THE FORM OF FREEDOM IN PLATO’S ​

LAWS​
:

AN INTERPRETATION

Diego von Vacano 
Theoria​
, Volume 59, Number 132, September 2012 , pp. 45­59(15) 

En Grèce, il y avait des hommes libres parce qu’il y avait des esclaves

Albert Camus, ​
Cahiers

PART I

1.1 Introduction

Both perplexing and intriguing, Plato’s conception of ‘freedom’ in ​

The

Laws is not evidently coherent. It is perplexing because the Athenian

philosopher does not address the term directly or systematically, and it is

intriguing because his desultory references to ‘freedom’ seem to offer more than a

merely casual notion. In this last work of Plato, the idea of freedom gains a

substantive, albeit implicit, construction that marks a critical turn in the history

of political philosophy. “[It] is the first time in Western philosophy that we see

1 
 
an attempt to explicate, at least in part, the freedom of the individual in terms of

his or her capacities for rational inquiry.” 1 However, I believe Plato offers an

immanent ​
theory of freedom that goes beyond the equation of reason and liberty.

Fundamentally, it describes freedom as a an elite phenomenon, rather than as

popular-democratic. In other words, liberty is fully available only to an exclusive

few, not to the broad spectrum of a city’s members or citizens. The purpose of

this article is to attempt a reconstruction of this implicit theory, which runs

counter to the traditional view that freedom and democracy are cognates. The

argument of this article is to be understood in a limited context: Book III of

Plato’s last work. For the present purposes, it is not intended as a general

interpretation applicable to all of Plato’s corpus. While the status and valence of

‘freedom’ is not clear in ​

The Laws​
, I argue that there must be an immanent

understanding of the Form of this concept in this crucial work. In particular, the

article seeks to determine which is the elite that is privy to freedom. This elite is

comprised of leisured wise elders, the only agents who are able to exercise liberty

in a way that is close to the ideal Form of Freedom described in Plato’s work. This

intellectual ​
elite is distinct from political and social elites, which Plato finds

important sources of concern, as they may mislead a city towards inadequate

understandings of freedom.

1.2 Method and Argument

1  Bobonich (1991), p. 387 
2 
 
 The method I will employ is exegetic. Alternatively, an assessment of the

Platonic view of freedom could be carried out in light of the history of political

thought, yet this approach is available only to an ​

éminence grise ​
such as Hannah

Arendt. 2 I will examine the text for key passages in order to draw out the notions

that comprise Plato’s theory of freedom in ​

The Laws. I will seek to be consistent

with the Platonic world-view.

Based on the findings from the passages, I will provide an argument for

the presence of a theory of freedom in ​

The Laws. ​
It runs as follows:

a) In keeping with the theory of the Forms (or Ideas) found in the Platonic
corpus, I posit the Form of Freedom. Further, there are two “aspects”3 to
Freedom.
b) The first aspect is the freedom of the body, which I term the ‘organic
aspect,’ as it relates to phenomena that issue from the bio-physical,
somatic existence of man and woman.
c) The second aspect is the freedom of the soul, which I term the ‘civic
aspect.’4 Plato’s theology as political allows this terminology.
d) The two aspects are engaged with each other. This relationship is owed
to their location in a common space, the person; in other words, the
human constitution. ​ It is dialectical and not merely formal or inert
because each aspect has its own force.
e) What relates the two aspects is agency or volition (not will)​.
f) In the external world there is a ‘stochastic sphere,’ because, in the eyes
of humans, chance seems to govern it. It is that which extends beyond the
limits of reason.
g) The ethical command, derived from Plato’s theology, to ‘make sense of
the stochastic world,’ manifests itself in the organization of society along
the lines of laws that “congeal”5 reason. This is a task that is carried out

2
 ​
vide​
 Arendt (1961), p. 143 for a ​particular​ example of a method that treats the evolution of the idea of 
freedom in ​ la longue duree​ .  Arendt’s grasp and command of the history of the idea of freedom is 
illuminating, especially as it refers to the distinction between Christian (beginning with St. Augustine) and 
pre­Christian conceptions.  Constant also offers a useful wide­angle historical framework.  I will utilize these 
contributions only as historical guidelines. 
3
 ​
vide Laws​,  (Saunders edition), p. 371 (section 862) 
4
 The description of soul­related freedom as ‘civic’ may seem incongruous.  However, Plato’s theology is 
political, as I will explain below.  The soul­body antinomy (the ‘human constitution’) can be interpreted from 
a reading of the ruler­ruled antinomy (the ‘political constitution’) in the ​
Laws.  
5
 An analogy with a jigsaw puzzle is fitting.  The parts that make up a rational (and beautiful) image of the 
world must be examined, and once one piece is located in its place, it should not be removed­­ as laws, like in 
3 
 
