Business Communications Paper

Capital Community College

May 30, 2018
Brian Ghilliotti

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 Content Warning

There is a section within this report that contains partially redacted

profanity. It was done to preserve the authenticity of the event being de-

scribed. Its purpose was not intended to unnecessarily shock or offend

readers. Please take notice.


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 Table of Contents

Content Warning Page 2

Section 1: Overview Page 4

Section 2: Background Pages 4 – 5

Section 3: The Incident Pages 5 – 8

Section 4: Review Pages 8 – 9

Section 5: Analysis Pages 9 – 15

Section 6: What Could Have Been Done? Pages 15 – 17

Section 7: Peer Review Pages 17 - 18

Notes Page 19

Sources Page 20

Diagram Page 21

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 Section 1: Overview

In this report we will examine the first aspect of communication, which is to in-

form, as it relates to an experience I faced during my deployment to Iraq in 2003. This

involved a situation where poor communications led to a lack of information being

passed along, leading to a very explosive situation.

The military has a very strict communication policy called “the chain of

command”, where one can only express information or their concerns to the person who

is immediately above them in their authority structure. If you do not follow this policy,

you can face reprimands. In this situation, there was a complete breakdown of the chain

of command, resulting in the offended party very angrily and violently telling me to not

use it again. All people in this report are actual people, and I have used their real

names.

Section 2: Background

Headquarters Company, 103rd Military Intelligence Battalion (now disbanded),

stationed at Fort Stewart Georgia, was partially broken up by Platoons and distributed to

other units to help support their various missions during the Iraq invasion. In the mili-

tary, the organizational unit known as a Company usually consists of three to four Pla-

toons, who are led by an enlisted authority known as a Platoon Sergeant. Platoons are

then broken down into smaller organizations known as Squads, which are led by enlist-

ed figures known as Squad Leaders. A Company is lead by an enlisted figure known

as a First Sergeant.

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 My Squad was separated from the Company to help support a helicopter unit that

was not part of the intelligence unit, based out of nearby Hunter Army Airfield, during the

invasion of Iraq. Neither the Squad nor the Company suffered casualties while it ad-

vanced to Bagdad during the invasion. Once we completed our mission, the various el-

ements of the Company re-converged on Baghdad and occupied the Baghdad In-

ternational Airport. The Company was stationed at a building that was once used to train

flight attendants.

People were visibly showing signs of stress related to the environment. Though

no one in the Company experienced combat (at least to the knowledge of the person

writing this report), people had extreme difficulty getting used to the flies, heat, dust, and

boredom. Once the invasion was over, the Company did not have much to do, and we

waited for about a month and half for orders to leave.

People were complaining about not having access to fully working bathroom fa-

cilities, washers, superficial needs, and “having freedom”. I was one the few people who

was establish any sort of equilibrium with the environment. The Company spent most of

the time cleaning equipment and vehicles before they were shipped home.

Section 3: The Incident

One day I was assigned generator detail. The entire facility used by the Compa-

ny was run by generators, as the local power system was completely down. As a matter

of fact, all units occupying the Baghdad International Airport had to rely on generators to

obtain power. Continuous checks had to be performed on the generators. The process

involved properly shutting down the generator after warning everyone in the facility that

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it was about to be shut down for a routine maintenance check. All fluids had to be

checked, dust had to be removed, and belts had to be inspected to make sure they

were still in good shape. As soon as this was done, the generator was started up again.

It is important to describe the setting where the generator was placed. There was

an open air enclosure to the left side of the main building where a tent was set up. The

enclosure was on the left side of the main building and flush with its front end. The main

building, or the training facility used to train Iraqi flight attendants, was the location

where the vast majority of the Company slept. The door between the enclosure and the

main building was at the enclosure’s lower right hand corner.

A military tent was set up in the upper left hand corner of the enclosure, which

was the location of the First Sergeant’s office, who I knew as Master Sergeant Gainey. It

was also his living quarters. The Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class Johnson, also

slept in that tent. The entrance to the tent was situated to its lower right hand corner,

and Master Sergeant Gainey’s work area was inside the tent’s lower left hand corner.

The generator was located across from the tent in the enclosure’s lower left hand

corner. Sergeant First Class Johnson liked to nap on a cot when he had nothing to do.

