Assignment No.

1
1. Definition of Procedure
Short Title Kring v. Missouri
107 U.S. 221 (April 2, 1883)
Case Title -
Case Nature ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Syllabi Class
Syllabi 1. A. was convicted of murder in the first degree, and the judgment of
condemnation was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Missouri. A previous
sentence pronounced on his plea of guilty of murder in the second degree, and
subjecting him to an imprisonment for twenty-five years, had, on his appeal,
been reversed and set aside. By the law of Missouri in force when the homicide
was committed, this sentence was an acquittal of the crime of murder in the first
degree, but before his plea of guilty was entered the law was changed, so that by
force of its provisions, if a judgment on that plea be lawfully act aside, it shall
not be held to be an acquittal of the higher crime. Held that as to this case, the
new law was an ex post facto law within the meaning of Section 10, Article I, of
the Constitution of the United States, and that he could not be again tried for
murder in the first degree.
2. The history of the ex post facto clause of the Constitution reviewed in
connection with its adoption as a part of the Constitution and with its subsequent
construction by the federal and the state courts.
3. The distinction between retrospective laws, which relate to the remedy or the
mode of procedure, and those which operate directly on the offense, is unsound
where, in the latter case, they injuriously affect any substantial right to which the
accused was entitled under the law as it existed when the alleged offense was
committed.
4. Within the meaning of the Constitution, any law is ex post facto which is
enacted after the offense was committed and which, in relation to it or its
consequences, alters the situation of the accused to his disadvantage.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------
The word "procedure," as a law term, is not well understood, and is not found at
all in Bouvier's Law Dictionary, the best work of the kind in this country.
Fortunately a distinguished writer on criminal law in America has adopted it as
the title to a work of two volumes. Bishop on Criminal Procedure. In his first
chapter, he undertakes to define what is meant by procedure. He says:

"S. 2. The term 'procedure' is so broad in its signification that it is seldom

employed in our books as a term of art. It includes in its meaning whatever is
embraced by the three technical terms, 'pleading,' 'evidence,' and 'practice.'

And in defining 'practice' in this sense, he says 'the word means those legal rules
which direct the course of proceeding to bring parties into the court and the
course of the court after they are brought in;' and 'evidence,' he says, as part of
procedure, "signifies those rules of law whereby we determine what testimony is
to be admitted and what rejected in each case, and what is the weight to be given
to the testimony admitted."
Docket -
Number
Dispositive Tested by these criteria, the provision of the Constitution of Missouri which
Portion denies to plaintiff in error the benefit which the previous law gave him of
acquittal of the charge of murder in the first degree on conviction of murder in
the second degree is, as to his case, an ex post facto law within the meaning of
the Constitution of the United States, and for the error of the Supreme Court of
Missouri in holding otherwise, its judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
to it with direction to reverse the judgment of the Criminal Court of St. Louis
and for such further proceedings as are not inconsistent with this opinion, and it
is

So ordered.

