The Cult of Age in Mass-Society: Alois Riegl's Theory of Conservation

Author(s): Thordis Arrhenius

Source: Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism,
Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 75-81
Published by: University of Minnesota Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25834933 .
Accessed: 26/09/2014 11:08

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

University of Minnesota Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Future
Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation, History, Theory, and Criticism.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ThordisArrhenius jhe Cult of
Age inMass-Society:
Alois Riegl's Theory of Conservation

In "The Modern Cult of Monuments: ItsCharacter and Its

Origin," theAustrian art historian Alois Riegl made an unprece
dented attempt to speculate on the popularization of heritage
inWestern culture.1His 1903 essay remains fascinating as it
predicts the imminentemergence of a ubiquitous admiration
for the old, while putting forwardan intriguingproposal for
how this "cult" of the old would affect the notion of the "mon
ument." Intriguingly,Riegl identifiedage as the clue to the
extension of heritage intomass-culture. Age, signified through
disintegration, manifested itself immediately to the beholder;
no scientific or art historical knowledge was needed to appre
ciate itsvisual qualities.2 Riegl saw this visual directness as
the futurepotential of age ina mass-society directed by
moods and feelings,what he called Stimmung, rather than
rational thinking.A review of Riegl's groundbreaking essay and
its speculations about the monument highlights contradictions
and complexities that stillmark the discourse and practice of
conservation today.
Riegl begins with a definition: "Amonument," he writes,
"in itsoldest and most original sense is a human creation,
erected fora specific purpose of keeping single human deeds
or events alive in the minds of futuregenerations."3 He points
out that the erection and care of such "intentional" commem
orative monuments can be traced back to the beginning of
human culture.And yet, Riegl suggests, these monuments are
no longer central: "When we talk about the modern cult and
preservation of monuments, we are thinkingnot about 'inten
tional' monuments, but about monuments of art and history."4
Riegl notes that even this definition of themonument is too
reductive and does not acknowledge that the concept of an
absolute inviolable canon of art has given way to a modern
relative "art-value."5 Instead, Riegl suggests an importantdis
tinction between "intentional" and "unintentional" monu
ments.

Riegl sees the development of heritage as a phenomenon

closely connected to a perception of history as a movement
trapped in the knowledge thatwhat has been can never be
again: "Everything that has been and is no longerwe call his
torical."6Through this notion of the irreplaceabilityof every
Future Anterior -
Volume 1, Number 1 event - of themortality of culture itself modern man attends
Spring2004 to artifacts leftfroma bygone era. These cult objects consist

75

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ed largelyof "unintentional" monuments. Unintentional in so
faras theywere not erected with the purpose of commemorat
ing any specific event or person, but still monuments in their
irreplaceable value formodern man. With his concept of the
unintentional monument Riegl makes a brutal expansion in
the definition of a monument: "Any artifact, regardless of its
original significance and purpose, can be considered a monu
ment as long as it reveals the passage of a considerable peri
od of time."7

[t is necessary, however, to complicate the notion of age

inorder to grasp the shift from the cult of the "intentional"
monument to the cult of the "unintentional," which, Riegl
argues, characterizes Western history from the Renaissance.
Age is a complex concept; it talks both of identificationand
distance. An intentionalmonument erected to commemorate a
human deed or event always has the purpose of overcoming
distance to refuse the passage of time.With its physical pres
ence, the unintentional monument aims to create a lapse in
time that renders the past present and establishes a transpar
ent connection to the event or the person that the monument
commemorates. The intentionalmonument's primary function,
according to Riegl, is to keep memory alive; to arrest the soft
forgetfulnessof history. For the intentionalmonument, age is
always an obstacle. Indeed the intentionalmonument is
dependent on an ageless appearance to maintain its function
as a memorial; any signs of decay would suggest a diminish
ing interest in the subject whose presence inmemory itgov
erns.

