Jenks, The Power of Shame Considerations

North American Philosophical Publications
THE POWER OF SHAME CONSIDERATIONS IN PLATO'S "GORGIAS"

Author(s): Rod Jenks
Source: History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (OCTOBER 2012), pp. 373-390
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of North American Philosophical
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History of Philosophy Quarterly
Volume 29, Number 4, October 2012
THE POWER OF SHAME CONSIDERATIONS

IN PLATO'S GÓRGIAS
Rod Jenks
When indicates Polusthat

indicates thatGórgias
takes Górgias up the
was shamed intowas defense
making shamed
certain of into oratory making in Plato's certain Górgias admissions he
admissions
that he, Polus, will now refuse to make (461a5). He does this not just to
defend Górgias but presumably also to defend oratory. When Polus him-
self is defeated, Callicles indicates that his downfall was brought about
because Polus was shamed into making concessions, a weakness to which
he, Callicles, refuses to succumb (482de). Yet Callicles tries to withdraw
from the discussion several times toward the end of the dialogue.2 He is
losing the argument, and he refuses to answer Socrates, presumably to
avoid the shame of defeat. The issues of shame, what we are ashamed
of, what we ought to be ashamed of, and the role that shame properly
plays in argument come up ten times in the dialogue,3 and these issues
are, arguably, among Plato's chief concerns in the Górgias .4
Connected with the issue of shaming is the publicity of the discussion.
Plato represents the discussion between Socrates, Polus, and Callicles
taking place before a crowd of largely unnamed spectators. The setting is
a gymnasium, a state-sponsored school, where Górgias has just finished
giving a public performance.5 Socrates, however, does not want to wit-
ness a display or to hear a speech; instead, he wants to determine "what
[Górgias] advertises or professes," (447c2) in order to expose "what sort
of a man he is" (447dl). But although Socrates would rather dispense
with theatrics altogether, his interlocutors are performers, and the dia-
logue is a public performance or display for them. It is for this reason
that Polus and Callicles often appeal to the many, to the majority, to
the notable witnesses they could call, to what almost everyone believes.
Callicles in particular seems to think that the fact that nobody agrees
with Socrates should shame him into silence.
While the assembled orators try to shame Socrates into submission,

Socrates often causes his interlocutors to feel shame, and this superfi-
373
374 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY
cial similarity between oratory and dialectic makes Socrates a

distinguish sharply between his own elenctic method and the
elenchos .6 The main difference between Socrates and the orators is that
truth is irrelevant to the orators. What matters to them is pleasure.7 Now,
Plato does not explain the connection between rhetoric and pleasure.
However, he does have Socrates say that the rhetorician only "sup-
poses that he refutes," while the philosopher genuinely refutes (47 le).
The philosopher seeks truth, and winning an argument, especially one
conducted in public, does not interest him. The applause and praise
that normally attend winning in public are the pleasant results that
motivate the rhetorician. Socrates seeks truth, so he dismisses appeals
to the gallery (474a) and derisive laughter (473e). In discussing things
with you, Socrates wants to know what you really believe - not what
someone else believes, not even what everyone else believes. Because
Socrates seeks truth, he is indifferent to what the many think. When
Polus suggests that they poll the audience to see who is right (474a),
Socrates replies that Polus is just producing "false witnesses" against
him. Polus also tries laughing Socrates down, in order to draw the ap-
proval of the crowd, but Socrates is not impressed (473e). Since the truth
may or may not conform to what the many think, it follows that what
the many think , what is customarily believed , is no measure of truth.
What is admirable "by custom" just is what the many admire. But
it is strongly suggested in the Górgias that Socrates questions "by na-
ture," rather than questioning "by custom." Callicles accuses Socrates,
at 482e, of alternating between what is true by nature and what is true
by custom. Socrates answers by pretending to praise Callicles for his
wisdom and his honesty,8 maintaining that whatever they agree upon
will be true by nature, "the truth itself," as he puts it (487e). Socrates,
then, conceives of himself as questioning "by nature." Yet it is a per-
plexing question just how what is "true by nature" is even accessible to
Socrates, who (apparently) has access, in the very best of circumstances,
only to what his interlocutors sincerely believe. I will argue that the
right kind of shame, what I will call "internal shame," is an indication
to the interlocutor that he is in the presence of what is false by nature.
In this way, shame considerations may help to illuminate what Vlastos
has called " the problem of the Socratic elenchos ."9 As Socrates can infer
that he is on the wrong track from the protests of the daimonion , perhaps
an interlocutor can and should gather that a thesis in the premise-set
of an elenchos is problematic from the presence in himself of genuine
internal shame.
The issue of the role of shame considerations in the Górgias is one

