Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
xxx We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-
appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to
the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution
"M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in
Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by
the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while
immediately after the Accused were taken into custody said accused-appellants were conversing with one another
by the operatives of the National Bureau of along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas,
to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then
Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa,
anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants
Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period
"Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and of time without even saying goodbye to their families, without
identified the said Accused as some of the pirates. even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage,
without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at
xxx sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with
human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different
incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact,
their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common
evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to criminal design.
recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco,
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with accused- appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others,
the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao"
and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio
Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew
and inherently a weak defense, much more so when from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer,
uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and
SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food
concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-
adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be
on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do since he performed his task in view of an objective common to
this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of all other accused- appellants.
work on the dates aforestated.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain
trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of
directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in
whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or
284 SCRA 79 [1998]). seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are
close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of
Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago,
conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
relative of the Changco brothers by affinity .Besides, Loyola
and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be
and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking
a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not
and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka
even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there
Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at (
that time remained at large. Underscoring supplied.)
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can
no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659
defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of January 1, 1994), reads:
Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659
(effective January 1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high
Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential seas or in Philippine waters. -The penalty of reclusion
Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the
532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a
both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and vessel or, being a member of its complement nor a
Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the
two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1 [d] of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that complement or passengers.
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who
are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, (Un
whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who derscoring ours)
are neither members of the complement or passengers of the
vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law. On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
532 provides:
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean
seas. -The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be and be understood, as follows:
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or
attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or
equipment, or the personal belongings of its
part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person.
including a passenger or member of the complement of
said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters,
piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
punished as hereinafter provided (underscoring of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates)
and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although
supplied).
the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore
where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires
on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement
that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates
No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened
of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of
to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the
piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine
other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974),
waters.
the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the complement Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the
of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
member of the complement or not, any person is covered by territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
the law. Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532.
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should
There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is
be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to
Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled
widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes
reprehensible crime against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo,
against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the
43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
"whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the However, does this constitute a violation of accused-
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was
Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws. convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by
As regards the contention that the trial court did not
direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle
evidence showing: jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of
conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b)
doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission
that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and
of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act
(People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano,
was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498
Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found
[1971]).
that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably
one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of
pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No 532 which presumes that
Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides: any person who does any of the acts provided in said section
has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to
abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. -Any overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or
person who knowingly and in any manner aids or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by
such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as
giving them information about the movement of police The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided
or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally
receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for
any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any
Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-
person who directly or indirectly abets the commission 23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the
of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services
considered as an accomplice of the principal officers personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List
and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by
the Revised Penal Code. Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food,
beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
the acts provided in this Section has performed them We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and
utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services
personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during
Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee"
could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired
place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise
in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his end while
"M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected. Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely
court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the following the orders of his superiors and that he has no
disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny
"Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the
himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should
authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General
have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the
Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage
very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired. He
off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record)
failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a
falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200
purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the
(10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on
firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and
board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation"
documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even
and that the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of
verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for
cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee"
the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew
with' Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto
that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in
Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity
the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not
Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating that the cargo
ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted
transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters;
with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any
that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he
receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was
affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word
a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It should also
"Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid
be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or
$150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that
roughly more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to
Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite
$1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was
"General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March
sold for less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant
29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A
Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-
his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
time and money for transportation -only to sell at the
aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in
addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his
firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant
was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An
individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an
order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful
purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out
said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981
ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior
Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of
Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was
committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover,
the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified
records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said
acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial
court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate
Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have
realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua
Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to
follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of
the cargo to the Navi Pride. He did not do so, for which reason,
he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-
appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
looted the "'cashier's box, handcuffed Edward, and forced him to
go with them.2 From the hallway, Jocelyn Tan (mentioned as
"Joselyn" in some parts of the record), Edward's wife, saw Pepino
take her husband. She went to the adjoining room upon Edward's
instructions.3
A: At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after
persons who entered the office of Kilton Motors and pretended to he pulled out his gun?
be customers.
A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.
Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are
referring to? Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he
stated those words?
A: Two men and a woman.
A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was
Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened? money with the cashier and told him to get it.
A: · They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the
money, they pulled out a gun. cashier's box?
Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said? A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with
them.
A: Only one, sir.
Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next? A: I
Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the told them why should I still go with them and then, I was
person who pulled out a gun is in court? handcuffed and was forced to go down.
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap. Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at
the NBI was not suggestive. We note that there were seven
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino? people in the lineup; Edward was not compelled to focus his
attention on any specific person or persons. While it might have
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face. been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup
instead of only two, or if there had been a separate lineup for
Q: You are very sure? Pepino and for Gomez, the fact alone that there were five males
and two females in the lineup did not render the procedure
A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya. irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or
even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the
xx x x36 suspected perpetrators.
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed,
violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and in a certain room?
EDWARD TAN: identified Pepino, the circumstances surrounding this out-of-court
identification showed that the whole identification process at the
A: Yes, sir. NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:
A: No, sir. Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed
during that time?
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged
kidnappers? JOCELYN TAN:
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who Q: Without any cover?
allegedly kidnapped you, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: None, sir.
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.
Q: Without any glass cover?
Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: See-through glass window.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: One-way mirror?
Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?
A: Not one way, see-through.
A: I cannot remember, sir.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged
Q: And how many were lined up? kidnappers, you were already instructed by the NBI what to
do and was told who are the persons to be lined up?
A: Seven, sir.
A: No, sir.
Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?
xxxx
A: No, sir.
40
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very
We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court positive that it was Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell?
identifications were made on the same day. While Jocelyn only
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo44 acquitted appellant Lee
know his face. Rodrigo since only a lone photograph was shown to the witness
at the police station. We thus held that the appellant's in-court
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino? identification proceeded from, and was influenced by,
impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic
A: Yes, sir. identification.
These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the
any suggestiveness on the part of the police or the NBI agents; malefactors in this case should not in any way taint the
there was no evidence that they had supplied or even suggested identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.
to either Edward or Jocelyn that the appellants were the
kidnappers. c. The Right to Counsel
We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to
acquitted an accused when the out-of-court identification is fatally preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused to
flawed. In these cases, however, it had been clearly shown that admit something false. The right to counsel attaches upon the
the identification procedure was suggestive. start of the investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda admissions from the accused.46
because the police suggested the identity of the accused by
showing only the photographs of Pineda and his co-accused Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into
Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos. custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the
According to the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion crime under investigation.47 As a rule, a police lineup is not part of
because the photographs were only of appellant and Sison, the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed
focusing attention on the two accused."43 by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. The right
to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial mention that they saw the appellants from the news reports in
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during print or on television.
identification in a police lineup.
At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case
Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara48 is instructive: were based on an independent in-court identification made by
Edward and Jocelyn, and not on the out-of-court
x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1 ), Art. III of the 1987 identification during the police lineup. We reiterate that the
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only RTC and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses
by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial to be positive and credible, and that there was no showing that
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a their factual findings had been arrived at .arbitrarily. The in-court
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on identification thus cured whatever irregularity might have attended
a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the police lineup.
the inte1Togation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:51
investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.49 Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court
identification was defective, their subsequent identification in
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We
Gomez were among those already presented to the media as emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police lineup identification
kidnapping suspects by the DOJ a day before the police lineup x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
was made. In this sense, the appellants were already the focus of independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the
the police and were thus deemed to be already under custodial accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution
investigation when the out-of-court identification was conducted. eyewitnesses during the trial.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming
identification for having been tainted by an irregular out-of- evidence adduced by the prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not
court identification in a police lineup. They focused, instead, even testify for their respective defenses.1âw phi 1
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, a special law, he could not be convicted anymore of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, an offense punishable under the
[G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996] Revised Penal Code, a general law; otherwise, the
constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be
violated. In other words, his acquittal of the crime charged
precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE through falsification of official and commercial documents,
PHILIPPINES and the because both offenses arose from the same overt act as
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents. alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844.
Balangue also testified that on April 3, 1991, petitioner Hernandez, an associate member of AFPSLAI and vice
instructed him to prepare Certificate of Capital Contribution Monthly president of Philippine Educational Trust Plan, Inc. (PETP Plans),
[9]
No. 52178 in the name of Rosario Mercader for an investment in testified that sometime in 1991, he was able to solicit from Rosario
AFPSLAI in the amount of P2,100,000.00 and to inform Guilas that Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI. He also
the finders fee for the aforesaid investment will be placed in the asked petitioner to place the finders fee in the name of one of his
latters name. On cross-examination, Balangue confirmed that a employees so that he (Hernandez) would not have to report a higher
P2,100,000.00 worth of investment from Rosario Mercader was tax base in his income tax return. On April 8, 1991, petitioner handed
deposited in AFPSLAI. He further acknowledged that the Finders to him the finders fee in the amount of P21,000.00.
Fee Program did not prohibit the placing of another persons name as
payee of the finders fee. Petitioner denied all the charges against him. He claimed
that the P21,000.00 finders fee was in fact payable by AFPSLAI
The defense presented three witnesses, namely, Emerita because of the P2,100,000.00 investment of Rosario Mercader
Arevalo, Ernesto Hernandez and petitioner. solicited by Ernesto Hernandez. He denied misappropriating the
P21,000.00 finders fee for his personal benefit as the same was
Arevalo, secretary of petitioner in AFPSLAI, explained that turned over to Ernesto Hernandez who was the true solicitor of the
the finders fee was for the P2,100,000.00 investment solicited by aforementioned investment. Since the finders fee was in fact owed
Ernesto Hernandez from Rosario Mercader. The finders fee was by AFPSLAI, then no damage was done to the association. The
placed in the name of Guilas upon request of Hernandez so that the finders fee was placed in the name of Guilas as requested by
same would not be reflected in his (Hernandezs) income tax Hernandez in order to reduce the tax obligation of the
return. She alleged that Guilas consented to the arrangement of latter. According to petitioner, Guilas consented to the whole setup.
placing the finders fee in his (Guilas) name. She also claimed that
there was no prohibition in the Finders Fee Program regarding the Petitioner also claimed that Hernandez was an associate
member of AFPSLAI because his application for membership was
approved by the membership committee and the Board of Trustees Bacalla of Branch 216, petitioner was convicted of estafa through
and was in fact issued an I.D. There was no prohibition under the falsification involving similar facts as the instant case. She further
rules and regulation of the Finders Fee Program regarding the stated that Hernandez was not a member of AFPSLAI under sections
substitution of the name of the solicitor with the name of another 1 and 2 of Article II of the by-laws. On cross-examination, she
person. On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that he merely admitted that the case decided by Judge Bacalla convicting petitioner
approved the substitution of the name of Hernandez with that of was on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Guilas in the disbursement voucher upon the request of
Hernandez. He brushed aside the imputation of condoning tax The defense dispensed with the presentation of Mercader in
evasion by claiming that the issue in the instant proceedings was view of the stipulation of the prosecution on the fact that Mercader
whether he defrauded AFPSLAI and not his alleged complicity in tax was a depositor of AFPSLAI and that she was convinced to invest in
evasion. the association by Ernesto Hernandez.[10]
After the defense rested its case, the prosecution presented On June 20, 2001, the trial court rendered a
[11]
two rebuttal witnesses, namely, Ma. Victoria Maigue and Ma. Decision convicting petitioner of falsification of private
Fe Moreno. document. On July 5, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for new
trial.[12] In an Order[13] dated December 20, 2001, the trial court ruled
Maigue, membership affairs office supervisor of AFPSLAI, that the evidence submitted by petitioner in support of his motion
testified that Hernandez was ineligible to become a member of was inadequate to conduct a new trial, however, in the interest of
AFPSLAI under sections 1 and 2 of Article II of the associations by- substantial justice, the case should still be reopened pursuant to
laws. However, she admitted that the application of Hernandez as Section 24,[14] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in order to avoid a
member was approved by the membership committee. miscarriage of justice.
Moreno, legal officer of AFPSLAI at the time of her Petitioner proceeded to submit documentary evidence
testimony on January 25, 2000, stated that there are eight criminal consisting of the financial statements of AFPSLAI from 1996 to
cases pending against the petitioner in various branches of the 1999 to show that AFPSLAI did not suffer any damage from the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In one case decided by Judge payment of the P21,000.00 finders fee. He likewise offered the
testimony of Paterno Madet, senior vice president of AFPSLAI, who The trial court ruled that all the elements of falsification of
testified that he was personally aware that Rosario Mercader invested private document were present. First, petitioner caused it to appear in
P2,100,000.00 in AFPSLAI; that Hernandez was a member of the disbursement voucher, a private document, that Guilas, instead of
AFPSLAI and was the one who convinced Mercader to invest; that Hernandez, was entitled to a P21,000.00 finders fee. Second, the
the finders fee was placed in the name of Guilas; that petitioner falsification of the voucher was done with criminal intent to cause
called him to grant the request of Hernandez for the finders fee to be damage to the government because it was meant to lower the tax
placed in the name of one of the employees of AFPSLAI; that there base of Hernandez and, thus, evade payment of taxes on the finders
was no policy which prohibits the placing of the name of the solicitor fee.
of the investment in the name of another person; that the substitution
of the name of Hernandez with that of Guilas was approved by Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the
petitioner but he (Madet) was the one who approved the release of trial court in an Order[15] dated May 13, 2002. On appeal, the Court
the disbursement voucher. of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration; hence, the instant petition
On January 29, 2002, the trial court rendered the assailed challenging the validity of his conviction for the crime of
Decision convicting petitioner of falsification of private document falsification of private document.
based on the following findings of fact: Hernandez solicited from
Rosario Mercader an investment of P2,100,000.00 for AFPSLAI; Preliminarily, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
Hernandez requested petitioner to place the finders fee in the name contradicted the ruling of the trial court. He claims that the Court of
of another person; petitioner caused it to appear in the disbursement Appeals stated in certain portions of its decision that petitioner was
voucher that Guilas solicited the aforesaid investment; the voucher guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial document
served as the basis for the issuance of the check for P21,000.00 whereas in the trial courts decision petitioner was convicted of
representing the finders fee for the investment of Mercader; and falsification of private document.
Guilas encashed the check and turned over the money to petitioner
who in turn gave it to Hernandez. A close reading of the Court of Appeals decision shows that
the alleged points of contradiction were the result of inadvertence in
the drafting of the same. Read in its entirety, the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and,
necessarily, it affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Although the public prosecutor designated the offense
falsification of private document and not of estafa through charged in the information as estafa through falsification of
falsification of commercial document. commercial document, petitioner could be convicted of falsification
of private document, had it been proper, under the well-settled rule
In the main, petitioner implores this Court to review the that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature
pleadings he filed before the lower courts as well as the evidence on of the offense and not the technical name given by the public
record on the belief that a review of the same will prove his prosecutor in the preamble of the information. We explained this
innocence. However, he failed to specify what aspects of the factual principle in the case of U.S. v. Lim San[19] in this wise:
and legal bases of his conviction should be reversed.
From a legal point of view, and in a very
real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is
Time honored is the principle that an appeal in a criminal the technical name of the crime of which he stands
case opens the whole action for review on any question including charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x That to which his attention should be
those not raised by the parties.[16] After a careful and thorough directed, and in which he, above all things else,
review of the records, we are convinced that petitioner should be should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in
acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the
The elements of falsification of private document under information in the manner therein set forth. x x x
The real and important question to him is, Did you
Article 172, paragraph 2[17] in relation to Article 171[18] of the perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged? not,
Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender committed any of the acts Did you commit a crime named murder? If he
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the
of falsification under Article 171 which, in the case at bar, falls law determines what the name of the crime is and
under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused
performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged,
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
then he ought to be punished and punished
in fact so participate; (2) the falsification was committed on a private adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime
document; and (3) the falsification caused damage or was committed which those acts constitute.[20]
This Court notes, however, that under the upheld the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
third count, the information alleged that petitioner accusation against him in a case involving a variance between the
issued a check dated May 14, 1992 whereas the
means of committing the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
documentary evidence presented and duly marked as
Exhibit "I" was BPI Check No. 831258 in the 3019 alleged in the information and the means found by the
amount of P25,000 dated April 5, 1992. Prosecution Sandiganbayan:
witness Fernando Sardes confirmed petitioner's
issuance of the three BPI checks (Exhibits G, H, and
I), but categorically stated that the third check (BPI Common and foremost among the issues
Check No. 831258) was dated May 14, 1992, which raised by petitioners is the argument that the
was contrary to that testified to by private Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them on a finding
of fact that was not alleged in the information. They There is no question that the manner of
contend that the information charged them with commission alleged in the information and the act
having allowed payment of P83,850 to Ricardo the Sandiganbayan found to have been committed
Castaeda despite being aware and knowing fully are both violations of Section 3(e) of R.A.
well that the surveying instruments were not actually 3019. Nonetheless, they are and remain two different
repaired and rendered means of execution and, even if reference to Section
functional/operational. However, their conviction by 3(e) of R.A. 3019 has been made in the information,
the Sandiganbayan was based on the finding that the appellants conviction should only be based on that
surveying instruments were not repaired in which was charged, or included, in the
accordance with the specifications contained in the information. Otherwise, there would be a violation
job orders. of their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the accusation against them.
xxxx
In Evangelista v. People, a judgment of
In criminal cases, where the life and liberty conviction by the Sandiganbayan, for violation of
of the accused is at stake, due process requires that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
the accused be informed of the nature and cause of Act, was reversed by the Court on the ground that
the accusation against him. An accused cannot be accused was made liable for acts different from
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in those described in the information. The accused
the complaint or information. To convict him of an therein was convicted on the finding that she failed
offense other than that charged in the complaint or to identify with certainty in her certification the
information would be a violation of this kinds of taxes paid by Tanduay Distillery, Inc.,
constitutional right. although the information charged her with falsifying
said certificate. The Court said that, constitutionally,
The important end to be accomplished is to the accused has a right to be informed of the nature
describe the act with sufficient certainty in order that and cause of the accusation against her. To convict
the accused may be appraised of the nature of the her of an offense other than that charged in the
charge against him and to avoid any possible complaint or information would be a violation of
surprise that may lead to injustice. Otherwise, the this constitutional right.
accused would be left in the unenviable state of
speculating why he is made the object of a Contrary to the stand of the prosecution, the
prosecution. allegations contained in the information and the
findings stated in the Sandiganbayan decision are
xxxx not synonymous. This is clearly apparent from the
mere fact that the defenses applicable for each one
are different. To counter the allegations contained in
the information, petitioners only had to prove that lower the tax base of Hernandez and aid the latter in evading
the instruments were repaired and rendered
functional/operational. Under the findings stated in payment of taxes on the finders fee.
the Sandiganbayan decision, petitioners defense
would have been to show not only that the
instruments were repaired, but were repaired in We find this variance material and prejudicial
accordance with the job order. to petitioner which, perforce, is fatal to his conviction in the instant
case. By the clear and unequivocal terms of the information, the
xxxx
prosecution endeavored to prove that the falsification of the voucher
This is not to say that petitioners cannot be by petitioner caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of
convicted under the information charged. The
information in itself is valid. It is only that the P21,000.00 and not that the falsification of the voucher was
Sandiganbayan erred in convicting them for an act done with intent to cause damage to the government. It is apparent
that was not alleged therein. x x x.[42] (Underscoring
supplied) that this variance not merely goes to the identity of the third party
but, more importantly, to the nature and extent of the damage done to
As in the Burgos case, the information in the case at bar is the third party. Needless to state, the defense applicable for each is
information and proof adduced during trial with respect to the third
essential element of falsification of private document, i.e., the More to the point, petitioner prepared his defense based
falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause precisely on the allegations in the information. A review of the
damage to a third party. To reiterate, petitioner was charged in the records shows that petitioner concentrated on disproving
information with causing damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of that AFPSLAI suffered damage for this was the charge in the
P21,000.00 because he caused it to appear in the disbursement information which he had to refute to prove his innocence. As
voucher that Guilas was entitled to a P21,000.00 finders fee when in previously discussed, petitioner proved that AFPSLAI suffered no
truth and in fact AFPSLAI owed no such amount to Guilas. damage inasmuch as it really owed the finders fee in the amount of
However, he was convicted by the trial court of falsifying the P21,000.00 to Hernandez but the same was placed in the name of
voucher with criminal intent to cause damage to the government Guilas upon Hernandezs request. If we were to convict petitioner
because the trial court found that petitioners acts were designed to now based on his intent to cause damage to the government, we
would be riding roughshod over his constitutional right to be
informed of the accusation because he was not forewarned that he the substitution of the names in the voucher was intended to lower
was being prosecuted for intent to cause damage to the the tax base of Hernandez to avoid payment of taxes on the finders
government. It would be simply unfair and underhanded to convict fee. In other words, the trial court used part of the defense of
petitioner on this ground not alleged while he was concentrating his petitioner in establishing the third essential element of the offense
defense against the ground alleged. which was entirely different from that alleged in the
information. Under these circumstances, petitioner obviously had no
The surprise and injustice visited upon petitioner becomes opportunity to defend himself with respect to the charge that he
more evident if we take into consideration that the prosecution never committed the acts with intent to cause damage to the government
sought to establish that petitioners acts were done with intent to because this was part of his defense when he explained the reason for
cause damage to the government in that it purportedly aided the substitution of the names in the voucher with the end goal of
Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on the finders fee. The establishing that no actual damage was done to AFPSLAI. If we
Bureau of Internal Revenue was never made a party to this case. The were to approve of the method employed by the trial court in
income tax return of Hernandez was, likewise, never presented to convicting petitioner, then we would be sanctioning the surprise and
show the extent, if any, of the actual damage to the government of injustice that the accuseds constitutional right to be informed of the
the supposed under declaration of income by Hernandez. Actually, nature and cause of the accusation against him precisely seeks to
the prosecution never tried to establish actual damage, much less prevent. It would be plain denial of due process.
intent to cause damage, to the government in the form of lost income
taxes. There was here no opportunity for petitioner to object to the In view of the foregoing, we rule that it was error to convict
evidence presented by the prosecution on the ground that the petitioner for acts which purportedly constituted the third essential
evidence did not conform to the allegations in the information for the element of the crime but which were entirely different from the acts
simple reason that no such evidence was presented by the alleged in the information because it violates in no uncertain terms
prosecution to begin with. petitioners constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
Instead, what the trial court did was to deduce intent to cause
damage to the government from the testimony of petitioner and his No doubt tax evasion is a deplorable act because it deprives
three other witnesses, namely, Arevalo, Hernandez and Madet, that the government of much needed funds in delivering basic services to
the people. However, the culpability of petitioner should have been court as expressly allowed under Section 19,[46] Rule 119 of the
established under the proper information and with an opportunity for Rules of Court.[47] Instead, the prosecution proceeded to try petitioner
him to adequately prepare his defense. It is worth mentioning that the under the original information even though he had an adequate
public prosecutor has been apprised of petitioners defense in the defense against the offense charged in the information. Regrettably,
[43]
counter-affidavit that he filed before the NBI. He claimed there these mistakes of the prosecution can only benefit petitioner.
that AFPSLAI really owed the P21,000.00 finders fee not to Guilas
but to Hernandez and that the finders fee was placed in the name of In closing, it is an opportune time to remind public
Guilas under a purported financial arrangement between petitioner prosecutors of their important duty to carefully study the evidence on
[44]
and Guilas. Yet in his Resolution dated September 14, 1992, the record before filing the corresponding information in our courts of
public prosecutor disregarded petitioners defense and proceeded to law and to be vigilant in identifying and rectifying errors
file the information based on the alleged damage that petitioner made. Mistakes in filing the proper information and in the ensuing
caused to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 representing prosecution of the case serve only to frustrate the States interest in
[45]
unwarranted payment of finders fee. During the trial proper, the enforcing its criminal laws and adversely affect the administration of
prosecution was again alerted to the fact that AFPSLAI suffered no justice.
actual damage and that the substitution of the names in the voucher
was designed to aid Hernandez in evading the payment of taxes on WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September
the finders fee. This was shown by no less than the prosecutions own 29, 2004 Decision and April 26, 2005 Resolution of the Court
documentary evidence the Certificate of Capital Contribution Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26556 are REVERSED and SET
Monthly No. 52178 in the amount of P2,100,000.00 issued to ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt. The
Rosario Mercader which was prepared and identified by the Bail Bond is CANCELLED.
prosecution witness, Judy Balangue. Later on, the testimonies of the
defense witnesses, Arevalo, Hernandez, Madet and petitioner, clearly
set forth the reasons for the substitution of the names in the
SO ORDERED.
disbursement voucher. However, the prosecution did not take steps
to seek the dismissal of the instant case and charge petitioner and his
cohorts with the proper information before judgment by the trial
EN BANC 28,[3] dated 27 December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 174473 doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape and one (1) count of acts of
Appellee, lasciviousness.
