De Leon v.

Esguerra

DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA

153 SCRA 602

FACTS:
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain in the elections on May 17, 1982. On February 9, 1987,
petitioner received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by OIC Governor Esguerra
on February 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores Taytay,
Rizal. Petitioners pray that the memorandum be null and void in accordance to Section 3 of Barangay
Election Act of 1982. Petitioner further that with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent
OIC governor no longer has authority to designate successors and replace them.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal order of De Leon et. Al. by respondent OIC Governor valid?

HELD:
The constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, the Provisional
Constitution has been superseded. As such, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2
Article III of said Constitution. The Memoranda was declared to be of no legal force and the writ of
prohibition enjoining respondents from proceeding with the take-over was granted.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary

G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,

vs.

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.

Facts:

•The Plebiscite Case 1.On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which
was amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines.

2.Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August
24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held
on November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June
1, 1971.

3.While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.
1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

4.On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential
Decree No. 73, “submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds
therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution
on January 15, 1973.

5.On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer
of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from
implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the
grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree “has no force and effect as law because the calling … of
such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to
be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the
purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper submission
to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech,
press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”

6.On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.

7.On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,
when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January
15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the
meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”

8.Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court
deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date
nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then,
again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January
22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not
have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the
President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission
on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
9.“In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent
motion,” praying that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,
1973.”

10.The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the
respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later
than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the
petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a “supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order
and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a restraining order be issued enjoining and
restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of Local Governments and
its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado
Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such
task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials
concerned, the so-called Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were
supposed to have met during the period comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the
two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion.”

11.On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said
case G.R. No. L-35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January
16, 1973,” and setting the motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was
being heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of
this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering
to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.
Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No.
L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present
that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said
Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

•The Ratification Case 1.On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from
implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935
Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and
as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged
that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his
Cabinet, respondents including.

2.Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed
constitution upon ground that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to
proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to
ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

3.Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order,
decree, and proclamation which have the same import and objective.

Issues:

1.Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.

2.Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified
validly conforming to the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.

3.Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification)
by the people.

4.Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.

5.Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

1.It is a justiciable and a non-political question. 1.To determine whether or not the new constitution is in
force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment
to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at the time of
the alleged ratification of the old constitution.

2.The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions
of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we
patterned our 1935 Constitution) shall show.

2.The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court. 1.The Constitution
does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

2.The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age
can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s
Assemblies must be considered null and void.
3.Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution
envisages with the term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the
persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the
American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major characteristics, namely,
uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with the
advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the
election returns.

4.The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is
void. The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of
the COMELEC and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those
of Presidential Decree No. 73. The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This
is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental
scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the “free, orderly, and honest”
expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void,
insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution

3.No majority vote has been reached by the Court. 1.Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution.”

2.Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no
expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of
the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the
doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect that independently of the validity of the
ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the people must be accorded
recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application
in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of
the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”

3.Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under
a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,
(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted
the Constitution.”

4.The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution. 2.A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition
by members of Congress do not constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have
performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law
and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law
government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance
with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have
admittedly had salutary effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or
approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inaction or obedience of the
people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or acquiescence.

3.As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the
same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both
Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is
an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which
Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.

4.In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be
given due course, there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not
been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has
been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and
effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the
submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in
accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the provisions of the Revised Election
Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.

5.Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect. 1.Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar,
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of
the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the
premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certainty
whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court, voted
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result,
there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

Tolentino v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971

Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

ISSUE:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue whether or not a resolution
of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and thus
subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention but
they are both subject to the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1
violated Sec. 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be submitted to
the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover, the voter must be provided sufficient time and
ample basis to assess the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not separately
but together.

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then
under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people.
Such is not allowed.

The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the
entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people
were not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time
no idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be
unable to assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of
Submission” which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to
the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

Imbong v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar, J.
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming
that it prejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a
Constituent Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have
two delegates from each representative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4
amending Resolution No. 2 by providing that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at
least two delegates from each representative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132, implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914
which previously implemented Res. No. 2. Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of
8(a), and the entire law, while Imbong questions the constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A.
6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of
such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The
Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A.
6132, since such details are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.
2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of
the Constitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2
also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of
delegates. The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in
Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both
contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that
basic constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid
infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by the petitioners.

