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Kathryn Yusoff
Abstract
As environments and their inhabitants undergo a multitude of abrupt
changes due to climate, in the aesthetic field there has been a hardening
of a few representational figures that stand in for those contested political
ecologies. Biodiversity loss and habitat change can be seen to be forcing an
acceleration of archival practices that mobilize various images of the ‘play
of the world’, including the making of star species to represent planetary
loss, and the consolidation of other species into archives implicitly organ-
ized around the category of their destruction. The first section of this article
looks at Jacques Rancière’s concept of political aesthetics in order to extend
an argument about the importance of aesthetics in multispecies living
beyond a concentration on practices per se and into a more excessive
engagement articulated by Georges Bataille. I argue that aesthetics must be
considered as part of the practice of politics and a space that configures the
realm of what is possible in that politics. This is to suggest aesthetics as a
form of ethics or an ‘aesthetics of existence’, as Foucault put it. The conclu-
sion considers how a biopolitical aesthetic comes into being through such
archival practices, and asks what aesthetic shifts would make the ‘play of
the world’ more present in its absences.
Key words
aesthetics ■ animality ■ Georges Bataille ■ climate change ■ ethics ■ Jacques
Rancière
■ Theory, Culture & Society 2010 (SAGE, Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, and Singapore),
Vol. 27(2–3): 73–99
DOI: 10.1177/0263276410362090
Aesthetics refers to a specific regime for identifying and reflecting on the arts:
a mode of articulation between ways of doing and making, their correspon-
ding forms of visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their relation-
ships (which presupposes a certain idea of thought’s effectivity). (Rancière,
2004: 10)
If, for example, you were to think more deeply about death, then it would be
truly strange if, in so doing, you did not encounter new images, new linguistic
fields. (Wittgenstein, quoted in Saramago, 2008: 1)
I
N THE contemporary political aesthetics of climate change, the polar
bear has become a mythic and biophysical storyteller, figuring the
complexities of changing climates and habitat loss, and conjoining the
biophysical and emotional worlds of humans and animals. This figuring
through the political register of environmental change is at once: (1)
biophysical – the polar bear literally absorbs the wastes of modernity that
sink in the Arctic to make it one of the most toxic creatures alive;1 (2)
cultural – the polar bear is a boundary object that negotiates climate change
across scales for publics (Slocum, 2004);2 (3) adaptive – the polar bear
predicts one possible story of climate change told through reproductive
adaptation to changing habitat conditions (a polar–grizzly bear hybrid was
recently shot);3 and (4) symbolic – the polar bear is a guardian of future
scenarios in as much as it is estimated that the polar bear may not exist in
50 years time. This visibility of polar bear futures and their entanglement
where are the spaces of this biopolitical aesthetic? And what kinds of careful
aesthetic practices open spaces to configure a more exuberant and full
politics of climate change? And, finally, in being careful, can we afford to
repress the violence that is so clearly part of this relating? Might violence
open another unexpected route into an ethical relation?
If we know anything about abrupt climate change from ice cores and
paleo-records, the impact of change has been experienced as a series of
mass extinction events: the Holocene, Cretaceous-Peleogene, Triassic-
Jurassic, etc. To imagine the world without us – as one possible climate
future – is to imagine our own extinction event, much as Beckett did in
‘Imagination Dead Imagine’ (1965). But before we ever get to such an end
game, we must imagine the world as it is: as a world of diminishing non-
human others, a world in which certain songs and calls and whoops are
quieting. As the force of these animal entities lessens, in the creative and
destructive acts that constitute the ‘play of the world’, this means not just
their extinction but also the extinction of the aspects of our lives that are
co-constituted through these aesthetic experiences of the world. That is to
say, while climate change is the big narrative of the anthropocene, with
carbon as the central player, there is not an adequately developed discourse
that describes the interdependence of multispecies flourishing and destruc-
tion within climate change. Furthermore, the conceptualization of climate
change as a human-centred, human-instigated global practice (i.e. a world-
forming practice) does not properly represent the biophysical world as an
already full space of that which is not exclusively ‘ours’ to make.