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING, In three (3) separate Informations[4] for Criminal Cases No. SC-7422,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated 16 June 1999, appellant was indicted
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO, before the RTC for three (3) counts of qualified rape against his
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, minor daughter AAA.[5] The accusatory portions in all the
CORONA,
CARPIO-MORALES, Informations are identical, except as regards the date of commission
AZCUNA, of the crime. The Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7422 reads:
ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA, TINGA,
Appellant. CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., At the instance of the private complainant [AAA]
NACHUR with the conformity of her mother [BBB][6] in a
A, and sworn complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit
REYES, JJ. Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan (Laguna), the
undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Promulgated: Laguna hereby accuses ALVIN ABULON Y
SALVANIA, of the crime of RAPE, committed as
August 17, 2007 follows:
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
That on or about March 14, 1999, in
DECISION the Municipality of Kalayaan,
Province of Laguna, and within the
TINGA, J.: jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with
lewd designs, with grave abuse of
For automatic review is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) confidence or obvious
dated 28 April 2006, affirming with modification the decision[2] of ungratefulness, and with force and
intimidation, did then and there
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch wilfully [sic], unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge likewise poked the knife on them.[9] The following morning, AAA
of his legitimate minor daughter,
[AAA], who at the [sic] time was found a whitish substance and blood stains on her panty.[10]
thirteen (13) years of age, against
her will and consent and to her On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA and her
damage and prejudice.
siblings were awakened as appellant came home drunk. He told them
CONTRARY TO LAW. to eat first as they had not taken their supper yet. After dining
After appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as together, appellant left and AAA, her brother, and her sister went
the first prosecution witness, testifying to the following facts: back to sleep.[11] As in the previous evening, appellant roused AAA
in mid-sleep. This time, she woke up with her father holding her
AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant hand, covering her mouth and lying on top of her. He undressed
and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16 March 1999, appellant raped AAA. The AAA, then mounted her. Repeatedly, he inserted his penis into her
first rape incident occurred at around 1:30in the morning of 14 vagina, and AAA felt pain in her private parts. Appellant also kissed
March 1999. AAA was home, fast asleep next to her brother and and fondled AAA on different parts of her body.[12]
sister when she suddenly woke up to the noise created by her father
who arrived drunk, but who likewise soon thereafter returned to the Again, AAAs siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their
wedding festivities he was attending. Abiding by their fathers sister. AAAs sister, however, took a pen and wrote her a note which
[7]
instructions, AAA and her siblings went back to sleep. read: Ate, let us tell what father was doing to the police officer. After
appellant had raped AAA, the latters sister asked their father why he
AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on had done such to AAA. In response, appellant spanked AAAs sister
top of her. Appellant had removed her underwear while she slept. He and threatened to kill all of them should they report the incidents to
poked a knife on AAAs waist and threatened to kill her and her the police.[13] The sisters nonetheless related to their relatives AAAs
siblings if she reported the incident to anyone. She begged him to misfortune, but the relatives did not take heed as they regarded
stop but he proceeded to kiss her mouth, vagina, and breast, and to appellant to be a kind man.[14]
have carnal knowledge of her.[8] Although they witnessed the
ongoing ordeal, AAAs siblings could do nothing but cry as appellant
The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the morning of 16 complaints of rape against appellant and the report of the latters
March 1999. Although appellant did not insert his penis into AAAs arrest.[20] Dr. Cabael, on the other hand, testified that she examined
vagina on this occasion, he took off her lower undergarments and AAA on 4 May 1999upon the request of Police Officer Gallarosa.
kissed her vagina.[15] On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her She identified the Rape Case Report she prepared thereafter.[21]
father inserted his tongue into the hole of her vagina and she felt pain
because of this.[16] Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial
and alibi as his defenses. According to appellant, he was hired by his
To corroborate AAAs testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and aunt, Raquel Masangkay, to deliver hogs and that at 1:30 in the
[17]
AAAs 6-year old brother CCC. BBB testified that she was a stay- morning of 14 March 1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant to
in housemaid working in Las Pias on the dates that her daughter was such employment. He averred that he went home at 7:00 in the
raped by appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and stayed morning of the following day and thus could not have raped his
with her family. However, it was only on 4 May 1999 that BBB daughter as alleged.[22] Likewise denying the second rape charge,
learned of the rape, when CCC told her that appellant had raped appellant testified that on 15 March 1999, he attended a wedding
AAA three (3) times and that he had seen his father on top of his ceremony in Sityo Kalayaan, San Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He
sister during those occasions. BBB then verified the matter with went home drunk at 6:00 that evening and promptly went to
AAA herself, and the latter affirmed the incidents. BBB thus took sleep.[23] Similarly, at 3:00 in the morning of 16 March 1999,
AAA with her to the barangay and police authorities to report the appellant claimed to have been asleep with his children and could not
incidents, and later to the provincial hospital for medical have thus committed the rape as charged.[24]
examination.[18]
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable
CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime of qualified rape in Criminal
lying naked on top of AAA, who was likewise naked.[19] Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts of
lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a
The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Consolidated Judgment against appellant and sentenced him
Montesur) and Dr. Gloria Cabael (Dr. Cabael). SPO1 Montesur accordingly, thus:
identified the Police Blotter of 4 May 1999which recorded the
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Q : In what part of your body? Q : And how did you come to know that he returned
A : On my mouth, sir. at around 11:00 P.M.?
A : My father suddenly held my hand, sir.
Q : Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts
of your body did he kiss? Q : And because of that, you were awakened?
A : On my private part, sir. A : Yes, sir.
Q : When did he kiss you private part, before Q : And what happened when you were
inserting his penis or after? awakened because your father held your
A : After he inserted his penis, sir. hand?
A : He covered my mouth, sir.
Q : What other part of your body did he kiss?
A : On my breast, sir.[36] Q : And after covering your mouth, what else did
he do?
xxxx A : He removed the lower portion of my
clothes. Hinubuan po niya ako.
Q : And where and what time said [sic] second Q : Now, what did he do to you when he was
incident happened? already on top of you?
A : 10:30 in the evening, sir, also in our house, sir. A : He was kinakayog niya po ako.
Q : Where? xxxx
A : Into my vagina, sir.
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q : How did you come to know that the penis of Q Now, how did it happen, that third incident?
your father was inside your vagina? A I was able to run downstairs but when I was about
A : I felt pain in my private part, sir. to open the door, he was able to hold my
dress, sir.
Q : And do you know why you felt pain in your
private part? Q : Was your father drunk at that time?
A : Yes, sir. A : Yes, sir.
Q : After kissing your vagina, what else and defoliated her.[39] As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy:[40]
happened, if any?
A : He again poked the knife on us, Your Honor. It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own
father, to submit herself for examination of her most
Q : At that time, was your father naked or not? intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and
A : Still with his clothes on, Your Honor. expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity
or even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for
xxxx a crime so serious that could mean the death
sentence to the very person to whom she owes her
Q : For clarification, what else, if any, did your life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do
father do after your father kissed your we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of
vagina? rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge
A : Nothing more, merely that act, Your Honor. against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly
scolding and maltreating her.[41]
Q : You mean your father did not insert his penis
to [sic] your vagina anymore?
A : No more, Your Honor.
In stark contrast with AAAs convincing recital of facts,
xxxx
supported as it was by the testimonies of BBB and CCC, are
TP. Arcigal, Jr.: appellants uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi.
Q : Now, what did he use in kissing your clitoris?
A : His tongue, sir. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi
and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony
Q : How did you come to know that it was his
and identification of the complainant.[42] Alibi is an inherently weak
tongue that he used?
defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be
fabricated.[43] Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be Menoy did not yield any positive result either. Fearing for the lives
buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit of her grandparents, AAA decided not to tell them about the
[44]
credibility. incidents.[47]
The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was A child of thirteen years cannot be expected to know how to
adduced by appellant to corroborate his alibi. Alibi must be go about reporting the crime to the authorities.[48] Indeed, We see
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the people
otherwise, it is fatal to the accused.[45] Further, for alibi to prosper, it around her were relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit
must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for appellant help from them were in vain. Thus, AAAs silence in not reporting
to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time the incidents to her mother and filing the appropriate case against
of its commission.[46] By his own testimony, appellant clearly failed appellant for over a month is sufficiently explained. The charge of
to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
present at the scene of the crime when the rapes were alleged to have unexplained.[49] It is not beyond ken that the child, living under threat
occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was within the from appellant and having been turned away by trusted relatives,
vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly even even accused by them of lying, would simply opt to just suffer in
sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third incidents. silence thereafter. In People v. Gutierrez,[50] we held:
Appellants contention that AAAs accusations are clouded by Complainants failure to immediately report
her failure to report the alleged occurrences of rape is unmeritorious. the rape does not diminish her credibility. The
silence of a victim of rape or her failure to disclose
To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told her fathers her misfortune to the authorities without loss of
niece about the incidents. However, the latter doubted her, believing material time does not prove that her charge is
baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for
instead that appellant was not that kind of man. AAAs subsequent
young girls to conceal for some time the assault on
attempt to report the incidents to the barangay turned out to be futile their virtues because of the rapists threat on their
as well as she was only able to speak with the barangay driver, who lives, more so when the offender is someone whom
she knew and who was living with her.[51]
happened to be appellants brother-in-law. She was likewise
disbelieved by the latter. Her disclosure of the rapes to a certain
nature and that, concomitantly, appellant failed to satisfactorily
Appellant brands the trial judge as partial against him for establish that he was prejudiced by such queries.
propounding leading questions to AAA. According to him, were it
not for the lower courts and the prosecutions biased leading The matter of the purportedly defective Informations was
questions, AAA would not have proven the elements of the crimes properly addressed by the Court of Appeals, pointing out that a close
charged.[52] scrutiny of the Informations would reveal that the words force and/or
intimidation are specifically alleged therein.[58] Even if these were
Appellants argument is not well-taken. It is the judges not so, well-established is the rule that force or intimidation need not
prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret out the truth.[53] It be proven in incestuous cases. The overpowering moral influence of
cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal a father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of
certain truths which, in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one resistance ordinarily required in rape cases where the accused is
[54]
party. After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be satisfied unrelated to the victim.[59]
himself as to the respective merits and claims of both parties in
accord with the stringent demands of due process.[55] Also, being the Now, we turn to the determination of the crime for which
arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to appellant under the third charge is liable and the corresponding
[56]
expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time. penalty therefor. In the Brief for the People, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) argues that all three (3) charges of rape,
Besides, jurisprudence explains that allegations of bias on
including the rape committed on 16 March 1999 subject of Criminal
the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially
Case No. SC-7424, were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The
court a quo held that it was clear from the evidence that appellant
propriety of the judges questions is determined by their quality and
merely kissed the vagina of AAA and made no attempt of
not necessarily by their quantity and, in any event, by the test of
penetration, meaning penile penetration, and for that reason found
whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or
him guilty of acts of lasciviousness only.[60] Yet, in affirming the trial
not.[57] In the instant case, the Court finds that on the whole, the
court, the Court of Appeals did not find any categorical testimony on
questions propounded by the judge a quo were but clarificatory in
AAAs part that appellant had inserted his tongue in her vagina,
stressing instead that the mere probability of such insertion cannot
take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of appellant
Q : You mean to tell the court when he kissed
beyond reasonable doubt for rape.[61] your vagina he used his lips?
A : His lips and tongue, sir.
The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case Q : What did he do?
for review,[62] as in this case. Thus, this Court is mandated to re- A : He put out his tongue thereafter he inano the
hole of my vagina.
examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly apply the
law thereto. The two courts below were both mistaken, as we note Court:
that AAA unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination to appellants Q : What did your father do with his tongue?
A : He placed it in the hole of my vagina.
insertion of his tongue into her vagina, viz:
Q : Did you feel pain?
A : Yes, sir.
Court:
Q : On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, Q : By just kissing your vagina you felt pain?
you said it happened at 3:30 in the morning A : Yes, Your Honor.[63]
of March 16, 1999.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And you said yesterday that he did not insert his Notwithstanding the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this
pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on March Court cannot find appellant guilty of rape as proved, but of acts of
16?
lasciviousness only. In reaching this conclusion, we take a route
A : Yes, sir.
different from the ones respectively taken by the courts below.
Q : What he did is he kissed your vagina?
A : Yes, sir.
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353),
Q : For how long did he kiss your vagina? otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,[64] the concept of
A : Two minutes, sir.
rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that the crime
Q : What did he actually do when he kissed your should include sexual violence on the womans sex-related orifices
vagina? other than her organ, and be expanded as well to cover gender-free
A : He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed
and laughed. rape.[65] The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification
of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction of rape by or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
sexual assault[66] as differentiated from the traditional rape through
carnal knowledge or rape through sexual intercourse.
Paragraph 1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now
Section 2 of the law provides: Paragraph 1 of the new Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
covers rape through sexual intercourse while paragraph 2 refers to
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. The crime
of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime rape by sexual assault. Rape through sexual intercourse is also
Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, denominated as organ rape or penile rape. On the other hand, rape by
as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal sexual assault is otherwise called instrument or object rape,[67] also
Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into
Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be gender-free rape,[68] or the narrower homosexual rape.[69]
known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
In People v. Silvano,[70] the Court recognized that the fathers
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How
Committed. Rape Is Committed insertion of his tongue and finger into his daughters vaginal orifice
would have subjected him to liability for instrument or object rape
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of
had the new law been in effect already at the time he committed the
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; acts. Similarly, in People v. Miranda,[71] the Court observed that
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or appellants insertion of his fingers into the complainants organ would
otherwise is unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave have constituted rape by sexual assault had it been committed when
abuse of authority; and the new law was already in effect.
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present. The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the
following:
2) By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault (1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man,
by inserting his penis into another persons while in the second, the offender may be a man or a
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. When there is a variance
woman, while in the second, the offended party may between the offense charged in the complaint or
be a man or a woman; information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
(3) In the first mode, rape offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
is committed through penile penetration of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included
vagina, while the second is committed by inserting
in the offense proved.
the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object into the genital or anal SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
orifice of another person; and offense proved when
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
higher than that under the second. constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape,
part of those constituting the latter.
the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-
versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case
No. SC-7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily
found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was proven,
included in rape.[72]
without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
In light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,[73] the penalty of
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in
death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty meted out
relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to appellant for rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Cases
appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of
No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 is reduced in each case from death
lasciviousness. Said provisions read:
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.[74] We affirm the
conviction of appellant in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 for acts of
lascivousness but modify the penalty imposed by the Court of maximum, and to pay AAA moral damages in the amount
Appeals instead to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six of P30,000.00 plus costs.
(6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two
(2) months of prision correccional as maximum as neither mitigating SO ORDERED.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
That on or about the 30th day of June, 2001, in the evening, in the
G.R. No. 190349, December 10, 2014
Municipality of Naval, Biliran Province, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, one “AAA,” an 11-year old lass,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCASIO after watching a billiard game in front of the new municipal building of
DELFIN, Accused-Appellant. said municipality went to a jeep parked near the back of said building,
closed its windows and slept thereat but was awakened when herein
RESOLUTION accused, who was then carrying a nightstick beamed his flashlight
towards her, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
means of force and intimidation [go] inside the vehicle and there,
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
[take] off her panty and his short pants and [succeed] in having carnal
knowledge [of] the said “AAA,” to her damage and prejudice.
On appeal is the January 27, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00077, which affirmed with modification CONTRARY TO LAW.5
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naval, Biliran, Upon arraignment on December 6, 2001, appellant, assisted by
Branch 16 by (1) finding appellant Francasio Delfin (appellant) guilty counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. After
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape instead of pre-trial was terminated, trial on the merits followed.
statutory rape in Criminal Case No. N-2130 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and pay the victim “AAA”3 civil Version of the Prosecution
indemnity and moral damages at P75,000.00 each; and, (2) acquitting
him of statutory rape in Criminal Case No. N-2131. The first rape incident happened on May 27, 2001. At around 10:00 to
11:00 p.m., “AAA,” then an 11-year old girl, was watching television in
Factual Antecedents a store at the public market in Naval, Biliran. When she went outside
the public market, appellant summoned her. “AAA” tried to run away,
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations of statutory rape, but appellant threatened to shoot her with a slingshot. She thus
the accusatory portions of which read:chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
approached appellant hesitantly. When already near him, appellant
Crim. Case No. N-2130 suddenly grabbed “AAA‟s” hand and dragged her to the second floor of
a newly-constructed commercial building facing the public market.
That on or about the 27th day of May, 2001, between 10:00 and 11:00
o‟clock in the evening, more or less, in the Municipality of Naval, When they were already in a secluded portion, appellant undressed
Biliran Province, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this “AAA,” spread her thighs, and inserted his penis into her vagina,
Honorable Court, said accused, with lewd designs, [summoned] “AAA,” causing her pain and horror. Once satiated, appellant gave “AAA”
an 11-year old lass on her way to a bakery after [watching] a video P100.00 and told her not to tell anyone about the incident or her
show, through hand signal but as she was about to run, accused family will be harmed.
picked up a stone so she approached him[. He then] held her right
hand and pulled her towards the second floor of the new commercial The second rape incident happened during the evening of June 30,
building of Naval, and while thereat, did then and there willfully, 2001. At about 11:00 p.m., “AAA” was sleeping inside a jeepney
parked outside a billiard hall when appellant focused a flashlight on her Maximo Ombing (Ombing), a neighbor and friend of appellant, testified
face. He then went inside the jeepney and removed “AAA‟s” panty and that on May 27, 2001, he was at appellant‟s house from 7:00 in the
again raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina which caused evening until 12:00 midnight watching television. He further stated
“AAA” pain. that appellant was with him the whole time and did not leave the
house.
After having difficulty in urinating and experiencing pain and swelling
in her abdomen, “AAA” told her aunt, “BBB,” about the rape incidents Ending Matugas, the owner of the store where “AAA” allegedly
and pointed to appellant as her rapist. Suspecting that “AAA” was watched television the night she was raped, claimed that it was not
suffering from vaginal infection due to the rape, “BBB” brought “AAA” true that “AAA” stayed at her store to watch movies that night. Aside
to the hospital. Accordingly, “AAA” was examined and the results from the fact that she does not allow children to watch television in
thereof as stated in the medical certificate6 issued by Dr. Gabriel P. her store late at night, said store was closed at that time as she was
Edano (Dr. Edano) on July 5, 2001 are as follows: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry then on her way to Cebu.
MEDICAL CERTIFICATE
Eduardo Borrinaga, the Chief Tanod of Barangay P. Inocentes Garcia,
NAME: “AAA” stated that on June 30, 2001, he was at the billiard hall having a
drinking spree from 2:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. of the following day.
AGE: 11 years old However, he neither saw appellant nor any parked vehicle outside the
billiard hall.
ADDRESS: x x x, Naval, Biliran
Appellant, for his part, denied the rape charges against him. With
Nature of incident: Allegedly raped by unknown person. regard to the first rape incident, he claimed that he was at home
watching television with Ombing up to 12 midnight. Thereafter, he
Time of incident: Around 10:00-11:00 p.m. went to sleep. And as he did not leave the house that night, it was
impossible for him to have raped “AAA.” As to the second rape
Date of incident: May 27, 2001 incident, appellant averred that he was again at home on the night of
June 30, 2001.
Place of incident: Commercial building, near Land Bank Naval Branch.
Appellant contended that “AAA‟s” allegations against him were
Findings: (+) lacerated hymen at 6:00 o‟clock position. fabricated. He surmised that “AAA‟s” aunt, “CCC,” instigated the filing
of the charges since he once reported to a police officer that “CCC”
(+) Corrugated hymen. was involved in illegal drug activities after he saw her and her live-in
partner Violeto Oral (Violeto) alias “Akid” packing shabu. To bolster his
Introitus: Nulliparous claim, appellant presented the testimony of Police Superintendent
Victoriano R. Naces (P/Supt. Naces), who declared in open court that
= Admits one finger with slight pain. appellant indeed reported to him such incident during the first week of
May, 2001. Because of appellant‟s report, a surveillance on “CCC,”
Vaginal smear result: Negative for the presence of spermatozoa. Violeto and two other persons was conducted where it was confirmed
Thereafter, “AAA‟s” family reported the incident to the Department of that they were indeed involved in illegal drug activities. However,
Social Welfare and Development. Consequently, complaints were filed P/Supt. Naces did not know what happened afterwards since he was
against appellant. relieved from his post in June 2001.