2. Purpose of Procedure
Short Title Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General., 20 Phil. 523 , December 01, 1911
Case Title THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE
ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the Insular Government et al.,
defendants and appellants.
Case Nature APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Jocson, J.
Syllabi Class REALTY|EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS|VENUE BY MUTUAL
CONSENT
Syllabi 1. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; LOCATION OF THE
LAND.-
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate stated in
said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After the filing of the
complaint the plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building
its line, stations and terminals, and put the same into operation. Commissioners
were appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held several
sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and finally made their report.
After said report had been made and filed with the court the plaintiff gave notice
to the defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to
dismiss the action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter thereof, it having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that
the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecijainstead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the .complaint. The motion
was heard and after due deliberation the trial court dismissed the action upon the
ground that, inasmuch as the land described in the complaint was situated in the
Province of Nueva Ecija instead of in the Province of Tarlac, the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the
action. Held: Error.
2. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; JURISDICTION OF
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE OVER ACTIONS AFFECTING REALTY.-
Sections 55 and 56 of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer upon
the Courts of First Instance complete and perfect jurisdiction over all of the
lands within the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon
locality. There is no limitation. It is universal. So far as jurisdiction over the
subject matter is concerned, the Court of First Instance of one province may, if
there is no objection by any of the parties, take cognizance of an action in
reference to real estate located in another province.
3. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; PURPOSE OF THE LAW
OF PROCEDURE.-
Certain statutes confer jurisdiction. Others provide for the procedure by which
that jurisdiction is made effective. The purpose of procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to give that jurisdiction
effectiveness. The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or
change that power or authority. It simply directs the manner in which it shall be
exercised. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the
court. None of the parties to the litigation can enlarge or diminish it or dictate
when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. On the other hand, questions of
civil procedure, generally speaking, are subject to the volition of the parties.
4. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; LAYING OF VENUE is
PROCEDURAL.-
The laying of the venue is procedural rather than substantive. It relates to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Provisions
of law relating to the same were not intended to take anything from the power of
the court but, rather, to grant something to one or both of the parties. They
establish a relation, not between the court and the subject matter, but between
the plaintiff and the defendant.
5. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; EFFECT OF SECTION
377, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.-
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing that actions affecting real
property shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or
some part thereof, is located, does not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance over the land itself but relates simply to the personal rights of the
parties as to the place of trial.
6. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; FULL JURISDICTION
CONFERRED UPON THE COURTS.-
The Philippine Commission has in fullest phrase given the Courts of First
Instance unrestricted jurisdiction over real estate in the Islands by Act No. 136,
and that jurisdiction ought not to be held to be withdrawn except by virtue of an
Act equally express or so clearly inconsistent therewith as to amount to the same
thing.
7. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; VENUE NOT
CONNECTED WITH JURISDICTION; WAIVER BY PARTIES.-
Venue is not connected with jurisdiction over the subject matter; and the
defendants' rights in respect thereto, as they are conferred by section 377 above
referred to, may be waived expressly or by implication. Act No. 136 before
referred to having conferred the fullest and completest jurisdiction possible upon
Courts of First Instance relative to the real estate of the Islands, section 377
referred to will not be held or construed to restrict or limit that jurisdiction, it not
containing express provisions to that end.
8. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS; EXTENT OF THE RIGHT
OF WAIVER.-
It is a general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law
gives unless such renunciation is expressly prohibited or the right conferred is of
such a nature that its renunciation would be against public policy. This right of
renunciation is so thoroughly established, and was at the time of the enactment
of the Code of Civil Procedure, that its exercise by a defendant in relation to the
venue of an action will not be held to have been abridged by section 377 without
very clear provision therein to that effect. There being no part of such section
express enough to accomplish such result, such section does not abridge the right
of the defendant to renounce the privilege conferred upon him thereby. If the
parties consent thereto there is no legal reason why the Court of First Instance of
 Manila may not take cognizance of and determine a controversy affecting the
title to or an interest in real estate situated in IlocosNorte or any other province.
9. REALTY; EXPROPRIATION BY RAILROADS GOVERNED BY
SPECIAL LAWS.-
The condemnation of real estate by a railroad corporation is governed by the
special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an action in condemnation
proceedings generally are not applicable to the proceedings by a railroad
company to condemn lands. Section 377 was intended to cover simply actions
relating to the condemnation of real estate where the land involved is,
comparatively speaking, compactly together. It was not intended to meet a
situation presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously f rom
one end of the country to the other.
10. REALTY; VENUE BY MUTUAL CONSENT; RIGHT OF DEFENDANT
TO INSIST UPON CHANGE OF VENUE.-
In an action by a railroad company to condemn lands, while, with the consent of
defendants, express or implied, the venue may be laid and the action tried in any
province selected by the plaintiff, it being one in which the lands sought to be
condemned, or some part thereof, is located, nevertheless, the defendants who
have lands lying in another province, or any one of such defendants, may, by
timely application to the court, require the venue as to their/ or, if one, his, lands
to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action
as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where
originally begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and
ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces.
11. REALTY; ESTOPPEL OF PARTIES CONSENTING TO VENUE.-
The plaintiff having brought the action of necessity submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. It took advantage of the situation it itself created to take
possession of the land described in the complaint, construct its line, switches,
stations, yards, and terminals, and carry the case through two years of expensive
litigation. It can not now be permitted to make all this go for naught alleging its
own negligence as a reason therefor. Under such circumstances the plaintiff is
estopped from alleging that the court has no jurisdiction over it.
Docket No. 6287
Number
Dispositive For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded
Portion to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law. So
ordered.