that has engaged scholars for quite some time. Dodds remarks that
Plato's Socrates often shames his opponents, seeking to "repay the
SHAME AND PLATO'S GÓRGIAS 375
sophists in their own coin, as no doubt [the h

did."10 Kahn maintains that Socrates uses his interlocutor's sense of
shame to get him to confront inconsistencies in his beliefs.11 But su
appeals to shame might be construed as arguments ad populum. Santa
who provides a minute dissection of the logic of the arguments in t
Górgias , makes no reference whatsoever to shame.12 Meanwhile, Irw
claims that, in the Górgias , Socrates "avoids appeals to shame. Socrat
is not saying that it is bad to be moved by shame in considering som
of the questions he puts forward, but he does not want the appeal
shame to stand alone."13 This last claim, I will argue, is right, but n
the claim that Socrates avoids shame considerations. He thinks, for
example, that Callicles should be ashamed to have expressed admira
tion for a wretched man (469a).
I. Some Passages on Shame in the Górgias
Socrates begins by observing that moral debate is often acrimonious: the

parties in a dispute both "lose their tempers and accuse one another
speaking from motives of personal spite. . . . [They] seek to score a v
tory, rather than to investigate the question at issue" (457d). Socrat
however, does not seek to humiliate Górgias. He seeks the truth, and
is a measure of this concern that he welcomes being refuted. He say
"I consider being refuted a greater good [than refuting someone els
inasmuch as it is better to be relieved of a very great evil oneself th
to relieve another" (458a). Socrates is aware of the way oratory pand
to public opinion, and several times, he warns Polus and Callicles t
say what they really think, not to be moved by what most people think
(489a, 492d, 494c, and 508ac).
While Socrates emphasizes his own quest for truth, he also char-
acterizes oratory as indifferent to truth. Oratory, Socrates maintai
is like pandering, in that it aims exclusively at satisfying an appetit
and is, therefore, "shameful" (463cd). By comparing oratory specif
cally to pandering, Socrates also suggests that oratory aims to satisf
a particularly low or shameful appetite. Polus, who has taken over f
Górgias, thinks the shamefulness of wrongdoing is a result of its vio
tion of mere social mores. Polus thinks that doing unjust things is what
passes for shameful behavior (among the great unwashed herd14) b
maintains that it is not in itself worse than suffering injustice (474
At 482d3, Polus maintains that Górgias showed shame "through th
habit of people" [dia to ethos tõn anthrõpõn ] that would make the
indignant [anagkasthēnai] if he refused." Thus, Polus thinks that wh
passes for shame is nothing other than what the many find distressing.
He allows that murderous tyrants behave shamefully but claims th
it does not matter. So long as one secures what one wants, Polus avow
it makes no difference whether he secures it justly or unjustly. A

point, Socrates sternly admonishes Polus: "Hush now! . . . Yo
not speak in this way about . . . miserable people. They should
be pitied" (469a). That the expression of admiration for a wicke
draws such a sharp Socratic rebuke shows that Socrates belie
Polus has said something genuinely contemptible, something
to be ashamed to say, let alone to believe.
II. Internal and External Shame
Shame is a feeling, and that feeling may arise from different sour
What I will call "external shame" arises from awareness of strictly soc
disapprobation. Callicles tells Socrates that he should be ashamed
bring up certain topics (494e). It is not that Callicles thinks these to
are irrelevant to the issues of desire and pleasure they are discussing,
rather that their mention is unseemly. When we suffer embarrassmen
or humiliation, it is often because of what other people think, or w
they would think. Internal shame, on the other hand, occurs when
come to recognize that a principle we have endorsed entails approva
activities we really do despise. We look back at that principle and think
"Good lord! Do I really believe thatT
Other scholars have hovered around the distinction between internal
and external shame. Tarnopolsky distinguishes "flattering" shame from
"respectful" shame.15 She thinks shame intuitions are more reliable than
are pleasure intuitions. Moss thinks shame is connected to "deep" beliefs,
which inexplicably track truth. Moss writes that shame can be a surgical
technique.16 Cain does not always attend to the cognitive grounding of
(what I am calling) internal shame.17 Futter considers internal shame
but dismisses it in the end, maintaining that what checks a false belief
is not a feeling but another belief.18
If someone advocates thorough subjectivism in ethics and we point out
to him that he is committed to finding nothing objectionable about rape
and child molestation, the hope is that he will say to himself, "Hmmm!
It seems that I do not believe that everything is subjective - and I never
really did believe it." For this strategy to be effective, the interlocutor's
horror of child molestation must be more deeply embedded than his
commitment to subjectivism. Child molesting, in the final analysis, must
be not only despised by the interlocutor; it must also be despicable.
There are, to be sure, occasions on which we are uncertain which
variety of shame we are experiencing, and there are also borderline
cases. But that a distinction suffers a degree of vagueness is not always a
reflection of the distinction's not having been carefully drawn. It is often
a result of the messiness of our world. The existence of twilight does not
encourage us to abandon the distinction betw