Riegl's concept of the unintentional monument on the

other hand suggests a radically different logic.Where inten
tional monuments always suppress loss through the articula
tion of triumphor martyrdom, the unintentional monuments
leave loss at the center. Not deliberately built as monuments,
they are found in the inflated realm of heritage as "historical
objects" that reject a transparent presence in preference foran
obscured and distant past. Riegl underlines that both the
intentional and the unintentional monument are characterized
by a commemorative value. While the value of the intentional
monument is always conditioned by itsmakers - the monu
ment is cared foras long as the person or event itcommemo
rates is still remembered - the value of the unintentional mon
ument is relative and, as Riegl points out, leftto us to define:
"When we call such works of art 'monuments' it is a subjective
rather than an objective designation."8 This observation is crit
ical, as itdenotes an importantdistinction between the inten
tional and the unintentional monument. While the intentional
monument appears as a trans-historical and almost ubiquitous
phenomenon, the unintentional monument is a datable inven

76

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 tion of theWest, whose origin Riegl traces back to the Italian
Renaissance.9

Riegl notes thatwe define the value of the unintentional

monument through a process of highlyvisually orientated
analysis, bywhich the onlooker constructs the monument.
Riegl abandons the classification of the monuments them
selves, instead identifyingand distinguishing between values
-
applied to them values almost exclusively based on the visu
al effectof the monument upon the beholder.
After summarizing the historical evolution fromthe cult of
the intentionalmonument to the modern cult of unintentional
monuments, Riegl continues by classifying and identifyingthe
differentvalues attributed to the monument. Indoing so, he
speculates how these values determine the conservation of
themonument. Should the monument be reconstructed to
regain its completeness and coherence of formor should itbe
allowed to disintegrate, to returnto nature? Riegl answers this
question by insisting that the answer depends on which value
the monument inquestion has for the beholder. He demon
strates, however, that these values often conflict and demand
differentkinds of conservation strategies for the same object.
Riegl distinguishes three forms of "memory-value" affect
ing the care of the monument: "intentional commemorative
value" (gewollte Erinnerungswert), "historical-value" (his
torischeWert) and "age-value" (Alteswert). The first,inten
tional commemorative-value, only refersto the class of inten
tional monuments; the latter two relate to the class of unin
tentional monuments and are thereforepart of the "modern
cult of monuments." As the scope of memory-value widens the
differentclasses of monuments become contained within each
other. The class of intentionalmonuments includes only those
works recalling a specific moment fromthe past. The monu
ments towhich a historical-value is designated still referto a
specific moment in history,but are unintentional in that the
choice of monuments is leftto our subjective preference. A
monument thatwas originally only an intentionalmonument
can therefore be incorporated into this class if it is defined as
having historical worth. The class of monuments relating to
age-value is even more expansive in its scope. Riegl radically
suggests that any artifact, regardless of itsoriginal signifi
cance and purpose, could gain an age-value defining itas a
monument, as long as it revealed to the onlooker that a con
siderable period of time had passed since itwas new.10
The three formsof memory-value, Riegl's Erinnerungswert,
suggested differentstrategies of restoration. To maintain an
intentional commemorative-value the monument must simply
be maintained in a pristine state. Historical-value demanded a
- the mon
similar negation of age, albeit on differentgrounds

77

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ument must define a precise moment in history. In this case,
the task of restoration is to restore the building to its "origi
nal" state, a requirementwhich risks jeopardizing the monu
ment's validity as an authentic historical document. We can
see here that the complication of conservation emerged with
the notion of historical-value that, in its own attention to
authenticity,would predicate the rise of age-value that, in
turn,would challenge the practice of restoration directed by
historical value. To possess an age-value the monument must
"truthfully"display the changes and evolutions ithad under
gone since its construction. Here, Riegl declares restoration as
fundamentally problematic, reducing it to preventative meas
ures to protect objects from the corrosive forces of nature or
modernization.

According to Riegl's prophecy, age-value is the most mod

ern value and the one thatwould guide the conservation of
the monument in the future.11 He emphasizes, however, that
the all-embracing value of age had yet to come, and that the
battle in conservation he experienced in 19th centuryVienna
was oftenwaged between historical-value and age-value.
Through his careful classification and naming of different
values, Riegl shows not only how differentmemory-values
conflict and demand differentstrategies of conservation, but
also how the memory-values themselves are often antithetical
to what he termed as present-day-values (Gegenwartswerte).
Riegl acknowledges that the monument fulfilledother
purposes relating not only to commemoration, but also to use
and aesthetic enjoyment. He notes that these present-day val
ues are not part of the modern cult of monuments as they
deny the memorial functionof the monument; yet they
impacts the conservation of the monument, so their proper
identification is crucial. He classifies these present-day values
into two main groups: use-value and art-value. The firstgroup
refers to the practical functional performance of the object,
the second to its aesthetic value for the beholder.12The use
value of a monument tends to stand in conflictwith the monu
ment's commemorative-value - both the historical and the
more modern age-value.13While age-value emerges out of the
gradual dissolution of formand color over time, use-value
requires the maintenance of the object. The inherentconflict
between these two values is evident, and informstheway
monumental conservation is viewed.
Riegl's notion of art-value ismore complex and related to
his concept of "Kunstwollen" the idea of a relative and
changing notion of art specific to every historical period. Riegl
claims that to possess art-value itwas necessary that the
object is a discrete entity, revealing no decay of shape and
color.14 InRiegl's schema, art-value does not necessarily con

