A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1582 February 28, 2005 investigation stage, as such, any and all incidents will
ANTONIO OCENAR, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ODELON S. MABUTIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In a verified Complaint1 filed before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Antonio Ocenar charges Judge Odelon
S. Mabutin, Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Catbalogan,
Samar, with grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the
law. In support thereof, Ocenar narrates: On 05 November
2002 at 10:30 p.m., Raymund Monsanto was arrested by the
police officers of Catbalogan, Samar, in a buy-bust operation.
Confiscated from him were shabu paraphernalia, money, and
3.8 grams of shabu. A case for violation of Section 5 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against Monsanto who was
held behind bars. Respondent judge conducted the
preliminary investigation of the case which was terminated on
07 January 2003. However, even before the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, respondent judge approved the
motion for bail of Monsanto in the amount of P150,000 on 26
December 2002. A motion to reduce bailbond filed by
Monsanto was again granted by the respondent and bail was
reduced to P120,000; whereupon, accused was released
from prison.
From the point of view of the Complainant, Monsanto is not
entitled to bail and the granting thereof was a violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002) inasmuch as Section 5 provides that the penalty
for the alleged crime is life imprisonment to death.
Complainant submits that the Respondent gave undue favor
to Monsanto because the latter is a grandson of Judge
Sinforiano A. Monsanto who is the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar. In
contrast, in another criminal case (Crim. Case No. Y3-H-330
entitled, People v. Felix Bantugan), likewise for violation of
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9165, the accused therein, Felix
Bantugan, who was arrested in a police buy-bust operation
and caught in possession of 0.06 grams of shabu, was
denied his bail by respondent. In sum, Complainant
challenges the propriety of the grant of bail by the respondent
to the accused Monsanto.
Per 1st indorsement of the OCA dated 23 October
2003,2 respondent judge was required to Comment on the
Complaint.
In his Comment,3 respondent judge takes exception to the
accusation of the complainant stating, first and foremost, that
the instant administrative complaint is not the first time the
Complainant dragged the respondent to an unnecessary suit.
Previously, in OCA I.P.I. No./Adm. Matter No. 99-778- MTJ,
complainant filed against respondent a case for partiality,
incompetence and ignorance of the law which this Court
dismissed for lack of merit in a Resolution dated 05 February
2001.4 Respondent surmised that the first complaint was an
offshoot of a case of which complainant was a party as
judgment-obligor whose assets were subjected to execution
and where respondent presided at the execution stage.
Respondent stated that in view of Monsanto’s application for
bail, the case was heard on 12, 17, 19 and 20 December
2003. While respondent admits that initially there was no
notice given to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP)
of Samar, there was really no irregularity of procedure taken
inasmuch as clarificatory hearings (i.e., cases for preliminary
investigations) are heard without the appearance of the
prosecutor considering that the MTC and the prosecutor’s
office are on equal footing in conducting preliminary
investigations. Respondent points out that on 12 December
2002, during the initial hearing of Monsanto’s application for
admission to bail, it was Judge Salvador Jakosalem - as
Presiding Judge designate – who presided over the case as
he (respondent) was on leave. As the Order 5 of the Court on
that day would bear out, Police Senior Inspector Joseph N.
Pensotes, representing the prosecution, sought for and was
granted additional time to consult the OPP which has control
and supervision over the prosecution of the case. At the next
hearing on 17 December 2002, respondent informed the
prosecutor assigned to the court, Prosecutor Dhida L. Lim,
regarding Monsanto’s application for bail. Lim merely stated
that she would not appear and intervene in the application for
bail because the case was only in the preliminary
ultimately be subject to their review in the OPP.1awphi1.nét
On the authority of the respondent to grant bail, he cites Rule
114, Sections 4 and 17(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to justify his action.
On the charge of partiality due to the grant of bail to
Monsanto and the denial of bail to Bantugan, the reason
proffered by respondent is simply because no bail was
applied for by Bantugan. The fact of non-application for bail is
attested by a certification, to that effort issued by Mr. Alfredo
Bardaje, Administrative Officer III of the OPP of Samar. 6
Relative to the allegation that he is a protégé of Judge
Monsanto, respondent denies the same and instead claims
that he comes from another town in Samar, Sta. Margarita,
while Judge Monsanto hails from Calbayog City. He never
had any dealings with Judge Monsanto except on a purely
professional basis such as when "he had to go to Judge
Monsanto’s office to research, the IBP officers induction, their
attendance in judge’s seminars, Christmas party of the trial
court, encounters during town fiestas, and the blow-out of
Judge Monsanto when he was chosen as centennial judge
for Region VIII." Other than those instances, there was never
any time where respondent dealt with Judge Monsanto
personally. Neither have they asked any favors from one
another and certainly not in the criminal case involving the
accused Monsanto.
Referred to the OCA, the OCA recommended that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.7
We concur in the recommendation of the OCA.
Evidence for the prosecution presented during the hearings
conducted for the purpose of determining accused
Monsanto’s right to bail shows that on 05 November 2002,
accused Monsanto was arrested at Purok 1, Barangay 13,
Catbalogan, Samar, in a buy-bust operation. Recovered from
him were one (1) piece heat sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance locally known
as shabu weighing more or less 4.0 grams and buy-bust
money of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P7,500).8 A
complaint dated 06 November 2002 for violation of Sections
5 and 15 both of Rep. Act No. 9165, The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, specifically for illegal sale and
use of dangerous drugs was filed against accused Monsanto
before the MTC where respondent judge is presiding. 9 On 02
December 2002, accused Monsanto, through counsel, filed
an application for admission to bail. 10 As earlier stated, the
preliminary hearing on the application for admission to bail
took place on 12 December 2002 where a judge-designate,
Judge Salvador P. Jakosalem presided owing to the absence
of the respondent. A subsequent hearing was held on 17
December 2002 where Prosecutor Dhida L. Lim manifested
that she would not intervene in the application for bail
considering that the case is only in the preliminary
investigation stage and the same would ultimately be subject
to their review.11 Another hearing was held on 19 December
2002 where the services of Atty. Jorge L. Almaden, a lawyer
from the Philippine National Police Regional Legal Services,
appeared for the prosecution, engaged by Inspector
Pensotes, team leader of the group that conducted the buy-
bust operation on Monsanto.12 Atty. Almaden appeared
during the hearings and presented evidence for the
prosecution.
In Te v. Perez,13 this Court held:
. . . We reiterate the following duties of judges in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of
the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt
of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court
to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |1
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the
bail should be denied.14
Restated in the more recent case of Managuelod v. Judge
Paclibon, Jr.:15
The duties of a judge, in case an application for bail is filed,
are to: (1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing on the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation; (2) conduct a hearing on the application for
bail whether or not the prosecution presents evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong, to enable the
court to exercise its discretion; (3) decide whether the
evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (4) if the guilt of
the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond.
Applying the foregoing, this Court finds that Respondent has
more than sufficiently complied with the requirements of the
law before his approval of the bail application of accused
Monsanto, negating a charge that he was remiss in his duty.
Clearly, the prosecutor assigned to the court to appear in
behalf of the People was notified of the hearing on the
application for bail and directed to make a recommendation.
The bail application was heard on different occasions before
the same was granted. The Order allowing the accused to be
released on bail on the ground that the evidence of his guilt
was not strong was based on and contained a summary of
the evidence of the prosecution as required by the law.
Conspicuously, the recommendation of the respondent was
in fact upheld by the reviewing prosecutors, Edilberto G.
Morales and Manuel F. Torrevillas, Jr., Provincial
Prosecutors of Samar, who made a review resolution without
questioning the grant of bail to the accused by the
respondent.16 1awphi1.nét
On the authority of the respondent to grant bail, the long
settled rule is that a municipal judge conducting a preliminary
investigation of a person in custody and charged with a
capital offense has the authority to grant bail. 17Rule 114,
Section 17 of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provides:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. – (a) Bail in the amount fixed may
be filed with the court where the case is pending, or in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any
regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may
also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of said place, or if
no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial
judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
In sum, the acts of respondent judge were all in accordance
with law and settled jurisprudence.l^vvphi1.net
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving the allegations in his complaint with
substantial evidence,18 i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion.19 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a
judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his functions.20
While it is our duty to investigate and determine the truth
behind every matter in complaints against judges and other
court personnel, it is also our duty to see to it that they are
protected and exonerated from baseless administrative
charges. The Court will not shirk from its responsibility of
imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.21
WHEREFORE, the Complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 February 28, 2006
TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This resolves the Memorandum/Supplement to the
Manifestation of respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis
seeking for a reinvestigation of the administrative case filed
against her and to be allowed to present additional evidence
thereto.
In the Court’s Decision dated September 20, 2005,
respondent judge was found guilty of gross misconduct,
suspended from office for six months without salary and other
benefits and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The record shows that the case was initially referred to
Executive Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City for investigation, report and
recommendation in a Resolution dated August 02, 2004. 1
In compliance with the foregoing directive, the Investigating
Judge submitted the Report dated November 18, 20042with
the recommendation that respondent judge be fined
P20,000.00 or suspended for three months.3
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) concurred with
the findings of the Investigating Judge but recommended that
respondent judge be suspended for three months.4
Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution dated August 3,
2005 requiring the parties to manifest within five days from
notice if they were willing to submit the case for resolution
based on the pleadings filed.5
Subsequently, the Court issued a Resolution dated
September 14, 20056 where it resolved to re-docket the case
as a regular administrative case; and dispense with the
manifestations of both parties submitting the case for
resolution based on the pleadings filed.
On September 20, 2005, the Court promulgated its
Decision7 finding respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct
and suspending her from office for six months.
It appears from the record8 that even before her receipt of a
copy of the above-mentioned judgment, the same had been
downloaded from the web site of the Court and disseminated
to the local media. Indeed, respondent judge was apprised by
her staff that her six-month suspension was bannered by the
Freeman, a local newspaper, in its September 23, 2005
issue.9 The Banat News, a sister publication of the Freeman
published in the local dialect likewise made reference to the
decision and called for respondent’s ouster from the judiciary
in its September 24, 2005 issue.10 These publications
compelled respondent to send a letter addressed to the Clerk
of Court of the First Division requesting for a certified true
copy of the judgment.11
In the afternoon of September 28, 2005, respondent judge
received a copy of the Resolution dated August 3,
200512 requiring the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution based on the
pleadings filed. This led respondent judge to conclude that
the case had not yet been resolved and the judgment
promulgated, thus, she filed a Manifestation on the same
date13 praying for a reinvestigation and to be allowed to
adduce evidence thereat.14
On October 7, 2005,15 the Court received a copy of
respondent’s Memorandum/Supplement to the
Manifestation16dated October 3, 2005 explaining in detail her
reasons for seeking a reinvestigation.
It must be stressed that the essence of due process in
administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one’s
side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.17 Owing to the foregoing confluence of events
aggravated by the delay in our postal system, the Court is
inclined to grant the request of respondent judge.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |2
In an administrative case, if the respondent judge must be
disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the
evidence against the miscreant magistrate should be
competent and should be derived from direct
knowledge.18The Judiciary to which the respondent belongs
demands no less. Before any of its members could be
faulted, it should only be after due investigation and after
presentation of the required quantum of evidence especially
because the charge is punitive by nature. 19
Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must be
examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential
effects are by nature penal in character, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal,
disbarment, or suspension. As champion – at other times
tormentor – of trial and appellate judges, this Court must be
unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of unscrupulous
magistrates, but it must also be quick in dismissing
administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than
to harass them.20
It has been said "[t]he wheels of justice would run smoothly
not only if the judiciary is purged of the debilitating presence
of recreant judges, but also importantly, if the members who
perform their functions conscientiously are not hampered by
groundless and vexatious charges. In its attempt to cleanse
the Aegean stables, so to speak, this Court must tread on
with utmost circumspection and prudence to make sure that
only the guilty is denounced and the innocent absolved."21 It
must be stressed in this regard that in cases where the
charges involved are misconduct in office, willful neglect,
corruption or incompetency, the general rules as to
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply and the
culpability of the respondent should be established beyond
reasonable doubt.22
Thus, as in criminal cases where the dictates of due process
is observed with utmost stringence, the respondent judge in
this administrative complaint should likewise be given full
opportunity upon reasonable notice23 to defend herself and to
adduce evidence in support thereof for the Court will not
allow itself to be an instrument that would destroy the
reputation of any member of the bench by pronouncing guilt
on the basis of incomplete evidence or mere speculation. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion of
respondent Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 4, Cebu City for a reinvestigation of the
above-captioned case is GRANTED. The records of the case
are ordered REMANDED to the Office of the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2361 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4144-
RTJ], February 02, 2016
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
v. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSEPH CEDRICK O. RUIZ,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, MAKATI
CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is the administrative complaint filed by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) against respondent Judge
Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Makati City.
This administrative case traces its roots to the Informations
for violation of Section 3(e)1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
and malversation of public funds2 filed by the People of the
Philippines against the respondent judge before the
Sandiganbayan. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 27467-68.
The Informations essentially alleged that the respondent,
then the City Mayor of Dapitan City, had conspired with
Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Pepe Nortal to facilitate the latter's
withdrawal of P1 million from the Confidential and Intelligence
Fund (CIF) and, thereafter, used this amount for his (the
respondent's) personal benefit.
In its decision3 dated April 29, 2013, the Sandiganbayan's
First Division found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes charged.
The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution successfully
proved that the respondent "instigated" Nortal's withdrawal of
a P1 million cash advance from the CIF allotted for the
Mayor's Office, and that he (the respondent) received and
used this amount for his personal benefit. The court found
that the respondent directed Nortal's request for the cash
advance because he (the respondent) already had four (4)
unliquidated cash advances as of December 31, 2006, and
that three of these cash advances (with a total of PI,3
84,280.00) already came from the CIF. The testimonies of
the city treasurer, the city accountant, and the city budget
officer supported the conclusion that the respondent actively
worked for the approval of the P1 million cash advance.
The Sandiganbayan also found that the respondent acted in
bad faith since the cash advance was made five (5) days
after he had lost his bid for re-election, and that the proposed
withdrawal covered the CIF appropriations for the entire year.
The court likewise found no merit in the respondent's defense
of denial.
The Sandiganbayan accordingly imposed the following
penalties on the respondent: (a) the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to eight (8)
years, as maximum, in Criminal Case No. 27467 for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019; (b) the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal minimum, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as maximum, in
Criminal Case No. 27468 for malversation; and (c) perpetual
special disqualification. The court also ordered him to pay a
P950,000.00 fine; and P950,000.00 as indemnity to the City
of Dapitan.
The respondent moved for the reconsideration of the
judgment of conviction and likewise moved for a new trial, but
the Sandiganbayan denied these motions in its resolution 4 of
August 28, 2013.
The OCA received a copy of the Sandiganbayan's April 29,
2013 decision in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468, and
in its Report5 of October 4, 2013, made the following
recommendations:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this
Honorable Court are the following recommendations:
1. that the instant report be considered a formal
complaint against Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz, Presiding Judge,
Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, for conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude and that the same be RE-
DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
2. that Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz
be FURNISHED a copy of this report and that he be required
to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice; and
3. that Judge Joseph Cedrick O. Ruiz
be SUSPENDED without pay and other monetary benefits
effective immediately from his receipt of this Court's
resolution, pending resolution of the instant administrative
matter, or until lifted by this Honorable Court. 6
x x x x (emphasis in the original)
The OCA reasoned out that conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude is classified as a serious charge under
Section 8(b) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It likewise
explained that the Court's power to preventively suspend
judges, although not clearly -delineated under Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, is inherent in its power of administrative
supervision over all courts and their personnel, and that a
judge can be preventively suspended until a final decision is
reached in an administrative case against him,.
The records also showed that on October 18, 2013, the
respondent filed with this Court a petition for review
on certiorari assailing his convictions by the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468. This case was
docketed as G.R. Nos. 209073-74.7
In its November 20, 2013 minute resolution,8 the Court's
Third Division resolved: (1) to re-docket the OCA report dated
October 4, 2013, as a regular administrative matter, and to
consider it as a formal complaint against the respondent for
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |3
having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) to furnish the respondent a copy of the OCA's Report, and
to require him to file a comment; and (3) to suspend the
respondent from office without pay and other monetary
benefits, effective immediately from his receipt of "this Court's
Resolution, pending resolution of the instant administrative
matter, or until lifted by this Court."
In his comment dated January. 24, 2014, the respondent
posited that the administrative complaint against him is
premature because his Sandiganbayan convictions in
Criminal Case Nos. 27467 and 27468 are not yet final. The
respondent also stated that he went on leave of absence
after his Sandiganbayan conviction, and had submitted his
application for optional retirement on May 27, 2013 (to take
effect on December 31, 2013). The respondent thus argued
that there was no more need to suspend him from office
because he should be considered already retired from
government service" when he received on January 9, 2014, a
copy of the Court's November 20, 2013 Resolution.
THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to dismiss the respondent from the service he
has dishonored and to bar him from the ranks of legal
professionals whose standards he has likewise transgressed.
I. The Court's disciplinary powers over justices and judges
We find no merit in the respondent's claim that the present
administrative case against him is premature because his
criminal convictions by the Sandiganbayan are not yet final.
Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
their personnel. This grant empowers the Supreme Court to
oversee the judges' and court personnel's administrative
compliance with all laws, rules, and regulations, 9 and to take
administrative actions against them if they violate these legal
norms.10
In the exercise of this power, the Court has promulgated
rules of procedure in the discipline of judges. Section 1, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A. M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of
Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a
verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon
an anonymous complaint, supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for
Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct.cralawlawlibrary
Based on this rule, disciplinary proceedings against sitting
judges and justices may be instituted: (a) motu proprio, by
the Court itself; (b) upon verified complaint, supported by
the affidavits of persons with personal knowledge of the facts
alleged, or by documents substantiating the allegations; or (c)
upon anonymous complaint supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.11
It was pursuant to this power that the Court - on its own
initiative -ordered the re-docketing of the OCA's report as a
formal complaint against the respondent and as a regular
administrative matter for the Court's consideration.
The Court likewise possesses the power to preventively
suspend an administratively charged judge until a final
decision is reached, particularly when a serious charge is
involved and a strong likelihood of guilt exists. This power is
inherent in the Court's power of administrative supervision
over all courts and their personnel as a measure to allow
unhampered formal investigation. It is likewise a preventive
measure to shield the public from any further damage that
the continued exercise by the judge of the functions of his
office may cause.
In the present case, we placed the respondent under
preventive suspension because he is alleged to have
committed transgressions that are classified as serious under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as
determined by a competent court in an appropriate
proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and
litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits, (emphasis
supplied)
The respondent's convictions by the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for
malversation of public funds confirm that the administrative
charges for which he may be found liable are serious charges
under Section 8(2) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Malversation is likewise considered as a serious
charge since it is a crime involving moral turpitude.
While the term moral turpitude does not have one specific
definition that lends itself to easy and ready application,12 it
has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or the
depravity in the performance of private and social duties that
man owes to his fellow man or to society in general. 13
Notably, jurisprudence has categorized the following acts as
crimes involving moral turpitude: abduction with consent,
bigamy, concubinage, smuggling, rape, attempted bribery,
profiteering, robbery, murder, estafa, theft, illicit sexual
relations with a fellow worker, violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, intriguing against honor, violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, perjury, forgery,
direct bribery, frustrated homicide, adultery, arson, evasion of
income tax, barratry, blackmail, bribery, duelling,
embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent
proof of loss on insurance contract, mutilation of public
records, fabrication of evidence, offenses against pension
laws, perjury, seduction under the promise of marriage,
estafa, falsification of public document, and estafa thru
falsification of public document.
To our mind, malversation - considering its nature - should
not be categorized any differently from the above listed
crimes. The act of embezzling public funds or property is
immoral in itself; it is a conduct clearly contrary to the
accepted standards of justice, honesty, and good morals. 14
The preventive suspension we impose pending investigation
is not a penalty but serves only as a preventive measure as
we explained above. Because it is not a penalty, its
imposition does not violate the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent. It also matters not that the offenses for
which the respondent had been convicted were committed in
2001 when he was still the Mayor of Dapitan City. 15As
explained below, it is likewise immaterial that his criminal
convictions by the Sandiganbayan are still on appeal with this
Court.
Optional early retirement
The records show that the respondent wrote the Court a
letter on May 27, 2013 (or soon after his Sandiganbayan
convictions), requesting that he "be allowed to optionally
retire effective November 30, 2013."16 He later requested, in
another letter,17 that the effectivity date of his optional
retirement be changed from November 30, 2013 to
December 31, 2013.
The Court has not acted on the respondent's request for
optional early retirement in view of his standing criminal
convictions; he stands to suffer accessory penalties affecting
his qualification to retire from office should his convictions
stand.18 The OCA records19 also show that he is currently on
"on leave of absence" status. In any case, that a judge has
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |4
retired or has otherwise been separated from the service
does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to rule
on complaints filed while he was still in the service. As we
held in Gallos v. Cordero:20
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of
his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications x x x If innocent, respondent public official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty,
he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the
situation.cralawlawlibrary
Nor does separation from office render a pending
administrative charge moot and academic.21
II. Administrative Liability
In the present case, our task is not to determine the
correctness of the Sandiganbayan's ruling in Criminal Case
Nos. 27467-68, a case that is separately pending before us
and which we shall consider under the evidentiary rules and
procedures of our criminal laws.
In the present proceedings, our function is limited to the
determination of whether substantial evidence exists to hold
the respondent administratively liable for acts he is alleged to
have committed while he was still the mayor of Dapitan City.
In this determination, it is immaterial that the respondent was
not yet a member of the Judiciary when he allegedly
committed the acts imputed to him; judges may be disciplined
for acts committed prior to their appointment to the judiciary.
Our Rules itself recognizes this situation, as it provides for
the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary. It need not be shown that the
respondent continued to do the act or acts complained of; it is
sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge/s
against the respondent through proof that the respondent
committed the imputed act/s violative of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.22
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Sardido,23 the
Court definitively ruled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The acts or omissions of a judge may well constitute at the
same time both a criminal act and an administrative offense.
Whether the criminal case against Judge Hurtado relates
to an act committed before or after he became a judge is
of no moment. Neither is it material that an MTC judge will
be trying an RTC judge in the criminal case. A criminal case
against an attorney or judge is distinct and separate from an
administrative case against him. The dismissal of the criminal
case does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case
arising from the same set of facts, x x x (emphases
supplied)cralawlawlibrary
We reiterate that only substantial evidence is required to
support our conclusions in administrative
proceedings.24 Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. The standard of substantial
is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
the respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
of, even if such might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.25 That the respondent committed acts
constituting malversation or violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act should be adjudged in the same
manner that other acts classified as serious charges under
Rule 140 (such as bribery, immorality, gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and partisan political activities) should be
weighed — through substantial evidence.26 Expressed from
the point of view of criminal law, evidence to support a
conviction in a criminal case is not necessary in an
administrative proceeding like the present case.
The Sandiganbayan, in considering the respondent's guilt in
the criminal case before it, gave full probative value to the
testimonies of Fatima Ruda (OlC-City Budget Officer), Jose
R. Torres (OlC-City Treasurer), Glendora Deloria (City
Accountant), and Pepe Nortal (Police Inspector of the
Dapitan City Police). These conclusions and approach do not
mean that we shall not examine, on our own in the present
proceedings, the evidence on record before us.
For purposes of the original administrative proceeding
before us and to fully accord the respondent the due process
owed him in these proceedings, we shall examine all the
evidence adduced and apply to these pieces of evidence the
substantial evidence rule that the present proceedings
require. This approach is only proper, as the present
proceeding is not an appeal from the Sandiganbayan ruling
but is an original one for purposes of establishing or negating
the claimed administrative liability on the part of the
respondent.
What do the evidence on record show?
Torres testified that when his office received a Request for
Obligation Allotment (ROA)27 and a Disbursement Voucher
(DV)28 on May 16, 2001, for a P1 million cash advance
payable to Nortal, he immediately sent a letter to the
respondent (through the City Budget Officer) informing him
that he could not accommodate the request because the CIF
appropriation covered the whole of 2001, and that Nortal was
not properly bonded.
On the same day, Torres' letter was returned with the
respondent's handwritten notation asking him to reconsider
his position. Torres eventually signed the ROA after the
respondent prevailed upon him to reconsider,29 although he
still noted his objection to the payment of the claim when he
received the disbursement voucher from the accounting
office, on the belief that the disbursement should only cover
two quarters, not the whole year.
In his affidavit, Torres stated that the CIF could not be
released without the respondent's approval because this fund
was an appropriation under the Office of the City Mayor.
Ruda declared on the witness stand that right after the May
11, 2001 elections, the respondent directed her to release the
whole appropriation (totalling P1 million) for the CIF. Ruda
hesitated to do as told considering that the respondent's term
would end on June 30, 2001, while the amount to be
released corresponded to the appropriation for the entire
2001. Ruda gave in to the respondent's request after the
latter stressed to her that he (respondent) was still the mayor
until the end of June 2001.
In her affidavit, Ruda stated that it was not customary for her
office to release, in the middle of the year, the whole
intelligence fund appropriation for the year.
Deloria testified that when she received a ROA and a DV for
a P1 million CIF cash advance, she informed the respondent
that the amount requested covered the appropriations for the
entire 2001. The respondent informed her that the city
government needed the money badly. Ruda reviewed the
request and found out that the payee, Nortal, had not yet
posted a fidelity bond. The respondent told Ruda that he had
already applied for Nortal's bond.
In her affidavit, Deloria stated that it was the first time that her
office processed a request for funds intended for the entire
year.
Nortal, for his part, narrated that the respondent asked him
on May 16, 2001, to withdraw P1 million from the CIF on his
(respondent's) behalf. Nortal initially refused since he might
not be able to liquidate this amount as the respondent had
lost in the elections. Instead, Nortal suggested that the Chief
of Police be asked to make the withdrawal. The respondent,
however, assured Nortal that one of his men would help him
liquidate the requested amount. Nortal thus yielded to the
respondent's request and proceeded to the City Budget
Office to sign the covering ROA and DV.
Nortal added that the respondent's private secretary picked
him up at his house on May 30, 2001, informing him that the
check of P1 million was already at the Treasurer's Office.
After securing the check, they proceeded to the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Dipolog City to encash it. Thereafter,
they went to the respondent's office where Nortal handed him
the P1 million. Nortal asked the respondent for a receipt, but
the latter refused to issue one; instead, the respondent gave
him P50,000.00 to be used in the city's drug operations.
In his affidavit, Nortal stated that the respondent told him that
he (respondent) could no longer make any cash' advances
since he had unliquidated cash advances.
Leonilo Morales, State Auditor of the City Auditor's Office
from 1997 to 2000, corroborated NortaPs affidavit when he
testified that the respondent had not liquidated his cash
advances from the CIF.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |5
Aside from the testimonies of these witnesses and their
respective affidavits, the records before the Sandiganbayan
are replete with documentary proof showing that the
respondent committed the acts attributed to him. The
respondent failed to refute these pieces of evidence before
the Sandiganbayan or in the comment he filed with this
Court.
The respondent's signature on the following documents
showed that he facilitated Nortal's withdrawal of P1 million
from the CIF: (a) Disbursement Voucher No. 105.0105.3888;
(b) Request for Obligation Allotment; and (c) PNB Check No.
0001097358.
The respondent's signature, as approving officer, on
Disbursement Voucher No. 105.0105.3888, proved that he
authorized the disbursement of a P1 million cash advance "to
defray Confidential and Intelligence Expenses." 30 The
respondent's signature on the ROA also showed that he (and
Nortal) requested P1 million to be used for confidential
expenses. Finally, the respondent's signature on the PNB
check established that he allowed Nortal to withdraw the
requested amount.
Considering that the CIF was an appropriation under the
Mayor's Office, it is unlikely that Nortal would attempt to
withdraw the P1 million CIF cash advance without the
respondent's imprimatur. In other words, Nortal — even if he
wanted to — could not have withdrawn any amount from the
CIF without the approval and authority of the respondent City
Mayor.
That the respondent authorized the withdrawal of the entire
CIF for the year 2001 after he lost in his reelection bid (and
less than two months before the expiration of his term) is
indicative of his bad faith. We note that several of the city's
financial officers, no less, made known to him their objections
to the request due to its patent irregularity.
Indeed, if the request for cash advance request had been
legitimate, there would have been no need for Nortal's
intervention in effecting a withdrawal as the respondent was
the City Mayor and the CIF was a fund under his office. This
reality validates Nortal's claim that the respondent could no
longer withdraw from the CIF because he already had
existing unliquidated advances.
Significantly, the records show that the withdrawn amount
was never liquidated as shown by the Commission on Audit's
schedule of unliquidated cash advances as of January 31,
2013. No evidence also exists showing that the withdrawn
fund had been used for its intended purposes, i.e., for
confidential or intelligence activities.
Viewed against the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses, which are supported by the documents on record,
the respondent's denial cannot stand. The respondent even
failed to substantiate his claim that the charges against him
had been politically motivated. Thus, by substantial evidence,
we consider it fully established that the respondent actively
worked for the approval of the P1 million cash advance from
the CIF; that he facilitated the withdrawal of the P1 million by
Nortal; and that he received and used this withdrawn amount
for his personal benefit.
III. The Appropriate Penalty
Section 11 of Rule 140, as amended, states that [i]f the
respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed: (a) dismissal from the service,
forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations; (b) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not
exceeding six months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's
transgressions, we find the imposition of the supreme
administrative penalty of dismissal to be appropriate. The
people's confidence in the judicial system is founded not only
on the competence and diligence of the members of the
bench, but also on their integrity and moral uprightness. 31 We
would violate this standard and unduly tarnish the image of
the Judiciary if we allow the respondent's continued presence
in the bench. We would likewise insult the legal profession if
we allow him to remain within the ranks of legal
professionals.
We emphasize that judges should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence, and their conduct
should be above reproach. They must adhere to exacting
standards of morality, decency, and probity. A magistrate is
judged, not only by his official acts, but also by his
private morality and actions. Our people can only look up
to him as an upright man worthy of judging his fellow citizens'
acts if he is both qualified and proficient in law, and equipped
with the morality that qualifies him for that higher plane that
standing as a judge entails.
In Conrado Abe Lopez v. Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon,32 we
ruled that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is
no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged
by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have recently explained, a judge's official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. (emphasis ours)cralawlawlibrary
The conduct of judges, official or otherwise, must always be
beyond reproach and must be free from any suspicion
tainting him, his exalted office, and the Judiciary. A conduct,
act,- or-omission repugnant to the standards of public
accountability and which tends to diminish the people's faith
and confidence in the Judiciary, must invariably be handled
with the required resolve through the imposition of the
appropriate sanctions imposed by law33 and by the standards
and penalties applicable to the legal profession.
Administrative Matter No. 02-9-02-SC (which took effect on
October 1, 2002) provides that an administrative case against
a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also
grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the
Bar, shall be considered as disciplinary proceedings against
such judge as a member of the Bar. It also states
that judgment in both respects may be incorporated in
one decision or resolution.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other
hand, provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended
from the practice of law, among others, for conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the Supreme
Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.cralawlawlibrary
In Bengco v. Bernardo,34 we ruled that it is not sound judicial
policy to await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon; otherwise,
this Court will be rendered helpless to apply the rules on
admission to, and continuing membership in the legal
profession during the whole period that the criminal case is
pending final disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare and to save courts of justice from persons unfit
to practice law. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court.cralaw-red
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Joseph Cedrick
O. Ruiz is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
with prejudice to reemployment in the Government or any of
its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies including
government-owned and -controlled corporations. As a
consequence of this ruling, Judge Ruiz is likewise
declared DISBARRED and STRICKEN FROM the roll of
attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be (1) attached to the records of
Judge Ruiz with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court
and with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and (2) posted
at the Supreme Court website for the information of the
Bench, the Bar, and the general public.
SO ORDERED.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |6
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY,1respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents
without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint
dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the
disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the
notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly
commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still
subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th
1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to
December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at
the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December
31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after
the expiration of his commission in December 1989.2
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to
order respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him
from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept
any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or
public servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this
administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and
fairness based on the premises.3
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court,
Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, which contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records
found and available in this office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly
commissioned notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports,
Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in the
ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b February to April 1980 report - was submitted on
June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of
submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of
submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of
submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20,
1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20,
1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial
documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after
December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission
issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988 until
December 31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge
categorically denied the charges against him. He also
submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-
Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well
as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register. The
respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents
notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to
raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case
No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus
Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for
Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City,
wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned
resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs. 6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator
recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation
to determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court,
in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b)
refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the
Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1,
2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held at
Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request
but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter was
forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a
Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The complainant presented
his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of
Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |7
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May
22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by
(a) notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in
submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his
notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his
commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be
suspended from the practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his
present commission, if any, be revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not
adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant
presented documentary evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification.
He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of
the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." And,
as already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly
on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983
(assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of
notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there
were only two Record Books available in the notarial section"
of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and
that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission
contains items on the Name, Date Commission was issued
and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry
appearing was made on December 1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the
"first book" would disclose so (at least, for the years 1982
and 1983). However, he did not present said book. Neither
did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he
was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did not
submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under
Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be
prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the
Office of the Solicitor General, together with the oath of office
of the notary public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the
evidence presented by the complainant, that the respondent
notarized documents in 1980 and 1983 without being
commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that
his earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984. 12
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant
complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are
based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized
as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and
disbarment cases against members of the bar who were
likewise members of the court were treated separately. Thus,
pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and
lawyers in the government service may be automatically
treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took
effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall
supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the
respondents have not yet been required to comment on the
complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing
resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment
on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases
Involving A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He Was
Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a
retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment;
and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were
committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer,
before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent
is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is
charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing documents
without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment
and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court
motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service: Provided, however, That all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them,
shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That
charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior to their appointment to the
Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication. 14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with
Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the
Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall
proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted
directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court
designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced
at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations together with the record and all the
evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of
the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment
is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the
IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court,
on which the Court will thereafter base its final action. 15
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |8
Although the respondent has already retired from the
judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as
such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme
Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 616of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As
such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the
Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the
Court of Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall
be filed with the Supreme Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the
Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary
authority over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v.
Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of
his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent public official innocent of the charges or
declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the
government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty,
he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a
penalty proper and imposable under the situation. 19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of unfounded or
malicious administrative or criminal cases against members
of the judiciary for purposes of harassment," we issued A.M.
No. 03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3, 2003. It
reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the
Court Administrator, an administrative complaint against any
Justice of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any
Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in
court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and
intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
included in the report and recommendation of the Office of
the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved
or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.
If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be required to
show cause why he or she should not be administratively
sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the
court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the
compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an
alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to
harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the Court
Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment
within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit
to the Court a report and recommendation not later than 30
days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of
the respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6)
months from such date without prejudice to the release of the
retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order
to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a
retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have
been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement
of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have
occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown
that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21,
2001 was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily
from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002.
Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action
alleged to have been committed by the respondent did not
occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the
service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and
intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore,
the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing
resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed
prior to his appointment to the judiciary. 22 In fact, even the
new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for the
immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition
and adjudication of charges against justices and judges
before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment
to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the respondent
continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is
sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on
the respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent
judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the
respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while
he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein
refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands,
and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a
judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the
respondent’s subsequent appointment as a judge will not
exculpate him from taking responsibility for the
consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of
prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged
with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated,
thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since
he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he
could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall again in
that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A
lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate
knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for
that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times
be free from the appearance of impropriety. ... 27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to
prove the charges by substantial evidence. 28 The
complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the
respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing
lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that the
latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being appointed
to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this
case because the complainant failed to present evidence that
the indiscretion continued even after the respondent was
appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The
Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this
Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal
profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys,
which authority is not only a right but a bounden duty as well.
This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of
its members.30
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If Not The Crime Of
Falsification Of Public Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public.31Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public one, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution.32
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |9
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary
public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.33 The
Court has characterized a lawyer’s act of notarizing
documents without the requisite commission therefore as
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice,
but also the crime of falsification of public documents." 34 For
such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring
lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of
the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as
such, and even disbarment.35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the occasion to
state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member
of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization
or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without
such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey
the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."37
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot,
therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith
in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect
of that function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported By The
Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s formal
offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to
decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed. 39 Neither
did he claim that he was commissioned as notary public for
the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer
that "there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted
Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as
found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented
no evidence of his commission as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial
reports and the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to
answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against
him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member
of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a
party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was
not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be
disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor which include the
statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 13842 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the
court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.
There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to
the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of
the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences. 43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar
Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in
the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice
of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer.
This is because his admission to practice merely creates a
rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to
a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the
leading case of In re Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who by their misconduct have prove[n]
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties
and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.
....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the Court
disregarded the Court Administrator’s recommendation that
the charge for immorality against the respondent be
dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to
adduce evidence that the respondent’s immoral conduct was
still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit conduct,
the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for
falsifying her children’s certificates of live birth to show that
her paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was
filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit
affair ended.50 The Court held that administrative offenses do
not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion
than that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer
who was thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only
after twenty-four years after the offending act was committed,
is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise,
members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the
very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that
as long as no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s
Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering
the seriousness of the matter involved - the respondent’s
dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the administrative
culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the
requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The Administrative
Case Would Merely Mitigate The Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing
is expected and required of a member of the bar. 52 By his
actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such
standards;53 he undermined the confidence of the public on
notarial documents and thereby breached Canon I of the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |10
Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers
to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. The
respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.54 In representing that he was possessed of
the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer
that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls
for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end.55 Furthermore, a
tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering
that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-
four years after the commission of the act complained
of;56 that there was no private offended party who came
forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the
documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that
the respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the
full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.57 The
Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is
found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay
a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., join Mr. Justice J. C. Vitug in his separate
opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in the Result)
VITUG, J.:
Allow me to express, very briefly, my views on the various
scenarios appurtenant to the subject of inquiry.
In A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, respondent Judge, now retired,
has been charged on 21 March 2001, while still an incumbent
judge, with having transgressed, prior to his appointment to
the judiciary, the Notarial Law.
A. Exceptionally, a judge may be held administratively
accountable for acts committed before his appointment
to the Judiciary.
Generally, a judge is not made to account administratively for
acts committed prior to his appointment. In Sevilla v
Salubre,1 respondent judge was charged with
misappropriating for his own benefit money entrusted to him
by his client while he was still a practicing lawyer. He,
however, continued to ignore, even after his appointment in
the judiciary, his previous client’s demand for restitution. The
Court explained: “Being the visible representation of law, and
more importantly, of justice, the people see in the respondent
the intermediary of justice between two conflicting interests. If
while still in active litigation practice lawyers do not know how
to (so) uphold this kind of justice to their clients previous to
their appointment as Judges, how then could people expect
them to render judgments in the cases before them?” In the
earlier case of Alfonso v. Juanson2 where respondent judge
was simply admonished for “appearance of impropriety,” the
Court said that he could not be disciplined for immoral acts
committed prior to his appointment in the judiciary absent
showing that he continued to engage in these acts after his
appointment.
B. The retirement or resignation of a judge could
preclude the filing thereafter of an administrative charge
against him for an infraction committed during his
incumbency.
The filing of an administrative proceeding against a judge is
predicated on the holding of his office or position in the
judiciary; thus, his resignation or retirement from office could
bar an administrative case3 from being initiated. An
administrative charge already pending upon resignation or
retirement is not necessarily rendered moot since the penalty
that can still be imposed, if the respondent is found guilty,
goes beyond just dismissal from the service. Noteworthy is
A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which provides that if a complaint
against a judge is filed within six months before his
compulsory retirement for an alleged infraction occurring at
least a year before such filing, and shown prima facie to be
intended to harass the judge, the complaint must forthwith be
recommended for dismissal.
C. A judge, already retired, may, but only under certain
conditions, be subject to disciplinary action for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.
A judge, already retired, may yet be subject to disciplinary
sanction for an act committed prior to his appointment in the
judiciary if (a) the judge has persisted, even after his
appointment to the judiciary, in his assailed act, and (b) the
administrative charge is filed while still an incumbent in the
judiciary.
D. If, such as in the instant administrative case, the two
conditions, above, are not shown, respondent judge may
still be disciplinarily dealt with for his misconduct not as
a judge but as a lawyer.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui generis;
neither purely civil nor purely criminal. It is not - and it does
not involve - a trial of an action or a suit; it is rather an
investigation into the conduct of an officer of the court. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor. Interest in the service of the profession is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney may still be a fit person to
continue enjoying his privileges as such.4 It may thus be
concluded that the administrative complaint can still be
pursued.
While the cause of action does not prescribe, it is to be
assumed, however, that the complaint must be filed within a
reasonable time. What may or may not be a reasonable time
is determined by circumstances peculiar and pertinent to the
case.5 The administrative charge for alleged violation of the
Notarial Law in this instance is said to have been committed
more than twenty years ago by respondent judge prior to his
appointment in the judiciary, filed several years after that
appointment and just about a year prior to his retirement. No
specific injury or damage has been shown for the alleged
violation. The circumstances are enough, in my view, to
warrant the dismissal of the complaint, and I so vote.
A.M. No. P-97-1247 May 14, 1997
(Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I.1 No. 95-71-P)
NARITA RABE, complainant,
vs.
DELSA M. FLORES, Interpreter III, RTC, Branch IV,
Panabo, Davao, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In an administrative complaint for "Conduct Unbecoming a
Government Employee, Acts Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Service and Abuse of Authority" dated August 18, 1995,
Complainant Narita Rabe, 2 by counsel, charged Respondent
Delsa M. Flores, Interpreter III at the Regional Trial Court,
Branch IV, Panabo, Davao, as follows: 3
(Mrs.) Flores took advantage of her position as a court
employee by claiming a stall at the extension of the Public
(sic) Market when she is (sic) not a member of our client's
association and was never a party to Civil Case No. 89-23.
She herself knows (sic) that the stalls in the said area had
already been awarded to our client's members pursuant to
the decision of the court on October 30, 1991. Worse, she
took the law into her hands when she destroyed the stall of
our client and brought the materials to the police station of
Panabo, Davao.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |11
After respondent filed her answer, the Court issued a
Resolution dated January 17, 1996, absolving her of the
charge. In the same resolution, however, the Court required
respondent to explain why she should no be administratively
dealt with for the following: 4
. . . a) why she obtained a certification dated June 18, 1991
issued by Atty. Victor R. Ginete, Clerk of Court, same court,
that she started performing her duties as (an) interpreter on
May 16, 1991 when (1) according to a certification dated
June 17, 1991 issued by Mr. Jose B. Avenido, Municipal
Treasurer, Panabo Davao, she was employed in the office of
the Municipal Assessor as Assessment Clerk I since
February 1, 1990 to June 3, 1991 with her last salary being
paid by said office on June 3, 1991; and (2) she took her oath
of office before Judge Mariano C. Tupas only on June 17,
1991;
b) why she did not report said business interest in her sworn
statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections, and
Identification of Relatives in the Government Service for the
years 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994;
c) why she has not divested herself of her interest in said
business within sixty (60) days from her assumption into (sic)
office; and
d) why she has indicated in her DTRs for August 1995 that
she worked on August 15-18, 21, 23-25 and 28-31 and fore
September, 1995 that she worked for all its twenty one (21)
working days when her Contract of Lease with the Municipal
Government of Panabo for the market stall in its Section 7
clearly states that she has to personally conduct her business
and be present at the stall otherwise the same would be
canceled as per its Section 13.
Respondent Flores, in a letter dated February 13, 1996,
explains that, as stated in the certification of Atty. Ginete, she
assumed her job in the Regional Trial Court, Branch IV,
Panabo, Davao on May 16, 1991, in compliance with the
directive from this Court for her to start working on the said
date. Respondent further states that "even prior to said date
(May 16, 1991)" she already reported to the court in order to
familiarize herself with the scope of her duties. 5
Respondent Flores also admits that she had received from
the municipality a salary for the period May 16 1991 — May
31, 1991, notwithstanding her transfer to the judiciary on May
16, 1991. She submits, however, the following justification: 6
I admit that I received my last salary in the amount of One
Thousand and 80/100 (P1,000.80) Pesos from the Local
Government Unit from May 16-31, 1991 but farthest from my
mind is the intent to defraud the government. It was my
desire all the time to refund the amount the moment my
salary is received from the Supreme Court, unfortunately
more often than not (the salary) is received three or four
months after assumption of office.
As we all know the month of May and June is the time we
enroll our children in school thus the money I got that month
from the Local Government Unit came handy in defraying
registration expenses of my four children. The passage of
time coupled with some intervening events, made me
oblivious of my obligation to refund the money. However,
when my attention was called on the day I received the copy
of the resolution, I took no time in refunding the same.
Respondent alleges that the certification of Municipal
Treasurer Jose V. Avenido is inaccurate because it was on
January 25, 1990 that she was appointed as Assessment
Clerk I. 7 According to respondent, she took her oath on June
17, 1991, simply because it was on that date that she
received a copy of her oath form. 8
Respondent avers that she did not divulge any business
interest in her Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Financial Disclosure for the years 1991-1994 because she
"was never engaged in business during said period although
I had a stall in the market." 9
Respondent further avers that her Daily Time Record
indicated that she held office on August 15, 18, 21, 23 to 25
and 28, 31 and all the working days of September, 1995
"because in truth and in fact . . . (she) did hold office on those
days." This was because her contract of lease with the
Municipal Government of Panabo was never implemented as
it became the subject of "Civil Case No. 95-53 — Panabo
Public Market Vendors Assn. Inc. and Pag-ibig Ng Gulayan
Ass. Inc. Vs. Municipality of Panabo, et. al., for Declaration of
Nullity of Mun. Ord. No. XLV, Series of 1994." 10
The Court referred the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In
its report, the OCA found respondent guilty of dishonesty and
failure to report her business interest, and recommended that
the penalty of dismissal be imposed on her. The Court finds
that the report and recommendation of the OCA is in accord
with the evidence and the law. We hold the explanation of
respondent unsatisfactory. Respondent's misconduct is
evident from the records.
By her own admission, respondent had collected her salary
from the Municipality of Panabo for the period of May 16-31,
1991, when she was already working at the RTC. She knew
that she was no longer entitled to a salary from the municipal
government, but she took it just the same. She returned the
amount only upon receipt of the Court Resolution dated
January 17, 1996, or more than five (5) years later. We
cannot countenance the same. Respondent's conduct is plain
dishonesty.
Her explanation, as observed earlier, is unsatisfactory. Her
overriding need for money from the municipal government,
aggravated by the alleged delay in the processing of her
initial salary from the Court, does not justify receipt of a
salary not due her. We sympathize with respondent's sad
plight of being the sole breadwinner of her family, with her
husband and parents to feed and children to send to school.
This, however, is not an acceptable excuse for her
misconduct. If poverty and pressing financial need could
justify stealing, the government would have been bankrupt
long ago. A public servant should never expect to become
wealthy in government.
But there is really more to respondent's defense of poverty. If
respondents was just driven by dire pecuniary need,
respondent should have returned the salary she had obtained
from the Municipal Government of Panabo as soon as she
obtained her salary from the court. However, she returned
the money only after receipt of the Court's Resolution dated
January 17, 1996, saying that she forgot all about it.
Forgetfulness or failure to remember is never a rational or
acceptable explanation.
In Macario Flores vs. Nonilon Caniya, Deputy Sheriff, RTC,
Imus, Cavite, 11 this Court ruled that a sheriff who failed to
issue an official receipt for the money entrusted to him for the
purpose of satisfying a judgment debt, "had really wanted to
misappropriate the said amount." Inevitably, he was
dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
It is well to stress once again the constitutional declaration
that a "(p)ublic office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives." 12
We have repeatedly held that although every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness
from an individual than in the judiciary. Personnel in the
judiciary should conduct themselves in such a manner as to
be beyond reproach and suspicion, and free from any
appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior, not only
in the discharge of their official duties but also in their
everyday life. They are strictly mandated to maintain good
moral character at all times and to observe irreproachable
behavior so as not to outrage public decency. 13
This Court, in JPDIO vs. Josephine Calaguas, Records
Officer, OCC, MTCC, Angeles City, 14 held:
The Court must reiterate that a public office is a public trust.
A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the
highest degree of honesty and integrity and should be made
accountable to all those whom he serves.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |12
Respondent's malfeasance is a clear contravention of the
constitutional dictum that the State shall "maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and
effective measures against graft and corruption." 15
Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of EO No.
292 known as the "Administrative Code of 1987" and other
pertinent Civil Service Laws, the penalty for dishonesty is
dismissal, even for the first offense. 16 Accordingly, for
respondent's dishonesty in receiving and keeping what she
was not lawfully entitled to, this Court has the duty to impose
on her the penalty prescribed by law: dismissal.
Apart from the above finding, we also note the contradiction
between the certification issued by Municipal Treasurer Jose
Avenido stating that respondent had worked as an
assessment clerk in his office up to June 3, 1991, and the
certification of Clerk of Court Victor Ginete stating that
respondent started working as an interpreter on May 16,
1991. Although specifically asked by the Court to explain this
contradiction, respondent could only state that the
certification of the treasurer is inaccurate because she
assumed her position as Assessment Clerk on January 25,
1990 and not on February 1, 1990 as written in the said
certification. Respondent, however, failed to explain the
gravamen of the inquiry, i.e., that she was certified to be still
connected with the Municipal Government of Panabo on
June 3, 1991, notwithstanding her assumption of her post in
the Regional Trial Court as early as May 16, 1991. To the
mind of the Court, respondent's inability to explain this
discrepancy is consistent with her failure to satisfactorily
explain why she knowingly received and kept a salary she
was not entitled to. Worse, it may be indicative of a conscious
design to hold two positions at the same time.
Aside from dishonesty, however, respondents is also guilty of
failure to perform her legal obligation to disclose her business
interests. Respondent herself admitted that she "had a stall in
the market." The Office of the Court Administrator also found
that she had been receiving rental payments from one
Rodolfo Luay for the use of the market stall. That respondent
had a stall in the market was undoubtedly a business interest
which should have been reported in her Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities. Her failure to do so exposes her to
administrative sanction.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 provides that it is the
"obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as
the "public has a right to know" the employee's assets,
liabilities, net worth and financial and business interest.
Section 11 of the same law prescribes the criminal and
administrative penalty for violation of any provision thereof.
Paragraph (b) of Section 11 provides that "(b) Any violation
hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall
sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against
him."
In the present case, the failure of respondent to disclose her
business interest which she herself admitted is inexcusable
and is a clear violation of Republic Act No. 6713.
The respondent's claim that her contract of lease of a market
stall was never implemented because it became the subject
of a civil case, fails to convince us. We agree with the finding
of the OCA on respondent's guilt for this separate offense. It
is a finding, which further supports its recommendation for
respondent's dismissal, to wit: 17
The case respondent is referring to was filed in 1995. This
can be seen from the number of the case which is 95-93.
Earlier than the filling of the case, respondent was already
collecting rentals — as early as February 22, 1991 — from
one Rodolfo Luay who was operating a business without the
necessary license.
Respondent should have, therefore, indicated in her "Sworn
Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections, and
Identification of Relatives in the Government Service" for the
years 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 that she had a
market stall in the Public market of Panabo, Davao.
She admits that she never indicated such in her sworn
statements.
As this Office had earlier stated in its Memorandum dated
November 10, 1995 filed in connection with the instant
complaint:
Such non-disclosure is punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five
thousand (P5,000.00) pesos, or both. But even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against the offender, the offender
can be dismissed from the service if the violation is proven.
Respondent 201 file speaks for itself.
Furthermore, respondent should have divested herself of her
interest in said business within sixty (60) days from her
assumption into (sic) office. She has not. The penalty for non-
disclosure of business interests and non-divestment is the
same. (Citations omitted.)
In her explanation, respondent maintains the position that
she has no business interest, implicitly contending that there
is nothing to divulge or divest from. As discussed above,
respondent had a business interest. We do not find her
administratively liable, however, for failure to divest herself of
the said interest. The requirement for public officers, in
general, to divest themselves of business interests upon
assumption of a public office is prompted by the need to
avoid conflict of interests. 18 In the absence of any showing
that a business interest will result in a conflict of interest,
divestment of the same is unnecessary. In the present case,
it seems a bit far-fetched to imagine that there is a conflict of
interest because an Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court
has a stall in the market. A court, generally, is not engaged in
the regulation of public market, nor does it concern itself with
the activities thereof. While respondent may not be
compelled to divest herself of her business interest, she had
the legal obligation of divulging it.
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the recommendations of
the Office of the Court Administrator, Interpreter III Delsa M.
Flores is hereby DISMISSED from service with
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits and accrued leave
credits and with PREJUDICE to re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY
DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO
OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING,
JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO
and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,
vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and
pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately
before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal
note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing
supplied.]
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |13
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our
Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list of
names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2
million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those
aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan.
Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have
access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following
provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject
to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will
receive your favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the
GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Compañero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained
serious legal implications, President & General Manager
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply
your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the
opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs.
Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would
not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality
unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the
GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very much
that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the
reply of the Government Service and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p.
8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners,
filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item
reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and
regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition
members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p.
41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and
the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated
reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having
complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to
the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General
Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS
Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since
administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners
have no cause of action.
To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a
purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one
of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that
before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is
expected to have exhausted all means of administrative
redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of
law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless
the available administrative remedies have been resorted to
and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity
to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is
when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial
Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R.
No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v.
Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.]
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular
courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of
Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus,
the exception of this case from the application of the general
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.
Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address
ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus hes to
compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners
to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts
sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of whether
or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a
controversy directly involving the constitutional right to
information. In Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April
24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29,
1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's
constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest
and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as
prayed for by the petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art.
111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |14
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded
the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the
1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them,
and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues
thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned
under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican
system of government is delegation of power by the people to
the State. In this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred
by the people. Denied access to information on the inner
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the
whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would
certainly be were empty words if access to such information
of public concern is denied, except under limitations
prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to
the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have
both the right to gather and the obligation to check the
accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the
freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but
vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access
to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered
nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent
information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to
keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is
in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government
may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this
open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are
aware of the issues and have access to information relating
thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a
meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to
say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to
information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies
of full public disclosure * and honesty in the public
service. ** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in
checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's
right to information is limited to "matters of public concern,"
and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided
by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited
to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern,"
and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the
terms "public interest" and "public concern". As observed
in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such
matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p.
541]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by
the constitutional right to information was the need for
adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to
regulate the actions and conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it
was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are
occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p.
539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth
of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa
belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans
from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986
election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government
and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and
46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual
appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest
and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as
employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the
Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the
nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with
the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the
reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A.
No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all
times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the
System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.]
Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is
not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that
these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers
were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who
themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and
that an its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS
and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to
information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be
among those excluded by law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists
between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy
of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS
the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of this petition. His position is apparently based
merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not
settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law
is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to
privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by
existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of
the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to
information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally
protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil.
415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then
Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |15
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. UItimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly
important as modem society has developed. All the forces of
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and
organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."
[at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government
intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict
between the rights to information and to privacy may arise.
However, the competing interests of these rights need not be
resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted
statement of the Court in Morfe is that the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover,
the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.
As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit
Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy
in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an
injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The
right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John
Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219
(1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31
L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the
person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of
the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions
in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See
also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the
loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and
hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which guarantees
"(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government
corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the
coverage of the people's right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the
GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its
loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy
of full public disclosure and the right to information which is
applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and
Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484
and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court
said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign
attributes or running some business, discharges the same
function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the
exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of
the right to information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and
controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them
within the coverage of the State policy of fun public
disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few
question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions" — referring to the transactions of the State —
and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include
all of the various agencies, departments, ministries and
instrumentalities of the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should
be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to
the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the
contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on
the national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional
Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned
and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary
or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the
Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the
GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to
be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to
or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue
interference with the duties of the custodian of the records
may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled
to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v.
Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and
third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act
sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the
names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |16
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records,"
the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information
on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus
to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the
imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-
20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.]
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard,
there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the
list requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and
respondent General Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access
to documents and records evidencing loans granted to
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners
may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time
and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision,
as the GSIS may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1655 July 8, 2004
(Formerly OCA IPI 91-1174- RTJ)
ATTY. GRACE M. VELOSO AND MA. JOEYLYNN B.
QUIÑONES, complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ANACLETO M. CAMINADE, RTC, Branch 6, Cebu
City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is an administrative complaint for sexual
harassment separately filed by Atty. Grace Veloso and Ma.
Joeylynn Quiñones against Judge Anacleto M. Caminade of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.
Atty. Veloso, a lawyer of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)
assigned to the RTC branch presided by Judge Caminade,
alleged in her affidavit that, on March 9, 2001, she went to
the court to check on her work schedule for the following
week. Judge Caminade was then having a conversation with
two men at the lawyer’s table. She was about to leave when
Judge Caminade asked her to join them. She acceded to
respondent’s request as she considered him as her superior.
After a few minutes, the two men and Atty. Veloso rose to
leave but the judge told her to stay behind because they
needed to discuss a case. Judge Caminade then ushered her
to his chambers. She was made to sit on the visitor’s chair
which was just a foot away from where the judge sat.
While discussing the case, she was stunned when Judge
Caminade suddenly placed his hand on her right thigh and
squeezed it. He then took her hand and kissed it. She
immediately stood up and headed towards the door leading
to the staff room. He, however, caught up with her and
placed his hand on her shoulder. Before she could open the
door, Judge Caminade told her "Kiss ko bi" (Let me kiss you).
Atty. Veloso, who was so shocked, retorted "Kalo-od nimo
Judge uy" (You are so disgusting, Judge). She then opened
the door and went out of his chambers.
At the staff room, respondent judge, acting as if nothing
happened, ordered his researcher to show her certain court
records. Although she was trembling, she pretended to look
at the records then ran out of the staff room and cried.
On March 12, 2001, Atty. Veloso sent a letter to Judge
Caminade informing him of her decision not to appear in his
court again as resident PAO lawyer. She was thereafter
assigned to another branch of the court.
In his comment dated April 25, 2001, respondent judge
averred that, after the court session on March 9, 2001, Atty.
Veloso entered his chambers to discuss a case she was
handling. Inside the chambers were Atty. Myrna Valderrama-
Limbaga, branch clerk of court, and Mr. Othello
Capangpangan, a court employee. After discussing her case,
she allegedly reminded respondent judge of the motion filed
by her father, Atty. Eustacio Veloso, pertaining to a case
pending before his sala. The judge told her to convey to her
father that he could not act on the motion yet since he
needed more time to review the voluminous records of the
case. She promised to relay the message to her father.
Purportedly as a gesture of appreciation, Judge Caminade
spontaneously placed his hand on her thigh and pressed it
while saying "Thank you" to her. He then playfully took her
hand and kissed it. She allegedly did nothing to protest such
action because she knew that he was just teasing her. He
also opined that the complaint was filed by Atty. Veloso in
order to erase any doubt about her moral values, knowing
that Atty. Limbaga and Mr. Capangpangan were present
when he kissed her hand.
Further, Judge Caminade explained that he had a tendency
to tease and play pranks on his friends, both male and
female, because of his congenial nature. In fact, even before
his appointment to the judiciary, it had been his natural way
of complimenting women for their physical attributes but he
never had any malice or lustful designs in his actuations.
On the other hand, Joeylynn Quiñones, Clerk III in the office
of Judge Caminade, claimed that respondent judge squeezed
her hand on three different occasions in February 2001. She
noticed that the judge would squeeze her hand whenever she
gave him the case records. Although offended by his actions,
Joeylynn opted to remain silent out of deference to or fear of
respondent judge.
Then, on February 14, 2001, Judge Caminade asked her to
open a jar of sugar; he was unable to do so due to his
disability of having only one hand. Joeylynn entered the
judge’s chambers and handed him the jar. Once inside, he
greeted her "Happy Valentine’s Day" and asked "Asa mo
gabii?" (Where did you go last night?). She replied "Sa balay"
(At home). To Joeylynn’s surprise, he suddenly grabbed her
right hand and kissed her on the cheek. She was so shocked
that she could not react. Thereafter, Joeylynn left the
chambers and cried.
From then on, Joeylynn avoided entering respondent’s
chambers, asking the court aide or legal researcher instead
to bring in the case records even when respondent called for
her. On March 23, 2001, upon her request, Joeylynn was
detailed to Branch 16 of RTC Cebu City and eventually to the
Office of the Clerk of Court.
Judge Caminade filed his comment on May 18, 2001 and
reiterated his earlier defense that he was just being friendly to
his staff. He admitted pressing Joeylynn’s hand on several
occasions but insisted that they were innocent gestures. On
February 14, 2001, he merely greeted Joeylynn and kissed
her on the cheek as it was Valentine’s Day. He asserted that
Joeylynn merely misinterpreted his actions towards her.
The two administrative complaints were consolidated and
referred to then Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales1 of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her report received by this Court on September 5, 2002,
Justice Morales found Judge Caminade guilty of violating
Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and recommended
that respondent be suspended for six months without pay.
After carefully evaluating the records of this case, we find the
conclusions and recommendation of the investigating justice
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |17
to be adequately supported by the evidence and based on x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
applicable law and jurisprudence. --------- x