himself is sensitive to our propensity to take t
article. The point at which we come to see that
is is actually just what the powers-that-be w
is the point at which we turn away from
211d; Hippias Major 298b, 292e; Republic 479c). Just as marketing
people encourage us to mistake demotic beauty for real beauty, so too
the assembled orators encourage Socrates to mistake external, strictly
social shame for the internal, alethically significant variety. It does not
disturb Socrates that he holds unpopular views (compare 481c ff.), but
it should disturb Callicles that he endorses principles that commit him
to approving activities he finds appalling (defecation [494b]; scratching
in the nether regions of the body [494c-95a]; fleeing in the face of danger
[498ad]; and pederasty [494e]).
Internal shame suggests problems in the premise set of an elenchos ,
which, when properly investigated, may lead us to abandon certain
premises and to embrace others. Polus is content to observe that most
people deny what Socrates affirms. Socrates thinks that this carries no
weight. But an orator, who seeks the approval of the crowd, is keyed
into what most people think. Among his tools is external shame, yet,
although this kind of shame shows that a position is unpopular, it does
not show that it is false. Internal shame, on the other hand, occurs when
we see the real nature of the position we have adopted. If we see that our
principles imply approval of the activities of cowards and catamites, and
if we condemn such practices, we feel internal shame. When Callicles is
first confronted with certain unfortunate consequences of his view, it is
remarkable that he tells Socrates that he should be ashamed to bring
these topics into the discussion. Callicles, that is to say, tries to prevent
himself from feeling internal shame by suggesting that Socrates should
feel external shame.
Callicles asserts that the "forced answers" of both Górgias and Polus
were dictated by (external) shame, but he vows that he will not suffer
a similar fate (482d; compare 487e). Shame will not prevent him from
saying what he thinks is true.19 Because Callicles is so resolute in his
determination to say what he thinks regardless of whether it conforms
to what the many think, Socrates takes any thesis on which he and Cal-
licles agree to be true: "There is no need to apply any other touchstone,
since you will never acquiesce from lack of wisdom20 or excess of shame
or from any desire to deceive me. ... So then it will be no exaggeration
to say that agreement between us is bound to result in truth" (487e).
On Callicles's account, the strong have a natural right to seize what-
ever they can, and the many, to protect themselves, have invented the
category of "shame" in an eñort to prevent the strong from dom

everything. Socrates points out that many weak people can o
one strong person, since their collective power exceeds his i
strength. But the many also believe that doing wrong is more sh
than suffering it, so that if, by nature, the strong should prevai
the many, who collectively are stronger than the one, are right a
ing wrong is more shameful than suffering it. It would follow th
wrong is more shameful "by nature" than suffering it. Socrat
much at 489b. Callicles indulges himself here in an aside ("The
end to the rubbish this fellow speaks!"), then demands, "Tell me,
are you not ashamed at your age of laying these verbal trap
you really take me to mean, if you sweep together a heap of s
riff-raff useful only perhaps for their brawn, and they say this
that what they say must have the force of law?" (489bc). Socr
tries to force Callicles to see that he himself considers some theses
false in themselves, whether or not the many approve of them. Wh
Callicles claims that by "stronger" [to krittous - 489c3], he meant n
stronger but worthier [ tous ameinous - 489e4] or better [to beltiõ] a
wiser [to phronimõteron - 490al0], he has been reduced to lying abo
his position in order to save face. Again, at 499b, Callicles lies abou
his view, maintaining that he has always held that some pleasures a
better than others. This directly contradicts what he said at 491e-9
Shortly thereafter, Socrates asks whether the kinaidos , one who fe
pleasure at being sodomized, is living a good life. Callicles expresse
disgust: "Are you not ashamed to introduce topics like these into t
discussion?" But the view that maximization of pleasure is the goo
has consequences that ought to make Callicles feel uncomfortable:2
catamites and scratchers in the nether regions (see Górgias 494ce),
well as fools and cowards (see 497e ff.) may feel intense pleasure, bu
Callicles really does find such people base. His hedonistic principle h
been shown to be inconsistent with his moral intuitions.
III. Refutation and Pseudo-Refutation
Let us distinguish between refuting an interlocutor and refuting

position. Górgias initially maintains that he is not responsible for
misuse of oratory by his students, but he is eventually brought round
the admission that he will teach justice to students who do not kno
(460a3-4), in order that they might use oratory justly. Kahn, howe
thinks that Górgias is forced to make this concession because of
position in Athenian society:22 as a foreigner, he cannot very well say
don't give a hoot about justice. I am only here in Athens to make mone
Introducing premises that are socially awkward for the interlocuto
deny is a species of ad hominem . If Kahn is right here, Górgias the m
might have been refuted by Socrates, but Gor

been affected at all.
Yet at the inauguration of the discussion, Socrates sets its parameters:

"If any person ever has a dialogue with another person from a desire to
know the thing which the discussion is about, I am such a person" (453e).
Again, he says, "I am afraid to complete my examination of you for fear
you will suppose I am . . . competing ... to defeat you. . . . Yet if you are
the kind of man I am. . . , one who would be pleased to be refuted if he
says something false. . . , then let us continue the dialogue" (457e-58b).
Socrates declares here that he seeks truth, and Górgias agrees to this kind
of discussion. But Socrates then leads the discussion with the elenchos.
This strongly implies that Socrates thinks the elenchos can secure truth.23
Socrates believes that real refutation, genuine elenchos , indirectly
tracks truth, but that oratorical (pseudo-) refutation does not. Callicles
has already distinguished between things that naturally are shameful
and things that are only thought to be shameful, and Socrates, as though
on cue, distinguishes several real arts from their counterfeits. Health
is secured by the real art of medicine, and the restoration of health is
often unpleasant, involving cutting, deprivation, bitter medicine, or a
bland diet. What masquerades as medicine is cookery. Cookery gives
us what we (apparently) want and makes us feel satisfied. Gymnastics
prescribes strenuous exercise to make our bodies strong, but cosmetics
creates the mask of health. Law reliably guides us toward right behavior
and right living, but sophistry just makes us feel all right. Corrective
justice aims to persuade us to improve our lives, but oratory just aims
to persuade us.24 The imitation dialectician, the orator, only " thinks he
refutes" (47 le), while Socrates claims that he offers real proof (479e).
There is, then, an emphasis on the difference between pseudo-arts, which
aim at creating appearances, and genuine arts, which create the real
thing. Appearance-pandering, the pseudo-tec/mē, aims to secure the ap-
proval of the many; thus, pseudo-dialectic secures only pseudo-victory.
At 464de, Socrates imagines a doctor and a pastry cook before a jury
of children.25 The pastry cook tells the children that he makes them
happy, giving them what they want, whereas, he continues, the doctor
makes them miserable. The doctor protests that he prescribes what he
does in the interests of securing his patients' health, but the cook man-
ages to secure a favorable verdict. Appearance-peddling thus emerges
as rather contemptible: it is akin to pimping or to supplying tasty foods
to the sick or to feeding children nothing but pastry. It purveys to people
who are too unsophisticated to understand what is good for them what
they think they want. It satisfies their uninformed desires, rather than
giving them what they need.
To be sure, internal shame is a better indicator of false belief t

the absence of internal shame an indicator of true belief. A paral
shows this. Socrates's daimonion operates pretty much like wh
be called a philosophical conscience today, and, arguably, ever
a conscience (though not everyone listens to it). In an honest,
person like Socrates, the absence of a warning from the daimo
reliable indication that he is not doing the wrong thing. Pá, Apol
he concludes from the silence of the daimonion that he did not do the
wrong thing in coming to trial, as opposed to trying to escape, as Crito
will shortly encourage him to do. But not everyone is honest, and not
everyone is reflective. We cannot reliably infer inerrancy of behavior
from the absence of a daimonic warning. Just so, in order for shame to
have alethic significance, we must be properly attuned to ourselves. But
not everyone is a fully integrated, emotionally and intellectually honest
person; thus, we cannot reliably infer from the absence of internal shame
that our beliefs are true. Daimonic stirrings warn us, but daimonic si-
lence does not ensure truth. Internal shame is a reliable sign that our
beliefs are suspect, but the absence of internal shame is not a generally
applicable measure of truth.
An additional cautionary note is that external can be mistaken for
internal shame. Shame is a feeling, and feelings are subject to misin-
terpretation. Such a misinterpretation of feelings occurs when Callicles
tries to shame Socrates into withdrawing the examples of the scratcher
and the catamite. The shame he seeks to make Socrates feel is external,
as if even to mention such things is unacceptably uncouth. Yet Callicles
really does find the activities of catamites,26 cowards, and pubic scratch-
ers to be contemptible; and if one's principles commit one to approving
practices one really does find appalling, one really ought to begin to feel
uncomfortable about those principles. One ought, indeed, to reexamine
them. Again, Socrates warns Callicles that he can only become powerful
in Athens by becoming like it. He cannot remain superior to the city he
seeks to dominate. He must, indeed, become like those "useful only for
their brawn." Callicles replies, "Somehow I think you are right, but I am
not wholly persuaded" (513c). He is on the brink of recognizing how vapid
the raw pursuit of power really is. Power at any price is itself a shameful
end with shameful consequences, and Callicles almost recognizes the
internal shame he feels when that shamefulness is exposed for what
it is. He almost feels enough shame at these consequences to abandon
the exclusive pursuit of power. Almost. But he begins instead to answer
resentfully, as though he had been done some monstrous injustice by
Socrates. Here, he misdiagnoses the feeling of distress within himself as
indignation at his (supposed) mistreatment, rather than recognizing it
as internal shame. The emotion of shame, then, can be misinterpreted.
Again, at 494e, Callicles feels shame himself,