3. Retroactive Application
Short Title Tan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 524 , January 16, 2002
Case Title JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C.
Tan, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and
JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLAMAGDANGAL, respondents.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class Remedial Law|StatutoryConstruction|Statute
Syllabi 1. Remedial Law; Statutory Construction; Statute; Section 1, Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in this
case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.-
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should
not be given retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to
 the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and
this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then
existing as well as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of
the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which
if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject
lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule
with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the
subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of
redemption when he made the redemption.
2. Remedial Law; Statutory Construction; Statute; The manner of exercising the
right cannot be changed and the change applied retroactively if to do so will
defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.-
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of
procedure on the date of reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous.
The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied
retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner
which is already vested.
Docket G.R. No. 136368
Number
Dispositive IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998
Portion and its Resolution dated November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled
and set aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July 24, 1996 of the RTC of
Davao City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are
reinstated. No costs.

4. Liberal Construction
Short Title Cabrera vs. Ng, 719 SCRA 199 , March 12, 2014
Case Title MARYLOU CABRERA, petitioner, vs. FELIX NG, respondent.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class Remedial Law|CivilProcedure|Motions|Three-Day Notice Rule
Syllabi Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions; Three-Day Notice Rule; The
general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4
and 5 of the Rules of Court is mandatory.—The general rule is that the three-day
notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process. “The purpose
of the three-day notice requirement, which was established not for the benefit of
the movant but rather for the adverse party, is to avoid surprises upon the latter
and to grant it sufficient time to study the motion and to enable it to meet the
arguments interposed therein.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the adverse party had been afforded the
opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in
opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is
deemed realized.—The three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule.
When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has
been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the
purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In such
case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied
with.
Docket G.R. No. 201601
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant
Portion petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 21, 2009 and the Resolution
dated March 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03392, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, to resolve the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera on the merits within five (5) days
from the finality of this Decision.

5. Requirements for Liberal Construction

Short Title Sebastian vs. Morales, 397 SCRA 549 , February 17, 2003
Case Title DAMASO SEBASTIAN and TOMASA CARDENAS, petitioners, vs.
HORACIO R. MORALES, Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
LEONILASARENAS, JOSEPHINE SARENAS-DAYRIT, EVANGELINE
SARENAS, ESTRELITASARENAS TAN, CECILIO MARCOS SARENAS,
MANUEL GIL SARENAS, DAISY RITA SARENAS, and JOY SARENAS,
respondents.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class Actions|Pleadings and Practice|Appeals|Certiorari|Agrarian Reform
Syllabi 1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Procedural law has its own rationale in the
orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of
substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.-
Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.
Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not
on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that procedural rules are to be
ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedural law
has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure
the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that
obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and procedural
law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the
substantive rights of the litigants. Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so
that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.
2. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Agrarian Reform; The
Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR secretary.-
Section 61 of R.A. No. 6657 clearly mandates that judicial review of DAR
orders or decisions are governed by the Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it is
Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under
Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, “an appeal taken to the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.” Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners to
pursue the proper mode of appeal.
3. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; That a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 should pro forma satisfy the requirements for the
contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 does not necessarily mean that
one is the same as the other, for that matter; If every error committed by the trial
court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper subject of a review by
certiorari, then trial would never end and the dockets of the dockets of appellate
courts would be clogged beyond measure.-
That a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should pro forma satisfy the
requirements for the contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 does not
necessarily mean that one is the same as the other. Or that one may be treated as
the other, for that matter. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a
special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct,
mutually exclusive, and antithetical. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is
proper if the tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial
functions acted without or in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in law. A petition for review, on the other hand, seeks to correct errors
of judgment committed by the court, tribunal, or officer. In the instant case,
petitioners failed to show any grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of
jurisdiction on the part of the DAR Secretary. When a court, tribunal, or officer
has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the
decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that
jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and
jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action
for certiorari. For if every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial
agency were to be the proper subject of review by certiorari, then trial would
never end and the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measure.
Hence, no error may be attributed to the appellate court in refusing to grant
petitioners’ request that their petition for certiorari under Rule 65 be treated as a
petition for review under Rule 43.
4. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; The “errors” which may
be reviewed by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari are those of the
Court of Appeals, and not directly those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial
agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance.-
As a final salvo, petitioners urge us to review the factual findings of the DAR
Secretary. Settled is the rule that factual questions are not the proper subject of
an appeal by certiorari, as a petition for review under Rule 45 is limited only to
questions of law. Moreover, it is doctrine that the “errors” which may be
reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari are those of the Court of
Appeals, and not directly those of the trial court or the quasijudicial agency,
tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance. Finally, it is
settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded
respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, a situation that obtains in this case. The factual findings of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who, by reason of his official position, has
 acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect
and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.
Docket G.R. No. 141116
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Portion Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 dated March 4, 1999, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated December 10, 1999, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

