Anthony Rimmington - From Military To Industrial Complex The Conversion of Biological Weapons' Facilities in The Russian Federation

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From military to industrial

complex? The conversion
of biological weapons’
facilities in the Russian
federation
a
Anthony Rimmington
a
Centre for Russian and East European
Studies , University of Birmingham ,
Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT
Published online: 28 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Anthony Rimmington (1996) From military to

industrial complex? The conversion of biological weapons’ facilities in
the Russian federation, Contemporary Security Policy, 17:1, 80-112, DOI:
10.1080/13523269608404128
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From Military to Industrial Complex? The
Conversion of Biological Weapons' Facilities
in the Russian Federation
ANTHONY RIMMINGTON
Introduction
President Boris Yeltsin's decree of April 1992 'On ensuring the
implementation of international pledges in the sphere of biological
weapons' sought to rein-in the Russian Federation's illicit offensive
biological weapons programme. Russia's new commitment to act in
accordance with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention raises a number
of important questions. How are microbiological facilities engaged in work
with military applications to be brought under the control of civil bodies?
Which organizations would implement and coordinate civilian R&D and
production programmes at these facilities? Would military microbiological
centres be able to find new markets and compete successfully during the
difficult phase of economic transition? Could an outflow (the so-called
brain drain) of military microbiologists to potential proliferating countries
be prevented by maintaining competitive wage rates and morale at facilities
targeted for conversion? Would such facilities cease to be secret and allow
visits by non-military personnel, including representatives from
international companies and scientific institutions?
This article seeks to address these questions and to provide some new
insight in the formulation of answers. It is argued that there is a new
ideological impulse toward conversion on the part of the Yeltsin
administration. Of course, this is not to suggest that conversion is new per
se\ the current conversion process must be viewed against a background of
significant transfer of military technologies from Russian BW facilities to
the civilian sector, including processes for the manufacture of a range of
antibiotics and several vaccines against highly pathogenic diseases, begun
in 1990 by the Gorbachev administration. However, such diversification
into civilian production did not necessarily lead to an immediate reduction
in military capabilities. Often Soviet facilities engaged in 'conversion' were
Anthony Rimmington is at the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of
Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT.
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.17, No.l (April 1996), pp.80-112

PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS. LONDON
CONVERSION OF RUSSIAN MICROBIOLOGICAL FACILITIES 81
merely seeking to commercialise spin-offs from ongoing defence-related

R&D projects which were deemed suitable for civilian applications, and
military capabilities were not being dismantled. In contrast, it will be argued
here, the Yeltsin government is fully committed to the conversion process,
which is viewed as being inextricably linked to overall economic reform
and the transition to a full market economy. Moreover, there is clear
evidence of attempts to institutionalize this process via the creation of new
organizations for the management of both Ministry of Defence and

Biopreparat microbiological centres. Civil bodies such as the Ministry of
Science and Technology Policy and the Ministry of Health and the Medical
Industry now play a major role in formulating and coordinating applied
R&D and production programmes at several military microbiological
institutes.
However, commitment cannot ensure success and a number of factors
will determine the success of Yeltsin's present conversion programme. The
high degree of specialization of Russian military microbiological facilities
will make it difficult to identify new civil markets for their work. Given the
acute shortages of vaccines and essential drugs in the former Soviet Union,
an obvious move would be to turn them into commercial pharmaceutical
companies. However, the absence of international manufacturing standards,
the possibility of contamination and the appalling quality of existing
buildings has meant that such facilities have failed to secure the necessary
investment of Western pharmaceutical companies. Instead, Russia's former
BW facilities are opting for a combination of more modest, but
nevertheless, useful activities including the packaging and marketing of
Western generic drugs and the formation of small companies based on
existing areas of expertise. Western regulatory standards are also being
bypassed by targeting civilian R&D and production at markets in
developing countries.
Another key factor which will determine the outcome of Yeltsin's BW
conversion programme is the degree to which the Russian administration is
willing to force the military to embrace a total and irreversible transfer to
civil R&D and production. There is presently a powerful lobby, including
senior members of the Ministry of Defence, who are opposed to the
complete conversion and demilitarization of Russia's former BW facilities.
It remains to be seen if the Yeltsin administration has the political will to
remove those in favour of cosmetic changes and to favour senior personnel
who wish to see the sector become completely independent from the
military-industrial complex and are prepared to implement an effective
conversion programme.
The outcome of Yeltsin's initiative is not merely of theoretical interest.
The result will have serious implications both for the Russian Federation
82 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
and the international community as a whole. One of the most pressing

problems which has to be addressed is how to prevent a brain drain of
personnel from Russian military microbiological facilities to countries
which wish to pursue their own biological weapons programmes. At least
two military research groups have been approached to perform contract
research on dangerous pathogens and Russian scientists have also been
implicated in a BW programme being conducted in Iran. There is clearly a
major threat of proliferation if researchers are not found a civil outlet for
their work.
The global community also has a role to play in facilitating a positive
outcome. In order to bolster the conversion effort, the International Science
& Technology Centre (ISTC) is making a serious attempt at constructive
engagement with former BW facilities in the Russian Federation. Several
programmes are being implemented under its auspices in collaboration with
active Western partners. This is helping to remove the atmosphere of
secrecy and total isolation from world markets which used to prevail and is
assisting in the creation of an infrastructure and modern managerial culture
better suited to the market economy.
In the wider socio-economic context, if the transition to a thriving civil
bioindustry is successful then it could serve to neutralize potential negative
political forces in the Russian Federation. With the threat of unemployment
and a significant loss of prestige, the workers in the defence industries
represent one of the main reservoirs of support for Russia's national
patriotic forces. In 1993 for example, they provided key support for
Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party. By ensuring that such
workers are kept in employment, the successful conversion of the military
microbiological sector may help to neutralize such potentially disastrous
political support.
It is clear from the above that many of the issues touching upon
conversion of Russia's BW facilities closely interact with each other.
Generally, one can argue that both the Russian Federation and the West can
benefit from the successful transition to a civil bioindustry. Russia will
retain a significant section of its working population in employment, who
will be engaged in the production of vitally important goods for domestic
consumption such as pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile for the West, successful
conversion will prevent a brain drain of Russian military scientists and
potential proliferation of biological weapons technology. In addition,
opening up the sector to Western businessmen will remove the atmosphere
of secrecy and total isolation from world markets associated with these
facilities.
This study seeks to provide an overview of the conversion of Russia's
BW facilities and the issues which are impacting upon the transition to a
civil bioindustry. It is divided into four parts. The first, outlining the
framework for conversion, describes the enormous scale of the Russian
military-microbiological complex and its organization prior to the onset of
the conversion process. The second part presents the general context in
which conversion is being initiated. The Yeltsin administration's
commitment to the process and its initiative to strengthen the role of civil
organisations is documented in the context of previous attempts to find a
civil role for this sector. The third part analyses the key factors determining
the success or failure of the Russian B W conversion programme. The final
part attempts to assess the possible implications for the West of the success
or failure of Yeltsin's initiative.
The Russian Military Microbiological Sector: The Framework for

Conversion
The Ministry of Defence's Network of Military Microbiological Facilities
The Russian Ministry of Defence's network of military microbiological
facilities is sub-divided into two distinct branches (see Figure 1). The first
and more substantial branch is subordinate to the Main Directorate for
Biological, Radiation and Chemical Defence (Glavno upravlenie
radiatsionnoi, khimicheskoi i biologicheskoi zashchity)1 headed by Col.-
General Petrov. A section of this new Directorate under Lt.-General Valentin
Ivanovich Evstigneev is now responsible for BW defence and recently took
over the responsibilities of the 15th Administration of Biological
Protection.2 However, the change appears to be merely cosmetic and the
existing personnel have been largely retained.' According to one recent
report the Directorate has a staff of around 100 including twelve medical
specialists.4 The second, smaller branch is administered by the Main
Military-Medical Directorate (Glavnoe voenno-meditsinskoe upravlenie or
GVMU for short) headed by Lt. Gen. Ivan Mikhailovich Chizh.5
The key organization subordinate to the Ministry of Defence's
Directorate for Bacteriological, Radiation and Chemical Defence is the
Scientific-Research Institute of Microbiology (Nauchno-issledovatel'skii
institut mikrobiologii or Nil mikrobiologii) now based in Kirov.6 It was
formed in 1933 and was originally subordinate to the Red Army.7 It was
relocated from the village of Perkushkovo near Moscow to Kirov (900 km
north-west of Moscow on the Vyatka river) in 1942 to prevent it from falling
into the hands of the advancing German forces.8 Originally the institute
appears to have been located on the outskirts of Kirov but as with other
Russian military microbiological facilities, subsequent expansion of the city
means that it is now in the middle of a densely populated area on 119-121
FIGURE 1
THE MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY MICROBIOLGICAL FACILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Ministry of Health Ministry of Science Committee on Ministry of

& Medical Industry & Technology Policy Convention Defence
Problems
n
Joint Stock Company Main Directorate fox Main Military- o
Biopreparat NBC Defence Medical Directorate z
m
•v
1 o
jo
Institute of
Microbiology
(Kirov)
a
n
c
Centre of Institute of Centre of Institute of 2
Applied Microbiology Inmunological Design Virology Military Medicine
(Obolensk) (Lyubuchany) (Sergiev Posad) (St. Petersburg) o
r
o
9
Oktyabr'skii prospekt. In 1980 the facility was reported to employ 125
researchers.10 This figure appears to have remained fairly stable over the
next decade or so, with the number of scientific personnel reported to be
employed by the institute in December 1992 as 120 out of a total workforce
of 400." Currently the institute's Director is Maj.-General Evgenii
Vasil'evich Pimenov. Little is known of research underway at the Kirov
facility but the majority of papers published in recent years appear to be
devoted to work on improving vaccines against plague.12 The institute is

reported to possess its own P3 containment unit.13
The Institute of Microbiology is in fact responsible for the management
of a small network of subordinate military microbiological facilities, which
in the past included a proving ground and associated field-testing
laboratories. One of the two facilities currently subordinate to the institute
is the Centre of Military-Technical Problems of Anti-bacteriological
Defence (Tsentr voenno-tekhnicheskikh problem protivobakteriologicheskoi
zashchity)14 in Ekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) some 1667 kilometres
east of Moscow.13 It is headed by Maj.-General Anatolii T. Kharechko.16 The
Centre was built in 1947 and its earliest known name is the Scientific-
Research Institute of Vaccine Preparations (Nauchno-issledovatel'skii
institut vaktsinykh preparatov)." It is located in the Chkalovskii raion in the
south-west of the city within Military Compound No. 19.18 The population
of the compound was estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000 in 1992.19
During the 1960s the Centre undertook tests on the production of
pathogenic agents which were suitable for use as biological weapons.20
More recently the main task of the Centre has been the biological defence
of buildings, military material and the population in the event of biological
attack.21 It has developed methods for the disinfection of terrain, military
hardware, weapons and equipment, means for protecting people against
biological aerosols and means for the early detection of noxious substances
in the environment.22 It is also monitoring the potential world-wide threat of
proliferation of biological weapons and has established a computerised
database of information on this issue.23
In the past fifteen years the facility has been the focus of intense local
and international media attention. Sometime around Monday, 2 April 1979
the release of an anthrax aerosol from Military Compound Number 19 led
to the deaths of at least 66 people in Ekaterinburg itself and to cases of
animal anthrax at a number of villages (Rudnii, Bol'shoe Sedelnikovo,
Maloe Sedelnikovo, Pervomaiskii, Kashino and Abramovo) to the south-
south-east of the city.24 The precise nature of the work underway which led
to the accident is not known,25 nor whether the anthrax was released from
the Centre's vaccine production plant or from its research laboratories (see
Appendix 2).26 The disaster led to the eventual closure of the facility's
g6 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
vaccine plant and the curtailment, at least temporarily, of various areas of

