mean that exemptions ought to be granted every time a Free Exercise claim
came up.
 Although benevolent neutrality was the lens through which religion clause cases had to be
viewed, the Court held that the interest of the State should also be afforded utmost
protection. Thus, under this framework, the Court could not dismiss a claim under the Free
Exercise Clause, simply because the conduct in question offended a law or the orthodox
view. This, precisely, was the protection afforded by the religion clauses of the Constitution.

The Compelling State Interest Test


 The compelling state interest test involves a three-step process. First, has the statute created
a burden on the free exercise of religion? Second, is there a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify this infringement of religious liberty? Third, has the State, in achieving its
legitimate purposes, used the least intrusive means possible, so that free exercise has not
been infringed any more than necessary to achieve its legitimate goal?
 Applying this test to resolve the ultimate issue in question, the solicitor general categorically
conceded that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and
practice were beyond serious doubt. Thus, the burden shifted to the government to
demonstrate that the law or practice justified a compelling secular objective and was the
least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
 This burden the government failed to discharge. The Office of the Solicitor General failed to
present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the gravest abuses that could endanger
“paramount interests” and limit or override respondent’s fundamental right to religious
freedom. Neither was the government able to show that the means it sought to achieve a
legitimate State objective was the least intrusive.
 The government argued for the stability and sanctity of the avowed social institutions of
marriage and family, arguing that the so-called “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” should
not be recognized or given effect. The Court, however, affirmed that the free exercise of
religion as a fundamental right enjoyed a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights.
 Hence, it was not enough to contend that the State’s interest was important, because the
Constitution itself held the right to religious freedom sacred. The government should have
articulated in specific terms the compelling nature of the State interest involved in
preventing the exemption. As the government had failed to do so, the Court held that for it to
rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free
 Exercise Clause as a source of right in itself.
 Finally, even assuming that the government had proved a compelling State interest, it had to
demonstrate further that the State had used the least intrusive means possible. In that way,
free exercise would not be infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal
of the State, which which had to be achieved in a way that imposed as little as possible on
religious liberties. Again, the solicitor general utterly failed to prove this element of the test.
No iota of evidence was offered, other than the two documents that established the sincerity
of the religious belief of respondent and the fact that the agreement was an internal
arrangement within her congregation.
 Thus, the Court found, in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, that
Respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement could not be penalized. She had successfully

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made out a case for exemption from the law, based on her fundamental right to freedom of
religion.

The Dissenting Opinions


 The Carpio Dissent
 Justice Antonio T. Carpio, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Morales and Callejo,
challenged the position of the majority on several points.
 First, deemed improper was its reliance on the obsolete Sherbert (“compelling state
interest”) test to accommodate respondent’s exemption under the Free Exercise Clause. The
price paid was too high, when weighed against the prejudicial effect on the sound
administration of justice and the protection of marriage and the family as basic social
institutions.
 Justice Carpio vigorously argued that what should have been applied was the Smith ruling,
which had already overturned the compelling state interest test. Smith properly stated that
the guarantee of religious liberty, as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause, did not require
the grant of any exemptions from generally applicable laws to individuals whose religious
practice conflicted with those laws. Certainly, he said, “there is a price to be paid, even by
religion, for living in a constitutional democracy.”
 Second, even assuming that the theory of benevolent neutrality and the compelling state
interest test were applicable, the State had a compelling interest in exacting the highest
standard of conduct from everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from the
highest magistrate to the lowest of its personnel.
 While arguably not constituting “disgraceful and immoral conduct,” Escritor’s cohabitation
with Quilapio was a patent violation of our penal law on concubinage and vitiated “the
integrity of court personnel and the court itself.”
 Equally compelling was the State’s interest in the preservation of marriage and the family as
basic social institutions -- ultimately the public policy underlying Articles 334 and 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. This Court had recognized in countless cases the State’s interest in these
institutions and in their protection.
 In dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Escritor, the majority opinion effectively
condoned and accorded a semblance of legitimacy to her patently unlawful cohabitation with
Quilapio, who in the eyes of the law remained married to his legal wife. This condonation
would in fact facilitate the couple’s circumvention of the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on concubinage and bigamy.
 Third, there was not even any claim in this case that concubinage was central to or even part
of the religious belief of Jehovah’s Witnesses.
 Closing his Dissent, Justice Carpio warned against the dangerous effect of the majority
opinion. It could turn every religion into a separate republic and thus make it a haven for
criminal conduct that would otherwise be punishable under the laws of the land. “Today
concubinage, tomorrow bigamy” would enjoy protection from criminal sanction under the
new doctrine foisted by the majority opinion.
 He then voted to impose a penalty of suspension on Respondent Escritor for six months and
one day without pay, for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The
suspension however, would immediately be lifted upon her manifestation to this Court that
she had ceased cohabiting with Quilapio. Moreover, respondent was warned that her
continued cohabitation with him, during or after her suspension and while his marriage with
his legal wife still subsisted, would merit the penalty of dismissal from the service.
 The Santiago Dissent
 The Dissent of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago took issue with the majority finding that,
under the circumstances, Escritor’s conjugal arrangement did not constitute disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Saying the issue was legal, not religious, she voted against dismissing the
Administrative Complaint filed against respondent.
 The ascertainment of what was moral or immoral called for the discovery of contemporary
community standards. The inescapable fact in this case, though, was the commission of acts

