, POLI 822 ET ‘THE CRISIS OF THE NATION STATE AS A DOMINANT POLITICAL INSTITUTION — SCENARIO-DIRECTED PERSPECTIVES Abstract ‘World politics is currenily showing signs of far-reaching change and transformation, As the dominant political institution, the nation-state stands at the centre of this transformation process and is most likely to be effected by changes. This article concentrates on the potential, and very often the real, crisis in which many nation-states find themselves. By analysing the dominant contributions which concentrate on the nature, scope and direction of this transformation process, itis possible to review the future of the nation-state as dominant political institution of our time. Scenario orientated (hypothetical) perspectives are developed which attempt to evaluate the future of the nation-state, Arguments are motivated with the use of empirical material 1 INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATION On the eve of the 21° century, world politics is embroiled in rapidly changing circumstances that hold only one promise - ever-increasing and continual change that will cloud the horizon, The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new world order are currently important focal points in the investigations of various fixturologists, theorists, prophets and prophets of doom. It appears that high up on the agenda there-are ‘attempts to uncover the dynamics of this new order (or is it chaos?) so that the scope and direction of this transformation process may be identified. One of the main actors in the transformation process is the nation state, which, in the long term, will not come through the process unscathed. Important focal points of study are, therefore, the potential and the regular real crises that nation states find themselves in at the moment, or may increasingly find themselves in, in fsture. ‘Since 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia, the nation-state concept, with its roots deeply embedded in Wester civilization and culture, has graduslly become ‘a global phenomenon. After the Second World War, the nation-state concept has been, almost ‘without exception, the ftamework or structure in which sovereign political and decision- making powers have been seated. Radical changes in various domains (occurring at an Duarechage A998. The crisis LP tRe Nation- Sate: A Gidea! Phenomenon vsithan Afican accent. Altix. Quarlec Re CUN 1 Re DAKAR MR AARRAAARARARASAAAARAMAHAAHAMHOAHAOMAKM MHSSSSSCUSUUUUUUEUCUee oes * ou POLI 822 ET increasingly mote rapid rate than in the past) are beginning to cast threatening shadows over the nation state es a political framework for sovereign political power.’ A new political economy, as an extension of post-industrial tendencies (real and potential), a changing snilitary-strategic environment, tendencies of political decay and anarchy, ‘escalating conflicts, competitive political power bases, and the scarcity factor are some of ‘the indicators suggesting that the once dominant position of the nation state is ‘currently under siege. These indicators emphasize that the nation state’s earlier, almost indisputable position (for at least a number of centuries) is currently under serious threat. Although some states are probably better equipped than others to deal with a changing environment, the indications are clear that on the long term, no state will be eft- unaffected, Indeed, both developed and developing states are inchided here, albeit that the nature and scope of the crisis will probably be more pronounced and divergent in the fatter. Although none of the above-mentioned threats have recently impacted on the nation state it is, however, at this point possible to accurately assess their impact. An assessment of the position of the nation state is possible especially because a number ‘of important academic works, with a fiturological orientation, have appeared since the early nineties. This article is an attempt to place the crisis (potential and/or real) of the nation state, as a political institution, in perspective, The contributions of prominent theorists, which may serve as indicators for the future, will be reconstructed, and points of view will be motivated by using empirical material. From these reconstructions, scenario-directed (hypothetical) perspectives will be developed with regard to the nation state in a changing world. The focus of this research is, in essence, exploratory, and directed at the development of greater insight into the fature of the nation-state idea in a new political environment. Issues that will be considered, include: ‘* Acconceptual orientation and theoretical vantage points. + Indicators of political change. ¢ Thectisis of the mation state. ‘The nation-state idea in the 21" century +The threuts to the sovereignty af the Nation State are nothing new. However, the emergenes of anew wild oder cand the associated changes once eguin highlight the serious nate of the eis.SSE eee POLI 822 ET 2 ‘CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION AND THEORETICAL POINTS OF DEPARTURE C Currently, almost all societies and communities are politically organized in terms of the ‘ nation-state idea” - or rather, this is how the concept is indicated on the political map < of the world. Typical of the nation state is the presence of a fixed geographical reference ¢ (territory ot territorium of the state); a permanent society or community (a nation, ‘ citizens or subjects) - irrespective of how these are composed, as an institution, such a bs state is assigned both external and internal sovereignty (independent on the outside and 7 all-powerfl on the inside), and it has a permanent government organization and public- 7 service institutions (Compare in this regard Du Plessis, 1941; 3-20, 68-79; Sicker, 1971: 1-16, Von Glehn, 1970: 65-66, Verloren van Themaat, 1981: 5-7). Migdal (1988: 19), concurting with Max Weber (1964: 156), defines the nation state as °... an c corginization composed of numerous agencies ed and co-ordinated by the state's teadership (executive authority) that has the ability to make and implement rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rulemaking for other social organizations in a given territory using force, if necessary, to have its way." From the above-mentioned definition it appears that the state must fave access to a presumed power base to be able to take binding decisions for society. This is what Easton (1967: 129-134) has in mind when he refers to politics as "(he authoritative allocation of values for a society" in the context of its "political system": Gaining political power occurs through mobilization and the organization of political support against the background of competition, conflict and even violence with aspiring and competitive power bases. It is inthis regard that Huntington (1968: 144) points out that "(p)ower is something which has to be mobilized, developed and organized, It must ‘be created". In essence, politics is concerned with the capacity to mobilize and organize support within society (in whatever way the term is defined) and/or the al power base (mostly institutionally based) that allows the ‘consolidation of a p 7 The Natio Sse idca i defined by Du Plessis (1941: 3-20) os one ofthe masifeaions of the “sa” as a ‘strc! phenomenen. Cer manifestations tat he stash essunel were the ptsahal ily onaniations, ‘heansiet mmarhy, th Grek ciy-sate, he Romaa inperiam an th nmocracy. Fer pupae of hs sy, ‘She concept pits (6s defn) ater tha “tale” (ecordng to Du Pls) is prefered. The complex ature of paliteal change andthe varous poll entite tht have erergd, makes the concep "poital” (which is more ‘extble) mere stable han the xe sretpial tem “oat” which more dicts apy. > Foryupotes ofthis researc, the nation ste ~and net the pola este) ~ eve she foes of invesgtion sav concpa framework, MAMAN MAK HRAMS |eee eee ee we wee eevee eveee eevee vow > a » a > 3 vouuuboueu ow POLI 622 ET taking of binding decisions (the allocation of values) with regard to the society or sections of'a society, or which may inhibit (and even prevent) enemy power bases to enforce their decisions/values on society or sections thereof. A fixed geographical reference which remains relatively unchanged in terms of the definition of the nation state is not 4 pre-requisite for practising politics. Indeed, for the greater part of the political history of the world, politics has been practised without an absohste hard-and- ‘ast geographical frame of reference. The extent that political actors have been able to sicvessfully assign values and scarce resources, signifies their capacity to maintain a political survival strategy for their citizens, It is indeed this requirement that will determine where, and for how