I want to argue for an aesthetics that is playful, pertaining to sensuous
perception of the ‘play of the word’ and an aesthetics that is politically
engaged as a practice in politicizing ecologies and structuring what ecol-
ogies enter politics (i.e. the political organization of life).4 Whereas Frederic
Jameson went searching for the ‘political unconscious’ that haunts aesthet-
ics (Jameson, 1981: 17; see also Jameson, 1992), following Michel Foucault
(1990[1984]; see also O’Leary, 2002), I argue that aesthetics must be
considered as part of the practice of politics; a space where things are made,
both materially and semiotically (to paraphrase Haraway) and a space that
configures the realm of what is possible in that politics. Foucault referred
to this as the search for an ‘aesthetics of existence’ (1990[1984]: 49).
Aesthetics is, in Foucault’s terms, fundamentally biopolitical. Alongside
this connection between aesthetics and politics as a space in which ecol-
ogies are made, there are various kinds of loss and violence that are an
attendant part of anthropogenic-induced climate change, which generate a
social urgency to these questions of representation and violence, aesthetics
and existence.
The article, then, is organized into three sections that question the
perception, production and spheres of action that the political aesthetics of
climate change articulate for multispecies living. The first section looks at
Jacques Rancière’s concept of political aesthetics in order to extend an
argument about the importance of aesthetics in multispecies living beyond
of the world, but, in turn, does not attend to the form through which things
become visible (that have previously been invisible) and, crucially, through
which we derive new thoughts of the possible.
It is the question of visibility that Rancière specifically takes up to
suggest that ‘artistic practices are ways of “doing and making” that inter-
vene in the general distribution of ways of “doing and making”, as well as
in the relationships they maintain to modes of being and forms of visibility’
(2004: 13). What is key here is that:
aesthetics refers to a specific regime for identifying and reflecting on the arts:
a mode of articulation between ways of doing and making, their correspon-
ding forms of visibility, and possible ways of thinking about their relation-
ships (which presupposes a certain idea of thought’s effectivity). (2004: 10)
This attention to modes of articulation between forms, ways of doing and
making and their in/visibility offers a politics that ‘revolves around what is
seen and what can be said about it’, where what can be seen and experi-
enced is already predetermined by the common forms of aesthetic practice
– ‘a parcelling out of the visible and invisible’ (2004: 19). Thus, these ways
of ‘making and doing’ are forms of arrangement and distribution in percep-
tion that constitute the social and its possible spheres of social action and
forms that inscribe a sense of community. So, aesthetics can be thought of
as ‘a mode of articulation between forms of action, production, perception
and thought’ (2004: 82). In other words, as Ben Higham suggests, in
reference to Rancière: ‘aesthetics is the condition of possibility of politics
and society’ (2005: 456). Rancière’s model of aesthetics is ontologically
social (as aesthetics is about senses), so it does not suggest how the
experience and politics of climate change can be made fuller with regards
to multispecies living. But if we push this sensibility further to include other
encounters with the world that are in excess of the common modes of percep-
tion and the social, into the realm of experience that Bataille calls non-
knowledge6 and those practices that do not have humans at their centre,7
Rancière’s thinking becomes useful in articulating the ways in which
aesthetics circumscribes the space of politics (Rancière, 2006). Reconsti-
tuting the social with any number of non-human things is one way to let
some other things into our consideration of the political aesthetics of climate
change; another is to follow Bataille into a more energetic engagement
(inspired by Nietzsche’s ‘play of the world’) that searches for the experi-
ences and things that bring us into contact with the depth and complexity
of the world (i.e. to think about what constitutes the experience of change
that climate shifts instigate; see Bataille, 1988, 1989). But, while we might
add to the multiplicity of things, it also becomes increasingly difficult to
account for what is taken away in climate-induced biodiversity loss and the
mass extinction events that characterize climate change. This difficultly
arises because some of what is lost is never so still or so present as to enter
a space of representation, and because absences in the ‘play of the world’
are always hidden in the overwhelming presence of things (in both the
If our key climate change compatriot is a polar bear, what kind of sensibil-
ity are we embracing in the face of death? The polar bear is what Bataille
calls an ‘unbroken animal’ (1991a: 133), an untrained and undirected
energy that represents the internal and external visibility of animality or ‘a
network of exteriority within’ (Privitello, 2007: 173). This notion of animal-
ity is a form of seeing that is transgressive, precarious and extends the
human into the limits of the biophysical world with all its abundant, exces-
sive, destructive energy. The presence of this ‘wild beast’, according to
Bataille, is part of the recognition of limits, of what it is to be human and
what is in excess of that. He says:
The animal opens before me a depth that attracts me and is familiar to me.