Those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and DECISION

judges, must not only know the law but must also possess
the highest degree of integrity and probity, and an YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and
private lives.2
In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003, [1] Trinidad O. Lachica
In this particular case, we are principally concerned with the charged Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of the Municipal Trial
moral fiber of Judge Caminade. His penchant for teasing and
showing unwelcome affection to women indicates a certain Court in Cities of Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of
moral depravity and lack of respect towards his female Authority relative to Criminal Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-
employees. They were his subordinates and he should have
treated them like his own children. Instead, he took R.[2] Complainant alleged that since the filing of the
advantage of his superior position. information, accused Domugho has remained at large. Thus,
the cases were ordered archived[3] but an alias warrant of
We have repeatedly held that, while every office in the
government service is a public trust, no position exacts arrest[4] was issued by respondent judge on January 14,
greater moral righteousness than a seat in the
2000.
judiciary.3 Performing as he does an exalted role in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the
honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge must comport
himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended by PO3
or otherwise, can weather the most exacting scrutiny of the Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and was brought to
public that looks up to him as the epitome of integrity and
justice.4 the police station for booking and custody at 9:30 p.m. [5]

Canons 35 and 46 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct However, on July 3, 2003, at around 8:30 a.m., complainant
mandate, respectively, that "judges shall ensure that not only
is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be was surprised to receive a call from the accused informing
so in the view of the reasonable observer" and that "judges her that she was released from confinement on July 2, 2003
shall avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities." These very stringent standards of at 10:00 p.m. Complainant inquired from the police station if
decorum are demanded of all magistrates and employees of an Order of Release was issued by the court, but she was
the courts.
informed that the accused was released because the
Judge Caminade’s behavior must be sanctioned. We are respondent judge called the police station and told the desk
neither amused by his claims of innocent playfulness nor
impressed by his excessive display of congeniality. He acted officer that the accused had posted a cash bail bond and may
beyond the bounds of decency, morality and propriety. He already be released.
failed to meet the standard of conduct embodied in the Code
of Judicial Conduct. His abusive and distasteful acts
unmistakably constituted sexual harassment because they Complainant checked the case records but the expediente
resulted in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for his female subordinates. contained no copy of the release order. It was only at 1:00
p.m. that she was shown a copy thereof. Meanwhile, the
Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, case records could not be located. It was only on 4:30 p.m. of
considers a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a
serious offense. A respondent found guilty of a serious July 3, 2003 that the same was found.
charge may be meted the penalty of: (1) dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or The police blotter showed no entry that an order of release
appointment to any public office, including government-
was received by the police. Only a notation that the accused
owned or controlled corporations, provided, that the forfeiture
of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; had put up a cash bail bond was entered therein.
(2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three but not exceeding six months; or (3) Complainant also averred that it was improper for the
a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000. respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the
function belongs exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of
We find it proper to adopt Justice Morales’ recommendation
to suspend respondent judge for six months without pay. Court. She claimed that respondent judge committed an act
of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found guilty of violating order the release of the accused. She claimed that it was
Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct by
committing sexual harassment and is irregular that no copy of the release order was found in the
hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six months
expediente in the morning of July 3, 2003 considering that it
without pay effective immediately, with the warning that a
repetition of the same offense shall be punished with was supposedly issued on July 2, 2003.
dismissal from the service.

SO ORDERED. In her Comment[6] dated December 3, 2003 respondent judge

denied the charges of complainant. She maintained that on
TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 July 2, 2003 at 7:00 p.m., she issued the Order of Release
Complainant, [OCA-IPI No. 03-1490-MTJ]
Present: after the accused posted a cash bond. She claimed that the
accused was released by virtue of the Order of Release and
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
- versus - Quisumbing, not on the basis of her alleged telephone call to the police
Ynares-Santiago, station.
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, On August 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Promulgated:
Branch 4, Cebu City, the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City for
Respondent. September 20, 2005 investigation, report and recommendation. [7]

PALE JUS SUSP DISC |18


[8]
The investigating judge submitted a Report
November 18, 2004 recommending that respondent judge be
fined in the amount of P20,000.00 or suspended for three (3)
months based on the following findings:
1. The accused was arrested at 8:45 in the evening
of July 2, 200[4], was booked at the Waterfront
Police Station at 9:00 p.m., and released without a
Release Order at 10:00 that same night.
2. The arresting officer and the accused never
appeared before the respondent judge on the night
of July 2, 200[4], as claimed by respondent judge.
The accused was arrested at 8:45 p.m., after her
classes at Southwestern University. She could not
have appeared before respondent judge prior to her
arrest since she was in school. Had it been true that
the arresting officer appeared before the judge that
night, it would have been highly improbable for the
arresting officer not to have asked for a copy of the
Release Order.
3. No one saw the Release Order on July 2, 200[4],
except the respondent judge, as per testimony of
the complainant and Helen Mongoya, and as shown
by the police blotter, and the affidavit of the
arresting officer claiming that they were
reprimanded by their Chief because they released
the accused without a Release Order.
4. The accused was released without the Release
Order, and only upon the telephone call of
respondent judge.
5. The Release Order was never issued on the
night of July 2, 200[4]. No judge in his right mind
would issue a Release Order without the record of
the case, more so if the case had been archived.
5. The Release Order appeared only in the
afternoon of July 3, 200[4].
6. The record of the case was found by court aide,
Juan Aos, in the bodega of MTCC, Branch 4,
together with the records of other archived cases, at
about 4:30 in the afternoon of July 3, 200[4].
7. Respondent judge was in Manila early morning of
July 3, 200[4].
8. It was physically impossible for the respondent
judge to have signed the Release Order before 1:00
p.m. of July 3, 200[4], since she was in Manila.
Questions may be raised whether the Receipt for
the Cash Bond and the Release Order were signed
by a person other than the respondent judge. As
can be gleaned from the record, the signature
appearing on the Receipt for the Cash Bond, the
Release Order and the signature of the respondent
judge on her Comment dated December 10, 2003,
do not appear to be signed by the same person.
9. Respondent judge authenticated the Release
Order during the Investigation proper as the
Release Order she issued on July 2, 2003. [9]
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the
findings of the investigating judge but recommended that
respondent judge be suspended for three (3) months. [10]
We agree with the findings of the investigating judge and the
OCA except for the recommended penalty.
During the investigation, it was established that the accused
was arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45 p.m. and was brought
directly to the Waterfront Police Station where she was
booked at 9:00 p.m. At about 10:00 p.m. the accused was set
free without a release order.[11]
Respondent judge, however, claimed that she issued the
dated Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m. after
the accused and her counsel, together with the arresting
officer, came to her office and posted a cash bond. It was by
virtue of this order that the accused was released.
A circumspect scrutiny of the testimonies given by
respondent judge reveals that she made several untruthful
statements possibly with the intent to mislead the Court.
It was improbable that, as claimed by respondent judge, she
issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00
p.m. considering that the accused was apprehended at 8:45
p.m. The complainant and the arresting officer, as well as the
entry in the police blotter all declared that the arrest was
made at 8:45 p.m. and not earlier. Verily, respondent judge
could not have issued the release order at around 7:00 p.m.
as the accused has not yet been arrested at that time.
She also insisted that on July 2, 2003, the accused and her
counsel, and the arresting officer went to her office and
posted a bond whereupon she issued the Order of Release.
However, this is belied by the testimonies of the arresting
officer and the complainant who both claimed that the
accused was brought directly to the police station after the
arrest. We agree with the observation of the OCA that, it
would be impossible for complainant or the arresting officer
not to have mentioned anything regarding this incident if the
same actually transpired. Likewise, as pointed out by the
investigating judge, it is highly improbable for the arresting
officer not to have demanded a copy of the release order if
he really appeared before the respondent.
Incidentally, the arresting officer denied receiving any order
of release from respondent judge on July 2, 2003. In fact, he
claimed that they were reprimanded by their commanding
officer for releasing from their custody the person of the
accused without any accompanying court order. The
following day, July 3, 2003, he went to the court to secure a
copy of the said order.
Respondent judge also averred that the Order of Release
was received by SP01 James Estrera, which receipt was duly
noted in the police blotter. An examination of the records,
however, discloses that what SPO1 Estrera received was
only a copy of the Receipt of the Cash Bail Bond dated July
2, 2003 and not the Order of Release. In fact, there was no
mention of a release order in the police blotter. [12]
It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally
received the cash bail bond for the accused. For this act
alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section
14, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be
deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the
provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not
authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should
such cash be kept in his office.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |19

The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having
abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted
the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately making
untruthful statements in her comment and during the
investigation of the instant administrative case with intent to
mislead this Court.
The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and
adversely reflect on the honesty and integrity of respondent
judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a character
flaw which speaks ill of her person. Making false
representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As
the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly justice, he must therefore, be the first to abide by
the law and weave an example for the others to follow. [13]
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue,
it is a necessity.[14] Respondent must bear in mind that the
exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are
designed to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.[15] When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to
apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages
disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary itself.[16]
Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct of a person
concerned in the administration of justice prejudicial to the
rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It
generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
[17]
purpose. To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action,
as is what is sought by complainant in this case, the law
requires that the error or mistake must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.[18]
It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash
bond respondent judge ran afoul with Rule 114 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the
Court Administrator v. Fernandez,[19] the Court held that:
The rules specify the persons with whom a cash
bail bond may be deposited namely: the collector of
internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1,
2000) provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The
accused or any person acting in his behalf
may deposit in cash with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial,
city or municipal treasurer the amount of
the bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who
investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of
deposit and of a written undertaking
showing compliance with the
requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from
custody. The money deposited shall be
considered as bail and applied to the
payment of fine and costs while the
excess, if any, shall be returned to the
accused or to whoever made the deposit.
A judge is not one of those authorized to
receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should
such cash be kept in the office of the judge.
Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, as amended, is classified as a
serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions
enumerated in Section 11 of the same Rule which provides
that:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of
a serious charge, any of the following sanctions
may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned
or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
This is not the first time that respondent judge was
sanctioned by this Court. It appears that aside from this case,
respondent judge has been administratively charged eight(8)
other times.[20] Of these cases three (3) have been
dismissed.[21]
On April 27, 2004 in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-00-
1337,[22] the Court found respondent guilty of improper
conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in
Criminal Case No. 99796-12 and was accordingly
reprimanded. She was also admonished for conduct
unbecoming of a judge.
On December 17, 2004, respondent was fined in the amount
of P5,000.00 in Administrative Matters Nos. 04-7-373-
RTC[23] and 04-7-374-RTC,[24] for gross violation of Section
17, Rule 114, for having approved the bail of an accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. CEB-BRL-783 and 922 pending before
the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, absent showing of
unavailability of all RTC judges in Cebu City.
On March 16, 2005, respondent judge was admonished in
Administrative Matter No. 04-1554-MTJ and reminded to be
more circumspect in granting postponements.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |20