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defined as criminal under penal law. Reciting a plethora of cases in which the Court had
upheld exacting standards for judiciary employees, the Dissent concluded that respondent
had been charged not as a Jehovah’s Witness, but in her capacity as a court employee.
Involved in this case were two persons who had
 started to live together in an ostensible marital relationship while still married to other
persons. Respondent mistakenly invoked her constitutional right to religious freedom.
 Well-established was the fact that, through its enactment of the Revised Penal Code, the
legislature made cohabitation with a woman who was not one’s wife a crime. The legislature
had also deemed it fit to enact the Civil Service Law, which was given
 general application.
 Justice Santiago believed that the relationship of Escritor with Quilapio was illicit and
immoral, notwithstanding the supposed imprimatur given by their religion. Accordingly,
Justice Santiago concluded, respondent should have been held
 administratively liable.

Imbong v Ochoa
 Fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law. The following arguments were raised by the parties:
o The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.
o They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" and
effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum
which already has life. As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental
human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.
 The defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the
Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health
care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.
The constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various
studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides
that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.
o The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and
other health problems.
o The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the
RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the
use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the
use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.
o While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not
covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their
religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether

75
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who
essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but
also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use.
o It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs. They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred
to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred
to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the
RH Law, are also not recognize.191
o While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech. While the right to act on one's
belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive
acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.
o Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to
justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or
threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people
(to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health,
education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are
being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom.
o Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be
couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to
obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to
participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their
religious beliefs.
 The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a
specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes
nor sanctions any religion or belief. They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the
public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to
ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution, and that what the law only prohibits are those
acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive health. They assert that
the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one
will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.
o The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be
allowed, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.
o With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient

76
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily
infringing on the rights of others. Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's
religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and
impact.
o Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15, the respondents
claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be
couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any
information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State.
o The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.
 The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical
practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack
of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be
able to avail of the practitioners services.
 The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly
be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service
providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services.
Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government,
the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
 The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law
discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. They add that the exclusion of private
educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program
imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
 The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is
vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH
Law.
 The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due
process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private
health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who
is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further results since
Section 7 only makes reference to
 a "private health care institution." They also point out that Section 7 of the assailed
legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive
health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section
23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2). it is also
averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
 In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due
process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to
decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It

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ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct
their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
 The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way
of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to
another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure.
 The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It
is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their
beliefs.
 It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive
health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes
the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered
a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives. Also, Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution
by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.
 The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority.
The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).
 The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI
of the Constitution.
 The RH Law violates Natural Law.
 The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM,
infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government
Code and R.A . No. 9054.

ISSUES:
I. Procedural: May the court exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy?
 1. Power of Judicial Review
 2. Actual Case or Controversy
 3. Facial Challenge

 4. Locus Standi

 5. Declaratory Relief

 6. One Subject/One Title Rule

II. Substantive: Is the RH Law constitutional?


 1. Right to Life

 2. Right to Health

 3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
 4. The Family

 5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
 6. Due Process

 7. Equal Protection

 8. Involuntary Servitude

 9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA

 10. Autonomy of Local Governments/ARMM
11. Natural Law

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RULING:
The petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
I. Procedural
 1. The Power of Judicial Review
o Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.
 2. Actual Case or Controversy
o In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry
out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present
a justiciable controversy.
 3. Facial Challenge
o Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
 4. Locus Standi
o With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as- applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government
act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. In view
of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also
to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After
all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life
and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights.
Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive
health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the
Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental
importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly,
considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.
 5. Declaratory Relief
o The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would
just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has
original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65.
 6. One Subject-One Title
o In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane

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to the overriding objective to control the population growth. The Court finds no
reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.

II. Substantive

1. The Right to Life
 In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and
more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable
conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
 This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus.

The RH Law and Abortion


 The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the
life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure
legalizing abortion.
 A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes
abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life
begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law
recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which
penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.
o However, the Court finds that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. With the addition of the word
"primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid.
There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for
the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution.
With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive
will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as
pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum. For the
same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of
contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.
 Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as
abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the
RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that
contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of
acting the same way.

2. The Right to Health


 The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The
public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive
drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life
resulting from or incidental to their use.

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 The Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that
ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory
"shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and
approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a
particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient.