In a sense I know this depth; it is my own. It is also that which is familiar to
me. It is also that which is farthest removed from me, that which deserves
the name depth, which means precisely that which is unfathomable to me.
(1992: 22)
Presence here, for Bataille, is about immanence, and hence not something
that can be utilized (as utility imposes its own structures on experience),
but something wildly transformative and poetic that re-stitches the tissue of
consciousness. It is not sociologically verifiable and does not permit an
opening into a policy arena, but permits an opening to thought about what
is possible. What is at stake here for Bataille is that we can reduce the
animal to an object of science or a thing, but it is never entirely reducible
to that ‘inferior reality which we attribute to things’ (Yusoff and Gabrys,
2007). For Bataille: ‘something tender, secret and painful draws out the
intimacy which keeps vigil in us, extending its glimmer into that animal
darkness’ (1992: 23). This precarious vision into the darkness appears ‘only
to slip away’ (1992: 23), leaving a cut in the visible.
Out on the tundra the polar bears are hungry. Their bodies are lean.
The ice is late. The trucks have driven across the tundra up into little terri-
tories with isolated bears herded between buggies for the promised photo
opportunities. Some other locals are worried about the tracks encroaching on
the fragile arctic tundra. Some of the locals are not so concerned; this tourism
of ‘edge species’ is big business,9 ‘The last show on earth’. Gold rush – eye
rush – every experience an image, and then a more primal rush, the rush of
bear, and nearness to bear – the rush of experience. This encounter that makes
our bear–human world is directly linked to the cataloguing of them. It is
about a category of experience that is bound up in the image. There is the
taking for oneself, seeing for oneself, before they are gone, the ‘last
witnesses’, the photographer at the catastrophe, all looking for the iconic
image, in polar bearness, poster child for Arctic and climate change narra-
tives. But here we might pause a while, take a breath, and ask what becomes
of this witnessing? How do lives change by the rub with these creatures?
What responsibilities might emerge from being present and seeing into that
animal darkness?
One male bear has approached the tundra vehicle, much to the delight
of its occupants, who search for the searched for National Geographic shot.
As a man leans over, eager to get his shot, he is inattentive. We watch, our
buggy suddenly transfixed by this human–bear encounter. The bear is
watching too. He has seen and fixed upon the dangling camera strap that
the man, who watches his screen for the perfect shot, has momentarily lost
sight of. As he leans over to get even closer, the bear gives nothing away. The
man’s sight resides fixedly on the screen before him. His prosthetic medium of
capture belies other spaces in which the image will travel. The bear has made
a connection too, from strap, to arm, to food. He has not eaten in three months
and is waiting restlessly for the ice to freeze, and the seals that will come to
rest upon it. We watch captivated, waiting for a crucial encounter. Suddenly,
someone on the truck realizes that the bear is not just there for photographic
opportunities, and pulls him back up. The words of the taxi driver in
Winnipeg come back to me: ‘Them bears, like watching your house burn
down.’
So what of this intersecting gaze that captivates and makes captive?
One thing that was apparent was the modalities of strategic ‘distancings’
that a real time substitute – the camera – facilitated, coupled with the
‘hunger’ for those images that had propelled many people’s trip to Churchill
in the first instance. To look was hard, moving and intensely terrifying. Polar
bears are the only animal that will repeatedly stalk and attack humans. They
have hungers too, but not of the aesthetic type. Don Ihde (2002) suggests
that technologies use us as much as we use them, as we are enfolded into
the modalities of seeing that the technology prescribes and the networks and
memory structures that it animates. In Haraway’s terms it is cohabitation.
What does it mean to meet the gaze of a polar bear prosthetically or other-
wise to pay attention to the polar bear’s future possibilities in a changing
climate – what is the protocol for such an engagement up close and, as most
of us are situated, at a distance? We might look to a more situated history
at the Eskimo Museum, Churchill, to see another kind of aesthetics of
engagement, one that is based on looking eye to eye, up close, with polar
bears as a companion species. The relationship of Inuit to the polar bear is
of hunter and hunted – in which respect proliferates through the frequent
reversal of these roles, in ‘a dance of relating, not from scratch, not ex-
nihilo, but full of the patterns of their sometimes-joined, sometimes-separate
heritages both before and lateral to this encounter’ (Haraway, 2008: 25).