Clearly, being chastised thrice has not reformed respondent.
For the foregoing considerations, we find that the penalties
recommended by the investigating judge and the OCA are
not commensurate to respondent judges misconduct which is
aggravated by her past misdeeds. Respondent judges
infraction merits suspension from the service for six (6)
months.
WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City, Branch IV, is
found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDEDfrom
office for six (6) months without salary and other benefits
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1886
ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, Complainant
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE EXEQUIL L. DAGALA, MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, DAPASOCORRO, DAP A,
SURIGAO DEL NORTE, Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This administrative case arose from an anonymous letter-
complaint1 filed against Judge Exequil L. Dagala (Judge
Dagala), presiding judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Dapa-
Socorro, Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman and indorsed to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.
In a letter-complaint dated September 30, 2015, an unnamed
resident of San Isidro, Siargo Island, Surigao Del Norte,
wrote to report, among others, an altercation involving his
neighbors and Judge Dagala. According to the unnamed
complainant, on September 29, 2015, he was in his hut when
he witnessed an argument between his neighbors and Judge
Dagala over the ownership of his neighbor's lot and the trees
planted thereon (September 29 incident). There, he saw
Judge Dagala walking back and forth, shouting invectives at
the lot's occupants and brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle to
intimidate them.2 He further claims that while police officers
were at the scene, they did nothing to pacify the situation.
Complainant alleged that no inquiries were made as to the
legality of the logging activities being undertaken at Judge
Dagala's apparent behest nor his authority to carry a high-
powered firearm. According to the complainant, while his
neighbors were able to take photos and make a video
recording of the incident, they were too afraid to file a
complaint against Judge Dagala and instead wanted to
arrange for a confidential transmittal of their evidence to the
Office of the Ombudsman. The complainant also recounted
rumors of Judge Dagala's involvement in illicit activities,
namely: illegal drugs, illegal fishing, illegal gambling, illegal
logging, maintaining a private army, owning high-powered
firearms and having several mistresses.3
The Office of the Ombudsman indorsed the letter-complaint
to the OCA for appropriate action.4 The OCA, in turn, directed
Executive Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge Canoy) of the
Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Surigao Del Norte, to
conduct a discreet investigation.5
In his report, Judge Canoy reported that the altercation
described in the complaint arose from an existing boundary
dispute among owners of adjacent lots in the area. One of
the disputants allegedly sold the trees planted on the
contested lot to Dagala. According to Judge Canoy, the chief
of police could not confirm whether Judge Dagala was armed
with a high-powered weapon at the time but that the incident
was subject of an ongoing police investigation. He concluded,
however, that unless the anonymous complainant comes
forward and substantiates his allegations, the complaint
should be dismissed.6
On November 13, 2015, the OCA also requested the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct further discreet
investigation.7 The investigation yielded the following
findings, among others: (1) Judge Dagala is legally married to
"A," on July 18, 2006, in Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte; (2)
they have no children; (3) Judge Dagala sired children with
three different women; (4) these children were born on
October 13, 2000, March 5, 2007, and March 24, 2008,
respectively; (5) in 2008, Judge Dagala and "A" agreed to live
separately; (6) "A" is currently working in the City Treasury
Office and receiving ₱l0,000.00 as monthly support from him;
(7) "B," the mother of Judge Dagala's youngest child,
appeared before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) relative to certain hardwood furniture
confiscated by the government; (8) Sergio Tiu
Commendador8(Commendador), a court interpreter in Judge
Dagala's court, was arrested during a recent buy-bust
operation; (9) Judge Dagala is alleged to be the owner of
Sugba Cockpit in Del Carmen, Surigao del Norte, and
thereafter sold the same to one Marites Borchs 9 (Horchs).10
In an Indorsement dated April 25, 2016, the OCA required
Judge Dagala to file his comment in relation to the
anonymous letter-complaint as well as the findings of its
preliminary investigation. Attached to the Indorsement were a
copy of the anonymous letter-complaint, a certificate of
marriage between Judge Dagala and "A," and the certificates
of live birth of his alleged children. 11
In his comment,12 Judge Dagala admitted that he was
married to "A" but that, due to their constant fighting, they
decided to separate. "A" returned to Surigao City while Judge
Dagala stayed in Siargao Island.13 Judge Dagala also
admitted, "without any remorse," that he has three children
with three different women. He added that his wife knew
about his children and that she has already forgiven and
forgotten him for his unfaithfulness.14 He denied any
involvement in illegal logging, asserting that it was "B" who
managed a furniture business.15 He also denies engaging in
any illegal drug activity, asserting that the only connection
linking him to the same is Commendador, who simply
happened to work as a court interpreter in his sala. Judge
Dagala also admitted to having owned a cockpit but asserts
that he had sold it to Borchs in 2008 to dispel any suspicion
that he was involved in illegal gambling. 16
Earlier, however, Judge Dagala submitted a
letter17 "irrevocably resigning" his post but this was rejected
by the Court on August 9, 2016 because he was still under
investigation.18 On August 19, 2016, the OCA received a
Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash disk by mail from "a
concerned citizen" containing a video recording of the
September 29 incident complained of.19
According to the OCA, while Judge Dagala may be "excused"
for having sired two children prior to his marriage, the record
is clear that he had his third child with "B" during the
subsistence of his marriage with "A." The OCA found it
morally reprehensible for Judge Dagala, a married man, to
maintain intimate relations with a woman other than his
spouse. That he has already separated from his wife and that
she had forgiven him for his extramarital affair do not justify
his conduct. The OCA asserted that Judge Dagala's act of
successively siring children with different women displays his
proclivity to disregard settled norms of morality. 20
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |21
The OCA also noted Judge Dagala's failure to disclose that
he already had a child in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS)
which he filed with the Judicial and Bar Council for his
application to the Judiciary in 2006. For the OCA, this
omission is a deliberate attempt to mislead. As a former
prosecutor, Judge Dagala knew or ought to know that making
false statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of a public document. Hence, his failure to
disclose the fact that he fathered a child in his PDS
constitutes dishonesty.21
The OCA also found that Judge Dagala committed gross
misconduct for openly carrying a high-powered firearm during
the reported altercation of September 29, 2015. Republic Act
No. 1059122 (RA 10591) provides that only small arms may
be registered by licensed citizens or juridical entities for
ownership, possession, and concealed entry. The OCA noted
that Judge Dagala neither refuted the allegation that he
brandished a high-powered weapon nor questioned the
veracity of the video recording of the September 29, 2015
incident. A certification from the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Firearms and Explosives Office further disclosed that,
per their records, Judge Dagala is not a licensed/registered
firearm holder of any kind or caliber.23
I.
a.
The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all
courts and their personnel.24 This supervision includes the
power to discipline members of the Judiciary. Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court outlines the process by which judges and
justices of lower courts shall be held to answer for any
administrative liability. A disciplinary case against a judge or
justice brought before this Court is an administrative
proceeding. Thus, it is subject to the rules and principles
governing administrative procedures.
Section 1 of Rule 140 states that proceedings for the
discipline of judges and justices of lower courts may be
instituted in three ways: by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, through a verified complaint, and through an
anonymous complaint. A verified complaint must be
supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged or by documents which may
substantiate the allegations. An anonymous complaint, on the
other hand, should be supported by public records of
indubitable integrity.25
While anonymous complaints should always be treated with
great caution, the anonymity of the complaint does not, in
itself, justify its outright dismissal.26 The Court will act on an
anonymous complaint –
x x x provided its allegations can be reliably verified and
properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public
records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant,
whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where
the matter involved is of public interest," or the declarations
by the respondents themselves in reaction to the allegations,
where such declarations are, properly speaking, admissions
worthy of consideration for not being self-serving.27 (Citations
omitted.)
Since a disciplinary case is an administrative proceeding,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense.28Administrative due process essentially means "an
opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."29 When
the Court acts motu proprio, this opportunity arises through
the filing of a comment upon order of the Court.1âwphi1 In a
case where the proceedings are initiated by a complaint, the
Rules of Court state that the complaint must state the acts or
omissions constituting a violation of our ethical rules. To our
mind, this is the standard of what suffices as information as
to the allegations against a respondent. It is sufficient that the
acts or omissions complained of are clearly identified.
b.
In this case, the OCA's Indorsement informed Judge Dagala:
(1) that an anonymous letter-complaint was filed against him;
and (2) that it conducted a preliminary investigation "on the
matter [anonymous letter-complaint]." It thereafter informed
Judge Dagala of the results of its preliminary
investigation,30 attaching copies of the anonymous letter-
complaint, the certificate of marriage31 between "A" and
Judge Dagala, and the birth certificates32 of his alleged
children. Judge Dagala was directed to comment "on the
matter" within ten (10) days from receipt of the
Indorsement.33
Plainly, when the OCA referred to the "matter," it meant not
only the information that the preliminary investigation yielded
and were stated in the Indorsement, but also the allegations
of the anonymous letter-complaint. In its first sentence, the
OCA defined "matter" to be the anonymous letter-complaint.
The last sentence of the Indorsement therefore directed
Judge Dagala to comment on the "matter," it was using that
word as a defined term.
To recall, the anonymous complaint stated that Judge Dagala
"carried [an] armalite firearm" during the September 29
incident and that he "maintained several mistresses." 34 The
anonymous letter-complaint also stated that there were
pictures and a video recording of Judge Dagala's
participation in the September 29 incident.
Justice Leonen admits, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion, that Judge Dag ala's act of brandishing an M-16
armalite rifle and his lack of registration for the firearm would
be sufficiently proven with the photographs and video on file.
He nevertheless faults the OCA for failing to specifically
require Judge Dagala to comment on these photographs and
videos. We disagree. The duty to disprove the allegation of
the anonymous letter-complaint that he carried a firearm, as
supported by photographs and a video, rested on Judge
Dagala. In fact, we note that Judge Dagala never denied the
allegation that he carried an M-16 armalite rifle during the
September 29 incident. Under these circumstances, the
Court finds that Judge Dagala was reasonably informed of
allegations of fact which, if left uncontroverted or
unexplained, may constitute ground for disciplinary action.
Justice Leonen argues that "immorality as a ground was not
properly pleaded."35 Again, the Court disagrees. The
anonymous letter-complaint clearly alleged that Judge
Dagala was known for maintaining "several mistresses." The
certificate of marriage between Judge Dagala and "A" on July
18, 2006 and the certificate of live birth of an alleged child
born to "B" on March 24, 2008 also clearly allege that Judge
Dagala sired a child not with his wife during the subsistence
of his marriage. To the Court's mind, all these sufficiently
plead the commission of acts of immorality as to enable
Judge Dagala to properly prepare his defense.
We agree, however, that Judge Dagala was not sufficiently
warned that he may be charged with dishonesty in
connection with how he accomplished his PDS. His PDS was
not mentioned in either the OCA Indorsement or the
anonymous letter-complaint. Penalizing him for a charge he
was not reasonably informed of will violate his right to due
process. Nevertheless, considering that this Court here finds
Judge Dagala liable for the separate counts of immorality and
grave misconduct, no useful purpose will be served by
remanding the charge of dishonesty to the OCA.
II.
a.
We agree with the findings of the OCA that Judge Dagala
committed acts amounting to gross misconduct.
There is sufficient evidence to hold Judge Dagala
accountable for gross misconduct in connection with the
September 29 incident, as recounted in the anonymous
complaint. The OCA identified Judge Dagala as the man
brandishing an M-16 armalite rifle in the video footage. In his
comment and manifestation, however, Judge Dagala failed to
deny or refute the allegation. We emphasize that Judge
Dagala was given sufficient notice of this allegation against
him because the anonymous letter-complaint was included in
the OCA's Indorsement. Although Judge Dagala was
informed of the existence of the accusation and ought to
have understood the implications, he made no efforts to
refute the claims against him. We thus rule that there is
substantial evidence before us to prove that Judge Dagala
brandished a high-powered firearm during an altercation in
Siargao.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |22
This finding of fact has various consequences. A certification
issued by the PNP Firearms and Explosives Office also
disclosed that Judge Dagala is not a licensed/registered
firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Even assuming that
he is licensed to own, possess, or carry firearms, he can only
carry those classified by law as small arms pursuant to RA
10591 which provides that only small arms may be registered
by licensed citizens or juridical entities for ownership,
possession, and concealed carry. Small arms refer to
firearms intended to be, or primarily designed for, individual
use or that which is generally considered to mean a weapon
intended to be fired from the hand or shoulder, which are not
capable of fully automatic bursts or discharge. An M-16
armalite rifle does not fall within this definition. Being a light
weapon, only the Armed Forces of the Philippines, PNP, and
other law enforcement agencies authorized by the President
in the performance of their duties can lawfully acquire or
possess an M-16 armalite rifle. It baffles us how Judge
Dagala came to possess such a high-powered weapon.
Worse, he had the audacity to brandish it in front of the police
and other civilians.
In light of these findings, we concur with the OCA's
conclusion that Judge Dagala is guilty of gross misconduct.
Misconduct has been defined as an intentional wrongdoing or
a deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior,
especially by a government official. Misconduct is considered
grave where the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules are
present.36
Judge Dagala's actuations, as recorded in the video, are
unacceptable for a member of the bench and should merit a
finding of administrative liability. This is without prejudice to
any criminal action that may also be filed against him.
b.
We also agree with the OCA's findings that Judge Dagala is
guilty of immorality.
In his Comment, Judge Dagala has admitted "without any
remorse" that he "was able to impregnate" three different
women.37 This is an admission that he is the father of "B's"
son, who was born on March 24, 2008,38 while his marriage
with "A" was subsisting.39 He is listed as the father in the
child's certificate of live birth.40 Dagala, in an obvious appeal
directed to the Court, pleads: [T]o err is human your
honors and to forgive is divine."41 He claims he is separated
from his wife, "A," because of "constant fighting in our
married life" and claims that she knew about his children out
of wedlock. She did not object because she understood his
desire to have children. "A" has learned to "forgive" and
"forget" him because she impliedly submits to the "notion that
we are not really meant for each and for eternity." 42
Under the above facts, we find Judge Dagala guilty of
immorality, for siring a child out of wedlock during the
subsistence of his marriage.
We have repeatedly said that members of the Judiciary are
commanded by law to exhibit the highest degree of moral
certitude and is bound by the highest standards of honesty
and integrity.43 In Regir v. Regir,44 we held:
It is morally reprehensible for a married man or woman to
maintain intimate relations with a person other than his or her
spouse. Moreover, immorality is not based alone on illicit
sexual intercourse. It is not confined to sexual matters, but
includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of
corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the
community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.45
Immorality is a recognized ground for the discipline of judges
and justices under the Rules of Court. 46 The New Canon of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges
to avoid "impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
their activities."47
In Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.48 (Castillo), we laid down
the doctrine of no dichotomy of morality. We explained
why judges as public officials are also judged by their private
morals:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to
his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a
judge's official life [cannot] simply be detached or separated
from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify
honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both
in the performance of official duties and in private life should
be above suspicion.49
Thus, in Castillo, we dismissed a judge from service for siring
a child outside of wedlock and for engaging in an extramarital
affair. The absence of a public and private dichotomy when it
comes to the ethical standards expected of judges and
justices has since become an unyielding doctrine as
consistently applied by the Court in subsequent cases.50
Here, the record is clear. The certificate of live birth of "B's"
male child indicates that Judge Dagala is the father as shown
by his signature in the affidavit of acknowledgment of
paternity.51 The date of birth (March 24, 2008) is during the
subsistence of Judge Dagala's marriage to "A," there being
neither proof nor allegation that said marriage was annulled
or voided in the meantime. Judge Dagala himself admits to
the paternity of his son with "B." He does not dispute the
entry in the certificate of live birth attesting to his paternity.
He admits his mistake and merely pleads for the Court's
forgiveness.
Justice Leonen opines that even if the filiation of the child is
proven, this fact alone is insufficient to prove immorality on
the part of Dagala. He suggests that only evidence which
would qualify to prove the commission of an illegal
act, e.g. concubinage or adultery under the Revised Penal
Code, the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995,52 and the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
200453 (VAWC), will suffice to establish immorality.
Again, we reject this argument.
While we agree with Justice Leonen that the circumstances
in this case may not be sufficient to successfully prosecute
Judge Dagala for the crime of concubinage, the spirit that
moves our criminal law in penalizing criminal infidelity is not
the same as the rationale which compels us to sanction acts
of immorality.
The Court has consistently held that absence of criminal
liability does not preclude disciplinary action. 54 As in the case
of disciplinary action of lawyers, acquittal of criminal charges
is not a bar to ·administrative proceedings.
In Pangan v. Ramos,55 we held that "[t]he standards of the
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of criminal law.
Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in
an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume
in trying criminal cases."56
Justice Leonen next argues that a complaint for immorality
should be commenced only by its victims, namely, the
spouse betrayed, the paramour who has been misled, or the
children who have to live with the parent's scandalous
indiscretions. According to Justice Leonen, a third party is not
a victim, so he/she cannot initiate the complaint unless there
is a showing that he/she is doing so for the benefit of the
victims. The inability of these victims to press the charges
themselves must likewise be pleaded and proven. 57
For the avoidance of doubt, the Court, in the clearest terms,
strongly holds otherwise.
Time and again, this Court has reminded judges that their
acts of immorality are proscribed and punished, even if
committed in their private life and outside of
their salas, because such acts erode the faith and confidence
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |23
of the public in the administration of justice and in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The public's
continued faith and confidence in our justice system is no
less a victim of the commission of acts of immorality by a
judge. The resulting harm to the justice system vests the
State with the interest to discipline judges who commit acts of
immorality, independent of the view or feelings of the judge's
spouse and their children.
For society, judges are the most tangible representation of
the Judiciary. Judges, in particular, are not just magistrates
who hear and decide cases; they are immersed in the
community and, therefore, in the best position to either
bolster or weaken the judicial system's legitimacy. In Tuvillo
v. Laron58 (Tuvillo ), we said:
As the judicial front-liners, judges must behave with propriety
at all times as they are the intermediaries between conflicting
interests and the embodiments of the people's sense of
justice. These most exacting standards of decorum are
demanded from the magistrates in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary. No
position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness
and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench.
As the epitome of integrity and justice, a judge's personal
behavior, both in the performance of his official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion. For moral integrity is
not only a virtue but a necessity in the judiciary. 59 (Citations
omitted; emphasis supplied.)
We reiterate what Justice Leonen said in his well-reasoned
dissent in Tuvillo, "[a]nyone applying for the judiciary is
expected to have a thorough understanding of community
standards and values."60 How a judge behaves impacts the
Judiciary's legitimacy. Society communicates not just through
language but through symbols as well. Judges are symbols
of justice. They are symbols not only when they are in the
actual performance of our duties but also when they move
through social circles in a community. When a judge exhibits
a willingness to flout the accepted standards of society, the
Judiciary's legitimacy takes a hit. There arises a dissonance
between the notion that they are symbols of justice and the
fact that they do not act with justice in their own lives. When
the Judiciary chooses to dispense justice through a judge
who refuses to respect the fundamental values of a society, it
effectively sends out a message that its judges can tell
society to observe the law and excuse themselves from it at
the same time. As we held in Leynes v. Veloso,61 "[a] judge
suffers from moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of
morality in public office when he labors under the delusion
that he can be a judge and at the same time have a mistress
in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the
community."62
We see no cogent reason in law or policy to depart from our
time-tested procedure for the discipline of judges and justices
of lower courts which allows complaints to be instituted in
three ways: by the Court motu proprio, through a verified
complaint, or through an anonymous complaint. 63
Any citizen or member of the public who knows a judge who
commits acts of immorality qualifies as, and has the civic duty
to be, a complainant or a witness against the errant judge.
These persons, usually members of the community whom the
judge serves, have a direct interest in preserving the integrity
of the judicial process and in keeping the faith of the public in
the justice system. The harm inflicted by the judge upon the
members of his family is distinct from the harm wreaked by
an erring judge upon the judicial system. The family and the
State are each imbued with the autonomy to exact their
response to acts of immorality by a rogue judge. The State
cannot intrude into the family's autonomy any more than the
family cannot intrude upon the autonomy of the State.
Justice Leonen ominously warns the Court not to be complicit
to the "State's over-patronage through its stereotype of
victims."64
The Court cannot agree with this rather constricting
view.
First. He appears to proceed from the notion that the State
stereotypes all women to be victims who are weak and
cannot address patriarchy by themselves.
Second. This view is based on a faulty presumption that all
erring judges are husbands who victimize their wives. Thus, if
the argument is to be pursued, when we discipline judges
even in cases where the wife did not file the complaint, we
"over-patronize" women because we believe that they are not
capable of invoking legal remedies on their own and, thus,
the Court must step in to protect them. This is an
unfortunately limited view.
The disciplinary procedure adopted by the Court is
gender-neutral. The prohibition against immorality
applies to all judges regardless of gender or sexual
orientation.
Further, in resolving immorality cases, the Court does not
discourage or prevent the spouse and the children of the
erring judge from exercising their autonomy to come before
us and express their sentiments. Nevertheless, we proceed
despite their absence because, as we said, administrative
proceedings against judges do not dwell on private injuries
inflicted by judges on private people. Administrative
proceedings do not exist so that a betrayed spouse can seek
redress of his or her grievance. Administrative proceedings
are not a remedy for a judge's betrayal of his or her marital
vows. These proceedings go into the question of whether a
judge, by his or her actions and choices, is still fit to dispense
justice and encourage the people's faith in the judiciary.
Moreover, we reject the position that proceeding in cases
such as this, where the wife does not bring the action herself,
amounts to the "over-patronage" of women because we
allegedly feel the need to hear the case to protect a victim
who cannot look out for herself. This position is out of touch
with reality.
Women empowerment is an advocacy taken seriously by the
Judiciary. We have made consistent efforts to make our
ranks more inclusive to female judges and justices. The
Court itself is headed by our first-ever female Chief Justice.
Similar efforts are being made in other branches of the
government. There are efforts, as well, in our communities to
provide equal opportunities for women. The status of women
in our society has improved. We agree with Justice Leonen
that there are women in our society who are perfectly
capable of not only protecting themselves from the
oppression of the patriarchy but even of shattering gender
glass ceilings. However, this is a very limited view of the
plight of women empowerment in this country.
Violence against women is a serious and prevalent problem
in the Philippines. This is, in fact, the spirit that compelled the
passing of the VAWC, which recognizes the need to provide
further protection to women and that violence against them
can take many forms.
In 2013, this Court, speaking through Associate Justice
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, affirmed the constitutionality of the
VAWC. In Garcia v. Drilon,65 we explained:
The unequal power relationship between women and men;
the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law.x x x
xxx
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VA W) is deemed
to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
based violence[."] Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers and
take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate
roles in society. This perception leads men to gaining more
power over women. With power comes the need to control to
retain that power. And VA W is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.66 (Emphasis in the
original; citations omitted.)
Statistics from the Philippine National Demographic and
Health Survey 201367 show that one in every five women
aged 15-49 years old has experienced physical violence.
Forty-four percent (44%) of the married women who
participated in this survey and claimed that they have
suffered physical violence revealed that their current
husbands or partners are the perpetrators.68 Violence is,
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |24
however, not only physical, and in this survey, about 26% of
the married women interviewed revealed that they suffered
some form of emotional, physical, and/or sexual violence
from their husbands or partners.69
The inequality does not end there.
These same statistics show that almost three in five married
women earn less than their husbands. Only 10% of women
own a house alone, while 19% own a house jointly with
someone else. Further, only 18% of women own land, either
alone or co-owned.70
While there are indeed serious efforts to empower women in
this country, the foregoing remains to be our reality. Much
work remains to be done. It is the height of insensitivity and a
display of a limited view to insist that when we are perceived
to take the cudgels for women, we are over-patronizing them.
To even go as far as to say that the State over-patronizes
women by stereotyping them as victims is unacceptable. The
reality-as shown by the Congress' decision to enact the VA
WC and the statistics showing the imbalance of power in this
country-is that there are women in this country who are in
peril and are in real need of protection. While it is true that
there are certain groups of women who are able to protect
themselves and even to successfully compete in a male-
dominated society, this is not the reality for many women in
the Philippines. To say that the State is over-patronizing and
stereotyping women just because some of our women are
empowered is, to borrow the words of United States
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "throwing away
your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting
wet."70 we are not over-patronizing women when we take
measures to help them. We are simply doing our part in the
great endeavor of women empowerment.
Finally, we reject the proposal because it will cause the Court
to be beset with intractable problems of proof. It will require
the Court to inquire into whether the "victims" are genuinely
exercising their autonomy, an invasive process that will, in
turn, intrude into the family's autonomy. To illustrate, a judge
who sires innumerable children outside of wedlock, maintains
multiple mistresses, and flaunts these misdeeds, is
immunized from the Court's disciplinary authority should the
spouse and children choose not to press charges.
Authorizing private attorney generals to act on behalf of the
Court to vindicate the public's interest is no solution. Justice
Leonen himself recognizes that violence against women and
children may prevent them from coming forward. Thus, he
concedes that third parties may be allowed to act on behalf of
the State provided they can plead and prove that they are
acting for the benefit of the victims, not "as a means to cause
more harm on them."71 How can this be shown to the
satisfaction of the Court without resolving, as a triable
question of fact, the question of whether the wife and children
truly and freely exercised their individual autonomy? What
about the reality of the violence of economic need and
dependence, which arguably prompts far more wives and
children into silently accepting the wrong done them? This is
a quagmire the Court is not wont to enter.
It is safer to go back to basics. Simply put, the State does not
recognize any sexual autonomy on the part of judges to have
children with persons other than their spouses or to have
extramarital affairs. It would be completely unprincipled for
the Court to reward a judge's commission of such grievous a
wrong to the public with an absolution based on the
forgiveness of the spouse and child. This is, of course,
assuming we will ever have the ability to ascertain whether
their forgiveness flows from the free exercise of their
autonomy. In the case of male judges, such a result will abet
the very patriarchy that Justice Leonen wants the Court to
reject. No one is forced to be a judge, just as Justice Leonen
pointed out in his concurring opinion in Tuvillo.73 To add to
that, no judge is forced to remain one.
The Judiciary, to maintain its legitimacy, must be able to
convince that it makes principled decisions. 74 This requires
that the Judiciary resolve cases fairly, impartially, and
convincingly. Decisions must be based on a logical
interpretation and application of laws. The Judiciary's
institutional legitimacy is also impacted by its members.
Members of the Judiciary must act in a way that will
encourage confidence among the people.
To be clear, we do not seek to interfere with a judge's
relationships. Thus, while we have sanctioned lawyers,
judges, and even justices, who have extramarital affairs, we
have refused to do so in cases where the parties, without any
legal impediment, live together without the benefit of
marriage.75 We have also been adamant in holding that a
person's homosexuality does not affect his or her moral
fitness.76 Nevertheless, immorality is a valid ground for
sanctioning members of the Judiciary because it (1)
challenges his or her capacity to dispense justice, (2) erodes
the faith and confidence of the public in the administration of
justice, and (3) impacts the Judiciary's legitimacy.
Finally, while a disciplinary case for immorality may proceed
even without the participation of the spouse, the children or
the alleged paramour, steps must be taken to protect their
decision not to air out their grievances in administrative
proceedings before us. As a matter of policy, in cases such
as this, the names of concerned parties who are not before
the Court should not be used. Care should be taken so as not
to disclose personal information and circumstances that are
not relevant to the resolution of the case. If necessary,
aliases should be used when referring to these parties.
Taking all these into consideration, we find that Judge Dagala
is also guilty of committing acts of immorality.
III.
Under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, immorality
and gross misconduct each constitute a serious charge.
Section 11 of the same Rule provides that serious charges
are punishable by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3) years but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than [₱]20,000.00 but not exceeding
[₱]40,000.00.
We affirm the recommendation of the OCA to impose on
Judge Dagala the supreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued
leave benefits. Because of the gravity of Judge Dagala's
infractions, we also impose on him the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government owned or controlled
corporations.
Without staking a position on the proper penalty to impose on
Judge Dagala on the immorality charge, Justice Leonen
discusses circumstances that may be considered mitigating
or aggravating in the determination of an immorality
case.77 We will comment only on one circumstance cited,
namely, where the "marriage does not work."78
The Court unequivocally reminds justices and judges that
until the Congress grants absolute divorce, or unless they
have secured a court annulment of their marriage or a
judgment of nullity, a failed marriage does not justify acts of
immorality.
Judge Dagala seeks this Court's forgiveness. He claims that
he and his wife separated because of "constant fighting;" that
his wife knew of his children with other women but did not
interpose any objection because she knew of his desire to
have children; his wife had learned to "forgive and forget"
him; and both have arrived at the "notion that [they] are not
really meant for each other and for eternity."79
We understand the undeniable sadness of a failed marriage.
We commiserate with Judge Dagala and his wife, as well as
his children, who must live with circumstances far different
from what society recognizes as ideal. We understand the
pain of accepting certain stark realities-that some
relationships must come to an end and not even the legal ties
of marriage can save them; that some married couples soon
discover that they are not right for each other; that in certain
cases, not even the legal bonds of marriage can fill the void;
that sometimes, happiness can be found in finding the
strength to get out of a relationship and begin again. We
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |25
understand that judges and justices are also human, and are
naturally inclined to search for what is good and what gives
meaning, including happy and fulfilling relationships. In this
case, we do not seek to pontificate that there is only one
honorable way to live. Judges are free to choose how to live
their lives. Nevertheless, choices are made within
particular con texts and in consideration of duties and
obligations that must be honored. More importantly,
choices have consequences. Judge Dagala made his
choice. He must now face the repercussions. Thus, as much
as we commiserate with Judge Dagala, we remain a court of
law with a mandate to dispense even-handed justice.
We thus compare the grounds offered by Judge Dagala in
mitigation of his wrong to similar pleas made by judges
similarly situated, namely, married judges who sired children
outside of wedlock or engaged in affairs during the
subsistence of their marriage.
Only last year, in Tuvillo, the Court rejected a plea in
mitigation by a judge. The judge explained that both he and
his mistress were "mature lonely people" whose marriage to
their legally wed spouses had "lessened sheen" and that his
mistress brought him a "soul connection, understanding and
great company." Further, his own wife "was distant to him."
In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla Marcos,79 which Justice
Leonen also quotes in his dissent in Tuvillo, we dismissed a
judge who publicly carried on a relationship with a woman not
his wife. We found him liable notwithstanding the fact that he
had already been physically separated from his wife for three
(3) years.80
In Anonymous v. Achas,81 we reprimanded a judge for going
out in public with a woman not his wife. We imposed this
penalty notwithstanding the fact that Judge Achas had been
estranged from his wife for the last 26 years. We held that the
fact remains that he is still legally married to her. It was not
therefore commendable, proper, or moral for a married judge
to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife. 82
In Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr.,83 we dismissed a judge
upon finding that he had a long standing relationship with a
married woman. We found the judge liable in spite of the fact
that both he and his partner were estranged from their
respective husband and wife. Notably, we took cognizance of
the complaint in this case even if neither the estranged
husband nor wife of the parties participated in the
proceedings.84
In Pe7:fecto v. Esidera,85 the Court, through Justice Leonen,
disciplined a female judge who carried on a relationship with
a man not her husband, even if the judge had never lived
with her legal husband and had long been estranged from
him.
The reason for the Court's consistent position is not difficult
to discern. The Philippines is a society that values
monogamy in marriages, except as to certain ethnicities and
religions where monogamy is not the norm. Our legal system
is replete with laws that enforce monogamy in a marriage and
penalize those who go against it. Save for religions that
accept and embrace multiple marriages, bigamy in the
Philippines is a crime.87 In the same vein, our criminal law
penalizes adultery88 and concubinage.89
No less than the Constitution emphasizes the value of a
marriage as the foundation of the family. 90 The Philippines is
a legal regime that intensely protects marriages by limiting
the grounds for its nullity or annulment. Until today, we do not
have divorce, with the exception provided for in the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. We only recognize
legal separation. There have been calls for allowing divorce
here but no law has been passed so far. Ultimately, we are
the branch of government tasked with interpreting the law.
We do not meddle with policies or with the endeavor to have
our laws reflect the developments in our values and morality.
It is not our place to ascertain whether our laws on marriage
have failed to adjust to the demands of the times.
For the Judiciary, this is the legal and social context within
which we must understand immorality in connection with
extramarital affairs.1âwphi1 In penalizing judges for engaging
in extramarital affairs, we merely seek to dis-incentivize
judges' propensity to disregard accepted standards of
morality because these acts impact their capacity to properly
perform their jobs. These acts affect the judiciary's
legitimacy-an element' essential in its role as a branch of
government charged with interpreting rules. We value
monogamous marriages and consider them worthy of strict
legal protection. A judge who disregards this fundamental
value opens himself or herself up to questions about his or
her capacity to act with justice in his or her own dealings.
This affects the people's perception of his or her moral
fitness. As we said in Resngit-Marquez v. Llamas, Jr., a
magistrate "cannot judge the conduct of others when his own
needs judgment."91
No one is forced to be a judge.92 The judiciary is an institution
reserved for those who, when they apply for a judicial
position, are expected to have a thorough understanding of
community standards and values which impose exacting
standards of decorum and strict standards of morality. 93 We
highlight that judges are bound to uphold secular, not
religious, morality. Thus, the values that a judge must uphold
are those in consonance with the dictates of the conscience
of his or her community. Among these community values is
respect for the sanctity of marriage.94 All applicants to the
Judiciary must, therefore, decide for themselves whether the
community values that the Court has recognized conform to
their own personal values, lifestyle, or proclivities. All who
desire to be part of the Judiciary must first decide if he or she
can live up to the highest standards of morality expected of
judges and justices.
How applicants to the Judiciary will choose to construe the
values that this Court upholds is their choice. Those who
have a fervent belief in a God may find that the values of this
Court compel them to live the lives of the faithful. Those who
are predisposed to pursue a strict code of morality may
choose to perceive our values as moral codes, proper and
worthy of being adhered to. Those who have the inclinations
to bend the rules or to live outside societal norms may find
that these rules are like straightjackets-pretentious,
unreasonable, or constricting.
Whether applicants to the Judiciary will choose to construe
these secular strictures as rules that require them to live the
life of a saint, or of a priest, imam, or other religious person,
is a purely personal decision. They are free to choose their
own metaphors. But once a lawyer joins the Judiciary, he or
she should abide by the rules. We remind all judges that no
position demands greater moral righteousness and
uprightness from its occupant than the judicial office. A
judge's personal behavior outside the court, not only while in
the performance of his official duties, must be beyond
reproach, for he is perceived to be the personification of law
and justice.95
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judge Exequil L.
Dagala is hereby found GUILTY of IMMORALITY and
GROSS MISCONDUCT. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from
the service with FORFEITURE of his retirement and other
benefits except accrued leave credits, and PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from re-employment in any government
agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned
and controlled corporation or government financial institution.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
SHERLITA O. TAN, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
x---------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1983 December 14, 2007
(Formerly A.M. No. 05-12-757-RTC)
JOHANNA M. VILLAFRANCA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
x---------------------x
ANONYMOUS LETTER-WRITERS, complainant,
vs.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |26
JUDGE REXEL M. PACURIBOT, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Gingoog City, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM, J.:
These consolidated-complaints filed against Executive Judge
Rexel M. Pacuribot (Judge Pacuribot) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Gingoog City, Branch 27, consist of the
following:
1. Affidavit-Complaint1 dated 4 December 2005 filed by
Sherlita O. Tan (Ms. Tan), Court Stenographer of RTC,
Branch 27, Gingoog City, and affidavit-complaint2 dated 20
December 2005 filed by Johanna M. Villafranca (Ms.
Villafranca), Clerk II, Gingoog City Parole and Probation
Office, charging Judge Pacuribot with sexual harassment;
2. Letter3 dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned citizens,"
asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot on the grounds that
he has been terrorizing and harassing most of the
employees, both casual and contractual, of the Hall of Justice
of Gingoog City; and
3. An undated letter4 from "concerned citizens" also asking
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to investigate the
illicit relationship of Judge Pacuribot and a certain Sheryl
Gamulo. They informed the OCA that Sheryl Gamulo bore
two acknowledged children of Judge Pacuribot, the eldest of
whom named Rexell Pacuribot was born on 15 October
2004, and the second child was born on 2 September 2005,
both at Maternity Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City.
On 14 December 2005, OCA issued a
Memorandum5 recommending that:
1. The complaint of Ms. Sherlita Tan be referred to the
Committee on Decorum and Investigation of the Regional
Trial Court of Gingoog City for investigation;
2. the complaint of Ms. Johanna M. Villafrancia be docketed
as a regular administrative matter
3. Judge Pacuribot be required to comment on the complaint
of Ms. Villafranca; and
4. Judge Pacurribot be suspended immediately until further
orders from this Court.6
On 7 March 2006, we issued a resolution amending Section
8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC, approving all the other
recommendations of OCA and suspending Judge Pacuribot,
thus:
With respect to all the other recommendations of the OCA,
finding them to be in accord with existing laws, the same are
hereby APPROVED. In particular, Judge Rexel Pacuribot is
immediately SUSPENDED until further notice from this Court.
He is likewise DIRECTED to comment on the complaints of
Mesdames Tan and Villafranca within ten days. The
complaint, however, of Ms. Sherlita Tan should be docketed
as a regular administrative matter to be consolidated with that
of Ms. Johanna M. Villafranca’s for proper disposition in line
with the foregoing discussions.7
On 25 October 2006, the court referred the case to Justice
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan
De Oro City Station, for investigation, report and
recommendation within 90 days from notice thereof.
On 8 October 2007, Investigating Justice Dy Liacco Flores
submitted her Report8 with the following findings:
Tan’s story
Ms. Tan’s nightmare as an underling of respondent judge
started on 20 October 2004 – a Wednesday. Having officially
filed a half-day leave, she went to Cagayan de Oro City to
attend a wedding ceremony at six o’clock in the evening at
Pryce Plaza Hotel. She stood as one of the principal
sponsors to a couple named Kimberly Castillon and Thomas
Elliot. At around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, while relishing
the "gala" portion during the wedding reception (when the
newly weds dance and guests pin peso bills on their attire),
she received from [Judge Pacuribot] a call through her mobile
phone, asking when is she going back to Gingoog City. She
said she intends to go back right after the wedding reception.
[Judge Pacuribot] offered to bring her to Agora Bus Terminal
but she politely refused the offer saying that she will just take
a taxi in going there. Taking her answer as declining his offer,
he ordered her to come out, displaying short temper, saying
he was already waiting outside the hotel. To hint at urgency,
he told her that he just slipped out from the Masonic Meeting
he was attending and will immediately return to it right after
he will have shuttled her there. Aware that he has the
tendency to humiliate anyone in public when he is angry, she
decided to abruptly leave the wedding reception and comply.
xxxx
Coming out into the lobby of the hotel, Ms. Tan saw
respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] inside his car, alone.
When she came near, he opened the car door for her and
she took her seat. Then, angrily he asked: "What took you so
long?" She kept mum. She saw in between their seats his
clutch bag with his short firearm. That sight frightened her
although she was consoled by the thought that she would
soon get rid of him at the bus terminal. Pryce Plaza Hotel to
the bus terminal would be about twenty (20) minutes ride,
traffic considered.
Unfortunately, [Judge Pacuribot] had other ideas. Along the
way to the bus terminal, he drove in to what looked like a
compound. She unexpectedly saw that his car entered a
small garage, and when it stopped, the roll down shutter
quickly locked up from behind. She was brought not to the
bus terminal but to a motel whose name she came to
recognize only after the incident as the City Lodge Motel in
Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City. She felt deceived. Knowing
the implications, she protested: "Why did you bring me here,
sir? Didn’t I tell you that I will just take a taxicab to the Agora
Terminal?" He rudely told her: "Shut up! As if you are still a
virgin!" Respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot] then directed
her to get down the car. Timorously, she obeyed. As soon as
she went down his car, she looked for a possible exit and
found none. All she saw was a door which opened. He
ushered her into the room, walking closely from behind her.
He locked the door.
Ms. Tan, scared and confused, walked to the comfort room,
where she pretended to relieve herself. There, she again
looked for a possible exit. Again, she found none. After a
short while, she heard [Judge Pacuribot] asking: "What are
you doing there? What’s taking you so long?" Remembering,
that he has a gun, she came out of the comfort room. To her
dismay, she found him nude in bed and fear overcame her
more.
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered Ms. Tan to undress. Her
reluctance made her move slowly. He let out more
impatience asking: "What’s taking you so long to undress?
Excite me!" She refused at first, but he became furious. At
that moment too, she saw his gun on what seemed to her
was headboard of the bed. Frightened, she undressed,
retaining her bra and panty. He asked her to kiss him and
she obeyed half-heartedly. While she was kissing his neck,
he expressed dissatisfaction by asking: "You don’t know how
to kiss! How do you do it with Ramon? Get into sex right
away without any preliminaries?" Ramon is her husband. She
was quiet.
[Judge Pacuribot] ordered her to lie down on the bed. She
yielded out of fear. He pulled her bra and panty, kissed her
neck and lips, and sucked her tongue and breasts. Minutes
after, he inserted his penis to her vagina. While he did a push
and pull motion, she was complaining: "You are so rude, Sir!
We work in the same office yet you disgrace me!" He told her
angrily: "Shut up! Concentrate! See! It’s softening...." She
recalled that he tried several times to stiffen his penis but he
seemingly has some erection problem. At his attempt for
coitus, she felt the penetration was just slight. Later, he was
getting exhausted and was breathing hard. He would rest
each time he failed to have full enjoyment. While he rested,
she would ask him to let her go, but angrily he refused.
Instead, he would forcibly ride on top of her again and make
more attempts at coitus until he finally gave up. He said to
her: "It won’t stiffen because I have been forbidden to eat
many kinds of food such as meat which gives energy."
After a while, Ms. Tan saw [Judge Pacuribot] got up from
bed, took his gun, and peeped through the window of the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |27
motel. This time, she once again implored him, "Sir, I’ll just A: I refused.
take a taxi to Agora." He answered: "I’ll bring you there." At
the time, she was so confused that she cannot recall whether Q: What was his reaction, if any?
he made payment in the motel. She could not concentrate
anymore.
A: He got angry, pulled my hair and pushed my face to his
penis saying: "suck it! Let it in till deep your throat! Let my
The two left the motel in his car. However, instead of penis reach your throat!"
conducting her to the bus terminal, again [Judge Pacuribot]
brought Ms. Tan to another place . . . this time to Discovery
Hotel adjacent to Limketkai Center, Cagayan de Oro City. Q: What did you do, if any?
When she protested, he told her that it would be safer for her
to sleep there instead of traveling alone. It was around 10 A: I gasped for breath so that when I opened my mouth, his
o’clock in the evening. Still unrelieved of her fright which Ms. penis entered my mouth.
Tan calls "shock," or "rattled," she failed to ask for help, nor
did she think of escaping. She was not even able to call her
husband. She was even wondering whether anyone will help Q: What happened next, if any?
her if the judge will do anything to her. After he partially
settled the room’s bill, he warned her not to leave until his A: He tightened his hold on me so I was forced to suck his
return the following morning saying he was returning to the penis afraid that he might break my neck.
Masonic Conference. After he left, she asked a bellboy if she
could leave, but the bellboy told her that she should first
settle the hotel bill before she can check out. Unfortunately, Q: What happened next, if any?
she had no money enough to pay the balance of the hotel
bill. Meantime, through his cell phone, he kept calling her that A: His penis reached my throat and I felt nauseated so I ran
night and threatening her to watch out in the office if she to the bathroom and vomited.
would disobey. She was crying in the hotel. She was terrified
of what he will do to her and her family, and what reaction her
Q: What happened next, if any?
husband would make once he learns of what happened to
her. She was scared that her husband might kill [Judge
Pacuribot] and her husband would be harmed in turn. A: I stayed in the bathroom for a while because I was not
feeling well.
At around 7 a.m. of the following morning, [Judge Pacuribot]
arrived. He came panting and rested in bed while Ms. Tan Q: What was his reaction, if any?
just stood by. She saw him put his gun near the bed. She
recounted the events that happened after, as follows: A: He angrily ordered me to go to him and lie beside him and
I obeyed.
Q: What did he do, if any?
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He ordered me again saying: "Make Love to me!"
A: He rode on top of me again and tried to insert his penis
Q: What was your reaction, if any? into my vagina.

