IX.

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

A. VIOLATOR OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Article 32, Civil Code

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress
of grievances;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an
entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may
be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

MHP GARMENTS VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1994)

 After the dismissal of a criminal complaint for Unfair Competition against the Private
Respondents, they in turn filed a Civil Case for Collection of Sum of money against
MHP Garments (Orig. Complainant in the Crim. Case) which the RTC ruled in favor
of the Private respondents and judgment was affirmed by the C.A.
 The S.C. held that both courts committed No Error in their judgments and ordered
MHP Garments and Larry de Guzman (the employee who effected the illegal search
and seizure) to pay damages JOINTLY and SEERALLY and return all the seized
items to the Private Resp.
  Needless to state, the Wantonness of the Wrongful Siezure justifies the award of
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
 Protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality and not a mere
burst of rhetoric.
 MHP and Employee Larry de Guzman was ordered to pay JOINTLY and
SEVERALLY damages to the defendants.

SILAHIS VS. SOLUTA (2006)

 On suspicion of sale of Marijuana and prostitution by the union officers and

members, the Vice President for finance (Panlilio) of Silahis with the aid of his
personal secretary and security guard entered and searched the Union Officers. The
accused were acquitted on the ground of illegal search and seizure and thereafter,
they filed a civil case for damages against Silahis. The Trial Court rendered
judgment ordering SILAHIS and Panlilio JOINTLY and SEVERALLY to pay for
damages against the union office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Moral Damages may be recovered by reason of illegal search and
other acts under Art. 32 and Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.

HELD: YES. It is necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly
liable for violation of rights enumerated in Art. 32 of the Civil Code.

The injured Citizen will always have adequate CIVIL REMEDIES before the courts
because of Independent Civil Action, even in those instances where the act or omission
complained of does not constitute a Criminal offense.

Article 2219, Civil Code

Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3
of this article, may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order named.

VINSONS CHATO VS. FORTUNE TOBACCO

 When R.A. 7654 was enacted and petitioner computed 55% Ad Valorem Tax
amounting to Php 9, 598, 334.00 of Respondent Corporation(based on RMC -37-93,
2 days before R.A. 7654 took effect). Petitioner was held liable for DAMAGES on the
basis of Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
 It was held that the clear intention of the legislators is to create a DISTINCT CAUSE
OF ACTION in the nature of TORT Violation of Constitutional Rights, irrespective of
the motive or intent of the defendant (2007 DECISION).
 However, on its 2008 Decision through a Motion for Reconsideration, the Earlier
Decision of 2007 was reversed.
 It was held that with no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is NO delict or
wrongful act/omission, and without such delict, the complainant then fails to create a
Cause of Action, because the COA is the act of omission by which a party violates
the right of another.
 The facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the Petitioner took nothing from
the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment
levied by the former by virtue of RMC -37-93 (2008 DECISION).

SESBRENO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (2014)

  When Sesbreno’s house was inspected and the VOC (Violation of Contracts) TEAM
replaced his Electrical System with a NEW one since his old meter was “turned
upside down”, he filed a complaint with the RTC on the ground that the inspection
was illegal and not in compliance with a valid search as there was no notice and he
was not present in his house at the time of the inspection.
 After dismissal by the RTC/CA, the SC: Denied the petition for certiorari and held
that there was NO denial of DUE PROCESS by the refusal of the T.C. judge to
inhibit from the case since it was grounded on mere suspicion of BIAS and
PREJUDICE.
 Sesbreno did not establish his claim for DAMAGES, if the respondents were not
guilty of Abuse of Rights.
B. INFORMATION FRAUD, PHYSICAL INJURIES

Article 35, Civil Code

When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with

the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law,
but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the
complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil
action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.

1. In General

MADEJA VS. CARO AND JAPSON (1983)

 While a Criminal case was pending against Dr. Eve Japson, who was accused of
HOMICIDE through Reckless Imprudence for the death of her patient (Cleto
Madeja), the WIDOW of the latter filed a CIVIL CASE against Japson in the same
courts on the ground that her husband died of Gross Negligience by Dr. Japson.
  On Dr, Japson’s Motion to Dismiss, the motion was granted on the ground that
Sec. 2 of Rule 111 applies:
 “After a Criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until FINAL JUDGMENT has been entered in the
Criminal Action.”
 SC: Rule III – Sec. 3 should apply, which provides that Civil Action may proceed
independently in cases of Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries – where
physical injuries include homicide in whatever stage, not Section 2 of Rule 111.
 It is not conclusive to Civic Spirit and to Individual Self-Reliance and initiative to
habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their
private rights.

2. Defamation

MVRS v. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILS. (2003)

FACTS: Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than
seventy(70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims (Linzag, Arcilla, de
Guzman,da Silva, Junio) filed in the RTC a complaint for damages in their own behalf and
as aclass suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publications,
Inc.,arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.

Islamic Da’Wah alleges that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to
the Muslims; not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings,
cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam,; that on account of these libelous words,
Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Islamic Da’Wah has a cause of action for libel.
(2) Whether or not in the alternative, the action can be considered as one is for intentional
tort and not libel.

HELD: (1) NO. There is no cause of action for libel. Defamation, which includes libel and
slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false
and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the
esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or
opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good
name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an
invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community
may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se,
and mere words of general abuse however ill-natured, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable
by itself.

Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to

advert to an identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically
pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right
of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression,
as well as of the press. If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous
statement is considered to have no application to anyone in particular, since one
might as well defame all mankind. As the size of these groups increases, the chances for
members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive.

(2) NO. "Emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature; it is a civil action filed by an
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. No particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Here, it is
relational harm — which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form
of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm — which includes injuries
to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

3. Fraud

HEIRS OF SIMON V. CHAN1

1
G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011
FACTS: Eduard Simon issued a check to Elvin Chan a Landbank Check dated December
26, 1996 worth P336,000.00. It was dishonored due to account closed.
After a formal demand, Simon filed for preliminary attachment - MeTC in Pasay City issued
a writ of preliminary attachment. Simon filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of litis
pendentia because there is already a charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 -
granted by the MeTC. Chan appealed to the CA - reversed and set aside the decision of the
MeTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil
action.

HELD: NO. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught. However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing
check issued in contravention of BP 22. Applying Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective
December 1, 2000 that the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed. Issuance of a bouncing check may result in two separate and
distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures for the recovery of the civil
liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-interchangeable.

4. Physical Injuries

1. The term Physical Injuries under Art.33 of the Present Civil Code should not be
understood as that described in the Revised Penal Code which is more specific. The
term physical injuries connote bodily injuries causing death.2
2. The civil code described physical injuries in general term which include
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.3
3. Criminal negligence (Reckless Imprudence) is not one of the crimes (Defamation,
Fraud, Physical Injuries) mentioned in Art 33 of the Civil Code, which authorizes the
institution of an Independent Civil Action, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal case which only require preponderance of evidence.4
4. Physical Injury could also be battery and assault.

Battery
 An intentional infliction of a harmful or offensive bodily contact; bodily contact is
offensive if it offends a reasonable person’s sense of dignity.

2
Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
3
Madeja v. Japzon; Dulay v. CA
4
Corpus vs. Paje; Bonite vs. Zosa
Assault
 Intentional conduct by one person directed at another which places the latter in
apprehension of immediate bodily harm or offensive act. Also includes bodily injuries
causing death.

5. Physical injuries which resulted because of negligence or imprudence is not included

in Article 33; they are already covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

CAPUNO v. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES5

FACTS: A Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi collided (1953) with a private car
driven by Capuno. The passengers, spouses Florencio Buan and RizalinaParas, died. The
truck driver Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence (1953).
While the criminal case was pending, without reservation, an independent civil action for
damages based on quasi-delict was instituted (1958). The defendants prayed for the
dismissal of said civil action for the action has already prescribed.

ISSUES: (1) Was the institution of the civil action under Art. 33 of the Civil Code correct?
(2) Was the independent civil action instituted under Article 33 of the Civil Code
already prescribed?

HELD: (1) YES. Though the criminal case filed was homicide through reckless
imprudence NOT Physical injuries only, the institution of an independent civil action
based on Article 33 of the Civil Code was correct because as explained in this case the
“term physical injuries” includes bodily injuries causing death.

(2) YES. The SC held that such claim, based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, has already
prescribed; such action must be instituted within four (4) years (Art 1146 of the CC)from the
day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. In this case 4 years had lapsed since the
death of the passengers.
CORPUS v. FELARDO PAJE and THE VICTORY LINER TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.6

FACTS: A passenger bus of the Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by
FelardoPaje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death
and in physical injuries to two other persons (1956).

5
G.R. No. L-19331, April 30, 1965
6
G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969
 Paje was charged with homicide and double serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence (CFI of Pampanga). The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right
to institute a separate civil action for damages. The trial court found the defendant guilty but
on appeal, CA found the defendant-appellant not guilty of said crimes for the collision was a
case of pure accident.

Beforehand while the case was pending before the CA, the heirs instituted a
separate civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence
against the driver and the bus company(1961). The defendants moved for the dismissal of
the civil case on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal of defendant Paje by
the Court of Appeals in the criminal action. The motion was denied.

But the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' action was
based upon a quasi-delict and that it had prescribed. The plaintiffs appealed direct to this
Court on questions of law from the order dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the civil action proper?

HELD: YES. The acquittal of the defendant by the CA in the criminal action on the
groundthat the reckless imprudence or criminal negligence charged against him did not
exist and that the collision was a case of pure accident, was a bar to the civil action for
damages for the death of Clemente Marcia, which action was based upon the same criminal
negligence of which the defendant was acquitted in the criminal action (Art. 100 RPC).
“In the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the
criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged
against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based
upon the same act.” (This can now be found under Sec. 2(par4), Rule 111 of the 1997
Rules of Court, as amended)

Article 33 of the present Civil Code is not applicable, since criminal negligence
(reckless imprudence) is not one of the three crimes (namely: Defamation, Fraud, and
Physical Injuries) mentioned in Art. 33.

CARMEN L. MADEJA v. HON. FELIX T. CARO

FACTS: DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of CletoMadeja after an appendectomy. DrJapzon was charged with homicide
through reckless imprudence. The widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madejareserved her
right to file a separate civil action for damages.
 While the criminal case was still pending, a civil action for damages was instituted
against Dr. Japzon. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of
Dr. Japzon. A motion to dismiss by the defendant was granted due to Section 3(a) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court(Now Sec.2, par1, Rule 111 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as
amended), stating that a civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action. Hence, this petition which seeks to set aside the decision of
the trial court.

ISSUE: May the independent civil action against Dr. Japzon proceed?

HELD: YES. The SC held that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed
independently of the criminal action against her based on Sec. 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court: (Now Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the1997 Rules of Court, as amended):

“Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles

31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved
as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

While the State is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the
one most concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to
demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him.

NOTE: In this case it was reiterated that the term "physical injuries" is used in a generic
sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

The filing of separate civil action under Art. 33 of the CC without the requirement of
reservationis possible, because the law itself make such reservation. However with the
1997 Rules of Court, as amended, the requirement of reservation has been declared as un
lawful being unauthorized amendment of the substantive law which does not require
reservation, thus it was stricken out under the present Rules of Court (Sec. 3, Rule 111 of
the 1997 Rules of Court)

Sec. 3.When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided for
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
 however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action."

BONITE, ET AL VS. HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA7

FACTS: Florencio Bonite, a caminero (street sweeper) was hit by a truck (1968) driven by
private respondent Abamongaresulting to Florencio’s death. Private respondent Abamonga
was charged with homicide through Reckless Imprudence by the surviving heirs (now
petitioners). Hon. Zora (Presiding judge) dismissed the criminal case against Abamonga for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

His heirs (petitioners)did not appeal but filed a civil action based on Art. 29 of the
Civil Code for recovery of damages against the same accused for the death of Bonite
(1970).The private respondent claimed that Art. 29 is not applicable but Art 33, because Art.
29 is not applicable to criminal offenses proceeding from a tortious act.

Hon. Judge Zora dismissed the complaint for damages for failure of the heirs to
reserve the right to file an independent civil action. A motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the civil case proper?

HELD: NO. It is a right of every party to be compensated for damages that they have
incurred by way of the criminal action. The petitioners anchored their right to bring a
separate civil action for damages under the express provisions of Article 29 and Art 2176 of
the Civil Code.

Article 29 of the present CC:

“When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
courtshall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be

7
G.R. No. L-33772, June 20, 1988
 inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.”

The court further stated that a criminal action is distinct from that of a civil action. So
upon this, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court
and remanded the case to the lower court for the trial of the merits of the case.

NOTE: It is important to note that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to
file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be availed of only in
offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise
of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in
the criminal action based on reasonable doubt. It is a well known maxim in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish. It
was further discussed that Art. 33assumesthat defamation, fraud, or physical injuries as
intentionally committed, not through criminal negligence.

MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.8

FACTS: An altercation between BenignoTorzuela (security guard on duty at the said

carnival) and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred (1998) at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa, which resulted Torzuelato shootAtty. Napoleon Dulay causing Dulay’s
death. Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against BenignoTorzuela and
private respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Corp, Inc. (Safeguard) and/or
Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard), alleged employers of defendant Torzuela.

Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that the alleged act of shooting was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), making the civil liability governed by Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code. Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based
on negligence under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners,
cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’
filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal
case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.

8
G.R. No. 108017, April 3, 1995
 Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant
on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both
motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is based on their
liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge dismissed the civil
action which was affirmed by the CA, that the complaint was one for damages founded on
crimes punishable under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished
from those arising from quasi-delict.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Torzuela’ s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-
delict actionable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;
(2) Whether or not Article 33 applies only to injuries intentionally committed; and
(3) Whether or not the liability ofcompany respondents is subsidiary under the Revised
Penal Code.

HELD: (1) YES. Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict. Article 2176 of
the present Civil Code provides that:“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-
entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary.

(2) NO. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include
bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised
Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no independent civil
action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case at bar, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant in Marcia was charged with
reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) NO. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore,
it is incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. Therefore the
decision appealed from was set aside and the case was remanded to the trial court
for trials on the merits.

C. NEGLECT OF DUTY

Independent Civil Action For The Liability Of City Or Municipal Police Force

ARTICLE 34 OF THE NCC

“When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer
shall be primarily liable for damages and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefore. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.”

1. Primary liable – are those city or municipal police force who refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property.

2. Subsidiarily liable - is imposed on the city or the municipal government concerned in

case of insolvency of the city/municipal police force. Subsidiary liability of cities and
municipalities is imposed so that they will exercise great care in selecting conscientious and
duly qualified policemen and exercise supervision over them in the performance of their
duties.

Action For Damages Where No Independent Civil Action is Provided

ART. 35 OF THE NCC

“When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another
with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any
special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute
criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the
alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence.
Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to
indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by

the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination
of the criminal proceedings.”

PART TWO - DAMAGES

I. THE CONCEPT OF DAMAGES

A. IMPORTANCE AND DEFINITION

The right of action for death and the presumption in favor of compensation being
admitted, the difficulty of estimating in money the worth of a life, should not keep a court
from judicially compensating the injured party as nearly as may be possible for the wrong.
true, man is incapable of measuring exactly in the delicate scale of justice the value of a
human life. True, the feeling of a mother on seeing her little son torn and mangled expiring
dead could never be assigned with money. true, all the treasure in nature's vault could
compensate a parent for the loss of a beloved child. Nevertheless, within the bounds of
human powers, the negligent should make reparation for the loss.

Damages pertains to the actionable loss, hurt, or harm which result from the
unlawful act, omission or negligence of another. it is the unlawful act, or omission or
negligence of another. it is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury and damages are
the recompense or compensating awarded for the damage suffered. The word "damages"
includes any and all the manifestation of his life, physical, material, moral, or psychological,
mental, spiritual, financial, economical, social, political or religous.

When damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is a damnum absque

injuria. There can be no damges to be charged on those who may exercise such precious
right in goodfaith, even if done erroneously. It lementary rule that goodfaith is presented and
that the burden of proving badfaith rests upon the party alleging the same.
B. WHEN ALLOWED
 To maintain an action for damages, it is necessary to show proof of its existence.
The party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not
evidence. A court cannot rely on mere speculation, conjectures or guesswork. The
fact, amount, and the cause of the damage must be proven by preponderance of
evidence.

CUSTODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS

 The custodios and the Santoses fenced their properties, effectively closing the
access of the tenants to the public highway. Santoses reasoned out that their
daughter was dragged by a bicycle driven by a son of a tenants and that their
footwear were lost. Also, when the tenants were drunk, they bang the doors and
windows of the Santoses. In any case, upon the application of the Mabasas. they
were granted easement and damages. The Supreme Court, however, deleted the
award of damages, ruling that there was no legal injury since the owners have the
right to fence their properties, and the Mabasas had no right to easement, prior to
the grant.
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages , there must be both a right
of action for a legal wrong inflicted inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong
, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by breach or wrong.

HOW TO ALLEGE DAMAGES

 The amount of damages sought must be specified not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer portion. The court cannot award damages if the
parties fail to claim it nor award damages that is different from that prayed for. There
are instances that even if not allege but maybe recovered such as when a party
move to amend the pleading to conform with the evidence due to failure of the other
party to raise an objection during the presentation of evidence in proving the amount
of damages.

E. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGE

PEOPLE VS HALIL GAMBAO (2013)

 The accused-appellants were charge with a crime of kidnapping for ransom in the
person of Lucia Chan, a ish dealer based in Manila. Two of the accused forcibly took
the victim from their house and demanded a PHP 400,000.00 ransom. The RTC
rendered a decision convicting 12 of them guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The CA,
on appeal, affirm the decision but with modified the civil liability, holding tha each of
them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of PHP
50,000.00 by way of moral damages. The SC increase the amount of damages to
PHP 300,000.00 in total. In their decision,the SC held that the entire amount of civil
liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission
of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and
actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a
greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than Larina Perpenian
who was adjudged as only an accomplice. In accordance to the difference in the
degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount of PHP
300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for PHP 288,000.00 or
PHP 32,000.00 each and Larina Perpenian who shall be liable for PHP 12,000.00.