6. Aspects of Jurisdiction
Short Title Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 16 , June 19,
2013
Case Title BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and LOLITA G. TOLEDO, respondents.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class Remedial Law|CivilProcedure|Parties|Substitution of Parties
Syllabi Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motion to Dismiss; Well-settled is the rule that the
special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by
the trial court of a motion to dismiss; The proper remedy in such a case is to
appeal after a decision has been rendered.―The Court of Appeals erred in
granting the writ of certiorari in favor of respondent. Well-settled is the rule that
the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial
by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a
motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a
case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, “the proper remedy in such a
case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.”
Same; Jurisdiction; Estoppel by Laches; The aspect of jurisdiction which may be
barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over
the subject matter.―The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being
assailed as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Thus, in Tijam, the case relied upon by petitioner, the issue involved was the
authority of the then Court of First Instance to hear a case for the collection of a
sum of money in the amount of P1,908.00 which amount was, at that time,
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal courts. In subsequent
cases citing the ruling of the Court in Tijam, what was likewise at issue was the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter of the case. Accordingly, in
Spouses Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 394 SCRA 472 (2002), the issue for
consideration was the authority of the regional trial court to hear and decide an
action for reformation of contract and damages involving a subdivision lot, it
being argued therein that jurisdiction is vested in the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree). In Lee v. Presiding Judge, MTC, Legaspi City, 145
SCRA 408 (1986), petitioners argued that the respondent municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the complaint for ejectment because the issue of
ownership was raised in the pleadings. Finally, in People v. Casuga, 53 SCRA
278 (1973), accused-appellant claimed that the crime of grave slander, of which
she was charged, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of municipal courts or
city courts and the then courts of first instance, and that the judgment of the
court of first instance, to which she had appealed the municipal court’s
conviction, should be deemed null and void for want of jurisdiction as her appeal
should have been filed with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. In all of
these cases, the Supreme Court barred the attack on the jurisdiction of the
respective courts concerned over the subject matter of the case based on estoppel
by laches, declaring that parties cannot be allowed to belatedly adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of a court to which they
submitted their cause voluntarily.
Same; Same; If the objection to the jurisdiction is not raised either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the
plaintiff or the defendant is deemed waived.―Since the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those defenses
which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be
invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a
waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff
or the defendant is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-
quoted Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Words and Phrases; An
indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter of a case that a final adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence,
without injuring or affecting that interest.―An indispensable party is one who
has such an interest in the controversy or subject matter of a case that a final
adjudication cannot be made in his or her absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest. He or she is a party who has not only an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but “an interest of such nature that a final decree
cannot be made without affecting [that] interest or leaving the controversy in
such a condition that its final determination may be wholly inconsistent with
equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable
party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete or equitable.”
Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in an action before
it may properly proceed.
Same; Same; Same; Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that
“[n]either misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an
action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just.―Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that “[n]either
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its
own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim
against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately.” Based
on the last sentence of the afore-quoted provision of law, a misjoined party must
have the capacity to sue or be sued in the event that the claim by or against the
misjoined party is pursued in a separate case. In this case, therefore, the
inclusion of Manuel in the complaint cannot be considered a misjoinder, as in
fact, the action would have proceeded against him had he been alive at the time
the collection case was filed by petitioner. This being the case, the remedy
provided by Section 11 of Rule 3 does not obtain here. The name of Manuel as
party-defendant cannot simply be dropped from the case. Instead, the procedure
taken by the Court in Sarsaba v. Vda. de Te, 594 SCRA 410 (2009), whose facts,
as mentioned earlier, resemble those of this case, should be followed herein.
Same; Same; Same; Where the defendant is neither a natural nor a juridical
 person or an entity authorized by law, the complaint may be dismissed on the
ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action or for
failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one
who cannot be a party to a civil action.―Where the defendant is neither a
natural nor a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, the complaint may
be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no cause
of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1(g) of Rule
16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of
action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action. Since the proper
course of action against the wrongful inclusion of Manuel as party-defendant is
the dismissal of the case as against him, thus did the trial court err when it
ordered the substitution of Manuel by his heirs.
Same; Same; Same; Substitution of Parties; Substitution is proper only where the
party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as expressly
provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.―Substitution is proper
only where the party to be substituted died during the pendency of the case, as
expressly provided for by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Death of party; duty of counsel.―Whenever a party to a pending action dies,
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to
inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and
to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. x x x
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased,
without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator x x x. The
court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear
and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. (Emphasis
supplied.) Here, since Manuel was already dead at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and, in effect,
there was no party to be substituted.
Docket G.R. No. 173946
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 February
Portion 2006 and the Resolution dated 1 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88586 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court dated 8 November 2004 and 22 December 2004,
respectively, in Civil Case No. 97-86672, are REINSTATED. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 24, Manila is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with the trial of
Civil Case No. 97-86672 against respondent Lolita G. Toledo only, in
accordance with the above pronouncements of the Court, and to decide the case
with dispatch.