A: I refused. Q: What happened next, if any?

Q: What was his reaction, if any? A: His penis could hardly stiffen.

A: He angrily shouted at me: "My goodness! Why are you so Q: What was his reaction, if any?
slow? As if you are a virgin!"
A: He got angry saying: "It can’t enter! Your vagina’s too
Q: What did you feel, if any? small.

A: I was terrified of him. Q: What did he do next, if any?

Q: What did you do, if any? A: He spread my two (2) legs wide apart and tried to insert
his penis but it did not stiffen.
A: I was forced to go near him, kissed his neck, but [I]
stopped. Q: What happened next, if any?

Q: Why did you stop? A: He pulled my head towards him by pulling my hair.

A: I was disgusted with what I was doing and with him. Q: What was your reaction, if any?

Q: What was his reaction, if any?
A: He angrily told me: "You don’t know how to make love!
How do you do it with Ramon? You simply have sex without
foreplay? Kayati ba sab?"
Q: What was your reaction, if any?
A: I felt helpless and kept quiet.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He ordered me saying: "Suck it!"
A: I told him: "Don’t pull my hair, sir! It’s very painful! What a
sadist you are!"
Q: What was his reaction, if any?
A: He just kissed my lips, neck, sucked my nipple and
mashed my breast by saying: "This is the breast of a lustful
woman" while continuing to suck my neck and breast.
Q: What happened next, if any?
A: He said: "I’m going to plant lots of kiss marks here to let
the people know that you passed through my hands."

Q: What was he referring to as "here"?

Q: What did he want you to suck on him?

A: My neck.
A: His penis.

Q: What was your reaction, if any?