If we look at the aesthetics of this death dance, it is one of incorpora-
tion and shamanistic intimacy with the polar bear. The shaman summons
transformation through a chaotic revealing to inform changes in state, where
a magic crossing of understanding takes place. The shamanistic ‘dances of
relating’ challenge the unity of isolated objects/subjects, causing a slippage
between them in which there is both mimesis and alterity (Taussig, 1993).
In Bataille’s terms, the summoned appears, only to slip away; but in the
movement between aesthetic forms a communication is made. The hunter
sees the hunted to know it and himself more fully. Of all the animals the
Inuit traditionally hunted, Nanuk, the polar bear, was the most prized.
Native hunters considered Nanuk to be wise, powerful and ‘almost a man’.
This dance of ‘yielding to’ and ‘becoming with’ is ambiguous and sensuous.
It is ambiguous because it is about a form of entering into and becoming
dominant over a certain other nature, yet it is sensuous because it does not
manifest an urge to deface or render absolute such cross-inhabitations
(Taussig, 1993). Traditional knowledge systems in the Arctic are used to
describe such an encounter:
A traditional hunter plumbs the depth of his intellect – his capacity to manip-
ulate complex knowledge. But he also delves into his animal nature, drawing
from intuitions of sense and body and heart; feeling the winds touch, listen-
ing for the tick of moving ice, peering from crannies, hiding himself as if he
In the world of eyes, a precarious vision appears in the darkness that goes
beyond the narrow limits to bring back that going-beyond into the realm of
the visible.
(Luck, 2008: 12; see also Nietzsche, 1974, 1989a, 1989b). For Nietzsche,
this play of and with the world is an aesthetic relation, aligned to a mobile
form of nature, a biocomplexity that is boundless, multispecies, changing
and corporeal (for Bataille too, inner experience is always corporeal). This
world play (rather than world-forming) suggests an ongoing re-centring, a to
and fro between things, what might be called, in Isabelle Stengers’ (2005)
terms, a form of cosmopolitical experimentation. What is crucial to this play
is abundance, or what Bataille calls an excess of energy and animality (the
generosity of the sun). As we enter a mass extinction event instigated by
anthropogenic-induced climate change, this play – ours and the world’s –
is vital to the possibilities of all experience and every politics. In Foucault’s
terms, it is an aesthetics of existence that we are both witness to and
participating in.
For Bataille ‘the history of life on earth is mainly the effect of wild
exuberance’ (1991a: 33), not of careful accumulation. The experience of
this exuberance, like cosmopolitanism, is synonymous with experiment
(Privitello, 2007: 171). Part of Bataille’s play of the world is configured
around what it means to allow other things and events into experience,
without restricting this experience to that which is deemed to be useful or
purposeful (i.e. something to be conserved). Furthermore, how we fend off
loss through various practices is vital to how we break with the destructive
logic of industrial capitalist modernity. Bataille’s argument is made, like
those made more recently by Haraway (2008) and Karen Barad (2007), by
understanding aesthetic communication as something that is tied together
through wounds or cuts in the fabric of utility. This play, according to
Bataille (1985: 250), only communicates when we are lost and losing
ourselves, and utility dissipates. There are several cuts that are important
here in an ethics of engagement with climate change: the loss of the
abundant play of the world (biodiversity loss and extinction) and the loss of
meetings with that animal intimacy that extend our human world. Rather
than retreat into a careful ecology (discussed below through archival prac-
tices), Bataille (1985) wants to meet this violence, death and expenditure
through visions of excess.
These visions of excess seek to study ‘the very matter whose unjusti-
fiable, a priori exclusion makes possible the coherence of rigorous, hierar-
chical systems of classification and thought’ (Stoekl, 2007a: 21). Thus,
Bataille’s approach to disrupt a priori forms, and his strange chaotic ledger
of expanding restricted economies (1991a, 1991b) and non-knowledge
(2001), suggest archival practices of the world that address both the form
and the visibility of aesthetics. And, crucially, he acknowledges the vitality
of an engagement with animality as destructive, intimate and part of what
opens the possibilities of the human, but also what has been entirely
restricted by quantification, ordering and stockpiling nature (see Stoekl,
2007a: 131). Bataille’s reordering of archival impulses in Encyclopaedia
Acephalica (1995) and Documents (1929–30) suggests that a museological
approach to biological life simply fends off loss, rather than understanding
its place and force. And, in a bizarre play, the repression of loss forgoes the
realization of the ethical potential of that loss to redistribute the sensible.