The cot placed at a point above the doorway between the main building and the open

air enclosure. His cot was positioned so that it was roughly diagonal to the lower right

hand corner of the Army tent. Part of the reason why he liked to stay in that location was

to stop Soldiers from going into the enclosure and ask what they wanted.

This was the case when I entered the open air enclosure to do a preventative

maintenance check on the generator. I was intending to go into the Army myself tent to

see if Master Sergeant Gainey was there so I can inform that I was about the generator

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check so he could shut down any computers he was using. I noticed that Sergeant First

Class Johnson was sleeping on his cot, but he quickly woke up and said:

“‘What do you need?

“I have been instructed to perform a preventative maintenance check on a gen-

erator, and was going to check to see if Master Sergeant Gainey was working on some-

thing with his computer so he could shut it down,” I replied.

Sergeant First Class Johnson then got up from a lying position on his cot, and,

while remaining seated on this cot, he attempted to shift his head so he could try to

peek through the Army tent’s doorway in order to see if there was any activity inside. He

did not call into the tent to see if anyone was inside. After he was convinced that there

was no one inside, he laid back down and said “Go ahead.” At no point did Sergeant

First Class Johnson ever make any effort to get off his cot and physically go inside the

tent to see if anyone was working inside.

I completed the generator check without incident. I them left the open enclosure

and returned to the main building. About one half hour later, at a point in front of the

open air enclosure, outside the main building, I was confronted by Master Sergeant

Gainey. When he saw me, he asked in a hostile, hateful tone:

“Hey Ghilliotti, did you f_cking turn off the f_cking generator while I was working?”

“Yes, Master Sergeant,” I replied, as I quickly got into a position of parade rest. I

was in a state of “get ready for anything”. I perceived a situation where I thought any-

thing could go.

“Sergeant First Class Johnson said I could go ahead and shut down the genera-

tor to do a maintenance check,” I continued

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 “Well next time you better f_cking tell me personally before you shut off the gen-

erator to do to a check. Do you understand me,?” he replied, with his voice getting loud-

er as he asked if I understood him.

“Yes, Master Sergeant, ” I replied. He then walked off.

My initial reaction to this was incident was one of apathy after it just happened,

as there were much more serious situations I was having with my Squad leader. I con-

trasted this incident with Master Sergeant Gainey to the mental abuse I was facing from

my Squad leader, which I felt was more serious, as a way to remain calm. I also re-

minded myself that this event was no reason to lose my cool, as I was about to get out

of the Army in five months.

Section 4: Review

It is not certain if Sergeant First Class Johnsons was aware of how his authoriza-

tion to let me shut down the generator, without actually going into the Army tent, nega-

tively impacted Master Sergeant Gainey. Sergeant First Class Johnson never offered

any apologies. Nor did Master Sergeant Gainey. All we can presume is that Master Ser-

geant Gainey was in the tent while Sergeant First Class Johnson was making a lazy ef-

fort to see if the Army tent was unoccupied, on my behalf, and did not see him. It is not

certain how I impacted Master Sergeant Gainey when I shut off the generator after get-

ting permission from Sergeant Class Johnson to do so.

There was probably no prior contact between Master Sergeant Gainey (who was

presumably in the tent) and Sergeant First Class Johnson, who remained lying the cot

during the generator check. There was certainly no contact between himself and Master

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Sergeant Gainey while I was doing the generator check, as I did not see anyone leave

the Army tent while performing the generator check. There was probably no communi-

cation with Sergeant First Class Johnson after the generator check, either.

If Master Sergeant Gainey was in the Army tent, he presumably chose to react

silently to the disruption of his computer work resulting from the generator shut down. I

never saw anyone inside the tent step out and ask “What happened?” as I was doing

the generator check. If Master Sergeant Gainey did leave the tent after I performed the

generator check, either Sergeant First Class Johnson was not there, he was sleeping

and did not wake him up, or he chose to not ask about what happened with the genera-

tor.

If he did, Sergeant First Class Johnson should have informed him that he had

authorized me to shut the generator down to do a maintenance check. It is also possible

that Master Sergeant Gainey did step out of the tent after I finished the generator check

and asked First Class Johnson what had happened, and Sergeant First Class Johnson

lied about the incident, making me look I was solely responsible. Perhaps Master Ser-

geant Gainey did know about Sergeant First Class Johnson’s role in the incident, and

chose to not direct the blame where it should have gone, as they had a special relation-

ship based on favoritism.