Five witnesses, including the appellant, testified for the defense. In a Decision7 dated November 19, 2003, the RTC gave weight and
credence to “AAA‟s” testimony. Hence, it declared appellant guilty of When required to file their respective supplemental briefs,12 both
two counts of statutory rape, viz: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary parties manifested that they would just adopt the briefs they filed with
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused the CA.13 And since the CA had already conceded to appellant‟s
Francasio Delfin y Suan alias „Aying‟ GUILTY in both Criminal Case No. argument in the Brief for Accused-Appellant14 that the prosecution
N-2130 and Criminal Case No. N-2131; hereby imposing upon him the failed to prove that “AAA” was 11 years old at the time of the alleged
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for each case. rape, the matters left for this Court to consider, as argued by appellant
in the said brief, are (1) the failure of the prosecution to prove that
The accused shall pay “AAA” the amount of P50,000.00 in civil appellant used force, threat or intimidation in the commission of the
indemnity for each rape committed. crime of rape; and, (2) the alleged material inconsistencies in “AAA‟s”
testimony and her ill-motive in filing the charges.
SO ORDERED.8
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Our Ruling
On appeal, the CA held that the prosecution was not able to The appeal has no merit.
satisfactorily prove that “AAA” was under 12 years of age at the time
of the alleged rape since no independent evidence of her age such as The elements of rape under par. 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC are
her birth certificate was presented. It thus concluded that appellant present in this case.
could not be held liable for statutory rape. However, it noted that in
Criminal Case No. N-2130, force, threat and intimidation were properly Under par. 1(a) Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed as
alleged in the Information as having attended the commission of the follows:
cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
crime9 and was also duly established by evidence. In view thereof, the ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
CA held appellant liable for simple rape under par. 1(a), Article 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). However, the existence of force, 1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
threat or intimidation was found wanting with respect to Criminal Case of the following circumstances:
No. N-2131, thus, appellant‟s acquittal in the said case.
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
The dispositive portion of the January 27, 2009 Decision10 of the CA
reads:chan roblesv irtuallaw lib rary
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 19, 2003 of the “Pertinently, the elements of rape under [the above-mentioned
RTC of Naval, Biliran, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. provision] are the following: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and, (3) that such act
In Criminal Case No. N-2130, appellant Francasio Delfin alias „Aying‟, is accomplished by using force or intimidation”15 These elements are
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE under present in this case.
Article 266-A, 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay “AAA‟s” testimony established that appellant, a man, had carnal
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. knowledge of her, a young lass. She positively identified appellant as
the one who raped her. Aside from being clear and straightforward,
Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charge in Criminal Case No. N-2131 for her recollection of the material details of her harrowing experience at
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. the hands of the appellant is consistent. Moreover, the medical
findings of Dr. Edano corroborated “AAA‟s” testimony as the same
SO ORDERED.11 showed that her hymen was lacerated at 6 o‟clock position. There is
Hence, this appeal. As earlier mentioned, appellant was acquitted in sufficient basis, therefore, to conclude that carnal knowledge in fact
Crim. Case No. N-2131. Thus, the only subject of this appeal is his took place.
conviction for simple rape in Criminal Case No. N-2130.
Further, appellant, in committing the crime used force, threat, and
intimidation. Per “AAA‟s” testimony, she was forced to approach Besides, said inconsistencies cannot affect “AAA‟s” credibility especially
appellant because he threatened to shoot her with his slingshot. When so when the RTC and the CA have already held that her testimony was
“AAA” was already near the appellant, he suddenly grabbed her and straightforward, credible, and spontaneous. The rule is well-settled
dragged her to the second floor of a commercial building near the that factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
market. He then took off her panty, forcefully laid her down on top of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect especially if affirmed
folded cartons, spread her thighs apart and inserted his penis into her by the CA.18 The reason behind this is that trial courts have firsthand
vagina. After ravishing “AAA,” appellant threatened to kill her and her account of the witnesses‟ demeanor and deportment in court during
family should she tell anyone about the incident. Verily, these satisfy trial.19 “The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the
the third element, that is, that the carnal knowledge was accomplished testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to
by using force, threat or intimidation. determine the issue of credibility”20 of witnesses being the one who
had face-to-face interaction with the same. “[I]n the absence of
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains appellant‟s conviction for misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion of the court
simple rape under par. 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC. a quo, and especially when the findings of the judge have been
adopted and affirmed by the CA, [as in this case,] the factual findings
Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of “AAA” do not detract from of the trial court shall not be disturbed.”21
the actual fact of rape; Factual findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witness are accorded great weight and respect especially There is nothing sufficient to show that “AAA” was impelled by
if affirmed by the CA, as in this case. improper motive in filing the case.
In an attempt to discredit his accuser, appellant points to several Appellant imputes improper motive on the part of “AAA” as he
supposed inconsistencies in “AAA‟s” statements, to wit: (1) “AAA” surmises that her aunt “CCC” instigated her to falsely testify against
stated on separate occasions three different amounts of money, i.e., him. Appellant claims that the accusations of rape were prompted by
P40.00, P20.00, or P100.00, that the appellant allegedly gave her after “CCC” who had every reason to instigate the filing of the criminal case
the first rape incident; and, (2) she first stated that appellant since he reported to the police that she was engaged in illegal drugs.
threatened to hit her with a stone if she would not come near him, yet
at another time, she mentioned that the threat was that he would hit Contrary to appellant‟s claim, however, “CCC” appears to have no
her with a slingshot. Appellant avers that these inconsistencies render knowledge of the rape incidents. “AAA” testified that prior to the filing
the prosecution‟s evidence unreliable and insufficient to support a of the case, “AAA” and “CCC” did not speak with each other. In her
conviction. cross-examination, “AAA” was questioned about her aunt “CCC,” to
wit:chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary
Article 266-B in relation to Article 266-A (1)(a) of the RPC provides SO ORDERED.
that the penalty for simple rape is reclusion perpetua. There being no
qualifying circumstances, the CA is correct in imposing the said
penalty. “It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant] shall not
be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
which states that „[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.”24
Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.27
G.R. No. L-21741 January 25, 1924 Once before, as intimidated, the petitioner had to come to us for
redress of her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, the way for the parties. But it seems not. Once again therefore
vs. and finally, we hope, we propose to do all in our power to assist
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial fiscal of Tayabas, and this poor woman to obtain justice. On the one hand has been the
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of Lucena, petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but fortunately
Tayabas, respondents. assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been
the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last
to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
see that these proceedings come to an end and that the accused
is discharged from the custody of the law.
MALCOLM, J.:
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of
has been forced to respond to no less than five informations for a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of
various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the
after the passage of more than one year from the time when the matter of Ford [1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3
first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite Montana, 512. See further our previous decision in Conde vs.
resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and the
Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.1
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of
a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has Tayabas shall abstain from further attempts to prosecute the
a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, accused pursuant to informations growing out of the facts set
and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending
Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance before the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered
attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily dismissed, with cost against the respondent fiscal. We append to
postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to our order the observation that, without doubt, the Attorney-
General, being fully cognizant of the facts of record, will take such
administrative action as to him seems proper to the end that
incidents of this character may not recur. So ordered.
On July 26, 1979, at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, an Information How many witnesses do you
for Robbery was filed against Leonardo Magat, Francisco Brosas intend to present?
and four others in the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch
1, at Olongapo City. The case was immediately raffled and set for COURT
arraignment and trial. Only petitioner-accused was arraigned at
4:35 that same afternoon, as the others had not been How about you, Fiscal?
apprehended. Petitions-accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty."
FISCAL ANONAS
Two (2). COURT Before you could cross
examine. For cross examination.
COURT You can consult your client from
time to time. 4
How about you Atty. Balingit?
Trial proceeded and lasted up to 7:30 in the evening. The
ATTY. BALINGIT following day, trial was resumed at 8:30 o'clock in the morning
when petitioner-accused and his witness, testified on direct,
cross, and re-direct examination. At 11:35 that same morning, a
Two (2).
judgment of conviction was promulgated, sentencing the accused
to six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision
FISCAL ANONAS mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of
P6,996.00, and to pay the costs.
I have no objection to the
conference between counsel and Petitioner-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. Instead of
his witness but after we have filing a Brief for the People, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
already submitted our case. a Motion and Manifestation joining the accused's cause, and
recommending the reversal of the Trial Court's judgment on the
And besides, we have only twenty- ground that complainant is not a transient visitor; that said Court
four (24) hours. acted with unusual haste in the arraignment, trial, and rendition of
the judgment of conviction; and that the evidence adduced failed
ATTY. BALINGIT to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
But just only one (1) hour to confer In its Decision promulgated on August 21, 1981, the Court of
to give me the chance to defend Appeals refuted the contentions of the Office of the Solicitor
my client. General, affirmed conviction, but modified the penalty. 1äw phï1.ñët
of times" and not "many times". And even if complainant has been in readily pointed to and Identified by complainant
Olongapo City a number of times, that does not make him any less a upon seeing their photos as among the persons
transient, or one whose stay is "of uncertain duration" or for a "short who divested him of his money on the day of the
time", or for a "brief period" only each time. 7 There is no question incident in question. 9
either that notwithstanding the number of times that he has been to
this country, complainant is a "tourist" or one who travels from place
Moreover, if as petitioner-accused testified, Lanigan was shouting at
to place for pleasure or culture. 8 As a "tourist" or a "transient",
petitioner-accused "you cheated me, give my money back" 10 it is
complainant falls within the coverage of General Order No. 12, as
incredible that "after that the American suggested that he was going
amended, supra.
to leave the place because he will cash the traveller's check
...". 11 One who has been allegedly cheated would refuse to return to
We likewise find it difficult to agree with the Solicitor General's play some more.
position that the guilt of petitioner-accused has not been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Complainant was Again, complainant had been to Olongapo City a number of times
categorical in his Identification of petitioner-accused and in the past, and, therefore was not a complete stranger to the
emphatic as to the latter's direct and active involvement in the place. He would have had more or less, an Idea where to go for
robbery. Petitioner-accused's version of the occurrence does not entertainment, so that petitioner-accused's allegation that
ring with truth. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals: 1äwphï1.ñët
complainant was looking for a girl when brought to his place brought to another room and taught the rudiments
hardly deserves credence. of poker blackjack preparatory to the theory to be
set up by the defense that if the American victim
In the last analysis, the issue simmers down to one of credibility. has lost his money ... it was in gambling where
The well established rule is that the conclusions of a Trial Court cards were utilized during the game. And
on the question of credibility are entitled to utmost respect and secondly, to properly appease the victim and
will remain undisturbed on appeal unless substantial facts, which condition his mind making him cool in the process
might affect the result of the case,, have been overlooked, which so that whatever he may have in mind by way of
is not the case herein. Suffice it to quote some notable retaliation may no longer be pursued by him. But
observations of the Court of Appeals on the matter of credibility the victim-complainant happened to be a person
even as it refuted some of the contentions advanced by the Office not of the type the accused thought of him to be.
of the Solicitor General in support of the latter's bid for acquittal of In short, he was underestimated by the culprits.
the accused. 1äwphï1.ñët
so.
This is in connection with Police
The third circumstance advanced by the Blotter Entry No. 2387, (p. 453
Honorable State Counsel is that it was rather dated 15 July, 1979.) Complainant
incredible and absurd for one who had robbed alleged that on or about 2:00 P.M.
another to still endeavor to teach his victim how to to 3:00 P.M. July 1975, at the
play a game of cards. The argument appears above mentioned located, suspect
plausible but not conclusive. Complainant was with intent to gain and with
intimidation took and carted away warranted for if complainant was divested of his
his cash money amounting to money merely through the use of flowers words
$940.00 more or less. then why was there a necessity for choking him
Complainant further alleged that and holding his hands and threatening him and,
while he was walking along further, that if he did not stop then he will be killed.
Magsaysay Drive, Q.C., when a Interpreted in the light of the testimony of the
jeepney driver picked him up and complainant, it would appear that the first step
with the use of flowery words was that led into complainant's being divested of his
able to take his money were the flowery words made by Brosas to
money. Furthermore, suspect/s him that ultimately brought him to Magat's place
choked him while others were whereby, through force and intimidation the
holding his hand and at the same offenders took his money from his pocket. 12
time threatened him that if he did
not stop strangling he will be All told, we find the second and third assigned errors also without
killed. Complainant pointed the merit, and like the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, we find
person of LEONARDO MAGAT as petitioner- accused's guilt proven beyond reasonable doubt.
one of the suspects when a
picture of the said suspect was WHEREFORE, this Petition for Review is denied and the
showed to him. (Emphasis judgment of the Court of Appeals hereby affirmed.
supplied).
Costs against petitioner.
Pfc. Isla was never placed on the witness stand to
testify on the alleged report. The contents therein
SO ORDERED.
appearing therefore is decidedly hearsay . . . the
prosecution being denied of the right to cross-
examine him on the truth thereof. But what
appears confusing is the fact that when
complainant-victim made a follow-up of his
complaint with the police, since nothing appeared
to have been done in connection therewith, no
records whatsoever pertaining to his complaint
could be found. And yet here comes this alleged
police report.
In the present case, there has not even been x x x (S)peedy disposition of cases is a relative term. Just like the
a first jeopardy, since the fourth element - dismissal or constitutional guarantee of speedy trial accorded an accused in all
termination of the case without the express consent of the criminal proceedings, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible
accused - is not present.Moreover, measured against the concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
aforequoted standard, the retaking of testimonies cannot in circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable,
any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it is beyond arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
dispute that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is utterly
without basis. In the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has
been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced
against each other. These are length of delay, reason for the delay,
The Second Issue: Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by
the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering
judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the
True, indeed, the 1987 Constitution provides the right not administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases
only to a speedy trial but also to a speedy judgment after trial guarantee.
when in Section 16, Article III, it provides:
In the case before us, the petitioner merely sat and waited
"All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases after the case was submitted for resolution in 1979. It was only
before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies." in 1989 when the case below was re-raffled from the RTC of
Caloocan City to the RTC of Navotas-Malabon and only after
Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the respondent trial judge of the latter court ordered on March 14,
trial stage but also in the disposition thereof, warranting 1990 the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes that matters started to get moving towards It appears later on that the case became a victim of neglect and
a resolution of the case. More importantly, it was only after the languished in the court docket. Not surprisingly, since the risk of
new trial judge reset the retaking of the testimonies to such loss through neglect and other causes grew with each passing
November 9, 1990 because of petitioner's absence during the year, part of the records and several transcripts were lost in the time
original setting on October 24, 1990 that the accused suddenly the case lay unattended. Before being finally assigned to the
became zealous of safeguarding his right to speedy trial and respondent trial court, the case was shuttled from court to court
disposition. through various endorsements of Executive Judges and the Court
Administrator of the Supreme Court as a result of the confusion as to
While it may be said that it was not petitioner's fault that which court had territorial jurisdiction over it."
the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses
were not transcribed, yet neither was it the prosecution's. The
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner
respondent trial judge can hardly be faulted either because he
raised the violation against his own right to speedy disposition
could not have rendered the decision without the transcripts in
only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for
question. Let it be remembered that he was not the judge who
rehearing.It is fair to assume that he would have just continued
conducted the trial and hence he would not have had sufficient
to sleep on his right- a situation amounting to laches - had the
basis to make a disposition in the absence of the said
respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the
transcripts. As respondent Court of Appeals noted:
non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy
precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could
"Indeed, it can be gleaned from the pleadings on file that the case
have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years
was assigned to respondent Judge only in late 1989 or early 1990,
between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989
and that he took prompt action thereon by setting the case for
when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of
retaking of testimonies, obviously as a prelude to judgment. The case
asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the
then was finally making progress toward termination. For such
new constitution took effect,[17] or at least made some overt act
dispatch and diligence, respondent Judge hardly deserves
(like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the
condemnation. Petitioner also faults the prosecution for its failure to
stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not
follow up the status of the case.
waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as
a waiver of such right.
As regards the other judges to whom the case was
assigned prior to 1989, the accused himself could not pinpoint While this Court recognizes the night to speedy
the cause of the problem:[16] disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and
although this Court has always zealously espoused protection
"2) Reason for the delay - No one knows why the Presiding Judge from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the
(Manuel A. Argel) of the respondent court who heard the trial did not party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's
render a decision during his tenure. No one knows either why individual rights should not work against and preclude the
another former Presiding Judge (Alfredo Gorgonio) failed to turn people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant
over the case to the Malabon court during the Judiciary case, three people died as a result of the crash of the airplane
Reorganization under B.P. Blg. 129. that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in
the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but
the people as well. Since the accused has completely failed to
assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent
judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the
merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper
and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and
the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The respondent
trial court is directed to proceed with judicious dispatch in the
re-taking of testimonies and in concluding the case in
accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the Philippine
Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the
Zamboanga PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th
Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army, bandied as members
[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003] of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The respondent opposed
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF reconsidered that the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases
JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were with the express
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said
PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. determination of probable cause and for examination of
ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR witnesses. The Court also held therein that although Section 8,
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be
OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine
vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent. whether the requirements for its application are attendant. The
trial court was thus directed to resolve the following:
RESOLUTION
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express
CALLEJO, SR., J.: consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after
notice to the offended party; (3) whether the 2-year period to revive
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any justification for the
Reconsideration[1] of the Resolution[2] dated May 28, 2002, filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices to
remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent
Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were
factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3)
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the other victims; (7) whether the multiple murder cases against
dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year
filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said bar.
court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his
co-accused were charged with multiple murder for the The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-
shooting and killing of eleven male persons identified as year bar had to be first determined whether it shall be from the
Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine Army, date of the order of then Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases,
Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray or from the dates of receipt thereof by the various offended
Abalora, who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new
Meleubren Sorronda, who was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only
after the two-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the
to justify its failure to comply with the said time-bar. It new rule.
emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize the
State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that
filed in court. However, the State is not precluded from the case be remanded to the RTC to determine whether
presenting compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases private complainants were notified of the March 22, 1999
beyond the two-year bar. hearing on the respondents motion for judicial determination of
the existence of probable cause. The records allegedly
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was
petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised furnished a copy of the notice of hearing on said motion. There
Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal is allegedly no evidence that private prosecutor Atty. Godwin
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar Valdez was properly retained and authorized by all the private
in said rule should not be applied retroactively. complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their
contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim. affidavits of desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of
the allegations therein.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found
CASES NOS. Q-99-81679 TO Q-99-81689. by the Court in its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his
resolution, the respondent himself moved for the provisional
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 because the accused filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal
essential requirements for its application were not present of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable
when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29, cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners
maintain that the respondent did not give his express consent The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the
to the dismissal by Judge Agnir, Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q- victims, through the public and private prosecutors, were duly
99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent allegedly admitted notified of said motion and the hearing thereof. He contends
in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during the that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was present
hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial
cases, or even agree to a provisional dismissal determination of the existence of probable cause because
thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were allegedly not criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of the
given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases by Judge People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the
Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents civil aspect thereof.
express consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the
the notice to all the heirs of the victims of the respondents
contention of the petitioners meritorious.
motion and the hearing thereon are conditions sine qua non to
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the
Procedure reads: express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a
criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally the revival of the criminal case will place him in double
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily
notice to the offended party. included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after
not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without provision should be construed to mean that the order of
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order of the prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been
without the case having been revived. revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply
with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of dismissal.
prosecutors and before the Court of Appeals, the respondent
is burdened to establish the essential requisites of the first Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given
paragraph thereof, namely: either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct,
unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the supply its meaning.[7]Where the accused writes on the motion
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No
or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to
dismissal of the case; express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of
the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional motion for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to
dismissal of the case; object to a provisional dismissal[10]does not amount to express
consent.
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a
case provisionally; case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal.[11] If
a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within
provisional dismissal of the case. the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a
criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even
beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and the decision of this
accused to oppose the same on the ground of double Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other cases, there was a
jeopardy[12] or that such revival or refiling is barred by the need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination of
statute of limitations.[13] probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
respondent and to have the prosecutions witnesses
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar summoned before the court for its examination. The
either by the refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new respondent contended therein that until after the trial court
Information for the same offense or an offense necessarily
shall have personally determined the presence of probable
included therein. There would be no need of a new preliminary cause, no warrant of arrest should be issued against the
investigation.[14] However, in a case wherein after the respondent and if one had already been issued, the warrant
provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein
of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their that:
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available
and new witnesses for the State have emerged, a new
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2,
preliminary investigation[15] must be conducted before an
Article III of the Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court,
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new
and for this purpose, an order be issued directing the prosecution to
preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the
present the private complainants and their witnesses at a hearing
original accused, other persons are charged under a new
scheduled therefor; and
criminal complaint for the same offense or necessarily
included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the
original charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal 2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if
complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must
be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits and Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.[18]
evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court
to wait in ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional
but essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the or otherwise, of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
court in dispensing that justice.[16] 81689. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a
mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in his reply
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that:
first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new
rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal ... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Irrefragably, the Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed
prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal by the petitioner and his other co-accused in the said criminal cases
of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely would show that the petitioner did not pray for the dismissal of the
filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner
for examination of prosecution witnesses alleging that under are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for ATTY. FORTUN:
the arrest of the accused be withheld, or if issued, recalled in the
meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be said, That is correct, Your Honor.
therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of JUSTICE SALONGA:
the petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and
made integral part hereof as Annex A.[19] And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31,
2001, the respondent, through counsel, categorically, That is correct, Your Honor.
unequivocally, and definitely declared that he did not file any JUSTICE SALONGA:
motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did he agree to a
provisional dismissal thereof, thus: Was there an express conformity on the part of the
accused?
JUSTICE SALONGA:
ATTY. FORTUN:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the
Court was provisional in nature? There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked
to sign any order, or any statement, which
ATTY. FORTUN: would normally be required by the Court on
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for pre-trial or on other matters, including other
it. What they wanted at the onset was simply provisional dismissal. My very limited practice
a judicial determination of probable cause in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me
for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge that a judge must be very careful on this matter
Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of of provisional dismissal. In fact they ask the
their witnesses, particularly those who had accused to come forward, and the judge himself
withdrawn their affidavits, made one further or herself explains the implications of a
conclusion that not only was this case lacking in provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba
probable cause for purposes of the issuance of dito. Puwede bang pumirma ka?
an arrest warrant but also it did not justify JUSTICE ROSARIO:
proceeding to trial.
You were present during the proceedings?
JUSTICE SALONGA:
ATTY. FORTUN:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a
case shall not be provisionally dismissed except Yes, Your Honor.
when it is with the express conformity of the
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
accused.
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN: the accused be withheld, or, if issued, recalled
in the meantime until resolution of this incident.