It is a repression of violence in this relation that contributes (through its
lack of recognition) to the continuance of structures of banal violence. And,
more importantly, it is the impact of those sense-experiences which Bataille
champions that can bring about intimacy with knowledge. For Bataille, this
is the ethical rub: how the world is ordered through archival principles acts
on the possibilities of experience and ethics. Thus Bataille’s aesthetic
engagement with the forms of experience and spaces of action in multi-
species living suggests a radical departure from the careful conservational
approaches that define our current response of accounting for biological life
and the loss of the world. And, if the distribution of the sensible is what
constitutes the very possibilities of making politics, as Rancière argues, then
our spaces of sensing climate change in the biophysical world (the archive
and animality) need to be examined. Clearly the news media and science-
in-public are two spaces in which the aesthetic sense data of climate change
is configured. However, the archive is more prevalent, since it informs the
stockpile of communicative strategies for both. It is thus to the archive that
I now turn
Archiving Life
There was the familiar gateway: EXTINCTATHON, Monitored by Madd
Addam. Adam named the living animals, Madd Addam names the dead ones.
Do you want to play? (Atwood, 2003: 251)
Over the past few decades a vast treasury of wildlife images has been steadily
accumulating, yet no one has known its full extent – or its gaps – and no one
has had a comprehensive way of gaining access to it. ARKive will put that
right. It will become an invaluable tool for all concerned with the well-being
of the natural world. (www.ARKive.org)
Figure 4 Bill Burns, How to Help Animals Escape from Natural History, 1995
(Courtesy of the artist)
As a wager [gageure]. The archive has always been a pledge, and like every
pledge [gage], a token of the future. To put it more trivially: what is no longer
archived in the same way is no longer lived in the same way. Archivable
meaning is also and in advance codetermined by the structure that archives.
(1996: 18)
Derrida asks us to consider how the archive is always posed between
destruction and conservation, decommissioning and commissioning new
materials, and thus it is a suitable metaphor for the organized processes of
memory and forgetting that we institute into our structures of knowledge (see
also Featherstone and Venn, 2006: 5). He continues:
. . . the technical structure of the archiving archive also determines the struc-
ture of the archivable content even in its very coming into existence and in
Derrida calls this force between the conservation and destruction the
archival drive or archive fever (1996: 19). The archive of ‘presence’ (or
aesthetic representation) is poised between representation and loss, between
protected permanence and the peril of time (Featherstone and Venn, 2006:
8). Hinchliffe has suggested that a careful political ecology ‘is one that is
intent on making spaces for others that are not simply about presence, inclu-
sion or accumulation. It also involves uncertainties, precautionary measures
and looser forms of assemblage’ (2008: 88). Like Serres’s understanding of
complexity and Bataille’s concept of animality, we must meet the fullness
of the world on its own terms, at its own pace, in the form that we encounter
it, faithful to that encounter even as it slips away in the ever-changing play
of the world. This may be a glimpse into the depths of animality, a fleeting
image, an interruption, a silence, the cut of a paw print through mud.
Conclusion
What would an ethics be like that, instead of seeking a mode of equivalence,
a mode of reciprocity or calculation, sought to base itself on absolute generos-
ity, absolute gift, expenditure without return, a pure propulsion into a future
that does not rebound with echoes of an exchange dictated by the past?