 step by step and is thus quantitative.
h) However, Plato holds two principles, for which he does not offer
supporting evidence, that undermine his ethical project. Combined, these
two principles lead to his political-ethical authoritarianism:
1. The first is the belief that humans are by nature generally
unintelligent and wicked. I term this the ‘intellectual-moral first
principle.’ It is a ‘first principle’ because Plato, in the ​
Laws​
, states it
without foundation, proof, or evidence.
2. The second is the related belief that humans can actually regress
in their education. That is, that once they have acquired a certain
level of education, they can still degenerate to a baser
intellectual-moral level.
i) As a consequence of the above-mentioned problems, Plato holds that the
attainment of freedom that closely resembles the divine Form of Freedom
is open only to a few persons.
j) The form that this freedom of the few takes-- which coalesces organic
and civic freedom-- is one of ​ lex ludens, ​
i.e., ‘a game of law-making.’

In what follows I will first examine the text for the foundations of a theory of

freedom (Part II). Subsequently I will expound on the components of the

structure of this theory (Part III).

PART II

2.1 The Text

The very term ‘law’ connotes a definition, albeit negative, of the liberties

available to members of a citizenry. It delineates the boundaries of human

behavior that demarcate a society, and simultaneously ​

allows for acceptable

behavior. Plato does not proffer a clear positive definition of freedom. Plato’s

Laws ​
offers a particular account of these boundaries and, in the process of

Egypt, should not be changed once in their right frame. The view of the totality emerges once all the pieces 
are fitted together.  
4 
 
defining them, implicitly constructs a notion of freedom. Now the term freedom

eludes facile definition. It is a central concept in political philosophy but has

been defined in diverse manners by different authors in distinct periods. Plato’s

work ​
The Laws refers to freedom in certain instances, yet not at great length.

Plato does not examine the notion exhaustively or focus on it; he offers us a

sketch of an account of freedom in a quite perfunctory fashion. As the concept

holds particular importance both in legal theory and the history of political

philosophy, it seems apposite to examine Plato’s understanding of freedom in

The Laws.

Where does the notion of freedom emerge in the text? In Book III the first

and most important appearance occurs. There Plato’s Athenian Stranger6 posits

the idea that the best regime for a state is that of a ‘mixed’ constitution. He

declares that the two ‘mother’ constitutions are democracy and monarchy, and

the appropriation of the best of each by a new state (such as we would find in

Cleinias’ Cretan colony of Magnesia) makes for the best political order. The

“wisdom” of a monarchy and the “freedom” of a democracy are the respective

fortes.

Although somewhat inelegant, the iteration of the relevant passages will

help to read the text in search of the meaning of ‘freedom.’ The first important

passage (A) deals with the Persian monarchy, while the second (B) deals with the

corruption of the Athenian democracy. It is crucial to read the passages

6 Although not entirely justifiably, we may assume the Athenian Stranger’s utterances to 
be Plato’s views. 
5 
 
remembering that, for Plato, the relationship between ‘ruler’ and ‘ruled’ not only

refers to a polity’s ‘leadership’ and ‘the people,’ but also, in a person’s

constitution, to the soul-body antinomy.

2.2 The Persian Neglect of Reason

(A)
Athenian: Then let’s listen to the story. Under Cyrus, the life of the
Persians was a ​judicious blend of liberty and subjection​
, and after gaining
their own freedom they became the masters of a great number of other
people​ . As rulers, they granted a degree of liberty to their subjects and
put them on the same footing as themselves, with the result that soldiers
felt more affection for their commanders and displayed greater zeal in the
face of danger. The king felt no jealousy if any of his subject was
intelligent and had some advice to offer; on the contrary, he allowed ​ free
speech and valued those who could contribute to the formulation of policy;
a​sensible man could use his influence to help the common cause. Thanks
to freedom, friendship, and the practice of pooling their ideas, during that
period the Persians made progress all along the line.7

It appears that the constitution should be a mixed one, where democracy

(freedom) and monarchy (wisdom) are coalesced. In a polity, the ruling group

should possess an adequate coercion mechanism (“subjection”) but also permit a

degree of free speech to the subjects. Nevertheless, we can aver that Plato’s

words fall short of a real coalescing: the liberty is a concession, and it is limited to

the eliciting of proposals that will serve as contributions to the bulwarks of the

regime. In no sense is there an ‘equal partnership’ or a balance of powers

between the two elements. The free speech of the citizens is led-along by the

wisdom of the ruler. In this manner the Persians progressed; here we get a

7
 Ibid. p. 144 (694)  
6 
 
glimpse of Plato’s view of history, which seems to follow a linear, teleological

structure.