7. Totality Rule
Short Title Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Standard Insurance Company, Inc., 453 SCRA
482 , March 16, 2005
Case Title PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN,
petitioners, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA
GICALE, respondents.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class Actions|Pleadings and Practice|Parties|Permissive Joinder of
Parties|Requisites|Jurisdictions|“Totality Rule”|Due Process
Syllabi 1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; Permissive Joinder of Parties;
Requisites; Where there is a single transaction common to both plaintiffs, they
have the same cause of action against the defendants.-
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the
same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact
common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise
proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue. In this case,
there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the
rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is,
whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to
both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against
petitioners.
2. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; To determine identity of cause of
action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to
sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a
recovery in the first.-
To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same
evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have
been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, had respondents filed
separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would have been presented
to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the
complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids
multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly
administration of justice.
3. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Parties; Jurisdictions; “Totality Rule”; Under
the “totality rule” “where there are several claims or causes of action between
the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.”-
Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “Sec. 5. Joinder of
causes of action.—A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative or
otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions: x x x (d) Where the claims in all the causes
of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount claimed
shall be the test of jurisdiction.” The above provision presupposes that the
different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor of the same plaintiff/s
and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is involved.
The issue of whether respondents’ claims shall be lumped together is determined
by paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the “totality
rule” as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among
others, that “where there are several claims or causes of action between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions.”
4. Actions; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.-
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to ex- plain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Petitioner Pantranco filed an answer and participated during the trial and
presentation of respondents’ evidence. It was apprised of the notices of hearing
 issued by the trial court. Indeed, it was afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain its side of the controversy. Clearly, it was not denied of its right to due
process. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing which
is not present here.
Docket G.R. No. 140746
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 23
Portion 1999 and Resolution dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 38453 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

8. Estoppel by Laches
Short Title Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 , April 15, 1968
Case Title SERAFINTIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MAGDALENOSlBONGHANOY alias GAVINOSlBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants, MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY Co., INC. (CEBU
BRANCH) bonding company and defendant-appellant.
Case Nature APPEAL from the orders of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class Judiciary Act|Estoppel|Laches|Jurisdiction|Execution|Jurisdiction of
courts|Exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject-matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings|Natureof|When execution returned
unsatisfied|recovery had upon bond
Syllabi 1. Judiciary Act; Jurisdiction of courts; Exception to the rule that jurisdiction
over the subject-matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings; Laches.-
The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts
exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case, a party may be barred by laches from invoking this plea for the first time
on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the
active participation of said party invoking the plea.
2. Estoppel; Kinds of estoppel.-
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or
by record, and of estoppel by laches.
3. Laches; Nature of; In general sense.-
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
4. Laches; Basis.-
The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.
5. Jurisdiction; A party cannot invoke the court’s jurisdiction and then deny it to
escape a penalty.-
It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court
in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape penalty. Upon this same principle is what we said in the
 three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963,
supra, to the effect that we frown upon the “undesirable practice” of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
6. Execution; When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond;
Separate judgment not necessary to hold sure. ty liable on the bond.-
There is no need for a separate action or judgment against the surety in order to
hold it liable on the bond. A bond filed for discharge of attachment is, per
Section 12 of Rule 59 “to secure the payment to the plaintiff of any judgment he
may recover in the action,” and stands “in place of the property so released.”
Hence, after the judgment for the plaintiff has become executory and the
execution is “returned unsatisfied” (Sec. 17, Rule 59), as in this case, the liability
of the bond automatically attaches and, in failure of the surety to satisfy the
judgment against the defendant despite demand therefor, writ of execution may
issue against the surety to enforce the obligation of the bond.
Docket No. L-21450
Number
Dispositive UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed,
Portion with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

9. General Rule
Short Title Figueroa vs. People, 558 SCRA 63 , July 14, 2008
Case Title VENANCIO FIGUEROA y CERVANTES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class Actions ; Jurisdiction ; Estoppel by Laches ;
Syllabi Actions; Jurisdiction; Statutes; Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof.—Applied uniformly is the familiar rule that the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
forceat the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a
retroactive application thereof. In this case, at the time the criminal information
for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with violation of the Automobile
Law (now Land Transportation and Traffic Code) was filed, Section 32(2) of
Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 had already been amended by Republic Act No.
7691.
Same; Same; Estoppel by Laches; The general rule should be, as it has
always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel—estoppel
by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of
jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).—The Court, thus, wavered on
when to apply the exceptional circumstance in Sibonghanoyand on when to
apply the general rule enunciated as early as in De La Santa and expounded at
length in Calimlim. The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been,
that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a
litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack of jurisdiction, only
supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
 jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its
jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and
not by mere consent of the parties. This is especially true where the person
seeking to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure
any advantage or the adverse party does not suffer any harm.
Same; Same; Same; Delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the
defense of “estoppel by laches” unless it further appears that the party, knowing
his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party
pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored
to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change
of title, intervention of equities, and other causes.—Applying the said doctrine to
the instant case, the petitioner is in no way estopped by laches in assailing the
jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that he raised the lack thereof in his appeal
before the appellate court. At that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain
thedefense of “estoppel by laches” unless it further appears that the party,
knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the
party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of
evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. In applying
the principle of estoppel by laches in the exceptional case of Sibonghanoy, the
Court therein considered the patent and revolting inequity and unfairness of
having the judgment creditors go up their Calvary once more after more or less
15 years. The same, however, does not obtain in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not
favored by law—it is to be applied rarely, only from necessity, and only in
extraordinary circumstances; When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be
a most effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.—We note at this
point that estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is
to be applied rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity must
be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may be a most
effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. Moreover, a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Hence, the Revised
Rules of Court provides for remedies in attacking judgments rendered by courts
or tribunals that have no jurisdiction over the concerned cases. No laches will
even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Docket G.R. No. 147406
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
Portion GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94 is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice.