(Grosz, 1999: 11)
use’ of everything: an elevated use and a low use, which throws into relief
the topology of the archive through this ‘de-class(ify)ing’ operation (Bataille,
1997: 47). The de-classification both interrupts the archive, because there
is literally no place for these experiences, and signals the limits of such
modes of accounting. In his refusal of the stable order of destructive things
(collections of natural history have always been collections of the dead),
Bataille opens knowledge up to the wound that can connect us to the imma-
nence of the universe, be that through earthworms or spit, wild beasts or
our own animality. While we might acknowledge our co-evolution with lots
of non-humans as an important step in understanding various forms of co-
habitation and forms of historical indebtedness and inheritance (Clark,
2005, 2007: 63; Diprose, 2002: 42), in the end (and in the experience) this
is not what is at stake in losing the play of the world. As Bataille argued,
what opens before us in animality is both interior and external to us – it is
a line of communication between two worlds. He says: ‘We calculate our
interests, but this situation baffles us: The very word interest is contradic-
tory with the desire at stake under these conditions’ (1991a: 30). Desire, for
Bataille, is bound to and by the intimacy of that experience – it must be
bound to experience as a possibility of politics and it must be bound by the
form of that aesthetic experience which forces a rethinking of the dominant
pre-ordered forms of experience. In short, categories of experience must be
faithful to those experiences. Climate change must force new images full of
loss and rage that scream through our aesthetic orders to break with the
stockpiling of nature in neat categories of extinction.
At a time when so much is at stake, a thinking that does not shy away
from the limits of an exchange with animality, both exuberant and violent,
is surely needed. This desire to endlessly accumulate and fend off loss and
destruction ultimately inflates the likelihood and magnitude of catastrophe
and loss. This is what is so paradoxical about strategies that exude care, but
return to a ledger of accounting so stultified that they imprison loss in a
restricted economy, endlessly suppressing the force of that biopolitical
exchange (be that with polar bears or the long-dead animal fossils that have
fuelled our carbon-climate experiment). The restricted economy, which
Bataille articulates, shares everything with the logic of industrial capitalist
modernity that has been so destructive to other forms of life, and nothing
with the intimacy of experience that can open up possibility in a politics of
biopolitical living. What is crucial here in the constant ‘bringing down in
the world’ of accumulative categories is an attack on conservation itself as
a practice that ignores the limits of the biosphere (for Bataille these are the
only real limits). How the biopolitical is ordered through archival principles
is key to the possibilities of intimacy and ethics. As Grosz asks: ‘what would
an ethics be like that did not rebound with echoes of an exchange dictated
by the past?’ (1999: 11). By conserving and accumulating our archives of
destruction, we continue ordering and spending destruction without ever
transgressing the limits (to transgress the limit is to become aware of the
limit) in ways that bring catastrophic loss and wholesale destruction,
The polar bear is a boundary object that attempts to translate the immensity
and distance of climate change into something more meaningful to a number
of publics in Canada. It is a temporary bridge that allows communication and
understanding among the constituencies of scientists, policymakers, and
citizens . . .
Polar bears are made from the mythic, organic, textual, technical, historical,
political, and economic (Haraway, 1991), which must be recognized along-
side the important facts about weight loss from fossil-fuel-induced climate
change. Boundaries from which societies derive knowledge about polar bears
and climate change are necessary for making meanings. (2004: 431)
3. There are already signs that polar bears are becoming not just physiological
hybrids, but spatial hybrids too, as the first polar/grizzly bear hybrid was recently
discovered (in 2008). Normally, grizzly bears and polar bears do not mix, either
sexually or in terms of habitat, as polar bears mate on the sea ice and grizzlies
on land. The hybrid bear is evidence of increasing changes in the bear’s patterns
of behavioural and spatial patterns.
4. That is to say, to reiterate Eric Swyngedouw (2007: 13–40), there is nothing post-
political about the discourse of climate change and the spaces in which its politics
are fought.
5. For a discussion on economies of excess see Yusoff (2009).
6. Ulrich Beck picks up the term ‘non-knowledge’ (without reference to Bataille)
in his book World at Risk (2009) to talk about the space of knowledge that exists
between knowledge and unknowing in the discourse of climate change (2009: 115).
7. As Jamie Lorimer argues about non-human charisma:
8. For a discussion of the discourse of the Anthropocene and the collapse of eco-
logical systems within and beyond the climate crisis see Crist (2007: 61).
9. Each tourist is worth roughly $400, each buggy holds 25–30 passengers and the
season is short (but getting longer each year). The maths is compelling to a small
town, constructed, and then deserted by the military.
10. For a discussion of archives, classification and knowledge systems see
Featherstone and Venn (2006).
References
Alaskan Native Science (2008) ‘What Is Traditional Knowledge?’, URL (consulted
January 2010): http://www.nativescience.org/html/traditional_knowledge.html