3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech


 The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or
favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs
among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the
use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
 Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee
of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to
act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. The second part however, is limited and subject
to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights
of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare."
 Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. The benevolent neutrality theory
believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion
may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The
purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person's or institution's religion. What is sought under the theory of accommodation
is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption
from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."
o In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state
interest test is proper. Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.
 In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing
with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a
church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the
civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. Stated
otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
 Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot
enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion
of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any
one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience.
 While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly
respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same
conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said
provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer
a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare
provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

81
o In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the
Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality finds application. In this
case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective.
 In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. The Court is of the view that the obligation to
refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an
act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has
written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
o They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not
be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.
o Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the
right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This
in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious
freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
 The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned
and operated by a religious group and health care service providers.
o The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious
belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should
not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to
other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.
 Exception: Life Threatening Cases
o All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in
the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life- threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger.
 In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting
death to one should not be deliberate. Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a
mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the
religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed
upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the
life he would be able to save.

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Family Planning Seminars
 Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the issuance of a
marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even
mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be
natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given
to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4. The Family and the Right to Privacy The Court cannot but agree.
 Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the
spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-
making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and
barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the
husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the
family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from
the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution. Unless it
prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it
that they chart their destiny together as one family. At any rate, in case of conflict between
the couple, the courts will decide.
First Exception: Access to Information
 There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning
services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor
referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her
to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article
II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the
unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
 As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the
minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at
grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person should be
denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that
is, the right to life.

In re Valenciano:
Re: Letter of Tony Q. Valenciano Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC
March 7, 2017

Facts:

This controversy originated from a series of letters written by Valenciano and addressed to the Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had been

83
converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with Catholic religious icons and other instrument
for religious activities. He believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions on the
separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public
money and property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
He further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended
to favor the Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused great disturbance to the
employees; and that court functions are affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to
1:15 in the afternoon.

Issue:

Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the
constitutional principle of separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional prohibition
against appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution or system of religion.

Ruling:

The holding of Religious Rituals in the Hall of Justice does not amount to the union of Church and
State. The 1987 constitution provides that the separation of Church and the State shall be inviolable;
if further provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to
the principle of separation of Church and state. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony
with each other. The Roman Catholic express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these
would be tantamount to repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion.

It is also the view of the Supreme Court that the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice is not a case of establishment but merely accommodation wherein the
government recognize the reality that some measures may not be imposed on a certain portion of the
population for the reason that these measures are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can
be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to
regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.

No appropriation of Public money or property for the benefit of any Church. The constitution
provides that “No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or any priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher, or
dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

The prohibition contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for the
furtherance of a particular church. The aforecited constitutional provision “does not inhibit the use of
public property for religious purposes when the religious character of such use is merely incidental
to a temporary use which is available indiscriminately to the public in general. Thus, the basement of
the Quezon City Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use because
the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.

There is in this case, merely an accommodation.

First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expresslly
mandating that judicial employees attend the mass.

Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it is at their own initiative

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and on their own free will.

Third, no government funds are being spent because the lighting and airconditioning continue to be
operational even if there are no religious rituals being observed.

Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel not has it been
permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of the faithful.

Fifth, the allowance of religious masses has not prejudiced other religions.

Banco Español Filipino v. Palanca


 action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a
mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila
 After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears
to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again
returning to the Philippine Islands.
 As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by
publication pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication
was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a
newspaper of the city of Manila.
o This order was made pursuant to the following provision contained in section 399
of the Code of Civil Procedure:
o In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is
known, the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith
deposited by the clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to
be served, at his place of residence
 Upon July 3, 1908, a decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was
recited that publication had been properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about
this notice having been given mail.
 About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a
motion was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the
original defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant
requested the court to set aside the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment
rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis
of this application, as set forth in the motion itself, was that the order of default and the
judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant or over the subject of the action.

DECISION:
1. Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily
from the statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general
sense, over the cause of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, if acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary
submission of the defendant or by the personal service of process upon him within the
territory where the process is valid
2. The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other
respects of the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to
the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the
jurisdiction of the court, for in our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more
secure than would be supplied by any form of notice that could be given to a resident of a
foreign country.

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3. We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the
proceedings was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which
was secured by the Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was
foreclosed.
4. With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail,
the requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the
clerk of the court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the
mail. We consider this to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard
to the principles upon which the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the
mortgaged property must, so far as the due process of law is concerned, take the risk
incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform his duty, somewhat as he takes the
risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or destroy the parcel or
envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be delivered to him.
5. In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of
the clerk to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the
court and (2) that such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law.
6. . There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about
mailing this notice; and we think that strong considerations of policy require that this
presumption should be allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this
case.
7. That the clerk of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the
defendant at a mistaken address affords in our opinion very slight basis for supposing that
the clerk may not have sent notice to the right address.
8. But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and
the alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the
judgment could be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of
law, the party aggrieved thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to
obtain relief.
9. We accordingly old that, assuming the judgment to have been void as alleged by the
proponent of this motion, the proper remedy was by an original proceeding and not by
motion in the cause
10.

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