Q: What did you do, if any?
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |28
A: I cried.
Q: What happened after that, if any?
A: He rested while I went crying to the bathroom, washed my
body then dressed up.
Ms. Tan again pleaded for [Judge Pacuribot] to let her go.
This time, [Judge Pacuribot] assented, but he offered to bring
her to the bus terminal. Traumatized, she refused the offer.
She told him that she will just take a taxi and will have
breakfast at the Ororama. Still he insisted to shuttle her there.
Thus, at about past 8:00 o’clock in the morning, he left her at
Ororama Cogon, Cagayan de Oro City.
Ms. Tan did not report to the office the next working day, that
was 22 October 2004 – a Friday. She absented herself from
her work because she still had noticeable number of kiss
marks on her neck. She only reported on Monday and
covered her kiss marks with her hair. At the office, [Judge
Pacuribot] told her not to file anymore her leave for October
20 and 21, 2004 while bragging, "Ako na gud ni, kinsay
magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail against me?)
Ms. Tan told no one of her traumatic experience and carried
on as if nothing happened. But from then on, [Judge
Pacuribot’s] advances on her went on unabated even in the
office. Whenever she would go inside his chamber, at times,
he would grab her blouse, mash her breast, and kiss her
neck saying that she smells so sweet. At times, he would
touch the crotch of her pants or pull the string of her panty.
On 13 October 2005, he did the same indignities to her in the
presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the latter
just pretended to see nothing by turning his back. Every time
she would resist and/or evade his sexual advances, he would
shame her before her officemates at a later time. He also told
her to send him text messages of endearment. She was
warned that her failure to comply, or to receive his call, or
reply to his text messages will have an adverse effect on her
performance rating.
The situation got worse for Ms. Tan when respondent judge [
Judge Pacuribot] indicated his interest in renting a room in
her house which she used as her home office. Ms. Tan’s
house is near the Police Station and the courthouse. Initially,
she candidly told him that the said room is not for rent. She
even refused him in the presence of her officemates who
cannot comprehend why she should not allow him to rent the
room considering that it would be an additional income for
her. At that time, they were unaware what she was going
through.
Ms. Tan brought her commercial calendar to their office. It
has her picture. Having seen it, [Judge Pacuribot], in the
presence of Ms. Tan, instructed Placido Abellana, the court
aide, to mount her calendar at the door of his chamber,
saying: "Whoever removes the calendar would take a
scolding from me. Don’t remove Shirley’s calendar. I like that
hot babes." Then, pointing to her picture, he added: "That’s
my idol, the hot babes Kikay!" As he was still trying to
persuade her then to let him rent a room in her house, he
said in jest to Placido Abellana: "If I rent the room, I will call
Shirly… she will massage me and step on my back and I will
feel good because Shirley is sexy."
With the pressure on her to rent him a room being kept, Ms.
Tan eventually yielded, but she erected a wall between his
rented room and her house, and provided for him a separate
ingress and egress. Nonetheless, when her husband is not
around, she would find him knocking on her window and
ordering her to go to his room.
Ms. Tan claims that if [Judge Pacuribot] could not have his
way with her because she resists, he would scold her in his
chamber and would also humiliate her in the presence of her
officemates. She would also receive threats from him as
regards her performance rating. In fact, her "Very
Satisfactory" rating in the previous years of her service went
down to "Satisfactory" for the period of January to June 2005,
the first and only time that she was given such a rating.
Because of the very oppressive ways of [Judge Pacuribot],
Ms. Tan eventually suffered from what doctors call "chronic
fatigue syndrome" and was hospitalized in December 2005.
Dr. Virgilio Lim of Lipunan Hospital of Gingoog City treated
her. Dr. Lim testified that emotional stresses of a patient
could lead to chronic fatigue syndrome.
Ms. Tan’s helplessness against the sexual abuses and
advances of her judge was gnawing on her. She found it
revolting. She finally mustered enough courage to come out
in the open to free herself. She executed an Affidavit
Complaint sworn before a woman Clerk of Court of Cagayan
de Oro City on 06 December 2005. She flew to Manila and
went to the Supreme Court on 08 December 2005 to file her
administrative case against her superior. In February 2006,
she filed criminal charges of rape, acts of lasciviousness and
sexual harassments against [Judge Pacuribot] before the City
Prosecutor of Gingoog City. At the onset, no lawyer in
Gingoog City would even want to accept her case. The
criminal cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. She re-
filed the case with the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro
City. They were also dismissed.
Villafranca’s Story
Ms. Villafranca first met respondent judge [Judge Pacuribot]
sometime in November 2004 at the lobby near the Probation
Office at the Hall of Justice of Gingoog City where she holds
office. When [Judge Pacuribot] passed by, she was then
talking to a certain Dondi Palugna, her childhood friend who
at that time was [Judge Pacuribot’s] driver. Short
introductions followed.
On 18 December 2004, Ms. Villafranca received a call
through her cell phone from [Judge Pacuribot]. To Ms.
Villafranca, the call was unexpected. After their talk, he asked
her if he could call again for chitchat. She answered "Ok
lang." She asked him how he got her mobile number. He said
he got it from Dondi Palugna. Later, she began to receive text
messages from him, telling her how beautiful and sexy she is,
how the mini skirt suited her, etc. She courteously
acknowledged his praises and said "thank you" to him. Then,
he started inviting her for dinner. Knowing him to be married
and the fact that she is married, she declined these
invitations citing an inoffensive excuse which is her evening
teaching sessions at Bukidnon State College, Gingoog City.
But she found him persistent. One time, he took offense at
her refusal, saying "Why don’t you come with me? I AM A
JUDGE! Why should you refuse me? Why do you go with
Dondi and not with me when I AM A JUDGE?" At another
instance, he even asked her why she goes with Dondi
Pallugna, a drug addict, and not him a judge. Although
scared of his outbursts, which by reputation he was known,
she politely explained to him that his driver Dondi Pallugna
was her childhood friend. Still, she had to dodge his
persistence.
In avoidance, Ms. Villafranca requested for a transfer to
Probation Office, Cagayan de Oro City. This was in February
2005. She was asked to make a written request which she
failed to file due to heavy work load. At that time, the
Regional Office of the Probation Office for Region X was
about to hold a Timestral Conference. Venue of the
Conference was Gingoog City and so the host office for that
conference was the Gingoog City Parole Office where Ms.
Villafranca works. She was assigned to take charge of the
hotel accommodations of participants in the conference. For
that reason, she was too busy attending to her assigned task
that she failed to prepare the written request. Accordingly,
nothing materialized out of her intended transfer.
Although calls of [Judge Pacuribot’s] were unwanted, but Ms.
Villafranca wanted to be polite to him for two (2) reasons: his
status as a judge and his reputation, in the Hall of Justice, as
"terror" which caused most people to fear him. So, she took
his calls politely, gave him respect, and when she had to turn
down his call, she had to do it courteously like: "Ok, sir, I still
have work to do, I cannot talk long."
In the last week of February 2005, Ms. Villafranca got a call
from [Judge Pacuribot] who was fuming mad because she
refused his dinner invitations. Scared, she finally relented. It
was scheduled on 22 February 2005 which turned out to be
her worst nightmare.
February 22, 2005 came. [Judge Pacuribot] asked Ms.
Villafranca to choose a restaurant. She singled out The
Mansion in Gingoog City for good reasons. The Mansion is
owned by her relative. On that account, she thought that in
the place she will be safe. She planned to invite one of her
relatives in that restaurant during the dinner. By arrangement,
she was to be picked up at 7 p.m. at the school gate.
A few minutes past 7 p.m., on the appointed date, [Judge
Pacuribot], driving his car, fetched Ms. Villafranca. He
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |29
opened the car door to her and she took her seat. While she
was talking to him, she saw him brought out his clutch bag,
took out his gun, cocked it and put it in between them.
Frightened that it may blow off anytime, she voiced out her
fears of guns. He quickly replied that guns are for the safety
of judges who are prone to ambushes.
Noticing that [Judge Pacuribot] was driving towards the
opposite direction of The Mansion, she told him they are
driving the wrong way. But she was told that they are going to
Butuan City as he knew a great dining place there. While
driving with his left hand, [Judge Pacuribot] would hold his
gun with his right hand and put it down every now and then
when he had to change gear. This scared her even more and
she started shaking in fear. She observed that he was over
speeding and would honk his horn furiously so the other
drivers would allow him to overtake. She started having
frightening thoughts like imagining being killed if she resists
and be left along the road. She feared for her life, and of her
children.
After about an hour, Ms. Villafranca noticed that [Judge
Pacuribot] turned right from the national highway, and a little
farther, he honked his horn, entered a garage which then
immediately closed as soon as his car entered. It was late for
her to realize that he brought her to a motel in Butuan City.
She became numbed with fear. He alighted from the car
carrying his gun, and opened the door on her side. She
asked him: "Why are you taking me here? You told me we
were going to a restaurant." He ignored her. He told her to
get out of the car. Sensing she was uncooperative because
she would not get down, he grabbed her from the car. She
tried to resist but she was numbed with fear. She wanted to
get away but she could not seem to move. He pushed her in
the room. She attempted to go out of the room but he locked
the door and blocked it with his body. She pleaded to him to
let her go because her children and family are looking for her.
Then, [Judge Pacuribot] grabbed Ms. Villafranca by her
shoulders and tried to kiss her. She evaded by backing out
from him and turning her face away. As she continued to
back away from him, she fell on the bed while he immediately
laid on top of her. She felt his hands groping all over her
body, as he tried to kiss her. She kept on pleading to him to
let her go; that she wants to go home because her kids are
looking for her. He lifted her blouse, unbuttoned and
unzipped her pants while she was pushing him away. But he
was too strong and big for her. She tried to get up when he
took off his pants and brief, but he was fast and was soon on
top of her. As he pinned her down on the bed, she could
hardly move and found him too heavy. All along she was
trembling in fear and was crying while pleading to him for
mercy. But he could not be dissuaded. On cross examination,
[Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel asked her some details on this
incident, as follows:
Atty. Kho:
Q: You said you were brought to Butuan City in a motel. Do
you remember the name of the motel?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Could you remember the size of the room that you were in
on that day which you claim on February 22, 2004?
A: I’m sorry, Attorney, everything seems to be so blurred
during that time. All I could really remember was asking him
to take me home because it was not agreed that I go with him
in a motel but in a restaurant at Mansion by the sea at
Gingoog City.
Q: So you don’t remember really anything else?
A: I remember what happened to me.
Q: Why, what happened to you?
A: When he forced himself to me.
Q: When you say he forced himself to you, what do you
mean?
A: When he was on top of me and he was kissing me. God, I
can feel and I can remember how heavily he was breathing in
my face and he was kissing me all over and he was trying to
position himself inside of me. Those are what I can
remember and I kept on telling him: "No! I want to go home to
my children." I wanted to go home because my family will be
looking for me. What? Did he listen to me? No, he kept on
telling me I am emancipated. Nobody will look for me.
Q: What were you wearing at that time on February 22?
A: I was wearing pants and a blouse.
Q: Were you undressed at that time?
A: I am sorry?
Q: Were you undressed?
A: Undressed? He undressed me.
Q: He undressed you?
A: Yes.
Q: Nothing left?
(No reply).
Ms. Villafranca felt that her legs were being parted as [Judge
Pacuribot] tried to insert his penis into her vagina, but she
could sense he had difficulty with erection. She felt
penetration was slight. She recalled that he tried penetration
more than three times, but was unsuccessful. She felt his
heavy breathing while he planted vile kisses on her neck and
chest. Her repeated pleas for mercy had not done her any
good. Not long after, he rolled over with her and she found
herself on top of him. He grabbed her hair and pushed down
her face to his penis, and forced her to do oral sex on him
instead. She resisted, but he insisted saying that it was what
he wanted, otherwise she would be put to harm. She took it
to mean that he will kill her if she refuses him. Scared, she
relented and had oral sex on him. She felt shamed as she
sucked his limp penis. She was disgusted with him, with
herself and the very act itself. Still not having an erection, he
released his grip on her. While she was physically and
emotionally exhausted, she continued crying for mercy, but
[Judge Pacuribot] was boasting that nobody in his right mind
would refuse his demands as he could easily cause damage
to anybody’s honor if he wanted to.
Ms. Villafranca then got up, and put on her underwear and
pants. [Judge Pacuribot] also got up and took his cell phone.
She pulled the sheets to cover herself because her blouse
was on the opposite side of the bed. However, he pulled the
sheets from her and pushed her to the bed half naked. She
braced herself with her arms so that the she would not be
pinned down on the bed again. But to her surprise, he took a
picture of her, using his cell phone. She was petrified. He
then looked at the picture commenting that it was no good
because she was not smiling, so he ordered her to smile as
he will take another picture of her. Although she defied him,
yet he did take another picture of her. She the hurriedly put
on her blouse while he dressed up, fixed himself and tucked
his shirt and his gun.
After [Judge Pacuribot] settled the bill, he led her out of the
room. Ms. Villafranca shrugged him off. At the garage, she
was ushered to the front seat of the car. She was dying to go
home. He drove back to Gingoog City. On their way back,
she turned her back on him, closed her eyes, covered her
face with hand, and pretended to be asleep. Later, he
informed her of their approach to Gingoog City. She asked
him to drop her off at the old Caltex gasoline station along the
national highway. From there, she hailed a motorela, went
home, took a long bath to wash his marks of her. At about 11
p.m., she fetched her children from her father’s house. When
asked where she had been, she gave her father a lame
excuse that she went out with her friends.
Ms. Villafranca reported to work the next day. There had
been some phone calls in their office. Like any other office,
whoever has the convenience to answer at the time would
pick up the phone. [Judge Pacuribot] had called twice their
office already and when her officemates answer the phone,
he would just hang the line. When the phone rung again, she
picked it up. It was [Judge Pacuribot] on the other end. After
recognizing her voice, he belittled her yelling: "Prostitute!
Devil! Animal! Why don’t you pick up the phone?" She was
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |30
consumed with fear, and meekly told him that she was just
busy. Days passed as he continued to threaten her with the
publication of her half naked picture. She tried to pacify him
sensing that he could make real his threats. Being married to
an overseas worker with two kids, she was so scared of
figuring in a scandal. Her fright of him was burdensome. He
would send her text messages telling her of sweet nothings,
but every time she would ignore them, he would burst in
anger and would renew his threats. At times, she made
excuses, like having no cell phone load, but he would insist
that she should secure a load, otherwise he would shame
her. He was far too wise to accept excuses. Her constant fear
made her succumb to his blackmails.
[Judge Pacuribot] was always demanding that Ms. Villafranca
send him text messages and letters expressing nonsense, a
matter she could not understand then. She thought it was
only to feed his ego. On cross examination, [Judge
Pacuribot’s] counsel asked why she complied with these
orders. She answered:
Atty. Kho:
Q: In your affidavit, do you remember having said that the
respondent is forcing you to send to him text messages?
A: Yes.
Q: And you complied with the sending of these text
messages?
A: Yes, because one day when I was not able to text he
called me and he screamed at me over the phone and then
he said: "Burikat, animal ka, yawa ka, imo gibuhat… dili ko
nimo i-ignore. This will be the last time na imo ko i-ignore sa
text or sa tawag nako. Otherwise, you will pay for it."
Atty. Ignes translating:
"You whore, you devil, you animal, don’t you dare! This will
be the last time you will ignore me in my call, otherwise you
will pay for it."
Atty. Kho:
Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?
A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that
picture, he will show that to my mother-in-law and then he will
destroy me and he will create scandal in Gingoog City.
Q: Is it not that you are well-connected? Your grandmother is
the mayor. Did you not report it to her?
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.
Q: And?
A: And what? How would I explain to them that I was there?
How he took my picture? How am I going to? I don’t know. I
just wanted to protect my family from any shame, from any
scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold to me. And he
knew that I would be very careful with the name that my
family had, that is why he is constantly threatening me with
such same arguments, you know. "Ikaw and madaot ani. Imo
ning kuan tana."
Atty. Ignes:
"You will be destroyed because of this."
Atty. Kho:
Q: So, you admit that you sent him a lot of text messages?
A: I did not deny it in my affidavit. I had it in my affidavit, that
there were text messages and forced notes written for him.
[Judge Pacuribot] also asked her to send him cards with
amorous messages. On these, she was also grilled on cross
– examination. It went as follows:
Atty. Kho:
Q: You mean you often wrote some notes?
A: Yes. I may even have some drafts there wherein he even
edited it.
Q: What kind of notes were they?
A: Love notes and there was a time he made me write a letter
to my mother-in-law which the very next day I was posting
myself at the Post Office awaiting for that letter to come so
that I could intercept it.
xxxx
Q: Also attached to the Comment of respondent are some
notes already marked as Annex 9. Could you go over some
of these notes and tell us if this is your handwriting? Annexes
9 and 9B.
A: I will not deny that I wrote these letters but they were
under his supervision just like the ones he made to my
mother-in-law and to my husband.
Q: You mean to say you were writing the letters?
A: Yes. He will dictate to me what to do, what to say.
xxxx
Q: So you were acting like a stenographer who writes down
his dictation?
A: I did not act like a stenographer who wrote down his
dictation. But I acted like a victim who is under threat by
some…
Q: The words here in Annexes 9-A and 9-B, you mean to say
all of these are his words, the respondent?
A: As I said Attorney, yes, under his dictation, under his
supervision. Do you know what is this?
Atty. Kho:
No. Do not ask me a question. You are not allowed to do
that.
Witness (continuing)
While I was doing those writing, I felt that all my limbs were
so tired. I felt so heavy writing those letters.
Atty. Kho:
Q: So you admit sending the respondent a lot more letters
that the ones I’ve presented you?
A: I admit that I wrote those letters under his supervision,
yes.
Q: All of the letters that you sent were all under his
supervision?
A: As I said, yes, under his supervision. There were times
that he would even call me to his chamber to have some
cards signed.
Q: So, aside from notes, you also sent him cards?
A: Yes, I recall signing them because he would ask me to do
so.
xxxx
Justice Flores:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |31
Q: When you said that the judge would even call you to his
chamber to sign cards, what kinds of cards?
A: Greeting cards, Your Honor.
Atty. Kho:
Q: Hallmark?
A: I don’t recall. I would just easily sign them, do whatever he
wanted and then after he is done touching me I would ask
myself to leave.
Q: So, you also sent him lots of greeting cards?
A: I did not send your client. He gave it to himself.
Q: I am going to show you one last card. Tell me, is this one
of the cards that you said you signed? I’m going to give this
to you. For submission.
A: Yes.
Q: This is one of the cards that you signed?
A: One of those cards that I signed.
xxxx
Q: Miss Witness, the handwriting on this card now marked as
Exhibit 6, on the second line of the handwriting are the words
"Love you, Bi." Could you tell us what is the meaning of the
word "Bi", if you know?
A: It has no significance with me because your client dictated
it to me.
Q: So, it was dictated only.
A: As I said, he dictated words to me.
Ms. Villafranca’s resistance would always be met with a
threat to divulge the incident in the motel. Although she
yielded to these promptings of sending him text messages or
cards or notes, she never understood why [Judge Pacuribot]
behaved so. It was late in the day when enlightenment came
to her that all his orders to her to send him amorous text
messages, letters and cards were not to feed his ego but to
prepare for his defense even while she was as submissive as
a lamb. In his Comment to the administrative charge against
him, he cited the text messages, letters and cards he induced
her to send to him to deflect her charges of rape and
unprofessional conduct and prove them untrue. He cited
them in his Comment as her manifestation of "fatal attraction"
to him.
xxxx
There had been occasions when [Judge Pacuribot]
summoned Ms. Villfranca to his chambers on the pretext of
discussing probation matters, but once inside his chamber,
he would lock the door, grab her, kiss her, put kiss marks on
her neck and chest. He would pull her hair and push her
down to his crotch and demand that she performs oral sex on
him. Her overpowering fear of him and the scandal he can
inflict on her family made her yield to him. When she would
disobey him he would call her cell phone with lots of insults
like calling her "burikat" or with his threats.
Also, [Judge Pacuribot] demanded food from Ms. Villafranca
which the latter had to bring to his room in Ms. Tan’s house.
Her fear of dire consequences of her resistance absorbed
her. When demanded to bring food, she would comply out of
fear. In her words, "Yes, I went because he would put me
under pressure and under fire." She went not only because of
his constant threat of making public his cell phone picture of
her, half naked, but also because of "his added threat that he
is going to tell my mother-in-law; that he is going to destroy
me; that I am nobody; that my family is no good and he would
call me ‘burikat, burikat (whore)’. He would call me that name
‘yawa ka, animal ka. Sumunod ka nako." She was angst-
ridden with the set – up. She was fearful that somebody
might see her in his rented room or on her way to it or back.
She was made to go there about eight (8) times. All these
instances, she saw him display his gun. She found him too
selfish and an ingrate. Once, on his demand to bring food,
she brought him only pansit and lumpia which was no longer
crisp. Unappreciative, he furiously stabbed his plate with fork,
breaking it and carped that she served him food which is not
fit for a judge, and suited only to her seaman husband. He
also made her eat with him on occasions which she abhorred
so much because according to her "he ate like a pig – eating
fast with shoulders hunched, elbows on the table, mouth
noisily chewing the food."
When grilled on those eight (8) times, the following
exchanges between [Judge Pacuribot’s] counsel and Ms.
Villafranca took place:
Atty. Kho:
Q: In all of these times, 8 times which you said, you did not
care to offer any resistance?
A: I had offered a lot of resistance, Attorney, but your client
would make it a point that I should not refuse him.
Q: You tried to resist?
A: I had evaded him many times, many times but he would
always point out that I should not refuse him, otherwise he
will destroy me and he did eventually when I finally had the
courage to put up with him, you know.
(The witness is crying at the witness stand)
Q: During those 8 times which you said you went to the room
of respondent at Sherlita Tan’s place which is near the police
station and the LTO, was there a time that you shouted?
A: I could not shout, I’m scared.
Q: You were scared of what?
A: Scared of your client.
Q: Of the person?
A: Yes and how intimidating he could be and how evil he
could be.
After eating, Ms. Villafranca would be ordered to take off her
clothes; then, [Judge Pacuribot] would lay on top of her for
his sexual pleasures. But penetration would be slight
because, as usual, he had difficulty with erection. As a
consequence, he would push her down to his organ and
order her to do oral sex on him. She detested his routine of
putting kiss marks on her neck and chest which he
intentionally used so that, as he told her, people would know
that he owned her. At times, she left his rented room wearing
a hooded jacket in order o hide her face fearful that certain
people might recognize her along the way. There were times
she also left his room without underwear because he would
not give it to her. She hated his sexual abuses, but she was
more afraid of causing scandal to her family.
In April 2005, after having dinner with [Judge Pacuribot] in his
rented room, Ms. Villafranca was pulled by her hair and was
asked, "[w]ho owns you now?" She answered in fear – "you."
He looked very pleased. Then, he told her to leave her
husband and promised to help her file a marriage annulment
complaint in Gingoog City. She did not say a word. He went
on top of her and pulled her hair demanding for an answer.
Terrified, she said "opo". Then, she was forced to have sex
with him.
[Judge Pacuribot] wanted to destroy the relationship Ms.
Villafranca has with her husband and his family. He forced
her to write a letter, asking for a break up of marriage from
her husband which [Judge Pacuribot] edited. He also ordered
her to write to her mother-in-law with whom she had some
difficulty in their in-law relationship, to say she wanted a
marriage break-up. She told him she does "not need to write
letters to her mother-in-law. What for?" But he insisted. Her
hands felt heavy writing them, in fact it took her three drafts
to write as shown in Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" of Ms.
Villafranca. Discontented with her drafts, he took away the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |32
last from her, edited it, and told her he will mail it to her
mother-in-law. Thinking he will make good of his threat, the
following day she posted herself outside the Gingoog City
Post Office for a long time and waited for the mailing of said
letter so that she can intercept it. No one came. She
instructed the postal clerk that if there is a letter intended for
her mother-in-law, she should not give it to her mother-in-law
but to her instead.
Meantime, Ms. Villafranca’s morbid fear of [Judge Pacuribot],
his threat to mire her and her family in scandal and her guilt
toward her family had been sucking her into a vortex of
emotional and physical collapse. She bore the immense pain
of yielding to him. She seemingly could not withstand the
humiliation for being involved in forced sordid incidents with
[Judge Pacuribot] whom she detested.
On 9 May 2005, seemingly depressed for her accumulated
frustrations for not being able to see her way out of her
predicament, Ms. Villafranca, sent a text message to her
husband who was then working aboard a foreign vessel. Her
text message went this way: "Whatever will happen to me,
you take care of the kids." He asked: "What’s wrong?" She
answered: "I cannot fully disclose to you everything but in
due time I will. Whatever happens to me, just take care of the
kids and that I love them." Her disturbing message
constrained her husband to pre-terminate his employment
contract and rushed home to Gingoog City on 15 May 2005.
She then personally told [Judge Pacuribot] to stop calling her
or asking for food, but he grabbed her hair, twisted her head
and planted a kiss mark on her neck, telling her that it would
send a message to her husband that he, not her husband,
owned her. Still, she was not prepared to make her
revelations to her husband.
In the third week of May 2005, Ms. Villafranca was
persistently instigated by [Judge Pacuribot] to file an
annulment case against her husband. Later, he asked her to
sign what Ms. Villafranca calls a "ridiculous document" he
drafted wherein it purported to show that she and her
husband agreed that each of them may freely cohabit with a
third person. She signed it in the face of his threats. Worse,
he asked her to ask her husband to sign the same document.
On 25 May 2005, at the Hall of Justice in Gingoog City, Ms.
Villafranca was summoned to [Judge Pacuribot’s] chamber.
Once inside, he slapped her for not filing her petition for
annulment of marriage and hit her head with clenched fist.
Then, he planted on her neck kiss marks which he said he
wanted her husband to see. Indeed, when her husband found
her with kiss marks, she suffered from her husband’s beating.
Citing her husband’s beating her, Ms. Villafranca pleaded to
[Judge Pacuribot] to stop molesting her. He countered with
an unusual suggestion – File a rape case against him. When
she refused, the threat of the dire consequences of her
refusal came again. She still kept from her husband what she
was going through.
But [JudgePacuribot] seized another incident to destroy her
more. On 15 June 2005, he reported in writing to the
superiors of Ms. Villafranca – superiors in local office and
superiors in Manila – alleging her negligence allegedly
committed on 6 June 2005 in forgetting to shut off the air-con
unit in their Probation Office. Her local superior in the
Probation Office referred to her the letter of [Judge
Pacuribot]. She prepared an explanation which her local
superior used as letter to the judge. Thinking that because
she authored that letter, the explanation there covered
already her side, she did not write nor see the judge
anymore. This further infuriated him.
xxxx
In July 2006, Ms. Villafranca’s request for transfer was
granted and she started working in Cagayan de Oro City on
17 July 2006. The transfer of assignment resulted in her
constant separation from her nine (9) year old son and four
(4) year old daughter, plus the great inconvenience of a 2½
hours bus ride from Gingoog City one way, and
transportation expenses. She would usually go home to
Gingoog City to be with her family and children on weekends,
or every now and then, and sometimes late at night.
After her transfer to the Probation Office in Cagayan de Oro
City on 17 July 2006, Ms. Villafranca was able to tell her
husband what she went through. Before that, she just could
not find the courage to tell him because she was scared.
When she was twitted on cross examination on how so long
that she was scared, she said:
Atty. Kho:
Q: So, what you told him at that time was that you were
scared?
A: Attorney, I was walking in fear most of those times and
even up to now when I came home I am walking in fear. I
don’t know if I’m safe. I don’t know if the next day I will be
dead. I don’t know. Those were the times when I asked my
husband to accompany me because I’m always scared all the
time. Even if I just go out of the gate ask my husband to
accompany me.
(At this juncture, witness is sobbing)
Ms. Villafranca decided to fight back with this administrative
charge. She subscribed her Affidavit-Complaint before State
Prosecutor Roberto A. Escaro on 13 December 2005. In Ms.
Villafranca’s Complaint she prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be
found guilty of gross violation of the Judicial Code Of
Professional Responsibility (Code of Judicial Conduct) for
being totally unfit to stay in the Judiciary and she prayed that
he be ordered immediately dismissed from service. She also
prayed that [Judge Pacuribot] be immediately ordered to
cease and desist from causing any further assault on her
person, in her personal and professional capacity.
On the same day, Ms. Villafranca submitted her Affidavit-
Complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator. [Judge
Pacuribot] filed his Comment. Among others, he cited that
Ms. Villafranca was "fatally attracted to him" and that he
refused to reciprocate because "he is a judge and happily
married," and for the reason that Ms. Villafranca’s
"misdirected adoration is atrociously immoral." Ms.
Villafranca filed a Rejoinder refuting point by point the
defenses of [Judge Pacuribot] and calling them lies. Ms.
Villafranca said his defenses are presumptuous and revolting
because in the Hall of Justice, female personnel "invariably
veer away from his path in trepidation." She asserts that
[Judge Pacuribot’s] extramarital indiscretions are well known,
if not well documented, in Gingoog City, that it is common
knowledge that his mistress Sheryl Gamulo, whom [Judge
Pacuribot] housed in Motomull St., Gingoog City, gave birth
to two (2) children by [Judge Pacuribot] on 16 October 2004
and 02 September 2005 at the Maternity Hospital, Cagayan
de Oro City; that the eldest child was baptized in Opol,
Misamis Oriental with Atty. Wilfredo Bibera, his clerk of Court,
and Dondi Pallugna, his driver, as baptismal sponsors. Ms.
Villafranca claims therein that respondent judge is also
known to have sired a daughter in Ozamiz City now about ten
(10) years old whose picture has been circulated in the Hall
of Justice and that [Judge Pacuribot’s] immorality most
probably inflicted on victimized women is a sick source of
scandal and gossip in the city.
To be able to put behind her harrowing experience, Ms.
Villafranca applied for leave of absence with their office to
work abroad knowing that [Judge Pacuribot’s] order in People
v. Anude and his letter to her superiors have effectively made
her lose that desired promotion. Eventually she left the
country on 2 October 2006 for Dubai, UAE to work and forget
her past even if her leave of absence in their office was not
yet approved. On 18 March 2007, she returned to testify in
this case after struggling against employment restrictions and
financial constraints, she not having been half a year yet
abroad. On 22 March 2007, when asked on the witness stand
when she will leave again for Dubai, she said: "I want to
leave the country as much as possible and stay out of here. I
don’t want to be reminded of what happened to me." At the
time she testified in March 2007 in this case, her leave of
absence in the Probation Office was not yet granted.
In his Comment,9 Judge Pacuribot denied the charges of Ms.
Tan and Villafranca for "lack of factual and legal bases"; and
opposed the allegations on the ground that the same were
motivated by revenge and were part of a comprehensive and
sinister plan to drive him out of service.
Judge Pacuribot made total denial of Ms. Tan’s charges
against him and claimed that the alleged incidents on 20 and
21 October 2004 were "big lie[s], a fraud, a hoax and
deception." He insisted that he could not have committed the
acts complained of by Ms. Tan because in his first five
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |33
months in office, he was busy planning what to do and how to
quickly dispose of the almost 500 cases he inherited,
including the new ones raffled to him.
In particular, Judge Pacuribot denied the alleged rape
incidents on 20-21 October 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City,
and interposed the defense of alibi. He contended that he
was in faraway Gingoog City, which is 120 kilometers away
from Cagayan de Oro City. He stated that on Mondays, he
reports for his duties in Gingoog City, and goes home to
Cagayan de Oro City only on Fridays. He maintained that on
20 October 2004, a Wednesday, at 7:00 p.m., he went out of
his chambers with his court aide Placido Abellana, Jr., and
his security officer SPO1 Ronald Espejon. They proceeded to
Garahe Sugbahan Grill for dinner. After dinner, Espejon and
Abellana escorted him back to his boarding house. Abellana
left him at 9:00 p.m. while Espejon went home at about 11:00
p.m.
Judge Pacuribot admitted that he did not hold trial on 21
October 2004, a Thursday, because the scheduled settings
were all cancelled that day which cancellation was made a
week before. He averred that on the same day, he was
writing decisions in his chambers. In the evening, he asked
Abellana to buy food and they ate supper with Espejon.
Abellana left him about 8:00 p.m. while Espejon left at about
10:00 p.m.
He, thus, concluded that it was impossible for him to be with
Ms. Tan on 20 and 21 October 2004, a Wednesday and a
Thursday, respectively. He argued that no proof existed to
show his physical presence in Cagayan de Oro City on those
dates; hence, the presumption of his continuing physical
presence in his station during the inclusive period alluded to
ran in his favor.
Judge Pacuribot also cited several factors which made Ms.
Tan’s allegations unbelievable:
1. Ms. Tan’s behavior was not reflective of a rape victim. Ms.
Tan did not immediately report the incident to the authorities.
As a 43-year-old lady who is no longer naïve and having
assisted as stenographer in countless rape cases, she
should know how important it is to immediately report the
incident.
2. Judge Pacuribot pointed to Ms. Tan’s admission that she
did not put up a struggle when he allegedly brought her to
City Lodge Motel and Discovery Hotel. Had she wanted to
catch the attention of employees, she could have done so.
He also stressed that what Ms. Tan called a headboard
where he allegedly put his gun in the motel room was merely
less than one inch in width, too narrow for a .45 cal. gun to
rest.
3. On 25 November 2004, a month and three days after the
alleged rape, Ms. Tan invited all her officemates, including
him, to her birthday party held at her home, where she sang
and danced. She displayed her dancing skills then. She even
taught him how to dance the swing. Again, during the Court’s
Christmas Party in December 2004, she socialized with her