Section 5: Analysis

This situation is clear a case of complete communication breakdown. Sergeant

First Class Johnson failed to properly inform me if everyone was ready for the generator

shutdown. The principle of informing others is one of the four basic reasons why organi-

zations need to communicate effectively. The other three reasons why we need effective

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communication is for effective persuasion, establishing credibility, and expressing

goodwill.

Sergeant First Class Johnson’s insisted that I use the chain of command to see

anyone was still in the Army tent before shutting down the generator. However, he failed

to perform his role in the chain of command process by getting the information I needed,

which constituted a complete failure in the chain of command process. In the military

chain of command process, all subordinates must express their needs to and receive

orders from their immediate supervisors. They cannot try to reach out to the authority

that is above their immediate supervisor, or they will face severe consequences.

According to the rules of the military chain of command system, Sergeant First

Class Johnson had the authority to insist that I ask him first if the tent was cleared, in-

stead of going into the tent on my own to verify this information. Yet it is was also his

obligation under the military chain of command system to directly contact, or make an

attempt to directly contact, his supervisor to obtain an answer to my question. He did

not even call inside the tent. Sergeant First Class Johnson’s failure to get off his cot and

personally check the tent demonstrates a failure to use chain of command protocols.

Because he failed to properly implement the use of the chain of command, he failed to

properly inform me about the status of the Army tent.

Master Sergeant Gainey also seriously failed to utilize the military chain of com-

mand properly. If he had done so, he would have contacted the immediate supervisor of

the person that generated the incident in question. This would determine if the situation

was the result of ineffective leadership or blatant dereliction of duty on the part of the

person causing the incident in question. Instead, Master Sergeant Gainey chose to re-

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sort to mentally abusive behaviors to deal with this issue, and inappropriately telling me

to no longer use the chain of command.

A serious problem with the chain of command is that it is only as effective as the

person with the worst social skills within that chain of command segment. If a particular

person within a chain of command segment does not like an individual who has made a

request, or is just a poor manager to begin with, the expected outcomes will either never

happen or get sabotaged.

In many cases, information gets distorted as it is exchanged between many indi-

viduals, with the end result being that the expected outcomes do not happen. This is

because the information received by the final decision maker involved in the chain of

command segment is usually distorted and inaccurate information. As a result, input

needs to be resubmitted, and more time is wasted. In some cases, the passage of time

may generate circumstances that make the original question or input outdated .

The chain of command was developed to filter out problems according to their

level of complexity, so that the higher levels of the organization do not bogged down

with superficial problems. It was also designed to ensure that all lower levels of the hi-

erarchy are fully accountable of their subordinates.

The foundation of the chain of command is the social institution called rank,

which is a hierarchical system where greater authority is concentrated in a vertical fash-

ion. In the military, one is taught to respect a person’s rank, not their individuality as a

person(1). At the very least, the writer of this report agrees with this assessment. This

leads to all kinds of social attitudes related to rank that work against the principle of

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goodwill, as all behaviors are measured against the protocol limitations (or lack thereof)

established by the individual’s rank. Ethical considerations are hardly considered.

The higher your rank, the less socially ethical considerations are applied to an

individual’s behavior, though their personal accountability for other events not in their

immediate control increases. Likewise, higher rank is often seen by recipients as a so-

cial license to disregard social skills when communicating to individuals. An exception to

this trend involves military leaders who are constantly exposed to the civilian public.

As stated, rank based social systems throw goodwill out of the window. The text

mentions that businesses cannot survive for long if they lack goodwill or do not value it

(2). The military is protected from these natural consequences on the basis that no one

can technically “quit” on their own initiative. For an individual to quit, they must either

chose desertion, which is illegal, or continued insubordination, which will have long term

stigmatizing impacts in civilian life. They can also make hardship claims based medical

or socioeconomic reasons.

The civilian business world is very well aware of the patterns that exist within

these hierarchal, rank based military systems. Their perceptions are not too far off. The

researcher was not surprised to come across this body of material while conducting re-

search for this paper:

‘For example, one of my clients was asked, during a job interview

for a director position of an association, “Since you are so accustomed

to shouting orders to your subordinates, how do you think you can

motivate volunteers?”’ (3).

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The researcher found this segment fascinating. It did not go into any further detail about

the context of when and where this question was asked, but we could make several

conclusions about this statement.

First, it seems as if this employer was looking for someone who was bossy and

arbitrary, and they picked a candidate with a military background to fill this role. This im-

plies that there is a perception in the civilian world that people with military backgrounds

are arbitrary, bossy, and even rude. To what extent can you really motivate employees

by shouting at them?

Secondly, if this is accurate, this is a double edge sword. Some civilian employ-

ers may find these qualities ideal, and will hire ex-military based on these stereotypes.

This seemed to be the case with the interview referenced above.

However, in a civilian context, where the normal social consequences associated with

goodwill usually apply, civilian employers may revile giving prior military candidates em-

ployment consideration as a result of this stereotype.

Unfortunately, there is a basis of truth to this stereotype, as demonstrated by

Master Sergeant Gainey’s example. Hs is not alone, as many others with prolonged ex-

posure to this system have learned bad habits that are based on de-emphasizing good

will.

Indeed, goodwill is the foundation for all effective communication. In many cases,

those who gained more rank eventually look at communication as one way process.

This is further emphasized by the fact that requests within a chain of command system

get higher priority if they originated from someone who is in a higher position of authori-

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ty within the chain of command. When these people get used to perceiving communica-

tion as a one way process, there is little need to apply social skills in their communica-

tion habits. As a result, they show less interest in sustaining good will.

Upon reflection, the researcher did not find it surprising to observe inflexible, poor

problem solving on the part of higher military leadership. These issues generated nu-

merous frustrations with the lower echelons. The textbook for this business communica-

tions course mentioned that ”somebody has to inform employees how to run machinery

or perform their jobs, and the employees need to explain their needs and describe their

problems. Communication is thus a huge problem solver in business; indeed, almost no

business problem could be solved without it.” (4)

Unfortunately, in a system where senior leadership cultivates bad habits of look-

ing at communication as a top down process, we get situations where they simply do

not care about the needs and problems of their employees. Thus they are poor problem

solvers. The military is protected from the consequences of this pattern by a combina-

tion of obligatory personal contracts and effective advertising incentives (tax payer

funded) to replace those who chose to not re-enlist. On the other hand, if civilian em-

ployers institutionalized poor communications and social skills, they would need to con-

sider the costs of re-hiring and re-training, lack of efficiency, the risks of potential law-

suits, and bad publicity.

Applying these observations with Master Sergeant Gainey, we can readily see

how his inability to effectively solve problems exposes a major weakness within the

chain of command. We will never know what happened between the time I finished the

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generator check and Master Sergeant Gainey’s explosive tirade about turning it off

without telling him first.

But if Sergeant First Class Johnson told Master Sergeant Gainey that I did it

without his permission (if he even talked to him at all), he would have realized that he

has a subordinate within his chain of command that lies to him. Of course, Master Ser-

geant Gainey had developed personality traits that clearly did not support normal com-

munication processes. His solution to problems was to use mentally abusive behaviors

and, ironically, encourage disregard for the sacred chain of command.

Section 6: What Could Have Been Done?

At the time, my reaction to this incident was apathetic. I was dealing with much

more serious and upsetting experiences with my Squad leader, who was even more

mentally abusive. My reaction to all of this was to simply remind myself that I was going

to be discharged from the military within five months, and I could not let these people

impact my mental health in a way that could affect the type of discharge I received.

Looking back, I realized that I placed no credibility within the chain of command

system. I saw no credibility in the chain of command after I realized that it’s effective-

ness was based on the least effective person within the chain of command segment.

Ironically, as one gained higher rank, I noted the cultivation of even poorer social and

communication skills, and concluded that the chain of command was inherently self de-

feating and self-destructive.

The text defines credibility as a function of someone’s willingness to place trust in

an individual or institution. After I noticed how social norms associated with the institu-

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tion of rank worked against its effectiveness to solve problems, I began to question the

integrity of this system. Integrity is the foundation of credibility.

Integrity, as defined by the text, is the quality of an individual or institution to re-

main true to its stated ethical principles, in all situations. A system that encourages

poorer communication and poorer social skills as more authority is granted if self defeat-

ing and unable to adhere to its principals, which is to help solve Soldier’s problems.