78

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 flictwith historical-value, even ifthese values are generated
fromdifferentpositions - the first in relation to the present
day value, the other fromthe memory-value of the monument.
The identificationof a historical-value in the monument often
results in the reconstruction of the object as new, with a com
pleteness and integritythat could satisfy an art-value.
Age-value, on the other hand, conflicts stronglywith art
value. It is aging, the process of dissolution into the general
that generated age-value and anything, independent of any
previous aesthetic properties, could gain it. Indeed, a monu
ment appreciated for itsage-value was nothing more than a
catalyst that triggers in the beholder a sense of the lifecycle.
As a result, age-value is not inviolably connected to the
object. As Riegl dramatically expresses: "the object has shrunk
to a necessary evil". Conversely, art-value is closely bound to
the object. To satisfy both art-value and age-value in the same
object is unfeasible: "where the monument's conception,
shape, and color satisfy our modern 'Kunstwollen,' it follows
that this value should not be allowed to diminish in signifi
cance inorder to conform to the expectations of age-value".15
The strongest opposition to age-value, however, iswhat
Riegl terms newness-value (Neuheitswert). Riegl intriguingly
and acutely places newness-value as a subclass to art-value.
He proposes that the new always has an art-value and sug
gests that the new has a specific power inmodern society.
Anyone can appreciate the integrityand purityof the new, and
no education is needed to appreciate its smooth and even
surfaces, Riegl argues, anticipating Siegfried Giedion's studies
of the streamlined in 1950s American Modernism.16 In its
directness, the new is a force in the same way as age ina
mass-society. Yet, the masses' love for the new constitutes the
largest hindrance to a general recognition of age-value: "The
masses have always enjoyed new things ...what is rooted in
-
thousands of years of perception namely the priorityof
- cannot be eliminated ina few decades."17
youth over age
The dichotomy between the attraction of the shiny new
and the emotion foraged structures is central to Riegl's argu
ment in "The Modern Cult of Monuments." For Riegl, writing
on the brink of Modernism, the attraction of the new was
stronger than that of the old. A century later,the situation
appears somewhat reversed; the comfortof the old and famil
iar dominates popular discourse, perhaps most specifically in
the realm of housing and urbanism, whose rhetoricalmost
always refers to the past. Riegl's prophecy that the force of the
old would conquer the masses seems to have been fulfilled.
Riegl, however, saw the power of age as a potential for
the new: the cult of the old would free the new from its histor
ical burden. With trulyModernistic ambition, Riegl wanted to

79

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 break with the historicism of the 19thcentury.18 The new, he
argues, had to gain itsquality specifically by differentiating
itselffromthe old: "the trulymodern work must, in its concept
and detail, recall earlier work as littleas possible."19 Riegl's
age-value places themonument firmlyin the realm of the old,
where it remains isolated fromthe functionalityand use of the
everyday. The old is not to be directly reused, but only to
-
returnto the present in the formof itsotherness as the cult
of the old. The new, conversely, defines its newness by itsvery
coherence with the present and itsoneness with the time.
"The Modern Cult of Monuments" displays the past and
current task of conservation in its fullcomplexity. Riegl's focus
on the cult of the monument rather than on the monuments
themselves is timeless as a deeply original contribution to the
study of the phenomena of conservation and the role of its
objects ina secularized and Capitalist society. Inevitably,some
aspects of Riegl's analysis are bounded by his time and con
text. His identificationof threememory-values based on inten
tion, history and age suggest a historical determinism imbued
with a Utopian desire. Riegl invested the cult of the old with
altruistic dimensions thatwould supersede the egoistic
desires of the individual and the nation. Inhis schema, the
historical process evolved from the cult of the intentional
monument, to the desire to preserve the monument for its his
torical significance to a given culture. This final stage in the
evolution of the cult of monuments would cross national and
social strata. Age, Riegl argues, is a ubiquitous phenomenon
that knows no borders; its expression is accessible to all and
would overcome the nationalistic sentiments of his day.
Riegl's prediction that the cult of intentionalmonuments
as a trace of an archaic traditionwould not survive a modern
notion of history and was to be proved wrong. The World Wars
and totalitarian regimes of the 20thcentury led to the re-affir
mation of the role and use of the intentionalmonument in the
fabrication of national myths. Generally, Riegl's historical
determinism is of historical rather than analytical interest.
"The Modern Cult of Monuments," however, does contain a
valuable legacy. Riegl's identificationof the unintentional
monument as a class remains a fruitfulcategory foranalytical
thinking;while his historical context prevented him fromsee
ing the Euro-centric perspective of his historical schema, his
history of conservation clearly shows that the unintentional
monument was specific toWestern culture.
The internalcontradictions that shift through "The
Modern Cult of Monuments" also reveal intriguingcomplexi
ties thatwiden the notion of the monument. Throughout his
examination of the notion of the monument and its function in
the age of modernity, Riegl maintains that the monument's pri