that Socrates should be ashamed to discuss certain matters. This is a
clear case of transference. His embarrassment is evident at 497ac, but,
again, he deflects the feeling. Instead of attending to what he is feeling,
Callicles pretends that he does not understand. Callicles also shows
substantial resentment at 505c: "I do not know what you are saying. Ask
somebody else." In all these instances, the feeling of embarrassment or
humiliation, which really ought to stimulate Callicles to reexamine his
principles, instead occasions his resentment. These passages illustrate
the need to be attuned properly to what one is feeling. That I may hear
internal voices other than the daimoniorì s ought to make me very sensi-
tive to exactly what I am attending to. That a strongly held belief feels
just like knowledge ought to make me very sensitive to exactly how my
beliefs are grounded. And that shallow, external shame may feel just
like internal shame should make me diligent in deciphering just what
it is that I am feeling. The shallow variety of shame is alethically unin-
formative. Internal shame, on the other hand, has alethic import.
It might be objected that to say shame or any other emotion has
alethic significance is to fly in the face of the generally received construal
of Socratic ethics as intellectualist.27 According to the received view,
Socrates thinks that we become better by thinking, debating, discuss-
ing, "working out the reason" ( aitias logismö - Meno 98a4). Virtue is
knowledge, Socrates thinks, in the sense that, if we really knew what
courage is, we would never be tempted by cowardice. We become better
people by thinking things through, by "working out the reason." We do
not become better, it might be argued, by attending to our feelings.
In answer to this objection, I grant that Plato does seem committed
to the view that an adequate understanding of any moral concept will
settle disputed questions about it. But I think, he is not committed
to the view that nonintellectual factors are strictly irrelevant. As a
writer, Plato ubiquitously employs nonintellectual touches to illuminate
philosophical points. For example, in Republic I, when Thrasymachus
is losing the argument, Plato portrays him as sweating profusely ( Re-
public 350d). In the Górgias , Plato has Callicles try to withdraw several
times from the dialogue to avoid the shame of refutation. Euthyphro's
name means "straight-ahead thinker" (incapable of the back-and-forth
necessary for dialectic), and Polemarchus's name means "first in war"
(he gets all the trouble started in Republic I). These are not philosophi-
cally irrelevant details. And Plato's character, Socrates himself, relies
on the daimonion, and believes in other extrarational phenomena such
as oracles and dreams (see Apology 33c), diviners and prophets (see Ion
534b). If nonargumentative, dramatic , details can show us something
about what a theory amounts to or how an argument is going, if we can
rely on at least some extrarational phenomena (hearing divin

and so forth), it seems reasonable to allow that a feeling, nam
right kind of shame, can possess alethic significance.
To be sure, Socrates holds that having a definition of a virtue i
ficient both for recognizing instances of that virtue in action
distinguishing such instances from instances of the correspon
in actions. Having a definition of piety is sufficient, for exam
distinguishing between pious and impious actions (compare Eu
6e). But Socrates is not committed to the view that defining
is necessary for possessing it. One could, for example, be temp
nature (compare Charmides 157e-58b). Moreover, one can ma
understanding of courage even if one cannot properly define
provided only that one can exhibit a proper product of one's unde
ing, namely, someone whom one has made courageous. At Lac
and 186b, Socrates allows that a person counts as an "exper
care of the soul" if that person can point to a "well-executed
of her art, that is, a person whom she has morally improved.
courage is not strictly necessary for expertise. Again, the auxi
Republic are courageous, but, though they have true beliefs a
things that are to be feared, only the rulers really know.28 Since
is knowledge, if one understands courage, one is thereby cou
And even though one does not strictly speaking know what v
one can still be virtuous as a result of holding true beliefs ab
tue, beliefs that come to one as "gifts from the gods" (so not
that one earns - see Meno 99bc). Again, it seems, the possession
knowledge, manifested in the ability to define, while it is suf
make one virtuous, is certainly not necessary for it.
Beyond direct textual evidence, there is the additional consi
that Plato surely intends for us to conclude that Socrates hi
virtuous. But Socrates denies repeatedly knowing what virtu
I take him at his word.29 He says rather strongly in the Meno
nothing whatsoever about virtue" ( Meno 71b), yet he was, testifi
edo, "the best and the wisest and the most just man of his gen
See Phaedo 118a. Since he does not know what virtue is, Socrat
himself surely say that he does not know whether he is virtuous.
close of Lysis, he says the other boys will laugh at Lysis and Mex
and Socrates himself, since they think they are his friends, b
of them is certain what friendship is. Socrates does not deny t
are friends. See Lysis 223b. At the close of Republic I, he says he
know whether justice is a virtue or whether the just person is ha
unhappy until he knows what justice is. See Republic 354b. Yet
he does not know what justice and friendship are, the status
friends and just persons is not affected. At the close of Lysis, he
"places or counts [ tithēmi ] [himjself among you

223b. And, as it turns out, of course, justice is a v
is easy" ( alia hradia, hē krisis) as to whether th
than the unjust person (. Republic 580b). The p
in Lysis and in Republic I is epistemic rather t
are friends and justice is a virtue - Socrates ju
the same way, Plato intends us to see that Socr
Socrates himself would deny knowing that he i
Conclusion
Socrates stands ready to reexamine any premise in any elenchos. F

Socrates, as one scholar puts it, "the question of the truth of anyth
he believes can always be sensibly re-opened. . . . [A]ny conviction
has stands ready to be re-examined in the company of any sinc
person who will raise the question and join him in the investigation.
Because the results of elenctic examination are tentative, there are very
few things that Socrates claims to know. But the cardinal point is th
contrary to what Vlastos feared, the auxiliary premises in elenchoi
not necessarily "unsecured," nor must they be regarded as arbitrary
unstable. They can be indirectly anchored in the way I have indicat
Descartes scholarship provides a parallel case. In his provocati
commentary on the Meditations , Kenny observes that there may b
problem for Descartes in relation to his doctrine concerning clear a
distinct ideas.32 For suppose, Kenny suggests, that an idea seems cl
and distinct to us, yet the same idea seems false to God. Now God, w
is omniscient, cannot be wrong, so the idea in question is false. Th
shows that the fact that an idea seems clear and distinct to us is not an
adequate criterion of its truth. Even if we feel certain about an idea,
we might still be wrong. Descartes's only available reply would be to
claim that the idea in question never really was clear and distinct for
us. It may have seemed to be clear and distinct, but it was not. But this
implies that it is possible for us to think we have a clear and distinct
idea, when, in fact, we do not. Thus, even though it follows, since
[Premise 1] I clearly and distinctly perceive that my perceptions are

caused by external things, and
[Premise 2] All of my clear and distinct perceptions are true,
that
[Conclusion] My perceptions really are caused by external things,
still, I may only think that I clearly and distinctly perceive something
when I, in fact , do not clearly and distinctly perceive it. This shows
that Premise 1 has an indeterminate truth value, and this sp

argument. In the same way, I may feel shame, and I may thin
is genuine, internal shame; but since shame is a feeling and so
to misidentification, the shame I feel may turn out to be externa
all. Thus, from the fact that I feel (some as yet unspecified va
shame concerning some belief I hold, I cannot safely infer that th
in question is false.
For this reason, the presence of an unspecified feeling of sh
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for false belief.
to count philosophically, shame must be of the right kind, i
case, its presence is a reliable indicator of trouble in the prem
but its absence does not guarantee that one's beliefs are true
presence is not a necessary condition for falsity. Still, the pr
the right kind of shame is a criterion , in the Wittgensteinian se
loose sort of measure or indicator, that something in the prem
awry. If I am in a windowless room and I see the barometer p
this is a symptom that it is raining outside. But if, on a dark
day, I am standing outside and drops of water are hitting my fac
is not just a good indication that it is raining - it is what it is
be raining. It is the criterion of rain.33 Still, it is possible that, o
a day, my neighbor is standing out of my sight on his roof, squi
fine mist into the air with a garden hose, and this explains th
of water hitting my face. Thus, the fact that drops of water are
my face on a dark, cloudy day is not a sufficient condition for
raining. Still, if drops of water are hitting my face on such a day
absence of any reason to suspect that my neighbor is tricking me
way indicated, any doubts about whether it is raining would b
Cartesian. In a sufficiently reflective person, the presence of
shame is a criterion, a loose sort of indicator, that there is so
amiss in the premise-set. Yet, because one might confuse exter
internal shame, the presence of an unspecified feeling of shame,
indicative of trouble in the premise-set, is not a sufficient condit
the falsity of any belief. Rather, internal shame indicates that
an item for the agenda. If an honest, reflective person feels (
internal shame when she comes to understand that her princip
mit her to things she despises, the phenomenon of shame h
import, is dialectically significant, so the premises in at leas
Socratic elenchoi do not float entirely free.34
University of Portland
NOTES
1. I follow closely, but not slavishly, Hamilton and Emlyn- Jones's tra
tion (2004) of the Górgias.
2. 497b, 498d, 501c, 505b, 510a, 513e, and 515c.
3. 461a, 463d, 464d, 474c fit, 477c, 482ab, 482e, 483a, 494e5, and 527
4. Shame , aischros, can also mean either ugly or bad. See LSJM, I,
entry under aischros. For kalos , see LSJM I, 870. When Meno defines virtue
"desiring kalos things and being able to acquire them," he presumably m
beautiful things, but Socrates understands him to mean good things and
tests that everybody (the virtuous as well as the vicious person) wants
things. See Meno 77b-78b. Both kalos (good/beautiful) and aischros (bad-
shameful) are ambiguous.
5. This sort of public display is common practice among the sophists
Hamilton and Emlyn-Jones 2004, xxiv, on this topic. Górgias in particular b
that he can answer any question (447d5-7). See also Meno 71c, where M
tells Socrates that, if he wanted to know what virtue is, he could have le
it from Górgias. Górgias evidently thinks of himself as, and does not discou
others from thinking of him as, the answer man. See Meno 77b-78b.
6. Socrates refers to the "oratorical elenchos" [elegchein hrētorikēs
471e3-4], distinguishing between it and his own elenchos. Elenchos is
ubiquitously translated as "refutation."
7. Moss (2007, 240) speculates that rhetoric provides the "pleasure of ex-
cessive praise." But Moss does not explain why the praise in question need be
excessive. She misses the fact that one can feel pleased when one is properly
praised also.
8. His apparent praise is also taken to be ironic by Teloh 2007, 68.
9. Vlastos 1983, 54.
10. Dodds 1990, 249.
11. Kahn 1983,92-93.
12. Santas 1979, 218-303.
13. Irwin 1995, 123.
14. I brush up against the related topic of pleasure. This issue comes up
in the discussion with Polus, who values the pleasure of applause, as well as
in the discussion with Callicles, who maintains that people ought to let their
desires run wild and satisfy them to the maximum. I think that Socrates might
distinguish genuine pleasure from ersatz pleasure, just as he distinguishes real
refutation from pseudo-refuation, and just as he distinguishes true virtue from
demotic virtue (. Phaedo 69b3;Republic 518d, 554c5, 619c6; Symposium 212a5-6;
Theaetetus 176c5 'Laws 963e).
15. Tarnopolsky 2004, 470.
16. Moss 2007, 235-36.

17. Cain 2008, 218-19.
18. Futter 2009, 460.
19. But, still, he withdraws from the discussion to avoid shame. Plato sug-
gests to us that Callicles really does care what others think, that his alleged
indifference to what others think about him is a pose.
20. I take Socrates's professed confidence that Callicles suffers no lack of
wisdom to be ironic; Teloh 2007, 68, concurs. But Callicles presents himself as
one who knows the truth and is not afraid to speak it.
21. I argue that the compresence argument at 495c-497e implies that plea-
sure and the good are metaphysically distinct, but that the brave man/coward
case, the catamite case and the case of the scratcher of the nether regions of
the body provoke positively visceral reactions from Callicles. He is brought to
silence when he recognizes that he is committed to recommending things he
personally finds appalling. See Jenks 2006.
22. Kahn 1983, 83-84.
23. Benson (1987) maintains that the elenchos cannot deliver truth, so we
must reconstruct such passages not as claims about what the elenchos can do
but as claims about what another, constructive method, of the kind Socrates
uses in Crito , can do. But if Socrates thinks that some nonelenctic method can
deliver truth, where in this dialogue is that other method? We have just seen
in this dialogue that Socrates strongly implies to Górgias that he thinks the
elenchos can secure truth. Again, he claims against Polus that "what I was saying
is true, that neither you nor I nor any other man would choose doing injustice
over suffering injustice, since [doing injustice] is actually worse" (475e). He
tells Callicles, who presents himself as one who sticks at nothing in stating the
truth, "I know well that if you agree with what my soul believes, these beliefs
will be the truth itself" [tauť hēdē estin auta talēthē - 486e]. It could be that
Socrates's method cannot, as a matter of logic, deliver truth - this is a disputed
question - but it seems clear that the Socrates of the Górgias thinks it can.
24. These contrasts, drawn out at 464-65, between the real thing and the
pale imitation are evocative also of Callicles's distinction between things that
(allegedly) are naturally shameful and things that are only thought to be shame-
ful by the many (491d). Teloh 2007, 65-66, sets out a similar array of arts and
their counterfeits.
25. Moss 2007 has an extended and useful discussion of this analogy.
26. Sodomy is roundly condemned by Socrates. See Dover 1989, 98-99, 103;
Vlastos 1991, "Additional Note 1.3, "Erõs Kalos : Its Hazards for the Boy," 245-47.
27. See especially Irwin on "KNV," in Irwin 1979, 90-92, 140-42, and 160-62;
and Grube 1980, 216-30. Santas is cautious about attributing intellectualism to
Socrates. See Santas 1979, 190-94. Nehamas 1986 and Klosko 1983 and 1986
argue that Socrates's commitment to strict intellectualism has been exagger-
ated.
28. Vlastos writes, "[T]he bravest man I ever met