A person’s constitution reflects a similar pattern. Plato’s tenet that the

soul is master of the body permits us to read the passage with an eye to the

intra-personal order. The ideal would seem one where the rational soul allows a

degree of liberty to the body, with the result that it becomes more amenable to

the commands of reason. A parallel to the free speech of subjects is the

flourishing of particular abilities of specific bodily or natural predispositions,

including emotions and instincts. In this way the soul/reason in a sense learns

from the corporeal aspect of the person, thereby becoming more self-conscious

and hence holistic.

The crisis of the constitution emerges when the ruling capacity

concentrates on external concerns and, in a sense, ​

neglects itself. On the one

hand, the neglect is of its ‘extension,’ i.e., its corporeal aspect. On the other, it is

of the mental/rational ability itself. The Athenian Stranger believes that Cyrus

“never considered, even superficially, the problem of correct education; and as

for running a household...he never paid any attention at all.”8 Cyrus’ foreign

adventures distracted him from his people (the corporeal aspect) but, more

importantly, from his own household. The analog for household in this respect is

the mind as a whole. Cyrus did not mind the education of his son Cambyses. The

heir was raised not under the strict discipline of traditional Persian ways, but

8
 Ibid. p. 145 (694) 
7 
 
under an effete, emasculated, and incomplete education. Cambyses can be seen

as an incomplete idea in the mind, as a loose thread that, because left untended,

was pulled by an instinct and ultimately unraveled the whole fabric.

Freedom, thus, is a problem when located too easily within the reach of

members of the ruling class. In the account of Persia’s decline, Plato does not

proffer that ‘the people,’ having tasted the savory morsel of free speech, jumped

to wrest the entire fruit of freedom. He takes pains at explaining the centrality of

Cambyses as the precursor of a period of “unrestrained debauchery.”9 Thus, the

mind as a whole can suffer from the neglect given to a nascent component of

reason.10 Consequently​
, this component may, owing to the pull of the instincts,

allow the entire constitution to shift towards the irrational, natural, ‘organic

freedoms’ (such as sexual license, alcoholic intoxication, passionate behavior,

etc.) Just as the danger to the polity lies not primarily in the people but in

misguided rulers, the danger to the person lies not principally in the pull of the

instincts, but misguided reasoning.

2.3 The Athenian Miscegenation of Reason

(B)
Athenian​ : Very well. ​When the old laws applied, my friends, the people
were not in control; on the contrary, they lived in a kind of ‘voluntary
slavery’ to the laws​...I’m thinking primarily about the regulations of the
music of that period (music being the proper place to start a description of
how life became progressively freer of controls)...People of taste and
education made it a rule to listen to the performance with silent attention
9
 Ibid. p. 146 (695) 
10
 For example, the mathematical, the grammatical, the rhetorical, etc. being neglected over the others. 
8 
 
 right through the end; children and their attendants and the ​ general
public could always be disciplined and controlled by a stick. Such was the
rigour with which the mass of the people was prepared to be controlled in
the theatre, and to refrain from passing judgment by shouting. ​ Later, as
time went on, composers arose who started to set a fashion of breaking
the rules and offending good taste. They did have a natural artistic talent,
but they were ignorant of the correct and legitimate standards laid down
by the Muse. Gripped by a frenzied and excessive lust for pleasure, they
jumbled together laments and hymns...11

In the case of Athens, the point that a moral hazard exists among the elites

rather than ‘the people’ is even sharper. Plato describes the ‘old days,’ as having

no concessions to freedoms as did the Persian monarchy of Cyrus. The people

were used to obeying the dictates of the ruling class. And, it was those most

knowledgeable of harmony, the composers, that began to experiment freely with

its elements. It seems that their position resembles that of Cambyses: luxury

enabled the Persian ruler to dispense with a martinet education, while the

Athenian composers possessed (being free from the necessity to engage in a

trade) the luxury to question the very foundations of their ‘occupation’ or

position. This critique emerges indirectly, through the apparently playful

12
exercise of their art, that is, “unintentionally.” In the same manner that

Cambyses and later Xerxes13 succumbed to the pull of their instincts and pursued

the organic freedoms of pleasure, the composers asserted that “the most correct

criterion is the pleasure of man.”14 This abandonment of norms was, in both

cases, unintended​
. The Persian heirs, being miseducated as children, and the

11
 Ibid. p. 153 (700)  
12
 Ibid. p. 154 (700) 
13
 Ibid. p. 146 (695) 
14
 Ibid. p. 154 (700) 
9 
 
Athenian composers “unintentionally” became retrograde. Eventually, “the

audiences, once silent, began to use their tongues:”15 the people, ‘the man in the

street,’ began to drop the veil of inhibitions.