fellow workers, including him, and even performed the "kikay
dance" during the program.
4. On 1 Septemeber 2005, all the staff of Judge Pacuribot,
including Ms. Tan, attended his birthday party at his house in
Cagayan de Oro City, where she merrily danced with dance
instructors and posed with Judge Pacuribot’s wife.
5. On May 2006, five months after she filed the administrative
charge against Judge Pacuribot, Ms. Tan joined the Search
for Mrs. Gingoog City Contest as one of the candidates and
she paraded in the gymnasium, all smiles, while attired in an
elegant gown.
6. Judge Pacuribot alleged that Ms. Tan and her husband
were publicly known to be putting up a façade that all was
well with them, although they constantly quarreled and had
been sleeping in separate rooms already.
Judge Pacuribot disputed Ms. Tan’s version of how he
became the lessee of a room at Ms. Tan’s house. He claimed
that in January 2005, she came to know that he was looking
for a new boarding house and she offered two small rooms at
her house available for rent. He chose the one facing the
Police Station of Gingoog City, which he claimed to be only
about five meters more or less from the room he rented. He
paid an advance rental of P5,000.00.
Judge Pacuribot denied sexually harassing Ms. Tan. In
refuting her claim that he sexually harassed her in his
chambers, he countered that this could not have happened
as his court aide, Placido Abellana, was always in his
chamber with him. If Abellana was out on an errand, his
security officer, SPO1 Ronald Espejon, temporarily took over.
There had never been any moment in his chambers that he
was without companion. There was always either his court
aide or his security officer with him. Even when he had
visitors, his court aide was still in his chambers to maintain
transparency and avoid unwarranted talk. Once in a while,
his branch clerk of court, Atty. Willfredo Bibera, Jr., would go
to his chambers to confer with him regarding cases.
Sometimes, too, his security officer Espejon would take his
blood pressure in his chambers. Under these circumstances,
Judge Pacuribot argued that no sexual harassment could
have occurred. He also called attention to the fact that Ms.
Tan’s affidavit and testimony presented the dates of the
alleged sexual harassments as follows:
27 October 2004 06 January 2005
03 November 2004 08 August 2005
25 November 2004 03 October 2005
08 December 2004 04 October 2005
09 December 2004 11 October 2005
05 January 2005 13 October 200510
The 6 January 2005 alleged incidents were followed only on
8 August 2005, thus, belying Ms. Tan’s claim that the sexual
harassments were done regularly. Also, Ms. Tan’s allegation
that he sexually harassed her on 25 November 2005 was
incredible, because on that date she was on her birthday
leave, and was busy preparing the dishes she was going to
serve them during her party. He emphasized that the criminal
complaints for rape, acts of lasciviousness and sexual
harassments filed by Ms. Tan against him with the City
Prosecutors Office in Gingoog City and Cagayan de Oro City
were all dismissed.
Judge Pacuribot explained that these administrative and
criminal charges filed against him by Tan and Villafranca
were part and parcel of a grand plot hatched by Ronnie
Waniwan, a radio commentator, to oust him from office. He
claimed that Waniwan was then facing four counts of libel in
his sala. The City Prosecutor recommended P50,000.00 bail
for each. When Waniwan filed a motion to reduce bail bond,
respondent denied it for several reasons, i.e., (1) there was a
previous conviction, (2) he was not from Gingoog City, and
(3) when a warrant for his arrest was issued, he went into
hiding instead of surrendering. Waniwan filed a motion for
respondent to inhibit himself, which the latter denied. As a
consequence, Waniwan spent 13 days in jail for failure to put
up a bail bond. Judge Pacuribot learned that Waniwan had
contacted the NPA for Judge Pacuribot’s "liquidation" as
revealed in the affidavits of two captured NPA sparrow unit
members. He discovered that Waniwan with Mesdames Tan
and Villafranca plotted and conspired to destroy him after his
personal talk with other media men including Jonas
Bustamante, Jerry Orcullo and Jessie Mongcal.
Judge Pacuribot believed that Ms. Tan succumbed to the
egging of Waniwan to jump the gun on him. Ms. Tan knew
that her job was in danger because of her growing
inefficiency, a subject of his several warnings, since her
inefficiency would essentially affect the performance of his
court, a scenario which he abhorred, having been a
consistent performer in the disposal of cases during his days
as labor arbiter. In fact, he considered Ms. Tan the most
inefficient among the four stenographers he had. She was
allegedly lazy, inarticulate in the English language, and
flawed in spelling, which hampered her effectiveness in
preparing transcriptions. Worse, due to her moonlighting as
manager of the Tan-Hoegee Internet Café, she would usually
go home during office hours to catch some sleep. He
believed that his good relationship with her soured when he
asked Ms. Tan to be more focused on the job; that he was
going to move to a new house; and when he did not let her
borrow P200,000.00, or at least be a guarantor of her loan.
Anent the written charges of Ms. Villafranca, Judge Pacuribot
specifically denied all material allegations therein for being
untrue. In particular, he denied the alleged rape incident on
22 February 2005 in Butuan City. He asserted that he never
went out alone at night in Gingoog City, knowing the place to
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |34
be dangerous, and the fact that PNP confirmed to him that he
was in the list of those slated for "liquidation" by the NPA.
Hence, he insisted that he neither invited Ms. Villafranca for
dinner, nor did he travel from Gingoog City to Butuan City
during night time.
Judge Pacuribot claimed that on 22 February 2005, at 5:00
o’clock more or less in the afternoon, he asked a certain Fil
Sumaylo to buy and cook a big fish and ten pieces of small
octopus because they would have dinner at the latter’s
house. At about 6:30 p.m., respondent went with his security
officer Espejon and court aide Abellana to Sumaylo’s house.
His branch clerk of court, Atty. Bibera, was also there. After
dinner, Espejon and Abellana escorted him back to his
boarding house at about 11:00 p.m. Abellana left ahead,
while Espejon left at about 11:30 p.m.
Also, Judge Pacuribot gave several reasons why he would
not venture at all to go to Butuan City alone. He said he was
security conscious, considering that he handled drug cases
and other high-profile cases. He had also received NPA
threats on his life. He claimed that Butuan City was about 80
kilometers from Gingoog City and he would not go there and
risk his life for a woman he barely knew.
In denying Ms. Villafranca’s allegations of sexual harassment
and acts of lasciviousness, Judge Pacuribot pointed out that
the acts of grabbing, kissing and performing oral sex in his
chambers could not have happened as his court aide,
Abellana, who is the uncle of Ms. Villafranca, was always
present in his chambers, aside from the fact that his chamber
was just beside the room of the staff.
Judge Pacuribot contended that Ms. Villafranca’s charges
were improbable. He assessed her to be a very intelligent
woman with a strong personality. Ms. Villafranca is well
connected, because she is a recognized illegitimate daughter
of a certain Polkem Motomull, a one-time member of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental and nephew of Mrs.
Ruthie Guingona, incumbent City Mayor of Gingoog City. A
sister of her father is the Assistant City Auditor of Gingoog
City, while Judge Pacuribot’s predecessor, Judge Potenciano
de los Reyes, is her father’s first cousin-in-law. RTC Judge
Downey Valdevilla of Cagayan de Oro City is also her uncle;
and even Judge Pacuribot’s court aide, Abellana, is her
father’s first cousin. Considering the big family of Ms.
Villafranca, anyone will think, not just twice, but several
times, before doing anything against her. Ms. Villafranca will
not just allow herself to be raped and beaten by a stranger
like him in Gingoog City. He found out that, as indicated in
the police blotter of Gingoog City, Ms. Villafranca reported
that she was raped and mauled by Mr. Ricky Lee Villfranca,
her husband, who carted away important belongings at about
2:00 a.m. of 26 May 2005. He claimed that if Ms. Villafranca
could report her husband to the police for said offense, then
she should have reported him also to the police if her
allegations were true.
Judge Pacuribot denied calling Ms. Villafranca through her
cellphone. On the contrary, it was she who was calling him.
She also sent him adoring or alluring text messages including
seductive notes and poems. He claimed that being a happily
married man, he ignored the flirtatious and seductive
advances of Ms. Villafranca, to her consternation and
bewilderment. He claimed that her adulation of him came to
an abrupt end and metamorphosed into an intense hatred
and dislike after he issued the 6 June 2005 Order in Criminal
Case No. 2004-2879 entitled, "People v. Anunde" pointing
out her incompetence, inexperience and unprofessional
attitude toward her work. He opined that the charges of Ms.
Villafranca are typical under the adage, "Hell hath no fury
than a woman scorned."
Judge Pacuribot further complained that Ms. Villafranca
would follow up cases of her relatives in his sala.
After weighing the evidences and arguments of all the
parties, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores found:
FATHERHOOD UNPROVEN
On the Anonymous Letters about [Judge Pacuribot’s]
illegitimate fatherhood, the Investigator finds the claim
unsupported by any documentary evidence. Although the
certification of the hospital’s administrative officer proves
correct the claim in the anonymous letter as to (1) the
hospital; (2) the identity of the mother; (3) the number of
children delivered; and (4) the date of birth of the two
children, but it did not shed light on the identity of the
children’s father. In this case, the certificates of birth of the
two (2) children mentioned in the anonymous letter showing
[Judge Pacuribot’s] fatherhood would be the best evidence
adequate to prove the claim. With no-record-of-birth-
certifications issued by the local civil city registrar and the
office of the Civil Registrar General, no finding of guilt can be
made.
RAPE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENTS PROVEN BEYOND
REASONBLE DOUBT
Ms. Villafranca’s story of rape and repeated sexual
harassments is credible. [Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of
denial and alibi failed to overcome complainants’ evidence.
On the rape in Butuan City motel, [Judge Pacuribot] insists
on the improbability of his presence at the scene of the crime
because he alleges that he does not go out at night in
Gingoog City without company for two (2) reasons – that he
is security conscious and that there is an NPA threat on his
person.
Firstly, [Judge Pacuribot’s] being security conscious is no
proof of improbability in going to Butuan City. So many
criminals are security conscious yet they go out alone at night
to commit a crime. Hence, his being security conscious could
not have deterred him to go out.
Secondly, his claim of an NPA threat on his person is
suspect. He claims that he learned he was marked for NPA
liquidation when he was given a copy of the affidavits of two
(2) captured NPAs named Marvin Lumod and Rico Roselem
marked as Exhibits "22" and "23" respectively. Unfortunately,
these two (2) affidavits will not help [Judge Pacuribot]. Marvin
E. Lumod’s Affidavit is dated 20 June 2006 while Rico A.
Roselem’s Affidavit is dated 19 June 2006. The incident in
Butuan City occurred on 22 February 2005. The reason,
therefore, in not wanting to go out at night without company
on 22 February 2005 was still absent. [Judge Pacuribot’s]
alibi that he was in Gingoog City on 22 February 2005 is
backed up by the testimonies of SPO1 Ronald Espejon and
Placido Abellana. But these two are his loyals aside from the
fact that Abellana, as his court aide, is also one whose
employment is under control and supervision of [Judge
Pacuribot]. Thus, on that account, their testimony must be
taken with grain of salt. Their testimony cannot discredit the
straightforward testimony of Ms. Villafranca on how [Judge
Pacuribot] deceived her twice – on the purpose and on the
place. He invited her for dinner but ravished her instead.
They agreed on The Mansion in Gingoog City for the dinner,
yet drove her to a Butuan City motel.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks: Why did Ms. Villafranca not report to
the authorities that he sexually assaulted her, if true, when
she even reported to the police that her husband raped her
on 26 May 2005? [Judge Pacuribot], to prove that Ms.
Villafranca reported to the Police, presented Annex "3", a
certified copy of an entry in the Police Blotter of Gingoog City.
[Judge Pacuribot] should have noted that in that certified
copy, it is shown that it was his security officer, SPO1 Ronald
Espejon, not Ms. Villafranca, who had the report entered in
the police blotter. The certification did not say that Ms.
Villafranca appeared at all in the Police Station and had the
incident blottered. All that Ms. Villafranca did was to ask
Espejon for assistance because he was beaten by her
husband.
[Judge Pacuribot] claims that the administrative charge is Ms.
Villafranca’s reprisal against him. He claims that Ms.
Villafranca appears to be "fatally attracted to him" and that he
"remains steadfast in his refusal to reciprocate he atrociously
immoral and misdirected adoration to him." He claims the
administrative charge is proof of the fury of a woman
scorned. On the "fatal attraction" [Judge Pacuribot] cited the
text messages, notes and cards he claims Ms. Villfranca sent
him. Ms. Villaffranca explained how he has always
demanded of her to send him those, the reason for which she
could not fathom then. He would even have cards in his
chamber and then summon her to sign them. When she
resists, he would let out a barge of insults and threats. [Judge
Pacuribot’s] possession of those letters, cards, and text
messages was adequately explained by Ms. Villafranca.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory of Ms. Villafranca’s "fatal
attraction" and "misdirected adoration" of him is funny. He
never disputed the testimony of the two (2) complainants that
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |35
[Judge Pacuribot] is reputed in the Hall of Justice as "terror",
that he is fond of humiliating people in public, using
excoriating language on his victim, that female employees
avoid him and veer away from him when they meet in the
Hall of Justice. He also failed to specifically deny the claim of
Ms. Villafranca that he housed his mistress, Sheryl Gamulo,
in Motomul St., Gingoog City. He also failed to specifically
deny her claim that he sired a ten (10) year old daughter in
Ozamis City. Will all the dark side of his character publicly
known, hardly would a twenty-nine (29) year-old, very pretty
married woman who [Judge Pacuribot] claims is very
intelligent fall for such character. Thus, [Judge Pacuribot’s]
claim of Ms. Villafranca’s "fatal attraction" and "misdirected
adoration" of him becomes incredible.
[Judge Pacuribot] asks why did Ms. Villafranca allow herself
to be raped and victimized over a prolonged period of time
when there were people capable of helping or protecting her
considering her illustrious, although illegitimate, lineage?
Further, if he committed sexual abuses on Ms. Villafranca at
his rented room which was very near the police station, why
did she not shout or report to the police?
The fact that Ms. Villafranca is well connected in Gingoog
City was actually not a boon but a bane. It was on that
account that she wanted to protect at all costs their family
from any scandal. [Judge Pacuribot] capitalized on it with his
constant threat that he will bring scandal to them by making
public her half naked picture taken in the motel. Her wanting
to protect her family from shame cowed her into silence and
submission. Her testimony demonstrates that. It reads:
Atty. Kho:
Q: A cellphone picture that is what you are afraid of?
A: No, also his added threats that he is going to tell my
mother-in-law, that he is going to destroy me, that I am
nobody, that my family is no good, and that he would call me
"burikat, burikat." He would call me that name. "Yawa ka.
Animal ka. Sumunod ka nako."
(Atty. Ignes – Div. Clerk of Court interpreting:)
"Burikat" means a whore. "You lewd devil, and you have to
follow me."
xxxx
Q: Why did you allow him to do that to you?
A: Because he constantly tells me that he will develop that
picture, he will show that to my mother-in-law and then he will
destroy me and he will create a scandal in Gingoog City.
Q: Is it not that you are well-connected?
A: My husband is not around, Attorney.
Q: And?
A: And what? How could I explain to them that I was there?
How he took my picture? How am I going to? I don’t know. I
just wanted to protect my family from my shame, from any
scandal. And he knew that it would be his hold to me. And he
knew that I would be very careful with the name that my
family had, that is why he is constantly threatening me with
such same argument, you know: "Ikaw and madaot ani. Ino
ning huan tanan."
(Atty. Ignes:)
"You will be destroyed because of this."
Ms. Villafranca said she was scared of [Judge Pacuribot’s]
person and "how intimidating he could be and how evil he
could be." She feared him because when she resists him he
would tell her "madaot ka ani." (You will be destroyed
because of this.) So she had to yield to him because she
knew he could do what he threatens to do – to destroy her.
She points to the Order dated 6 June 2005 in People v.
Anude of how indeed he had destroyed her.
[Judge Pacuribot] claims in his Comment and Consolidated
Memorandum that Ms. Villafranca is a very intelligent girl and
with strong personality, reasons why it is improbable to make
her a victim of rape and sexual harassments. And yet, when
he issued the Anude Order, he made her look like she is an
irredeemable incompetent who "cannot spell", who "uses
high falutin words in her Post Sentence Investigation Report
which she herself may not have understood," whose
sentence construction is horrendous," "her proper noun is
written with small letter" and that "her adjectives or adverbs
do not fit the things or persons described." [Judge Pacuribot]
engages in double – talk.
In the three – paged Anude Order, [Judge Pacuribot] tried to
show that Ms. Villafranca’s incompetence is toxically mixed
with acute haughtiness because Ms. Villafranca refuses to
consult the judge or see him or refused to come to him even
when summoned repeatedly. [Judge Pacuribot] should not
gripe. He summoned Ms. Villafranca to his chamber on 25
May 2005. Once inside, [Judge Pacuribot] slapped her for not
filing her petition for annulment of marriage and her head with
his clenched fist. He planted on her neck kiss marks which he
said he wanted her husband to see. When Ms. Villafranca’s
husband saw them later, he beat her. At 2:00 am of 26 May
2005, SPO1 Ronald Espejon claims that Ms. Villafranca
called him for assistance. It was the start of Ms. Villafranca’s
growing defiance to [Judge Pacuribot], a fact that roiled him
to point of issuing the Anude Order eleven (11) days later.
[Judge Pacuribot] also belittled Ms. Villafranca repeatedly in
said Order by referring to here as "MERE Clerk II/understudy
Johanna M. Villafranca of Gingoog City Parole and Probation
Office," calling her "visibly inexperienced mere clerk," "very
raw," and that her report was atrocious. He ordered her Post
Sentence Investigation Report returned "OFFICIALLY" to the
superior of Ms. Villafranca for proper corrections. [Judge
Pacuribot] stated therein that Ms. Villafranca cannot be
located in her office as she is always absent per information
in her office. He stated that she should not be allowed to
practice making post sentence investigation in preparation for
a desired promotion.
The Anude Order is the classic proof of how Ms. Villafranca’s
disobedience to [Judge Pacuribot] ended up in her
destruction – "Madaut ka ani." The Order destroyed her
person and her career. Therein, he has beaten Ms.
Villafranca’s career to a pulp. Any superior of Ms. Villafranca
who will read the Anude Order will block any desire of Ms.
Villafranca for promotion which the latter was aiming for at
the time. She rued with tears how the Anude Order displaced
her from her job.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] repeated harping in said Order about Ms.
Villafranca’s failure to consult him and to come to him even
when summoned, rendered more believable Ms. Villafranca’s
claim that [Judge Pacuribot] would summon her to his
chamber on the pretext of official matters and thereafter
subject her to his lasciviousness conduct.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that Ms. Villafranca was part of Ms.
Waniwan’s conspiracy was unproven. All the Sun Star
pictures of Ms. Tan’s filing of the criminal complaint before
the City Prosecutor’s Office did not show at any instance the
face of Ms. Villafranca. Also, she made it clear in her
testimony that sometime in February 2006, when Ms. Tan
filed her criminal complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, two other media men called her up to see if they
can get a copy of her Affidavit-Complaint. But she refused to
prevent the public from knowing what she went through.
Indubitably, Ms. Villafranca’s testimony and the anguish that
came with it can only come from a very sad experience. Even
on the very delicate matters where [Judge Pacuribot] had
stripped her mercilessly of her dignity and womanhood, Ms.
Villafranca was frank and straightforward, proof of how
outraged she was when [Judge Pacuribot] had raped her and
had sexually harassed her repeatedly.
Her spontaneity in answering the cross examination
questions, the anguish she revealed in court, her very natural
and coherent way of telling how she was ravished and
abused repeatedly as an underling leaves no room to doubt
her testimony and the things she said under oath in her
Affidavit – Complaint, her Rejoinder, and her Sworn
Statement. Her tears could only be the clues to her righteous
indignation against the indignities she suffered from [Judge
Pacuribot]. Indeed, the conviction to reveal the truth must
have been so strong that she had to come back to the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |36
country hurdling employment restrictions and the difficulty of
not having saved enough yet for her trip back just to testify in
this case.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that her administrative charge is a
fabrication is unacceptable against the avalanche of Ms.
Villafranca’s evidence. The Investigator cannot find any valid
reason to sustain [Judge Pacuribot’s] denial and alibi as a
defense.
[Judge Pacuribot] is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
charge of rape in Butuan City and guilty of multiple sexual
harassment committed inside respondent judge’s chamber
and in his rented room in Gingoog City. His claim that Ms.
Villafranca’s charge is a fabrication is unacceptable
considering the avalanche of evidence against him.
While [Judge Pacuribot] committed physical assault on Ms.
Villafranca on 25 May 2005 when after summoning her to his
chamber, he slapped her for not filing the petition to annul her
marriage and hit her head with his clenched fist, the same is
deemed absorbed by the offense of sexual harassment
considering that brute force and intimidation had always been
used by [Judge Pacuribot] to commit said offenses.
On the eight (8) occasions that [Judge Pacuribot] had carnal
knowledge of Ms. Villafranca in his rented room while [Judge
Pacuribot’s] gun was always displayed on the table, implying
the commission of rape, the same are treated as sexual
harassments only for Ms. Villafranca’s failure to state when
they were committed and to provide details on those
occasions.
Ms. Tan’s agony started with [Judge Pacuribot’s] deception.
He made her believe he will bring her in his car to the bus
terminal from Pryce Plaza Hotel, only to surprise her after
riding with him by bringing her to the City Lodge Motel to
ravish her. Again, while about to leave City Lodge Motel, he
deceived her again by telling her that he will bring her now to
the bus terminal, only to bring her to the Discovery Hotel, so
that he can ravish her some more later. Aside from
deception, [Judge Pacuribot] uses extravagantly another tool
– intimidation. Immediately after Ms. Tan settled herself on
the front seat on that infelicitous night of 20 October 2004, he
immediately had his bag between them, the bag Ms. Tan
knows contains [Judge Pacuribot’s] gun. Also, he used on
her an uncouth language in a loud voice, an irrational temper,
a fake message of urgency to rattle Ms. Tan and make her
jump to obedience without thinking. By the time Ms. Tan
realized [Judge Pacuribot’s] repulsive intentions, it was too
late to fight back because she had been trapped in the motel.
His repeated intimidating warnings on Ms. Tan that she could
harm her if she disobeys were indeed proven true. On 24
November 2004, Ms. Tan was severely and publicly scolded
before her office mates, a fact that was affirmed by Atty.
Wilfredo Bibera. Her performance rating from "Very
Satisfactory" slipped down to "Satisfactory" in 2005.
[Judge Pacuribot] uses force and cruelty on his hapless
victims. When he ordered her to do oral sex on him and she
refused, he pulled her hair and pushed her face to his penis
with an order: "Suck it. Let it in till deep your throat. Let my
penis reach your throat." He tightened his hold on her that
she was frightened he might break her neck. In pain, she had
to plead: "Don’t pull my hair, sir. It’s very painful. What a
sadist you are." While he was sucking her nipple and
mashing her breasts, he was telling her: "This is the breast of
a lustful woman." While he was planting vile kisses on her
neck to produce "chiquinini" on her, he told her: "I am going
to plant lots of kiss marks here to let the people know that
you passed through my hands." Upon hearing it, Ms. Tan
cried. Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot] is a sadist beyond
description capable of declaring his unconcealed intention to
parade her to the public as his victim.
At the trial, when issues would touch on her tender feelings
towards her family or when it would recall [Judge Pacuribot’s]
cruelty that crushed her respectability or the delicateness of
her womanhood, she would invariably sob on the witness
stand. The way he ravished her and sexually harassed her
showed how irrationally lewd or unbearably cruel he was.
Even when Ms. Tan was already abused, still the thought that
he is her superior had never been lost to her. Ms. Tan has
always addressed him – "Sir."
"Why did you bring me here, Sir? Didn’t I tell you I will just
take a taxi to Agora Terminal?
"Don’t pull my hair, Sir. It is very painful. What a sadist you
are."
"You are so rude, Sir, we work in the same office yet you
disgrace me."
"Sir, I just take a taxi to Agora."
[Judge Pacuribot’s] moral ascendancy over Ms. Tan was an
undeniable factor to her blind submission to his depravity.
[Judge Pacuribot] pointed to Ms. Tan’s inefficiency, her not
being a happily married woman, that her husband is a wife
beater and a violent man, that she is in financial straits who
even run to him for help. It is precisely these weaknesses,
personal problems, and economic difficulties which added to
Ms. Tan’s inability to fight back and made her so submissive.
She was the ideal prey. As she was made to admit during her
cross examination, she is the lone breadwinner in the family
with two (2) children to support.
[Judge Pacuribot] challenges Ms. Tan’s claim of rape and
repeated sexual harassments by arguing, to wit:
"Why did she not refuse to go with respondent when he
allegedly fetch her at Pryce Plaza Hotel on 20 October 2004
and instead go voluntarily with him?"
"At the Discovery Hotel, if indeed she stayed and slept there
all by herself, why did she not escape or call for help and
instead wait for respondent to arrive the next morning? So
that he can sexually assault her again? Or why did she fail to
ask for help from any of the hotel staff or from anybody while
in the Discovery Hotel?"
"If she immediately reported to the police authorities the
maltreatment of her son by her husband, why did she not
complain of the alleged incidents of sexual harassments and
acts of lasciviousness she experienced from the
respondent?"
Despite her claims of having been subjected to rape, sexual
harassment and acts of lasciviousness, why did she gleefully
socialize with respondent during their Christmas party and
respondent’s birthday celebration?"
Ms. Tan had only two (2) options –
"Lose her job by promptly fighting back at [Judge Pacuribot];
or
"Keep her job tolerating him with muffled defiance.
Ms. Tan had correctly assessed the far reaches of his
influence. When she was looking for a lawyer to help her file
the administrative charge, no lawyer in Gingoog City would
like to accept her case. She had to look for one in Cagayan
de Oro City. She was thus correct to wonder while she was in
Discovery Hotel whether anyone there would come her aid if
[Judge Pacuribot] will start harming her.
Ms. Tan as a victim cannot be put in the same footing as
other rape victims where the offender holds no control on the
victim’s survival and has no moral ascendancy over her.
Fighting back immediately against the offender is a rational
move. In the case at bench, [Judge Pacuribot’s] moral
ascendancy and influence over her was a given. It was that
together with his flair to humiliate people and his blackmails
which made her succumb to his sexual abuses. Ms. Tan
values her job; in fact, she consciously keeps track of her
performance ratings. An underling who believes that her
immediate superior wields control over her continued
employment or sudden separation from service will cower in
fear to the point of tolerating the indignities committed on her.
As [Judge Pacuribot] impressed on her, looking for a new job
at her age is not easy.
At the time that [Judge Pacuribot] was taking advantage of
Ms. Tan, [Judge Pacuribot’s] proverbial explosives temper
and short fuse were being put to good use to terrorize her
with remarkable frequency. That dark spot in his character
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |37
which has been brought up front in other people’s
consciousness in the months following his arrival in the Hall
of Justice as a "terror" is enough intimidation. To Ms. Tan, to
"submit now and complain later" is a good, albeit temporary,
shelter against immediate public humiliation or job
separation. Thus, Ms. Tan’s failure to report to the police is
understandable.
Also, [Judge Pacuribot] seems to have a masterful skill on
how to exploit his victim’s weaknesses. Ms. Tan is a
stenographer, a position she has difficulty coping with
because as [Judge Pacuribot] noted, her spelling, her
grammar and her knowledge of the English language are not
at par with the demands of her job. He has warned her of her
"inefficiency" and of staying late in the evening as manager of
the internet café. He pointed to her joining without prior SC
permission a trip to Hongkong on a weekend in a packaged
tour for stenographers in Cagayan de Oro City. Thus, with
such faults and difficulties, she is the ideal prey. Her fear of
losing a source of livelihood has made her behave
submissive to him.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] alibi that on October 20 and 21, 2004, he
was in Gingoog City and it was impossible for him to be in
Cagayan de Oro City on those days does not impress. It fails
to establish the impossibility of his presence at the scene of
the crime. With the convenience of his car, [Judge Pacuribot]
could travel and be in different places, one after another in a
short time. After all, the incidents on October 20 and 21, 2004
were all beyond office hours.
To support [Judge Pacuribot’s] claim that he was present on
those days in Gingoog City, he presented his Certificate of
Service for the month which shows that he was only on leave
on October 4 to 7, 2004.
Noteworthy is the testimony of Ms. Tan stating that when she
met [Judge Pacuribot] on Monday in their office after the rape
incident, the latter told her not to file anymore her leave for
October 20 and 21, 2004 and bragging, "Ako na gud ni,
kinsay magbuot nako?" (It is me, who will prevail against
me). If he can forego the filing of application for leave for his
subordinates, much more is there reason for him not to
submit an application for leave for his own absence reason
why his Certificate of Service for the month of October is not
reliable.
On 21 October 2004 – a Thursday, all schedule of hearing
were cancelled and [Judge Pacuribot] said that they were
cancelled the week before. Was the cancellation the week
before due to the fact that [Judge Pacuribot] received the
notice of their Masonic Conference scheduled on October 20
in Cagayan de Oro City? It was [Judge Pacuribot] who
informed Ms. Tan of that Masonic Conference that evening of
October 20. Ms. Tan could not just have invented that idea of
a Masonic Conference. That is the reason why the
cancellation of hearing on October 21 casts doubt on [Judge
Pacuribot’s] alibi.
Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness. A mere denial, like alibi, is a self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony
that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.
[Judge Pacuribot] cites Ms. Tan’s merry behavior during the
Christmas Party and his Birthday Party in Cagayan de Oro
City as hardly the behavior of a rape victim or a victim or
repeated sexual harassments. Normally, such a victim is
expected to behave with animosity and grievance toward the
offender. Unfortunately for her, she cannot afford to display
such animosity and grievance unless it is at the cost of her
job. If she cannot defy his demands when he victimizes her,
shouldn’t her economic realities prompt her to win her war
with friendship? [Judge Pacuribot] should be reminded that in
sexual harassments under Section 3 of RA No. 7877, an
offense is committed regardless of whether the demand,
request or requirement for submission is accepted by the
subject of said act.
Ms. Tan’s testimony was clear, frank and consistent. Her
candid and clear-cut account of how respondent judge had
been deceitful and intimidating in his dealings with her that
evening has inspired belief. And throughout her testimony,
she succeeded in revealing how [Judge Pacuribot] took full
advantage of his moral ascendancy over her as his underling,
destroying whatever resistance she could put up by belittling
her, outwitting her and insulting her to reduce her to
submission.
There is no standard reaction of a victim in a rape incident. In
fact, not every victim of rape can be expected to act in
conformity with the expectations of anyone who has not been
subjected to the same danger at any time. The workings of a
human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently.
Investigator, thus, finds [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charges of rape committed on
October 20 and 21, 2004 in Cagayan de Oro City, and guilty
of sexual harassments committed in respondent judge’s
chamber in RTC, Branch 27, Hall of Justice, Gingoog City
against Ms. Sherlita O. Tan.
One can see in these two cases a common strategy used by
[Judge Pacuribot] in achieving his vile purposes. He used
deceit on Ms. Tan. He used deceit on Ms. Villafranca. He
used intimidation on Ms. Tan and he used it on Ms.
Villafranca. He makes use of a substantial blackmail against
both.
In the case of People v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court had
occasion to instruct us on the effects of intimidation, thus:
Physical resistance need not be established in rape when
threats and intimidation are employed, and the victim submits
herself to her attackers because of fear. Besides, physical
resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman
involuntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused. Rape
victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong
resistance while others may be too intimidated to offer any
resistance at all. The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly
suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening
the victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her into submission.
Thus, the law does not impose upon the private complainant
the burden of proving resistance.
[Judge Pacuribot] computed nine (9) months, twenty-one (21)
days as interval from the time Ms. Villafranca claimed she
was raped on 22 February 2005 to 13 December 2005 when
she filed the complaint. Ms. Tan also filed her administratively
charge only thirteen (13) months of being his superior’s prey.
Did delay cast doubt on the truthfulness of their claim?
In the case of People v. Aguero, Jr., where there was a two
(2) years delay in the filing of the complaint for rape, the
Supreme Court said:
As to the alleged two-year delay in the filing of the complaint,
suffice it to say, that complainant’s failure to promptly report
the incident does not sufficiently detract from her credibility
and cannot be taken against her. It has been held that a rape
victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not
destroy the truth of the complaint and is not an indication of
deceit as it is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for
fear for her aggressor and lack of courage to face the public
stigma of having been sexually abused.
In the case of People v. Espinosa, where the criminal
complaint was filed about one and a half years from
commission of the offense, the Supreme Court said:
x x x Delay in reavealing the commission of rape is not an
indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never
complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they
prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than
reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender’s making
good on his threats. This is understandable, considering the
inbred modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public
disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
Delay in the filing of the charges does not necessarily
undermine the credibility of witnesses.
The Supreme Court has deemed delay as justified when
there is fear of reprisal, social humiliation, familial
considerations and economic reasons. In the case of Ms.
Tan, her tormentor is her superior who constantly dangles his
influence and power over her and her job. As regards Ms.
Villafranca, the threat to destroy her, her family and her
family’s good name was ever present; thus, haunting her
emotionally and psychologically. The delay in reporting the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |38
rape cases committed by [Judge Pacuribot] has been
justified.
On the repeated sexual harassments and violence committed
separately on the persons of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca
within the chamber of [Judge Pacuribot], the latter deems
them improbable because of the situation in his chamber. He
points out that outside his chamber is the staff room and
there is a glassed window that divides them. Ms. Villafranca
cited the incident on 13 October 2005 where [Judge
Pacuribot] did lascivious acts on her inside the chamber in
the presence of Placido Abellana, the court aide, and the
latter’s just turned his back and pretended to see nothing.