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was
nothing of that sort which the good Judge JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Agnir, who is most knowledgeable in
criminal law, had done in respect of There is no general prayer for any further relief?
provisional dismissal or the matter of Mr. ATTY. FORTUN:
Lacson agreeing to the provisional dismissal
of the case. There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are
prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed
a motion for a judicial determination of probable Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of
cause? this Court, precisely addressed your prayer for
just and equitable relief to dismiss the case
ATTY. FORTUN: because what would be the net effect of a
Yes, Your Honor. situation where there is no warrant of arrest
being issued without dismissing the case?
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
ATTY. FORTUN:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes
that if there is no probable cause what should
the Good Justice, but what is plain is we did
the Court do?
not agree to the provisional dismissal,
ATTY. FORTUN: neither were we asked to sign any assent to
the provisional dismissal.
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That
was the only prayer that we asked. In fact, I JUSTICE GUERRERO:
have a copy of that particular motion, and if I
may read my prayer before the Court, it said: If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a you not file any motion for reconsideration of the
judicial determination of probable cause order of Judge Agnir that the case should be
pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the dismissed?
Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, ATTY. FORTUN:
an order be issued directing the prosecution to
present the private complainants and their I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well
witnesses at the scheduled hearing for that at that time that my client had already been
purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of arraigned, and the arraignment was valid as
far as I was concerned. So, the dismissal,
Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least
benefit me, and therefore I did not take any three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15,
further step in addition to rocking the boat Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that
or clarifying the matter further because it in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that
probably could prejudice the interest of my the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be
client. given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private
Continue.[20] prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor
who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the
the Court of Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of
terms that: such service must be shown during the hearing on the motion,
otherwise, the requirement of the new rule will become
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs
the Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively
were remanded to the QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds,
to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others promptly filed a motion for including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the
judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He asked that accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case
warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b)
dismissal of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional
claim.[21] dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the
accused from detention would enable him to threaten and kill
The respondents admissions made in the course of the the offended party or the other prosecution witnesses or flee
proceedings in the Court of Appeals are binding and from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the
conclusive on him. The respondent is barred from repudiating destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other
his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake in making evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to
such admissions.[22] recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment
or furtive disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679
the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
to Q-99-81689 would be to add to or make exceptions from the
new rule which are not expressly or impliedly included In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a
therein.This the Court cannot and should not do.[23] determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses
may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of
99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or of the
thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22,
1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion 81689 or file new Informations for multiple murder against the
only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, respondent.
1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE
public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
records do not show that notices thereof were separately given
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY.
to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenae were issued to
and received by them, including those who executed their The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that
affidavits of desistance who were residents of Dipolog City or the respondent expressly consented to a provisional dismissal
Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the
well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified heirs of the victims were notified of the respondents motion
the heirs of the victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof before the hearing thereon and were served with copies of the
on March 22, 1999. Although Atty. Valdez entered his resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the
appearance as private prosecutor,[25]he did so only for some two-year bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap- Criminal Procedure should be applied prospectively and not
ap, Imelda Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, retroactively against the State. To apply the time limit
Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna Abalora, and Leonora Amora who retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and
(except for Rufino Siplon)[26] executed their respective his co-accused would violate the right of the People to due
affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the process, and unduly impair, reduce, and diminish the States
heirs of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren substantive right to prosecute the accused for multiple
Sorronda. There is no proof on record that all the heirs of the murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
victims were served with copies of the resolution of Judge Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never was criminal complaints against the accused. However, under the
any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor new rule, the State only had two years from notice of the
and/or the private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of Criminal Cases
victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon and Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the
of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing said cases. The said cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1,
said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the 2000, the State only had one year and three months within
respondents motion and to protect their interests either in the which to revive the cases or refile the Informations. The period
trial court or in the appellate court. for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder under
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and
the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued arbitrarily reduced. They submit that in case of conflict
his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth between the Revised Penal Code and the new rule, the former
in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the should prevail. They also insist that the State had consistently
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the
revive or refile Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99- Revised Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it
would forever be barred beyond the two-year period by a
retroactive application of the new rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is
to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28, 2002. not a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed
as acts of grace, and a surrender by the sovereign of its right
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule to prosecute or of its right to prosecute at its discretion. Such
under Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty
Procedure may be applied retroactively since there is no founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be
substantive right of the State that may be impaired by its allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
application to the criminal cases in question since [t]he States
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary for the
witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of time passed
testimony but the prosecution failed to act on these cases until beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes
it became politically expedient in April 2001 for them to do are jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses
so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either covered.[34]
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long
as they favor the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule
period commenced to run on March 29, 1999 and lapsed two 117 is akin to a special procedural limitation qualifying the right
years thereafter was more than reasonable opportunity for the of the State to prosecute making the time-bar an essence of
State to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given the the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that the lapse
right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the State to
the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01- prosecute the accused.[35]
101112 beyond the time-bar under the new rule.
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the right of the State
substantive right of double jeopardy to the prejudice of the to revive a criminal case against the accused after the
State because the prohibition against the revival of the cases Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally
within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is a dismissed with the express consent of the accused. Upon the
legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of lapse of the timeline under the new rule, the State is
a provisionally dismissed case within the periods stated in presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover, he claims that the effects of right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The
a provisional dismissal under said rule do not modify or negate dismissal becomes ipso factopermanent. He can no longer be
the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of the charged anew for the same crime or another crime necessarily
Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal included therein.[37] He is spared from the anguish and anxiety
Code simply becomes irrelevant upon the application of as well as the expenses in any new indictments.[38] The State
Section 8, Rule 117 because a complaint or information has may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or two-year
already been filed against the accused, which filing tolls the periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the
running of the prescriptive period under Article 90.[32] delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on
motion of the accused because the trial is not concluded within
the period therefor, the prescriptive periods under the Revised constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
Penal Code are not thereby diminished.[40] But whether or not vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has
the prosecution of the accused is barred by the statute of been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy,
limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case,
the effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
Illinois held: procedure.
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be
arrived, the right of the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the applied retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would
liability of the offender to be punishedto be deprived of his involve intricate problems of due process or impair the
libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action independence of the Court. In a per curiam decision
which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the United States Supreme
which the crime had created in the offenders title to liberty. In this Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce
respect, its language goes deeper than statutes barring civil remedies substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is
usually do. They expressly take away only the remedy by suit, and ample basis for avoiding the injustice of hardship by a holding
that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy would of nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which a statute is fairly
enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
this statute is aimed directly at the very right which the state has mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious
against the offenderthe right to punish, as the only liability which the consequences.[45] This Court should not adopt an
offender has incurred, and declares that this right and this liability interpretation of a statute which produces absurd,
are at an end. [41] unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such
interpretation could be avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural has decreed that statutes are to be construed in light of the
laws may be applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
procedural law provides or regulates the steps by which one remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the
who has committed a crime is to be punished. In Tan, Jr. v. enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held that: construed with reference to the intended scope and
purpose.[47]
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their Court designed to enhance and implement the constitutional
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that rights of parties in criminal proceedings may be applied
extent.The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the retroactively or prospectively depending upon several factors,
litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not whether the retrospective application will further its operation,
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely the particular conduct sought to be remedied and the effect
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes thereon in the administration of justice and of criminal laws in
particular.[48] In a per curiam decision in Stefano v. banc primarily to enhance the administration of the criminal
Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the justice system and the rights to due process of the State and
factors in determining whether a new rule or doctrine the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial
enunciated by the High Court should be given retrospective or courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of
prospective effect: either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no
time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public
application of the new standards. prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
time-bar of two years under the new rule should not be applied prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
retroactively against the State. proceedings.[51]
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the It is almost a universal experience that the accused
Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the welcomes delay as it usually operates in his
revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his
express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed
offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the expire.[53]
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal
Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused cases may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove
for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with its case with the disappearance or nonavailability of its
minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into witnesses.Physical evidence may have been lost. Memories of
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of
accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused
is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally may become a fugitive from justice or commit another
dismissed cases with the consent of the accused and notice to crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal of the
the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short crime.
or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice.[50] The
petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional
of the time-bar. dismissal of a criminal case does not terminate a criminal
case. The possibility that the case may be revived at any time
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
the Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to
public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-
and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to
and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period
memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long run, under the new rule. As the United States Supreme Court said,
it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system.[56]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to
always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail
excise the malaise that plagued the administration of the
themselves of it waived their rights .
criminal justice system for the benefit of the State and the
accused; not for the accused only.
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the of both the State and the accused. It should not be
time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced emasculated and reduced by an inordinate retroactive
to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received application of the time-bar therein provided merely to benefit
his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship
criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new to the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in
rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive general and of criminal laws in particular.
provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less
than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed To require the State to give a valid justification as a
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March 29, condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally
1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the
Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is
have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before
within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State
of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On the other must be given a period of one year or two years as the case
hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case
have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not
2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance reviving the case before the effective date of the new
with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and rule. Although in criminal cases, the accused is entitled to
thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, justice and fairness, so is the State. As the United States
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
the administration of justice. in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,[58] the concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 filament. We are to keep the balance true. In Dimatulac v.
should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period Villon,[59] this Court emphasized that the judges action must
not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of
the State and offended party to due process of law. This Court
further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to
be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the
offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial
of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice, for,
to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
[G.R. No. 127262. July 24, 1997] Prior to their arraignment, petitioner Webb and his co-
accused, Gerardo Biong, had sought the disqualification of
respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 95-404. In his motion
of August 21, 1995, petitioner Webb relied on the ground that
HUBERT WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, HOSPICIO respondent judge allegedly told the media that "failure of the
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of
ESTRADA and MICHAEL GATCHALIAN petitioner, arrest is an indication of guilt." Respondent judge denied the
vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE motion. Two days later, on August 23, 1995, petitioner Webb
HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, Presiding filed a second motion to disqualify respondent judge as the
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch latter allegedly told the media that the accused "should not
274, and LAURO VIZCONDE, respondents. expect the comforts of home," pending the resolution of his
motion to be committed to the custody of the Philippine
DECISION National Police at Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan,
Paraaque. Respondent judge again denied the motion to
PUNO, J.: inhibit. On September 4, 1995, Gerardo Biong filed another
motion to disqualify respondent judge on the ground of bias
Petitioners Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Hospicio and partiality. This was likewise denied by respondent judge.
Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Michael
Gatchalian[1] assail the decision of the Court of Appeals dated The petitioners were arraigned on September 4,
June 21, 1996 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 39839[2] and C.A. G.R. SP 1995. They then filed separate petitions for bail.
No. 39840,[3] as well as its resolution dated November 15, On September 21, 1995, petitioner Webb filed an Urgent
1996 insofar as it denied the petition for the inhibition of Motion for Hospitalization. He alleged that he was sick of
respondent Judge Amelita G. Tolentino in Criminal Case No. dermatitis or asthma of the skin which aggravated due to his
95-404[4] pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial continuous commitment at the Paraaque Municipal Jail. The
Court of Paranaque.[5] motion was denied by respondent judge on October 16, 1995.
The antecedent facts show that on August 8, 1995, On October 9, 1995, the hearing on petitioners' petitions
petitioners were charged with the crime of rape with for bail commenced. The prosecution presented its "star
homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde and on the witness," Jessica Alfaro, who identified petitioners as the
occasion thereof, killing Carmela herself and her mother, perpetrators of the crime. During the cross-examination, the
Estrellita, and her sister, Jennifer. The crime was committed in defense counsel tried to impeach Alfaro's credibility by asking
the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, her questions regarding the contents of an affidavit she
1991 at the Vizconde residence in BF Homes, Paraaque.[6] executed at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on April
28, 1995. The defense tried to show that some of her On November 15, 1995, petitioners filed two separate
statements in said affidavit are inconsistent with her petitions with this Court. Petitioners Webb, Lejano, Fernandez,
statements in a subsequent affidavit executed on May 21, together with their co-accused, Gerardo Biong, filed a petition
1995 and with her testimony in court. The prosecution for certiorari seeking to set aside (1) the order of respondent
objected and moved that all questions relating to the contents judge dated October 16, 1995 denying petitioner Webb's
of Alfaro's April 28 affidavit be expunged from the records for motion for hospitalization and (2) the order of respondent
being inadmissible in evidence under Article III Section 12(1) judge dated October 30, 1995 disallowing the defense to
and (3) of the 1987 Constitution.[7] Respondent judge cross-examine Alfaro on the contents of her April 28
sustained the objection and on October 30, 1995, she issued affidavit.[10] Petitioners Gatchalian and Estrada filed a petition
an order holding that Alfaro cannot be cross examined on the for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing respondent
contents of her April 28 affidavit because said affidavit was judge's order prohibiting the cross-examination of Alfaro on the
inadmissible in evidence as it was not executed in the contents of her April 28 affidavit.[11]
presence of a counsel.[8]
On December 8, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court a
The defense also tried to prove Alfaro's motive in supplemental petition to set aside the November 28, 1995
testifying against petitioners. She was questioned about her order of respondent judge denying their motion for inhibition.
brother, Patrick Alfaro, and her uncle, Roberto Alfaro. Jessica
Alfaro allegedly admitted that her brother, Patrick, was a drug In a resolution dated January 22, 1996, we referred both
addict and was arrested once by the NBI for illegal possession petitions and the supplemental petition to the Court of Appeals
of drugs and that he is presently in the United States. When for proper disposition.
defense counsel inquired about the circumstances of Patrick's In the meantime, the hearing on petitioners' petitions for
departure for the United States, the prosecution objected to bail continued. The prosecution presented Mila Gaviola, a
the questions on the ground of irrelevancy. Respondent judge former maid at the Webb residence, who testified that she saw
sustained the objection. petitioner Webb in their house in the early morning of June 30,
The defense also cross-examined Alfaro on her 1991. On December 5, 1995, respondent judge, over the
educational attainment to show that she lied in her direct objection of the petitioners, ordered an ocular inspection of the
testimony. The defense presented her transcript of records to former Webb residence in BF Homes, Paraaque to verify
Gaviola's testimony about a secret door through which she
prove that she only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9)
academic units, contrary to her claim that she finished second peeped to see petitioner Webb.
year college. The prosecution again objected on the ground On January 12, 1996, petitioner Webb filed a motion for
that Alfaro's educational attainment was deposition of witnesses residing in the United States who shall
irrelevant. Respondent judge sustained the objection. testify on his presence in the United States on the date of the
commission of the crime.[12] On February 6, 1996, respondent
On November 9, 1995, petitioners filed a motion to
disqualify or inhibit respondent judge due to bias and judge denied the motion for the reason that petitioner Webb
prejudice. Respondent judge denied the motion for lack of failed to allege that the witnesses do not have the means to go
merit on November 28, 1995.[9] to the place of the trial.[13] Hence, on January 12, 1996,
petitioner Webb filed another supplemental petition to the II
Court of Appeals challenging the said order.
The Court of Appeals erred in not honoring that the right to
Petitioners made their Formal Offer of Evidence upon a fair trial requires that the case be tried by an impartial
conclusion of the hearings on the petitions for bail. On judge.
September 25, 1995, the prosecution filed its
Comment/Objection to the Formal Offer of Evidence. On On February 5, 1997, petitioners filed a supplemental
October 1, 1996, respondent judge ruled on petitioner's formal petition. It alleged, among others, that during the trial on the
merits, respondent judge allowed prosecution witness Atty.
offer of evidence. She admitted only ten (10) out of the one
hundred forty two (142) exhibits offered by petitioner.[14] Pedro Rivera to testify on the character of the accused
although the defense had not put his character in issue; that
On October 11, 1996, respondent judge denied respondent judge disallowed the defense to impeach the
petitioners' petitions for bail.[15] credibility of Atty. Rivera by the presentation of an earlier
statement executed by him because such statement was
On June 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its immaterial; and that respondent judge struck off from the
Decision on the various petitions and supplemental petitions. It record the proffer of oral evidence made by defense counsel
reversed respondent judge's ruling refusing to admit Alfaro's
Atty. Vitaliano Aguirre after ruling that the proffer was improper
April 28 affidavit but denied all the other reliefs prayed for by on cross-examination.[18]
petitioners.[16] It also denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated November 15, 1996.[17] The core issue is whether respondent judge should inhibit
herself from hearing Criminal Case No. 95-404 on the ground
On December 12, 1996, petitioners filed the present of bias and prejudice.
petition contending:
We rule in the negative.
I
The Bill of Rights guarantees that "(n)o person shall be
The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that no sufficient
held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
ground exists for the disqualification of the respondent
law."[19] A critical component of due process is a hearing
judge.
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. We have
A. Respondent judge has consistently and repeatedly shown ingrained the jurisprudence that every litigant is entitled to
bias and hostility against petitioners. nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge for all
the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing,
B. The rejection of the 132 of 142 exhibits not only paved would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come
the way for the denial of bail but also sets irreversibly from a partial and biased judge.[20] Hence, the Rules of Court
the eventual conviction of all the accused. allows a judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case
C. The reported trip to the Vizconde residence by the for "just or valid reasons" other than those referring to his
respondent judge exposes her propensity to consort with pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous
the complainant on the pending issues. rulings or decisions. Section 1 Rule 137 of the Revised Rules
of Court states:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. -- No judge or the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife of the judge.[21] As a general rule, repeated rulings against a
or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.[22] Extrinsic evidence
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
the civil law, or in which he has been executor, purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a
decision is the subject of review, without the written judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself
consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered would be insufficient to establish a case against the
upon the record. judge.[23] The only exception to the rule is when the error is so
gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
faith or malice.
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above. A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed
to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that respondent
Under the second paragraph, a party has the right to seek the judge was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the
inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series
be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in of adverse rulings of the respondent judge which they
handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. We note
a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to that respondent judge's rulings resolving the various motions
disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the filed by petitioners were all made after considering the
movant must prove the same by clear and convincing arguments raised by all the parties. It is true that the
evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to respondent judge erred in some of her rulings such as her
discharge their burden of proof.
rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty two (132) pieces of
To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent evidence. It appears, however, that respondent judge reversed
judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous this erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of
rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility
themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and have been cured through the introduction of additional
prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, evidence during the trial on the merits."[24]This correction
the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from diminishes the strength of petitioners' charge that respondent
an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits judge is hopelessly biased against them. To be sure, the
on some basis other than what the judge learned from his respondent judge did not score a complete cipher in her
participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of rulings against the petitioners. Just last June 11, 1997, the
judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are Third Division of this Court dismissed an administrative
based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by complaint against the respondent judge on the ground that "x x
x it is within the respondent judge's right to conduct an ocular IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for lack of
inspection since it is an exercise of her judicial prerogative x x merit. No costs.
x."[25] There is still another reason why we should observe
caution in disqualifying respondent judge. The trial of the SO ORDERED.
petitioners is about to end and to assign a new judge to
determine the guilt or innocence of petitioners will not be for
the best interest of justice. The records of the case at bar run
into volumes. These voluminous records cannot capture in
print the complete credibility of witnesses when they testified in
court. As the respondent judge observed the demeanor of
witnesses while in the witness chair, she is in the best position
to calibrate their credibility. The task of evaluating the
credibility of witnesses includes interpreting their body
language and their meaningful nuances are not expressed in
the transcripts of their testimonies.
We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous
interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not without
remedy. The range of remedy is provided in our Rules of Court
and we need not make an elongated discourse on the
subject. But certainly, the remedy for erroneous rulings, absent
any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, is not the outright
disqualification of the judge. For there is yet to come a judge
with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always
infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who
err for we all err.
We again remind respondent judge of our counsel in the
first Webb case[26] "x x x that our ability to dispense impartial
justice is an issue in every trial, and in every criminal
prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent
accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the
innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of
the promise that justice shall be done and is done - and that is
the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of
public opinion."
BRACY v. GRAMLEY, WARDEN There is no question that, if proved, such compensatory,
camouflaging bias in petitioner's own case would violate due
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF process. Pp. 904-905.
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
(b) Petitioner has shown good cause for appropriate discovery
No. 96-6133. Argued April 14, 1997-Decided June 9, 1997 to prove his claim. The usual presumption that public officials
have properly discharged their official duties has been soundly
Petitioner was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death before rebutted here. Maloney's public trial and conviction show that
then-Judge Thomas J. Maloney, an Illinois judge who was he was thoroughly corrupt. A Government proffer in that case
later convicted on federal charges of taking bribes from details his corruption as both a trial attorney and a judge.
criminal defendants. In this federal habeas petition, petitioner Additional evidence supports the claim that Maloney was
claims that Maloney had an interest in his conviction to deflect biased in petitioner's own case. His trial attorney was a former
suspicion that the judge was taking bribes in other murder associate of Maloney's in a law practice that was familiar and
cases during and around the time of petitioner's trial, and that comfortable with corruption, who announced that he was ready
this interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Due Process for trial just a few weeks after his appointment and requested
Clause. The District Court denied both the claim and a no additional time before trial to prepare for the penalty phase
supplemental discovery motion. In affirming, the Seventh of the case. Petitioner alleges that Maloney appointed the
Circuit held, inter alia, that petitioner had not shown "good attorney with the understanding that he would not object to, or
cause" for discovery to prove his claim, as required by Rule interfere with, a prompt trial, so that petitioner's case could
6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. camouflage bribe negotiations being conducted in another
murder case. The Government's proffer confirms that
Held: Petitioner has made a sufficient factual showing, under petitioner's murder trial was sandwiched tightly between other
Habeas Corpus Rule 6(a), to establish "good cause" for murder trials that Maloney fixed. Although petitioner may be
discovery on his claim of actual judicial bias in his case. Pp. unable to obtain evidence sufficient to support a finding of
904-910. actual judicial bias in his trial, he has made a sufficient
showing to establish "good cause" for discovery. Although,
(a) Before addressing whether petitioner is entitled to given the facts of this particular case, it would be an abuse of
discovery, his claim's essential elements must be identified. discretion not to permit any discovery, Habeas Corpus Rule
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456, 468. Due 6(a) provides that the scope and extent of discovery is a
process requires a fair trial before a judge without actual bias matter confided to the District Court's discretion. Pp. 906-909.
against the defendant or an interest in the outcome of his
particular case. Petitioner claims that Maloney's acceptance of 81 F.3d 684, reversed and remanded.
bribes from criminal defendants not only rendered him biased
against the State in those cases, but also induced a REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous
compensatory bias against defendants who did not bribe him, Court.
since he did not want to appear "soft" on criminal defendants.
