2 HTE M E XI CAN R EVO LU T I O N ,

1 87 6 1 9 40
Globalcontext
Earlyinthe20thcentury, uelledbynationalism ande ectso theFirstWorldWar, theGreat
andindustrialization, mucho Europewas DepressionandtheSecondWorldWar.
busycolonizingvariousoverseaspossessions
Mexico seconomicgrowthandpoliticalstability
inanattempttoexpandtheirexistingempires
in the latter part o the 1 800s and early 1 900s
andfndneweconomicmarketstomeetthe
drewtheattentiono manyEuropeanand
needs o growing industries. However, this led
North American investors to the country. This
to tensions among countries, and soon Europe
economicgrowthandstabilitywasspurredon
collapsed into the First World War. The United
bytheinvestmentso oreignersandcreatedat
States grew economically, uelled by expanding
the expense o Mexican labourers. President D az and
railwayandresourcedevelopment, which
the elite class who wanted a modern and industrialized
caused it to push the nation s boundaries and
Mexico heavily supported the oreign investment.
discover outside markets through geographic
However, D az ruled as a tyrant and
expansion. ThisledtoUS involvementin
allowedtheexploitationo hispeopleby oreign
regional events such as the Spanish American
businessinordertoseehiscountryprogress.These
Warandthebuildingo thePanamaCanal. The social,economicandpoliticalproblemsgaveway
MexicanRevolutionwouldspanaperiodduring
toMexico srevolutionin1 91 0.
whichtheworldwasinvolvedinthecauses

Timeline

Constitution o 1857 developed due to 1857

liberalre orms
1867 BenitoJu rezbecomespresident
Sebasti nLerdodeTejadabecomes
1872
president

1876 Porfrio D az becomes president

MaderoopposesD azinpresidential
election 1910
D azresigns
MaderowritesthePlandeSanLuis
Potos 1911 Maderowinsthepresidentialelection
Zapatadra tsthePlandeAyalaand
denouncesMadero
TheTenTragicdays(LaDecena
1913
Tr gica)
Huertaresigns
1914
Carranzadeclareshimsel president
Carranzade eatsZapataandVilla
1915
underthedirectiono lvaroObreg n

70
 C H AP T E R 2 : T H E M E X I C AN R E VO L U T I O N , 1 8 7 6 19 4 0

VillaraidsColumbus,NewMexico 1916
AnewMexicanconstitutionisdrafted
1917
Carranzaelectedpresident
Zapataisassassinated 1919

1920 Obreg niselectedpresident

Villaassassinated 1923

1924 Calleselected

CristeroRebellion 1925

1928 RuleoftheMaximato

C rdenaselectedpresident 1934

1938 Oilindustrynationalized

ElPaso Columbus
Nogales Ciudadju rez U.S.A.
CasasGrandes
Baja Sonora Chihuahua
California
Guerrero Chihuahua
Cuauht moc
Alamos Coahuila
Jim nez Monclova
Parral
Baja
California Durango Saltillo Nuevo
Sur Le n GulfofMexico
Durango
Monterrey
Concepci n

Zacatecas Guanajuato
S.Luis
Aguascalientes Potos Cancun
Tampico Merida
Le n S. Luis Potosl Quer taro Yucat n
Guadalajara Guanajuato Quer taro Tlaxcala
Aguascallentes Jalisco Hidalgo
Celaya Pachuca Morelos
Colima Veracruz Campeche
Puebla Veracruz Tabasco
Pueblacity C rdoba
Iguala
Taltuac n Tuxtla
MexicoCityD.F.
Acapulco Acailan Oaxaca
Chiapas
Tlaxiaco
Oaxaca

MapofMexicoin1910

71
 2.1Causeso theMexicanRevolution
Porfriato
D azandhisallies 35-yearruleofMexico.
Porfrio D az, President 1876 1911
72
Conceptualunderstanding
Keyquestion
WhatconditionsinMexicoledtorevolution?
Keyconcepts
Causation
Perspective
Porfriato 1876 1911
Mexicowasri ewithpoliticalandsocialchaos romthe1 820sto
the 1 870s. Mexico lacked an identity and struggled as a nation, still
embarrassedbythetakingo itslandbytheUnitedStatesinthe
Mexican American War, the continual political fghting in the power vacuumle
tbySpainwhenitvacatedMexico, andtheconstant
argumentovertheroleo theCatholicChurchinstatea airs. Warhero
and President Benito Ju rez served fve terms and almost 1 4 years in the
presidentialo fce, rom 1 85 8 to 1 872 . He was loved by many or his
sacrifce in military campaigns or Mexico and or advocating liberal
policies, suchashumanrightsanddemocracy. Manycitizensstruggled
underhisrulehowever, ashemanipulatedtheelectoralsystemtostayin
o fceandcentralizedpowertothe ederalgovernment.
Fed up with the liberal policies o Ju rez and the political and social
banditrytakingplaceinMexicoatthetime, PorfrioD azopposed
President Ju rez in the 1 871 election. Neither D az, nor Ju rez, nor the
third candidate received a majority o votes, orcing the election to be
takentotheMexicanCongress. Being ullo loyalJuaristas, President
Ju rez was named president and immediately General D az proclaimed
himsel inrevolt. D azdra tedtheRevolutiono LaNoria, ademand
or electoral reedom and no re- election or presidents. Very ew people
supportedhimandeventuallyhewasstopped romcampaigning.
However, in1 872 PresidentJu rezabruptlydiedo aheartattack
and Supreme Chie Justice Sebasti n Lerdo immediately stepped in as
acting president, in accordance with the Mexican constitution o 1 857 .
PresidentLerdoserved or ouryears, closely ollowingtheideasand
policiessetbyhispredecessor, Ju rez. A terLerdo stermwasup, Mexico
heldelectionsin1 876 oranewpresident. Lerdodecidedtorun or
re- electionandGeneralPorfrioD azopposedhim, standingagainonthe
plat orm o no re- election . Upon losing the election D az led a series o
battles, accompaniedbyseveralothergenerals, eventuallyoustingLerdo
andproclaiminghimsel Presidento Mexico.
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

Politicalrule
Finally in o ce, with military loyalty, President D az could now give the
peopleo Mexicothepeaceandstabilitythattheydesired. DuringD az s
35 - year tenure in o ce he urthered the country economically, socially
and politically. Many citizens loved their country, and enjoyed the social
stabilityandlacko politicalrebelliono eredunderD az. Hehelped
raisethenationaleconomybygettingrido thenation sdebt, and
commercializingandpro essionalizingindustrieslikemining, textiles,
ranching, bankingandothereconomicsectors, thuspushingMexicointo
the uture. However, theprogresso thenationthattookplaceunder
D az swatchcameattheexpenseo thepeopleo Mexico.
D azruledasatyrantandasheado themilitary;hesupportedtheelite
inanywayhecould,inreturn ortheirloyaltyandsupportpoliticallyand
socially.InthiswayD azmicromanagedMexico,advisedbyagroupo
o cials known as the cient ftcos , controlling every aspect o the country:
cient fcos
politics,economics,themilitaryandthejusticesystem.Becauseo this,
Agroupo administratorsthatadvised
only a small portion o the population were able to take advantage o the
Diazduringhisregime.
economicprogresswhilemostMexicanshadtolabour orlowwagesand
longhoursinbadconditions.D azalsomadepoliticalcompromisesinorder
to subdue the confict between liberals and the Catholic Church. To make
mattersworse,mucho theworkdonebythevastmajorityo Mexicanswas
orthebene to theverysmalleliteclassor or oreigninvestorswhoD az
hadallowedtobuymucho Mexico.Thisledtoawideningclassgapand
createdmanyproblemsbetweenlabourclassesandindustryacrossMexico.

D azandtheCatholicChurch WhenD azenteredo cehisgoalwastoco-optthe

Churchandstaterelationshadbeenacentrepieceo
politics oranumbero years,evenbe oreD aztooko ce.
Thereason orthiswasbecauseo thelargein uencethe
CatholicChurchheldoverMexicaneconomics,politicsand
culture.Theconstitutiono 1824didnothingtoaddressthe
controltheChurchhadonMexico.Theliberalso Mexico
struggledwiththeChurchholdingpropertyrights,controlling D azcompromisedheavilywithboththeChurchand
educationandreceivingsomanybusinessprivileges.In
1854therewasaliberalpoliticalrevolution,knownasLa
Re orma,andChurchcontrolwasatthecentreo it.From
thisrevolutiontwolawsandaconstitutionemerged.This
rstlawwastheLeyJu rezlawthateliminatedthespecial
exceptions ortheChurch,andlimitedtheirroleinpolitics
andeconomics.ThesecondwastheLeyLerdolaw,which
orcedthesaleo anyChurchpropertyused orpro t.From
thisliberalrevolutiontheycreatedthe1857constitution
whichwould ormallyseparatetheChurchandthestate.
IncorporatingtheLeyLerdoandLeyJu rezlawsintothe D azallowedothernon-Catholicdenominationsinto
constitution ormally disallowed the Church rom owning
land,monopolizingeducationinMexicoandcurbedthe
Church sin uence.It ocusedonindividualrightsandgiving
thejudicialbranchpowertosupporttheserights;however,
italsoreducedsomeo thepowerheldbytheexecutive
branchwhichallowedtheselawstogounen orced ormuch o
thenext ewdecades.
Church.Thiswasdi cultasmanypriestsstillheld
in uenceinthecommunity,especiallyinruralareas.
D azdidnotappreciatethereacho theChurchandtried toen
orcetheLeyLerdolawwhenheenteredo ce.
Hequicklyrealizedthatamorepoliticalapproachwas
necessarytoavoiddirectandopencon ict.
theliberals.HekeptthelandtakenduringLaRe orma
andkepttheexistinglaws.Howevertheen orcemento
theselawswasgiventolocalauthorities,allowingwide
diferences in en orcementacross the nation. The Church
inmostareaswasstillallowedtodomucho whatit
hadalwaysdone,includingimplementingavarietyo
socialwel areprogrammes.Thishelpedimprovepeople s
opiniono theChurchinMexico.Inthisway,theChurch
slowlycreptbackintopowerunderD azandeventually
becameaD azsupporter.
Mexico,wantingtobreakthereligiousmonopoly
theChurchheldinMexico.Thisencouraged oreign
investmentinMexicohelpingtheeconomypickup.
Ironicallythispopulationbasewouldplayapartinthe
uturerevolutionasadvocates orcivilrightsandthe
reductiono Churchpower.

73

hectares
Ametricunitofsquaremeasure,equal
to2.471acres.
hacienda
Large land estate, which could include
plantations,factoriesormines,where
workers were usually indebted to the
owner,facingalifeofperpetualobligation.
Rurales
RuralpoliceforceinMexicofromthe
1860sto1914.
74
C H AP T E R 2 : C AU S E S O F T H E M E X I C AN R E VO L U T I O N
Agriculture
WhenD azenteredo fcehebegancommercializingandprivatizing
agriculturallandsthroughtheTerrenosBaldioslaw. Thestatesurveyed
thelandallacrossMexico, looking ordeedso ownershipinorder
toidenti ywhoownedwhatsectionso propertyandseizingany
unownedland. Closeto50millionhectareso landweretakenand
auctioned o to bankers, land barons and oreign investors while D az
was in o fce. Three US ranching co mp anies became the o wners o
closeto1 3 millionacresalone. Thesearablelandsweretaken rom
individuals and communities who could not fnd ownership paperwork,
despitethe actthattheymayhavebeen armingthatveryland or
over a hundred years. These lands were then turned into haciendas
andMexicancitizensweremadetoworkthesamelandthathadbeen
taken rom them. Haciendados ruled these vast plantations strictly and abusively,
payingworkersinscrip, atypeo creditthatcouldonlybe
spentattheestatestore, whereitemswereexpensiveanduna ordable,
orcingmanyworkersintodebt. Strikeswereprohibited, theworking
daywaslong, therewerenoholidaysandnocompensation orinjury
orillness. Thelosso landhadaculturale ectascitizenshadno
money to celebrate certain holidays or celebrations. The haciendas also
causedaneconomicproblem. The oreignlandownersgainedaccessto vast
resources on the land they had acquired, which in turn produced money.
Theyusedtherevenuetobuymoreland, whilepoorMexican
armerscouldnotcompete.
Miningandtextiles
The mining sector o the Mexican economy during this period was
similartotheagriculturalsector, andwasdominatedbyUS and
Europeancorporations. Workingconditionsinthemineswerepoor, andminers
romtheUS andEuropewerebettertreatedthanthose
seenasMexicanbythemanagement. So localMexicanlaborers( even
i theywereo Europeanancestry) didallthelow- levelj obs, such
as digging and hauling, while US and European workers were given
superintendentj obs. Theselowlevellocalworkerswere orcedto
train their oreign counter parts who then received better pay, better housing,
oodandmedicalcare. These oreignworkerswerepaid
withgolddollarswhilelocallaborerswerepaidwithsilverpesos,
addingtowagedisparities. Thisbecameabiggerproblemin1 905
when silver lost 5 0 % o its value and import prices increased, causing seriousunrest.
B y1 906 , localminerswalkedouto workatthe
C ananea C onsolidated C opper C ompany in C hihuahua. The workers
demandedfvepesosaday, asAmericanworkerswereearningtwice
what they were. They no longer wanted to train American workers
tobecometheirsupervisors, anddemandedaneight- hourworking
day. President D az prohibited the company rom negotiating with the
strikersandsent ederaltroops, calledRurales, torestoreorderand
gettheemployeesbacktowork. Afghtensuedand23 peopledied.
TheArizonaRangers, called orbytheAmericancompany, cameto
help stop the strike, in complete violation o Mexico s sovereignty.
Theworkerseventuallyreturnedtoworkwithnochangeinpolicy.
However, thestrikeplantedtheseedso uturerevolutionascitizens
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

andworkersalikewereappalledatthesupportD azgavetheUS
companyoverhisownpeople, andthebrazendisrespecttheUS had
orMexicanautonomy.
Thelacko decentwagesmadeithard orworkersto eedtheir amilies.
Thiseventually orcedminersandtextilemillworkerstostrike or
increasedpayandbetterconditions, howeverthegenerousclimateD az had
created or oreign investors showed just how much control oreign
companieshadgained. Onestrikeinparticular, theRioBlancotextile
strike( 1 907) , showedthis. Thegovernmenttoldthe oreigncompany
toagreetothestrikers demands orimprovedwagesandconditions.
Instead, thecompanyignoredthegovernmentandendedupfringshots
attheprotestors. Thelabourersreturnedtoworkwithnochangeinpay
or conditions. There was no punishment or the shots fred. This added
revolutionary uelagainstD azand oreigncorporations.