Such retrogression to the more primordial freedoms of the instincts, the

unbinding of restraints, began, according to Plato, in circles of “gentlemen.”16 It

would have been acceptable, he says, for this disposition to experience the

freedoms of the senses to occur only among the gentlemen. But it seems that the

contagion inevitably spreads to the people, as “complete license was not far

behind”17 the discord in music. The challenge to music, that is, to ​

nomoi​
,

eventually leads to the challenge of established laws by all sectors of society.

We can imagine the usual response of human bodies to music to envision

the mirror-process of the retrogression in the human individual constitution.

Dancing seems to ensue in a natural manner. Of course, the physical movements

and the response of the passions are dependent on the characteristics of the

music (rhythm, timbre, loudness, etc.). In the old days, a person’s instincts,

emotions, and bodily parts would pliantly accept the rules given by his or her

rational soul. This was owed to the fact that the reasoning was well-ordered.

However, apparently inexplicably,18 certain diverse mental skills jumped on the

same train of thought that would lead to the disturbance of their ‘opposite

numbers’ in the organic realm, pleasures and instincts. Choice does not seem to

15
 Ibid. p. 154 (701) 
16
 Ibid. p. 154 (701) 
17
 Ibid. p. 154 (701) 
18
 Plato merely says that at some time the corrupt composers appeared on the scene. 
10 
 
be the reason, as this process occurs unintentionally. The problem seems to arise

when ​
mixing of distinct types of rational inquiry occurs. The composers mixed

paeans and dythyrambs; it could be possible that the danger for the individual is

the improper mixing of two strands of thought or reason,19 leading to

emancipated emotions, instincts, or bodily processes.

From the assay of the Persian and Athenian cases we can gather that the

crisis of the constitution emanates from the higher realms of reason, not the pull

of the instincts or pleasures. That the inception of degeneration occurs in reason

does not necessarily mean that the body’s process will degenerate as well.

However, Plato does claim that the retrogression of rationality effects a similar

disjunction in the body. Plato focuses precisely on “the capacities for rational

inquiry” and their tendency to fall to neglect and mixing-up, not on the demands

of the somatic.

The retrogression is, in effect, a transition from the freedom to

participate in the political life of the community20 to the baser, more primordial

freedom to satisfy desires and pleasures. This second freedom, the ‘organic’ type,

while satisfying to a part of human being (the instincts) stands in the way of civic

freedom, which organizes the city in view to divine order. As such, organic

freedom draws the will internally, to the individual, and hence foments the

ultimate political malady: atomization.21 Thus it is the precursor of modern

19
 One possibility is ‘interdisciplinary studies.’ 
20
 The “classical view of freedom,”  according to Constant and Arendt 
21
 Which is not Plato’s concern in his discussion of the two types of doctors.  However,  the pull of the 
11 
 
“individual freedom.”22 It is also the aspect of Freedom that is in a sense ‘slavish’

itself,23 for it is bound to be the object of restraint by the coupled forces of reason

(as civic freedom) and the ethical obligation imposed on the will by theology.

PART III

3.1 The Form of Freedom

There is no single comprehensive account of the Forms in Plato’s corpus,

yet the theory is present throughout. In order to build the structure of my

argument for the existence of a Platonic theory of freedom in ​

The Laws, I will

start from the claim that there is an Idea of Freedom.

Unity in difference is the heart of the theory of Forms. Plato believes that

an individual’s unique characteristics cannot be possessed by another individual.

However, we observe that some attributes held by an individual are qualitatively

identical to another individual’s. For example, a lawyer is free to travel abroad

for vacation, while a welder is free to play a sport on the weekend. The

qualitative trait shared by them is the freedom to act. This freedom can differ

quantitatively: the lawyer can choose to go to Paris, Madrid, London, or Rome,

while the welder may play rugby or soccer. The difference in number makes the

distinction possible, without having to compare the activities themselves. Plato

posits that there must be an entity that explains the qualitative identity between

instincts also promotes atomization, not just unwillingness to be persuaded. 
22
 It may be identical to it.  The modern idea of satisfaction of an individual’s own desires reverts to organic 
freedom. 
23
 ​
vide infra ​
section 3.4 
12 
 
the two acts. In a sense it must be identical to the two, or it would not serve to

equate them. However, it must also be different, because if it were wholly

identical to one of them, it would not be able to include the other as well. Thus,

the Form of Freedom emerges. One could object to this schema by pointing out

that the quantitative difference per se obviates identity. Further, without

examining the internal (i.e., qualitative) content of each act, the identity is not

altogether immediate. Nevertheless, this sketches a view of the Platonic theory of

Forms.