Gilbert H. Levy, by appointment of the Court, 519 U. S. 1106,
argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs
was Martin S. Carlson.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Meanwhile, various groups[11] also sent to the Chief Justice their
Philippines[5] (NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong respective resolutions and statements bearing on these matters.
[6]
Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed on November 22, 2010 a petition
praying that the Court constitute Branch 221 of RTC-Quezon City The principal accused in the cases, Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan),
as a special court to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre trial filed a Consolidated Comment of December 6, 2010 in A.M. No. 10-
to relieve it of all other pending cases and assigned duties, and 11-5-SC and A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC. The President, through the
allow the installation inside the courtroom of a sufficient number of Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and NUJP, et al. filed their
video cameras that shall beam the audio and video signals to the respective Reply of January 18, 2011 and January 20,
[7]
television monitors outside the court. The Court docketed the 2011. Ampatuan also filed a Rejoinder of March 9, 2011.
petition as A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC.
On Broadcasting the Trial of the Maguindanao Massacre Cases
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22,
2010[8] addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and
support of those who have petitioned [this Court] to permit television radio coverage of court proceedings. They principally urge the Court
to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public trial, right to
Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case[12] and assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances,
the 2001 ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the right of free access to courts, and freedom of association, subject to
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President regulations to be issued by the Court.
[13]
Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they contend, violate the
doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners prayer for
narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to the
regulation is a viable alternative. guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has Putts Law[16] states that technology is dominated by two types of
attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the people: those who understand what they do not manage, and those
crime, prominence of the accused, and the number of media who manage what they do not understand.Indeed, members of this
personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and Court cannot strip their judicial robe and don the experts gown, so to
searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and speak, in a pretense to foresee and fathom all serious prejudices or
that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast risks from the use of technology inside the courtroom.
coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the
courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media A decade after Estrada and a score after Aquino, the Court is once
institution. again faced with the same task of striking that delicate balance
between seemingly competing yet certainly complementary rights.
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina,
by January 12, 2010 letter[14] to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a The indication of serious risks posed by live media coverage to the
dialogue to discuss concerns over media coverage of the proceedings accuseds right to due process, left unexplained and unexplored in the
of the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Judge Solis-Reyes replied, era obtaining in Aquino and Estrada, has left a blow to the exercise
however, that matters concerning media coverage should be brought of press freedom and the right to public information.
[15]
to the Courts attention through appropriate motion. Hence, the
present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the
The rationale for an outright total prohibition was shrouded, as
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's
it is now, inside the comfortable cocoon of a feared speculation right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly
which no scientific study in the Philippine setting confirms, and administration of justice, and considering further that
the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
which fear, if any, may be dealt with by safeguards and safety information may be served and satisfied by less
nets under existing rules and exacting regulations. distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed. Video footages of court
In this day and age, it is about time to craft a win-win situation that hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and
shall not compromise rights in the criminal administration of justice, limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial
officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to
sacrifice press freedom and allied rights, and interfere with the the commencement of official proceedings. No video
integrity, dignity and solemnity of judicial proceedings. Compliance shots or photographs shall be permitted during the
trial proper.
with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable
solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to
due process, to prevent the distraction of the
at the same time, maintaining the same underlying principles upheld
participants in the proceedings and in the last
in the two previous cases. analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court
resolved to PROHlBIT live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. Video footage of
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and
in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and restricted as above indicated.[17]
should not be treated as a means of entertainment[, and t]o so treat it
deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from
the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the
proceedings are formulated. The observation that [m]assive intrusion question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in
of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter a criminal case. It held that [t]he propriety of granting or denying the
and destroy the constitutionally necessary atmosphere and decorum instant petition involve[s] the weighing out of the constitutional
stands. guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public
information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the
The Court concluded in Aquino: accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a
court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court
and other sanctions in case of violations of the
trial. The Court disposed: prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are
observed, the audio-visual recording of the
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent proceedings shall be made under the supervision and
technological and scientific advances but to chance control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules
bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the
nets are provided and the concerns heretofore release of the audio-visual recordings for public
expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in
pay. the National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. in accordance with law.[19]
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioners note that the 1965 case of Estes v.
In resolving the motion for reconsideration, the Court in Estrada, by [20]
Texas which Aquino and Estrada heavily cited, was borne out of
Resolution of September 13, 2001, provided a glimmer of hope when the dynamics of a jury system, where the considerations for the
it ordered the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary possible infringement of the impartiality of a jury, whose members
purposes, under the following conditions: are not necessarily schooled in the law, are different from that of a
x x x (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, judge who is versed with the rules of evidence. To
excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan petitioners, Estes also does not represent the most contemporary
may determine should not be held public under Rule position of the United States in the wake of latest
119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b)
cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the jurisprudence[21] and statistical figures revealing that as of 2007 all
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be 50 states, except the District of Columbia, allow television
regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of
the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall coverage with varying degrees of openness.
be made for documentary purposes only and shall be
made without comment except such annotations of
Other jurisdictions welcome the idea of media coverage. Almost all
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to
explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings the proceedings of United Kingdoms Supreme Court are filmed, and
before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its
decision in all the cases against the former President
sometimes broadcast.[22] The International Criminal Court broadcasts venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is abated,
its proceedings via video streaming in the internet.[23] for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the
trial when necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power
On the media coverages influence on judges, counsels and witnesses, of contempt and issue gag orders.
petitioners point out that Aquino and Estrada, like Estes, lack
empirical evidence to support the sustained conclusion. They point One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre
out errors of generalization where the conclusion has been mostly cases apart from the earlier cases is the impossibility of
supported by studies on American attitudes, as there has been no accommodating even the parties to the cases the private
authoritative study on the particular matter dealing with Filipinos. complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the
courtroom. On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right
impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his
prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with
must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. and would not be unjustly condemned and that his
Teehankee, Jr.[24] and Estrada v. Desierto,[25] that the right of an rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of
long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with
accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that
publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors
pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the
to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
and observe the trial process. In the constitutional
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice reasonable number of the public to observe the
proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial. negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall
then be totally free to report what they have observed
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies. He may
during the proceedings.[26] (underscoring supplied)
challenge the validity of an adverse judgment arising from a
proceeding that transgressed a constitutional right.As pointed out by
petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on move for a change of
Even before considering what is a reasonable number of the public purposes and for transmittal to live radio and
television broadcasting.
who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject
criminal cases is that the proceedings already necessarily entail the (b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter
of application, manifesting that they intend to
presence of hundreds of families. It cannot be gainsaid that the broadcast the audio-visual recording of the
families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have as much proceedings and that they have the necessary
technological equipment and technical plan to carry
interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings
out the same, with an undertaking that they will
as those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations
at this juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed more and cover the entire remaining proceedings until
promulgation of judgment.
than 200 witnesses each.
No selective or partial coverage shall be
allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to
broadcast the proceedings without an application
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a duly approved by the trial court.
courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed
private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more
inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a
if the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial
public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place inside court. No panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents
the courtroom.Technology tends to provide the only solution to in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the equipment shall be operated and controlled only by a
duly designated official or employee of the Supreme
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial. Court. The camera equipment should not produce or
beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights
or signs showing the equipment is operating should
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and
not be visible. A limited number of microphones and
television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the least installation of wiring, if not wireless
the following guidelines toward addressing the concerns mentioned technology, must be unobtrusively located in places
indicated by the trial court.
in Aquino and Estrada:
The Public Information Office and the Office
(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist
massacre cases may be made both for documentary
the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective
and equipment. witnesses from the courtroom, in instances
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from where, inter alia, there are unresolved identification
inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be issues or there are issues which involve the security
conducted in such a way that the least physical of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony
disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is
dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the material, minority of the witness).
exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The trial court may, with the consent of the
The hardware for establishing an parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the
interconnection or link with the camera equipment witness or mute the audio output, or both.
monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account
of the media entities, which should employ (f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of
technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome the proceedings, no commercial break or any other
snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are
the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and adjourned, except during the period of recess called
(iii) preclude undue commotion in case of technical by the trial court and during portions of the
glitches. proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack (g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio
space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, output from the on-going proceedings, the
the media entities shall access the audio-visual proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-
recording either via wireless technology accessible overs, except brief annotations of scenes depicted
even from outside the court premises or from one therein as may be necessary to explain them at the
common web broadcasting platform from which start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall
streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the
images and sounds. contempt power of the court;
At all times, exclusive access by the media (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording
entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment,
be protected or encrypted. except brief footages and still images derived from or
cartographic sketches of scenes based on the
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a recording, only for news purposes, which shall
particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of the contempt power of the court;
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court[27] applies, and where
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in
the National Museum and the Records Management Indeed, the Court cannot gloss over what advances technology has to
and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition
in accordance with law. offer in distilling the abstract discussion of key constitutional
precepts into the workable context.Technology per se has always
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings
shall be made under the supervision and control of been neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need fine-
the trial court which may issue supplementary tuning. Law and technology can work to the advantage and
directives, as the exigency requires, including the
furtherance of the various rights herein involved, within the contours
suspension or revocation of the grant of application
by the media entities. of defined guidelines.
That on or about the 15th day of April 1980, in the On 3 January 1990, the trial court promulgated its
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did decision,21 dated 5 December 1989, convicting the accused of the
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, crime of rape and sentencing him as follows:
by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by
holding the neck of the complainant WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered pronouncing
simultaneously poking a deadly bladed instrument accused ROBERTO R. PIDO guilty beyond reasonable
against her, threatening to kill her should she doubt as principal of the crime of RAPE, and sentencing
shout for help and ordering her to remove her him to reclusion perpetua.
entire clothings, have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned complainant, against her will. The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party,
Teresita Patinio, of the sum of P25,000.00 as moral
Contrary to Law. damages. However, payment of the required docket and
other legal fees shall constitute a lien in the execution of
was filed with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial this award.
Court) of Manila. It was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
61752 and was assigned to Branch 35 thereof. With costs against the accused.
4. While the rule is that conviction must rest not on the In respect to credibility, appellee asserts that the conclusion of
weakness of the defense but on the strength of the the trial court on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases carries
prosecution's evidence, the lower court still convicted the great weight because it observed their behavior and
accused. A charge for rape must be supported with deportment.32 Also, accused's offer of compromise is a factor
convincing evidence that will definitely prove the alleged indicating the truth of complainant's charge.
guilt of the rapist.
Finally, appellee argues that the assertion of the accused that the
5. The purported victim in this case is not a young girl with sexual liaison was with the consent of complainant because she
traditional modesty — but a wizened (sic) mature woman was his former sweetheart is without foundation for he offered no
with extensive experience in sex with other men. Moral evidence to corroborate such claim; besides, assuming this to be
damages are unjustly awarded by the lower court.27 so, the relationship does not preclude rape. Moral damages in
rape is proper. In the instant case, it should be increased to
P30,000.00 in accordance with present jurisprudence.
In Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General maintains that the
decision appealed from is correct and prays that it be affirmed
with the modification that the indemnity for moral damages be The basic issue which these conflicting theories raise is whether
increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. Appellee argues that or not the guilt of the accused-appellant has been established
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution, it was beyond reasonable doubt.
established that accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge
We have carefully and meticulously reviewed and analyzed the instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to
evidence for the prosecution in this case and, guided by the the Constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses
jurisprudential principles and considerations adverted to in the against him and to show that the presumption of innocence has
exordium of this decision, We find that the prosecution failed to remained steadfast and firm.
discharge its duty to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Reversal of the decision appealed from is This case then provides one more occasion for this Court to take
inevitable. exception to the rule that appellate courts will generally not
disturb the factual findings of the trial court considering that it is in
The prosecution can only rely on the testimonies of the a better position to decide the question, having heard the
complainant, Teresita Patinio y Gam, and her witness, Lydia Sulit. witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and
The trial court gave it full weight and credit as easily suggested by manner of testifying.33 Two special considerations in this case
the abundance of quotations, in the challenged decision, of their justify such departure. Firstly, it was another judge (Judge Alfredo
testimonies on direct examination. Although it makes reference to Lazaro) who heard and received the whole testimony on direct
"lengthy, rigid and searching cross-examination by an able and examination of the complainant and the major portion of her
competent counsel, such that any deliberate falsehood in their testimony on cross-examination. Judge Makasiar, who decided
testimonies could have been easily detected and exposed," the case, did not then have sufficient basis to form an opinion as
nothing at all is mentioned as regards the implausibilities, to the complainant's deportment and manner of testifying.
improbabilities and inconsistencies on substantial matters which Secondly, the trial court had ignored or overlooked substantial
the cross-examination revealed and exposed. The trial court facts and circumstances, as hereafter shown, which would affect
merely hurried itself to the sweeping conclusion that "the the result of the case.
credibility of their declarations have not been shaken much less
destroyed by the searching questions of the cross-examiner." As The following circumstances cast serious doubts on the theory of
hereinafter shown, this is not supported by the facts unfurled the prosecution that accused had carnal knowledge with
during the cross-examination. On the whole, the challenged complainant through force and intimidation:
decision leaves much to be desired. We find no serious effort at
all to dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the A
evidence for the prosecution in the light of the teaching in various
rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party
There is uncertainty as to the weapon allegedly used to intimidate
must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. Common sense
complainant. The sworn complaint describes it as a "deadly
and logic, and above all the duty to render impartial justice, which
bladed instrument"; on direct examination, complainant describes
is expected from judges, demand that the testimonies of
it as a "knife" (patalim).34 Yet, on cross-examination, she only said
witnesses must be viewed in their totality. This of course means
that a pointed instrument which she "does not know" was pointed
that due attention must be given to the cross-examination. It is
on her neck, thus:
the province of the latter to test the credibility of the witnesses,
expose falsehood or half-truth, uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct-examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and Q But an intruder strangled you with his both (sic) hands
demonstrate inconsistencies on substantial matters which create on your neck?
reasonable doubt. In short, cross-examination is an indispensable
A Only his lefthand sir, but his righthand is (sic) holding a sworn complaint and then merely as a "pointed instrument" on
pointed instrument. cross-examination, which the prosecution did not even try to
rectify on redirect examination.
xxx xxx xxx
B
Q Neither he fondled (sic) you in your breast?
In her sworn complaint, complainant categorically asserted that
A No sir, he released me because something was pointed accused ordered her "to remove her entire clothings," yet in her
to my neck which I do not know.35 direct testimony, she was merely told to remove her panty, which
she did not fully comply with because it was removed from the
(Emphasis supplied). right leg only, and remained with the left leg.37 On cross-
examination, she reiterated this and even quoted the alleged
instructions of the accused.
and on redirect examination, instead of clarifying what the pointed
weapon was in relation to the knife, what resurfaced was not a
knife but a "pointed object," thus: C
Q Let us come (sic) back to the scene where you were On direct examination, complainant testified that when she woke
threatened by the accused. You stated on cross- up because the accused strangled her, the latter was kneeling on
examination that his lefthand was holding your neck while her left side near her twins;38 yet, on cross examination, she
his righthand was holding a pointed object and pointed to declared that her body was in between his legs, thus:
your neck, do you remember that?
Q When you woke up, according to you, the accused was
A Yes, sir. strangling you, what was the position of the accused?
Q When he threatened you that you should hold his penis A When I woke up he had my body in between us both
and place it in your vagina where was the pointed (sic) legs and with the hand placed on my neck in a
object pointed to you at that time? strangle hold and he had a knife on his right hand.39
A I stood up, sir. Q After making love with you, do you know if this intruder
dressed-up?
Q You stood up because you want (sic) to wear again
your panty which you voluntarily removed? A I do not know anymore sir, I was crying because of fear.
Q You never even bothered to go to the window and Q So, you want to impress this Honorable Court that while
asked (sic) help from your neighbors? you were making love with the accused this Lydia Sulit
passed by?
A No. sir.49
A Yes, sir.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
F
Q While you were making love with the accused, do you
On cross-examination, the cross examiner succeeded in showing remember if the party is (sic) still going on downstairs?
that the sexual liaison was the product of mutual consent, or the
complainant and the accused were "making love." The following A Yes, sir.
questions and answers are enlightening:
Q So, there are (sic) still many people at the ground floor
Q Now, you said that after less than 5 minutes making of your house during that night when you were making
love with this alleged intruder, he left you at the sala, am I love with the accused?
right?
A No sir, that is not true. Q So, you were then lying when you testified on January
18, 1982 that the accused jumped over the window?
Q Which is not true?
A It was not our window that opened in front of where we
A The people were already asleep, sir. are (sic) sleeping, sir.
Q After making love with the accused, do you know where Q But you are telling that the window is (sic) still open
the accused passed thru in going down? since you slept and making (sic) love with the accused?
A I do not know, sir. A That window was really open because it is (sic) warm,
sir.53
Q Is it not true that the accused jumped over the window?
If the references to "making love" were without basis, or that the
A I do not know sir, I was crying because I was afraid.
50 questions based thereon were misleading, the prosecuting fiscal
should have objected. None was made, and there is no showing
that the prosecuting fiscal is incompetent. After this "love-making"
This claim that she did not then know where the accused passed
rendezvous, the accused promised to return to make love again.
through is of course inconsistent with her assurance on direct
examination that the accused used the window for his exit:
Q And after finishing the intercourse what did this intruder
do if he did anything?
A After he put on his panty or shorts, he left through the
window. This window is at the second floor of the house
where he jumped.51 A He told me that he will return, sir.
A He went out of the window where the stairs is just A Yes, sir.
nearby and he stepped on it. There he already went
down. Q And you said "yes" because you like it?
A Well, I don't know how he entered, Your Honor, but he Q Because you are (sic) afraid that your husband might
went out through the window.52 know it?
then she confirmed on such cross-examination, thus: A No sir, I was still startled because of my fear.54
G moon but of the "light in the kitchen which was kept open at
night."57
This fear, however, seemed to be more imagined than real in the
light of the above findings clearly demonstrating her consent to The version of Lydia cannot prevail over the testimonies of both
the act. As a matter of fact, there is enough evidence to show that the complainant and the accused that she (Lydia) saw them "in
she signaled to the accused to spend time with her and that she the act."
prepared for the tryst. For reasons only known to the prosecution,
it opted not to rebut the damaging testimony of the accused that H
among others, complainant signaled to him to come up; she
thereafter took a bath; when he came up, she ordered him to get The conduct of the complainant after the alleged rape is
inside the mosquito net, and to give him space beside her, she inconsistent with that of one who had been subjected to a
even moved her youngest child; and then they simultaneously harrowing experience under the bestial act of a rapist. Contrary to
took off their clothes and made love. While they were in the act, the alleged initial interest of the complainant and Lydia Sulit to
Lydia Sulit came out of her room and saw them. Because of seek immediate redress and vindication as evidenced by Lydia's
embarrassment, complainant cried. He then dressed up and immediate advice:
returned to the party.
Q After Teresita Patinio informed you that she was raped
That Lydia saw them while they were making love is admitted by by Pido and after having observed her condition, what did
complainant as indicated above. Lydia, however, has her own you do next?
version. According to this version, which the trial court
erroneously credited, when she woke up at dawn of 16 April
A Because it was still dark and everybody was still
1980, she saw the accused, who was 4 1/2 meters away facing
asleep, I told her to go to (sic) precinct but it is not proper
the window with his back toward her, in the act of either buttoning
because we have to go first to the Barangay Chairman,
or closing the zipper of his pants; then he passed through the
sir.58
window. She then turned on the light and saw the complainant
inside the mosquito net sitting with her back against the aparador.
She was crying. Lydia then got a glass of water, gave it to her, yet, it was only on 30 May 1980 that the sworn statement of the
and asked her what happened. Complainant was shaking and so complainant was prepared.59 The delay has not been explained.
Lydia waited until she calmed down. After she calmed down, she
told Lydia that she was raped by the accused. At that time, Complainant did not report the incident to her common-law
complainant's panty was still down on one foot.55 husband, Nicasio Gam, when he arrived in the morning of the day
it happened, 16 April 1980. As to when she did so, she gave
According to Lydia, she was able to recognize the accused conflicting versions. In her direct testimony, she declared that it
because of the "moonlight giving the light inside the house." The was only on the following day that she "revealed to him the
flourescent lamp was put truth."60 Yet, on cross-examination, she declared that she reported
off.56 However, the complainant, when asked how she was able to it to him several days after:
identify the accused, did not make mention of the light of the
Q And you are (sic) afraid that your cousin [referring to complainant was so embarrassed that she had to concoct the
Lydia Sulit] might tell your husband that she saw you story of rape.
making love with the accused?
I
A No sir, I reported it to my husband.
Complainant's protestation that she was strangled or choked by
Q And that is (sic) several days when your cousin saw the accused is belied by the medical certificate prepared by Dr.
you? Maximo Reyes, senior medico-legal officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation, and his testimony.
A Yes, sir.61
The medical certificate states:
Lydia Sulit, however, claims that it was she who told
complainant's husband: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injury noted on
the body of the subject at the time of examination.
Q How did the husband of Teresita Patinio come to know
about the incident? On cross-examination, said medico legal officer testified:
A I was the one who told the matter to the husband of Q After examining the alleged victim, did you find any
Teresita Patinio, sir.62 injury which caused by a (sic) violent acts on her body?
If she is to be believed, after the act, she just stood up to "wear A I did not find any injury, sir.
again her panty"; however, Lydia testified that complainant was
sitting inside the mosquito net with her back on the aparador and Q So that, when she presented herself to you for
her panty down on one foot only and although she was crying, it examination she was at her usual, ordinary health and
was not loud enough, it would be heard only if one would come person?
near her. All that complainant told Lydia was that she was raped
by the accused, who threatened her and promised to "return A Yes, sir.
back."63When asked to describe the facial expression of
complainant, the best that Lydia could say was that she "looked
COURT:
pale."
Q In other words, when you made your physical
There was nothing in the complainant's behavior to show a
examination of the subject you did not find any bruises on
natural reaction to a heinous offense.
her body from which we may conclude that she was a
victim of physical violence?
What then seems to be clear to Us is that Lydia did not arrive
after the act, but as testified by the accused and corroborated by
A Nothing your Honor,64
complainant herself, she saw both inside the mosquito net. The
With the foregoing, the judicial mind cannot securely rest on a
verdict of conviction. The evidence for the prosecution fails to
1âwphi1
The so-called offer of compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution. The evidence on this matter is amorphous.