Planas. v. COMELEC

49 SCRA 105; January 22, 1973

Ponente: Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:
While the 1971 Constitution Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the president issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under martial law. On November 29, 1972 the Convention
approved its proposed constitution. The next day the president issued PD No. 73 submitting to the
people for ratification or rejection the proposed constitution as well as setting the plebiscite for said
ratification. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a petition to enjoin respondents from
implemented PD No. 73 because the calling of the plebiscite among others are lodged exclusively in the
Congress. On December 17, 1972, the president issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of
PD 1081 for the purpose of free and open debate on the proposed constitution. On December 23, the
president announced the postponement of the plebiscite, as such, the Court refrained from deciding the
cases. On January 12, the petitioners filed for an “urgent motion” praying that the case be decided “as
soon as possible”.

ISSUES:
1. Is validity of PD 73 justiciable?
2. Is PD 73 valid?
3. Does the 1971 Constitutional Convention have the authority to pass the proposed constitution?

HELD:
The Court may pass upon constitutionality of PD 73 not only because of a long list of cases decided by
the Court but also of subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution which expressly
provides for the authority of the Court to review cases revolving such issue. The validity of the decree
itself was declared moot and academic by the Court. The convention is free to postulate any
amendment as long as it is not inconsistent to what is known as Jus Cogens.

Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by
Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132,
approved on 24 August 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said
Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform
its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President
issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the
Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30
November 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the
plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after,
or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925, against the
Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said
"respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner, until further
orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect
as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the
prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the
appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress,"
and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17
December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation
1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the
President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General
Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15 January 1973, be
postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the
"order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of
free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement
of the plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for
neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or
announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet
in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that
the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor,
which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the
plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress
and the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on
these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent
motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January
1973." It was alleged in said motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of
Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public
questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or
oppose — [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite
on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement
of the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of
the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial
Law."

Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.

Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue
on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the authority, not only of a long list of cases in
which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but,
also, of no less than that of Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which
expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the
Constitution proposed by the Convention.
Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the
Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is
unnecessary, for the time being, to pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said
Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time
later, the proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.

Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of
specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.

Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of
the President of the Philippines. This question has not been explicitly raised, however, in any of the
cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation,
although the petitioners in L-35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution
to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of January 15,
1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases,
and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental question without the most thorough
discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering
the surrounding circumstances, that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said
petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.

Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1)
There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On
the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and
Concepcion, or 6 Members of the Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and
academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree.
(3) On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to
incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948, Justice Makalintal, Castro,
Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4)
Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to
continue in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices
Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question whether the proclamation of
Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the
freedom essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy
between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial
Law, and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo,
Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of
adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated. (6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the
following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
Esguerra and Concepcion are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been
properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b] Justice
Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to
and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the Proposed
Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict
conformity with the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate
drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution
is legally recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains
unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels
"that the Court is not competent to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been
ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards,"
since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be
dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative,
for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer
similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners
therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to
contest the legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period
to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in effect, that the Court
should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of
the cases are dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Sanidad v. COMELEC

73 SCRA 333; October 12, 1976

Ponente: Martin, J

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to
declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the
president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such, the referendum
plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a justiciable
question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to perform such act
is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the governmental powers are
generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-
plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are issues of the day and
the people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law.

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his
present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of
Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens
Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly,
Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of
22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he
submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its
"whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people
in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976,
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991
and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the
Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose
amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has
no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the
Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under
action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan,
docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming
Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.
Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote
of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by
a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2
thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the
approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National
Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,
therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the
(1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional
Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the
calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a
majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be
proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by
the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent
President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination
of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing
conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention
voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent
President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The
President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from
the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly.
In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will
to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February
1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was
eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention,
who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion
since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore,
when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that
body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending
process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In
the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly).
While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political
science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a
legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval
of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do
with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Phil. Bar Association v. COMELEC

Lawyers League v. Aquino

Facts:

On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.

Issues:

1.Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue.

2.Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:

•In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.

•The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made
the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.

Rulings:

1.Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that
petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.

2.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government.
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

Magallona v. Ermita

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of
their particular arguments are as follows:

a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;

b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
(innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,
contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;

c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire, or
lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is
the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the
treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.