Railwayindustry
Allo theeconomicsuccessexperiencedbytheeliteand oreignbusiness
inMexicodemandedthebuildingo morerailwaysacrossthecountry TheRioBlancotextilestrike
inordertoshipmoreproductstoseaportsandnorthtotheUS.D az,
o course, was more than willing to oblige as he could see the economic
advantages.Hegavesubsidiesandno- bidcontractsto oreigncompanies
tobuildtherailwayswhileallowingthemmajortaxbreaksandlow
costdealsonbuyingtheland.D azandtheelitereapedtheeconomic
benefts immediately as land values rose, more products could be sent to
destinations quicker, more cheaply and more e fciently, and D az could
nowsendhisRuralesalloverMexicomuch aster.Therailwaysmeantthat
all Mexican industies, such as mining, ranching, arming and textiles, saw
majorincreasesintheirincome.However, therailwayboomalsoaddedto
theindustries stri easworkersdidnotgetashareo theprofts.Citizens
resentedD azandthe oreigncompanies orbuyingmoreMexicanland
andreceivingconcessionsinordertoprosperattheirexpense.

Oilindustry
Theoilindustrybegantoexpandinthelastyearso D az spresidency.
This was due to new oil discoveries, an increase in oreign investment and
improvementsintransportation.Notably, USinvestorEdwardDoheny
discoveredareserveinSanLuisPotosi.Hereceivedsometaxbreaksand
otherassistance romtheD azgovernmentinordertodevelopthereserve.
With US dominance o the existing oil industry in Mexico and Doheny
making a large amount o money, D az eared the US was creating an oil
monopoly in his country. To thwart this, D az courted British engineer Sir
Weetman Pearson to develop oil felds and in rastructure. Weetman had
alreadyworkedinMexicoandhadacloserelationshipwithD az.So, D az
gave Weetman large concessions on oil development, including a 50-year
contract orallo Veracruz, reeexportationo oil, reeimportationo
equipment, and limited ederal and state taxes. With the business privileges
grantedtoWeetmanbytheD azgovernment, Weetmanwouldcreatehis
oil company El guila. Under this company Weetman built Mexico s frst oil
refnery, created the most productive oil well in Mexico and ended up
controllinghal o the oreigninvestors oildevelopmentsinMexico.

75
 C H AP T E R 2 : C AU S E S O F T H E M E X I C AN R E VO L U T I O N

OilproductioninD az slastyearsgrewastronomically, andledtotwo

problemsthatwouldhave utureimplications.First, hisintentionalattempt
tolimitUScontrolo theoilindustryledtotensionsbetweentheUSand
Mexico.Second, thegrowtho theindustryattractedworkers romall
over Mexico, initially paying wages higher than in other industries, but the
treatmento workersandharshconditionsbecameasourceo discontent.

Discontentleadstorevolution
D azwascommittedtoseeingMexicoenterthe20thcenturyasa
strongeconomicnation;hewantedindustriestohavenewtechnologies
andtobeabletoentertheglobaleconomy. Ashiscountryprogressed
economically, albeitonthebackso Mexicanlabourers, hekeptatight
holdoverMexicosociallyandpolitically, anddidnotallowmodern
ideas o justice or democracy to take root. He consistently jailed or exiled
politicaldissidents, putdownanystrikesorrebellions, anddidnotallow
the Mexican citizens to speak out or allow them to be heard. For example,
brothers Ricardo and Enrique Flores Mag n elt D az s social and political
inj ustices frsthand. Tired o the President and his policies, they became
outspokencritics, ormingtheMexicanLiberalPartyandwantinga
return to the previous president Ju rez s liberal policies o ederalism and democracy.
In1 906, theFloresMag nbrotherscalled orrevolution
andwassoonpursuedbytheRurales, eventuallycaughtandimprisoned,
and later died in ederal prison. D az would not allow citizens to vote and
choose their local o fcials, which was something Mexicans had been
doing or as long as they could remember. Local o fcials were now
chosenbythegovernorsandthegovernorswerechosenbyD az. This
showed D az s lack o concern or locals and greater concern or the elite.
SocietywastornanddisgruntledoverD az streatment; citizens notjust
thelabouringclass, buttheuppermiddleclassaswell wantedavoice.
Althoughthelabourersweretakingthebrunto D az sdictatorial
ruleand oreignexploitationo Mexico, theuppermiddleclass
pro essionals and businessmen grew tired o competing in the un air
marketthatD azandhiscient fcoshadcreated. Itwasbecoming
increasinglydi fculttocompetewith oreigncompaniesthatreceived
pre erentialtreatment romtheMexicangovernmentinthe orm
o taxbreaks, discountedlicences, permitsandno- bidcontracts. As aresult,
theuppermiddleclasswouldhelp undandsupportthe
workingclasses uturerebellion.
The Mexican economy soon saw a downturn as demand or Mexican
products ell on the global market. This orced harsher conditions as
businessownersworkedpeoplehardertoproducemoreinthehope
o makingmoremoney, andtheylaido workerstosavemoney,
increasingunemployment. Meanwhile oodpricesstartedtoriseas
thepriceo silverdecreased. Thisdevaluationo silverhurtlabourers
signifcantly, as they were paid with a silver- based peso causing urther
resentmenttowardsmanagementand oreigners.
campesinos The ollowingmadeMexicoripe orrevolution:
Peasants,farmers,labourersintherural harshtreatmentandconditions orcampesinos
areasofMexico.
resourcesbeingexploitedandshippedo toothercountries

76
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

oreign control o wealth made at workers expense

workers desire oravoiceinnationalpolitics
workers demand or an opportunity to gain wealth rom their country
sresources
Native laborers receiving hal the pay o US and European
counterpartsinmostindustries
uppermiddleclasslackedpoliticalopportunity
D az sappeasemento theCatholicChurch, violatingthetermso the
1 857 constitution
increasingcostso oodandothergoods.
Long- standingpolitical, socialandeconomicproblemswouldbethebasis
o discontentinMexicoand ueltherevolutionin1 91 0.