Moreover, as admitted by the complainant, there was only a
request by Leonardo Pido, brother of appellant, that she should
not go through with the filing of the complaint; he did not offer any
monetary consideration; and that accused appellant was not even
present during that time.65
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were
SUPREME COURT charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila for
Manila Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) docketed as Criminal Case No. 396447. The
THIRD DIVISION Information4 dated September 24, 2003, later amended5 on
September 14, 2004, reads:
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
"That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE the said accused, conspiring, confederating together and helping
GO, Petitioners, one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
vs. feloniously defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE Luen Ping, in the following manner, to wit: all said accused, by
COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., Respondents. means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations
which they made to said Li Luen Ping to the effect that they have
chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw
DECISION
materials installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial
Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage
for a consideration of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso
The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML
the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial evidence and prove Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the
its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot, said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and in fact the
however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly accused well knew that the same had been previously
involvement in a prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANK
otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing
fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in
him. the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 more or less."
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioners seek to nullify and set aside Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
the February 19, 2008 Decision1 and November 28, 2008
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
99383, which reversed the September 12, 2006 Order3 issued by businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27 in Civil Case country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held
No. 06-114844 and upheld the grant of the prosecution‘s motion on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently
to take the testimony of a witness by oral depositions in Laos, postponed due to his unavailability.
Cambodia.
On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for
a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he reconsideration. Hence, this petition alleging that –
was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity
Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
health. INFRINGED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
PETITIONERS TO A PUBLIC TRIAL IN ALLOWING THE
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition,7 the MeTC granted8 the TAKING OF THE DEPOSITION OF THE COMPLAINING
motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA.
a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its
reconsideration which the MeTC denied,9 prompting petitioners to II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
file a Petition for Certiorari10 before the RTC. THAT THE DEPOSITION TAKING OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS IN LAOS, CAMBODIA IS AN
On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
declared the MeTC Orders null and void.11 The RTC held that THE PETITIONERS TO CONFRONT THE SAID
Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in WITNESS FACE TO FACE.
civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since there is a
specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the taking III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING
of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which THE JUDICIAL LEGISLATION COMMITTED BY THE
is primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT IN APPLYING THE
accused to meet the witness against him face to face. RULES ON DEPOSITION-TAKING IN CIVIL CASES TO
CRIMINAL CASES.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration
through an Order dated March 5, 2006,12 the prosecution elevated IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING THE
the case to the CA. TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, OVERLOOKING THE ESTABLISHED
On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision RULE THAT VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE
which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed upon LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE SIMILARLY COMES
the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF GRAVE ABUSE OF
witness Li Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly DISCRETION.
disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases and that, in
any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross- We rule in favor of petitioners.
examine the complaining witness and make timely objections
during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of Prosecution Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
the witness.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
in open court.13 This is true especially in criminal cases where the particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119
as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
manner and deportment while testifying.14 It is not without provision reads thus:
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick
testimony. or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
availability of conditional examination of witnesses – both for the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
ruling in the case of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15 explicitly states examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the
that – same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a behalf of or against the accused.
party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate
the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must
proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised take place at no other place than the court where the case is
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting
2000, allow the conditional examination of both the defense and the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the
prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied)16 Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote with
approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows
the taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral The condition of the private complainant being sick and of
examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary advanced age falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of
public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that
place within the Philippines; or before any he should be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the language of
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to
authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with present testimony at the hearing through live witnesses, whose
no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding
the other party.17 at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in
the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the
Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not.18(Underscoring However, it is likewise true that criminal proceedings are primarily
supplied) governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the
elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable Defeat the Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case Confrontation of Witnesses
against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in
Vda. de Manguerra19 where we further declared that – The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in
criminal cases and overlooked fundamental considerations no
While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to
testimony of its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot a public trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section
disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection 14(2), Article III of the
of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a Constitution provides as follows:
witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls
for a strict construction of the rules.20 (Underscoring supplied)
Section 14. (1) x x x
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
explicitly applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
consular official under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
under the circumstances.
impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
Vda. de Manguerra, as follows: failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the
the rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, deprivation of their constitutional rights to a public trial and
and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be
procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. accorded the right to cross-examine the deponent witness and
raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same "insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus
manner as in a regular court trial. deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable instrument in
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the
face-to- face confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his
of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a credibility."25
foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial
judge. In the aptly cited case of People v. Estenzo,21 the Court As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in
noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in the right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet
open court, thus: him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his
presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-
"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear examination,"26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee against the
and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American case
opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to of Crawford v. Washington,27 the US Supreme Court had
an eminent authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation
purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by requirement, thus:
him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be
had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's right to confront
witness before the judge, and it is this – it enables the judge as witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of
trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence evidence, much less to amorphous notions of "reliability".
of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above acknowledges
moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.
witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his
countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally
detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's
condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not
will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.
x"22 (Underscoring supplied)1âw phi 1
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before Decision dated February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated
the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
Ping's old age and fragile constitution should have been SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act with which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is
zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken REINSTATED.
before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the SO ORDERED.
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's
testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a
UNITED STATES v. SCHEFFER (a) A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is
subject to reasonable restrictions to accommodate other
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.
APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES See, e. g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 55. State and
federal rulemakers therefore have broad latitude under
No. 96-1133. Argued November 3, 1997-Decided March the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence.
31, 1998 Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to present a
defense so long as they are not "arbitrary" or
A polygraph examination of respondent airman indicated, "disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
in the opinion of the Air Force examiner administering the serve." E. g., id., at 56. This Court has found the
test, that there was "no deception" in respondent's denial exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or
that he had used drugs since enlisting. Urinalysis, disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a
however, revealed the presence of methamphetamine, weighty interest of the accused. See, e. g., id., at 58.
and respondent was tried by general court-martial for Rule 707 serves the legitimate interest of ensuring that
using that drug and for other offenses. In denying his only reliable evidence is introduced. There is simply no
motion to introduce the polygraph evidence to support his consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable: The
testimony that he did not knowingly use drugs, the scientific community and the state and federal courts are
military judge relied on Military Rule of Evidence 707, extremely polarized on the matter. pp. 308-312.
which makes polygraph evidence inadmissible in court-
martial proceedings. Respondent was convicted on all Syllabus
counts, and the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (b) Rule 707 does not implicate a sufficiently weighty
reversed, holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph interest of the accused to raise a constitutional concern
evidence offered by an accused to support his credibility under this Court's precedents. The three cases principally
violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. relied upon by the Court of Appeals, Rock, supra, at
57, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 23,
Held: The judgment is reversed. 44 M. J. 442, reversed. and Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302-303, do
not support a right to introduce polygraph evidence, even
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court in very narrow circumstances. The exclusions of
with respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-D, concluding that evidence there declared unconstitutional significantly
Military Rule of Evidence 707 does not unconstitutionally undermined fundamental elements of the accused's
abridge the right of accused members of the military to defense. Such is not the case here, where the court
present a defense. pp. 308-312, 315-317. members heard all the relevant details of the charged
offense from respondent's perspective, and Rule 707 did *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the
not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence, State of Connecticut et al. by John M. Bailey, Chief
but merely barred him from introducing expert opinion State's Attorney of Connecticut, and Judith Rossi, Senior
testimony to bolster his own credibility. Moreover, in Assistant State's Attorney, and by the Attorneys General
contrast to the rule at issue in Rock, supra, at 52, Rule for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Bill Pryor of
707 did not prohibit respondent from testifying on his own Alabama, Bruce M. Botelho of Alaska, Winston Bryant of
behalf; he freely exercised his choice to convey his Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren of California, M. Jane
version of the facts at trial. Pp. 315-317. Brady of Delaware, Thurbert E. Baker
THOMAS, J., announced the judgment of the Court and JUSTICE THOMAS announced the judgment of the
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect
II-A, and II-D, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and to Parts I, II-A, and II-D, and an opinion with respect to
O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, Parts II-B and II-C, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined, and an opinion JUSTICE SCALIA, and JUSTICE SOUTER join.
with respect to Parts II-B and II-C, in which REHNQUIST,
C. J., and SCALIA and SOUTER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, This case presents the question whether Military Rule of
J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in Evidence 707, which makes polygraph evidence
the judgment, in which O'CONNOR, GINSBURG, and inadmissible in court-martial proceedings,
BREYER, JJ., joined, post, p. 318. STEVENS, J., filed a unconstitutionally abridges the right of accused members
dissenting opinion, post, p. 320. of the military to present a defense. We hold that it does
not.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting I
Solicitor General Dellinger, Acting Solicitor General
Waxman, Acting Assistant Attorney General Keeney, In March 1992, respondent Edward Scheffer, an airman
David C. Frederick, Joel M. Gershowitz, and Michael J. stationed at March Air Force Base in California,
Breslin. volunteered to work as an informant on drug
investigations for the Air Force Office of Special
Kim L. Sheffield argued the cause for respondent. With Investigations (OSI). His OSI supervisors advised him
her on the brief were Carol L. Hubbard, Michael L. that, from time to time during the course of his
McIntyre, Robin S. Wink, and W Craig Mullen. * undercover work, they would ask him to submit to drug
testing and polygraph examinations. In early April,
of Georgia, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Carla J. Stovall respondent denied using drugs since joining the Air
of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Andrew Force.1
Ketterer of Maine, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland,
Scott Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Mike Moore of On April 30, respondent unaccountably failed to appear
Mississippi, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, Don for work and could not be found on the base. He was
Stenberg of Nebraska, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, absent without leave until May 13, when an Iowa state
Philip T. McLaughlin of New Hampshire, Dennis C. patrolman arrested him following a routine traffic stop and
Vacco of New York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, held him for return to the base. OSI agents later learned
Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Drew Edmondson of that respondent's urinalysis revealed the presence of
Oklahoma, D. Michael Fisher of Pennsylvania, Jeffrey B. methamphetamine.
Pine of Rhode Island, Charles Molony Condon of South
Carolina, Richard Cullen of Virginia, Christine O. Respondent was tried by general court-martial on
Gregoire of Washington, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, charges of using methamphetamine, failing to go to his
and William U Hill of Wyoming; and for the Criminal appointed place of duty, wrongfully absenting himself
Justice Legal Foundation by Kent from the base for 13 days, and, with respect to an
unrelated matter, uttering 17 insufficient funds checks.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the He testified at trial on his own behalf, relying upon an
American Polygraph Association by Gordon L. "innocent ingestion" theory and denying that he had
Vaughan; for the United States Army Defense Appellate knowingly used drugs while working for OSI. On cross-
Division by John T. Phelps II; for the Committee of examination, the prosecution attempted to impeach
Concerned Social Scientists by Charles F. Peterson; for respondent with inconsistencies between his trial
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers testimony and earlier statements he had made to OSI.
by Charles W Daniels and Barbara E. Bergman; and for
the United States Navy-Marine Corps Appellate Defense Respondent sought to introduce the polygraph evidence
Division by Syed N. Ahmad. in support of his testimony that he did not knowingly use
drugs. The military judge denied the motion, relying on
one of the OSI agents supervising respondent requested Military Rule of Evidence 707, which provides, in relevant
that he submit to a urine test. Shortly after providing the part:
urine sample, but before the results of the test were
known, respondent agreed to take a polygraph test "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
administered by an OSI examiner. In the opinion of the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a
examiner, the test "indicated no deception" when polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take,
1 The OSI examiner asked three relevant questions: (1) Amendment, the Court of Appeals held that "[a] per
"Since you've been in the [Air Force], have you used any se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an
illegal drugs?"; (2) "Have you lied about any of the drug accused to rebut an attack on his credibility ... violates his
information you've given OSI?"; and (3) "Besides your Sixth Amendment right to present a defense." Id., at
parents, have you told anyone you're assisting OSI?" 445.3 Judge Crawford, dissent-
Respondent answered "no" to each question. App. 12.
2 Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall authorizes the President, as Commander in Chief of the
not be admitted into evidence." Armed Forces, see U. S. Const., Art. II, § 2, to
promulgate rules of evidence for military courts: "Pretrial,
The military judge determined that Rule 707 was trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof,
constitutional because "the President may, through the ... may be prescribed by the President by regulations
Rules of Evidence, determine that credibility is not an which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
area in which a fact finder needs help, and the polygraph principles oflaw and the rules of evidence generally
is not a process that has sufficient scientific acceptability recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
to be relevant." 2 App. 28. He further reasoned that the States district courts." 10 U. S. C. § 836(a).
factfinder might give undue weight to the polygraph
examiner's testimony, and that collateral arguments 3 In this Court, respondent cites the Sixth Amendment's
about such evidence could consume "an inordinate Compulsory Process Clause as the specific constitutional
amount of time and expense." Ibid. provision supporting his claim. He also briefly contends
that the "combined effect" of the Fifth and Sixth
Respondent was convicted on all counts and was Amendments confers upon him the right to a "'meaningful
sentenced to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for op-
30 months, total forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The Air Force ing, stressed that a defendant's right to present relevant
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in all material evidence is not absolute, that relevant evidence can be
respects, explaining that Rule 707 "does not arbitrarily excluded for valid reasons, and that Rule 707 was
limit the accused's ability to present reliable evidence." supported by a number of valid justifications. Id., at 449-
41 M. J. 683, 691 (1995) (en bane). 451. We granted certiorari, 520 U. S. 1227 (1997), and
we now reverse.
By a 3-to-2 vote, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces reversed. 44 M. J. 442 (1996). Without II
pointing to any particular language in the Sixth
A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not or "court-martial" are used throughout, as is the military
unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable term "accused," rather than the civilian term "defendant."
restrictions.4 See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 410
(1988); Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 55 Rule 707 serves several legitimate interests in the
(1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 295 criminal trial process. These interests include ensuring
(1973). A defendant's interest in presenting such that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial,
evidence may thus "'bow to accommodate other preserving the court members' role in determining
legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.'" Rock, credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the
supra, at 55 (quoting Chambers, supra, at 295); primary purpose of the trial.5 The Rule is neither arbitrary
accord, Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U. S. 145, 149 (1991). As nor disproportionate in promoting these ends. Nor does it
a result, state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the defendant
under the Constitution to establish rules excluding to raise a constitutional concern under our precedents.
evidence from criminal trials. Such rules do not abridge
an accused's right to present a defense so long as they A
are not "arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve." Rock, supra, at 56; State and Federal Governments unquestionably have a
accord, Lucas, supra, at 151. Moreover, we have found legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable evidence is
the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Indeed, the
arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed exclusion of unreliable evidence is a principal objective of
upon a weighty interest of the accused. See Rock, many evidentiary rules. See, e. g., Fed. Rules Evid. 702,
supra, at 58; Chambers, supra, at 802, 901; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow
302; Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 22-23 (1967). Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 589 (1993).
It is equally clear that Rule 707 serves a second By its very nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the
legitimate governmental interest: Preserving the court jury's role in making credibility determinations. The
members' core common form of polygraph test measures a variety of
physiological responses to a set of questions asked by
8 Respondent argues that because the Government-and the examiner, who then interprets these physiological
in particular the Department of Defense-routinely uses correlates of anxiety and offers an opinion to the jury
polygraph testing, the Government must consider about whether the witness-often, as in this case, the
polygraphs reliable. Governmental use of polygraph accused-was deceptive in answering questions about the
tests, however, is primarily in the field of personnel very matters at issue in the trial. See 1 McCormick §
screening, and to a lesser extent as a tool in criminal and 206.9 Unlike other expert witnesses who testify about
intelligence investigations, but not as evidence at trials. factual matters outside the jurors' knowledge, such as the
See Brief for United States 34, n. 17; Barland, The analysis of fingerprints, ballistics, or DNA found at a
Polygraph Test in the USA and Elsewhere, in The crime scene, a polygraph expert can supply the jury only
Polygraph Test 76 (A. Gale ed. 1988). Such limited, out with another opinion, in addition to its own, about whether
of court uses of polygraph techniques obviously differ in the witness was telling the truth. Jurisdictions, in
character from, and carry less severe consequences promulgating rules of evidence, may legitimately be
than, the use of polygraphs as evidence in a criminal trial. concerned about the risk that juries will give excessive
They do not establish the reliability of polygraphs as trial
evidence, and they do not invalidate reliability as a valid 9 The examiner interprets various physiological
concern supporting Rule 707's categorical ban. responses of the examinee, including blood pressure,
perspiration, and respiration, while asking a series of
function of making credibility determinations in criminal questions, commonly in three categories: direct
trials. A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system accusatory questions concerning the matter under
investigation, irrelevant or neutral questions, and more assessments of such issues as whether the test and
general "control" questions concerning wrongdoing by control questions were appropriate, whether a particular
the subject in general. The examiner forms an opinion of polygraph examiner was qualified and had properly
the subject's truthfulness by comparing the physiological interpreted the physiological responses, and whether
reactions to each set of questions. See generally other factors such as countermeasures employed by the
Giannelli & lmwinkelried 219-222; Honts & Quick, The examinee had distorted the exam results. Such
Polygraph in 1995: Progress in Science and the Law, 71 assessments would be required in each and every
N. D. L. Rev. 987, 990-992 (1995). case.10 It thus offends no constitutional principle for the
President to conclude that a per se rule excluding all
Opinion of THOMAS, J. polygraph evidence is appropriate. Because litigation
over the admissibility of polygraph evidence is by its very
weight to the opinions of a polygrapher, clothed as they nature col-
are in scientific expertise and at times offering, as in
respondent's case, a conclusion about the ultimate issue 10 Although some of this litigation could take place
in the trial. Such jurisdictions may legitimately determine outside the presence of the jury, at the very least a
that the aura of infallibility attending polygraph evidence foundation must be laid for the jury to assess the
can lead jurors to abandon their duty to assess credibility qualifications and skill of the polygrapher and the validity
and guilt. Those jurisdictions may also take into account of the exam, and significant cross-examination could
the fact that a judge cannot determine, when ruling on a occur on these issues.
motion to admit polygraph evidence, whether a particular
polygraph expert is likely to influence the jury unduly. For lateral, a per se rule prohibiting its admission is not an
these reasons, the President is within his constitutional arbitrary or disproportionate means of avoiding itY
prerogative to promulgate a per se rule that simply
excludes all such evidence. D
For the foregoing reasons, Military Rule of Evidence 707 JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR,
does not unconstitutionally abridge the right to present a JusTICE GINSBURG, and JUSTICE BREYER join,
defense. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
reversed.
I join Parts I, II-A, and II-D of the opinion of the Court. In
It is so ordered. my view it should have been sufficient to decide this case
to observe, as the principal opinion does, that various
courts and jurisdictions "may reasonably reach differing mistakes the role and competence of jurors in deciding
conclusions as to whether polygraph evidence should be the factual question of guilt or innocence. Post, at 336-
admitted." Ante, at 312. The continuing, good-faith 337. In the last analysis the principal opinion says it is
disagreement among experts and courts on the subject unwise to allow the jury to hear "a conclusion about the
of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating ultimate issue in the trial." Ante, at 314. I had thought this
a per se exclusion of polygraph results or of the fact an tired argument had long since been given its deserved
accused has taken or refused to take a polygraph repose as a categorical rule of exclusion. Rule 704(a) of
examination. If we were to accept respondent's position, the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
of course, our holding would bind state courts, as well as
military and federal courts. Given the ongoing debate "Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the
about polygraphs, I agree the rule of exclusion is not so form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is
arbitrary or disproportionate that it is unconstitutional. not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." The Advisory
I doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, Committee's Notes state:
and some later case might present a more compelling
case for introduction of the testimony than this one does. "The older cases often contained strictures against
Though the considerable discretion given to the trial court allowing witnesses to express opinions upon ultimate
in admitting or excluding scientific evidence is not a issues, as a particular aspect of the rule against opinions.
constitutional mandate, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow The rule was unduly restrictive, difficult of application,
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579, 587 (1993), there is and generally served only to deprive the trier of fact of
some tension between that rule and our holding today. useful information. 7 Wigmore §§ 1920, 1921;
And, as JUSTICE STEVENS points out, there is much McCormick § 12. The basis usually assigned for the rule,
inconsistency between the Government's extensive use to prevent the witness from 'usurping the province of the
of polygraphs to make vital security determinations and jury,' is aptly characterized as 'empty rhetoric.' 7 Wigmore
the argument it makes here, stressing the inaccuracy of § 1920, p. 17." Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule
these tests. Evid. 704, 28 U. s. C., p. 888.
With all respect, moreover, it seems the principal opinion The principal opinion is made less convincing by its
overreaches when it rests its holding on the additional contradicting the rationale of Rule 704 and the well
ground that the jury's role in making credibility considered reasons the Advisory Committee recited in
determinations is diminished when it hears polygraph support of its adoption.
evidence. I am in substantial agreement with JUSTICE
STEVENS' observation that the argument demeans and
The attempt to revive this outmoded theory is especially JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.
inapt in the context of the military justice system; for the
one narrow exception to the abolition of the ultimate The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
issue rule still surviving in the Federal Rules of Evidence held that the President violated the Constitution in June
has been omitted from the corresponding rule adopted 1991, when he promulgated Rule 707 of the Military
for the military. The ultimate issue exception in the Rules of Evidence. Had I been a member of that court, I
Federal Rules of Evidence is as follows: would not have decided that question without first
requiring the parties to brief and argue the antecedent
"No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental question whether Rule 707 violates Article 36(a) of the
state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U. S. C. § 836(a). As
state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant presently advised, I am persuaded that the Rule does
did or did not have the mental state or condition violate the statute and should be held invalid for that
constituting an element of the crime charged or of a reason. I also agree with the Court of Appeals that the
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the Rule is unconstitutional. This Court's contrary holding
trier of fact alone." Fed. Rule Evid. 704(b). rests on a serious undervaluation of the importance of
the citizen's constitutional right to present a defense to a
The drafting committee for the Military Rules of Evidence criminal charge and an unrealistic appraisal of the
renounced even this remnant. It said: "The statutory importance of the governmental interests that undergird
qualifications for military court members reduce the risk the Rule. Before discussing the constitutional issue, I
that military court members will be unduly influenced by shall comment briefly on the statutory question.
the presentation of ultimate opinion testimony from
psychiatric experts." Manual for Courts-Martial, United I
States, Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, App.
22, p. A22-48 (1995 ed.). Any supposed need to protect Rule 707 is a blanket rule of exclusion.1 No matter how
the role of the finder of fact is diminished even further by reliable and how probative the results of a polygraph test
this specific acknowledgment that members of military may be, Rule 707 categorically denies the defendant any
courts are not likely to give excessive weight to opinions opportunity to persuade the court that the evidence
of experts or otherwise to be misled or confused by their should be received for any purpose. Indeed, even if the
testimony. Neither in the federal system nor in the military parties stipulate in advance that the results of a lie
courts, then, is it convincing to say that polygraph test detector test may be admitted, the Rule requires
results should be excluded because of some lingering exclusion.
concern about usurping the jury's responsibility to decide
ultimate issues.
The principal charge against the respondent in this case evidence, but the federal courts have also been engaged
was that he had knowingly used methamphetamine. His in the process of rejecting the oncepopular view that all
principal defense was "innocent ingestion"; even if the lie detector evidence should be categorically
urinalysis test conducted on April 7, 1992, correctly inadmissible.2 Well reasoned opinions are concluding,
indicated that he did ingest the substance, he claims to consistently with this Court's decisions
have been unaware of that fact. The results of the lie in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.
detector test conducted three days later, if accurate, S. 579 (1993), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.
constitute factual evidence that his physical condition at S. 136 (1997), that the federal rules wisely allow district
that time was consistent with the theory of his defense judges to exercise broad discretion when evaluating the
and inconsistent with the theory of the prosecution. The admissibility of scientific evidence.3 Those opinions
results were also relevant because they tended to correctly observe that the rules of evidence generally
confirm the credibility of his testimony. Under Rule 707, recognized in the trial of civil and criminal cases in the
even if the results of the polygraph test were more federal courts do not contain any blanket prohibition
reliable than the results of the urinalysis, the weaker against the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
evidence is admissible and the stronger evidence is
inadmissible. 2 "There is no question that in recent years polygraph
testing has gained increasingly widespread acceptance
Under the now discredited reasoning in a case decided as a useful and reliable scientific tool. Because of the
75 years ago, Frye v. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, advances that have been achieved in the field which
293 have led to the greater use of polygraph examination,
coupled with a lack of evidence that juries are unduly
1 Rule 707 states, in relevant part: swayed by polygraph evidence, we agree with those
courts which have found that a per se rule disallowing
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of polygraph evidence is no longer warranted .... Thus, we
a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph believe the best approach in this area is one which
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to balances the need to admit all relevant and reliable
take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be evidence against the danger that the admission of the
admitted into evidence." Mil. Rule Evid. 707(a). evidence for a given purpose will be unfairly
prejudicial." United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529,
F. 1013 (1923), that anomalous result would also have 1535 (CAll 1989). "[W]e do not now hold that polygraph
been reached in nonmilitary cases tried in the federal examinations are scientifically valid or that they will
courts. In recent years, however, we have not only always assist the trier of fact, in this or any other
repudiated Frye's general approach to scientific individual case. We merely remove the obstacle of the
per se rule against admissibility, which was based on plays a special role in the military establishment, military
antiquated concepts about the technical ability of the practices are more favorable to a rule of admissibility
polygraph and legal precepts that have been expressly than is the less structured use of lie detectors in the
overruled by the Supreme Court." United civilian sector of our society. That is so because the
States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 434 (CA5 1995). military carefully regulates the administration of
polygraph tests to ensure reliable results. The military
3 "The per se ... rule excluding unstipulated polygraph maintains "very stringent standards for polygraph
evidence is inconsistent with the 'flexible inquiry' examiners" 5 and has established its own Poly-
assigned to the trial judge by Daubert. This is particularly
evident because Frye, which was overruled 4 "Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including
by Daubert, involved the admissibility of polygraph modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter
evidence." United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other
227 (CA9 1997). military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry,
may be prescribed by the President by regulations which
In accord with the modern trend of decisions on this shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the
admissibility issue, in 1987 the Court of Military Appeals principles of law and the rules of evidence generally
held that an accused was "entitled to attempt to lay" the recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
foundation for admission of favorable polygraph States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or
evidence. United States v. Gipson, 24 M. J. 246, 253 inconsistent with this chapter." 10 U. S. C. § 836(a).
(1987). The President responded to Gipson by adopting
Rule 707. The governing statute authorized him to 5 According to the Department of Defense's 1996 Report
promulgate evidentiary rules "which shall, so far as he to Congress:
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the
rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of "The Department of Defense maintains very stringent
criminal cases in the United States district courts." 10 U. standards for polygraph examiners. The Department of
S. C. § 836(a).4 Thus, if there are military concerns that Defense Polygraph Institute's basic polygraph program is
warrant a special rule for military tribunals, the statute the only program known to base its curriculum on
gives him ample authority to promulgate special rules forensic psychophysiology, and conceptual, abstract, and
that take such concerns into account. applied knowl-
Rule 707 has no counterpart in either the Federal Rules graph Institute, which is "generally considered to be the
of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. best training facility for polygraph examiners in the United
Moreover, to the extent that the use of the lie detector States." 6 The military has administered hundreds of
thousands of such tests and routinely uses their results training, DoD personnel must serve an internship
for a wide variety of official decisions.7 consisting of a minimum of six months on-the-job-training
and conduct at least 25 polygraph examinations under
edge that meet the requirements of a master's degree- the supervision of a certified polygraph examiner before
level of study. Candidates selected for the Department of being certified as a Department of Defense polygraph
Defense polygraph positions must meet the following examiner. In addition, DoD polygraph examiners are
minimum requirements: required to complete 80 hours of continuing education
every two years." Department of Defense Polygraph
"1. Be a United States citizen. "2. Be at least 25 years of Program, Annual Polygraph Report to Congress, Fiscal
age. Year 1996, pp. 14-15; see also Yankee, The Current
Status of Research in Forensic Psychophysiology and Its
"3. Be a graduate of an accredited four-year college or Application in the Psychophysiological Detection of
have equivalent experience that demonstrates the ability Deception, 40 J. Forensic Sciences 63 (1995).
to master graduate-level academic courses.
6 Honts & Perry, Polygraph Admissibility: Changes and
"4. Have two years of experience as an investigator with Challenges, 16 Law and Human Behavior 357, 359, n. 1
a Federal or other law enforcement agency .... (1992) (hereinafter Honts & Perry).
"5. Be of high moral character and sound emotional 7Between 1981 and 1997, the Department of Defense
temperament, as confirmed by a background conducted over 400,000 polygraph examinations to
investigation. resolve issues arising in counterintelligence, security, and
criminal investigations. Department of Defense Polygraph
"6. Complete a Department of Defense-approved course Program, Annual Polygraph Report to Congress, Fiscal
of polygraph instruction. Year
"7. Be adjudged suitable for the position after being The stated reasons for the adoption of Rule 707 do not
administered a polygraph examination designed to rely on any special military concern. They merely invoke
ensure that the candidate realizes, and is sensitive to, the three interests: (1) the interest in excluding unreliable
personal impact of such examinations. evidence; (2) the interest in protecting the trier of fact
from being misled by an unwarranted assumption that the
"All federal polygraph examiners receive their basic polygraph evidence has "an aura of near infallibility"; and
polygraph training at the Department of Defense (3) the interest in avoiding collateral debates about the
Polygraph Institute. After completing the basic polygraph admissibility of particular test results.
It seems clear that those interests pose less serious 8 When the members of the court-martial are officers, as
concerns in the military than in the civilian context. was true in this case, they typically have at least a
Disputes about the qualifications of the examiners, the college degree as well as significant military service. See
equipment, and the testing procedures should seldom 10 U. S. C. § 825(d)(2); see also, e. g., United
arise with respect to the tests conducted by the military. States v. Carter, 22 M. J. 771, 776 (A. C. M. R. 1986).
Moreover, there surely is no reason to assume that
military personnel who perform the factfinding function defense. It is not necessary to point to "any particular
are less competent than ordinary jurors to assess the language in the Sixth Amendment," ante, at 307, to
reliability of particular results, or their relevance to the support the conclusion that the right is firmly established.
issues.8 Thus, there is no identifiable military concern It is, however, appropriate to comment on the importance
that justifies the President's promulgation of a special of that right before discussing the three interests that the
military rule that is more burdensome to the accused in Government relies upon to justify Rule 707.
military trials than the evidentiary rules applicable to the
trial of civilians. The Sixth Amendment provides that "the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for
It, therefore, seems fairly clear that Rule 707 does not obtaining witnesses in his favor." Because this right "is an
comply with the statute. I do not rest on this ground, essential attribute of the adversary system itself," we
however, because briefing might persuade me to change have repeatedly stated that few rights "are more
my views, and because the Court has decided only the fundamental than that of an accused to present
constitutional question. witnesses in his own defense." 9 According to Joseph
Story, that provision was included in the Bill of Rights in
II reaction to a notorious common-law rule categorically
excluding defense evidence in treason and felony
The Court's opinion barely acknowledges that a person cases.10 Our holding in Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S.
accused of a crime has a constitutional right to present a 14(1967), that this right is applicable to the States, rested
on the premises that it "is in plain terms the right to
1997, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year 1996, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year present a defense" and that it "is a fundamental element
1995, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year 1994, p. 1; id., Fiscal Year of due proc-
1993, App. A; id., Fiscal Year 1992, App. A; id., Fiscal
Year 1991, App. A-I (reporting information for 1981- 9 "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an
1991). accused to present witnesses in his own defense, see, e.
g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 (1973).
Indeed, this right is an essential attribute of the adversary
system itself .... The right to compel a witness' presence rules that exclude entire categories of relevant evidence
in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the that is potentially unreliable. At common law interested
adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have parties such as defendants,13 their spouses,14 and their
the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right co-conspirators 15 were not competent
to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth
Amendment .... " Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 408-409 11 "The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to
(1988). compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms
the right to present a defense, the right to present the
10 "Joseph Story, in his famous Commentaries on the defendant's version of the facts as well as the
Constitution of the United States, observed that the right prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth
to compulsory process was included in the Bill of Rights lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
in reaction to the notorious common-law rule that in prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging
cases of treason or felony the accused was not allowed their testimony, he has the right to present his own
to introduce witnesses in his defense at all. Although the witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a
absolute prohibition of witnesses for the defense had fundamental element of due process of law." Id., at 19.
been abolished in England by statute before 1787, the
Framers of the Constitution felt it necessary specifically 12 "It is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less
to provide that defendants in criminal cases should be violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories
provided the means of obtaining witnesses so that their of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a
own evidence, as well as the prosecution's, might be priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.
evaluated by the jury." Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S.
14, 19-20 (1967) (footnotes omitted). "The rule disqualifying an alleged accomplice from
testifying on behalf of the defendant cannot even be
ess of law." 11 Consistent with the history of the defended on the ground that it rationally sets apart a
provision, the Court in that case held that a state rule of group of persons who are particularly likely to commit
evidence that excluded "whole categories" of testimony perjury." Id., at 22.
on the basis of a presumption of unreliability was
unconstitutional.12 13 "It is familiar knowledge that the old common law
carefully excluded from the witness stand parties to the
The blanket rule of inadmissibility held invalid record, and those who were interested in the result; and
in Washington v. Texas covered the testimony of alleged this rule extended to both civil and criminal cases. Fear of
accomplices. Both before and after that decision, the perjury was the reason for the rule." Benson v. United
Court has recognized the potential injustice produced by States, 146 U. S. 325, 335 (1892).
14 "The common-law rule, accepted at an early date as trend has been consistent and it has been manifested in
controlling in this country, was that husband and wife constitutional holdings as well.
were incompetent as witnesses for or against each other
.... Commenting on the trend that had followed the decision
"The Court recognized that the basic reason underlying in Benson, the Court in 1918 observed that in the
thEe] exclusion [of one spouse's testimony on behalf of
the other] had been the practice of disqualifying "years which have elapsed since the decision of
witnesses with a personal interest in the outcome of a the Benson Case, the disposition of courts and of
case. Widespread disqualifications because of interest, legislative bodies to remove disabilities from witnesses
however, had long since has continued, as that decision shows it had been going
forward before, under dominance of the conviction of our
[Footnote 15 is on p. 328J time that the
witnesses. "Nor were those named the only grounds of been abolished both in this country and in England in
exclusion from the witness stand; conviction of crime, accordance with the modern trend which permitted
want of religious belief, and other matters were held interested witnesses to testify and left it for the jury to
sufficient. Indeed, the theory of the common law was to assess their credibility. Certainly, since defendants were
admit to the witness stand only those presumably honest, uniformly allowed to testify in their own behalf, there was
appreciating the sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party no longer a good reason to prevent them from using their
by the result, and free from any of the temptations of spouses as witnesses. With the original reason for
interest. The courts were afraid to trust the intelligence of barring favorable testimony of spouses gone the Court
jurors." Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, 336 concluded that this aspect of the old rule should go
(1892). And, of course, under the regime established too." Hawkins
by Frye v. United States, scientific evidence was
inadmissible unless it met a stringent "general 15 See Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S., at 20-21.
acceptance" test. Over the years, with respect to
category after category, strict rules of exclusion have truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the
been replaced by rules that broaden the discretion of trial testimony of all persons of competent understanding who
judges to admit potentially unreliable evidence and to may seem to have knowledge of the facts involved in a
allow properly instructed juries to evaluate its weight. case, leaving the credit and weight of such testimony to
While that trend has included both rulemaking and be determined by the jury or by the court, rather than by
nonconstitutional judicial decisions, the direction of the rejecting witnesses as incompetent, with the result that
this principle has come to be widely, almost universally, provisions of the Sixth Amendment'). We break no new
accepted in this country and in Great ground in observing that an essential component of
Britain." Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 471. procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. In re
Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 273
See also Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371, 377-378 (1948); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 394 (1914).
(1933). It was in a case involving the disqualification of That opportunity would be an empty one if the State were
spousal testimony that Justice Stewart stated: "Any rule permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence
that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law
impedes as well the doing of justice." Hawkins v. United (1973), we concluded that "where constitutional rights
States, 358 U. S. 74, 81 (1958) (concurring opinion). directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated,
the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
State evidentiary rules may so seriously impede the defeat the ends of justice." 17 As the Court notes today,
discovery of truth, "as well as the doing of justice," that restrictions on the "defendant's right to present relevant
they preclude the "meaningful opportunity to present a evidence," ante, at 308, must comply with the admonition
complete defense" that is guaranteed by the in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U. S. 44, 56 (1987), that they
Constitution, Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 "may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).16 they are designed to serve." Applying that admonition to
In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284, 302 Arkansas' blanket rule prohibiting the admission of
hypnotically refreshed testimony, we concluded that a
16 "Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of "State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence
the Fourteenth does not extend to per se exclusions that may be reliable
Amendment, Chambers v. Mississippi, [410 U. S. in an individual case." Id., at 61. That statement of
284 (1973)], or in the Compulsory Process or constitutional law is directly relevant to this case.
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth
Amendment, Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 23 bearing on the credibility of a confession when such
(1967); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308 (1974), the evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence.
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a In the absence of any valid state justification, exclusion of
meaningful opportunity to present a complete this kind of exculpatory evidence deprives a defendant of
defense.' California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. [479,485 the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encounter
(1984)]; cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 684- and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial
685 (1984) ('The Constitution guarantees a fair trial testing.' United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 656
through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic (1984). See also Washington v. Texas, supra, at 22-
elements of a fair trial largely through the several 23." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S., at 690-691.
17 "Few rights are more fundamental than that of an illustrate, the Court is quite wrong in assuming that the
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. E. g., impact of Rule 707 on respondent's defense was not
Webb v. Texas, 409 U. S. significant because it did not preclude the introduction of
95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U. S. 14, 19 any "factual evidence" or prevent him from conveying "his
(1967); In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948). In the exercise version of the facts to the court-martial
of this right, the accused, as is required of the State, members." Ante, at 317. Under such reasoning, a rule
must comply with established rules of procedure and that excluded the testimony of alibi witnesses would not
evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability be significant as long as the defendant is free to testify
in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although himself. But given the defendant's strong interest in the
perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or outcomean interest that was sufficient to make his
more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable testimony presumptively untrustworthy and therefore
to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow inadmissible at common law-his uncorroborated
the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to be testimony is certain to be less persuasive than that of a
trustworthy have long existed. The testimony rejected by third-party witness. A rule that bars him "from introducing
the trial court here bore persuasive assurances of expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility,"
trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic ibid., unquestionably impairs any "meaningful opportunity
rationale of the exception for declarations against to present a complete defense"; indeed, it is sure to be
interest. That testimony also was critical to Chambers' outcome determinative in many cases.
defense. In these circumstances, where constitutional
rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are Moreover, in this case the results of the polygraph test,
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied taken just three days after the urinalysis, constitute
mechanistically to defeat the ends of independent factual evidence that is not otherwise
justice." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S., at 302. available and that strongly supports his defense of
"innocent ingestion." Just as flight or other evidence of
III "consciousness of guilt" may sometimes be relevant, on
some occasions evidence of "consciousness of
The constitutional requirement that a blanket exclusion of innocence" may also be relevant to the central issue at
potentially unreliable evidence must be proportionate to trial. Both the answers to the questions propounded by
the purposes served by the rule obviously makes it the examiner, and the physical manifestations produced
necessary to evaluate the interests on both sides of the by those utterances, were probative of an innocent state
balance. Today the Court all but ignores the strength of of mind shortly after he ingested the drugs. In Dean
the defendant's interest in having polygraph evidence Wigmore's view, both "conduct" and "utterances" may
admitted in certain cases. As the facts of this case con-
stitute factual evidence of a "consciousness of handle its financial affairs. That defense was seriously in
innocence." 18 As the Second Circuit has held, when issue as to most of the charges against him, drawing
there is a serious factual dispute over the "basic defense considerable support from the evidence ....
[that defendant] was unaware of any criminal
wrongdoing," evidence of his innocent state of mind is ''With the credibility of the accusations about Mariotta's
"critical to a fair adjudication of criminal charges." 19 The knowledge of wrongdoing seriously challenged, evidence
exclusion of the test results in this case cannot be fairly of his denial of such knowledge in response to an
equated with a ruling that merely prevented the opportunity to obtain immunity by admitting it and
defendant from encumbering the record with cumulative implicating others became highly significant to a fair
evidence. Because the Rule may well have affected the presentation of his defense ....
outcome of the trial, it unquestionably "infringed upon a
weighty interest of the accused." Ante, at 308. ''Where evidence of a defendant's innocent state of mind,
critical to a fair adjudication of criminal charges, is
The question, then, is whether the three interests on excluded, we have not hesitated to order a new
which the Government relies are powerful enough to trial." United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 691-
support a categorical rule excluding the results of all 692 (CA2 1990); see also United States v. Bucur, 194
polygraph tests no matter how unfair such a rule may be F.2d 297 (CA7 1952); Herman v. United States, 48 F.2d
in particular cases. 479 (CA5 1931).
20 Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, The Scientific Status of specific evidence. But such questions are properly
Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case for addressed in adversary proceedings; they fall far short of
Polygraph Tests, in 1 Modern Scientific Evidence 572 (D. justifying a blanket exclusion of this type of expert
Faigman, D. Kaye, M. Saks, & J. Sanders eds. 1997) testimony.
(hereinafter Faigman) (compiling eight laboratory studies
that place mean accuracy at approximately 90%); id., at There is no legal requirement that expert testimony must
575 (compiling four field studies, scored by independent satisfy a particular degree of reliability to be admissible.
examiners, that place mean accuracy at 90.5%); Raskin, Expert testimony about a defendant's "future
Honts, & Kircher, A Response to Professors Iacono and dangerousness" to determine his eligibility for the death
Lykken, in Faigman 627 (compiling six field studies, penalty, even if wrong "most of the time," is routinely
scored by original examiners, that place mean accuracy admitted. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 880, 898-901
at 97.5%); Abrams, The Complete Polygraph Handbook (1983). Studies indicate that handwriting analysis, and
190-191 (1989) (compiling 13 laboratory studies that, even fingerprint identifications, may be less trustworthy
excluding inconclusive results, place mean accuracy at than polygraph evidence in certain cases.24 And, of
87%). course, even highly dubious eyewit-
21 Iacono & Lykken, The Scientific Status of Research 24 One study compared the accuracy of fingerprinting,
on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph handwriting analysis, polygraph tests, and eyewitness
Tests, in Faigman 608 (compiling three studies that place identification. The study consisted of 80 volunteers
mean accuracy at 70%). divided into 20 groups of 4. Fingerprints and handwriting
samples were taken from all of the participants.
22 E. g., Iacono & Lykken, The Case Against Polygraph
Tests, in Faigman 608-609; Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, A In each group of four, one person was randomly
Response to Professors Iacono and Lykken, in Faigman assigned the role of "perpetrator." The perpetrator was
instructed to take an envelope to a building doorkeeper
(who knew that he would later need to identify the witness testimony is, and should be, admitted and tested
perpetrator), sign a receipt, and pick up a package. After in the crucible of cross-examination. The Court's reliance
the "crime," all participants were given a polygraph on potential unreliability as a justification for a categorical
examination. rule of inadmissibility reveals that it is "overly pessimistic
about the capabilities of the jury and of the adversary
The fingerprinting expert (comparing the original system generally. Vigorous cross-examination,
fingerprints with those on the envelope), the handwriting presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction
expert (comparing the original samples with the signed on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
receipt), and the polygrapher (analyzing the tests) sought means of attacking shaky but admissible
to identify the perpetrator of each group. In addition, two evidence." Daubert, 509 U. S., at 596.25
days after the "crime," the doorkeeper was asked to pick
the picture of the perpetrator out of a set of four pictures. 25 The Government argues that there is a widespread
danger that people will learn to "fool" the polygraph, and
The results of the study demonstrate that polygraph that this possibility undermines any claim of reliability. For
evidence compares favorably with other types of example, the Government points to the availability of a
evidence. Excluding "inconclusive" results from each test, book called Beat the Box: The Insider's Guide to
the fingerprinting expert resolved 100% of the cases Outwitting the Lie Detector. Tr. of Oral Arg. 53; Brief for
correctly, the polygrapher resolved 95% of the cases United States 25, n. 10. Beat the Box, however, actually
correctly, the handwriting expert resolved 94% of the cuts against a per se ban on polygraph evidence. As the
cases correctly, and the eyewitness resolved only 64% of preface to the book states:
the cases correctly. Interestingly, when "inconclusive"
results were included, the polygraph test was more "Dr. Kalashnikov [the author] is a polygraph professional.
accurate than any of the other methods: The polygrapher If you go up against him, or someone like him, he'll
resolved 90% of the cases correctly, compared with 85% probably catch you at your game. That's because he
for the handwriting expert, 35% for the eyewitness, and knows his work and does it by the book.
20% for the fingerprinting expert. Widacki & Horvath, An
Experimental Investigation of the Relative Validity and "What most people don't realize is that there are a lot of
Utility of the Polygraph Technique and Three Other not so professional polygraph examiners out there. It's
Common Methods of Criminal Identification, 23 J. very possible that you may be tested by someone who is
Forensic Sciences 596, 596-600 (1978); see also Honts more concerned about the number of tests he will run this
& Perry 365. week (and his Christmas bonus) than he is about the
precision of each individual test.