research.
The second of the two facilities subordinate to the Russian Ministry of
Defence's Institute of Microbiology is the Centre of Virology (Tsentr
virusolgii) based in Sergiev Posad (formerly Zagorsk), which is around 70
km from Moscow.27 The Centre is headed by Maj .-General A.A. Makhlai. It
possesses its own P3 containment unit. As is the case of the Ekaterinburg
Centre, during the 1960s the facility was engaged in testing production of a
number of pathogenic agents.28 At least some of the buildings at Sergiev
Posad which were used for this work on biological weapons appear to have
been destroyed.29 More recently the Centre has been engaged in work on the
development of methods for the prophylaxis and treatment of dangerous
diseases (including an inactivated vaccine against lassa fever), protective
equipment, apparatus for the detection of pathogenic agents and equipment
for the decontamination of weapons, hardware and land.10
The Sergiev Posad Centre was also responsible for the management of a
Scientific Field Testing Laboratory (possessing its own separate P3
containment unit)31 based in Aral'sk in Kazakhstan32 and on the island of
Vozrozhdenie, in the Aral Sea. A top secret base with a population of over
1,000 is reported to have been built on Vozrozhdenie Island in 1954.33 It
utilized a biological weapons test range which was initially 200 square
kilometres in size but had expanded to 2,000 square kilometres by the
1990s. The proving ground was located on the part of the island which
belongs to the territory of Karakalpakstan, Uzbekistan.34 In 1991 the base's
personnel were evacuated and the laboratories mothballed.35 Work on
dismantling the base is then reported to have begun in May 1992.36 US
officials later confirmed that the test site had been closed and was being
decontaminated.37
A second smaller branch of military microbiological facilities under the
Russian Ministry of Defence's Main Military-Medical Directorate has been
in existence since the 1930s.38 Today the only BW defence facility known to
be subordinate to the Directorate is the Scientific-Research Institute of
Military Medicine (Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut voennoi meditsiny or
Nil VM ) which is located at Lesoparkovdya 4a in Saint Petersburg.39 Nil
VM was formed in September 1969 on the basis of the S.M. Kirov Military
Medical Academy's Scientific Laboratory Number 1 (NIL-l). Included
among its staff are thirty professors and 100 doctors and it is one of the
leading Russian facilities engaged in R&D on defensive measures against
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The institute's Third Directorate
(Bacteriology) is directly concerned with biological warfare agents.40
Throughout most of the period of its existence little information has
been made available concerning research related to biological weapons at
this facility which is perhaps not surprising since it was not until 1989 that
any Soviet publication was even allowed to refer to the existence of Nil
VA/.41 However, according to recent official Soviet data Nil VM is engaged
in the 'development and testing on troops of vaccines, methods of mass
immunisation, medical methods for prophylaxis of infectious diseases,
methods for detecting pathogenic agents, and equipment and methods of
decontamination for the work of the military medical service.'42
An Illicit Offensive BW Programme. The Biopreparat Network

Running in parallel with the Ministry of Defence's network is a grouping of
facilities subordinate to the Russian Joint Stock Company Biopreparat, an
organization which although ostensibly civilian, has played a key role in the
funding and management of biological weapons R&D. Biopreparat was
created in 1973 by a decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the
USSR Council of Ministers and has its headquarters at Ulitsa Samokatnaya,
4a in Moscow.43 Over the subsequent 20 years Biopreparat succeeded in
building itself into the most powerful biotechnology organization within the
former Soviet Union. It embraces a network of around 50 R&D and
production facilities employing a workforce of 100,000 people.44 The
organization controls the world's second largest antibiotics industry45 and
produces a range of biopharmaceuticals and veterinary products valued at
12 billion roubles (US$12 million) in 1992. It has succeeded in marketing
its products in many developing countries and has formed around ten joint
ventures.46 However, until September 1992 Biopreparat was simultaneously
being used as an ostensibly civil front for an elaborate military biological
weapons programme which had been in existence since the 1950s.47 In the
Russian Federation the network of military microbiological R&D,
production and storage facilities run by this organization were often referred
to as 'Sistema Ogarkova' (Ogarkov's System) after the General (Vsevolod
Ivanovich Ogarkov)48 who served as Biopreparat's first director.49 This
article will not attempt to provide further particulars of the offensive
programme run by Biopreparat which has been described in detail
elsewhere.50 Rather it will focus on the progress which has been made since
the suspension of the programme in September 1992, to demilitarise three
of its most significant military microbiological centres, the State Scientific
Centre of Applied Microbiology (Gosudarstvennyi nauchnyi tsentr
prikladnoi mikrobiologii or GNTsPM), the Institute of Immunological
Design and the Scientific Centre of Virology & Biotechnology Vektor
(Gosudarstvennyi nauchnyi tsentr virusologii i biotekhnologii Vektor). The
history and organization of these three facilities is described in Appendix 1.
Conversion: Economic and Ideological Impulses

Conversion of military facilities to civilian production is far from new, but
in post-Soviet Russia it has taken on new quantitative and qualitative
dimensions. Boris Yeltsin's decree of April 1992 'On ensuring the
implementation of international pledges in the sphere of biological
weapons'51 represents a major ideological shift in the Russian government's
policy towards the conversion of its BW facilities. Throughout the Soviet

period the desire to find civil outlets for this sector was driven by economic
imperatives, especially the need to reduce the overall defence budget.
However, only cosmetic changes were implemented, and no attempts were
made to demilitarize facilities and insist that they be completely
independent from the military-industrial complex. In order to demonstrate
his determination to end the illicit offensive BW programme and to embark
upon full conversion, Yeltsin has opened up Russian facilities to US/UK
inspection. The policy shift is in line with the Yeltsin administration's effort
to present itself as adhering to international norms with the aim of
reintegrating the Russian Federation within the world community. It is also
a reflection of the government's overall conversion programme which as
part of the transition to a market economy aims to severely reduce military
production.52
The Reorganization of the Military Microbiological Sector

As part of this new commitment to demilitarization the Russian government
is seeking to reinforce the role of civilian agencies in their administration.
A major shake-up of the management of military microbiological facilities
belonging to both Biopreparat and the Ministry of Defence has been
implemented which strengthens the prospects for the eventual successful
demilitarization and conversion of this sector. The most significant
organizational modification with regard to Biopreparat facilities concerns
the creation of a new network of federal research centres administered by
the Russian Ministry of Science and Technology Policy. Two of
Biopreparat's most significant R&D and production centres, Vektor," and
GNTsPM)54 have already been included within the new system and the
Institute of Immunological Design is expected to become incorporated
soon.
The Biopreparat facilities are among only some 33 such federal research
centres to have been created thus far on the basis of defence-oriented
establishments which 'perform research of great value to the state'. Yeltsin's
government is to provide a special allocation of 57 billion roubles which
translates into a 30 to 40 per cent increase in the budgets of chosen centres,
and thus also in the salaries of their research staff.55 This may go some way
to stemming the outflow of personnel seeking employment abroad or in new

professions within Russia itself. Under the terms of Yeltsin's decree
governing the operation of these centres, it is obligatory for their directors
to present a yearly account of their activities to an Interdepartmental
Coordinating Commission for Scientific-Technical Policy. They must also
operate in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation.56 Besides this
new accountability to civil bodies, the new Biopreparat centres are also now
actively engaged in an applied R&D programme aimed at boosting

production in the pharmaceutical industry and run directly by the Ministry
of Science."
The second major organizational change to impact on the conversion of
Biopreparat facilities concerns the creation of a new Federal Ministry, the
Ministry of Health and the Medical Industry of the Russian Federation
(Ministerstvo zdravookhraneniya i meditsinskoi promyshlennosti Rossiiskoi
Federatsii or Minzdravmedprom for short). The State Concern Biopreparat
was originally transferred to the control of the Russian Ministry of Health
under the terms of a decree issued by President Yeltsin on 5 December
1991.58 However, in January 1994 President Yeltsin issued a decree
'Concerning the Structure of Federal Organs of Executive Power' which
abolished the Ministry of Health and replaced it with Minzdravmedprom19
headed by a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Medical
Sciences, Eduard Aleksandrovich Nechaev.60 The new Ministry is now by
far and away the most significant organization with regard to the
management of applied and industrial biotechnology in the Russian
Federation. Within its vast network are included 32 research institutes and
colleges, 101 immunobiological and pharmaceutical production facilities,
29 facilities producing various medical equipment, 21 farms and most
significantly in the context of this report, 'conversion enterprises'61 (which
presumably encompass the Biopreparat network). As former Head of the
USSR Ministry of Defence's Central Military-Medical Directorate and
subsequently, the Russian Ministry of Defence's Main Military-Medical
Directorate which possesses its own military microbiological facility, the
new Minister of Health, Nechaev, appears to possess the experience
necessary to tackle the problem of conversion of the Biopreparat network.62
The new ministry is determined to utilize Russia's own production
capacities in the pharmaceutical and microbiological industries to eliminate
shortages of key preparations. Nechaev has requested that federal and
municipal resources are allocated to these industries. Within l1/2-2 years he
wishes the Ministry to set up production of a range of key pharmaceuticals
including insulin, anaesthetics, hormone preparations and broad-spectrum
antibiotics.63 It may well be the case that the State Scientific Centres and
other production facilities belonging to Biopreparat, which are among the
most modern and sophisticated in the Russian Federation, and particularly

well suited for the production of a new generation of genetically engineered
preparations, will be prioritized for new investment by the Ministry.
As well as tightening state control over Biopreparat's facilities the
Russian government is also seeking to rein in the Ministry of Defence's
network of military microbiological establishments. A new organization,
the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological
Weapons (Komitet po konventsial'nym problemam khimicheskogo i

bakteriologicheskogo oruzhiya), established by Boris Yeltsin in February
1992,64 has been entrusted with responsibility for the formulation and
implementation of a coordinated conversion programme for the Ministry of
Defence's facilities. The Committee is headed by Pavel Pavlovich Syutkin
who recently replaced Lt.-General (Reserve) Anatolii Kuntsevich.63 It
operates on a budget of around $290,000* and is sub-divided into three
departments concerned with destruction of chemical weapons, ensuring
compliance with chemical weapons agreements and ensuring compliance
with the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.67
The Committee is exercising close control over the conversion of
military microbiological facilities. At least one member of the Committee,
for example, its Chief Engineer General A. Blatov, has been given specific
responsibility for Compound No.19 in Ekaterinburg. Interestingly, the
committee also includes within its membership Anatolii D. Smirnov from
the State Concern Biopreparat. Evidence from Western business sources
appears to indicate that the latter organisation is playing a pivotal role in the
management of conversion projects at microbiological establishments
subordinate to the Ministry of Defence.68 According to a recent report in
hvestiya experts from the Committee hold the view that the Centres based
at Kirov, Sergiev Posad and Ekaterinburg should, over time, be removed
from military jurisdiction and switched to work for the civil economy. In
order to achieve this they put forward the idea that a single science
production complex (nauchno-proizvodstvennyi kompleks) should be
created for the management of coordinated R&D and production at these
centres.69
A Historical Seedbed for Conversion: The Transfer of Military

Biotechnologies to the Civilian Bioindustry
There is considerable evidence that, independently of any recent attempts to
accelerate the process, for several decades Russian BW facilities have
played an important role in the development of the civilian bioindustry,
especially via the transfer of key production technologies. This represents a
substantial seedbed of experience which can be utilized by the military-
microbiological sector in the conversion process.
This previous history of technology transfer was recently alluded to by

Valentin Evstigneev, head of Russia's BW defence. According to him a
number of vaccines developed by Ministry of Defence facilities are
currently being used by the civilian health service including the anthrax
(caused by Bacillus anthracis) vaccine based on the 57/-1 strain which has
been used as the basis of all subsequent preparations developed against this
disease (see Appendix 2 for a full account of the development of this
vaccine and related products by the Russian military). He also claims that
virtually all preparations developed against highly pathogenic infections
have been tested at his facilities before entering civilian production. Other
technologies transferred to the civilian sector which he outlines include
those for the production of plague vaccine, gamma globulins and brucellosis
strains. Moreover, according to Evstigneev, the first industrial batches of
antibiotics, developed by civilian colleagues, were in fact produced within
military facilities.70
More details of this transfer of military technology have recently been
provided by Eugenii Pimerov, Director of the Institute of Microbiology in
Kirov. He has described how the institute began penicillin production in
1944 and how the antibiotic was shipped from his facility directly to
hospitals at the front.71 Later, technologies for the production of a number of
important antibiotics were transferred to civilian facilities which formed the
basis for the subsequent development of a large and successful antibiotics
industry.72 Pimenov also confirms that the first development of vaccines
against plague, tularaemia and brucellosis was carried out at his facility.73
The political and economic reforms implemented by Gorbachev
provided the impetus in the late 1980s for Biopreparat to make its first
attempts to forge links with Western companies and academic institutions to
seek their assistance in finding international markets for research and
products originating from its military microbiological facilities. In what
appears to be the first such visit of its kind, members of Oxford Virology pic
(London) and the Institute of Virology and Experimental Biology (Oxford)
were received at Biopreparat's subordinate organization, Vektor, in 1990.74
A number of agreements then followed, under the terms of which the UK-
based company had 50 per cent of the rights to innovations developed at
Vektor's Institute of Molecular Biology and it also licensed three
compounds developed by this institute which had been shown to have
potential utility in the treatment of AIDS.75
However, this desire to form commercial partnerships on the part of
Biopreparat facilities represented a frantic attempt to find export markets in
the face of a severe political and economic crisis. Little or no attempt was
made to dismantle existing military programmes and the term 'conversion',
although in use at this time, appeared to imply that a facility was merely
considering the commercialization of offshoots from ongoing defence-

related projects. The Yeltsin decree of 1992 marks the transition from such
'entrepreneurial conversion' to 'full conversion', that is, the transformation
of a branch working for defence into a branch producing civilian goods and
The Prospects for Conversion of Russia's BW Facilities