Source skills
SourceA
Excerpt romZapataandtheMexicanRevolution
( 1 969) by John Womack, Jr. Womack is a retired Harvard
pro essor o Latin American History and Economics.
Escand n sactionswereinpartonlyanotherepisode
in the oppression traditional in those districts o Mexico.
Sincethesixteenthcentury, sugarplantationshad
dominatedli ethere;in1 910itwasanoldstorythat
theycrowdedvillagesandindependent arms, that
haciendalawyers nagledlands, timber, andwater
rom weaker but right ul users, that hacienda oremen beat
and cheated eld hands. Still prevailing as the
excusewasthelordlyracismo viceroyaltimes. For
the young Joaquin Garc a Pimentel, whose ancient
and illustrious amily owned the largest plantations
inthestate, itseemedthat theIndian hasmany
de ects as a laborer, being as he is, lazy, sottish, and
thieving. His pious and learned older brother, Luis,
whomanagedthe amily svastestates, eltthesame
way. Thelocalvillagers naturalinclinationtoward
banditry impressed him deeply, and he o ten lamented that
Jacobingovernments hadremovedthevillagers
only restraint and guide: religion, leaving the
planterstoimposetheirowncrudercontrols.
SourceB
Excerpt rom Francisco Madero s Plan de San
LuisPotosi,5 October1 91 0.D azhadMadero
4 Withre erencetotheiroriginandpurpose,
imprisoned, soassoonasMaderowasreleasedhe
assessthevaluesandlimitationso
fedtoSanAntonio,Texas,andissuedthePlande
andB.
San Luis Potosi, nulli ying the elections and calling on
Mexicanstotakeuparmsagainstthegovernment.
Ourbelovedcountryhasreachedoneo thosemoments.
A orceo tyrannywhichweMexicanswerenot
accustomed to su er a ter we won our independence
oppressesusinsuchamannerthatithasbecome
intolerable. Inexchange orthattyrannyweare
o ered peace, but peace ull o shame or the Mexican
nation, becauseitsbasisisnotlaw, but orce;because
itsobjectisnottheaggrandizementandprosperityo
the country, but to enrich a small group who, abusing
theirinfuence, have convertedthe publiccharges into
ountains o exclusively personal bene t, unscrupulously
exploitingthemannero lucrativeconcessionsand
contracts the administration o justice, instead o
imparting protection to the weak, merely serves to
legalizetheplundering scommittedbythestrong
Questions
1 WhatisbeingproclaimedinSourceB andhow
diditcontributetotheMexicanRevolution?
( 2 marks)
2 In Source A John Womack describes the
treatment o hacienda workers. How did
it contribute to the start o the Mexican
Revolution? ( 3 marks)
3 CompareandcontrastideasinSourcesA
and B on what contributed to the start o the
MexicanRevolution. ( 6 marks)
SourcesA
( 6 marks)

77
 2.2Therevolutionanditsleaders
Mexican politician Francisco
Madero( 1873 1913)
Maderistas
Followerso Madero.
Research and communication
ATL
skills
Researchapersonorevent romthe
revolution.Workinpairs,withonestudent
intheroleo interviewerandtheother
asthepersonorawitnesso theevent.
Holdaninterviewin ronto theclass.The
questions and answers should refect the
qualityo theresearch.
78
Conceptualunderstanding
Keyquestion
Whatweretheaimsandmethodso therevolutionaryleadersVilla,Zapata,
HuertaandCarranza?
Keyconcepts
Change
Causation
Consequence
MaderochallengesD az spower
In 1 908 President D az gave an interview with American j ournalist
JamesCreelmaninwhichD aztoldCreelmanthathewouldbe
steppingdown romtheMexicanpresidencyattheendo histermin
1 91 0becausehe eltthatMexicowasready orademocracyandthe
ormation o political parties. When the Mexican populace heard this
theybegantoprepare oranelection. Politicalpartiesattemptedto
orm, candidates sought supporters, elites tried to link up with notable
political gures, andpoliticaltractsandbookletswerewritten( notably
FranciscoMadero sLaSucesi nPresidencialen1 91 0, whichsethispolitical
plat ormagainstthere- electiono Por rioD az orasixthtime) . D az
didnotseemconcernedwithanyo thepartiesorcandidatesbecause
all were airly small with little initial infuence, and he believed he
wouldbeabletopickhissuccessororcontinueaspresidenthimsel .
D az s decision to choose to continue as president orced Francisco
Maderotoactagainsthim. Madero scampaigningwasinstantly
success ul; hestoodonamoderateplat orm, was undedbyhis
amily s wealth, and promised democracy or the peasants yet limited
social and economic changes, appealing to the elites and oreigners. It
was under this rhetoric that Madero s ollowers increased. C oncerned,
PresidentD azdisruptedMadero scampaignineverywaypossible
untiltheyeventuallythrewMaderoandtheMaderistas that ollowed
himintoprison. Asaresult, Maderowasineligibletobevotedinas
president. Maderowassoonreleasedonbondwiththe understanding
thathestayinSanLuisPotosiwherehecouldbewatched. A ter
the election, which D az won through corruption and raud, Madero
went to San Antonio, Texas where he wrote his Plan de San Luis Potosi,
recallingtheelectionas raudulent, promisingpoliticalre orm, ree
elections, and a no re- election principle, and calling or Mexican
citizenstoriseupagainstthedictatorialruleo PresidentD az.
AlthoughitseemedironicthatMaderowascalling orrevolution rom
thesa etyo theUnitedStates, therebelsknewtheyneededorganization
anduni cation. EventhoughMaderoandhiscalltoarmsdidjustthat,
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

there were two undamental problems. Firstly, the plan never called
intoquestionthegenuineproblemscitizensandlabourershadwith
TOKdiscussion
theD azregime landrightsandlabourrights. Maderoonlycalled To whatextentwas emotion ofered as a
orpolitical reedoms, whichwasnotatoppriorityamonglabourers justi cationtorebel?
andcampesinos. Secondly, manypeasantswerealreadyrebellingand Inwhatwayswasemotionaparto the
didn t need the plan to prompt them to do so: Zapatistas were already rebels styleo persuasiontowardstheir
reclaiminglandsinthesouth; PascualOrozcowasoverthrowinglocal revolutionarygoals?
authoritiesinthenorth, increasinglybecomingamilitarythreatto
D az; miners were protesting against abuses; and textile labourers were fghting
ormorepayandbetterconditions. Zapatistas
Followerso EmilianoZapataunderthe
WhenMaderoreturnedtoMexico romTexashehadnoarmyorrebels bannero landre orm.
toleadandwas orcedtorecruitmen.HejoinedlocalpoliticalbossLucio
Blancoand500meno variousbackgroundsandoccupations.
NorthernrebelleadersOrozcoandPanchoVillajoinedMaderoin
early1 91 1 withtheir orceso 2500men.
OrozcoandPanchoVillagainedtherevolution sfrstmajor
victory against General Navarro at Ciudad Ju rez despite Madero s
passiveness. Navarro re used to hand over the ederal garrison to
Madero. D azsentrepresentativestoestablishpeacetermsand
tobuysometime. AnnoyedwithMadero sinsistenceonwaiting
or a deal that they believed was never going to come, Villa and
Orozco attacked the garrison against Madero s wishes. A ter two
days o fghting, General Navarro was orced to surrender. This
allowedtherebelstogaincontrolo arailwayporto entryinto
theUS orweapons, oodandothersupplies.
Thisrebelvictoryinthenorth, coupledwithZapata smencontinuing
totakebacklandinMorelosjustsoutho MexicoCity, orcedD azto
signthetreatyo CiudadJu rezandgointoexile.Thetreatycalled Orozco, Branif, Villa and Garibaldi
orPresidentD azandVice-PresidentRam nCorraltoresign,topay
damagereparationsto oreigners, orallrebelstodisarmanddisband, or
the retention o existing generals and or Francisco Le n de la Barra to be
namedprovisionalpresident,withopenelectionswithinsixmonths.

