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the verb 'to be' in its Latin form. But its disadvantage is that it conveys
to modern ears a sort of opposition to 'existence'. There is, however, no
trace of any such opposition in the Greek terminology. Greek employs
the same verb for the English 'to be' and 'to exist' and their derivative
forms. A translation which implies an opposition between essence and
existence would be highly prejudicial.
Nor will the translation problem be solved, Owens tells us, by em-
ploying a simple transliteration, for the frequent use of the Greek term
in philosophical discussion may have already fixed its meaning as equivalent
to the current notions of either 'substance' or 'essence'. It has probably
become as familiar to its reader of it as his native language and with the
same fixation of meaning. What is required, says Owens, is an English
word which not only implies no prejudice in favor of any post-Aristotelian
theory of being and not only denotes the concrete individual, but also
can express to English ears an immediate realation with Being. The
English word that answers these requirements, he tells us, is 'entity'. It
can refer to Being, (derived as it is f r o m the participle ens), suggest
something concete, and apllies equally to essence and to existence.
Now, it might be maintained, in opposition to Owens' thesis
summarized above, that although 'substance' is an accurate translation
of ousia f r o m the purely linguistic point of view, it can nevertheless be
justified on doctrinal grounds; i.e., it might be affirmed that the meaning
which ousia has in Aristotle's system is adequately represented by
'substance'. Such a justification of'substance' is ruled out if the interpre-
tation offered in the following pages is correct.
Now Aristotle does speak of ousia as that which is not predicated of
any subject but of which everything else is predicated, or as that which is
neither predicated of nor present in any subject; in short, as 'to hypo-
keimenon', 'subject' or, literally, in 'that which underlies', Zeller^ calls
this a definition of substance. Ross^ calls it 'the primary meaning of
substance'.
There is not much difficulty in this notion as it occurs in the Categories,
where Aristotle's concern is largely with words and where ousia is considered
f r o m the point of view of logic as the subject of a sentence. What is there
asserted is that proper names and designations, such as 'Socrates', 'a
certain man', 'a certain horse', which denote concrete individuals, cannot
be predicated of anything else, i.e., you cannot say of anything other
than Socrates, this man, or this horse, that it is Socrates, this man or this
horse. The concrete individuals are f r o m this point of view, the primary
ousiai. When the notion of ultimate subject or substratum is carried over
42 Stanley Sfekas
The sub ject, or substratum (to hypokeimenon), is that of which the other things are
predicated, while it is itself not further predicated of anything else, wherefore we must first
decide about this, for the primary subject, or substratum (to hypokeimenon), especially
seems to be Entity (ousia). In one any matter is said to be underlying, in another way the
shape, and in a third way that which is made up of these (I mean by the matter, e.g., the
bronze, by the shape the figure of the form, and by that which is made up of these the
statue, which is the whole); and so, if the form is prior to the matter and is being (to on)
more than matter is, the form will also be prior to that which is made up of both, by the
same argument. It has now been said in outline, in answer to the question what Entity
Ousia. Substratum, and Matter 43
(ousia) is, that it is that which is not predicated of a subject but is itself the subject of which
the other things are predicated. But we must not describe it only thus, for it is not enough;
for this is itself unclear, and besides it is matter that turns out to be entity (ousia). For if
this is not entity (ousia), what else is escapes our grasp; for if the other things be stripped
away, there is apparently nothing remaining underneath, for the other things are affections
and doings and powers of bodies, while length and breadth and depth are quantities and
not Entities (ousiai), for quantity is not Entity (ousia). It is rather the first thing to which
these belong which is Entity (ousia). But if length and breadth and depth are taken away,
we see nothing left underneath, unless these is something bounded or determined by these;
so that, necessarily, matter alone appears as Entity (ousia) to those who view the matter
thus. Now, by matter I mean that which in itself is not said to be something, or so much or
any of other things by which the existent {to on) is determined. For there is something of
which each of these is predicated, whise being {einai) is other than the being of each of the
predicates, for the other things are predicated of Entity (ousia), while this is predicated of
the matter; so that to which we come in the end is in itseld not something and not of a
certain quantity and not anything else; but neither is it the negations of these, for the
negations also belong to it accidentally. Hence, if we take this yiew, it turns out that the
matter is Entity (ousia); But this is imposible, for being separate and being a this seem
especially to belong to Entity (ousia); wherefore the form and that which is made up of
both would seem to be Entity (ousia) more than the matter. Now the Entity (ousia) which
is made up of both, I mean of both matter and form, may be set aside, for it is posterior
and obvious, and the matter, too, in a way is obvious. Hence we must examine the third
sort of Entity (ousia), for this presents the most difficulties.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Aristotle; The Basic Works of Aristotle; Richard Mc Keon, ed., Random house.
New York, 1941.
2. Buchanon, Emerson; Aristotle's Tlieory of Being; University Microfilms International,
Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1978.
3. Grene, Marjorie; Portrait of Aristotle, Faber, London, 1963.
4. Hartman Edwin; Substance, Body and Soul, Princeton University Press; 1977.
5. Owens, Joseph; The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics; Pontifical
Intitute of Medieval Studies; Toronto, Canada, 1951.
6. Ross W. D.; Aristotle's Metaphysics, a Revised Text with Introduction and Com-
mentary; Clarendon, Oxford, 1924.
7. Zeller Eduard; Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy; Meridian Books; New
York, 1960.