Case No.

3
Concept of Torts
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his
love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had,
in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
DAVIDE, JR.,

Facts: Marilou Gonzales, 22 years old, filed with the RTC a complaint , for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. Gashem Shookat Baksh, the
petitioner is an Iranian and an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. On August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year.
Petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to
live with him. She was a virgin before she began living with him.

A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change. He
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Marilou
then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less
than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable.

Petitioner denied Marilou’s allegations in his counterclaim.

RTC ruled in favor of Marilou Gonzales citing Article 21 of the Civil Code. P20,000.00 moral
damages, P3,000.00 atty's fees and P2,000 litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether the breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong.

Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy
for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Art. 2176 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal
system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional
and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs;
it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the Court is in the opinion that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving
of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction. The petitioner could not be held
liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
Case No. 4

"The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful win not render one liable as for a
tort, simply because the unintended effect of such act is to enable or assist another
person to do or accomplish a wrong,"

BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. vs. FIRST FARMERS MILLING CO., INC., ETC.

G.R. No. L-29041 March 24, 1981

MELENCIO-HERRERA

Facts: Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. commenced an action against First Farmers Milling Co. for
creating a sugar central known as the First Farmers Sugar Central. The First Farmers Milling
Co. (FMMC) transferred their quota "A" allotments to their co-defendant First Farmers Milling
Co. (FMMC) and are actually milling their sugar with the said FFMC which illegal transfer has
been made over the vigorous protest and objections of the plaintiff Bacolod-Murcia.

(NB. Medyo magulo po talaga yung facts ng case pero yan na talaga yung simplified version.
Iyong co-defendant ay sarili niya rin.)

Philippine National Bank (PNB) and National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC)
were included as new defendants because they extended loans to defendant sugar mill in the
amount of P12,210,000.00 on June 18, 1965, and P4,000,000.00 on Dec. 14, 1966,
respectively, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said mill, hence, a joint tortfeasor in
the trespass of plaintiff's rights, aggravated by the fact that defendant mill has only a paid up
capital stock of P500,000.00, hence, said loans are far beyond the limits fixed by law.

PNB and NIDC alleged that they have no participation whatsoever either directly or indirectly on
the alleged illegal (transaction) transfers of the defendant planters from the plaintiff to the
defendant mill, and therefore, the defendants PNB and NIDC could not be held liable for any
damage that the plaintiffs alleged to have suffered from the said particular act complained of.

RTC dismissed the claim for damages against PNB and NIDC.

Issue: Whether there is a sufficient cause of action for the claim for damages against PNB and
NIDC.

Held: No. Plaintiff-appellant's allegation "that defendants NIDC and PNB have extended loans
to defendant sugar mill ..., to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said mill, hence, a
joint tortfeasor in the trespass of plaintiff's rights. ..." is, a mere conclusion not warranted by
sufficient facts. What appears from the record is that PNB and NIDC came into the picture in the
ordinary and usual course of its business after the borrowing entity had established itself as
capable of being treated as a new milling district (FFMC is officially designated as Mill District
No. 49) because it could already operate and had its array of adhering planters. "The doing of
an act which is in itself perfectly lawful win not render one liable as for a tort, simply
because the unintended effect of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or
accomplish a wrong,"
Case No. 5

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent court action as specifically provided for in Article 2177.

PORFIRIO P. CINCO vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

Facts: Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by
Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident. Before that, a criminal case was filed
against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determination
of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court.

The City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but it was dismissed citing that suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his
claim for damages in the criminal case

Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action.

Held: Yes. An action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code is
quasi-delictual in character which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal action.

Where the plaintiff made essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault
or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which caused the collision between his automobile
and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages because of the collision; that a direct causal
connection exists between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-
driver and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among others, that they
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a defense peculiar to
actions based on quasi-delict , such action is principally predicated on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual in nature and character.

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict, the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent court action as specifically provided for in Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the
same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may
be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered". The civil action
referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be suspended
after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and not the
civil action based on quasi delict.

The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no
distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to
property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm"
done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to "harm" it is plain that
it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not limited to
personal but also to property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
decision of the city court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal
action is finally terminated.