Hidalgo
S.Juan TOKdiscussion
Guadalupe
MexicoCity Tlaxcala Thepeasantsandlabourerso Mexico
S.Angel
Mexico roseupinoppositionagainsttheruling classo
Tl lpam Tlaxcala
Xochimilco Mexico ormanyreasons.
Toluca
MilpaAlta Isitjusti ableormoral ortheoppressed
Amecameca
PueblaCity toresorttoviolenceratherthanusecivil
means in order to ree themselves rom
Cuernavaca
Cholula theiroppressors?
Atlixco
Morelos Tochimilco

Puebla
Taxco
Iz car de
Iguala Matamoros
Huitzac Chiautla

Guerrero

Morelosin1910

79

RevolutionaryleaderEmilianoZapata
Classdiscussion
ForwhatreasonsdoyouthinkMadero
abandoned the revolutionaries who put
him in ofce?
80
C H AP T E R 2 : T H E R E VO L U T I O N AN D I TS L E AD E R S
Madero takesofce
Upon D az s resignation the revolutionaries loyally ollowed Madero
into o fce. This sup p o rt so o n ade d as Madero kep t many o D az s
meninpower, appeasingPorfristasinthehopeo gettingtheir
cooperation, andpushedawaythemenwhogothimintothe
presidency. Maderonaivelybelievedthati thepoliticalsystemwas
fxed and democracy adopted, then the social and economic problems
wouldbe fxedasaresult.
MaderowasgladthefghtingwasoverandthePorfristaswerepleased
thatmanyo themhadretainedtheirgovernmentpositions, butthe
revolutionaries were outraged at the compromise. The Treaty o Ciudad
Juarezbecamethebeginningo theend orMaderoasrevolutionary
leaderswonderedwhytheFederalArmythathadpersecutedthepeople
wasle tinpower, whyrevolutionarieshadtolaydowntheirweapons
leavingthemunabletoprotectthemselves, andwhynothingwasdone aboutlandre
ormandotherlabourissues.
Madero had to address the problems o the nation. He put many
conservativesinhiscabinetwhoblockedallprogressivere orms.
Thismadehimlookasi hewasmaintainingthePorfristaagenda
andignoringtherevolutionariesthatputhiminpower, causing
resentment among leaders who quickly turned against him. Asking all
revolutionariestolaydowntheirarmsandallowingalllandinquestion
tobehandledbythecourtsystem orcedZapatatore usetodisarm
ordemobilizehismen. Zapatahadexpectedlandre ormimmediately
butdidnotgetit romMadero. Instead, MaderoputlocalMoreloselite
Juan Carre n in charge and gave Zapata a list o haciendas to protect.
Insulted, ZapatametMaderoinMexicoCityanddemandedland
re orm. Re using to compromise, Madero o ered Zapata a ranch or his
revolutionarye orts. Zapatawouldnotbeappeased; hereturnedto
Morelos and launched a rebellion against Madero. Zapata then wrote
his Plan de Ayala calling or a return o stolen land and the break- up o
haciendas. He withdrew his support o Madero, declared the south was
rebellingandnamedOrozcoasthechie o fcero therevolution. This
gavelegitimacytoZapata snameandanew ocustotherevolutionas
Orozco turned on Madero when he was not named Minister o War and claimed
himsel a rebel against Madero. In turn, Madero named General Victoriano Huerta
as commander o the ederal orces. Madero, tired o Zapata
sresistancesoondispatchedhis ederaltroopssouthtoMorelos
undertheleadershipo GeneralVictorianoHuerta, whohadahatred
or all revolutionaries, to fnd and kill Zapata. Zapata escaped into the
mountainsandbeganhisguerrillawar are.
Rebel leader Pancho Villa remained loyal to Madero, unlike Zapata who
arguedagainstMadero slegitimacytotherevolutionbecauseo hislack
o actiontowardslandre orm. VillawasmadeacolonelintheFederal
ArmywithspecifcinstructionstoputdownOrozco srebellion. Villa,
who lacked a real revolutionary agenda, was put under the direction o
General Huerta in the hunt or Orozco. Huerta, however, immediately
dislikedVilla, seeinghimasabanditandnotarealsoldier. Huertabeat
Orozco in a number o battles, which damaged Orozco s reputation as a
generalandalsogaveMaderoalittlemoretimeaspresident.
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

WhileVillawashuntingOrozcointhenortherndeserto Mexico, Villa

gotintoanargumentwitha ederalo fceroverahorse. Villaasked
Huertai hecouldtakethehorseandanargumentensued. Villadeparted
rom the army and the next day Huerta had him arrested and put in ront
o a fring squad. Madero stepped in to stop the execution, which Huerta
viewedasMaderochoosingthebanditoverhim somethinghewould
alwaysremember. SoHuertahadVillatrans erredtoanotherprison
whereheeventuallyescaped. VillathenreturnedtoChihuahuatorecruit
men orthe uturerebellionagainstMaderoandbyyear sendhehad
morethan7000menunderhiscommand.
Madero ocused on political re orm, believing that changing the political
systemwouldeventuallyleadtoeconomicandsocialre orm. This,
however, alienated key sectors o his initial support base. Zapata de ected
becauseo alacko changeinlandre orm, Orozcode ectedwhenhe
wassnubbed oraministryjobandVillade ectedwhenhewasarrested
andMaderochosenottoreleasehim. Madero sinactionconcerned
many other people besides these three and within 1 5 months o being
votedintothepresidency, Madero oundhimsel acingacoupd etat (
knownasLaDecenaTr gica, theTragicTenDays) . Fourgenerals,
Victoriano Huerta, F lix D az ( Porfrio s nephew) , Manuel Mondragon
andBernardoReyes( whomMaderode eatedinthe1 91 1 election) ,
supportedbyUS AmbassadorHenryLaneWilson, organizedanassault
onthePresidentialPalaceinMexicoCity.
While Reyes and D az led their rebels in the fght or the palace, Huerta GeneralVictorianoHuerta
seeminglyprotectedMadero. Butthiswasa a ade: Huertametwith
ReyesandD azseveraltimes, andsometimesallowed reshsupplies
in, inordertoextendthebattleand orceMaderointonegotiations.
Huerta s apparent support or Madero, however, was certainly real or
the many rebels, troops and innocent civilians who died. A ter 1 0 days,
HuertaturnedonMaderoandoverthrewhim. Huertaimmediately
arrestedMadero sbrother, handinghimovertoGeneralD azinorder
to orcenegotiations. Maderowas orcedtoresignaspresident, a ter
securingthepromiseo sa epassageouto Mexico orhimsel andhis
amily. Huertaproclaimedhimsel provisionalPresidento Mexico.
Madero, initiallyunderhousearrest, waslatermovedtothe ederalprison.
OnthewaytoprisonbothMaderoandVice-PresidentPinoSu rezwere Bombed buildings during
shot and killed. Huerta denied knowing anything about the murders, but LaDecenaTr gica
quickly arranged or Congress to name him interim president. Assuming
his militancy would bring back past economic successes, Porfrian elites, the
CatholicChurch, wealthyelitesand ederalo fcialswereallsupporters.

Huertaseizespower1913 1914
Asinterimpresident, Huertaquicklymadethechangeshewanted.He
usedtheFederalArmytocontrolthecentralstatesbyoustinglocal
o fcials and replacing them with trusted military generals and demanded
recognition romloyalgovernors, whichallbutthreegave.Oneo those
who re used was Abraham Gonz lez, Pancho Villas mentor, and Huerta
hadhimthrownunderamovingtrain.Huerta smainconcernwasa
consolidationo powerandincreasingthesizeo theFederalArmy,
allowinghimtocontrolMexicoviaintimidationandmilitarism.Healso

81
 C H AP T E R 2 : T H E R E VO L U T I O N AN D I TS L E AD E R S

constitutionalists
LedbyVenustianoCarranza,theywere
advocatesforastrongpresidentand
centralgovernment,andaweakerformof
federalism.
VenustianoCarranza
encouragedhaciendaownerstoputtogethertheirownprivatearmies
toprotecttheirlands.OldD azsupporterswhoweresidelinedduring
the revolution came back to infuence under Huerta. For example, the
Catholic Church and oreign investors hoped or a return to prosperity,
similartotheli etheyknewunderthePor riato.Mucho thisdesire
wascreatedbywhatwouldeventuallybecometheFirstWorldWarin
Europe, increasing the demand or Mexican resources, rom which oreign companies
wanted to gain. Many western European countries and Latin American nations
recognized Huerta, but only because their ambassadors pushedthemtodoso,
infuencedby oreigncompanieswhocould
makemoney romMexicowithHuertaasPresident. Policies avouring
oreign investors encouraged the same people and groups that opposed
PresidentD az toopposeHuerta.Themainproblem orHuertawasthat
US PresidentWoodrowWilsonre usedtorecognizehim, ultimately
leadingtoHuerta s all rompower.
WilsonneitherrecognizednoropposedHuertaimmediately. Wilsonkept
theexistingarmsembargo orallrevolutionaries, butli tedit orHuerta.
Healsosent ormerMinnesotaGovernorJohnLindtogatherin ormation
onthesituation, since ormerUS AmbassadorHenryLaneWilson
had other motives. Lind proposed early elections, without Huerta as a
candidate. Huerta rejected this notion, became increasingly upset with
Wilson smeddlinginMexico sa airsandestablishedanti- US rhetoric.
A ter this, Huerta s reign tightened on Mexico, arresting or assassinating
politicaldissidentsoranyonewhoopposedhim. Hesoonabolished
Congressandimprisonedanyo cialshethoughtopposedhim. Huerta
did hold elections, but through his intimidation the required amount o
votersneeded orano cialelection( 51 % ) wasnotmetsoheremained
in power. These actions lost Huerta urther oreign and domestic support
andonlythoseholdingontoahopethatHuertawouldreturnMexico
tothePor riatostillsupportedhim. PresidentWilsoncouldseeHuerta
losingpowerwithinhisowncountry, soheturnedtoVenustiano
Carranzaasheado theconstitutionaliststohelptoppleHuerta.
Carranza, however, turnedPresidentWilsondownbecausehewas
opposedtoUS interventionanddidn tbelieveheneededhelpinorder
tooustHuerta. HopingCarranzawouldchangehismind, Wilsonli ted
thearmsembargo, andrecognizedCarranzaastheConstitutionalist
leader, which gave Carranza legitimacy and strengthened the various
revolutionary armies. Carranza still re used to join Wilson, so the US
Presidentle tMexico, butstillwithoutrecognizingHuerta srule.
CarranzaledtheresistanceagainstHuerta, organizingthenorthern
revolutionarymovement.Hewantedtooperatebytheoldconstitutiono
1 857andtriedtopullthesouthernrebelsintohiscause, aswellasleaders
suchas lvaroObreg no Sonora. Carranzaentitledhis calltoarmsthe
Plan de Guadalupe, rejecting Huerta as president and placing himsel as the
interimpresidentuntilelectionswereheld.Inhisplanheneveraddressed
anysocialorpoliticalre orms, resultinginsomerevolutionarieschoosing
nottojoinhimandmakingitdi culttoraise anarmy.Huertachased
CarranzanorthwiththeFederalArmy, orcinghimintoSonora.Itwas
herethatCarranzaalliedwith lvaroObreg nwhohelpedhimrecruitand
leadthearmy.CarranzanamedObreg nHeado MilitaryOperationsand
itwasinthisarmythat uturepresidentPlutarcoCallesroseasaleader.

82
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

A shared hatred or Huerta pulled together revolutionaries under Carranza s

banner.Obreg n,ZapataandVilladidnotacceptHuerta sclaimtopower
astheysawhimasasimilardictatortoD azwhowouldnot ul llthe
social, political or economic needs o the revolution. Villa ought alongside
Carranzasolelybecauseo hishatred orHuerta.Thisprovedcritical or
CarranzalaterasVillawonaserieso battlesinthenorth, orcingFederal
troopsintomajorcapitalsandouto ruralareas.Zapatare usedtodealwith
Huerta, neverrecognizinghiscontrolo Mexicoaslegitimatebecauseo
theirdi eringviewsonagrarianre orm.
Huerta acedmuchoppositionatthispoint: non- recognition romthe
US;Carranzaorganizingtherebelsandgivingthema ocus orwhichto
ght;Obreg npoisedinthewestwithhisarmy;Villamarching romthe
north capturing town a ter town, gaining legitimacy as well as key railway
centres and towns like Torre n; and Emiliano Zapata still in open rebellion
in the south near Mexico City. Seeing the utility o his situation, and the
governmentonthevergeo collapse, Huertafedintoexileon1 2 August
1 91 4, leavingavacuumo powerandbitterrivalry orthepresidential
seat.GeneralObreg nwasthe rsttoarriveinMexicoCity, courtesyo
Villa s victory in the town o Zacatecas, and signed the armistice o cially
ending Huerta s reign. This armistice required soldiers along the southern
perimetertoholdtheirpositions, preventingZapatistas, whomhedidnot
trust, toenterMexicoCity.This ght orpowerinMexicoCitywouldlead General Pancho Villa and
therevolutionariesintoanotherperiodo revolution. hissoldiers

CarranzaandCivilWar1914 1920
HuertamadeittotheUnitedStateswhereeventuallyhewasimprisoned
anddied. Thearmyhele tbehindcameunderthecontrolo General
Obreg n o the Constitutionalists. With Huerta gone, the ri t between
CarranzaandVillaopenedupasObreg nprotectedMexico sseato
power or Carranza to take. Zapata received representatives rom both
CarranzaandVilla, eventuallysidingwithVillabecauseo Carranza s
opposition to land re orm. Those in the inner circle knew the revolution
wouldcontinueuntilCarranzaandVillacametoterms.
A terthebattleo Zacatecas, VillaandObreg nmetinVillas camp, to seei
theycouldagreeonwhatthepoliticalstateo thenationshould
beandtostopthe ghting. However, Villalosthistemper, ashewas
pronetodo, andtriedtohaveObreg nexecutedtwice. Oncewas
because Carranza cut railway services, stranding Villas army between
AguascalientesandTorre n. Withnothingo signi canceachieved,
Obreg nle t, distrustingCarranzaanddespisingVilla.
On 1 October 1 91 4, in an e ort to settle di erences, stop the continuing
violenceandtrytoestablishalegitimategovernment, representatives
romall acetso Mexicoandrepresentatives romallthemajorleaders
( Carranza, Villa, andZapata) metatAguascalientes orameetingon
how to deal with the power vacancy and uture government. The
delegatesrepresentedthesocialandeconomicmixo Mexicoand
hadtheauthoritytoestablishalegitimategovernment. Themeeting
encompassed ourmaingroups: Villistaswhoweresurprisinglywilling
tocompromise; CarrancistaswhoattendedtoimpresstheUS, butwere
hardlineintheirdesiretoseeCarranzaaspresident; independentsand

83

conventionalists
Loosely associated with Obreg n,
theywereadvocatesforpolitical
freedoms,labourrights,astrongregional
government, and wanted to implement
partsifnotallofthePlandeAyala,Zapata s
agrarian reform.
Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata
togetherinthecapital
84
C H AP T E R 2 : T H E R E VO L U T I O N AN D I TS L E AD E R S
Zapatistas who ocused on land re orm. The meeting s moderates, led by
General ngelesandGeneralObreg n, triedtopush orwhatwasright
orMexicoandlessentheinfuenceo VillaandCarranzaatthemeeting.
ThecommitteeadoptedZapata sPlandeAyala, agreeingtothreemajor
points: toseize oreign- ownedland, takeland romenemieso the
revolution, andreturnlandbacktoright ulowners. Manyideas, voices
andproposalswereheard, butintheendrevolutionarypartypolitics
infuencedtheoutcome.
ThecommitteeaskedC arranzatostepdownasFirstC hie andVilla
togiveupcommando theDivisi ndelNorte, seeingthisasaway
toendrevolutionandgetalegitimategovernmentino ce. Without
delay C arranza rejected the committee s power to make any mandatory
decisions. The committee immediately declared C arranza in rebellion,
causingasplitbetweendelegates. VillaandZapata ormedanalliance
and infuenced the committee members to vote in Eulalio Guti rrez,
Governor o San Luis Potosi, as the interim president. His ollowers,
including Villa, would become known as the conventionalists, the
opposingpartytoC arranza sC onstitutionalists. C arranzaandhis
delegates dismissed the convention and Guti rrez, and abandoned
MexicoC ity orVeracruzwhereC arranzawouldbeabletocontrola
tradeport. Obreg nwasle twithachoiceo whotoj oin. Hehated
Villa orhisearlierattemptstokillhimandknewVilladidn tneed
himtowinmilitarily. Obreg nknew, however, thatC arranzaneeded
hismilitaryexpertise, couldgethimpoliticalpowerinhishomestate
o Sonora, and that C arranza distrusted, rather than hated, him. S o a
care ul, thought ul Obreg n took his time, then strategically chose to
sidewithC arranza, takingovertheFederalArmyandroundingout
the C onstitutionalists. These two parties engaged in a C ivil War or the powero
Mexico.
WhenCarranzale tMexicoCity, VillaandZapatatookthecapital
andneighbouringcityPuebla, orcingObreg ntogotoVeracruzto
meetwithCarranzaandre- gatherhisarmy. VillaandZapatathen
metto ormastrategytode eatObreg n sarmy. Oddly, astrategy
was never developed, a ormal alliance never signed; however, Villa
promisedtosupplyZapatawithweaponsandZapataagreedtoattack
theConstitutionalistarmy romthesouthandholdthecityo Puebla.
Neithero themdesirednationalpoliticalprominencebutrathercontrol o
theirownsphereso infuence. A terthemeeting, nevertempted
by national power, Zapata le t or Morelos, leaving Villa in the capital.
ZapatacontinuedwithhisresistanceinsouthernMexico, raiding
haciendasandredistributinglandsbacktopeasants.
InJanuary1 91 5 , withnoo cialgovernmentandvariousrebel
actionsthroughoutMexico, bothsides ocusedontherecruitment
o men and military training in preparation or the impending battles
betweenCarranzaandVilla. A termurderingC arrancistasandraiding
and looting Mexico City, Villa le t or northern Mexico where he had a
strong ollowing but ailed to expand his political base outside o that
region, mainlyduetothelacko atruepoliticalplat orm. Carranza,
however, didgather ollowersbecausehenotonlyhadapolitical
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

visionbutalsocommunicateditwell. HehatedtheUS and oreign

imperialismwithinMexico, a eelingthatmostMexicanscouldsupport;
hepromisedapoliticalvoice, landandbetterworkingconditions
including wages. This increased Carranza s political ollowers and in
turnincreasedObreg n sarmy.

Villa and Obreg n ace-of

Obreg n was con dent he could de eat Villa because President Wilson
hadnotonlyj ustrecognizedtheC onstitutionalist governmentbuthad alsoj
ustvacatedVeracruz, leaving behindacacheo modernweaponry
orObreg n suse. Itwaswiththiscon dencethatObreg nstarted
preparationstoengageVillaonthebattle eldnearC elayainthespring o 1 91 5 ,
ora ghttoestablishthecountry sgovernmentand uture.
First, VillasenthisarmyacrossnorthernMexicotocon ront
Constitutionalist armies, primarily in Sonora, led by General Calles.
ThisspreadVilla sarmythin orthepotentialshowdownwith
Obreg n. Also, Villas relationshipwithZapatastartedtoweaken
becausethepromisedarmamentsdidnotimmediatelyarriveandwhen
theydidtheywereoldandsecond- hand. Zapataheardrumorsthat
previous Madero supporters had j oined Villas ranks and were saying
Zapatawouldeventuallyhavetobekilled. FromthatpointonZapata
protectedMorelosbutle tVillato ghtObreg nvirtuallyalone. Zapata
and Villa s inability to work together was a signi cant detriment to the
revolution, but their aims or the revolution seemed too di erent or a
lastingalliance.
It came down to the battle eld. The warrior Villa, who everyone,
including the United States, believed would win, aced the cunning
politicianC arranzaandGeneralObreg n. GeneralObreg nmoved
rst, takinghismilitarynorth, away romhissuppliesandMexico
C ity. Villas mentorandrighthandman, themilitarilybrilliantFelipe
ngeles told Villa to move north and extend Obreg n urther, but Villa arrogantly
didnotlistenandinsteadengagedhimoutsideC elaya.
While con ronting Obreg n, despite ngeles advice, Villa asked Zapata
tocutObreg n srailwaysupplylines. Zapataneverdidthis, allowing
Obreg n access to continuous supplies. Villa ought Obreg n on the
outskirts o Celaya and, again ignoring the advice o ngeles, sent
in antry and cavalry in waves into an onslaught o trench war are,
machinegunsandcannons. Villa acedtwomajorde eatsatCelaya,
losing thousands o men, horses and artillery, and orcing him and his
army to fee, many o them abandoning him permanently. Villa ought
Obreg n sarmyina ewbattlesasheretreatedtowardsthenorth,
mainly to Sonora and Chihuahua, and the once strong Divisi n del
Nortewasnowonlyaremnant. Obreg n svictoryoverVillaallowed
Carranza to win the war, the Constitutionalists to govern Mexico, and
increasedObreg n sstatureasamilitarygeneral.
Villamadeanattemptatonelast ght, scrapingtogetheranymen hecould
romthenorthernstatesandtryingto establishcontrolin
Sonora. Hebelievedthati hecouldcontrolthistowntheUS would

85
 C H AP T E R 2 : T H E R E VO L U T I O N AN D I TS L E AD E R S

reconsider recognition o C arranza, but he ound sti opposition in

Classdiscussion
Atthispoint,whatdoyouseeasthemost
signifcantturningpointo the revolution
andwhy?
Sonora rom General C alles. Incidentally, C alles was rein orced with
troops andsupplies romObreg nthatwentthroughUS territory
andhadbeenallowedbyPresidentWilson. WhenVillawas
de eated he blamed Wilson and turned towards the US or revenge.
Unsurprisingly, Villadidn thavemanyproblems ndingMexican
citizenswhowereangryattheUS. TheybelievedtheUS was
responsible ormanyo theirproblems, especiallyeconomic. Once
de eatedbyC alleshewentbacktoC hihuahuaC itywithonlyhismost
loyalgenerals. A termuchdeliberationVillacame torealizethathis
armywasallbut nished. Obreg ntookadvantageo thesituation, o
eringamnestytoVillistas. Thousandso o cersandsoldierstook
theo er, j oiningtherankso C arranzaandObreg n sarmy. Villafed
tothemountains.