80

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 mary function is to provoke memories (Erinnerungen). Riegl's
notion of the unintentional monument and his identificationof
the modern age-value suggest that the memory function of the
monument, as well as the verymonument itself,will eventual
lybecome redundant. The intentionalmonument's logic of
duration, expressed in its hard and durable surfaces, had gov
erned the memory of its commissioner. Riegl's record of the
history of conservation reveals on the other hand how the
monument has gradually been transformed froman object
that originally communicated permanence, to an object that
was about fragilityand loss, removed from the present for rea
sons of history and sentiment.

Author biography
Thordis Arrhenius is an architect and researcher. She recently concluded her Ph.D.
thesis "The FragileMonument; on Modernity and Conservation" at the School of
Architecture, KTH, inStockholm where she also co-ordinates and teaches theory
and design in the diploma year. Thordis studied at the School of Architecture in
Stockholm, the Royal Academy School ofArchitecture inCopenhagen, and the
ArchitecturalAssociation Graduate School ofArchitecture in London fromwhich
she holds an MA inHistory and Theory. She has published widely on architecture
{AAFiles, MAMA, Bang, Index ArtMagazine and Nordic Journal of Architectural
Research).

1
Riegl, Alois. "Der moderne Denkmalkultus. SeinWesen und seine Entstehung".
(Vienna: 1903), reprinted inGeorge Dehio, A. Riegl, Konservieren, nicht restauri
eren: Streitschriftenzur Denkmalpflege urn 1900 (Braunschweig-Wiesbaden: Friedr.
Vieweg & Sohn, 1988). English translation: "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its
Character and ItsOrigin, transl. Forster and Ghirardo, Oppositions 25 (Fall 1982):
21-56, French translation: "Le Culte moderne des monuments". Son essence et sa
genese (Paris: Seuil, 1984).
2
"The Modern Cult of Monuments: ItsCharacter and ItsOrigin", op. cit., 24.
3
Riegl, 1. Riegl probably drafted the firstparagraph of the law defining the monu
ment.
*
Riegl, 21.
5
Riegl, 21-23.
6
Riegl, 21.
7
Riegl, 21.
8
Riegl, 24.
9
Riegl, 24-31. See also Franchise Choay, L'allegorie du patrimoine (Paris: Seuil,
1992) 128-131.
10
"The Modern Cult of Monuments: ItsCharacter and ItsOrigin", 0 cit., 24.
"
Riegl, 21-31.
12
This related foremost to architectural buildings but could also include the safety
measures taken in relation to other types monument i.e. the monuments should
not riskdamaging an onlooker (falling stones etc.).
13"The Modern Cult of Monuments: ItsCharacter and Its
Origin", 0 cit., 39-42.
14
KurtW. Forster, "Monument/Memory and the Mortality of Architecture,"
Oppositions 25 (1982): 10.
15"The Modern Cult of Monuments: ItsCharacter and Its
Origin", 0 cit., 24, 48.
16
Riegl, 42. For the reference to Siegfried Giedion see: Siegfried Giedion,
Mechanization Takes Command, a Contribution to Anonymous History. (Oxford:
Oxford UniversityPress, 1948).
17
"The Modern Cult ofMonuments: ItsCharacter and ItsOrigin", 0 cit., 43-44
18
For Riegl's criticism of historicism see: Reynolds, Diana, Graham, "Alois Riegl and
the Politics of Art History: Intellectual Traditions and Austrian Identity in Fin de
Siecle Vienna," PhD dissertation, University of California at San Diego: Ann Arbor
(UMI), 1997.
19"The Modern Cult of Monuments: ItsCharacter and ItsOrigin", 0 cit., 44.

81

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Fri, 26 Sep 2014 11:08:33 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions