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People vs.

Ireneo Alcoreza

FACTS: Accused ireneo alcoreza y marcelino was charged with rape by his 14-year old stepdaughter Estrella
Manila and two (2) counts of statutory rape by his 11-year old stepdaughter Mary Joy Manila.

On September 21, 1997, the accused forcibly took off shorts and panty of Mary Joy, pushed her on the bed and
mounted her. He kissed and embraced her and inserted his penis into her organ. She could not shout as the accused
threatened to kill her if she did. Barely a week later, on September 27, 1997, the accused approached Mary Joy and
took off her shorts and panty. He laid her down, hurriedly took off his clothes and kissed her. When the accused
mounted her, his penis touched her organ but he failed to insert it as he heard her 8-year old brother, Benito, arrived.

The accused had also been molesting Estrella, the elder sister of Mary Joy, since she was eight years old. On
October 28, 1996, the accused then repeatedly tried to remove Estrella’s shirt and lower her shorts but she resisted.
When Estrella revealed the incident to her mother, Melita, she refused to believe her. Instead, melita directed estrella
not to tell her siblings about her ordeal.

Estrella and Mary Joy turned to her grandfather Benito Gonzales for help to report the rape incidents to the police
authoritiesa and to accompany them to the hospital for medical examination. Examination revealed that both Mary
joy and Estrella were in a non-virgin state. Mary joy had a healed laceration and abrasion on her hymen while
estrella's hymen sustained 4 healed lacerations.

ISSUE: WON accused was guilty of rape for his 14-year old stepdaughter and;
WON accused was guilty of two (2) counts of statutory rape for his 11-year old stepdaughter.

RULING: No. Accused is guilty only for acts of lasciviousness for his 14-year old stepdaughter. Records reveals
that the prosecution evidence failed to prove that rape, at whatever stage, was committed. The acts, as described by
estrella, are insufficient to prove that the appellant intended to have carnal knowledge of her. He did not lie on top of
estrella or even made the motion of removing his underwear. In fact, he kept his clothes on during the entire time
that he was in the bedroom. Neither does it appear that he tried to insert his finger or any object into the genital or
anal orifice of estrella. All that the appellant was able to do was touch her "private parts". From the circumstances
thus proved, the appellant can only be convicted of acts of lasciviousness.

No. Accused is guilty of one count of simple statutory rape and one count of attempted rape for his 11-year old
stepdaughter. The first count of statutory rape is consummated. With the testimoy of the victim, coupled with the
medical findings, it is proven beyond doubt that the accused was able to consummate the sexual assault of Mary Joy.
However, on the second count of statutory rape, it failed to consummate the crime of rape as his penis merely
touched Mary joy's organ. The court clarified touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere
epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the
victim's vagina, or the mons pubis. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the
labias or slid into the female organ and not merely stroked the external surface thereoffor an accused to be convicted
of consummated rape. Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of attempted rape.

Sermonia vs CA

FACTS: On 26 May 1992, Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the RTC of Pasig for contracting
marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained
valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability has been
extinguished by prescription. RTC denied motion to quash. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to
the CA assailing that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in
1975, such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the offended party as
of 1975, and that prescription commenced to run on the day the contract was registered. For this reason, the
information should have been filed on or before 1990. He also holds that the second marriage ceremony was held at
Our Lady of Nativity Church in Marikina and was open to inspection by any interested party. The prosecution
maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from the time of
discovery by the complainant which was in July 1991.

ISSUE: WON prescription applies in cases of bigamy;


WON prescription commences at the time of registration

RULING: No. The rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and
legal circumstances warrant, but it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy because a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into by the offender in secrecy in order to conceal his legal impediment, that even though his second
marriage may be contracted in an open place, it may be done so in a place and among people who do not know of
his original subsisting marriage.

No. It is reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on
which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency, otherwise, the
prosecution of such offense would be impossible and would encourage a fearless violation of a social institution
cherished and protected by law.

Insular Life vs Serrano

FACTS: In June 1987, respondent Manuel M. Serrano bought from petitioner Insular Life Assurance Company,
Limited, a life insurance policy called "Diamond Jubilee, Participating" on his understanding that he shall be paying
premiums for seven years only. Dividend accumulations and earned interests were to be applied to subsequent
premium payments. Respondent obtained six Diamond Jubilee Life Insurance policies, and religiously paid the
premiums. In early 1996, respondent was informed by his accountant that he had been paying premiums on some of
his policies even beyond the seven-year period of their effectivity. Consequently, respondent wrote a letter to Atty.
Ernesto G. Montalban, petitioner's Senior Vice President, Sales Operations Group, requesting that the overpayments
be applied as premium payments of his other policies which have not reached the seven-year period. The request
was denied on the ground that the self-liquidating option of the policies was not guaranteed because it was based on
dividends which vary. Atty. Montalban, however, assured respondent that some of his policies will self-liquidate but
only on specific dates.

In addition, respondent filed on December 11, 1996 a civil case for specific performance, sum of money, and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City against petitioner and some of its officers. In turn,
petitioner filed in May 1997 a complaint for libel against respondent before the City Prosecution Office of Makati
City, in relation to the notice the respondent caused to be published in the Manila Bulletin, which used the
words “victim” and “refusal to honor its representation”.

ISSUE: WON there was probable cause for respondent to be charged with libel?

RULING: No. The City Prosecutor dismissed petitioner's complaint for libel because two elements of the crime
were missing, defamatory imputation and malice. Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be
held liable for the crime if the following elements concur, viz: (1) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another, (2) publication of the charge, (3) identity of the person defamed, and (4) existence of malice.

In determining whether there was prima facie case for libel against respondent, the City Prosecutor and the Secretary
of Justice viewed the subject article in its entirety, and considered the same as a mere notice of meeting addressed to
Diamond Jubilee policyholders. The words "victim" and "refusal to honor its representation," although used in the
notice, were dismissed as not defamatory per se. Mere assertion that a person failed or refused to perform a
contractual obligation does not, in and of itself, injure that person's business reputation or deprive him of public
confidence. Whatever defamatory interpretation of which the subject notice may have been susceptible of was
considered debunked by the good faith that motivated the respondent in causing the publication of the notice, i.e., to
redress what he considered to be a violation of his rights and those of others similarly situated as himself.
Respondent's action was considered inconsistent with "malice" which is characterized by a reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of one's remarks.