The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The
area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na.
mi. (See image below for comparison)

If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space
and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:

Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.

b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal
waters”, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS
itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of
others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to
absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law
without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.

c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes
of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that,
then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS –
that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.

NOTES:

Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-
based rights:

a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty

b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).

c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit
the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone

Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.

PVTA v. CIR

Facts:

This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.

1. In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444.

2.Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge
Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that
the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act
No. 444.

3.PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental

functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

Held:
YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has
become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.

There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case. The objection of private
respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of
governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because
petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was
beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner
does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the
differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne
by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render
overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That
would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on
this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

Romualdez-Yap v. CSC

ROMUALDEZ-YAP v CSC

225 SCRA 285

FACTS:

The petitioner Conchita Romualdez-Yap worked and was appointed in 1983 as Senior Vice President of
the Philippine National Bank Fund Transfer Department. While on leave due to medical reasons,
Executive Order No. 80 or the Revised Charter of PNB, which authorized the reorganization of PNB, was
approved on December 3, 1986. As part of the reorganization plan, the Fund Transfer Department was
abolished and its functions transferred to the International Department. Petitioner was notified of her
separation from the service effective February 16, 1986 (later corrected as 1987). She appealed her
separation to the Civil Service Commission, who upheld the validity of her separation. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner which was denied by the CSC on January 30, 1992. Petitioner
filed for a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization of PNB, a government-owned or controlled corporation performing
ministrant functions valid.

HELD:

PNB's reorganization was by virtue of a valid law. At the time of reorganization, due to the critical
financial situation of the bank, departments, positions and functions were abolished or merged. The
abolition of the Fund Transfer Department (FTD) was deemed necessary. This, to the Court's mind, was a
management prerogative exercised pursuant to a business judgment. At this point, a distinction can be
made in ruling on the validity of a reorganization between a government bureau or office performing
constituent functions (like the Customs) and a government-owned or controlled corporation performing
ministrant functions (like the PNB). But a reorganization whether in a government bureau performing
constituent functions or in a government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant
functions must meet a common test, the test of good faith. Whether there was a hidden political agenda
to persecute petitioner due to her consanguinial relation to Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the widow
of former President Marcos, is not clearly shown. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that,
precisely because of such consanguinial relation, petitioner may have been the object of deferential, if
not special treatment under the Marcos regime. It is part of the Filipino culture to extend such
deferential, if not special treatment to close relatives of persons in power. Many times this is carried to
unwholesome extremes. But a discontinuance of such deferential or special treatment in the wake of a
change in government or administration is not bad faith per se. It may be merely putting things in their
proper places.

Due to the restructuring — and this is empirically verifiable — PNB became once more a viable banking
institution. The restoration of the FTD four years after it was abolished and its functions transferred to
the International Department, can be attributed to the bank's growth after reorganizations, thereby
negating malice or bad faith in that reorganization. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in
the validity of one's right. The petitioner’s present argument that bad faith existed at the time of the
abolition of the FTD because it was restored four years later is a little too late. Who could have
predicted in 1986 or 1987 that PNB would be able to rise from its financial crisis and become a viable
commercial bank again? The decision to abolish the FTD at the time it was abolished, to repeat, was a
business judgment made in good faith.

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,

vs.

EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Co Kim Cham had a pending Civil Case with the Court of First Instance of Manila initiated
during the time of the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge, Judge Arsenio Dizon, refused to continue hearings on the case which were
initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than
that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free
of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings
and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the
lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such
authority.

Respondent, additionally contends that the government established during the Japanese occupation
were no de facto government.

Issues:

1.Whether or not judicial acts and proceedings of the court made during the Japanese occupation were
valid and remained valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.

2.Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation issued by General MacArthur declaring that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts.

3.Whether or not those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them, if the said judicial
acts and proceedings were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation.

Discussions:

•Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of war. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by
Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and
govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and
flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political
institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in
his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government
are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as
established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts
— in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which
regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto
government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
•General MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments in his proclamation October 23, 1944,
but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of
nations.

•If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military
occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive
Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts,
which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International
Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without
necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor
graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the
removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially
unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic
bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same
exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

Rulings:

1.The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being
de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of justice
of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid. Those not only
judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a political complexion,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur.

2.The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to the judicial
processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of
the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese
occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political
complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid
before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular
sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to
refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law.

3.Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter
of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the
administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer
the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive
Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws)
are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary
tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a
theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-
point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which
compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.”
Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and
the government established by the occupant of transient character.

Government of P.I v. Monte De Piedad

In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in
turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the
said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The bank
argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the
respondent bank.

HELD: Yes. The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is
in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of
the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest.
No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has
the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Facts:

1. Spain paid $400,000 into the treasury of the Philippine Islands for the relief of those damaged by an
earthquake.

2. Upon the petition of Monte de Piedad, an institution under the control of the church, the Philippine
Government directed its treasurer to give $80,000 of the relief fund in Four (4)4 installments. As a
result, various petitions were filed, including the heirs of those entitled to the allotments. All prayed for
the State to bring suit against Monte de Piedad, and for it to pay with interest.

3. The Defendant appealed since all its funds have been exhausted already on various jewelry loans.

Issue: Whether the government is the proper authority to the cause of action
Held: YES. The Philippine government, as a trustee towards the funds could maintain the action since
there has been no change of sovereignty. The state, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae of the people.
These principles are based upon public policy. The Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party
because it was exercising its sovereign functions or powers and was merely seeking to carry out a trust
developed upon it when the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. Finally, if said loan was
for ecclesiastical pious work, then Spain would not exercise its civil capacities.

Cabañas v. Pilapil

Florentino Pilapil insured himself and he indicated in his insurance plan that his child will be his
beneficiary. He also indicated that if upon his death the child is still a minor; the proceeds of his benefits
shall be administered by his brother, Francisco Pilapil. The child was only ten years of age when
Florentino died and so Francisco then took charge of Florentino’s insurance proceeds for the benefit
of the child.

On the other hand, the mother of the child Melchora Cabanas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of
the insurance proceeds in favor and for her to be declared as the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the
terms of the insurance policy and that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding
only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the
insurance policy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be
affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve that case according to the best
interest of that person. The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shall show more care towards
the child than the uncle will. The application of parens patriae here is in consonance with this country’s
tradition of favoring conflicts in favor of the family hence preference to the parent (mother) is observed.

Facts:

1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise
indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of
Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed
a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?

YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country
for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and
mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her
plea.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

75 PHIL 875

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on December
8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to
the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area.
The case at bar is a petition for prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from
further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not subject to
military law at the time of offense.

ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?

HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo Area was
a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United States army. The
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII
Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the
Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or
life imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are agencies of executive character
and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is dismissed with costs.
Laurel v. Misa

FACTS:

The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, theaccusedadhered to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that hecannot be tried fortreason since his
allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a
change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was
replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO: The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanentallegiance tohis
government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it ispresumed that thePhilippine
government still had the power. Moreover, sovereignty cannot besuspended; it is eithersubsisting or
eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather,it was theexercise of sovereignty
that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspendedallegiance. Regarding thechange of government, there
is no such change since the sovereign – the Filipinopeople – is still thesame. What happened was a mere
change of name of government, fromCommonwealth to theRepublic of the Philippines.DISSENT: During
the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of thePhilippineswere suspended. Thus,
treason under the Revised Penal Code cannot be punishablewhere the lawsof the land are momentarily
halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t sovereign at the time
of the Commonwealth since it was underthe United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry
over to the new Republicwhere thePhilippines is now indeed sovereign.

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be prosecuted for the
crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code on the grounds that
the sovereignty of the legitimate government and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended,
and that there was a change of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.

ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?

HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their
legitimate government on sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such
thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of government does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason because it is an offense to the same
government and same sovereign people.
People v. Perfecto

FACTS:
About August 20, 1920 Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Sentae discovered that
certain documents which constituted the records of testimony by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies had disappeared from his office. On September 7, 1920, the newspaper La Nacion, edited by
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto published an article criticizing the Senate and its members in general. As a result,
he was charged guilty of violating Article 256 of the Penal Code by the CFI of Manila. Petitioner filed an
appeal to the Supreme Court praying for the dismissal of the case on the ground that said Article is no
longer in force.

ISSUE:
Is Article 256 of the Penal Code still in force despite the change of Spanish sovereignty to American
sovereignty over the Philippines?

HELD:
It is a general principle of the public law that the previous political relations of the ceded region are
totally abrogated. All laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions
and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Article 256 was enacted to protect
Spanish officials which were representatives of the King. Such intent is contradictory to the ideology of
the new government where “In the eye of our (American) Constitution and laws, every man is a
sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man”. As such, Article 256 is
deemed abrogated and the case is consequently dismissed and judgment reversed.

Macariola v. Asuncion

Facts:

On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in Civil Case 3010 final for lack of
an appeal.

On October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion. The project of partition of
lots was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
petitioner Bernardita R. Macariola. The Judge approved it in his order dated October 23, 1963.

One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots denominated
as Lot 1184 A – E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of
certificate of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6, 1965, Galapon sold a
portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest inn
Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing & Fishing Industries Inc. Judge Asuncion was the President and
his wife Victoria was the Secretary. The Asuncions and Galapons were also the stockholder of the
corporation.
Respondent Macariola charged Judge Asuncion with "Acts unbecoming a Judge" for violating the
following provisions: Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Article 14, par. 1 & 5 of the Code of
Commerce, Sec. 3 par H of RA 3019 also known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practice Act., Sec. 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

On November 2, 1970 a certain Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno dismissed the complaints filed against
Asuncion.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.

Ruling:

No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of "Acts unbecoming a Judge"
but was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities.

Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr.
Galapon who earlier purchased the lot from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on
March 6, 1965 from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in
Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and November, 1963. The said property was no
longer the subject of litigation.

In the case at bar, Article 14 of Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent. Upon the sovereignty from the Spain to the US and to the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. 14 of this Code of Commerce, which sourced from the Spanish Code of Commerce, appears to have
been abrogated because whenever there is a change in the sovereignty, political laws of the former
sovereign are automatically abrogated, unless they are reenacted by Affirmative Act of the New
Sovereign.

Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019, citing that the public officers
cannot partake in any business in connection with this office, or intervened or take part in his official
capacity. The Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and sold their
respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the corporation did not benefit in any case filed by
or against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966 up to
its incorporation on January 9, 1967. The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation
contravenes against Canon 25.

Peralta v. Director of Prisons

FACTS:

William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as
defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The
petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and
which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial
and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 is constitutional.

HELD:

Yes, it is constitutional. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal
jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. It is merely a governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it
was within the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All
judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon
reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political
complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as
defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The
petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and
which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial
and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE:
1. Is the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?
2. Is the sentence of life imprisonment valid?
3. By principle of postliminy, did the punitive sentence cease to be valid from the time of the
restoration of the Commonwealth?

HELD:
There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction established
by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a
governmental agency. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power
and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65. All judgments of political
complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as
such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be
considered as having ceased to be valid.

Alcantara v. Director of Prisons

FACTS:
Petitioner Aniceto Alcantara was convicted of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious
physical injuries. The Court of Appeals modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty from arresto
mayor to prison correccional. Petitioner now questions the validity of the decision on the sole ground
that said court was only a creation of the so-called Republic of the Philippines during Japanese military
occupation, thus, a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus from petitioner.

ISSUE:
Is the judgment of Court of Appeals good and valid?

HELD:
Judgments of such court were good and valid and remain good and valid for the sentence which
petitioner is now serving has no political complexion. A penal sentence is said to be of a political
complexion when it penalizes a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penalized by
the latter as a crime against the legitimate government but taken out of territorial law and penalized as
new offenses committed against the belligerent occupant which is necessary for the control of the
occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. Such is the case at hand, the petition
for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

Vilas v. City of Manila

FACTS:
Petitioners are creditors of the city of Manila before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United
States. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is
a totally different corporate identity from the previous one and is not liable for the debts of the Spanish
municipality.

ISSUE:
Is the present municipality liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the
United States?

HELD:
The contention that the liability of the city upon such obligations was destroyed by a mere change of
sovereignty is one which is without a shadow of moral force. The city, acting as a corporation, possesses
two kinds of powers: governmental and public. In view of the dual character of municipal corporations,
there is no public reason for the presuming their total dissolution as a consequence of military
occupation or territorial cession. The cession did not operate as an extinction or dissolution of
corporations. The present city is, in every legal sense, the successor of the old. As such, it is entitled to
the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject to all of its
liabilities. All three of plaintiffs in error are entitled to judgment.

Facts:
Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the
creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed
to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the
cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the
theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

Issue

Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to
its creditor?

Held

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the
successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions
that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila
retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of
Manila.