"Remember, the adage is that you can't beat the "Let the accused's whole conduct come in; and whether it
polygraph system but you can beat the operator. This tells for consciousness of guilt or for consciousness of
book is gleefully dedicated to the idea of a sporting innocence, let us take it for what it is worth, remembering
chance." V. Kalashnikov, Beat the Box: The Insider's that in either case it is open to varying explanations and
Guide to Outwitting the Lie Detector (1983) (preface); id., is not to be emphasized. Let us not deprive an innocent
at 9 ("[W]hile the system is all but unbeatable, you can person, falsely accused, of the inference which common
surely beat the examiner"). sense draws from a consciousness of innocence and its
natural manifestations." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 293, p.
Thus, Beat the Box actually supports the notion that 232 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
polygraphs are reliable when conducted by a highly
trained examiner-like the one in this case. There is, of course, some risk that some "juries will give
excessive weight to the opinions of a polygrapher,
Nonetheless, some research has indicated that people clothed as they are in scientific expertise," ante, at 313-
can be trained to use "countermeasures" to fool the 314. In my judgment, however, it is much more likely that
polygraph. See, e. g., Honts, Raskin, & Kircher, Mental juries will be guided by the instructions of the trial judge
and Physical Countermeasures Reduce the Accuracy of concerning the credibility of expert as well as lay
Polygraph Tests, 79 J. Applied Psychology 252 (1994). witnesses. The strong presumption that juries will follow
This possibility, however, does not justify a per se ban. the court's instructions,
First, research indicates that individuals must receive see, e. g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 211
specific training before they can fool the polygraph (1987), applies to exculpatory as well as inculpatory
(i. e., information alone is not enough). Honts, Hodes, & evidence. Com-
Raskin, Effects
of Physical Countermeasures on the Physiological
The Role of the Jury Detection of Deception, 70 J. Applied Psychology 177,
185 (1985); see also Honts, Raskin, Kircher, & Hodes,
It is the function of the jury to make credibility Effects of Spontaneous Countermeasures on the
determinations. In my judgment evidence that tends to Physiological Detection of Deception, 16 J. Police
establish either a consciousness of guilt or a Science and Administration 91, 93 (1988) (spontaneous
consciousness of innocence may be of assistance to the countermeasures ineffective). Second, as
jury in making such determinations. That also was the countermeasures are discovered, it is fair to assume that
opinion of Dean Wigmore: polygraphers will develop ways to detect these
countermeasures. See, e. g., Abrams & Davidson,
Counter-Countermeasures in Polygraph Testing, 17
Polygraph 16, 17-19 (1988); Raskin, Honts, & Kircher, proceedings when the party objecting to admissibility has
The Case for Polygraph Tests, in Faigman 577-578. Of a basis for questioning some aspect of the examination, it
course, in any trial, jurors would be instructed on the seems quite obvious that the Government is in no
possibility of countermeasures and could give this position to challenge
possibility its appropriate weight.
26 Indeed, research indicates that jurors do not "blindly"
mon sense suggests that the testimony of disinterested accept polygraph evidence, but that they instead weigh
third parties that is relevant to the jury's credibility polygraph evidence along with other evidence.
determination will assist rather than impair the jury's Cavoukian & Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph
deliberations. As with the reliance on the potential Evidence in Court: Some Empirical Findings, 4 Law and
unreliability of this type of evidence, the reliance on a fear Human Behavior 117, 123, 127-128, 130 (1980)
that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of (hereinafter Cavoukian & Heslegrave); see also Honts &
this testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in Perry 366-367. One study found that expert testimony
the intelligence of the average American.26 about the limits of the polygraph "completely
eliminated the effect of the polygraph evidence" on the
Collateral Litigation jury. Cavoukian & Heslegrave 128-129 (emphasis
added).
The potential burden of collateral proceedings to
determine the examiner's qualifications is a manifestly the competence of the procedures that it has developed
insufficient justification for a categorical exclusion of and relied upon in hundreds of thousands of cases.
expert testimony. Such proceedings are a routine
predicate for the admission of any expert testimony, and In all events the concern about the burden of collateral
may always give rise to searching cross-examination. If debates about the integrity of a particular examination, or
testimony that is critical to a fair determination of guilt or the competence of a particular examiner, provides no
innocence could be excluded for that reason, the right to support for a categorical rule that requires exclusion even
a meaningful opportunity to present a defense would be when the test is taken pursuant to a stipulation and even
an illusion. when there has been a stipulation resolving all potential
collateral issues. Indeed, in this very case there would
It is incongruous for the party that selected the examiner, have been no need for any collateral proceedings
the equipment, the testing procedures, and the questions because respondent did not question the qualifications of
asked of the defendant to complain about the examinee's the expert who examined him, and surely the
burden of proving that the test was properly conducted. Government is in no position to argue that one who has
While there may well be a need for substantial collateral successfully completed its carefully developed training
program 27 is unqualified. The interest in avoiding evidence in all cases, no matter how reliable or probative
burdensome collateral proceedings might support a rule the evidence may be. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
prescribing minimum standards that must be met before
any test is admissible,28 but it surely does not support
the blunderbuss at issue.29
IV
G.R. Nos. 183152-54 January 21, 2015 In June of 1990, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (US
DEA) approached the NBI with information on the sale of a
REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM V ALENZONA and ANTONIO considerable amount of heroin in the Philippines. Jaylo was
G. HABALO, Petitioners, assigned by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim to head the team that
vs. would conduct a buy-bust operation with the aid of US DEA
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE undercover agent Philip Needham (Needham).
PHILIPPINES and HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO DE GUZMAN,
FRANCO CALANOG and AVELINO From 3 to 8 July 1990, Needham, posing as a member of an
MANGUERA, Respondents. international drug syndicate, conducted negotiations for the
purchase of 10 kilos of heroin from Estella Arrastia (Arrastia),
DECISION Franco Calanog (Calanog) and Rolando De Guzman (De
Guzman).The exchange was scheduled on the evening of 10 July
1990 at the parking lot of the Magallanes Commercial Center.
SERENO, CJ:
Needham arrived at the parking lot on board a taxicab with
What are the repercussions of the failure of the accused to
Arrastia and Philip Manila (Manila), an undercover NBI operative
appear, without justifiable cause, at the promulgation of a
who posed as Needham‘s bodyguard.6 The taxicab was driven by
judgment of conviction? With the resolution of this singular issue,
Romeo Noriega (Noriega), another undercover NBI operative.7
the Court writes finis to the 24-year-old controversy before us.
At the parking lot, Needham and Arrastia met Calanog and
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
Avelino Manguera (Manguera), who both alighted from a blue
the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan finding
Volkswagen Beetle; and De Guzman, who alighted from a brown
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Saab.8 Needham approached the Volkswagen and examined the
homicide. Petitioners also challenge the Resolution dated 29
heroin in the backseat.9 After some time, he straightened up and
November 20072 issued by the same court, which took no action
walked back towards the taxicab, while executing the
on the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, and the
prearranged signal of taking out his handkerchief and blowing his
Resolution dated 26 May 20083 denying the motion for
nose.10
reconsideration of the earlier Resolution.
It is at this point that the versions of the prosecution and the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
defense diverged, particularly on the manner of the arrest.
Version of the Prosecution Jaylo was able to move away, so only the window on the driver‘s
side of the Saab was hit and shattered.17 He retaliated and shot
On board two vehicles, Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, Habalo, and at De Guzman twice, hitting him in the left eye and chest.18
least 15 other operatives, rushed in and surrounded De Guzman,
Calanog, and Manguera.11 Out of instinct, Castro shoved the gun of Calanog upward and
shot him twice.19 Calanog staggered, but again aimed the gun at
Jaylo pointed his gun at De Guzman. Two other operatives him. It was then that Castro shot Calanog two times more,
instructed Calanog and Manguera to lie face down on the ground causing the latter to finally fall down.
and placed a foot on their backs while training a gun at them. The
rest cordoned the area. Valenzona and Habalo saw Manguera in the act of drawing his
firearm.20 Both of them fired and hit him.
Later, a car with passengers Needham, US DEA country attaché
Andrew Fenrich (Fenrich), and two armed bodyguards moved out The operatives brought De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera to
of the cordoned area. When the car was safely on its way, Jaylo the hospital.21 Upon verifying their identities, the victims were
and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. They found to be soldiers: Colonel Rolando de Guzman and Major
waited 15 minutes for the victims to bleed out and thereafter Franco Calanog.22 Manguera was the driver/security aide of Major
loaded them into the vehicles under the ruse of bringing them to Calanog.23
the hospital.12
The Elma Committee
Version of the Defense
President Corazon Aquino issuedAdministrative Order No.
When he saw Needham executing the prearranged signal, Manila 18224 on 13 July 1990 creating the "Elma Committee." Headed by
executed the second signal of wiping the right side of his face as Presidential Assistant for Legal and Judicial Affairs Magdangal
confirmation.13 Elma, with Undersecretary of National Defense Leonardo
Quisumbing and Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro
Castro, who was driving a Lancer car with Jaylo as his as members, the Elma Committee was tasked to conduct an
passenger, stepped on the accelerator to block the path of the investigation of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Volkswagen.14 Both of them immediately alighted from the vehicle. seizure of heroin and the shooting incident.
Jaylo confronted De Guzman in the Saab, while Castro arrested
Calanog in the Volkswagen. Meanwhile, Valenzona and Habalo Pursuant to its mandate to submit its findings and
approached Manguera.15 recommendations to the President after the completion of its
investigation, the Elma Committee recommended the prosecution
A speeding blue-green car and a burst of gunfire caught the of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for that of Calanog,
attention of the operatives while they were approaching their and Valenzona and Habalo for that of Manguera.25
quarries.16 Taking advantage of the distraction, De Guzman,
Calanog, and Manguera reached for their firearms and tried to However, in three separate Amended Informations dated 8
shoot. September 1992 and filed before the Sandiganbayan, Jaylo,
Castro, Valenzona and Habalo, together with several John Does, attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances.32 Treachery
were charged with conspiracy in the murder of De was not established. The Sandiganbayan ruled that it could not
Guzman,26 Calanog,27 and Manguera.28 RULING OF THE take judicial notice of the statements given before the Elma
SANDIGANBAYAN Committee by Dr. Desiderio Moraleda, who had conducted the
autopsy on the victims. Dr. Moraleda died before he could testify
In a Decision dated 17 April 2007, the Sandiganbayan found before the Sandiganbayan, and his testimony onthe trajectory of
Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide. Jaylo the bullets and the positions of the assailants relative to those of
was convicted for the killing of De Guzman under Criminal Case the victims could not be admitted in evidence without violating the
No. 17984; Castro for that of Calanog under Criminal Case No. rules on hearsay evidence.
17985; and Valenzona and Habalo for Manguera‘s under Criminal
Case No. 17986.29 Each of the accused was sentenced to On the allegation that the four accused took advantage of
imprisonment ofsix years and one day of prision mayoras superior strength, the court ruled that there was no evidence
minimum to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion showing the use of excessive force out of proportion to the
temporalas maximum, and perpetual disqualification from public defense available to the victims. In particular, the shooting of
office. Each was likewise ordered to pay ₱50,000 as damages to Manguera by Valenzona and Habalo only showed numerical
the heirs of their respective victims, and a proportionate share in superiority, not superior strength.
the costs of suit.
The prosecution also failed to prove evident premeditation. It was
The Sandiganbayan noted that the prosecution and the defense not able to indicate the time when the four accused determined to
were in agreement that the four accused shot and killed the three commit the killing; neither was it able to pinpoint the overt act
victims.30 With this established fact, it was only necessary to demonstrating that they adhered to their resolve to commit the
determine the following: crime even after the lapse of enough time "to allow their
conscience to overcome the resolution of their will."33
a) Whether the accused conspired to kill the victims;
For their part, the accused also failed to prove their defense of
b) Whether the killing was attended by treachery, evident fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.34 The
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength; Sandiganbayan was not convinced that they had acted within the
and bounds allowed for an arrest in a buy-bust operation.
c) Whether the killing was justified by the circumstance of For one, the Sandiganbayan highly doubted the existence of the
fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office. speeding car that distracted the operatives while they were
arresting the suspected drug dealers. In this regard, it took note
According to the Sandiganbayan, the evidence presented did not of the inconsistent testimonies of Manila and Noriega on one
show conspiracy or any intention on the partof the four accused hand and of Needham on the other.
to aid one another in the shooting.31 They did not demonstrate a
preconceived common plan or scheme to liquidate the suspected According to Manila, when he heard the gunfire from the
drug dealers. The prosecution was also unable to prove the speeding car, he covered Needham and ran with him towards the
South Superhighway, away from the taxicab driven by During the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan‘s judgment on 17
Noriega.35 Needham got into the diplomatic car that approached April 2007, none of the accused appeared despite notice.38 The
them. When the shooting subsided, he went back to the scene. court promulgated the Decision in absentia, and the judgment
was entered in the criminal docket. The bail bonds of the accused
According to Noriega, he saw the speeding car going towards the were cancelled, and warrants for their arrest issued.
Maranaw Building parking lot and heard three gunshots.
Thereafter, he saw Needham run towards his taxi and board it. On 30 April 2007, counsel for Jaylo, Valenzona, and Habalo filed
While Noriega was trying to get Needham away from the area, a a Motion for Partial Reconsideration39 of the Decision. In the
diplomatic car blocked their taxicab, and the latter transferred to assailed Resolution dated 29 November 2007, the
that car. Sandiganbayan took no action on the motion and ordered the
implementation of the warrants for the arrest of the convicted
According to Needham, however, he immediately walked back to accused.40 The court ruled that the 15-day period from the
the taxi after executing the prearranged signalfor the arrest, got in promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed without any of the
the cab and left the scene. As the taxicab was leaving, he saw accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the
the "rescue" coming in.36 Other than that, he did not notice any promulgation. Under Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
commotion or gunfire. He was then picked up by Fenrich, and Court,41 Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo have lost the remedies
they went on their way. available under the Rules against the Sandiganbayan‘s judgment
of conviction, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The Sandiganbayan also noted that the slugs or shells recovered
from the scene all came from short firearms, contrary to Jaylo‘s In an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration42 dated 25 January
testimony that the shots from the speeding car were from a rifle 2008, counsel for the three urged the Sandiganbayan to givedue
(an "armalite"). course to and resolve the Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The
Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed Resolution dated 26
Further militating against the existence of the speeding car was May 2008. The court ruled that for the failure of the three to
Jaylo‘s incident Report dated 10 July 1990, in which he stated surrender and move for leave to avail themselves of a motion for
that when they rushed in for the arrest, they were met by a volley reconsideration within 15 days from the date of promulgation, the
of gunfire from the three cars of the suspected drug judgment has become final and executory, and no action on the
dealers.37 There was no mention at all of any speeding car. motion for reconsideration can be taken.43 It then reiterated its
order to implement the warrants for the arrest of the three. ISSUE
Considering the failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and
the attendance of any of the alleged qualifying circumstances, as On 19 June 2008, petitioners Jaylo, Valenzona and Habalo, by
well as the failure of the defense to prove the justifying counsel, filed the instant petition assailing the Sandiganbayan
circumstance of fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or Decision dated 17 April 2007 and Resolutions dated 29
office, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the crime committed was November 2007 and 26 May 2008. Regarding the Decision dated
homicide. 17 April 2007, petitioners argue that the
3. The existence of the speeding car was highly doubtful. OUR RULING
4. The inconsistency in the testimony of Jaylo was Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an
determinative of his lack of credibility. accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment
of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said
5. There should be conclusive physical evidence to prove judgment.
the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court states:
6. The admissions of petitioners before the Elma
Committee were admissible in evidence. SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is
promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
7. Petitioners are guilty of homicide even in the absence judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
of their positive identification as the ones who committed conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced
the crimes charged. in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge
is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the clerk of court.
Anent the Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May
2008, petitioners argue:
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city,
the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the
1. Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court cannot
Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights like the
confinement or detention upon request of the court which
filing of a motion for reconsideration provided under
rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1606.44
shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve
the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the
2. The conditions under Section 6 Rule120 of the Rules of trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
Court do not obtain in the instant case. offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
As stated at the outset, the resolution of the instant case hinges
on the question regarding the effects of the non appearance of
the accused, without justifiable cause, in the promulgation of the
The proper clerk of court shall givenotice to the accused accused ifthe judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear
personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, was without justifiable cause.45
requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If
the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was
escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the remedies
known address. available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the availability of their
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. When the
be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation of the
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion
counsel. for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from
the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).46
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to
appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to present
available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they
order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of are considered to have lost their standing in court.47 Without any
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion standing in court, the accused cannot invoke itsjurisdiction to
for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the seek relief.48
reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he
proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away
allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from substantive rights; itmerely provides the manner through which an
notice.(6a) (Emphasis supplied) existing right may be implemented.
Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case Petitioners claim that their right to file a motion for reconsideration
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of the counsel or an appeal has a statutory origin, as provided under Section 7
for the accused or the latter‘s representative, the accused is of P.D. 1606, to wit:
required to be present at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made Section 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. — All
to the accused personally or through the bondsman or warden decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or
and counsel. finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the
Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and
The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised
of the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall before it and necessary in deciding the case.
be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known address A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be
or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall Aside from the condition that a motion for reconsideration must
be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon. be filed within 15 days from the promulgation or notice of the
(Emphasis supplied) judgment, the movant must also comply with the conditions laid
down in the Rules of Court, which applies to all cases and
xxxx proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan.54
According to petitioners, Section 7 of P.D. 1606 did not provide Petitioners insist that the right to file a motion for reconsideration
for any situation as to when the right to file a motion for under Section 7 of P.D. 1606 is a guarantee, and no amount of
reconsideration may be deemed lost. Thus, it is available at all Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court can operate to diminish
times and the Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court cannot or modify this substantive right. Aptly citing Fabian v.
operate to diminish or modify the right of a convicted accused to Desierto,55 the Sandiganbayan was correct in rejecting the
file a motion for reconsideration.49Furthermore, they argue, the argument of petitioners in this wise:
right to file a motion for reconsideration is a statutory grant, and
not merely a remedy "available in [the] Rules," as provided under Fabian v. Desiertolays down the test for determining whether a
Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Thus, according to rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
them, their absence at the promulgation of judgment before the procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges or modifies any
Sandiganbayan cannot be deemed to have resulted in the loss of substantive right, to wit:
their rightto file a motion for reconsideration.
"…whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial
Petitioners‘ argument lacks merit. process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
lawand for justly determining remedy and redress for a disregard
Like an appeal, the right to file a motion for reconsideration is a or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
statutory grant or privilege. As a statutory right, the filing of a procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it
motion for reconsideration is to be exercised in accordance with may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
and in the manner provided by law. Thus, a party filing a motion means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals
for reconsideration must strictly comply with the requisites laid merely with procedure.
down in the Rules of Court.50
Applying the Fabian v. Desiertotest, it appears indubitable that
It bears stressing that the provision on which petitioners base Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court (ROC) clearly applies to
their claim states that "[a] petition for reconsideration of any final the Sandiganbayan.
order or decision maybe filed within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment."51 In Social Section 6, Rule 120, ROC as well as Section 4, Rule VIII of the
Security Commission v. Court of Appeals,52 we enunciated that Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan (which makes applicable
the term "may" denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an Section 6, Rule 120, ROC when the accused is absent during
option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it promulgation of judgment) merely regulates the right to file a
or not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606. These are mere
thereto.53 rules of procedure which the Supreme Court is competent to
adopt pursuant to its rule-making power under Article VIII, Section absence at the promulgation of the
5(5) of the Constitution. And, contrary to the view espoused by judgment of conviction.
the accused, said rules do not take away, repeal or alter the right
to file a motion for reconsideration as said right still exists. The According to petitioners, even if wewere to apply Section 6, Rule
Supreme Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a 120, the conditions under which an accused loses the remedies
judgment of conviction done in absentia in cases when the available in the Rules of Court do not obtain in this case. It is
accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days argued that for the provision to apply, it must be shown that 1) the
from promulgation. The Supreme Court can very well do this as accused was notified of the scheduled date of promulgation, and
the right to file a motion for reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is that 2) the accused failed to appear at the promulgation of the
not preclusive in character. Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606 judgment of conviction without justifiable cause.
which prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the procedure
for promulgation of decisions in criminal cases done in absentia.56 Petitioners insist that the Sandiganbayan did not bother to
determine whether their absence at the promulgation of judgment
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away was without justifiable cause. In other words, as petitioners would
per se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies have it, it was incumbent upon the Sandiganbayan to take pains
under the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without to find out whether their absence at the promulgation was without
justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the justifiable cause, and only then could the court conclude that
judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves petitioners have lost the remedies available in the Rules of Court
of the remedies against the judgment. against the judgment of conviction.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court
Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. also provides the remedy by which the accused who were absent
It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the
"provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In
disposition of cases."57 This provision protects the courts from order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as
delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases – delay arising follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail
from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15
the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction. days from the date of the promulgation of judgment.58
In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the In Villena v. People,59 we stated that the term "surrender"
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by not appearing before it for contemplates the act by the convicted accused of physically and
the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely they voluntarily submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court to
cannot later on expect to be allowed to invoke the suffer the consequences of the judgment against them. Upon
Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction to grant them relief from its surrender, the accused must request permission of the court to
judgment of conviction. avail of the remedies by making clear the reasons for their failure
to attend the promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
It is incumbent upon the accused to
show justifiable cause for their
Clearly, the convicted accused are the ones who should show conviction, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan attained finality 15
that their reason for being absent at the promulgation of judgment days reckoned from 17 April 2007.
was justifiable. If the court finds that the reasons proffered justify
their nonappearance during the promulgation of judgment, it shall In view thereof, this Court no longer has the power to conduct a
allow them to avail of the remedies.60 Thus, unless they surrender review of the findings and conclusions in the Decision of the
and prove their justifiable reason to the satisfaction of the court, Sandiganbayan. The Decision is no longer subject to change,
their absence is presumed to be unjustified. revision, amendment, or reversal.63Thus, there is no need to pass
upon the issues raised by petitioners assailing it.
On the scheduled date of promulgation on 17 April 2007, the
Sandiganbayan noted that only Atty. Francisco Chavez, counsel WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan
for petitioners, appeared.61 Jaylo was not served notice of the Resolutions dated 29 November 2007 and 26 May 2008 in
promulgation, because he was no longer residing athis given Criminal Case Nos. 17984-86 are AFFIRMED. The
address. Valenzona and Habalo were duly notified. Castro had Sandiganbayan Decision dated 17 April 2007, having attained
died on 22 December 2006.62 finality, stands.