The Identification of Civil Markets for Russia's Biological Weapons
Expertise
Russian facilities formerly engaged in the country's biological weapons'
programme are highly specialized and have experienced difficulties in
identifying civil outlets for their work. Given their obvious expertise in
biotechnology and the acute shortages of vaccines and essential drugs in the
former Soviet Union, many Russian directors were optimistic that, on the
basis of Western investment, their military microbiological facilities could
be rapidly converted into commercial pharmaceutical companies.
Ambitious conversion programmes were launched such as Vektor's
'Innovation Development Programme for 1992-1995 to 2005', issued in
1991, which detailed how there would be a major shift in emphasis at the
facility away from pure and applied R&D to the large-scale production of a
wide range of pharmaceutical preparations.77 It anticipated that there would
be a twenty-fold increase in industrial output over the next 15 years
requiring 'capital investment in new construction, technological re-tooling
and reconstruction of the existing production spaces'.78 One of the key
components of Vektor's plan was to attract Western investment in the
construction of a Centre for Preclinical Trials. Possession of such a centre
would allow it to 'manufacture in this country preparations in accordance
with international requirements and therefore facilitate their access to
foreign markets'. Among the preparations which had been developed by
Vektor and which were slated for production were recombinant vaccines
against hepatitis B ('Revax B') and tick-borne encephalitis, vaccines against
hepatitis A ('Hep-A-en-VAC'), measles, mumps and rubella, and tick-borne
encephalitis and a range of recombinant cytokines.™
However, despite strenuous efforts, Vektor and other Russian military
microbiological facilities have been singularly unsuccessful in forming
commercial partnerships with Western pharmaceutical companies.80 A
number of factors have combined to make Western pharmaceutical
companies reluctant to invest in Russia's military microbiological facilities.
Aside from the general background of political and macro-economic
instability, these have included: poor construction standards; possible
contamination from previous work on the development of biological

weapons; and the absence of good manufacturing standards (GMP) as
practised in the West.81
For these reasons many of the international companies which are
pursuing commercial partnerships with former BW facilities have sought to
find more modest, but nevertheless useful, alternatives to production of
Pharmaceuticals at existing production sites. These include the packaging of
Western-produced generic drugs and acting as wholesale distributors for

pharmaceutical companies.82 A good example of such activity is provided
by Vektor which is helping to finance its R&D programme by marketing (for
hard currency) Western Pharmaceuticals manufactured by companies such
as Bayer (Germany), Lek (Slovenia), Krka (Slovenia), Novopharm
(Canada)8' and Wellcome (UK).84
Another strategy being pursued by Russian managers is to invite
Western companies to build new plants operating to GMP-standards on
green field sites attached to military microbiological facilities. Not only
would there be a local pool of highly trained labour upon which the
company could draw, but also the availability of a ready-made infrastructure
including provision of services (electricity, steam generation, etc.). At least
one such project presently appears to be ongoing. A consortium of five
Western pharmaceutical companies (including Hoechst in Germany and
BLT Teva in Israel) is planning to invest $50 million in the construction of
the Mir Pharmaceuticals Factory at Obolensk. The new facility will initially
manufacture a range of Western generic drugs. The first stage of the project
which consists of the reconstruction of GNTsPM's existing warehousing
capacity is already underway.*5 A similar project to build an antibiotics plant
is being pursued in conjunction with a US concern by the Centre of Anti-
bacteriological Defence in Ekaterinburg.86 Such projects could have a huge
spin-off if they are successful, including the implementation of Western
training schemes for workers, the establishment of 'development poles' in
the local economy and provision of access to Western expertise and know-
how.87
One way in which Biopreparat has succeeded in bypassing Western
regulatory standards has been to target its civilian production at developing
countries such as Brazil (importing test kits from Vektor),*" North Korea,
India, Mongolia and China (importing supplies of anti-malarial drugs), and
the countries of Eastern Europe.8" Of the ten or so joint ventures which have
been formed by Biopreparat facilities the majority are primarily aimed at
accessing markets in developing countries.90 Two joint ventures have
already been formed between GNTsPM and Chinese partners for example,
one based in Obolensk and the other in China. The latter project is
concerned with the transfer of Russian technology for the manufacture of
recombinant a-2 interferon and v-interferon to Chinese production

facilities. A joint venture has also been formed with a Vietnamese
organization. Successful field trials of the Centre's microbial pesticides
have been carried out in Vietnam with a view to the widespread application
of these preparations in the near future. Vektor has also succeeded in
forming a joint venture in China for the production of its genetically
engineered human a-2 interferon in a factory in China."
However, commercial partnerships with the East have been just as prone
to collapse as those forged with Western pharmaceutical concerns. South
Korean companies for example, perhaps less inclined to adhere rigidly to
international standards than their Western counterparts, have been very
aggressive in seeking collaborations with former Soviet BW facilities. An
unnamed South Korean company promised to provide a $20 million line of
credit to GNTsPM for construction of a joint complex for the production of
amino acid and other infusions. However, despite a two-year wait the
money has thus far not been forthcoming.92 The Institute of Immunological
Design's novel technology for tableting liquid pharmaceutical preparations
also attracted the interest of the South Korean company Hyundai. The
technology appears to have originated out of a project aimed at production
of tableted vaccines undertaken jointly with the Russian Ministry of
Defence's Centre of Virology in Sergiev Posad. Following successful pilot
trials Hyundai attempted to purchase the technology at a price which would
have covered only a fraction of the development costs but their offer was
rejected by the Lyubuchany management.93
Many Russian military microbiological facilities have now scaled-down
their initially over-ambitious conversion projects and are targeting only
particular areas of their R&D and associated lines for commercialization. In
the past five years both GNTsPM and Vektor have been creating a number
of small 'spin-off companies based on existing R&D programmes. In
November 1990, for example, the joint stock company (Aktsionernoe
obshchestvo zakrytogo tipa) KONPO was created within the framework of
the State Programme of Conversion of Defence Industry Enterprises. Its
Director is Valerii Bataragin and it possesses a workforce of seventy. Its
main task appears to be to market products, especially those with medical
applications, already developed by GNTsPM (it has recently produced its
own catalogue for this purpose) and to seek out foreign partners for
collaborative projects.94 Another small company which has recently been
created is the Biotechnological Innovation Centre which specialises in the
marketing of GNTsPM's range of microbial pesticides.95 At least ten
companies of this kind have now been created at Obolensk.96 The exact
number of small enterprises created at Kol'tsovo is unknown although at
least one, Vektor bioprodukt, is currently manufacturing and marketing test
kits for early detection of pregnancy.97

There is also evidence that organizations such as the Russian Ministry of
Health and Medical Industry are seeking to identify new national roles for
the country's military microbiological facilities. In May 1993 for example,
part of GNTsPM at Obolensk was established under the Russian Ministry of
Health as the Scientific Research Centre for Toxicology and Hygiene
Regulation of Biopreparations. The new centre focuses on ensuring the
safety of microbial pesticides which find widespread use in Russian

agriculture.98 This directly parallels the experience of the United States
which closed and converted its two main BW R&D and production
establishments in 1972. The facility at Pine Bluff Arsenal was turned over
to the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Food and Drug
Administration as a new National Centre for Toxicological Research. It had
the role of examining 'the biological effects of a number of chemical
substances which are found in man's surroundings, such as pesticides, food
additives, and therapeutic drugs'.99
Opposition to Yeltsin's Conversion Programme: The Military-Industrial

Lobby
Another key factor which will determine the success of the Russian
government's BW conversion programme is the degree to which it is willing
to force the military to embrace a total and irreversible transfer to civil R&D
and production. The response to the government's new commitment to the
conversion process has been highly uneven in this sector to date. Whereas,
managers of Biopreparat facilities are eager to begin commercialisation of
their activities, there appears to be a powerful lobby against similar changes
at facilities subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Defence.
Economic constraints have forced a number of Ministry of Defence
microbiological facilities to embark upon limited conversion
programmes.100 The Centre of Military-Technical Problems of Anti-
bacteriological Defence in Ekaterinburg, for example, has launched
research projects with potential civil applications. These include work on
anti-staphylococcus preparations and on the prevention of metal
corrosion.101 With regard to the latter problem, a well-equipped department
with a highly-qualified staff headed by Valerii Nepokrytii has been
established. In 1992 it built several climatrons which are being used to test
tanks, armoured transporters and troop-carrying vehicles for their
susceptibility to microbial degradation. The facility is also working on the
microbial destruction of chemical weapons and in 1992 hosted a special
conference on this subject."12 However, despite this programme, senior
personnel at the facility do not appear fully committed to the complete
conversion and demilitarization of the facility. According to Anatolii
Lobur', Deputy Director of the Ekaterinburg Centre, the term 'conversion'

is inappropriate since his facility has always focused on defence.103
Moreover, General Evstigneev (responsible for BW defence), while
approving of the construction of an antibiotics facility at Ekaterinburg,
asserted that it would be a 'quiet tragedy' if his scientists were to get
involved in commercial activity.104 Whether the Russian government has the
political will to overcome such opposition within the military remains to be
seen, but the outcome of this struggle may determine the fate of the military
microbiological sector's conversion programme as a whole.
Implications for the West: The Brain Drain and the Potential Threat of
Proliferation
One of the most pressing problems which must be addressed by Russia and
the world community today is how to prevent a brain drain of personnel
from military microbiological facilities, and their contractors to countries
interested in pursuing their own biological weapons programmes. In 1992
the Director of the CIA Robert Gates warned that 'a few thousand [Russian
scientists] have the knowledge and the marketable skills to develop and
produce biological weapons' and that prospects of unemployment and
collapse of living standards might force such researchers to market their
expertise abroad.105 Such an outflow of microbiologists has already taken
place within the Russian civilian bioindustry. Thus, for example, 40
members of the Russian Academy of Sciences Siberian Department's
Institute of Cytology and Genetics in Novosibirsk are recently reported to
have emigrated en masse to Brazil, presumably to work for a local
pharmaceutical company.106 Moreover, several reports indicate that military
microbiological facilities are now also being targeted for recruitment by
foreign agencies. At least two research groups working at Biopreparat's
centre Vektor (Kol'tsovo, near Novosibirsk) for example, have recently been
invited by 'certain countries' to perform contract work on dangerous
pathogens.107 The same phenomenon is affecting facilities belonging to the
Russian Ministry of Defence. A lack of resources at the Scientific-Research
Institute of Microbiology in Kirov has led to the departure of one third of its
staff.108 The head of Russia's BW defence, General Evstigneev, recently
reported 'instances of certain military biologists receiving invitations from
various foreign representatives of Third World countries to go and work for
them'.109 Finally, in August 1995 a report appeared in the Sunday Times
claiming that Iran had hired Russian experts for its own programme aimed
at the development of biological weapons. According to unidentified
Western intelligence officials in Washington the Iranians had 'saved years
of experiments and have been able to go straight from basic research to
production, and the development of an effective delivery system'."0 The
conversion of Russia's military microbiological facilities will play a key

role in providing future employment for biological weapons scientists and
preventing a significant outflow of technological know-how to potential
proliferators.
Perhaps the most serious Western attempt at constructive engagement
with Russian military microbiological facilities has been via the
International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC). This is an
intergovernmental organization based in Moscow comprising the USA,

European Union, Japan, Russia and five other countries. It aims to provide
funding for Russian weapons scientists formerly engaged in Soviet
programmes aimed at creating weapons of mass destruction, to work on
civil projects. The ISTC has already organized two symposia designed to
review and improve project proposals from Russian military
microbiological facilities. It is also seeking to identify possible commercial
partners for institutes seeking to find civil outlets for their work.1"
Several projects have already been launched with microbiological
facilities via the ISTC. The impact of such international funding on
individual establishments can be assessed by examining the case of the
Institute of Immunological Design at Lyubuchany. It is in receipt of $1
million funding from the ISTC over the next three years. In addition, the
institute is being supported by the US National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Soros fund, the EU's INTAS programme and
the UK's Royal Society.112 The combined income from these grants has
turned the fortunes of the facility around and allowed the institute's Director,
Vladimir Petrovich Zav'yalov, to increase salaries for researchers to
$400-600 per month (a researcher's basic salary in Russia can be as low as
$50 per month).1" Researchers who left the facility as part of the 'internal
brain drain' for better paid temporary jobs in the local area are now returning
in significant numbers. Whole R&D departments have now been restored,
and the facility's future, at least in the short to medium term, looks bright.114
The main benefits from the West's point of view of such assistance is
that it allows full access to the work being carried out under its auspices. A
strict requirement of ISTC funding is that an active Western partner is
required for any project it funds in order to ensure that the work was
directed at civil applications. In addition, the partnership concept, helps
ensure that linkages are made between the Russian facility and the
international scientific community. All this marks a welcome change from
past patterns of secrecy and total isolation from the world market which
used to prevail. In addition the ISTC programme addresses the problem of
the lack of a managerial culture at such facilities by providing access to new
ideas in marketing, quality-control and international regulations, which are
of crucial importance if the conversion process is to succeed.115
Conclusion
This article has argued that the potential for the transformation of the
military complex to an industrial complex in the sphere of microbiological
production has never been greater in Russia. At the same time either internal
Russian opposition or Western indifference could potentially hinder or even
halt the process underway. The domestic political environment is largely
beyond the influence of Western organizations. This article will conclude by

outlining areas of possible constructive involvement by the global
community.
Such involvement is made all the more essential by the well-publicized
failings of the 1972 'Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons and on their destruction' (the BW Convention). Concern over the
potential proliferation of biological weapons from the former Soviet Union
highlights the major deficiencies. These include the omission of a
requirement to produce evidence of compliance and no provision for
verification of Convention obligations by international assessors.116
Attempts have been made to address these deficiencies by the 1980, 1986
and 1991 reviews of the BW Convention but its continuing inadequacies
were recently demonstrated by the exposure of Iraq's programme, which
was one of the most extensive in the history of biological warfare.117 Given
that the Russian Federation has inherited the bulk of the R&D and
production facilities which were utilized by the Soviet Union in its offensive
BW programme it too provides ample illustration of the weaknesses of the
current global control mechanisms for biological weapons.
The past virtual total isolation of Russian facilities from both the
international community and the domestic bioindustry has until recently left
them beyond civil regulation. This paper argues that one of the most
effective means of monitoring research programmes at Russian BW
institutes, and simultaneously preventing an exodus of highly trained
weapons scientists, is for the international community to pursue a policy of
constructive engagement. This has already been partly achieved via ISTC,
NASA and similar programmes. However, in the longer term international
assistance should seek to focus on enterprise management and the creation
of a managerial culture, and on economic policy with advice from
international institutions on the reorganization of the sector. In addition
financial assistance should be provided to enable private Western
investment and the creation of joint ventures which will improve flexibility
and international competitiveness.
NOTES
1. D. Frolov, Biologicheskoe oruzhie, 'My nikogda ne nachinyali svoi makety boevymi

retsepturami', Sluzhba biozashchity budet zanimat'sya tol'ko zashchitoi, Nezavisimaya
gazeta, No.232(403), 2 December 1992, p.6; A Pashkov, Military deny involvement in
mysterious illness. Chief of CIS joint armed forces top secret military laboratories answers
journalist's questions for the first time, Izvestiya, Morning Edition, 17 April 1992,
translated in Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1367, 29 April 1992, p.C2/6.
2. Ostankino Television, 17 February 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV, 1 March 1993, carried in
Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, June 1993, p. 12. General Valentin Ivanovich
Evstigneev (Candidate of Medical Sciences) was the former head of the 15th
Administration for Biological Protection, which was one of the most secret administrations
of the General Staff and responsible for running an offensive biological weapons
programme in breach of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. See ITAR-TASS News
Agency, Moscow World Service, 0135 gmt, 2 December 1992, carried in Summary of World
Broadcasts, SU/1558, 8 December 1992, p.C3/l; Nezavisimaya gazaeta, 2 December
1992, translated in JPRS-TAC, 30 December 1992, carried in Chemical Weapons
Convention Bulletin, No.19, March 1993, p.11.
3. M. Leitenberg, 'The Conversion of Biological Warfare Research and Development
Facilities to Peaceful Uses', in E. Geissler, J.P. Woodall (eds.), Control of Dual-Threat
Agents: The Vaccines for Peace Programme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994),
pp.77-105.
4. Given recent defence cuts the staff is now likely to be smaller. D. Frolov, 'My nikogshe'.
5. P. Altunin, 'Interviewee of the Day; I wish the armed forces health', Krasnaya zvezda, 3
February 1994, pp. 1-2, translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central Eurasia,
JPRS-UST-94-017, 9 August 1994, p. 113.
6. It has undergone a whole series of name changes in the past sixty years including possibly
the Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene and the Medical-Technical Institute
(STI). See E.N. Whlyakov and E. Rubinstein, 'Human Live Anthrax Vaccine in the former
USSR', Vaccine, Vol.12, No.8 (1994), p.727. According to Pimenov the inhabitants of
Kirov, perhaps confused by the many changes of name, still refer to the facility as the 'Red
Army institute' (Institut Krasnoi Armii). V. Mokhov, 'Sekrety voennykh biologov',
Krasnaya zveda, 19 December 1992.
7. V. Mokhov, ibid. Hirsch reports that the Red Army's Scientific-Medical Institute
(presumably the forerunner to the present Institute of Microbiology) was in existence at
least as early as the spring of 1933. According to him it was originally based 'in the vicinity
of the Rublevsk Water Works near the Perelniskovo Station not far from the town of
Vlashchicha'. The director at that time was Ivan Mikhailovich Velikov (also referred to as
Velikonov). In 1935 Hirsch reports that a branch of the institute (known as V/2-1094) was
established on Gorodomyla Island (Lake Seliger) for the study of leprosy, plague, foot and
mouth disease and other pathogens. Professor Nikanarov was director of the new facility
although Velikov (Velikonov) retained overall control of both facilities. The decision to
move to Gorodomyla was taken because R&D with such pathogenic micro-organisms was
considered to constitute a serious threat to Moscow's population. See W. Hirsch, Soviet BW
and CW Preparations and Capabilities, translated by Zaven Nalbandian, unclassified
report prepared by the Intelligence Branch, Plans, Training and Intelligence Division,
Office of the Chief, Chemical Corps, Washington, DC, undated. According to Popovsky
the first director of the Kirov institute was Professor Velikanov who together with his wife
was shot. He also claims that some time after its formation the facility was transferred to
an island on Lake Seliger near Kalinin (now renamed Tver'). See M. Popovsky, Science in
Chains: The Crisis of Science and Scientists in the Soviet Union Today (London: Collins
and Harvill Press, 1980), p. 156. Interestingly, as late as the 1960s, Oleg Penkovskii
claimed that 'Near the city of Kalinin, on a small island in the Volga [presumably
Gorodomlya] there is a special bacteriological storage place. Here they keep large
containers with bacilli of plagues and other contagious diseases. The entire island is
surrounded by barbed wire and is very securely guarded.' See O. Penkovskiy, The
Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p.241. According to
a recent Russian report an institute for the study of foot and mouth disease was established
on Gorodomlya before the Second World War. It records claims that a 'top-secret germ
weapon was developed there'. Interviews with local inhabitants confirm that biologists
were at one time working on the island: 'According to old-timers, some biologists or
chemists came over, worked for a while, and then broke up camp and left.' Currently a top
secret defence munitions plant, Zvezda (Ostashkov-3) is based on the island. There has
reportedly been no admittance to Gorodomlya without a special pass since the 1930s and
guards are posted on the main landing stage. See M. Shitz, 'An Off Limits Island', New
Times International, No.32 (1993), pp.16-17.

8. V. Mokhov, 'Sekrety voennykh'.
9. Ibid. According to Popovsky, when the institute was transferred to Kirov, it occupied the
hospital in which Stalin, as Soso Dzhugashvili, had once been a patient before the
revolution. 'At that time the hospital was on the fringe of the town, but meanwhile Kirov
has expanded to such an extent that the former hospital with its concrete enclosure is now
located in the very centre of the city, just a stone's throw from the party's regional and
executive offices.' M. Popovsky, Science in Chains. Another source confirms that the
institute is located just 100 metres from Kirov's central square with its statue of Sergei
Kirov. Vachnadze, Georgii, Spravochnik oblastei, respublik, kraev i okrugov Rossiiskoi
Federatsii (Moscow: Kniga, 1995), p.231.
10. Popovsky, Science.
11. D. Frolov, 'My nykogda'. In June 1992 a report stated that 'a total of 114 officers who are
scientists' were employed at the Kirov facility including 36 State Prize winners, five
doctors of science, (and) 82 candidates (of science)'. See V. Litovkin, 'We have no
bacteriological weapons, military bacteriologists maintain', Izvestiya, 12 June 1992,
translated in JPRS-TND-92-019, 19 June 1992, p.22 and quoted in M. Leitenberg, 'The
Conversion of Biological Warfare'.
12. L.V. Lapin, A.L. Kovtun, B.A. Shabalin, A.V. Kibirev and N.V. Martynov
'Usovershenstvovanie metoda kontrolya kontaminatsii chumnykh vaktsin i ikh
polufabrikatov', Biotekhnologiya, No.3 (March 1994), pp.37-9; A.L. Kovtun, N.A.
Cherkasov, A.Z. Rogozhin, V.P. Nepranov, V.G. Kuznetsov and A.A. Bogatyrev, 'Otsenka
vozmozhnosti povtornogo ispol'zovaniya zhidkoi pitatel'noi sredy dlya prigotovleniya
polufabrikata chumnoi zhivoi sukhoi vaktsiny', Biotekhnologiya, No.9 (September 1993),
pp.31-4; I.V. Darmov, I.V. Marakulin, S.N. Yanov, A.A. Byvalov, T.G. Abdullin and E.V.
Smirnov, 'Construction of strains producing FI- and T-antigens to plague microbe',
Biotekhnologiya, No.6 (November-December 1992), pp.59-62, translated in JPRS, JPRS-
UST-94-009,18 April 1994, p.40; Yu.V. Chicherin, V.I. Evstigneev, V.A. Lebedinskii, N.P.
Dodonov and N.A. Cherkasov, 'Fiziko-khimicheskie i biologicheskie svoistva
tabletirovannoi chumnoi zhivoi sukhoi vaktsiny', Zhurnal mikrobiologii epidemiologii i
immunobiologii, No.4 (April 1991), p.79; A.A. Nesterenko, Yu.V Chicherin, V.A.
Lebedinskii, E.V. Chebotarev, N.P. Dodonov and S.N. Ermolin, 'Stabilizatsiya
kul'tural'nykh i immunogennykh svoistv vaktsinnogo shtamma EV i razrabotka referens-
preparata', Zhurnal mikrobiologii epidemiologii i immunobiologii, No.l (January 1991).
13. E. Geissler and G. Brunius, 'Information on high-risk laboratories', in E. Geissler (ed.),
Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention by Confidence-Building Measures
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp.80-104.
14. V.P. Syukrev, V.I. Khursa and A.A. Baranov, 'Konversionnye problemy aerozol'nykh
tekhnologii, Konversiya, No. 12 (1993), p.31.
15. The facility, which possesses its own rail spur, comprises an outer residential zone
(incorporating four- and five-storey apartment houses, shops, kindergartens, a stadium,
etc.), an inner industrial zone guarded by a checkpoint, and at its heart guarded by another
security post and barbed wire, the administration and production buildings and laboratories
engaged in secret work. 'The Generals and Anthrax', Russian Television, 0615 gmt, 16
September 1993.
16. The Deputy Directors of the Centre include Colonel Anatolii Mikhailovich Lobur' and
Colonel Gleb Arkhangelskii. L. Usacheva, Devyat' chasov za kolyuchei provolokoi, Poisk,
No. 11 (1992), p.5; K. Belyaninov, V. Nedogonov, V. Umnov and V. Chelikov,
'Priobnamzhenii meriya v bessoznatel'nom sostoyanii proshu soobshchit' v gorod
Sverdlovsk ...', Komsomol'skaya pravda. No. 104(20404), 10 June 1992, pp.1-2.
17. In 1986 the Scientific-Research Institute of Vaccine Preparations was renamed the
Military-Epidemiology Section (Sektor voennoi epidemiologii). See L. Usacheva, 'Smert'
pod shifrom 022', Poisk, No.50(85), 14-20 December 1990, p.3.
18. S. Parfenov, 'The secret of the "Sarcophagus'", Znamya yunosti, No.24, 25 October 1990.
The facility was originally sited on what were the outskirts of Ekaterinburg. However, as
is the case in Kirov, subsequent growth of the city means that it is now located in the middle
of a densely populated industrial district.

19. This estimate is based on V. Chelikov, 'A weapon against their own people', Moscow
News, 7-14 June 1992, p.8, reproduced in JPRS, Life Sciences, JPRS-ULS-92-022, 30
September 1992, pp. 10-12. Meselson states the number of residents living in apartment
buildings in Compound 19 as 'about 5,000'. See M. Meselson, J. Guillemin, M. Hugh-
Jones, A. Langmuir, I. Popova, A. Shelokov and O. Yampolskaya, 'The Sverdlovsk anthrax
outbreak of 1979', Science, Vol.266, 18 November 1994, pp.1202-8.
20. CBM submission (1992) for the Russian Federation. See M. Dando, Biological Warfare in
the 21st Century, Biotechnology and the Proliferation of Biological Weapons (London:
Brassey's (UK) 1994), p. 182. Among the research underway at the Centre before 1985 was
work on improved vaccines against anthrax and brucellosis, and work on glanders and
melidiosis, diseases for which no vaccines were then available. Other sources confirm that
the Centre formerly specialised in research on anthrax, and bubonic plague. K. Belyaninov
et al., 'Priobnaruzhenii'; 'The Generals and Anthrax' (1993), loc. cit.
21. L. Usacheva (1992), loc. cit.
22. V. Chelikov (1992), loc. cit.
23. A. Pashkov (April 1992), loc. cit.
24. Meselson et al., 'The Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak'. Pathological examination of human
victims consistently revealed lesions diagnostic of inhalational anthrax. See F.A.
Abramova et al., 'Pathology of inhalational anthrax in 42 cases from the Sverdlovsk
outbreak of 1979', Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., USA, Vol.90 (March 1993), pp.2291-4.
25. In general it has been reported that the Ekaterinburg facility had been developing an
improved anthrax vaccine. K. Belyaninov et al., 'Priobnaruzhenii'.
26. 'The Generals and Anthrax', loc. cit.
27. This facility was previously called the Division of Virology. See E. Geissler and G.
Brunius. 'Information on high-risk laboratories'.
28. CBM submission (1992) for the Russian Federation. See M. Dando, op. cit.
29. Ostankino Television, 17 February 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV, 1 March 1993,
reproduced in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.20, June (1993), p.12.
30. V.P. Krasnyanskii et al., 'Experience in the production of inactivated lassa fever vaccine',
Voprosy virusologii, No.6 (November-December 1993), pp.276-9, translated abstract in
JPRS, JPRS-UST-94-012, 8 June 1994, pp.69-70. Other agents which are studied in the P3
unit include plague, cholera, tularaemia, melidiosis, glanders, spotted fever, viral
encephalitises and haemorrhagic fevers. E. Geissler and G. Brunius, loc. cit.
31. Ibid.
32. I. Nevinnaya, Island of degeneration, Delovoi mir, No.61, 28 March 1992, p.l, translated
in JPRS, JPRS-ULS-92-013, 1 May 1992, pp.1-2.
33. The decision to use the island as a proving ground was made in 1952 but construction of
facilities did not begin until 1954. See S. Zeberkhanuly, 'Aral disaster', Zhas alash, 23
May 1992, p.2, translated in JPRS, JPRS-ULS-92-019, 2 July 1992, pp.3-5.
34. Military unit No. 25484 which was based on the island was part of, and subordinate to, a
larger unit based in Aral'sk, which itself received its orders from Sergiev Posad. Tests on
the island have recently been linked to various environmental disasters in the region.
Mayak Radio, Moscow 1200 gmt, 13 January 1992, translated in Summary of World
Broadcasts, SU/1278, 15 January 1992, p.B/15; S. Zeberkhanuly, Aral disaster, Zhas alash,
23 May 1992, p.2, translated in JPRS, JPRS-ULS-92-019, 2 July 1992, p.3; U. Esirkepov,
'There is an island of revival in the Aral ...: Who is declassifying the secrets', Molodezh
uzbekistana, 16 May 1992, p.5, translated in JPRS, JPRS-ULS-92-018, 23 June 1992,

pp. 1-2; S. Leskov, Plague and the bomb: Russian and US military bacteriological
programmes are being developed in deep secrecy, and present a terrible danger to the
world, Izvestiya, 26 June 1993, p.15, translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology,
Central Eurasia: Life Sciences, 27 August 1993, pp.8-12. One of the most detailed
accounts of an accident at the island is provided in S. Krymova, 'ChP na ostrove
vozrozhdeniya', Poisk, No.l5(101), 5-11 April 1991, p.6.
35. Subsequently in November 1991 at a meeting of the Scientific Council in Sergiev Posad
the decision was taken to terminate experimental work on the island. S. Kozlov, 'Ecology:
The scientists have abandoned the secret laboratory', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 June 1992,
p.6, translated in JPRS, JPRS-ULS-92-019, 2 July 1992, p. 1.
36. Russia's Radio, 1600 gmt, 9 May 1992, translated in Summary of World Broadcasts,
SU/W0231, 22 May 1992, p.A/11.
37. General Anatolii Kuntsevich is also quoted in the same report as stating that the material
base for weapon testing had been destroyed and that the island would be safe for civilian
use in two to three years. R.J. Smith, 'US fears Moscow still makes germ weapons'.
International Herald Tribune, 1 September 1992, pp.1, 6. In 1994 representatives from
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (the border between the two countries traverses the island)
utilized NATO channels to seek assistance with the decontamination of the proving ground.
Personal communication to the author.
38. The Red Army Military-Medical Directorate's Military-Medical Institute (Voennyi-
Sanitarnyi institut), incorporating the Central Medical-Hygiene Laboratory, was created on
10 April 1930. It was later renamed the Red Army's Scientific-Research Experimental
Medical Institute (Nauchnoissledovatel'skii ispytatel'nyi sanitarnyi institut Krasnoi Armii
or NIISI for short). NIISI was a multi-branch organization and may therefore have
incorporated laboratories at several separate locations. NIISI researchers, Aleksandrov and
Gefen, are reported to have developed a 'chemical vaccine' (based on antigens extracted
from the various microorganisms by use of the protease trypsin) which gave combined
immunization against typhoid, para-typhoid, dysentery, cholera and tetanus. This vaccine
was used by the Soviet army during the Second World War. The eventual fate of NIISI is
unknown although it may later have been absorbed by the S.M. Kirov Military Medical
Academy in St. Petersburg. L.D. Kuvshinskii and S.S. Georgievskii, Ocherki istorii
sovetskoi voennoi meditsiny (Leningrad, 1968), pp.135, 229, 521.
39. During the Soviet period NII VM was subordinated to the USSR Ministry of Defence's
Central Military Medical Directorate (Tsentral'noe voennomeditsinskoe upravlenie or
TsVMU (for short). TsVMU, itself subordinate to the Commander of the Rear Services of
the Armed Forces, was the highest administrative body for medical institutions in the
Ministry of Defence. It had its own Scientific Council composed of senior specialists from
the Ministry of Defence which played a major role in assigning and transferring staff to NII
VM and assessing research results. S.I. Peymer, Chemical warfare and radiation research
in the former Soviet Union: The Military Medical Academy and Institute of Military
Medicine (1970-1989) (Alexandria, Virginia: 1992), Global Consultants, Inc., p.20.
40. S.A. Kutsenko and V.I. Legeza, 'Instituto voennoi meditsiny - 25 let', Voennomeditsinskii
zhurnal, No.8 (August 1994), pp.73-4.
41. For reasons of secrecy the institute is reported to have used several different names
depending upon the organizations with which it was in contact: for some civil organizations
including purchasing and city departments it used 'IVM': for some more important civil
organizations including all military ones it was referred to as 'Unit #35' and papers were
marked 'secret' or 'top secret'; and for the USSR Defence Council and other higher-
authority bodies 'Institute of Defence' was used. Peymer, S.I., pp.2, 20.
42. Geissler and Bninius, NII VM has established a substantial infrastructure for its biological
weapons' research programme. During the late 1970s a special building containing various
exposure chambers was constructed for the institute by Voenproekt(the Chief Designer was
Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Vaisberg of the Engineering Corps). The design of the ventilation
systems and chambers meant that this facility was particularly suited for the testing of
biological weapons by NII VM's Third Directorate. The building was put into operation in
the 1980s. NII VM also possesses a P3 high-containment facility which has been used for
work on tularaemia, typhoid fever and tetanus. S.I. Peymer, p.79.
43. Bank dannykh: proizvoditeli produktsii i uslug, NTK, 'ASU-Impul's', Moscow, Version 26
February 1992.
44. Meeting with Vladimir N. Davidov of the State Concern Biopreparat, Moscow 22
September 1993. The author was a member of a delegation visiting the Russian Federation
under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry Overseas Science and
Technology Expert Mission's (DTI OSTEMS) scheme. The objective of the mission was
to learn about Russian programmes in biotechnology, with a view to exploring the scope
for future collaboration in this field. The findings of the OSTEMS team are presented in
OSTEMS Mission to Russia, September 20-30, 1993 Mission Report, Biolndustry
Association, London, 1994, 35 pp.
45. L.P. Telegin, 'Antibiotic industry is 50 years old', Antibiotiki i khimoterapiya, Vol.39, No.l
(January 1994), pp, 11-12, translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central
Eurasia, JPRS-UST-94-030, 14 November 1994, pp.57-8.
46. Interview with Yurii Tikhonovich Kalinin, current Chairman of the Board of Biopreparat
in V. Kaisyn, 'Top secret: Drugs: A defence or a weapon?!'. Pravda, 15 October 1992, p.4,
translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central Eurasia, Life Sciences, JPRS-
ULS-92-025, 25 November 1992, pp.42-44.
47. V. Umnov. 'Opasnost' bakteriologicheskoi voiny ostaetsya', Komsomol'skaya pravda, 19
September 1992, pp.11-12.
48. Vsevolod Ivanovich Ogarkov, Biotekhnologiya, Vol.3, No.5 (1987).
49. S. Leskov, 'Chuma i bomba. Voennye bakteriologicheskie programmy v Rossii i SShA
razrabatyvayutsya v glubokoi taine i predstavlyayut dlya mira strashnuyu ugrozu',
Izvestiya, No. 118(23973), 26 June 1993, p.15.
50. The most comprehensive account of the nature and extent of this programme is provided
by M. Leitenberg, loc. cit. A more sensational but nevertheless informative version of this
story can be found in J. Adams, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage
(London: Hutchinson, 1994), pp.270-83.
51. V. Litovkin (1992), loc. cit.
52. T. Malleret, Conversion of the defence industry in the former Soviet Union, (New York:
Occasional Paper Series of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1992).
53. This facility was formerly the Science Production Association Vektor and became a State
Scientific Centre in 1993. See V. Chernomyrdin, 'Implementation of Edict of President of
the Russian Federation', No.939, 22 June 1993, 'On State Scientific Centres in the Russian
Federation', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 April 1994, p.4, translated in JPRS Report, Science &
Technology, Life Sciences, JPRS-UST-94-012, 8 June 1994, p.l. Its new name was
confirmed in G.A. Kostina, el al., 'Tekhnologiya proizvodstva syvorotki krovi zhivotnykh-
rekonvalestsentov dlya profilaktiki i lecheniya virusnykh infektsii', p.73 in Materialy
mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, Perspektivy razvitiya proizvodstva
biopreparatov dlya meditsiny i sel'skogo khozyaistva (Stepnogorsk: Kazakh National
Centre for Biotechnology, 1995).
54. S. Ptichkin, Gde zhivet chuma, Rossiskaya gazeta, 25 July 1995, p.3.
55. V. Pokrovsky, 'Russia to identify key centres', Nature, Vol.364, 5 August 1993, p.475.
56. Ukaz prezidenta Rossisskoi Federatsii, 2420 O gosudarstvennykh nauchnykh tsentrakh
Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Sobranie aktov Prezidenta i Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii,
No.26, 28 June 1993, p.2, 640.
57. Meeting with Mikhail P. Kirpichnikov, then Director of the Russian Ministry of Science
and Technology Policy's Administration of Life Sciences and Scientific-Technical
Progress in Biotechnology and the Timber Industry Complex, Moscow, 20 September
1993. The author was a member of a DTI OSTEMS delegation visiting the Russian
Federation. Within the past year or so the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences
has been discussing proposals concerning the creation of a major new academy, the
Russian Technical Academy (also referred to in some documents as the Russian Scientific-
Technical Academy). It was intended that this organization would embrace all institutes
and centres engaged in civilian and military applied R&D, including the Biopreparat
centres referred to above. The new Academy was to have been charged with providing
scientific support for conversion of the military-industrial complex and assisting civilian
branches in the utilization of dual technologies. However, thus far a majority within the
Presidium have resisted this move towards increased bureaucratization and the Ministry of
Science's system of federal research centres survives intact. V. Pokrovsky, 'Russian
academy seeks a wider role in military research'. Nature, Vol.372, 17 November 1994,
p.208; V. Pokrovskii, 'Defensive "card" with an academic face. Under the oversight of the
First Vice Minister', Segodnya, No.3, November 1994, p.9, translated in JPRS, JPRS-UST-
94-034, 12 December 1994, p.1; Pochemu zakryty dveri, Poisk, No.47 (289), 26
November-2 December 1994, p.l.

58. V. Umnov (1992), loc. cit.
59. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii o strukture federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noi
vlasti, Rossiiskie vesti, No.6(430), 11 January 1994, p.l.
60. 'Rossiiskie farmakologi svoimi razrabotkami mogli by zavoevat' mir ..., Otchet s tret'ei
(LXVI) sessii Obshchego sobraniya RAMN, Meditsinskaya gazeta, No.l5(5448), 25
February 1994, p.l.
61. E.A. Nechaev, 'Scientific concept of provision of medicines and drugs to Russian
population', Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii Meditsinskikh Nauk, No.7, July 1994, pp.5-10,
translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central Eurasia, JPRS-UST-94-033, 9
December 1994, pp.46-51.
62. Nechaev is a retired Colonel-General of the Medical Services. During his period of service
in Afghanistan he worked as the chief surgeon in the Central Military Hospital in Kabul.
During the period 1985-87 he was chief surgeon of the Soviet forces based in Germany.
From 1987 tol988 he was Deputy Head of the S.M. Kirov Military Medical Academy. He
served as chief surgeon of the USSR Ministry of Defence from 1988 to 1989. Nechaev's
military career is outlined in Yubilei, Voenno-meditsinskii zhurnal. No. 12, 1994, pp.68-9.
63. 'Rossiiskie farmakologi svoimi razrabotkami mogli by zavoevat' mir..., Otchet s tret'ei
(LXVI) sessii Obshchego sobraniya RAMN', Meditsinskaya gazeta, No.l5(5448), 25
February 1994, p.l; E.A. Nechaev, 'Scientific concept of provision of medicines and drugs
to Russian population', Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii Meditsinskikh Nauk, No.7 (July 1994),
pp.5-10, translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central Eurasia, JPRS-UST-
94-033, 9 December 1994, pp.46-51.
64. Rossiiskaya gazeta. First Edition, Moscow, 28 February 1992, translated in Summary of
World Broadcasts, Part 1, Former USSR, SU/1317, 29 February 1992, p.C3/l.
65. Reuters, 22 June 1994, carried in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.25
(September 1994), p.22. Syutkin was formerly a Deputy Chairman of the Committee
overseeing the Department concerned with compliance to the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention. Kuntsevich was dismissed as Chairman in April 1994. See D. Frolov, 'Lateral
move: Generals come and go, chemical weapons remain', Segodnya, 9 April 1994, p.2,
translated in JPRS, JPRS-UST-94-010, 3 May 1994, p.l; Yeltsin closes plague plants,
Sunday Times, No.8,851, 10 April 1994, p.19.
66. The 1994 appropriation for the Committee was reported to be 735.9 million roubles. See
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 July 1994, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 July
1994, carried in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.25 (September 1994), p.24.
67. Russian CW Destruction Program President's Committee, 22 July 1993, unpublished
research document kindly provided by academic colleague.
68. Information based on report of meeting with members of the Committee on Convention
Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons by Western company, 1992.
69. V. Litovkin, 'El'tsin zapretil raboty po bakteriologicheskomu oruzhiyu. Eto znachit: on
velis', a nas obmanyvali', Izvestiya, Moscow Edition, No.99 (23673), 25 April 1992, p.l.
70. Evstigneev also reports that his Directorate has agreed to begin production of a vaccine
against typhus but no further details are provided. D. Frolov (1992), loc. cit.
71. V. Mokhov (1992), loc. cit.
72. The first antibiotics were manufactured in the Soviet Union during the Second World War.
It is not therefore surprising to find that military microbiological facilities were responsible
for their output. See L.P. Telegin (1994), loc. cit.
73. Live vaccines against tularaemia and plague were used by the Soviet army during the
Second World War. See L.D. Kuvshinskii el al., loc. cit.
74. S.V. Netesov (1994), loc. cit.
75. A. Zinov'ev, 'Eshche odno lekarstvo ot SPIDa?', Izvestiya, 11 June 1991; D. Fishlock,
Biotech windfall from the Soviets, Financial Times, 3 January 1991; Soviet Weekly,
No.2552, 31 January 1991. One of the treatments, Ridostine, underwent initial trials at
King's College Hospital in London. If successful, Oxford Virology had intended
approaching a Western pharmaceutical company to undertake clinical trials. A brochure
detailing the full range of products and services offered by Vektor was advertised and
distributed by Oxford Virology in the early 1990s. In a more ambitious project in 1990 Dr
Alibekov, a senior official within Biopreparat, undertook negotiations with Derek Lennon,
Chairman of Oxford Virology, concerning the formation of a joint venture which would
comprise of his company, Moscow Narodny Bank, the State Concern Biopreparat and the
Science Production Association Vektor. The aim of the joint venture would be to 'market
services, (and) promote into the world market the products and technologies of Biopreparat
subordinate facilities and research and development centres.' Unfortunately Oxford
Virology ceased trading before negotiations concerning the creation of the new venture
were complete. R. Highfield, 'Soviet drugs could be used to treat UK patients', Daily
Telegraph, 21 May 1991, p.4; NPO Vector, Novosibirsk, Siberia, USSR, Biological
Sciences - Research and Production. Products, distributed by Oxford Virology plc,
London, 75 pp.; Telex from Professor Alibekov to Derek Lennon, Chairman of Oxford
Virology plc, 12:46, 5 December 1990. Copy kindly supplied by Mr Lennon.
76. T. Malleret (1992), loc. cit.
77. Vektor is the Russian Federation's major supplier of restriction enzymes used in biomedical
research. However, production of Pharmaceuticals has thus far been very limited. See A.
Rimmington, Technology and Transition: A Survey of Biotechnology in Russia, Ukraine
and the Baltic States (London: Pinter Publishers; and Westport: Quorum Books, 1992),
S.V. Netesov (1994), loc. cit.
78. L.S. Sandakhchiev (1991), loc. cit.
79. Information kindly provided to DTI OSTEMS team in Moscow, September 1993.
80. Vektor, for example, has in recent years hosted visitors from SmithKline Beecham,
Merieux, Schering Plough, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Hofmann La Roche, Hoechst,
Novo Nordisk, Wellcome, Merck, Sharpe & Dohme, Ortho Diagnostic Systems, and
Pharmacia LKB Pribori. L.S. Sandakhchiev (1991), loc. cit.; S.V. Netesov (1994), loc. cit.
81. A.M. Harrington, 'Redirecting biological weapons expertise: Realities and opportunities in
the former Soviet Union', Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.29 (September
1995), pp.2-5.
82. In a similar way the Institute of Immunological Design is planning to pack and market
veterinary antibiotics which will be supplied from abroad. I. Mosin, 'Superlekarstva iz ...
morovoi yazvy', Trud, No.138 (22156), 3 August 1994, p.4.
83. 'Uvazhaemye kollegi!'. Catalogue issued by Vektor. Place and date of publication
unknown, p. 1.
84. Preparaty dlya meditsiny i veterinarii, loc. cit. (1992), p. 1.
85. Interview with Professor Nikolai Nikolaevich Urakov, Director, GNTsPM, Obolensk, 15
August 1995. One has to remain sceptical, however, about the eventual outcome of the Mir
project. Other, similar projects have been stymied. GNTsPM's plans to collaborate with the
US company Eli Lilly on the construction of a new plant for the production of recombinant
human insulin have failed to come to fruition. Similarly, although Merck, Sharpe & Dohme
carried out a feasibility study of vaccine production at Obolensk, no collaborative projects
have resulted from this exercise. Meeting with Professor Nikolai Nikolaevich Urakov,
Director of GNTsPM, 24 September 1993.
86. V. Chelikov (1992), loc. cit. Blood substitutes and cardiovascular preparations are also
slated for production at the new facility. Negotiations are reported to have been underway
with a US company or agency with regard to the supply of the necessary equipment.
However, perhaps understandably, given the 1979 disaster, the decision to build this new
factory has provoked opposition among local residents who refuse to accept reassurances
from the facility's directors that such a plant will utilize ecologically clean production
technologies. Pashkov, an Izyestiya reporter who visited Ekaterinburg late in 1991 was
'deeply convinced that without restoring the trust of the people and providing for the most
rigid safety measures, they will never begin the next production, which could be a potential
threat to a city of a million people'. L. Usacheva (1992), loc. cit.; A. Pashkov (1992), loc.
cit. At least one major Western company has looked at the possibility of commercializing
work underway at the Ekaterinburg Centre. During 1992 representatives of a major
corporation met General Vladimir A. Blatov, Chief Engineer of the Committee on
Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and who has specific
responsibility for Military Compound No. 19. Several of the vaccines under development
for use against infectious diseases in cows, pigs and horses were identified by the Western
side as being of interest to pharmaceutical companies. General Blatov was particularly
keen to include also diagnostics and special-purpose antibiotics in any prospective
collaboration but recognized the need to begin with animal vaccines. It was agreed that the
objects of further cooperation would be the conversion of the facility to peaceful uses with
projects being pursued on the basis of both Western and Russian demand for putative
products. It is not known if these contacts were pursued but the Western side agreed to
provide data on vaccine markets and potential companies which might be approached
while the Russian side agreed to provide additional data on Compound No. 19 and related
facilities. Information on Biological Warfare Compound No. 19 based on report of meeting
by commercial company, 1992.
87. T. Malleret, loc. cit. (1992), p.57.
88. Meeting with Tatyana V. Targonskaya, Marketing manager, Vektor, Fifth International
Exhibition 'Healthcare, Medical Technology and Pharmaceuticals', Zdravookhranenie-93,
Exhibition Centre, Krasnyi Presn, Moscow, 28 September 1993.
89. Although it should be noted that Western countries have imported a few of Biopreparat's
preparations. Veterinary antibiotics have been exported to Spain and medical antibiotics to
Switzerland. Meeting with Vladimir N. Davidov (Deputy Director) and other senior
personnel from the State Concern Biopreparat, Moscow, 22 September 1993.
90. V. Kasyn, 'Top secret: Drugs: A defence, or a weapon?!', Pravda, 15 October 1992, p.4,
translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central Eurasia: Life Sciences, JPRS-
ULS-92-025, 25 November 1992, p.44.
91. Information provided by Tatyana V. Targonskaya, Marketing manager, Vektor, Fifth
International Exhibition 'Healthcare, Medical Technology and Pharmaceuticals'
Zdravookhranenie-93, Exhibition Centre, Krasnyi Presn, Moscow, 12.25h, 28 September
1993.
92. Meeting with Professor Nikolai Nikoaevich Urakov, Director of GNTsPM, 24 September
1993.
93. I. Mosin, 'Superlekarstva iz ... morovoi yazvy', Trud, No.138 (22156), 3 August 1994, p.4.
94. Russian Pharmaceutical Company 'KONPO', Promotional catalogue, place and date of
publication unknown.
95. V. Shevtsov, 'Commercial proposals on organisation of joint production of biological
formulations for insect pest (lepidopterous, dipterous) control', International Conference
'Biotechnology St. Petersburg' '94, St. Petersburg, Russia, September 21-23, 1994.
Program and Abstracts, St. Petersburg, 1994, pp. 118-21. Shevtsov is the Director of the
Biotechnological Innovation Centre.
96. V. Kaisyn, 'Vizit k plennomu zveryu', Pravda, No.28(26,782), 4 February 1992, p.6.
97. A. Rimmington (1993), loc. cit.
98. A centre of biopreparation regulation has been created, Zashchita rastenii, No.l, 12
January 1994, pp.6-7, translated in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central Eurasia,
JPRS-UST-95-002, 13 January 1995, pp.51-52.
99. M. Leitenberg (1994), loc. cit.
100. The nature and extent of such exercises is rather obscure. In April 1992, for example, it was
reported that the Institute of Microbiology had been allocated a budget of 8 million roubles
for conversion and was providing important assistance to the creation of an agro-industrial
complex in Kirov. The same report talked of a special conversion programme that was
being elaborated for the Centre of Virology in Sergiev Posad. However, a few months later
General Evstigneev was complaining to a reporter that despite an original discovery at the
Centre related to the prophylaxis of AIDS, lack of funding meant that he was only able to
employ one or two scientists on this work. V. Litovkin (1992), loc. cit.; D. Frolov (1992),
loc. cit.
101. 'The Generals and Anthrax' (1993), loc. cit.
102. In conjunction with scientists from the Tyumen Institute of Oil and Gas the Centre's
researchers have also developed a method of eliminating fuel oil and other oil products
from water and soil with the concomitant production of microbial protein for use as animal
feed. A catalogue has now been published offering more than seventy services to the civil
sector ranging from the disinfection of hospitals, pharmacies and food industry enterprises,
to participation in resolving ecological problems facing the city and surrounding oblast'.
K. Belyaninov et. al. (1992), loc. cit.; L. Usacheva (1992), loc. cit.
103. L. Usacheva (1992), loc. cit.
104. A. Pashkov (April 1992), loc. cit.
105. E. Geissler, 'Vaccines for Peace: An international program of development and use of
vaccines against dual-threat agents', Politics and the Life Sciences, Vol.11, No.2 (August
1992), pp.231-43.
106. J. Hughes, 'For sale - Russia's best brains', Guardian, 15 September 1992.
108. Izvestiya, 12 June 1992, translated in FBIS-SOV, 16 June 1992, subsequently carried in
Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 17, September 1992.
109. A. Pashkov, 'Military deny involvement in mysterious illness. Chief of CIS joint armed
forces top secret military laboratories answers journalist's questions for the first time',
Izvestiya, Morning edition, 17 April 1992, translated in Summary of World Broadcasts,
SU/1367, 29 April 1992, p.C2/5.
110. Sunday Times, 27 August 1995, carried in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No.29,
September 1995, p.34.
111. A.M. Harrington (1995), loc. cit.
112. Meeting with Vladimir Petrovich Zavyalov, Institute of Immunological Design,
Lyubuchany, 16 August 1995. Projects are also underway with Western academic
institutions including joint research with the University of Birmingham on the production
of protein A (used in affinity chromatography and various types of immunoassay). This
information was kindly provided by Vladimir Tishchenko (Institute of Immunological
Design) and Professor R. Jefferies (Department of Immunology, University of
Birmingham).
113. P. Aldhous, 'Elite group struggle on with a little help from the West', Science, Vol.264, 27
May 1994, pp. 1264-7.
114. Meeting with Vladimir Petrovich Zavyalov, Institute of Immunological Design,
Lyubuchany, 16 August 1995. A whole range of conversion projects are currently being
implemented. The most important of these relates to the institute's expertise in clean room
technology. The facility possesses a suite of clean rooms for production of vaccines, other
Pharmaceuticals and electronic equipment. In conjunction with an unnamed Swiss
company one of the rooms is currently being utilized for the production of Pharmaceuticals
to 'international standards'. Other work with potential civil applications currently
undertaken at the institute includes research on the development of tableted insulin,
tableted cytokines (including recombinant interferon), and a 'super vaccine' to boost
immunity. A new associative vaccine against plague, cholera and anthrax is also under
development. Trud, 3 August 1994, translated excerpts in JPRS Report. Science &
Technology, Central Eurasia, UST-94-020, 20 September 1994, pp.41-2.
115. A.M. Harrington (1995), loc. cit.
116. Scientific aspects of control of biological weapons: Report of a Royal Society Study Group
(London: The Royal Society, 1994).
117. See for example R. Wright, 'Iraq comes clean on germ warfare'. Guardian, 7 September
1995.
Appendix 1
History and Organization of Biopreparat's BW Facilities

The State Scientific Centre of Applied Microbiology (Gosudarstvennyi nauchnyi tsentr
prikladnoi mikrobiologii or GNTsPM) is located around 100 km south of Moscow at Obolensk,
in the Serpukhov raion. It was created on the 18 April 1974 by a decree of the Central Committee
of the CPSU. Its Director since 1986 has been Professor Nikolai Nikolaevich Urakov, a former
Deputy Director of the Russian Ministry of Defence's Institute of Microbiology in Kirov.1
GNTsPM possesses a staff of 1,570 (of whom around 50 per cent are scientists) and occupies a
total area of 620 hectares including 228 hectares used for production.2 The institute is reported to
have been a major participant in Biopreparat's covert biological weapons programme and to have
tested genetically engineered pathogens in a purpose-built aerosol-dissemination chamber.3 It
possesses a P2 containment facility and has a range of vaccines under development against highly
pathogenic viruses including recombinant preparations against plague and anthrax, and molecular
preparations against anthrax and legionnaire's disease.4
The Institute of Immunological Design is located at Lyubuchany near Chekhov in the
Moscow oblast'. It was created in 1980 as an offshoot of GNTsPM's Laboratory of Molecular
Immunology headed by Vladimir Petrovich Zav'yalov. Zav'yalov became a deputy director of
the new institute in 1986 and was appointed director in 1989.' The institute was formerly 'top
secret' and 'was established to develop protective measures against biological weapons'.6 The
Lyubuchany facility embraces the full cycle of basic and applied R&D, fermentation (via a small
plant) and production of finished preparations (via its own tableting factory). It has more than 100
scientists on its staff.7 It played a major role in the development of technology for the production
of a live tularaemia vaccine and is engaged in the development of a chemical and molecular
vaccine against this agent. Diagnostic kits using monoclonal antibodies (luminescent and solid-
phase immunoenzymatic peroxidase- and penicillinase-linked methods) have also been created
for detection of tularaemia.8
The third Biopreparat facility which this paper focuses upon is the State Scientific Centre of
Virology & Biotechnology Vektor (Gosudarstvennyi nauchnyi tsentr virusologii i biolekhnologii
Vektor). It was established on the 25 March 1985 by Decree No.20 issued by the Central Board
of the Main Administration of the Microbiological Industry (Glavmikrobioprom).9 In 1994 the
Centre possessed a staff of 3,000 (including more than 120 with Ph.Ds or higher qualifications)
and its industrial buildings occupied a total area of 160,000 m2.10 Its Director is currently Lev
Stepanovich Sandakhchiev.11
Until the early 1990s Vektor remained a closed organization and even the list of pathogens
being studied by the organization remained classified.12 The head organization of Vektor, the
Scientific-Research Institute of Molecular Biology (NIIMB), also directed by Sandakhchiev, has
been identified in several different Western and Russian sources as having played an important
role in Biopreparat's covert biological weapons programme.13 Among the R&D projects currently
underway at Kol'tsovo is work aimed at the development of vaccines against a whole range of
highly pathogenic viruses including Marburg, Ebola, Lassa, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever.
Eastern equine encephalitis etc.14 At least one vaccine, against Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic
fever virus has been produced on a scale sufficient to allow Vektor to offer the preparation for sale
to potential domestic and foreign customers 'for research purposes'." Interestingly, in 1983 the
Crimean-Congo virus was being viewed as a potential biological weapons agent by the US
military who at that time had no therapeutic vaccine available, although the Department of
Defence was engaged in development of such a preparation.16
Appendix 2
Development of the STl anthrax vaccine by the USSR Ministry of Defence

The military development of a live spore 577-7 vaccine against anthrax and its subsequent
utilization by the Russian health and veterinary services is well documented in recent
publications. It was one of the first and most significant transfers of technology from military
microbiological facilities to the civilian bioindustry. Russia already possessed a two-stage
veterinary anthrax vaccine originally developed by Lev Semenovich Tsenkovskii in 1884" using
a method elaborated by Louis Pasteur." One of the first industrial production sites of the
Tsenkovskii vaccine was at the Kursk Biofactory which was commissioned and began output of
the anthrax vaccine in January 1896.
In 1935 the Red Army's Scientific-Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene (then
also known as the Medical-Technical Institute or STl for short) in Kirov was assigned the task of
developing a human anthrax vaccine. The decision to embark upon this project was prompted by
fears that anthrax might be employed against the Soviet Union's troops and/or the civilian
population. The authorities also wished to reduce the very high incidence of human anthrax in
various regions of the Soviet Union at that time. Before the Second World War, for example, there
were as many as 40 cases of anthrax per 100,000 head of population in Azerbaijan with similarly
high incidences in Kyrgyzia and other parts of Central Asia."
The first anthrax vaccine to be developed by the military microbiologists was in fact to find
widespread application in the Soviet Union's livestock sector. In 1940 a team of researchers at
the institute led by N.N. Ginsburg and A.L. Tamarin2" successfully derived two avirulent non-
capsulating B. anthracis strains, 577-7 and strain No.3, from virulent parents2' by culture in
coagulated horse serum. A new live vaccine containing 25 x 107 spores of 577-7 was then
developed and subsequently tested on more than two million agricultural animals.22 Since the
Second World War, the military anthrax vaccine has played a crucial role in reducing the
incidence of anthrax in livestock in Russia and the republics. The technology for the industrial
production of the veterinary S77 vaccine was transferred to a civilian industrial manufacturing
facility which enabled the number of animals being vaccinated to be increased from 38.4 million
in 1947 to 140 million in 1960, with a concomitant fall in the number of cases of anthrax from
30,500 to 3,500 over the same period.2'
The use of the military anthrax vaccine has not however, been without problems. In 1982
inoculation with contaminated 577 vaccine manufactured by the Orel Biofactory (subordinate to
the Russian Ministry of Food and Agriculture's Science Production Concern Rosagrobioprom)
resulted in illnesses and deaths of an unknown number of cattle and sheep.24 Besides specific
incidents such as this it was also found that not all animals injected with the vaccine developed
immunity and for those which did it was sometimes of short duration. As a result it was
recommended that in certain regions animals should have two shots of the vaccine (in spring and
autumn) which was both wasteful and expensive.2' Moreover, since the 1950s the more
widespread use of 577 vaccine has not led to an appreciable decline in the number of cases of
anthrax in the human and animal population and there has been a recurrence of the disease in
animals in the immediate period after inoculation. The deficiencies of the military veterinary
vaccine have led in recent years to its replacement by a new more effective preparation against
anthrax developed by a team of researchers working at the Russian Ministry of Food and
Agriculture's All-Russian Scientific-Research Institute of Veterinary Virology and Microbiology
in Pokrov (Vladimir oblast').™
The military researchers at the Institute of Microbiology (Kirov) also succeeded in their
original aim of creating an anthrax vaccine for human use. In 1943 Ginsburg and Tamarin
developed a human live anthrax vaccine based on a mixture of spores of the 577-1 and No.3
strains which was administered via skin scarification (91.3 x 108 spores) or subcutaneous
injection (5 x 107 spores). This work was followed in 1951-52 by a field trial in Moldova
involving vaccination of 141,663 individuals. This was highly successful and the risk of
contracting anthrax following vaccination was reported to have fallen by 5.4-fold. These results
led the USSR Ministry of Health to license the human 577 vaccine for administration by
HO CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY
scarification in 1953 and by subcutaneous inoculation in 1959. It may have been at around this
time that the technology for the industrial production of the human STI vaccine was transferred
to production facilities belonging to the civilian bioindustry.27 Although, officially, the use of the
vaccine was restricted to persons employed in high-risk occupations, immunization was also
extended to those members of the public living in endemic areas and by the late 1960s two
million individuals were being immunised annually.21 The military 577 vaccine is still employed
today and remains the only preparation currently available in the Russian Federation for use
against anthrax.29
The Institute of Microbiology appears to have established its own production of the human
STI vaccine at its subordinate facility, the Scientific-Research Institute of Vaccine Preparations.
This Ekaterinburg-based institute formerly possessed its own plant for the production of anthrax
vaccine." By the mix-1980s the facility is reported to have stockpiled 10 million doses of anthrax
vaccine which were stored at the base. However, some time in 1985 orders came from Moscow
to shut the plant down and it ceased to produce vaccine." Equipment from the military anthrax
plant then appears to have been shipped out to an unknown destination.'2
It is known that the STI vaccine was used to inoculate residents of the Chkalovskii raion
following the release of an anthrax aerosol from military compound No. 19 in April 1979 (see
above). Around 80 per cent of the 59,000 persons considered eligible registered for a voluntary
immunization programme," and were inoculated with triple shots of the STI vaccine.
Interestingly the vaccine produced at the Ekaterinburg facility was only used for vaccination of
the inhabitants of compound no. 19. The general population is reported to have been inoculated
with triple doses of a STI vaccine produced in Tbilisi, Georgia," presumably by the Science
Production Association Bakteriofag."
Other civilian spin-offs of the military anthrax research programme include a dry-spore
vaccine delivered by aerosol and a skin test to monitor immunity to anthrax following vaccination
or infection. The latter 'Anthraxin' test is in widespread use today in Russia for monitoring
postvaccinal immunity in humans and animals."
NOTES TO APPENDICES
1. For a full biography of Professor Urakov see A. Rimmington, Who's Who in Russia &
Republics Biotechnology (York: Technology Detail, 1994), pp.299-300. This volume was
written in collaboration with scientists from the COBIOTECH Information Centre in
Moscow.
2. Meeting with Professor Nikolai Nikolaevich Urakov, Director of the State Scientific Centre
of Applied Microbiology, 24 September 1993. The author was a member of a DTI OSTEMS
delegation visiting the Russian Federation. See Note 44.
3. J. Barry, 'Planning a plague?', Newsweek, VoI.CXXI, No.5, 1 February 1993, pp.20-22.
4. The Russian Federation does not employ the WHO system of containment levels. There 'P2'
containment may therefore span the upper limits of BL-2 and lower limits of BL-3. N.N.
Urakov, 'Obolensk Scientific-Production Complex: Outlook for cooperation with Western
companies', paper presented at workshop Russian Biotechnology: An Overview of its
Standards and Efficiency and Opportunities of Cooperation with Western Companies,
organized by Pharmaceutical Worldwide Database GmbH at DECHEMA, Frankfurt, 1-2
March 1993.
5. A. Rimmington (1994), op. cit., pp.332^1.
6. Trud, 3 August 1994, translated excerpts in JPRS Report, Science & Technology, Central
Eurasia, UST-94-020, 20 September 1994, pp.41^»2.
7. The 112 scientists include two Professors, five Doctors of Science and 46 Candidates of
Science. Institut Immunologii, Lyubuchany, Moskovskaya oblast', SSSR, Chekhov, date of
publication unknown, p.2.
8. Institut Immunologii, Lyubuchany, Moskovskaya oblast', SSSR, Chekhov, date of publication
unknown, p. 12.
9. Under the terms of the decree Vektor incorporated the Scientific-Research Institute of
Molecular Biology (Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut molekulyarnoi biologii, abbreviated to
CONVERSION OF RUSSIAN MICROBIOLOGICAL FACILITIES HI
NUMB), the Scientific Experimental Production Plant, the Scientific-Research Technological

Design Institute of Biologically Active Substances (Nauchno-issledovatel'skii
konstruktorsko-tekhnologicheskii institut biologicheski aktivnykh veshchestv, abbreviated to
N1KT1BAV) and the Experimental Agricultural Production Enterprise. While the bulk of
Vektor's R&D and production capability is concentrated in the town of Kol'tsovo near
Novosibirsk, N1KTIBAV is located at a site in the south-west of Berdsk, Novosibirsk oblast'.
It in fact adjoins the territory of, and has a close relationship with, Biopreparat's Berdsk
Factory of Biological Preparations. The latter facility is reported to have been one of four
production plants used by Biopreparat to mothball special equipment associated with
biological weapons production and was recently subjected to inspection by US and British
officials. Other sites visited include the Pokrov Factory of Biopreparations, the Omutninsk
Chemical Factory, the Scientific-Research Institute of Applied Microbiology and the
Institute of Especially Pure Biopreparations. L.S. Sandakhchiev, Innovation development
program of the Association "VECTOR'for 1992-1995 and till 2005 (Novosibirks, 1991); N.
Burbyga, 'Ne my, a SShA i Velikobritaniya gotovy k proizvodstvu biologischeskogo
oruzhiya, schitaet rossiiskii ekspert', Isvestiya, 5 April 1994; M. Leitenberg (1994), loc. cit.
10. S.V. Netesov, 'The Scientific and Production Association Vector: the current situation,
pp. 133-8 in E. Geissler and J.P. Woodall (eds.), Control of Dual Threat Agents: The Vaccines
far Peace Programme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). In 1990 the Association
possessed a workforce of 4,500. NPO Vector, Novosibirsk, Siberia, USSR, Biological
Sciences-Research and Production: Products, Catalogue issued by Oxford Virology pic,
London, 1990.
11. A. Rimmington, Ex-USSR Biotechnology Industry Contact Directory, Technology Detail,
York: 1993), p.84.
12. 'Vektor' protiv virusa, lnzhenernaya gazeta, No.56(237), May 1992; S.V. Netesov (1994),
loc. cit.
13. For an overview of this literature see M. Leitenberg (1994), loc. cit. Together with the
Scientific Experimental Production Plant the institute is located in the town of Kol'tsovo
near Novosibirsk. Construction at the site began in 1975. The first phase which was
completed in 1991 focused on NUMB which incorporates four laboratory buildings, two
animal houses, and 'experimental' and 'experimental technological' buildings. The second
phase planned for the period 1986 to 1995 involves construction of separate buildings for
production of vaccines, interleukins, peptides and cell culture-based Pharmaceuticals. L.S.
Sandakhchiev (1991), loc. cit.
15. Preparaty dlya meditsiny i veterinarii, Siberian Division of the Russian Academy of Medical
Sciences, 1992, pp.13-17.
16. E. Geissler, 'A new generation of biological weapons' pp.22-4 in E. Geissler (ed.),
Biological and Toxin Weapons Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
17. N.G. Ipatenko el al., 'Istoriya sozdaniya otechestvennykh i zarubezhnykh
protivosibireyazvennykh vaktsin', Veterinariya, No.3, March 1989, p.71.
18. V.A. Gavrilov, 'Immunogeneticheskie aspekty razrabotki protivosibireyazvennykh vaktsin',
Veterinariya, No. 10, October 1987, p.27' Biologi: Biologicheskii spravochnik (Kiev:
Naukova Dumka, 1984), pp.678-9. For a description of Pasteur's vaccine see P. Hambleton,
etal, 'Anthrax: the disease in relation to vaccines'. Vaccine, Vol.2 (June 1984), p.127.
19. E.N. Shlyakov and E. Rubinstein, 'Human live anthrax vaccine in the former USSR',
Vaccine, Vol.12, No.8 (1994), p.727.
20. U.E. Viestur, I.A. Shmite and A.V. Zhilevich, Biotekhnologiya: Biologicheskie agenty,
tekhnologiya, apparatura (Riga: Zinatne, 1987), p. 129.
21. 577-1 was derived from the virulent strain Krasnaya Niva (Red Cornfield), N.G. Ipatento
(1989), loc. cit.
22. E.N. Shlyakov (1994), loc. cit.
23. Official instructions for the application of liquid 577 vaccine in animals were approved by
the USSR Ministry of Agriculture's Main Administration for Veterinary Medicine on the 27
August 1956 (these instructions were revised on the 20 March 1970). In the case of the dry
vaccine these instructions were approved on the 8 March 1964 (revised 27 March 1970). See
A.D. Tret'yakova, Veterinarnoe zakonodatel'stvo, Vol.1 (Moscow: Kolos, 1972), pp.525-7.

24. I.A. Bakulov, V.A. Gavrilov and N.S. Kosyachenko, 'Sovremennye vozzreniya na
bezopasnost' zhivykh sibireyazvennykh vaktsin', Veterinariya, No.l, 1993, p.23.
25. N.G. Ipatenko, et al., 'RezuPtaty primeneniya vaktsiny protiv sibirskoi yazvy iz shtamma
55', Veterinariya, No.8 (August 1989), p.7.
26. The live Iyophilized spore anthrax vaccine is based on strain No. 55-VNHWM. It received
formal state approval in 1987 and has already been used on more than 600 million head of
livestock. See LA. Bakulov and V.A. Gavrilov, 'Immunoprofilaktika sibirskoi yazy
zhivotnykh, Vestnik sel'skokhozyaistvennykh nauki, Vol.419, No.8 (1991), p.129; N.G.
Ipatenko et at. (August 1989), p.9; L.A. Bakulov and V.A. Gavrilov, 'Evaluation of the
efficacy of 10-year use of strain 55-VNIIV ViM vaccine against anthrax in animals',
Veterinariya, No.8 (August 1994), pp.1115, translated in JPRS Report, Science &
Technology, Central Eurasia, JPRS-UST-94-031, 23 November 1994, p.50.
27. For example, according to a recent Russian directory of industry in Georgia and Armenia the
Science Production Association Bakteriofag based in Tbilisi, Georgia produces a 577 anthrax
vaccine for export. See O.V. Yuferev, V.E. Samusenko and L.K. Zhdanko, Biznes-karta
armenii, gruzii, promyshlennost', NPO 'Nauka' - MP 'NIK' (Moscow, 1992), p.108.
28. E.N. Shlyakov and E. Rubinstein (1994), pp.7278.
29. The 577 preparation is the only one for use against anthrax in the 1991 list of vaccines
officially approved by the USSR Ministry of Health. See V.A. Lyashenko, 'Vaktsiny v
zdravookhranenii SSSR. Obshchaya kharakteristika, Zhurnal mikrobiologii epidemiologii i
immunobiologii, No.2 (February 1991).
30. 'The Generals and Anthrax', Russian Television, 0615 gmt, 16 September 1993. According
to Evstigneev the Ekaterinburg plant also produced diagnostic preparations. See A. Pashkov
(April 1992), loc. cit. The live anthrax vaccine manufactured within the compound was a
dark brown liquid which was packed into ampoules. See V. Chelikov (1992), loc. cit.
31. 'The Generals and Anthrax' (1993), loc. cit; K. Belyaninov etal. (1992), loc. cit; A. Pashkov
(April 1992), loc. cit.
32. "The Generals and Anthrax' (1993), loc. cit. According to a retired General Andrei
Yakovlevich Mironyuk, a 'laboratory [from the Ekaterinbug Centre] was sent on several
Tupolev aircraft to the environs of Irkutsk'. This may have been the anthrax vaccine
production facility referred to in the text. See A. Pashkov, ' "I know where the anthrax in
Sverdlovsk [now Ekaterinburg] came from", a former counter-intelligence general informed
the editorial office', Izvestiya, All-Union edition, 25 November 1991, translated in Summary
of World Broadcasts, SU/W0209, 13 December 1991, p.A/21.
33. Posters urged people to obtain 'prophylactic immunisation against anthrax' and provided
information regarding times and places when anthrax vaccination would be available. M.
Meselson et al. (1994), loc. cit.
34. V. Chelikov (1992), loc. cit; K. Belyaninov et al. (1992), loc. cit.
35. According to a recent Russian directory of industry in Georgia and Armenia this facility
produces a 577 anthrax vaccine for export. See O.V. Yuferev, V.E. Samusenko and L.K.
Zhdanko, Biznes-karta armenii, gruzii, promyshlennost', NPO 'Nauka' - MP 'NIK'
(Moscow, 1992), p.108.
36. E.N. Shlyakov and E. Rubinstein (1994), p.728.

Anthony Rimmington - From Military To Industrial Complex The Conversion of Biological Weapons' Facilities in The Russian Federation

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This article was downloaded by: ["Queen's University Libraries,

From military to industrial

To cite this article: Anthony Rimmington (1996) From military to

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523269608404128

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any

Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.17, No.l (April 1996), pp.80-112

merely seeking to commercialise spin-offs from ongoing defence-related

organizations for the management of both Ministry of Defence and

and the international community as a whole. One of the most pressing

The Russian Military Microbiological Sector: The Framework for

Ministry of Health Ministry of Science Committee on Ministry of

devoted to work on improving vaccines against plague.12 The institute is

vaccine plant and the curtailment, at least temporarily, of various areas of

An Illicit Offensive BW Programme. The Biopreparat Network

Conversion: Economic and Ideological Impulses

policy towards the conversion of its BW facilities. Throughout the Soviet

The Reorganization of the Military Microbiological Sector

to stemming the outflow of personnel seeking employment abroad or in new

actively engaged in an applied R&D programme aimed at boosting

most modern and sophisticated in the Russian Federation, and particularly

Weapons (Komitet po konventsial'nym problemam khimicheskogo i

A Historical Seedbed for Conversion: The Transfer of Military

This previous history of technology transfer was recently alluded to by

considering the commercialization of offshoots from ongoing defence-

The Prospects for Conversion of Russia's BW Facilities

contamination from previous work on the development of biological

Western-produced generic drugs and acting as wholesale distributors for

recombinant a-2 interferon and v-interferon to Chinese production

kits for early detection of pregnancy.97

safety of microbial pesticides which find widespread use in Russian

Opposition to Yeltsin's Conversion Programme: The Military-Industrial

Lobur', Deputy Director of the Ekaterinburg Centre, the term 'conversion'

conversion of Russia's military microbiological facilities will play a key

intergovernmental organization based in Moscow comprising the USA,

beyond the influence of Western organizations. This article will conclude by

1. D. Frolov, Biologicheskoe oruzhie, 'My nikogda ne nachinyali svoi makety boevymi

Times International, No.32 (1993), pp.16-17.

of a densely populated industrial district.

uzbekistana, 16 May 1992, p.5, translated in JPRS, JPRS-ULS-92-018, 23 June 1992,

November-2 December 1994, p.l.

History and Organization of Biopreparat's BW Facilities

Development of the STl anthrax vaccine by the USSR Ministry of Defence

NUMB), the Scientific Experimental Production Plant, the Scientific-Research Technological

A.D. Tret'yakova, Veterinarnoe zakonodatel'stvo, Vol.1 (Moscow: Kolos, 1972), pp.525-7.

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