long, nation states are going to dominate the political arena, Although the nation state has dominated the political scene since 1648 as an institution {and then as the framework within which political power is seated and which has been responsible for the authoritative allocation of values), this is indeed not a true reflection of the political history of the world, Various “political institutions", among others, family organizations, great empires of the past, civilizations, the church, city-states, economic institutions and even individuals have imposed typical political power bases ‘and decisionsivalues on society or segments of society. Even today, there are institutions - and they have always been in place - who, in addition to the nation state, have access to political power, or had such power. This does not necessarily imply that such political power bases constitute an immediate threat to the nation state as a dominant political institution, In a rapidly changing political environment, however, such a scenario cannot be ignored, especially inasmuch as this scenario includes at least some of the developing states of the world, Although the crisis is not limited to developing states, the situation varies from one state to the next, and one situation to the next, and generalizations have to be avoided, From a historical perspective, political structures responsible for the authoritative allocation of values/decisions vatied significantly from one period to the next. A ‘potpourri of political institutions rather than a standardized nation-state concept may be ‘presented as the more accurate version of the historically valid norm (Van Creveld, 1991; 192). A conclusion that one may arrive at from this perspective, is that the phase citt \POL! 822 ET ‘of radical change that world politics has currently entered, does not only imply a re- alignment of nation states worldwide, but most probably the transformation of contemporary state systems with the nation state as the most important building block. ‘This deduction can be placed in perspective through a reconstruction of some indicators of political change. 3 INDICATORS OF POLITICAL CHANGE As 2 result of the exploratory nature of this study, a number of indicators that pose a threat, or may constitute a threat in some or other way to the dominant position of the ration state in future, are identified. Issues that are isolated for attention are post- industrial tendericies, a changing military-strategic environment, tendencies of political decay and anarchy, scarcity and escalating conflicts. 3.1 Post-industrial tendencies From his trilogy of works, Future Shock (1970), Third Wave (1980), and especially" Power Shift - Imowledge, wealth and violence at the edge of the 21" century (1991), Toffler formulates several perspectives, presented as scenarios, on the society of tomorrow. Some thoughts pertaining to the political dimensions of society are outlined below. ‘A central perspective in the thinking of Tofiler (1991: 12-22) is that violence, wealth and knowledge (in @ mutual interaction with one another) are core determinants that shape human relationships, as well as the structures that develop from such relationships. During the agrarian phase of development, violence was a prominent detetminant in relation to the other two (Le. wealth and knowledge), while wealth was more decisive a factor during the industrial phase. However, the post-industrial phase (the society of tomorrow?) will be driven by knowledge as the most important determinant, with its implication of far-resching change and transformation of all the institutions of society (Toffler, 1991: 3-22). The agrarian phase took, 2s its political partner, structures of a feudal nature, while the industrial era was associated with the ination state, However, the political partner of the post-industrial phase (partners?) cannot be distinguished clearly. What is clear to Toffler (1991: 3) is that "... this is the dawn of the Powershift era. We live at a moment when the entire structure that held the PARRA AMARA RARER AAR AR AAA AAA ARAMA AARA RAIMA AMOHAa a 2 2 ® EY 2 2s a a 2 a 3 a a a a 2 a a a 3a POLI 822 ET world together is now disintegrating. A radically different structure of power is taking form, And this is happening at every level of human society”. Following the Baconian view that knowledge is associated with power, Toffler (1991: 8-11) points out that the information explosion of today has introduced a new era in the development of mankind, and the direct result has been changed social, economic and political power bases and new pattems of politico-economic interaction. The nature and scope of the information explosion becomes clear when it is considered that oxisting Jevels of knowledge double every 2,7 years, and that what we know at this ‘moment will make up 1% of the fsture pool of knowledge by 2030 (Muller, 1998: 7). Toffler's (1991: 15-16) view of a redistribution of knowledge also implies a redistribution of power ~ which includes political power. In these terms, the creators of wealth, typical of the industrial phase, will be replaced by the knowledge engineer of ‘the post-industrial era, The control of information is elevated to an instrument of political power, and this will have far-reaching implications for the nature of political institutions such as democracies, the nation state and even the system of states in general. The proletariat, associated with the theory of Marx (typical of the industrial phase), will be substituted, TofMler (1991: 26) by what Toffler (1991: 26) refers to as the “cognitariat". This implies a category of people in society who have access to both knowledge and the instruments of power that place them in authoritative positions and who are, therefore, responsible for the authoritative allocation of values. Change, more particularly radical change (associated with transformations), implies significant distuption and disequilibrium ~ especially in the field of politics, New identities - however these may be defined - are activated in the process of rapid change, Toffler (1991: 246) identifies at least four categories of actors in the politics of tomorrow, viz. globalists, nationalists, regionalists and Yocalists, Conflicting patterns of intefaction among these four categories will contribute to 2 situation where the structures in which the processes of politics are conducted, will be transformed radically. Toffler (1991: 465-466) argues as follows: "We are witnessing a significant shift of power from individuals or groups of nation-states 10 the Global Gladiators. The shift towards heterogeneity in the emerging world system will sharply intensify if giant nations splinter, as now seems eminently possible". The latter is illustrated in practicalPOLI 822 ET terms by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as well as tendencies of balkanization worldwide. For example, itis estimated that more than one third of all third-world states are threatened by secessionist movements (Palmer, 1989: 246). Large states, where disintegration is envisaged, include China and Brazil (Toffler, 1993: 281-290), Even the future of the USA is presented by Toffler (1991: 246-247) as a nation state that should be subsumed by a umber of city-states. Kaplan (1997: 22-24) supports Toffler's perspective and points out that Mexico should initially break up into three parts, namely, "Mex-America" in the north, with an orientation towards the First World and the USA; "Mex-Central America", with a Latin-American orientation; and Mexico City, which should continue to exist as a city state. On the long term, an even more radical balkanization of Mexico is envisaged [Compare Kaplan, 1997: 21-31 for full details). Aspects of a new political order that are highlighted by Toffler (1991: 371-387, 466) for further attention, include, the notion that the philosophy of the secular state is in a state of crisis and that the process of change will be accompanied by disequilibrium, conflict, violence and even wat. The implication of the Toflerian pattern of thinking, politically speaking, is that the nation state, rooted philosophically in secularism, will find itself increasingly in an environment of increasing conflict and violence, and in its current form, will not assume the position of the political institution of the future insofar as the authoritative allocation of values is concerned. This perspective ties in with Huntington's perspective which holds that civilizations rather than nation states will be responsible for escalating conflicts, and that this is in a certain sense already the case.