10.
Short Title Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399 , November 19, 1982
Case Title MODESTACALIMLIM AND LAMBERTOMAGALI IN HIS CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF DOMINGO MAGALI, petitioners,
vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PANGASINAN, BRANCH I, and
FRANCISCO RAMOS, respondents.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari the orders of the Court of First Instance of
 Pangasinan, Br. I. Ramirez, J.
Syllabi Class Judgment|Jurisdiction|LandRegistration|Laches|Estoppel|Waiver
Syllabi Judgment; There is no res judicata or bar by prior judgment where a CFI
acting as a court of limited jurisdiction as a land registration court resolved a
highly controversial matter—ownership of titled property and cancellation of
torrens title previously issued—beyond its judicial competence to pass upon.—It
may hardly be questioned that the issues raised by the petitioners in their petition
to cancel TCT No. 68568 refer to the ownership or title over the property
covered thereby. The said petition presented before the respondent Court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction as a cadastral court, the question of who
should be considered the true and lawful owner of the parcel of land embraced in
said title. The petitioners alleged therein that they are the true owners of the
property, and that TCT No. 68568 which they sought to cancel was issued as a
result of the errors which were not of their own making. In short, the petition
raised a highly controversial matter which is beyond the judicial competence of
a cadastral court to pass upon or to adjudicate.
Same; Land Registration; Jurisdiction; The ruling inTijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
23 SCRA 29, that a party is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
land registration court in which it filed a petition for cancellation of title, is to be
considered as a mere exception rather than the general rule. Unfortunately, the
ruling inSibonghanoy case had become to be regarded as the general rule.—A
rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the
action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of
the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of
Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had
been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The
exceptional circumstance involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure
front the accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that
rendered the supposed ruling In Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the
general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that
the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Same; Same; Laches; Petitioners herein cannot be faulted with laches as they
immediately filed a petition in court after learning that their title had been
cancelled.—The petitioners in the instant case may not be faulted with laches.
When they learned that the title to the property owned by them had erroneously
and illegally been cancelled and registered in the name of another entity or
person who had no right to the same, they filed a petition to cancel the latter’s
title. It is unfortunate that in pursuing said remedy, their counsel had to invoke
the authority of the respondent Court as a cadastral court, instead of its capacity
as a court of general jurisdiction. Their petition to cancel the title in the name of
Independent Mercantile Corporation was dismissed upon a finding by the
respondent Court that the same was “without merit.” No explanation was given
for such dismissal nor why the petition lacked merit. There was no hearing, and
the petition was resolved solely on the basis of memoranda filed by the parties
which do not appear of record. It is even a possibility that such dismissal was in
view of the realization of the respondent Court that, sitting as a cadastral court, it
lacked the authority to entertain the petition involving as it does a highly
controversial issue. Upon such petition being dismissed, the petitioners instituted
 Civil Case No. SCC-180 on January 1, 1971, or only two and one-half years
after the dismissal of their petition in LRC Record No. 39492. Hence, we see no
unreasonable delay in the assertion by the petitioners of their right to claim the
property which rightfully belongs to them. They can hardly be presumed to have
abandoned or waived such right by inaction within an unreasonable length of
time or inexcusable negligence. In short, their filing of Civil Case No. SCC-180
which in itself is an implied non-acceptance of the validity of the proceedings
had in LRC Record No. 39492 may not be deemed barred by estoppel by laches.
Same; Estoppel; Estoppel, when it can be invoked.—It is neither fair nor
legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which was taken
cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective of
the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires
knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing
is true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown,
among others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of
the facts and that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the
matter. (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623.) The filing of an action or suit in a
court that does not possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be
presumed to be deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be
annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding.
Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair.
Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Waiver; Filing of petition or complaint in court does
not result in waiver on lack of court’s jurisdiction as the determination of the
correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter and court itself which takes
cognizance over a case it has no jurisdiction over should be faulted for the
resultant situation.—The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is
not a simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that
the highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
entertain the same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing
his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could
have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of
doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such
course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall
entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their
remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to
dismiss an action “whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter.” (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court.) Should the court render a
judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for
lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the
finality of the same. (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code.)
Docket No. L-34362
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Orders appealed from are hereby REVERSED and SET
Portion ASIDE. The Motion To Dismiss filed by the private respondent in Civil Case
No. SCC-180 shall be deemed denied and the respondent Court is ordered to
conduct further proceedings in the case. With costs against the private
respondent.