the Socratic examination on courage." See Vlastos 1
29. Gulley (1968) and Robinson (1980) think Socr
claiming not to know, but most scholars think he
Vlastos 1985; Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 30-45; S
2010, 89-112.
30. Evidence of his virtue is present throughout.
41cd, Charmide s 155d, Symposium 213d.
31. Vlastos 1985, 10.
32. Kenny 1995, 195. Kenny and also Frankfurt (see his 1965 and, for a more
sustained discussion, 2007) enter into a dispute with Williams (1978, 182-83)
over whether the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas is an attempt at providing
a criterion of truth or merely of certainty.
33. On symptoms and criteria, see Wittgenstein 1953, § 354.

34. Many thanks are due to my colleague Alejandro Santana for his com-
ments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper. An earlier version of
this paper was presented at the Northwest Philosophy Conference, October 5-6,
2007, at Lewis and Clark College. I thank Lewis and Clark College for mak-
ing the conference possible, and I thank those who attended and discussed my
work, in particular, my commentator, John J. Craw. I would also like to thank
my two anonymous readers from History of Philosophy Quarterly .
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North American Philosophical Publications

THE POWER OF SHAME CONSIDERATIONS IN PLATO'S "GORGIAS"

North American Philosophical Publications, University of Illinois Press are collaborating

THE POWER OF SHAME CONSIDERATIONS

When indicates Polusthat

While the assembled orators try to shame Socrates into submission,

cial similarity between oratory and dialectic makes Socrates a

The issue of the role of shame considerations in the Górgias is one

sophists in their own coin, as no doubt [the h

I. Some Passages on Shame in the Górgias

Socrates begins by observing that moral debate is often acrimonious: the

it makes no difference whether he secures it justly or unjustly. A

II. Internal and External Shame

encourage us to abandon the distinction betw

category of "shame" in an eñort to prevent the strong from dom

III. Refutation and Pseudo-Refutation

Let us distinguish between refuting an interlocutor and refuting

might have been refuted by Socrates, but Gor

Yet at the inauguration of the discussion, Socrates sets its parameters:

To be sure, internal shame is a better indicator of false belief t

Again, at 494e, Callicles feels shame himself,

rely on at least some extrarational phenomena (hearing divin

"places or counts [ tithēmi ] [himjself among you

Socrates stands ready to reexamine any premise in any elenchos. F

[Premise 1] I clearly and distinctly perceive that my perceptions are

[Conclusion] My perceptions really are caused by external things,

that Premise 1 has an indeterminate truth value, and this sp

16. Moss 2007, 235-36.

28. Vlastos writes, "[T]he bravest man I ever met

33. On symptoms and criteria, see Wittgenstein 1953, § 354.

tory of Philosophy 27: 591-99.

Burnet, John. 1924. Plato's "Euthyphro," "Apology of Socrates" and

cartes' Meditations. Princeton, NJ: Princet

Grube, G. M. A. 1980. Plato's Thought. Indianapolis, IN., and Cambridge: Hack-

Jenks, Rod. 2006. "The Sounds of Silence: Rheto

Is the Test of Truth. Lewiston, NY, and Lamp

Kenny, Anthony. 1995. Descartes: A Study of his Phil

Kraut, Richard. 1983. "Comments on Gregory Vlastos, The Socratic Elenchos."

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