VillaandtheUnitedStates
Subsequentlytwomajorincidencestookplace internationalopinionandUSpublicpressure,Wilson
involvingVillaandtheUS.The irstincidentinvolved respondedtothisbrutalattackwithanexpedition
Villistatroops,butnotVillahimsel .On17January ledbyGeneralJohnJ Pershingtopursueandcapture
1916 Villa stroopsstoppedatrainandshot16US Villa.Wilsonasked orCarranza spermission,which
miningengineersandCommanderPabloL pezwho Carranzaneverdeniedorgave,beingcare u ltobalance
wereonboard.Villawasnotpresentbuthewas USrelationswithMexicanpublicopinion.Pershing
publiclyheldaccountable.Thesecondincidentwas andbetween5000to10000men,pursuedVilla or
moresigni icantbecauseitinvolvedVillapersonally almostayear,butnevercaughthim.TheUSattack
andtookplaceonUSsoil.Tryingtosparkan revivedVilla slegacy,allowinghimtoholdtowns
internationalincidenttocausedisorder orCarranza, suchasTorre n.ThisupswinginVilla spopularity
VillaraidedtheNewMexicotowno Columbus.Reasons alarmedCarranzaandheaskedtheUStoleaveMexico.
includedWilson srecognitiono Carranza,aserieso PershingandWilsonobliged,buttheexpeditionhas
lossestoObreg nandbecausehewasbeingcheated donetheoppositetowhatwasintended,hurtingUS
byhisammunitionandgunsuppliers.Balancing MexicorelationsandmakingVillaaspopularasever.

Carranzaaspresident
Carranza was elected president in 1 91 6 and he immediately tried to
structureanewconstitutionwrittenbyregionallyelecteddelegates.
The convention members refected the diversity o interests and people
inMexico. Carranzapresentedthemwithadra to anewconstitution
butitdidnotaddresslandre ormorlabourrights. Carranzaputa
ve- month deadline on the document, hoping the short timeline would
increasethechanceso hisconstitutionaldra tbeingadopted. The
councilignoredCarranza srequestsandinstructionsanddevelopedone
o the most progressive constitutions o its time, addressing land issues,
genderinequality, workers rightsandtheroleo theChurch. Two
parties emerged rom this convention, one supporting Carranza s ideas
andonesidelooselyidenti yingwithObreg n.
DuringCarranza spresidencyhecontinuallystruggledagainstthe
infuenceo Obreg nandmanyo hispolicydecisionsdidnotcomply withthe1 91
7 constitution, losinghimsupportthroughouthistenure

86
2 U N I T 11 : TH E M E XI C AN R E VO LU TI O N 18 7 6 19 4 0

in o ce. He continually opposed agrarian re orm and never settled the

issuesthatorganizedlabourhadexperiencedbe oretherevolution.
Asaresponse, thetradeunionsinthenorthjoined orcesto ormthe
Regional Con ederation o Mexican Workers ( CROM) to ght or better
wagesandconditionsacrossmultipleindustries.
D uring the constitutional talks, Zapata put orward his Mani esto tothe
Nation whichdenouncedC arranzaandreassertedhisPlan
de Ayala. C arranza, tired o this continual nuisance in Morelos, sent
PabloGonz leztoMorelostokillZapata. Hewasunsuccess ul, sohe
setatraptoassassinatehim, whichsucceeded. ThiseliminatedZapata, butC
arranzahadotherproblemstodealwithaswell. Thedi erences thatemerged
romtheconventiondividedrevolutionariesand
politicians, Obreg n spopularityandindependencewasachallenge,
andcaudilloslooking ortheleaderwhocouldgivethemthemost
weredi culttocontrol. Zapatistasinthesouth

The revolution had stirred up political and economic discontent among

citizensandcaudillos. Thenewconstitutionhadgiventhemastructure
toaddresstheissues. Alongwithpoliticalpressure romthepeople, caudillos
Carranza aced competition within his own party. Obreg n resigned as Secretaryo Militaryorpoliticalleaders.
Warin1 91 7 andin1 920ran orpresident.
In the 1 92 0 election C arranza handpicked Ignacio B onillas to ollow TOKdiscussion
him in o ce. B onillas had been Mexico s ambassador to the United
Manyleadersgavespeechesandput
Statesandhadbeeneducatedinthe US aswell. D espitethis, itwas
orward plans in order to communicate
C arranza that still had the infuence to secure the votes. Realizing that Obreg n
their belie s or expectations about the
spopularitywasontherise, accusingC arranzao political
revolution.ExamplesarethePlandeAyala,
corruptionandnotservingthe people o Mexico, C arranzaattempted
PlandeSanLuisPotosi,PlandeGuadalupe,
tounderminethewholeelectionprocess. Obreg nimmediately
PlandeAguaPrietaandPlandeVeracruz.
deliveredthePlandeAguaPrietawith ellowSonoran sPlutarcoElias
C allesandAdol o delaHuerta, callingthe nationtoarmsagainst Thewayinwhichthoughtandexperience
C arranza. Whenthe maj orityo politicalleadersj oinedObreg n iscommunicatedcantrans ormthe
andovertookthe capital, C arranzafedtoVeracruz, where hewould wayinwhichothersshapetheirthought
trytosetupatemporarygovernment. Onthe wayto Veracruzhis andaction.
trainwasheldupandattackedanumbero times, buthe fedon 1 How does language used by the
horseback, makingittonorthernPuebla. Thatnight, 2 1 May1 92 0 , revolutionaries infuence orchange
C arranza was killed while sleeping. Adol o de la Huerta was appointed ourunderstandingo therevolution?
interimpresident romJune toNovembero 1 92 0 . C arranza sdeath
2 Whatroledidlanguageplaythrough
markedtheendo the oldregime; alltherevolutionaryleaders were
thesevariousspeechesandplans
now romadi erentgenerationandtheywantedtoseethe1 91 7
byleadersincreatingorrein orcing
constitutionrealized.
revolutionaryidealsandgoals?

87
 C H AP T E R 2 : T H E R E VO L U T I O N AN D I TS L E AD E R S

Thinkingandknowledgeskills
ATL
Organizethein ormationinthischapterusingthetablebelow.Oncethetablehasbeencompleted,usethein ormationto
analysetheleadersintermso therevolution sgoalsandhowwelltheymetthem.

Madero Villa Zapata Carranza

Leader Family
background politician,
adorero
Benito Ju rez
andwell
educated
Aim(s) OverthrowD az,installanew Toacquireandreturn
governmentthatwilleventually landthatwasusurped by
fxtheeconomicandsocial elite and oreigners
needso thecountry backtoitsoriginal
owner
Issues with His aims at times were
aim(s) contradictoryandmost
o the time non-existent,
likehewasinpermanent
revolutionmode.I Villahad
apoliticalagenda,itwasnot
communicatedwell.
Methods Political ascendancy and when Politicalre ormthrough
thatdidn twork,revolution hisPlandeAyala
supported by revolution
andwar
Outcome Was assassinated
neartheendo the
revolutionbyCarranza s
men.HisPlandeAyala
wasadoptedintothe
constitution o 1917.
Student Credit or starting the revolution,
analysis o butmadesomepivotalmistakes
leader once he ascended to the
presidency. Many o these
mistakescame romhispersonal
aims,whichdidnotalignwiththe
goalsanddesireso thepeople.

88