11.
Short Title Mangaliag vs. Catubig-Pastoral, 474 SCRA 153 , October 25, 2005
Case Title NORMA MANGALIAG AND NARCISOSOLANO, petitioners, vs. HON.
EDELWINACATUBIG-PASTORAL, Judge of The Regional Trial Court, 1st
Judicial Region, San Carlos City, (Pangasinan), Branch 56 and
APOLINARIOSERQUINA, JR., respondents.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of
San Carlos City, Br. 56.
Syllabi Class Civil Procedure|CivilLaw|Appeals|Courts|Jurisdictions|Statutes|CivilLaw|Quasi-
Delicts|Damages|Moral Damages
Syllabi 1. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Jurisdictions;It is necessary to stress that
generally a direct recourse to the Supreme Court is highly improper, for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of
courts.-
It is necessary to stress that generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly
improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals
(CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court
is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.
2. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Jurisdictions;The judicial hierarchy of
courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring
factual allegations.-
The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to
cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required
to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of
these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases
which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately
before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases
brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
3. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Jurisdictions;The contention of petitioner
that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active
participation in the trial is not the general rule but an exception, best
characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
29 (1968).-
Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived
by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the
general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in
Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction
did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already
been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
4. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Jurisdictions; Statutes;Section 1 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, provides
inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds
P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
 litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with
the RTC. The jurisdictional amount was increased to P200,000.00, effective
March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative
Circular No. 21-99.-
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994,
provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds
P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with in
the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in
the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The jurisdictional amount was increased to
P200,000.00, effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7691
and Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
5. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Courts; Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Damages; Moral
Damages; The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. Viewed as an action
for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article
2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-
delicts causing physical injuries.-
The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint
and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all
or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present case, the
allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to
recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for
physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity from
injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict,
the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which
provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing
physical injuries.
6. Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages;Moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused a person.-
It must be remembered that moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. Its
award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast
rule in determining the proper amount.
Docket G.R. No. 143951
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
Portion merit. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 9, 2000 is
LIFTED.The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City is DIRECTED to
continue with the trial proceedings inCivil Case No. SCC-2240 and resolve the
case with dispatch.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

12.
Short Title Frianela vs. Banayad, Jr., 594 SCRA 380 , July 30, 2009
Case Title APOLONIABANAYADFRIANELA, petitioner, vs.
SERVILLANOBANAYAD, JR., respondent.
Case Nature PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class Courts|Jurisdiction
Syllabi Courts; Jurisdiction; Probate Proceedings; The applicable law, therefore,
confers jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Municipal Trial
Courts (MTCs) over probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the
estate, which value must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.—The
applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or the MTCs over
probate proceedings depending on the gross value of the estate, which value
must be alleged in the complaint or petition to be filed.
Same; Same; Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost be waiver or by estoppel.—Nowhere
in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of Moises’s estate. Thus,
from a reading of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined which court
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore
committed gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction despite the
fact that the initiatory pleading filed before itdid not call for the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at the outset, dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Be it noted that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered
motuproprioby the courts. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have dismissed the
case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may
be raised by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Same; Same; No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be
wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instituted
probate proceedings.—Despite the pendency of this case for around 18 years, the
exception laid down in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968), and clarified
recently in Figueroa v. People, 558 SCRASCRA 63 (2008), cannot be applied.
First, because, as a general rule, the principle of estoppel by laches cannot lie
against the government. No injustice to the parties or to any third person will be
wrought by the ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instituted
probate proceedings.
Same; Same; Since the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over
the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null
and void.—Since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void. With the
above disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss and resolve the
other issues raised in the petition.
Docket G.R. No. 169700
Number
Dispositive IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P before the
Portion Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

13. Exclusive Venue

Short Title Briones vs. Court of Appeals, 746 SCRA 240 , January 14, 2015
Case Title VIRGILIO C. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CASH
ASIA CREDIT CORPORATION, respondents.
Case Nature SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Venue ;
Syllabi 1. Same; Civil Procedure; Venue; The general rule is that the venue of real
actions is the court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is
the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at
the election of the plaintiff.-
—The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which has
jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated; while the venue of personal actions is the court which has
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils., 559
SCRA 410 (2008), instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either
introduce another venue where actions arising from such instrument may be
filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion;
The Supreme Court (SC) stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner] must satisfactorily show that the court or
quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it.”-
—At the outset, the Court stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner] must satisfactorily show that the court or
quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave
abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’
discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law.”
Docket G.R. No. 204444
Number
Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated
Portion March 5, 2012 and the Resolution dated October 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117474 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders dated September 20, 2010 and October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 173 in Civil Case No. 10-124040 are REINSTATED.