I.

Emergency Circumstances

People vs De Gracia: This is a case of an attempted coup d’etat. The SC opined that the case
based on the circumstances, falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against
warantless search. The following facts were taken to account:
(1) Reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed.
(2) There was no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts.
(3) There was a prevailing general chaos and disorder (in People v. De Gracia, there was
an attempted coup)

People vs De Gracia
There was a general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which
was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted. This case
fails under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. The
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation
then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search
warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that when the raid was
conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency of the moment, a search warrant
could lawfully be dispensed with.

II. Checkpoints
 Legality. Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Under exceptional circumstances(as where the
survival of the government is on the balance, or when lives of the people are in grave peril)
checkpoints may be allowed and may be installed by the government.(Valmonte vs. De
Villa)
 Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order
and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. (People v. Escaño)
 When considered legal. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search,
said routine checks are not constitutive of unreasonable search. (People v. Escaño)
 Requirements for Checkpoints:
(1) Existence of exceptional circumstances
(2) conducted on a fixed area
(3) inspection limited to visual search
(4) occupants must not subjected to physical or body search (Caballes vs. CA)
 Illustration. For, example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light
therein. A warantless search of incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and
departure areas of an international airport, is a practice not constitutionally objectionable
because it is founded on public interest, safety, and necessity. (Valmonte vs. DeVilla)
 Q: Can vehicles be stopped and extensively searched?
A: If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it should be because of some
probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of men at the checkpoints that either
 the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments
of some offense. (Valmonte vs. De Villa)
 Q: Where can warrant less searches and seizures in checkpoints be compared to?
A: These warrantless searches and seizures at the checkpoints are quite similar to
searches and seizures accompanying arrests during the commission of a crime, or
immediately thereafter. (Valmonte vs. De Villa)
 Q: Must checkpoints be announced?
A: No. Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban.
Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their fixed location and
the regularized manner in which they are operated. (People v. Escano, 2000
Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)

F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations
w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the
social, economic and political dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order,
the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM.
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela residents
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon,
was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or
continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.

HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal. No
proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the
military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful search and
seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure
to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be regarded
as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
 True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconveninece, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an
orderly society and a peaceful community.

III. Inspection of Buildings

Camara v. Municipal Court (387 US 523) arose out of the conviction of the appellant for refusing
entry to a housing inspector who, unarmed with a search warrant, sought to inspect appellant’s
dwelling. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction saying “We hold that administrative
searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure
lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual.
For the determination of probable cause the Court allowed the issuing magistrate’s evaluation to
rest upon the “passage of time, the nature of the building or the condition of the area.” As for
description the Court was willing to accept warrants on an area-wide basis. (Bernas Green Book,
page 183)
(However, according to Nachura, Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement
of fire, sanitary and building regulations is basically an exercise of police power of the State, and
would not require a search warrant. These are routine inspection which, however, must be
conducted during reasonable hours.)

IV. Warrantless Arrest

Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of Court.)
 Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where an arrest can be made either by
the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his presence". The
key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge".

Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the arrest made by the constabulary
without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive was held
unconstitutional, since there was no personal knowledge of the offense itself.

The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the former to be
his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule.
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The
penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be
allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As
amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).
Anonuevo v. Ramos.

The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under
surveillance. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents
found them to be loaded guns. They were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
carry firearms and ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their
former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On
8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this Court.

HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and
ammunitions in their person when apprehended.
 There is also no merit in the contention that the info. filed against them are null and void
for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did petitioners
ask for prel. inv. after the informations had been filed against them in court.

IV

Ocaya v. Aguirre.

On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP

Command, armed w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house located at Marikina Green
Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the
search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several
rounds of ammunitions for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They were brought
to the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce any permit or authorization to possess
the ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. Rivera was
released from custody.
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2.

HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. No.
prel. inv. was conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive the
provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
V. Rebellion as a continuing crime

A person charged with rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such

crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof may be arrested
without a warrant because these are continuing offenses and therefore the accused
are assumed to be always continuing the offense. (Umil v. Ramos)

VI. Committed in the presence of police officers

People vs. Sucro
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states that "A peace officer or private person may,
without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;" An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds
at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the
fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfil the requirements
for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Still, that
searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. Herein, police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
Under the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the
arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the
requirements of a warrantless arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.

VII. Personal knowledge of the offense

People vs. Gerente [GR 95847-48, 10 March 1993]

The search of Gerente's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were
valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that "A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it;" The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after Gerente
and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they
inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a
concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente,
as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of
the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they
could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could
obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. The search conducted
on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest.
This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that
"A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search
of Gerente's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers
to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack
them unless he is first disarmed.