Another self destructive mechanism I observed built into the chain of command

were social norms that encouraged was a lack of restraint as one gained more power

within the rank structure. The text defines restraint as a disinclination of acing impulsive-

ly, taking time to consider appropriate responses, and acting accordingly. The text de-

scribes this quality as “self-regulation” (5). I observed deteriorating self regulation as

people progressed in the ranks. This was clearly the case with Master Sergeant Gainey.

One could perhaps apologize for Master Sergeant Gainey’s behavior by explain-

ing that he could have been going through the stress associated with an austere envi-

ronment such post invasion Iraq. This is not acceptable. No one in the Company saw

combat. Additionally, from basic training, we are told that as one gains more rank, they

are to be held to a higher standard.

I guess these standards also do not include the qualities of restraint, which is the

foundation ethical behavior, as described in the course text book. Based on what I ob-

served, and what Master Sergeant Gainey demonstrated, the exact opposite happens in

regards to restraint in rank based systems.

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 Given this observation, I felt there was nothing I could so except hold out until

discharge. While my Squad was detached to support the helicopter unit, I was able to

contact the unit Chaplain, who then constantly shadowed my Squad leader.

When my Squad was reintegrated back with the Company, there was no Chap-

lain. As I felt there was no integrity in the chain of command, I did not make any com-

plaints to a leader with more authority than Master Sergeant Gainey. All I could do was

isolate myself for mental survival. At least the Squad leader became less abusive once

we were settled at the Baghdad International Airport.

Section 7: Peer Review

On April 25th I conducted an in-class discussion of the matter with a fellow stu-

dent by the first name of ‘Jovan’. After I told him about the incident, his initial reaction

was to laugh. However, I did not find the incident very funny. It could be that he was

laughing at the ridiculous behavior of Master Sergeant Gainey. Or perhaps he comes

from a different socio-cultural environment that processes confrontational situations dif-

ferently. In any case, I then told him about the central idea of my paper, where social

skills and effective, appropriate communication skills decline as one gains greater au-

thority in chain of command based power structures.

To my surprise, he seems to understand what I was talking about. He said that

he agreed, and even stated that this problem is bad “especially in the Army.” I was won-

dering if he had relatives in the Army, but decided to remain focused listening to the rest

of what he had to say. He wondered why the formalities of the chain of command had to

implemented in the situation I was describing in the first place. To him, it lacked common

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sense, and only served to reinforce a sense of power by establishing distance. He fur-

ther explained similar situations he faced in the civilian work force, and told me that this

form of management is counterproductive. He then referred back to my situation, and

stated that chain of command procedures would only make sense if Master Sergeant

Gainey was at a distant location on the airfield, and Sergeant First Class Johnson had

to make a phone call to Master Sergeant Gainey to ask permission for shutting down

the generator to perform a maintenance check.

In that case, a chain of command communication system would be essential, as

it would be inappropriate for Soldiers to overload his phone asking for requests. This

made me realize another reason why the chain of command was developed. It was de-

signed to save valuable communication resources. Again, this application has no rele-

vance to the incident described in this report. It turns out that common sense, rather

than misusing authority on the basis of chain of command protocols, would have pre-

served valuable communication resources, in this case the internet.

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 Notes

(1) Unknown author. Unknown date. “Learn to be a Leader: Military Leadership”

http://www.learn-to-be-a-leader.com/military-leadership.html

Last Viewed: 9 April 2018.

(2) Lentz, Paula & Rentz, Kathryn. Business Communication: A Problem Solving

Approach. McGraw Hill Education, New York, N.Y., 2018. Page 167.

(3) Hudson, Diane. “Understanding How Military and Civilian Cultures Differ.”

Job-hunt: For a Shorter, Smarter Job Search. Undated. Last Viewed:

April 9, 2018. https://www.job-hunt.org/veterans-job-search/military-vs-civilian-

cultures.shtml

(4) Lentz, Paula & Rentz, Kathryn. Business Communication: A Problem Solving

Approach. Page 5.

(5) ibid, page 182.

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 Sources

Hudson, Diane. “Understanding How Military and Civilian Cultures Differ.”

Job-hunt: For a Shorter, Smarter Job Search. Undated.

Lentz, Paula & Rentz, Kathryn. Business Communication: A Problem Solving

Approach. McGraw Hill Education, New York, N.Y., 2018.

Unknown author. Unknown date. “Learn to be a Leader: Military Leadership”

http://www.learn-to-be-a-leader.com/military-leadership.html

Last Viewed: 9 April 2018.

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