The Form of Freedom explains the existence of freedom in different

phenomena, such that disparate things or acts can be characterized as ‘free.’ In

relation to human beings, who are conceived of as beings constituted by body and

soul (which are distinct but unified), there are two manifestations of freedom in

the phenomenal world, one pertaining to the somatic, the other to the sphere of

the soul. This distinction follows Plato’s view that a thing can have different

“aspects” and hence be described with different, often contradictory terms.24 To

the extent that a person achieves a harmony between soul and body, he or she

achieves virtue, for “virtue is this general concord of reason and emotion.”25

3.2 The Aspect of Organic Freedom

The first aspect of human freedom is the organic. I believe this word

captures the full range of a class of liberties associated with the bodily aspect of

24
 Ibid. p. 371 (862), 367 (860) 
25
 Ibid. p. 86 (653) 
13 
 
humans. In this term I intend to include the biological and physical

characteristics. It entails instincts, emotions, pleasures, pains, passions, and

physiological functions and processes. The processes of aging, procreation,

eating, and drinking are examples.26 Sexuality27 plays a central role because it

links the human species to time, through the inter-generational aspect. Generally,

the organic can be described as ‘involuntary’28 because it is faced by the ‘unfree’

dimension of instinct. The satisfaction of pleasures is in a sense ‘leisure’ or ‘play,’

for it is a natural freedom related to realized instinctiveness. Children’s discovery

of play epitomizes this phenomenon.29 In this manner, ‘play’ is the essence of

organic freedom.

The inert inception of the organic is owed to its material base. There is a

tendency to rest rather than motion in the organic. But because of its

relationship to the soul-related aspect of freedom, it gains motion. A historical

‘development’ emerges, as time is apprehended through the trans-generational

continuum of the species. The idea of time is divine; for Plato a city’s level of

progress must be measured according to the degree to which it replicates God’s

design. From this, Plato’s hierarchical thinking emerges, as we see a

‘gerontocratic’ view that favors the wisdom of the old over the qualities of the

26
 Ibid. p. 265 (782) 
27
 The relationship between woman and man is quite complex and is beyond the scope of this article.  its 
importance is such that it merits independent attention.  
28
 Plato’s discussion of homicide sheds light on this. However, I believe he applies the misnomer of 
‘involuntary’ to accidental deaths, while in reality his ‘in­between’ category of ‘death by passion’ is more 
suitable to be termed involuntary because the passion of anger overwhelms agency. ​ vide ​
Ibid. p. 380 (867) 
29
 Ibid. p. 283 (797) 
14 
 
young.30

3.3 The Aspect of Civic Freedom

The second aspect of human freedom is that related to the soul. It is not a

‘spiritual freedom’ in the modern sense, such as the expression of one’s faith, but

it springs from human association. Plato’s theology, as an account of the soul, is

fundamentally a ​
political theology. ​
I use this term because Plato’s doctrine of the

soul differs from the Christian one in that it defines it as rational, thought- and

knowledge-oriented rather than ‘faith’-oriented. Hence it is not strictly

‘spiritual.’ It is, ​
par contre, ​
related to the ‘mental life.’

Crucial, however, is Plato’s conception of God and the cosmos as

rationally-ordered. And, if humans are to partake of the rationality of God’s

universe, they should strive to imitate it in the world. Hence, the religious project

is not the communion of the individual with God, but the partaking of God’s

design by engaging in the terrestrial imitation of it. Reason is the channel, and

the bringing about of reason in the world can be carried out by law-making. Thus

in this sense it is ‘civic’ because it is city- (i.e., polis) related. ‘Political

participation’ qua freedom is thus the ‘liberty of the ancients.’

Civic freedom, as organic freedom’s opposite number, also contains a

variety of manifestations. Generally speaking, it is the possibility to get involved

30
 Plato does see qualities in the young, but it appears they are instrumental with respect to the those of the old. 
For example, in the Nocturnal Council, the young serve as the ‘eyes,’ to watch out for ‘the brain’ (the old). 
vide ​
Ibid. p. 524 (964) 
15 
 
with reason as applied to society. For Plato, the majority of citizens will actually

partake in this only in obeisance owing the ‘intellectual-moral first principle.’31

Still, the high number of official posts in Magnesia reflects the extent of civic

freedom. However, for those who combine natural gifts, good education, and the

virtues the door is open to pursue practices that, avoiding the neglect of the

Persians and the miscegenation of the Athenians, seek to perfect rational inquiry

by intense studies and a separation from others and material necessity. Hence

the importance of the Guardians of the Laws, and particularly those in the

Nocturnal Council, emerges.32

3.4 The Dialectic of Freedom

The two different aspects of human freedom are located in the united

space of the human person. Owing to this unity in difference, they are

contiguous. However, far from being inert and formal, this contiguity evinces

much interaction. The civic aspect relates to soul, and thus has the capacity for

motion. Because of this attribute, it has a transitive relation to organic freedom.

The subject is the soul, while the object is the somatic. In a sense civic freedom

has an ‘upper-hand’ on organic freedom. Further, civic freedom is enjoined by

agency to subject the unruly forces of instinct in order to imitate divinity. In this

31
 ​
vide infra ​
on ‘Contingency.’ 
32
I do not argue that the Guardians of the Laws are the elite to which freedom applies. I argue that
freedom, understood as a Platonic Form, is an elite (i.e., exclusive) phenomenon that is not broadly
available to all members of the polity. The Nocturnal Council are by definition an elite, albeit an
intellectual one, not a legislative, social, economic, or political one.
16 
 
sense, organic freedom stands in a subordinate, ‘slavish’ relation to civic freedom.

However, it does have its own force-- ​

ou thnaskei zalos eleutherias ​
(“The Passion

for Freedom never dies,” as the proverb says).

This ‘unequal’ relation between civic and organic freedom is of critical

import. Given the asymmetry of this nexus, the organic aspect of freedom (while

being positive owing to the force of instincts and emotions) contains a kernel of

bondage in its essence. Thus, while it is an aspect of freedom, it is pregnant with

its contradiction, slavery. Now we can grasp Camus’ epigram: freedom requires

slavery. From this idea we can posit that Freedom contains an element of

bondage.

The issue of ‘liberality’ emerges in the dialectic between civic and organic

freedom. The extreme version of liberality, as the quality of a state to ​

favor the

freedom of individuals to act and express their views, does not apply to the

present context because neither the Persian nor the Athenian cases propounds

such a perspective. In both cases the ruling rational component has

predominance over the emotive/somatic. This is manifested in the transitive

relationship of civic freedom to organic freedom. Thus, liberality must be

understood in a second sense, as a form of generous permission. In this manner,

the free speech of the Persians was contingent on “helping the common cause.”33

In the personal constitution, the same controlled permission is evident in

drinking parties. The enjoyment experienced by the senses in the consumption of

33
 Ibid. p.144 (694) 
17 
 
wine is not favored per se. The senses experience pleasure in a momentary lapse,

while being managed under the guidance of a sober leader.34 Liberality entails a

highly-controlled, limited lapse of reason.

3.4.1 Agency

Plato does not elaborate on the notion of ‘will’ in ​

The Laws. He does not

provide a doctrine of the will, yet he does refer to the concept in a few instances.

The will deals with both the internal human constitution and the external world.

However, the will’s general relationship to the organic aspect of freedom is

characterized as unfree. “Every unjust man is unjust against his will”35 is possible

if we imagine the will as standing between organic and civic freedom, joining its

ethical duty to subordinate instincts for divine reasons to the soul’s motive force

directed against instincts. Something willful is “premeditated”36-- i.e., requires

mental exercise. This exercise is not will, but a form of agency or volition. And

only the civic side of freedom can have this rational capacity. Thus, when the

force of instincts does emerge, it is in spite of the force of both agency and civic

freedom. Agency or volition thus mediates between the two aspects of freedom.

It enables freedom to be realized: either when it is overwhelmed by instinct or

desire, or when it joins with the reason of the soul in order to produce action.37

34
 Ibid. p. 67­69 (639­641) 
35
 Ibid. p. 195 (731) 
36
 Ibid. p. 385 (870). In reference to “voluntary homicide” 
37
 Agency in this schema is not the same as will. In Plato’s dialogues, terms such as ​
hekousion/akousion​
 refer 
to the voluntary and involuntary dimension of agency. 
18 
 
3.4.2 The Stochastic Sphere

Both the rational and moral aim of man is to imitate the model of the gods.

To determine what this model looks like is a task reserved for priests and

priestesses as well as wise legislators. Like an archer’s target, this model has a

precise center: it is the gods’ way of being. In terms of Freedom, those in a

position to achieve a proper imitation of divine Freedom must aim at living,

thinking, and acting like the gods. In order for his to occur, man must relate the

two aspects of freedom and face the world, with view to the gods. This relation

occurs in the dialectic between organic and civic freedom.

The relevant parts of ‘the world’ is the social-- hence the need to establish

laws; and the ‘stochastic,’ that which appears to be governed by chance. The

second part involves the physical world and its innate rules (physics, chemistry,

etc.), which for man seem at first glance chance events. But in reality it is infused

with divine reason and must be examined scientifically. The few learned

legislators engage in this enterprise to discover the cosmos and simultaneously

order society. In their relation to the stochastic sphere they appropriate the

essence of both organic and civic life.

3.4.3 Quality to Quantity

Each aspect of freedom starts as qualitative, that is, as distinct expressions

of Freedom. However their dialectical relationship is characterized with

19 
 
movement. Since the ultimate aim is to live a virtuous life that seeks to replicate

divine life, man must progress step by step towards God. Human conventions

(laws, education) progress teleologically to God, thereby infusing a quantitative

aspect to the quality of citizenship. That is, At the onset, one is a citizen or not,

but the excellence of citizenship can always be improved by moving towards the

divine scheme. This provides legitimacy to the freedom and authority of the

Guardians of the Laws, for they are concerned with day-and-night minding of the

polis’ advancement towards God. Further, there is no necessity to resort to ‘lies,’

38
for this would debase the level of education among the citizenry and hence of

the city as a whole, running counter to the divine dictum to infuse rationality in

the polis.39

3.4.4 Contingency

The progressive character of the quality-quality element of the civic

education of the citizenry is vital for the synthesizing of organic and civic freedom

that is carried out by the elite Guardians of the Laws and Nocturnal Council.

However, Plato undermines his own teleology by positing an ‘intellectual-moral

first principle.’ This belief is founded on Plato’s conception of organic freedom,

for instincts and passions foment corporeal freedom that goes counter to civic

38
 ​
vide ​
 Bobonich (1991)  p. 373.  Contra Popper, we can aver that the use of ‘propaganda’ would diminish the 
degree of rationality permeating the city, a practice that would contradict both civic freedom as well as the 
divine design.  It does not mean, however, that the preambles must be concerned with the more difficult 
questions exhaustively.  they may even state simple truths, which,  as banal truisms, are not ‘lying 
propaganda.’ 
39
 Further, although there are seven title to rule, the sixth, that the ignorant should follow the wise, is the most 
important.  And, the Athenian believes this can occur spontaneously, without the need to lie. 
20 
 
freedom and ultimately stalls the movement towards an imitation of the divine

freedom.

The innate unintelligence and wickedness of most humans is a notion that

Plato reiterates throughout ​

The Laws without proper evidence or basis. He

declares that, in the selection of citizens for a new city, legislators must follow the

example of those in charge of animals, to perform a “purge” in order not to “waste

endless effort on sickly and refractory beasts, degenerate by nature.” 40 The

Athenian believes that men have an “innate depravity”41 that, goaded by bad

education, leads to lust, avarice, and the relegation of both reason and the body

while objects such as money are promoted. It is not clear how this argument

stands, for Plato does not provide a solid grounding.

Concomitant with the moral and intellectual first principle, Plato believes

education is a fragile thing. Education is “a matter of correctly disciplined

feelings of pleasure and pain. But in the course of a man’s life it wears off, and in

many respects it is lost altogether.”42 The process of de-education takes place in

the realms of the soul and reason, i.e., in the ruling elements. As we saw in the

case of Persia, neglect engendered degeneration. With Athens, thought became

miscegenated.

What ensues is the conclusion that only a few virtuous men can achieve a

position to imitate divine life, including freedom. Few, because most men are

unregenerate. And virtuous because the concord of reason and emotion requires

40
 Ibid. p. 202 (735) 
41
 Ibid. p. 385 (870) 
42
 Ibid. p. 86 (653) 
21 
 
tending to the intellect and refurbishing of the body and its traits. A hierarchy is

thus built, where slaves toil physically owing to their distance from virtue as

defined above; citizens engage in their daily lives with a modicum of rational life43

, officials abound, but a small elite distances itself (but does not separate) from

the body politic.

3.4.5 Synthesis: The Shadow of Divine Freedom

In its distancing from the necessities of daily life, the elite can become the

agents that will coalesce the essence of organic freedom and civic freedom. This

synthesis is an approximation of divine freedom-- the greatest approximation

available to the human race. Unconcerned with private property and supported

by the system of slavery, the few among the Guardians of the Laws44 will devote

themselves to and ​
enjoy ​
the liberty to engage in legislation. Thus, their freedom

takes the form of ​

lex ludens. The essence of organic freedom is play, and that of

civic freedom is rational ordering. In their playful treatment of legislation, the

elite’s freedom is achieved.

This freedom is the shadow of the gods’. Playfulness and rule-making are

both divine activities of the first order. For Plato, “each of us living beings is a

puppet of the gods.”45 All men of good will

should put God at the centre of their thoughts...man...has been created as

a​toy for God​
...and this is the great point in his favour. So every man and
every woman should ​ play this part and ​order their whole life accordingly,
43
 Matched by the low level of intellect evident in the laws’ preambles. 
44
 The section on the Nocturnal Council is cryptic.  In any case, the ​
intellectual ​
elite will be ​
some​
 Guardians of 
the Laws, who may be in the Nocturnal Council.  
45
 Ibid. p. 74 (644) 
22 
 
 engaging in the best possible ​
pastimes​
-- in a quite different frame of mind
to their present one.46

For the select few, this ‘different frame of mind’ involves the serious task of

legislation, tempered by the not-so-serious ethos of playfulness owing to the

inherent cosmic insignificance of man. The comic and absurd quality of man (his

foibles, his absurdity47) are things to entertain, yet as humans, we must still strive

to imitate the divine. Hence the Athenian’s suggestion to Cleinias and Megillus

to “while away the journey...by ​

amusing ​
ourselves with laws-- it’s a dignified

game and its suits our time of life.”48 In their leisurely walk towards Zeus’ cave,

the three old men find the freedom to write ​

The Laws. ​
Freedom is thus an

activity available exclusively to wise elders who are able to play with the laws in a

light-hearted way that has grave consequences for a polity. It is not broadly

available to the ​
demos​
. Thus, it is a mistake to understand the idea of freedom as

truly associated to the vast majority of a city’s population. In effect, if we follow

Plato’s ​
Laws​
, we see that liberty is not the realm of the average citizen. In other

words, full freedom is not something that belongs to the Athenian Stranger nor to

the majority of the citizens of the polis.49 It is theoretically only available to wise

elders who are able to bridge the civic and the organic dimensions of liberty in a

ludic manner. The thirty-seven ​

nomophylakes ​
are merely interpreters of the

46
 Ibid. p. 292 (803).  Emphasis added. 
47
 Where J.­P. Sartre (as an atheist) sees despair in the Absurd, and anxiety in ‘being condemned to be free,’ 
the Athenian finds comedy in the absurd, and leisure in the elite’s freedom. 
48
 Ibid. p. 131 (685) 
49
 This follows Plato’s conviction that if “most citizens [were] given a larger sphere of freedom...they would 
go badly astray” (Kraut, “Ordinary virtue from the ​ Phaedo ​to the​
 Laws​,” in Bobonich, ed. ​
Plato’s Laws: A 
Critical Guide​ , p. 66).  
23 
 
laws. the law-givers themselves must be wise ludic elders.

--:--

This account of the immanent theory of freedom in ​

The Laws ​
points to the

simultaneously exclusive and dangerous nature of the idea of liberty. Rather than

immediately asserting the expansion of freedom to ‘the people’ (which is a

traditional leitmotiv in political philosophy), this work of Plato leads to the idea

that the Form of Freedom is approximated by wise elders. Who precisely these

wise elders are in the practical formation of Plato’s ideal city is unclear. It is

among these wise elders, who experience their tasks as a kind of game, that the

Platonic Idea of Freedom applies.50 However, it also tells us to be wary of the

degeneration of the rational capacity of the ruling classes (understood this time

as the economic, social, and political upper echelons of a city). The danger of

excessive freedom does not rest in the masses, but in the political elites, who may

effect a desire for freedom in the people, but not necessarily.51 The education of

citizens not in positions of power is important, yet Plato’s treatment of the

education of the ruling elites, such as that of the Persians, is inadequate. He does

not elaborate a curriculum drawn to avoid negligence and ‘miscegenation’ (or

50
The ​
​ nomophylakes ​ are probably not this exclusive group. The Nocturnal Council’s metaphysical and 
theological studies most likely approximate the activities of this select or elite group of wise elder men who 
engage in a playful approach that ought to have direct implications on the city’s form of legislation. 
51
 In the case of Athens, ‘democratic freedoms’ reached the theater’s audience.  Yet in Persia, the degeneration 
of the regime was limited to the political elite. 
24 
 
confusion) of thinking for the elite members bound to rule. Such an epistemic

task is a lacuna in ​
The​
Laws.
​

25 
 
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