* ‘Toffler (1991), however, is not rigid at all in his projections. In fuct, it is emphasized ‘that unsuccessful transformation from an industial to a post-industrial order (a possibility that cannot be eliminated in all respects) could- result in a regressive ‘movement into what may be typified as "11" century darkness”. The core aspects of the ‘Tofflerian pattern of thought entail the following: ‘* Post-industrial economic forces are at the heart of political transformation. 5 Ta pection 3.5 ofthis conbibution, a detailed outline is provided of Huntington's view. € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € & « € € € € € & & € € € € & €eee eee 2 2 a a 2 3 a a a a a a ) a » a > 3 POLI 822 ET 10 ‘+ The nation state as a political institution is increasingly becoming redundant as the institution that provides a frame of reference for the organization or mobilization of political support. ‘+ The secular basis from which the nation state develops, is going to be replaced by other premises for the organization and mobilization oF support, for example, premises of an economic and a fundamentalist nature. + The nation state as a standardized political institution is going to be replaced (and thas partially been replaced) by a larger number, as well as a variety (potpourti) of political actors. ‘The "11" century darkness" referred to as a possibility carlier, continues to suggest a Janger mumber and variety of actors, as well as escalating patterns of conflict (Toffler 1991: 385-387). The possibility of a retogressive "power-shift” with far-reaching implications for the idea of @ nation state may also be placed in perspective fiom a ‘miilitary-strategic angle. 3.2 Achanged military-strategic environment In hiis work, The transformation of war, Van Creveld (1991) points out that the ‘modern nation state, as the dominant political institution of our time, and the avcompanying system of states that has evolved since 1648 with the Peace of ‘Westphalia, will increasingly sink into crisis. In essence, this crisis is concerned with ‘the inability of states to guarantee the safety of their citizens, Guerilla actions, terrorism ‘end sabotage as sub-components of low-intensity wars, will leave the security mechanisms of the state in a vulnerable position with regard to the most basic function of the state, namely, the maintenance of order, stability and safety. It is in particular the states in the developing world, where eighty percent of the world population are found, and where the survival of the state, as the institution that has jurisdiction over, and the monopoly on power, is under serious threat. Of the almost 160 armed conflicts that heve atisen since the Second World War, approximately 75% have been low-intensity wars (Van Creveld, 1991: 20). Although the phenomenon of low-intensity wars is prominent in the so-called developing world, it is however beginning to impact on the developedPOLI 822 ET world ina scenario of increasing instability, accompanied by a threat to the nation state ~ so nmuch so, that the threat will be carried to the core of our civilization, A central concern in the thinking of Van Creveld (1991) is the view that conventional warfare (Trinitarian war) has become redundant as a modus operandi, and that it is increasingly being replaced by what can be typified es a “non-Trinitarian Wer" (Van Creveld, 1991: 49-62). Van Creveld (1991: 33-62) is particularly critical towards the ‘Clausewi idiom of total warfare (Trinitarian War). Clausewitz's point of departure that war is an extension of politics using other means (organized violence), is rejected by Van Creveld (1991: 33-62). Indeed, he argues that Clansewitz's notion that the nation state, as a dominant political institution of our time, which, in.a conventional sense, will Jaunch an organized war effort against other states (similar entities) if required, is an antiquated and invalid point of departure considering what is happening in large parts of the world, and what will increasingly be the case globally, Given the gradual decay of the nation-state concept in international politics, it is argued in this school of thought, that conventional warfare will gradually disappear from the scene. Van Creveld (1991: 52) states that "... to speak of war in modern Cleusewitzian terms as something made by the state for political ends is to misrepresent reality. For thousands of years after the fall of Rome, armed conflict was waged by different kinds of social entities, ‘Among them were barbarian tribes, the Church, feudal barons of every rank, free cities, even private individuals", A dispensation, comparable with what preceded the nation- state dispensation, but in the context of a changing socio-political milieu and with different military ethics, Van Creveld claims (1991; 52), is the scenario that could replace the current system, and which has indeed already replaced it in part. The Clausowitzian idiom that the modem nation state provides the political basis from which we may gain an understanding of war and types of warfare, is questioned by Van Creveld (1991: ix, 35-49, 49462). Van Creveld (1991: 49) points out that within the Clauzewitzian perspective, it is neither people, nor armies, but governments of nation states that are responsible for war and warfare, This type of warfare (ceferred to as Trinitarian Wer) is, however, foreign to most people in the world - the same people for whom the nation state is also largely an unknown entity.* + ‘Thistendency, which is also refered tos the "weak-sate concept” is dealt with n greater detain Setion ae) ‘of the text, Where governments cn no longer exercise social contol over parts ofthe popnaton, the decision. 10 MW € € € € € € € € € € € & € € & € € € € € € € € & € € € & € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € eCUBE UCOV UU eee eee OVOvCoecoouoeuuUoubeue eee POLI 822 ET In contrast to:the nation-state concept, which has had prominence only since 1648 in sworld politics, low-intensity wars are much older, and for that reason, better known to larger segments of the world population, The nation-state concept is indeed embedded ‘in a Western culture and tradition, which is foreign to the majority of inhabitants of the developing world - especially those in sub-Sehara Aftica. Although the phenomenon of low-intensity war has a greater impact on the so-called "developing states", it has the capacity to cause the collapse of the most powerful states, Van Creveld (1991: 192) even points out that "(a)s the second millenium A.D. is coming to an end, the state's attempt to monopolize violence in its own hands is faltering. Brought fice to face with ‘the threat of terrorism, the largest and mightiest empires that the world has-ever known, have suddenly begun falling into each other's arms. Should present trends continue, then, the kind of war that is based on the division between government, army, and people seems to be on its way out, The rise of low-intensity conflict may, unless it can be quickly contained, end up destroying the state. Over the long run the place of the state" will be taken by war-making organizations of a different type". Some of the most important conclusions presented by Van Creveld (1991) portaining to the crisis of the nation-state idea, can be summarized as follows: + The nation state and its "military partner" (conventional warfare) are under threat, ‘worldwide, as the politcal actors who are responsible for the authoritative allocation of valves, + Loveintensity wars may be seen as the instrument which undermines the nation state, and they are - and will continue to be - responsible for the radical transformation of prominent political structures, * Warfare is going to be transformed from “civilized” to “uncivilized”, with the implication that a changed military-ethical code, and therefore another modus operandi, will be in place. ‘making competence about who engages in wer, aginst whom, witen tnd how, will become the prerogative of sosiepolitcal insititions rer than the nation tte, esPOLI 822 ET + The new militery-ethical code and the accompanying modus operandi may be linked to the military tradition and culture of majority of people worldwide (low-intensity wars). '» The nation’ state and the culture and tradition associated with such states, are ‘Western monuments that can only be retained, on the long term, with much Jifficulty; indeed, they are destined for the scrap-heap. * Low-intensity wars, as instrument of political change, will not result in a disintegration of nation states at the same rate in all setings. ‘+ Low-intensity wars are elevated to a political survival strategy in their own right. To 2 nutshell, ‘Van Creveld (1991:225) presents a scenario of the future in which he views the nation-state idea as follows: "Extensive conflict of this nature will cause existing distinctions between government, armed forces, and people to break down. National sovereignties are already being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state’s monopoly over armed. violence. Armies will be replaced by police- Tike security forces on the one hand, and bands of ruffians on the other, not that the difference is always clear even today. National frontiers, that at present constitute perhaps the greatest single obstacle to combating low-intensity conflict, may be ‘obliterated or else become meaningless as rival organizations chase each other across ‘them. As frontiers go, so will territorial states,” ‘The perspectives presented by Van Creveld (1991) show important similarities with those theorists who emphasize the importance of an ever-expanding anarchy and chaos that pose a threat to the nation state, 33 Tendencies of political decay and anarchy Recently, 2 prominent expert on Aftica made the following observation st-a Congress in Johannesburg: “Africa is in the strangle-hold of degeneration and decay. Even the measure of dependent modernization that was achieved under colonial rule, is being 12 AAO MANA OAM ANA ANAM ANAAAAA NASPOLI 822 ET reversed, The successive collapse of one African country to the next in the nineties indicates a previously unthinkable solution: Re-colonization." (translated Yssel, 1996: 7), This crisis seems to be so serious in at least some states that "re-colonization™ += the most unthinkable solution - is propagated by some, including a black expert from Aftica (Ali Mazmui) States where tendencies of political decay and anarchy are present, include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda and ‘Somalia - to name but a few. The recent crisis in Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the so-called large Jakes area, where large-scale political instability and ethnic conflict are rife, has already led to the uprooting of more than a million people, and can be adjudged to be a situation ‘where an ever-widening anarchy or implosion is evident. Although prominent on the ‘African continent, conditions of political decay and anarchy are not limited to this part of the world - they are also evident in states such as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Peru and Columbia (Van Creveld, 1991: 204). Working from a similar preniise as Van Creveld (1991), but with the focus of attention on West Affica, Kaplan points out in his article The coming anarchy (1994: 44-76) that the conditions of ever-widening anarchy do not only pose a threst to Affica and parts of the Third World, but aiso to the developed world. Kaplan (1994: 45-76) contends that world politics is on the eve of radical change where the basis of a new ‘order (chaos?) will be determined outside the centres of Western politics. Conditions such as rapid population growth, the incidence of serious diseases that take on epidemic proportions, unchecked criminality, scarcity of resources, the migration of populations, the presence of private armies, and the activites of drug cartels, will force West Africa, ‘but also other parts of the world, to sink into a quagmire of chaos and anarchy (cf. Kaplan, 1994: 45-76). For example, it is calculated that 95% of the world’s population growth from aow until 2025 will occur in the Thitd World (cutrently 78% of the world population) (Scholtz & Scholtz, 1996: 55; Kaplan, 1994: 72-73), As far as Aftica is concerned, the continent with the highest population growth, numbers doubled between 1960 and 1986 from 290 million to 580 million, and a total of 1 billion will be exceeded by the year 2008 if current growth rates.are maintained (Esterhuysen, 1995/6: 16). By 1990, the population of Latin America and the Caribbean area was estimated at 430 tillion, and the expectation is that this umber wit! double in the next 25 years (Millan & Mortis, 1990: 31). The well-known historian, Paul Kennedy (1987: 34), summarizes PSCSSVSSCSVUVOREGUSSOUSHEUSVEHUEBDOYVESEUBEUEES 13CE eee eet POLI 822 ET the political implications of population explosions as a historical phenomenon in the following words: "Behind many well-known historical upheavals = the outward thrust of the Vikings, the expansion of Elizabethan England, the French ‘Revolution, Wilhelmine Weltpolitik, the turbulences that rack central America and the Middle East today - the societies involved were experiencing population explosions and often having difficulties in absorbing increasing mmbers of energetic young men. Sometimes the unfulfilled expectations of e new generation exploded into violence and revolution. In other instances, those energies were diverted by nimble and ambitious political Jeaders into foreign adventures and conquests," ‘The current population explosion that is about o confiont us will be felt far beyond the borders of the developing world. Indeed, it is impossible for South Afica to be ‘unaffected by demographic tendencies in the rest of Aftica - likewise, established nation states (read Wester states) will be unable to isolate themselves fiom the impact of these tendencies, In France, there were already 3,6 million refugees by 1994, and they represented 6,3% of the population, OF these, half were from Aftica, By 1993, 8.5% of the German population were foreigners, of whom 1,9 million were seeking asylum (Scholtz. & Scholtz, 1996: 55) In the USA, 40 of the largest cites already have ‘ population composition where + 10% are of Latin-American origin (Millan & Monti, 1990: 32-33). It is estimated that ‘by 2025 the ‘Spanish-speaking population will be the largest minority in the USA (Sunter, 1992:45). In spite of attempts in the developed ‘world to terminate illegal migrations, the tendency is that there will be an increase rather than a decrease, and of course migration is ofien exploited as a viable business opportunity (Compare Sunter, 1992: 48). The once hard, rigid and impenetrable borders of states are therefore beginning to show a greater permeability. It is a tendency that seems to be evident worldwide. At the heart of this tendency (especially in parts of the developing world, but with enormous implications for the developed world), some grey ‘eas are emerging in which the authoritative allocation of values is becoming an ever- increasing problem. Tm this way, power vacuums arise that have to be filled by institutions other than the nation state, and in some areas these have indecd been filled tong ago. 16 TANT T ANAT ner een cenmnennSCSCSCSESSSCCCSCSCOSSSSSSTCSETCCES TEC SEE EUSEEELGEES POLI 822 ET Circumstances that include escalating conflicts, unchecked population growth and ‘changed migration patterns, a systematic collapse of socio-economic circumstances in ever-expanding parts of the world, are at the heart of conditions of ever-widening, anarchy, which do not only pose a threat to states in the developing world, but also to the community of nations in general.® Tendencies of political decay are promoted by ‘what is referted to as the scarcity factor (limited resources). 3.4. Limited resources ‘The determinant of limited resources is increasingly noted as @ potential threat to ‘national and international security. Authors, among others, Brown, Gleick, Lipschuts, Holdren and-Myers, emphasize the potential consequences that limited resources may exert on world polities. In his pioneering work, On the threshold: environmental changes as causes of acute conflict, Homer-Dixon (1991: 76-116) points out the reality of political conflict and politicl instability as an extension of limited resources. Homer- Dixon (1991: 76-116) even goes so far as to emphasize that scarcity rather than ideological reasons may become the most impostant cause of political conflict and political instability. Homer-Dixon (1991: 78) points out further that environmentally dominated conflict may be the direct result of *... a range of atmospheric, terrestrial and aquatic environmental pressures (that) will in time produce either singly or in combination, four main, causally interrelated social effects: reduced agricultural production, economic decline, population displacement, and the disruption of regular and legitimized social relations". To gain an understanding of the rationale behind the thinking of Homer-Dixon and others, # concise reconstruction of what is going on in the field of the environment is important because these factors will place the issue of ‘imited resources and the political implications for nation states in perspective as some ‘of the most significant tendencies. Currently the world population is estimated at 6 billion, with » projected increase of 1 ‘billion in the next 12 years if the current growth rate remains constant (Sunter 1992: 28- 29), Furthermore, projections indicate that by the end of the 21* century, the world total will be approximately 11 billion, if current growth rates are maintained (Palmer, 1989: 83; Homer-Dixon, 1991: 102; Sunter, 1992: 28-29). If it is considered that 3 © ‘Compare Kaplan (1994: 44-76) fora comprehensive cutine, 15 16POL! 822 ET babies are bom every second, while in the same second 1 acre of tropical forest is destroyed; 500 tons of greenhouse gases ate released into the atmosphere; 800 tons of top soi, fertilizer and poisons are released into the ocean, and almost 10 species of fauna and flora are destroyed, one cannot but conclude that this is a crisis of ever widening proportions (Compare Sunter 1992: 39-40). Since 1945, 1,2 billion hectares of soil have been degraded in some or other way for various reasons, It entails 10,5% of the soil surface of the world (Sumter, 1992: 40), Between 2 and 3 million hectares of arable soil are lost annually as a result of soil erosion, 4-6 million hectares as a result of urbanization and 1 million hectares as a result of increased salt levels in the soil ‘(Homer-Dixon, 1991: 93-94), It is calculated that between 1985 and the year 2000, a hundred million hectares of soil were lost due to the factors referred to above (Homer- Dixon, 1991: 93-94). However, the impact of environmental destruction, and what may be described as “human induced environmental pressures” (Homer-Dixon, 1991: 76) on the African continent, deserves special attention, Desertification has led to 50% of the continent currently qualifying as desert areas, and up to 300 million people's lives are affected by this phenomenon, The Sahara desert alone grows at an estimated 250 000 acres (@ 107 000 hectares) annually (Lamb, 1987: 7). Moreover, Affica loses as much as 3,5 million hectares of natural forest annually, while the destruction of the rain forests is ‘also taking on disturbing dimensions. With independence in 1961, up to 60% of Sierra Leone's rain forests were untouched, as opposed 10 6% today. In the Ivory Coast, the percentage for the same period declined from 38% to 8% (Kaplan, 1994: 48), In 1994, 54% of the Aftican population (380 million) had inadequate access to “safe water” ‘Against the background of the current population growth on the continent, the availability of water, calculated per capita, will dectine to half that figure in the next 25, years (Novicki, 1997: 22). With an escalating water shortage, it can be expected that the more than 300 water areas worldwide, which are utilized by more than one state, may become the cause of political conflict: States such as Reypt, Mauritania, Botswana, Gambia, Sudan, Niger and Senegal are examples of states that are dependent on water areas that form borders, or that have their origins outside the various territories of these states, Novicki (1997: 22) summarizes the implications of water scarcities as follows: “Dwindling water supplies of lower quality, and ever-higher costs, also will constrain 16 mm PPAR PRMER RAM ARAM R RAR A AMP MANO MNP ANAM ANAK NASneil e@sbueeesoudduls PEVPSCSUSESUSESEDESE SES SEY POLI 822 ET food production and increase environmental degradation - and may possibly result in conflict, among users within countries and across borders." From the preceding information, itis clear that limited resources (with reference to affected areas, but with e worldwide impact) should have an ever-increasing influence on world politics, and could possibly become the factor that lies at the root of the majority of political conflicts of the future. Conflicts such as those between Iraq and Kuwait over oil reserves, Egypt and Sudan's conflict over the waters of the Nile, and the battle between Namibia and Botswana over the waters of the Okavango delta are only some of the conflicts that have arisen as a result of this factor. Even internal instability in a state such as Zimbabwe can be attributed to limited resources. The recent illegal ‘occupation of commercial farms in Matabeleland (in Zimbabwe) by the landless, can be interpreted as symptomatic of searcity which, in turn, contributes to the collapse of law and order ~ a pattern which is certainly not unique to Zimbabwe. The conclusion ‘Homer-Dixon (1991: 104-113) arrives at, is that "(hese (environmentally dominated) pressures might overwhelm the management capacity of institutions in developing, countries, inducing praetorianism or widespread social disintegration ... The regimes that do gain power in the face of such disruption are likely to be extremist, authoritarian and abusive of human rights", The implications of limited resources as 4 result of, among others, environmental destruction may lead to a situation in the affected ‘area where: ‘© Political conflicts and instability will increase as a result of limited resources. © In an attempt to maintain order, stability and security under rapidly deteriorating circumstances, demovratic dispensations ‘will increasingly be replaced by non- democratic dispensations. '* States, especially in developing countries, will find it increasingly difficult to fulfil their primary function in an environment of increasing scarcity (i.e. the maintenance of order, stability and security). 7POLI 822 ET ‘* In conjunction with other factors, the survival of nation states - at Teast in some parts of the world - will be threatened by the reality of limited resources. The reality of escalating conflicts appears to be a further factor that elucidates the crisis of the nation state in the current circumstances. 3.5 — Escalating conflicts ‘Almost all futurologists (or those who are active in the field) have consensus on this aspect, namely, the reality of escalating political conflict and political instability (Compare Toffler, 1991: 382-387, 457-458; Van Creveld, 1991:1-32; Kaplan, 1994: 44-76 and Homer-Dixon, 1991: 76-116). Indeed, various and often divergent causes of these escalating pattems of conflict are proposed. For example, Toffler emphasizes economic factors, Homer-Dixon scarcity, and Kaplan a combination of factors that precipitate conflict and political decay. In a comentious article, The dash of civilizations, and a subsequent commentary, If not civilizations - what?, Huntington (1993: 22-49; 1993a: 186-194) emphusizes that the so-called Cold War paradigm, founded on the premise that political conflict had an ideological basis, and that the paradigm was going to be replaced, or had partially already been replaced, could be interpreted from the point of view of the paradigm of conflicting civilizations. [The term civilization basically implies a cultural identity, or in the words of Huntington (1993: 24): *... the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species...” Language, history, faith, customs, habits and institutions are unique within each civilization] Prominent civilizations of our time include the Western, the Confucian, ‘the Japanese, Islam, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox and Latin-American civilizations.” Within the civilization paradigm, conflict has acquired a cultural (anthropological), religious and even fundamentalist (civilization-based) character. The premise adopted bby Huntington (1993; 22) in this regard is that "(T)he great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. The clash of civilizations will “Huntingen (1993: 25) is uncertain about Atces position as civilization becauoe, in terms of Bis definition, it oes not guaify fal. 18 19 AAA MOAB AMA RAR AMARA AMAA MMA RAM REM Ame PMMA Re ee3 POLI 822 ET dominate global politics, The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future." Since the Peace of Westphalia, political conflicts have arisen within Westem civilization. Civil wars, wars among nation states and ideological conflicts. within ‘Wester civilization may be cited as examples here (compare Huntington, 1993; 23), However, the focus now shifts to conflicts between civilizations, at a micro-level on the ‘one hand where the spheres of influence come into contact, and on the other band, at a ‘macro-level between nation states that mobilize political, economic and military power against each other (Huntington, 1993: 29). The causes of escalating conflicts between civilizations include deep-seated differences among peopile that are manifested in terms ‘of culture and contact is implied; « reaction against Westem values in general; the immutability of culture and the values of civilization; and larger regionalism as a worldwide phenomenon (Huntington, 1993: 25-25). ization; a world that is becoming forever smaller where increasing ‘Huntington (1993:29) emphasizes that "@he fault lines between civilizations are replacing the political and ideological boundaries of the Cold War as the flash points for crisis and bloodshed."* The important point that has to be made about these fauit lines is that they do not necessarily take the borders of states into account. Indeed, the reverse is often the norm. In many cases, the fault lines divide nation states such as Ukraine, Rumania, Bella-Rus and the former Yugoslavia in terms of Westem-Christian values of civilization on the one hand, and Orthodox-Christian and/or the values of Muslim civilization on the other (Huntington, 1993: 29-30). Other states that are affected by the various fault fines, include, among others, Turkey (Wester vs Muslim), Mexico (Latin American vs Western), Lebanon (Christian-Western vs Muslim), Nigeria (Chri Aftican vs Muslim), and India (Hindu vs Muslim), Other manifestations of ci ‘based conflicts are found in the battle between the West and Western-orientated states (Saudi-Atabia and Kuwait) on the one hand, and the Muslim-orientated Middle Hast (ran, Iraq, Jordan, and others) on the other; the conflict between Orthodox influences and Muslims in the Horn of Affica, and even the economic war between Japan and the ization- + ‘Compare Huntington (1993:29-35) for information on the idcaifiaton of fault ines as the focel point uf politcal coulict 19SESE EEE EH EE eH EE Eee ete Ht POLI 822 ET wu U.S.A. Conflicts often have the tendency to draw other important actors into the fray, leads to “civilization rallying" which Huntington (1993: 35-39) also refers to do the " country syndrome". In this way, the values of the civilization, and often the amorphous sphere of influence of civilizations, provide a new basis for the organization and the mobilization of political support that does not coincide with the more stereotypical boundaries of states which demarcated conflict zones in the past. The mobilization of ‘Arabic and Islam is support against a possible American military attack against Iraq should be viewed against this background. Like Van Creveld (1991), Huntington (1993: 23-24) points out that "(W)esterners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in global affairs, They have been that, however, for only a few centuries." Huntington (1993: 23-24) further points out that “(be broader reaches of human history have been the history of civilizations". His perspective that Westem civilization cannot always have supremacy, and thet the nation state is @ product of this civilization, signifies a smaller sphere of influence for this civilization, and moreover, a limited ‘growth base for the nation state whose political roots are firmly embedded in the West. The disintegration of nation states on the periphery of Wester civilization, as pointed out by Van Creveld and Kaplan, may therefore also be explained from Huntington's perspective, In spite of the above-mentioned perspective, Huntington (1993: 48-49) nonetheless ‘points out that the nation state remains the most important actor in world politics, but that its importance will diminish, and that several states may become the victims of ® ® » ® . ® » * 3 ® 2 | POL! 822 ET groups and other conflicting interest groups. What is indeed true is that such conflicts develop inter-state dimensions, which explains several conflicts in Central, West and ‘Southern Affica at the moment and in the past. For example, Mathews (1997: 51) points ‘out that of the 100 armed conflicts that occurred since 1989 in world politics, with very few exceptions, all of them were intra-state conflicts, At the root of these conflicts, there is often something other than national identities, as they tended to mobilize, in-a conventional sense, in accordance with the pattern in Western Europe since 1648. It is against this background, and in accordance with Van Creveld (1991), that Kaplan (1994: 46) interprets conditions in West Affica as “(a) pre-modem formlessness (that) governs the battlefield, evoking the wars in modioval Europe prior to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ushered in the era of organized nation states". In large parts of the ‘world, the image of the “weak state" is beginning to predominate over the notion of the “strong state". 4.3 The weak-state syndrome In contrast t0 strong states, weak states display a limited capacity, and often an incapacity to enforce the rules of the political game, as well as to become the institution responsible for the authoritative allocation of values and scarce resources. Here Migdal (1988: 4) refers to this as an incapacity to exercise social control in the political domain. Inadequate social control signifies an incapacity to penetrate society, to regulate social relations within society, to exploit human and natural resources and to ulilize them efficiently. The inability of the state to assign values authoritatively leaves: scope for other political entities to take over the fiction of social control. The result is that support is organized and mobilized in terms of polifical power bases that assign values in conflict with the state. Migdal (1988: 40) refers to this tendency in the following words: "Where an environment of conflict persists, states have been at loggerheads with kinship and ethnic groups and others, Each has struggled to establish the currency of social control in what its leaders consider its domain; each has offered the wherewithal for people's strategies of survival. In many cases, web-like societies have survived with social control dispersed among vatious social organizations having their own rules, rather then centralized in the state or organizations authorized by the state." This state of affairs is prominent in large parts of the developing world, with specific reference to Africa, parts of Asia and Latin America, where, in the words of S.P. Huntington 23POLI 822 ET 25 (1968: 2, 28), "Governments simply do no govern", Moreover, he argues: *The function of a government js to gover, A weak government, a goverment which lacks authority, fails to perform its function and is immoral in the same sense in which @ comupt judge, a cowardly soldier, or an ignorant teacher is immoral”. The weak-state syndrome, on the ‘one hand, and the development of political power bases that are related’ to post- industrial and other tendencies, on the other hand, are responsible for competing ‘political power bases that pose a threat to the dominant position of the nation state as a political institution, 4.4 Competitive political power bases “The era in which the nation state has had the sole authority in the allocation of values and scarce resources seems, increasingly, to belong to the past (if it Had indeed ever fully existed at all). It is not suggested that nation states cease to exist, but only that a multitude of actors are involved in assigning values and scarce resources in their ovm ‘Tight so that they may obtain political status. Although the above-mentioned aspect is ‘not at all a new tendency, the nature of political competition, which is derived from non-state origins, has undoubtedly escalated sharply. Political competition that derives fiom the "global gladiators", political power bases that develop around ethnic and ‘minority interests, and institutions with a criminal background, are some of the relevant examples in this context. For example, Toffler (1993: 321-322) points out that currently there are +3500 trans-national corporations that have approximately 150.000 affiliates, Worldwide, these corporations are engaged in allocating values and scarce resources in their own right to the extent that trans-national companies in alliances with city and regional authorities, are regarded as the political actors of the future. The presence of ethnic and minority groups, which inhibits the nation state’s authoritative allocation of values (the so-called weak-state syndrome), is the norm in the developing world rather than the exception, as indicated earlier. The existence of a trans-national company such as Executive Outcomes (EO), a company which makes available, among others, military force for pay to its clients, has already been responsible for military operations in Angola, Papua New-Guinea and Sierra Leone. EO regards itself as a Execntive Ontcomes was fomded as n South Afizan company in 1989, and began to operteinternstionally ‘since 1991. Activites associated with EO include: the traning of militry, ateligenve and security personnel ca ‘demand; advice in terms of military, inteligence, security and criminel eases, end miltery operations es ‘mentioned, The activites ofthe company are contentions, ands far as possible, they ane coaduarted in secret. 24 a Pe oe ae ee het ee a ert c |Jie & SUwO Ee POLI 822 ET professional, cost-effective force that handles conflict and conflict situations for pay on behalf of its clients (who are often nation states, but not necessarily so), without political-ideological preferences. In this sense, EO may be seen as a trans-national company that allocates values (mostly issues that pertain to order, stability and safety) in an authoritative sense so that they may gain political status, EO validates the views of Van Creveld (1991: 192) who states that "war making organizations of a different type" (mercenaries) will increasingly become involved in the political domain. Furthermore, criminal institutions, which have a trans-national character, are increasingly gaining a foothold in world politics, and they allocate values in their own right, In contrast to several nation sietes’ inability to adapt to a post-industrial era, criminal institutions have already made the necessery adjustments in a pro-active sense, ‘which allows them to exploit the rapidly changing environment. In several states of the ‘world, cartels, syndicates and organizations with criminal ims find themselves in an almost untouchable situation with regard to the authoritative allocation of values and scarce resources, For example, Jamieson (1990: 4) provides an outline of the trade in drugs as the most profitable and truly trans-national economic activity in the world “Apart from the arms trade, the drug trade is the largest economic activity in the world; indeed, 2 conservative estimate is that this trade represents approximately 500 billion dollars annually (Jamieson, 1990: 4, 23), For example, Latin-American states, including Peru, Bolivia and Columbia, whose economies are becoming increasingly dependent on the export of drugs as a source of foreign currency. In Bolivia, the export of cocaine has reached 0,9 ~ 1,2 billion dollars, 1,5 -4 billion dotlars in Columbia, and 1 - 1,8 billion dollars in Peru, This trade is 19-23%, 4-10 % and 2,5-4,6% of the Gross National Product of these states respectively (Jamieson, 1990: 16, 18), In Columbia, the contliot ‘between those maintaining public law and order end the drug cartels in the eighties led tothe deaths of 50 judges, and between 1985 and 1990, no fewer than 2011 members of the police were ‘killed in actions against the drug cartels (Jamieson 1990: 16). Calculations indicate that 70% of all merijuane and cocaine reach the USA via Mexico, with an estimated value of 30 billion dollars (Kaplan, 1997: 22). Kaplan (1997: 22) goes so far as to say that "(drugs constitute the economic subsoil of Mexico ~ the subterranean part of North American free trade that doesn’t require treaties or ‘congressional approval". Even within the USA, currently the most powerful state in thePOLI 822 ET world, 24 Mafia families recently had an estimated 60 billion dollar profit mergin annually (Sunter, 1992: 39). In terms of the earlier definitions of politics, we are undoubtedly concemed here with competing political power bases, nationally and internationally, whose sphere of influence will be restricted, with great difficulty, by a system of nation states. In fact, in extreme cases, the state is taken hostage, as happened in the case of some Latin- American states and parts of Aitica that were referred to earlier ~ a tendency that is on the increase, Seen in general, the rising competitive power bases, however they are defined, are sucessful at the authoritative allocation of values with far-reaching implications for the nation state as a dominant political institution. Competing power bases often succeed in providing survival strategies to segments of the population who are in direct conflict with the state's attempts to maintain a public legal order ina political sense. 4.5 Politics as. a survival strategy It was pointed out earlier that the ability of political actors to successfully allocate values and scarce resources in an authoritative sense, provides a direct indication of a political capacity to maintain a survival strategy. For some centuries at least, the nation state has had the capacity to ensure survival for a significant mumber of people, especially in the so-called Westem world, because the nation state was able to accommodate political needs that were related to the search for order, stability and security in a structural sense, Changed circumstances, precipitated by a multitude of factors (that were outlined previously), currently place enormous pressure, worldwide, on nation states as the political actors who have to maintain political survival on their ‘own. Changing needs and the inability of particular nation states to deal with these needs will bring new political actors 10 the fore who are able, at least partially, to address the political needs of segments of the citizens. New actors, however they are defined, increasingly succeed in establishing and maintaining survival strategies at the cost of nation states, The greater the inability of nation states, the greater the number of ‘new ectors who enter into the political game. The nature and form taken by the new actors will vary from one situation to the next - indeed they may assume a multinde of forms, as Toffler (1991: 457-458) has pointed out. The inability of a single actor to 26; 3 3 3 > a ww SoU POLI 822 ET atthoritatively assign values and scarce resources signifies that the individual's needs, in 4 political sense, can be guaranteed only through # number of institutions rather than a single institution, In future, this tendeney may become the norm rather than the exception, until such time that a particular actor proves himself to be supreme ~ which ‘underlies the Jaw of political survival. As, and when, nation states Tose their dominant position and power vacuums are filled by other political actors, this tendency will indeed increase. Against this background, it appears that the salvation of citizens is often seated in concluding political contracts with a multitude of (sometimes conflicting) eetors so that political survival may be ensured ina changed environment. 5, THENATION STATE IDEA IN THE 21ST CENTURY Insofar as the future of the nation state is concerned, the following issues may be highlighted: «A multitude of factors, sometimes a combination of them, undermine the nation state as the central building block of contemporary international politics. «The worldwide disintegration of nation states will not take place on the same scale or at the same rate. «The disintegration of nation states is sometimes associated with great disequilibrium sand instability. © ‘Nation states will continue to be the most important political actors in world polities in the near future; however, the importance of this institution will decline rather than increase. ‘« The organization and mobilization of support (with a view to control the allocation of values and searce resources) will be performed in future by a pluralism of actors rather than a monism (the standardized nation-state concept). 7POLI 822 ET aA © “Increasingly, various nation states are going to be degraded where these states become one among many institutions competing with one another in maintaining political survival strategies. » Nation states will not disintegrate with the same ease; however, the demands that emanate from a changed envitonment will at least give new political content to existing structures. ‘¢ Nation states could be transformed in future into one or more of the following: weak states, strong states, “virtual states" and non-funetional units. (@). Weak states: This category of slate was considered in an earlier section, and signifies « timited ability and even an inability to authoritatively assign values and scarce resources. In an environment of conflict and even violent confrontation with competing political power bases, weak states do not succeed in making authoritative allocations in terms of the above-mentioned factors. Tis corrently the case in various developing states, Migdal claims (1988: 206-237), where the weakstate syndrome is dominated by @ political strategy in which influential persons (politicians) are manoeuvred to restrict growing political power bases in which non-mert-based appointments are the order of the day, political dirty tricks are allowed to occur quite openly, administrative activities are fully politicized, and comuption and malpractices are rife. Seen in the ‘extreme, conditions associated with political implosions tay emenate from the situation, ani the survival of the state may be under threat. In this regard, states such as Sierra Leone, Somalia and even Rwanda may serve as examples of weak states that Sind themselves on the brink of total collapse, In circumstances Jike these, the polities of chaos is practised, and in terms of Van Creveld (1991), one may refer to low-intensity warfare, which, under conditions of extreme politcal Auidity, may become a survival strategy in its own tight (political anarchy). (b) Strong states: Unlike weak states, strong states succeed in developing mechanisms of social control that show a capacity to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, as well as exploit and apply human and natural resources in 2B tt—<“‘i‘COSOOCSCSCSCSCSCSCSoe 2 Qo a 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 a 2 a 2 i) a a 2 © POLI 822 ET 30 ‘goal-directed ways. Competing power bases are managed and regulated in terms cof sophisticated institutions that comply with the requirements of political institutionafization such as adaptability, complexity, autonomy, unity and coherence [Compare Huntington (1968: 8-23) for information on institutionalization]. High levels of institutionalization signify an ability t0 be able to act in the public interest, and fiom this base, the demands of political change may be addressed more successfully. Various Western states, including Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and Germany, may be placed in this category. Co-operative agreements and the development of political structures among strong states in regional and international context, such as the European Union, could serve as a guideline for political development, Balkanization, and its ‘accompanying reduction in the territory of the state and privatization of the state's task are also forces that may contribute to transformation in strong states, However, there is much foom for the undermining of the state, and political change should be introduced more incrementally and in a balanced manner. The ‘product of transformation may, in certain cases, be what has been proposed by some as the "Virtual State". “Virtual states": In contrast to the industrial era when territorial expansionism (colonization and imperialism) was (is) an important objective, the “virtual state", as a direct extension of post-industrialization, emphasizes smaller ond ‘more functional political units. Larger and better are redefined as smaller and more excellent. Indeed, terttorial expansionism is expensive, and territory is no Tonger rated asan affordable asset, Rosecrance (1996: 46, 47) refers to"... a state that has downsized its territotially-based production capability ... (and which) .. is reliant on mobile factors of production", Virtual states are per definition highly sophisticated, knowledge ‘intensive, economic in orientation, and responsible for marketing, financing, designs and research development, while ‘the production and manufacturing tines are seated elsewhere in the world. Rosecrance (1996: 51, $3) compaies the “virtual state” with a company that has fa management, but no "body" (manufacturing and production lines). Hong Kong (before it was incorporated into China), Singapore and Switzerland could serve as examples of "virtual states” ("head nations"), while a state such as China and 29@) POLI 822 ET 31 most probably other third-world states could develop as "body states’. [The latter category is primarily responsible for manufacturing and production] This view of "virtual states" is in line with Toffler's view of a greater pluralism of actors and, more specifically, the city-state concept that are often alluded to. ‘Non-functional units: This category of states refers to political entities, which were once legitimate, influential and functional, but which, as a result of ‘changed circumstances, have lost, or are in the process of losing that status. Examples of political entities, which could mot survive the test of the times, include great empires of the past, various former colonial empires and the former Soviet Union. Demands that emanate from a changed environment may contribute to a situation where political units have to be adapted, on a functional basis, so ‘that survival: strategies for citizens may be maintained. The balkanization of nation states in terms of smaller functional and sometimes cculture-bound units is an indication of this process, Privatization is an attempt to adapt on functional grounds, and implies that the state will fulfil'a more limited task against the background of an ever-increasing mumber of tasks that shift to the private sector (sometimes to global glediators), In this way, issues such as functionality and cost-cffectiveness may be addressed. This process does indeed assign greater power 10 “non-state institutions" in terms of the authoritative allocation of values. From this perspective, one may conclude thet larger ‘geographical units in particular, which experience problems in operating in functional terms, may become victims of change. In this regard, nation states -such as China, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, the USA and Canada are the exceptions. Small and effective - that js, the premise that applies to "virtuall states” - can be used as north for political development and as a counter-measure for inadequate ‘functionality, What is clear, is that the demand for greater functionality will rather increase than decline. 6. EVALUATION Entry into a new world order presupposes radical changes that have far-reaching implications for existing political structures, Even the nation-state concept, as it has developed since 1648 into a worldwide phenomenon, is included. Post-industrial 30WVevooUeeeeuUeuUeUUUY we veouvoe POLI 822 ET tendencies, a changed military-strategic environment, tendencies of political decay and anarchy, limited resources and escalating conflicts contribute to conditions that can be described as.a distorted political map, distorted battle zones, the weak-state syndrome, competing political power bases and different kinds of "political institutions” which Keep survival strategies in place. In general, the future is in the shadow of great disequilibrium and discontinuity in comparison with the relative continuity and equilibrium that characterized the Cold War phase in lange parts of the world. The equilibrium of power, as maintained by a system of nation states, is being replaced in ‘parts of the world by disequilibrium, which has birthed, rather painfully, various actors who allocate values and scarce resources in their own right in such a way that political survival strategies are established. The more unstable a system becomes, the greater the number of individuals, groups and even populations that are drawn into the process by the forces of change; moreover, they are in search of new survival strategies outside of ‘what nation states have to offer. ‘The forces of political change will contribute in ways consistent with these indicators towards yielding a future where standardization and uniformity will be replaced by ‘greater typicality aid uniqueness, A period of greater political Muidity is eminent, ‘namely, what Toffler (1991: 261) has described a "shifting centres of power", and ‘Kaplan (1994: 46) in his observations on parts of Aftica has referred to as "a premodern formlessness”. What is clear is that the fiture of certain parts of the world will be different from others. For example, where forces of political change in Western states prepare the terrain for the functional re-orientation of political structures (for example, virtual states) , tendencies of political decay in other parts may have exactly the ‘opposite effect. In general, the disintegration of political units will not take place at the same rate and seale, However, political change must be seen against the backdrop of disequilibrium and greater instability, characterized by an outeome of pluralism rather than a monism oP actors. The capacity of powerful states to deal with political change means that they are more Tikely than weak states to survive in an environment where the premium is incressingly placed on functionality 31BES EE eS In eee POLI 822 ET Ina political environment in which a muititude of forces contribute to political change, the course of events for states can only be judged in terms of probabilities. The underlying fogic of various political changes is sometimes clear only once the process has been concluded - a logic that is often striking in its "simplicity", but somewhat difficult to predict. 32 33. NRANARARHRARA MARMARA AARARONH i , 7 ’ € € € ec € € € € € € € € € € € € € € € & € €a Sve sewed eo erie eee POLI 822 ET REFERENCES Anon, 1996, The nation-state is dead : long live the nation state. ‘The National ‘Times. May 5(4): 30-34. Du Plessis, LJ: 1941. Die modeme staat. Stellenbosch : Pro Exclesia, Easton, DE, 1967. The political system - an inquiry into the state of political science. ‘New York:: Alfred A. Knopf. (8" ed.) Esterhuysen, P. 1995/6, Africa at a glance. Pretoria : Aftica Institute of South Affica. ‘Homer-Dixon, TF. 1991. On the threshold : environmental changes as causes of acute conflict. Intemational Security. 16(2) : 76-116, Huntington, SP. 1968. Political order in changing societies. London : Yale University Press, Huntington, §.P. 1993. 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