In the case of People v. Lavador, the rapist-appellant argued
that rape was impossible due to the presence of the victim’s
son on her side. The Supreme Court said:
Nor can we accept the argument that the rape was
improbable due to the presence of Noniluna’s sons by her
side. This Court has repeatedly declared that lust is no
respecter of time and place and rape can be committed even
in places where people congregate: in parks, along the
roadside, within the school premises, inside the house where
there are several occupants and even in the same room
where other members of the family are sleeping. x x x.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] defense of "improbability" cannot,
therefore, be accepted.
[Judge Pacuribot] declares that the charges against him are
complainants’ tools of revenge against him. He cites
his Order in People v. Anude and his letter reporting Ms.
Villafranca’s negligence as reasons from Ms. Villafranca’s
anger and resentment. Against Ms. Tan, he cites his warning
against her inefficiency as stenographer, her moonlighting in
her internet caféhis refusal to grant her a loan of P200,000.00
or being her guarantor.
In the case of Simbajon v. Esteban, the Supreme Court in
believing the testimony of the complainant saying:
"The investigating judge correctly disregarded the
respondent’s imputation of ill motive on the part of
complainant. No married woman would cry sexual
assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny
and humiliation, and strain her marriage in order to
perpetuate a falsehood.
Indeed, it is against human nature for a married woman to
fabricate a story that would not only expose herself to a
lifetime of dishonor, but destry her family as well. Besides,
there is no sufficient evidence of any ill-motive imputable to
Mesdames Tan and Villafranca to narrate anything other than
their respective desire to tell the truth and seek redress for
the wrong inflicted on each of them. For the kind of reputation
[Judge Pacuribot] has in the Hall of Justice and by his
behavior where he projects himself as full of influence and
power, these two women will be the last to even cross the
path of respondent judge without just cause. Thus, the
presumption applies that, one will not act and prevaricate
"and cause damnation to one who brought him no harm or
injury.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] theory that all these charges are part of
the sinister plan to oust [Judge Pacuribot] from office at the
instigation of Ms. Waniwan is far fetched.
On 8 December 205, or earlier, when Ms. Tan filed her
complaint, there was no Mr. Waniwan to speak of. Mr.
Waniwan only materialized in February 2006 when she filed
the same charges against [Judge Pacuribot] before the City
Prosecutor of Gingoog City. Media men at the slightest clue
of a "scoop" hound without let up those who could be sources
of information. When the media men became nosey, it was
already in February 2006 when Ms. Tan filed the case in the
Prosecutor’s Office. By then, the filing of the administrative
charge of Ms. Tan and Ms. Villafranca was fait accompli. In
the case of Ms. Villafranca, the Waniwan theory is patently
absurd. Two media men were eager in February 2006 to take
hold of Ms. Villafranca’s affidavit but she refused them
staunchly. It is incredible that two (2) married women would
prevaricate against a person who has power and control over
their jobs at the mere urging of Mr. Waniwan is irrelevant.
In People v. Mortales, the Supreme Court, speaking through
now Chief Justice Renato Puno, appositely said:
No married woman would subject herself to public scrutiny
and humiliation to foist a false charge of rape. Neither would
she take the risk of being alienated from her husband and her
family. The fact that the victim resolved to face the ordeal and
relate in public what many similarly situated would have kept
secret evinces that she did so to obtain justice. Her
willingness and courage to face the authorities as well as to
submit to medical examination are mute but eloquent
confirmation of her sincere resolve.
Finally, it may be true there are minor and trivial
discrepancies in Ms. Tan’s testimony, but they neither impair
the integrity of the victim’s evidence as a whole nor reflect
negatively on the witness’ honesty. Such inconsistencies,
which might have been caused by the natural fickleness of
memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the
credibility of the witness, for they shake off the suspicion of a
rehearsed testimony.
In sum, [Judge Pacuribot] should be made administratively
liable for the charges against him in A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-1982
and RTJ-06-1983.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines integrity to mean "soundness
or moral principle and character." It is said to be synonymous
with "probity," "honesty," and "uprightness." The evidence
adduced indubitably show that [Judge Pacuribot] lacks the
honesty in dealing with his two subordinates herein. Not only
did he fail to live up to the high moral standard expected of a
member of the Judiciary but he has transgressed the norms
of morality expected of every person.
[Judge Pacuribot’s] offenses in raping his victims and
sexually harassing them were committed with aggravation.
He knew they were married but instead of helping strengthen
or protect their marriage, he tried his best to destroy their
marital bonds.
Indeed, [Judge Pacuribot’s] reprehensible acts amount to
gross misconduct, and immorality the depravity of which is
quite rare. They undoubtedly violated the Code of Judicial
Conduct. They are classified as severe charges under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 22 of the same Rules, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed if the respondent is guilty of a
serious charge:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more that three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
In Simbajon v. Esteban, the respondent Judge Esteban, for
his sexual advances on one of his female subordinates which
consisted of "grabbing her, kissing her all over her face,
embracing her and touching her right breast" was
preventively suspended for the duration of the investigation
until further notice AND was subsequently dismissed from
service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except leave
credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government –
owned or controlled corporations.
Herein [Judge Pacuribot’s] conduct is far worse that those of
Judge Esteban. [Judge Pacuribot’s] acts indubitably went far
beyond the bounds of decency and morality. He raped and
repeatedly sexually assaulted, not only one, but two female,
married subordinates. He did not only violate his victims’
womanhood and their dignities as persons but he aimed to
weaken, then eventually destroy two families. By such act,
[Judge Pacuribot] disgraced his noble office, as well as the
judiciary, in the eyes of the public. He has shown himself
unworthy of the judicial robe.
When the fading sobs of two tearful women finally died down
and their copious tears dried in the numerous hankies that
absorbed them what emerges is a figure that unmistakably
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |39
exudes the abominable torpedo of marital bonds, a practicing
deceiver and a merciless pervert whose face is
unrecognizable as he is hooded with a judicial robe that helps
conceal his dark side. His family, wife and children may have
all been innocently kept away from knowing this dark side
and to spare them from the afflictive and crushing humiliation
of having a husband and father of such a character, may the
foregoing description be a "for your eyes only" to the
members of the highest court and the court administrator.
Thus, Investigating Justice Dy-Liacco Flores recommended:
This finding is made with full awareness of the recent
Supreme Court ruling on quantum of evidence required in the
cases at bench. In the 7 August 2007 case of Alquizar v.
Carpio, et al., the Supreme Court pronounced that:
x x x. In administrative or disciplinary proceedings, the
burden of proving the allegations in the complaint rests on
the complainant. While substantial evidence would ordinarily
suffice to support a finding of guilt, the rule is a bit different
where the proceedings involve judges charged with grave
offense. Administrative proceedings against judges are, by
nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by
the rules applicable to criminal cases. The quantum of proof
required to support the administrative charges or to establish
the ground/s for the removal of a judicial officer should thus
be more than substantial; they must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. To borrow from Reyes v. Mangino:
Inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent Judge
connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail
dismissal from the bench, the quantum of proof required
should be more than substantial.
It is doctrinal that the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal law does not mean such a
degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and
produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required
or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The evidence adduced here
overwhelmingly established moral certainty that respondent
judge raped and sexually harassed complainant Mesdames
Tan and Villafranca on separate and repeated occasions.
xxxx
Having found [Judge Pacuribot] guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offenses of rape and repeated sexual
harassments, the penalty of dismissal from service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits
is hereby recommended.11
We agree in the recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
We have reviewed the record of this case and are thereby
satisfied that the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice are in truth adequately supported by the
evidence and are in accord with applicable legal principles.
We therefore resolve to adopt such findings and
recommendations relative to the administrative liability of the
respondent judge for grave misconduct and immorality.
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that
it is able to administer justice, but also upon the perception
and confidence of the community that the people who run the
system have administered justice. At times, the strict manner
by which we apply the law may, in fact, do justice but may not
necessarily create confidence among the people that justice,
indeed, has been served. Hence, in order to create such
confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly
judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more
importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity,
and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public
and in their private lives. Only then can the people be
reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial
system.
With the avowed objective of promoting confidence in the
Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the following
provisions:
Canon I
Rule 1.01: A Judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.
Canon II
Rule 2.00: A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.
Rule 2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.
We have repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to so
conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion,
and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their official
duties but also in their everyday lives. For no position exacts
a greater demand on the moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.
Judges are mandated to maintain good moral character and
are at all times expected to observe irreproachable behavior
so as not to outrage public decency. We have adhered to and
set forth the exacting standards of morality and decency,
which every member of the judiciary must observe. 12 A
magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by
his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized.13 He should not only possess proficiency in law
but should likewise possess moral integrity for the people
look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
We explained the rationale for requiring judges to possess
impeccable moral integrity, thus:
The personal and official actuations of every member of the
Bench must be beyond reproach and above suspicion. The
faith and confidence of the public in the administration of
justice cannot be maintained if a judge who dispenses it is
not equipped with the cardinal judicial virtue of moral
integrity, and if he obtusely continues to commit an affront to
public decency. In fact, moral integrity is more than a virtue; it
is a necessity in the judiciary.14
We also stressed in Castillo v. Calanog, Jr.15 that:
The code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a
judge must be free of [even] a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also
to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge,
in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all
times. As we have very recently explained, a judge’s official
life can not simply be detached or separated from his
personal experience. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should
freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify integrity and exemplify honest
public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be
above suspicion."
Judge Pacuribot miserably failed to measure up to these
exacting standards. He behaved in a manner unbecoming a
judge and model of moral uprightness. He betrayed the
people's high expectations and diminished the esteem in
which they hold the Judiciary in general.
It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.16 In the cases at bar, the complainants Ms. Tan
and Ms. Villafranca were able to adequately substantiate
their allegations.
We find totally unacceptable the temerity of Judge Pacuribot
in subjecting the complainants, both his subordinates, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness.
Over long periods of time, he persistently solicited sexual
favors from Ms.Tan and Ms. Villafranca. When they refused,
he made their working conditions so unbearable that Ms. Tan
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |40
was eventually forced to transfer to another office and Ms.
Villafranca to seek employment abroad. Certainly, no judge
has a right to solicit sexual favors from any court employee,
even from a woman of loose morals.17 Judge Pacuribot’s
conduct indubitably bears the marks of impropriety and
immorality. Not only do his actions fall short of the exacting
standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance
of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at
large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are
an affront to women, unmistakably constitute sexual
harassment because they necessarily "x x x result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the
employee[s]."18
We need not detail again all the lewd and lustful acts
committed by Judge Pacuribot in order to conclude that he is
indeed unworthy to remain in office. The narration of the
Investigating Justice was sufficiently thorough and complete.
The audacity under which the sexual violation of the
complainants were committed and the seeming impunity with
which they were perpetrated by Judge Pacuribot shock our
sense of morality. All roads lead us to the conclusion that
Judge Pacuribot has failed to behave in a manner that will
promote confidence in the Judiciary. His actuations, if
condoned, would damage the integrity of the Judiciary,
fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts deserve no
less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction --
dismissal from the service.
On his part, Judge Pacuribot put up the defense of denial,
attributing ill feelings and bad motives to Ms. Tan and Ms.
Villafranca.
Already beyond cavil is the evidentiary rule that mere denial
does not overturn the relative weight and probative value of
an affirmative assertion. Denial is inherently a weak defense.
To be believed, it must be buttressed by strong evidence of
non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving
and is with no evidentiary value. Like the defense of alibi,
denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations.19 Denial
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
by the witnesses who had no ill motive to testify falsely.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there is utter lack of basis to
sustain the purported ill motives attributed by Judge
Pacuribot to the complainants. The Investigating Justice
correctly disregarded Judge Pacuribot’s imputation. No
married woman would cry sexual assault, subject herself and
her family to public scrutiny and humiliation, and strain her
marriage in order to perpetrate a falsehood. 20 The only
plausible and satisfactory explanation for us is that the
charges against respondent are true.
Judge Pacuribot and his witnesses failed to overcome the
evidence presented by the complainants.
Let it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy
and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of
the court of which he is an officer. His actuations are
aggravated by the fact that complainants are his
subordinates over whom he exercises control and
supervision, he being the executive judge. He took
advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his
lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of acting in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees, he was even the
one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior
position.21
In sum, we concur with the Investigating Justice in holding
that complainants were able to muster the requisite quantum
of evidence to prove their charges against Judge Pacuribot.
By having sexual intercourse with Ms Tan and Ms.
Villafranca, his subordinates, respondent violated the trust
reposed on his high office and completely failed to live up to
the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of
members of the Judiciary.
Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, we hold, without
any hesitation, that Judge Pacuribot be meted out the
severest form of disciplinary sanction - dismissal from the
service for the charges of sexual harassment against him.
We, however, find the complaints of the Anonymous Letter
Writers without merit. Beyond the bare allegations that Judge
Pacuribot maintained an illicit relationship with a certain
Sheryl Gamulo and fathered two children with her, there is
nothing in the records that would indicate that he, indeed,
committed the crime charged. We have stressed time and
again that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence.
Mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to
proof.22 The letter dated 4 April 2005 from "concerned
citizens" asking for the relief of Judge Pacuribot on the
grounds that he has been terrorizing and harassing most of
the employees has been rendered moot by the disposition of
these cases.
All those who don the judicial robe must always instill in their
minds the exhortation that "[T]he administration of justice is a
mission. Judges, from the lowest to the highest levels are the
gems in the vast government bureaucracy, beacon lights
looked upon as the embodiments of all that is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against injustice and
oppression. The Judiciary hemorrhages every time a Judge
himself transgresses the very law he is sworn to uphold and
defend at all costs. This should not come to pass."23
WHEREFORE, Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot is
hereby DISMISSED from the service for gross misconduct
and immorality prejudicial to the best interests of the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
re-employment in any branch of the government, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, except the
money value of accrued earned leave credits. Respondent
judge is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately
from rendering any order or decision; or from continuing any
proceedings, in any case whatsoever, effective upon receipt
of a copy of this Decision. Lastly, respondent judge
is REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
disbarred as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Department of
Justice for appropriate action.
This Decision is immediately executory. The Office of the
Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this
resolution be immediately served on respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168584 October 15, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, THE HONORABLE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR
OF CUSTOMS OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding Judge, Branch 74,
RTC, Third Judicial Region, Olongapo City, INDIGO
DISTRIBUTION CORP., herein represented by ARIEL G.
CONSOLACION, W STAR TRADING AND
WAREHOUSING CORP., herein represented by HIERYN
R. ECLARINAL, FREEDOM BRANDS PHILS., CORP.,
herein represented by ANA LISA RAMAT, BRANDED
WAREHOUSE, INC., herein represented by MARY
AILEEN S. GOZUN, ALTASIA INC., herein represented by
ALAN HARROW, TAINAN TRADE (TAIWAN), INC., herein
represented by ELENA RANULLO, SUBIC PARK N’
SHOP, herein represented by NORMA MANGALINO
DIZON, TRADING GATEWAYS INTERNATIONAL PHILS.,
herein represented by MA. CHARINA FE C. RODOLFO,
DUTY FREE SUPERSTORE (DFS), herein represented by
RAJESH R. SADHWANI, CHJIMES TRADING INC., herein
represented by ANGELO MARK M. PICARDAL, PREMIER
FREEPORT, INC., herein represented by ROMMEL P.
GABALDON, FUTURE TRADE SUBIC FREEPORT, INC.,
herein represented by WILLIE S. VERIDIANO, GRAND
COMTRADE INTERNATIONAL CORP., herein represented
by JULIUS MOLINDA, and FIRST PLATINUM
INTERNATIONAL, INC., herein represented by ISIDRO M.
MUÑOZ,respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners seek via petition for certiorari and prohibition to
annul (1) the May 4, 2005 Order 1 issued by public
respondent Judge Ramon S. Caguioa of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 74, Olongapo City, granting private
respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and (2) the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction2that was issued pursuant to such Order, which
stayed the implementation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9334,
AN ACT INCREASING THE EXCISE TAX RATES IMPOSED
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |41
ON ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO PRODUCTS, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 131, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145 AND 288 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1997, AS AMENDED.
Petitioners likewise seek to enjoin, restrain and inhibit public
respondent from enforcing the impugned issuances and from
further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 102-0-05.
The relevant facts are as follows:
In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A) No. 72273 or
the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 which,
among other things, created the Subic Special Economic and
Freeport Zone (SBF4) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA).
R.A. No. 7227 envisioned the SBF to be developed into a
"self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and
investment center to generate employment opportunities in
and around the zone and to attract and promote productive
foreign investments."5 In line with this vision, Section 12 of
the law provided:
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated
and managed as a separate customs territory ensuring
free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into
and exported out of the Subic Special Economic Zone,
as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free
importations of raw materials, capital and equipment.
However, exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to
customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff
Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
(c) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations
to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and
national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special
Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent (3%)
of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises
within the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be remitted to
the National Government, one percent (1%) each to the local
government units affected by the declaration of the zone in
proportion to their population area, and other factors. In
addition, there is hereby established a development fund of
one percent (1%) of the gross income earned by all
businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Economic Zone to be utilized for the development of
municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the
Municipality of Subic, and other municipalities contiguous to
be base areas.
In case of conflict between national and local laws with
respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic Special
Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the
latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free
markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and future
shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special
Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall
supervise and regulate the operations of banks and other
financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the
establishment of foreign currency depository units of local
commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign
banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone
whose continuing investment shall not be less than Two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and
dependent children under twenty-one (21) years of age, shall
be granted permanent resident status within the Subic
Special Economic Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress
and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone
without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue
working visas renewal every two (2) years to foreign
executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills
which no Filipino within the Subic Special Economic Zone
possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and
Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent
residence status and working visas by the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30) days after
issuance thereof;
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the law, private respondents Indigo Distribution
Corporation, W Star Trading and Warehousing Corporation,
Freedom Brands Philippines Corporation, Branded
Warehouse, Inc., Altasia, Inc., Tainan Trade (Taiwan) Inc.,
Subic Park ‘N Shop, Incorporated, Trading Gateways
International Philipines, Inc., Duty Free Superstore (DFS)
Inc., Chijmes Trading, Inc., Premier Freeport, Inc., Future
Trade Subic Freeport, Inc., Grand Comtrade Int’l., Corp., and
First Platinum International, Inc., which are all domestic
corporations doing business at the SBF, applied for and were
granted Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption6 by
the SBMA.
These certificates allowed them to engage in the business
either of trading, retailing or wholesaling, import and export,
warehousing, distribution and/or transshipment of general
merchandise, including alcohol and tobacco products, and
uniformly granted them tax exemptions for such importations
as contained in the following provision of their respective
Certificates:
ARTICLE IV. The Company shall be entitled to tax and
duty-free importation of raw materials, capital
equipment, and household and personal items for use
solely within the Subic Bay Freeport Zonepursuant to
Sections 12(b) and 12(c) of the Act and Sections 43, 45, 46
and 49 of the Implementing Rules. All importations by the
Company are exempt from inspection by the Societe
Generale de Surveillance if such importations are delivered
immediately to and for use solely within the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress subsequently passed R.A. No. 9334, however,
effective on January 1, 2005,7 Section 6 of which provides:
Sec. 6. Section 131 of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1977, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 131. Payment of Excise Taxes on Imported Articles. –
(A) Persons Liable. – Excise taxes on imported articles shall
be paid by the owner or importer to the Customs Officers,
conformably with the regulations of the Department of
Finance and before the release of such articles from the
customshouse or by the person who is found in possession
of articles which are exempt from excise taxes other than
those legally entitled to exemption.
In the case of tax-free articles brought or imported into the
Philippines by persons, entities or agencies exempt from tax
which are subsequently sold, transferred or exchanged in the
Philippines to non-exempt persons or entities, the purchasers
or recipients shall be considered the importers thereof, and
shall be liable for the duty and internal revenue tax due on
such importation.
The provision of any special or general law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the importation of cigars and
cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines
into the Philippines, even if destined for tax and duty free
shops, shall be subject to all applicable taxes, duties,
charges, including excise taxes due thereon. This shall
apply to cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented
liquors and wines brought directly into the duly
chartered or legislated freeports of the Subic Economic
Freeport Zone, created under Republic Act No. 7227; x x
x and such other freeports as may hereafter be established
or created by law: Provided, further, That importations of
cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and
wines made directly by a government-owned and operated
duty-free shop, like the Duty Free Philippines (DFP), shall be
exempted from all applicable duties only: x x x Provided,
finally, That the removal and transfer of tax and duty-free
goods, products, machinery, equipment and other similar
articles other than cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits,
fermented liquors and wines, from one Freeport to another
Freeport, shall not be deemed an introduction into the
Philippine customs territory. x x x. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |42
On the basis of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334, SBMA issued on
January 10, 2005 a Memorandum8 declaring that effective
January 1, 2005, all importations of cigars, cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the SBF,
including those intended to be transshipped to other free
ports in the Philippines, shall be treated as ordinary
importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and
charges, including excise taxes.
Meanwhile, on February 3, 2005, former Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) Commissioner Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr.
requested then Customs Commissioner George M. Jereos to
immediately collect the excise tax due on imported alcohol
and tobacco products brought to the Duty Free Philippines
(DFP) and Freeport zones.9
Accordingly, the Collector of Customs of the port of Subic
directed the SBMA Administrator to require payment of all
appropriate duties and taxes on all importations of cigars and
cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines; and
for all transactions involving the said items to be covered
from then on by a consumption entry and no longer by a
warehousing entry.10
On February 7, 2005, SBMA issued a
Memorandum11 directing the departments concerned to
require locators/importers in the SBF to pay the
corresponding duties and taxes on their importations of
cigars, cigarettes, liquors and wines before said items are
cleared and released from the freeport. However, certain
SBF locators which were "exclusively engaged in the
transshipment of cigarette products for foreign destinations"
were allowed by the SBMA to process their import
documents subject to their submission of an Undertaking with
the Bureau of Customs.12
On February 15, 2005, private respondents wrote the offices
of respondent Collector of Customs and the SBMA
Administrator requesting for a reconsideration of the
directives on the imposition of duties and taxes, particularly
excise taxes, on their shipments of cigars, cigarettes, wines
and liquors.13 Despite these letters, however, they were not
allowed to file any warehousing entry for their shipments.
Thus, private respondent enterprises, through their
representatives, brought before the RTC of Olongapo City a
special civil action for declaratory relief 14 to have certain
provisions of R.A. No. 9334 declared as unconstitutional,
which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 102-0-05.
In the main, private respondents submitted that (1) R.A. No.
9334 should not be interpreted as altering, modifying or
amending the provisions of R.A. No. 7227 because repeals
by implication are not favored; (2) a general law like R.A. No.
9334 cannot amend R.A. No. 7727, which is a special law;
and (3) the assailed law violates the one bill-one subject rule
embodied in Section 26(1), Article VI 15 of the Constitution as
well as the constitutional proscription against the impairment
of the obligation of contracts.16
Alleging that great and irreparable loss and injury would
befall them as a consequence of the imposition of taxes on
alcohol and tobacco products brought into the SBF, private
respondents prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
preliminary mandatory injunction to enjoin the directives of
herein petitioners.
Petitioners duly opposed the private respondents’ prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO,
arguing that (1) tax exemptions are not presumed and even
when granted, are strictly construed against the grantee; (2)
an increase in business expense is not the injury
contemplated by law, it being a case of damnum absque
injuria; and (3) the drawback mechanism established in the
law clearly negates the possibility of the feared injury. 17
Petitioners moreover pointed out that courts are enjoined
from issuing a writ of injunction and/or TRO on the grounds of
an alleged nullity of a law, ordinance or administrative
regulation or circular or in a manner that would effectively
dispose of the main case. Taxes, they stressed, are the
lifeblood of the government and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperious need. They maintained that
greater injury would be inflicted on the public should the writ
be granted.
On May 4, 2005, the court a quo granted private
respondents’ application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, after it found that the essential
requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction were
present.
As investors duly licensed to operate inside the SBF, the trial
court declared that private respondents were entitled to enjoy
the benefits of tax incentives under R.A. No. 7227,
particularly the exemption from local and national taxes under
Section 12(c); the aforecited provision of R.A. No. 7227,
coupled with private respondents’ Certificates of Registration
and Tax Exemption from the SBMA, vested in them a clear
and unmistakable right or right in esse that would be violated
should R.A. No. 9334 be implemented; and the invasion of
such right is substantial and material as private respondents
would be compelled to pay more than what they should by
way of taxes to the national government.
The trial court thereafter ruled that the prima
facie presumption of validity of R.A. No. 9334 had been
overcome by private respondents, it holding that as a partial
amendment of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of
1997,18 as amended, R.A. No. 9334 is a general law that
could not prevail over a special statute like R.A. No. 7227
notwithstanding the fact that the assailed law is of later
effectivity.
The trial court went on to hold that the repealing provision of
Section 10 of R.A. No. 9334 does not expressly mention the
repeal of R. A. No. 7227, hence, its repeal can only be an
implied repeal, which is not favored; and since R.A. No. 9334
imposes new tax burdens, whatever doubts arising therefrom
should be resolved against the taxing authority and in favor of
the taxpayer.
The trial court furthermore held that R.A. No. 9334 violates
the terms and conditions of private respondents’ subsisting
contracts with SBMA, which are embodied in their
Certificates of Registration and Exemptions in contravention
of the constitutional guarantee against the impairment of
contractual obligations; that greater damage would be
inflicted on private respondents if the writ of injunction is not
issued as compared to the injury that the government and the
general public would suffer from its issuance; and that the
damage that private respondents are bound to suffer once
the assailed statute is implemented – including the loss of
confidence of their foreign principals, loss of business
opportunity and unrealized income, and the danger of closing
down their businesses due to uncertainty of continued
viability – cannot be measured accurately by any standard.
With regard to the rule that injunction is improper to restrain
the collection of taxes under Section 21819 of the NIRC, the
trial court held that what is sought to be enjoined is not per se
the collection of taxes, but the implementation of a statute
that has been found preliminarily to be unconstitutional.
Additionally, the trial court pointed out that private
respondents’ taxes have not yet been assessed, as they
have not filed consumption entries on all their imported
tobacco and alcohol products, hence, their duty to pay the
corresponding excise taxes and the concomitant right of the
government to collect the same have not yet materialized.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction directing petitioners and the SBMA Administrator
as well as all persons assisting or acting for and in their
behalf "1) to allow the operations of [private respondents] in
accordance with R.A. No. 7227; 2) to allow [them] to file
warehousing entries instead of consumption entries as
regards their importation of tobacco and alcohol products;
and 3) to cease and desist from implementing the pertinent
provisions of R.A. No. 9334 by not compelling [private
respondents] to immediately pay duties and taxes on said
alcohol and tobacco products as a condition to their removal
from the port area for transfer to the warehouses of [private
respondents]."20
The injunction bond was approved at One Million pesos
(P1,000,000).21
Without moving for reconsideration, petitioners have come
directly to this Court to question the May 4, 2005 Order and
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which, they submit, were
issued by public respondent with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |43
In particular, petitioners contend that public respondent
peremptorily and unjustly issued the injunctive writ despite
the absence of the legal requisites for its issuance, resulting
in heavy government revenue losses. 22 They emphatically
argue that since the tax exemption previously enjoyed by
private respondents has clearly been withdrawn by R.A. No.
9334, private respondents do not have any right in esse nor
can they invoke legal injury to stymie the enforcement of R.A.
No. 9334.
Furthermore, petitioners maintain that in issuing the injunctive
writ, public respondent showed manifest bias and prejudice
and prejudged the merits of the case in utter disregard of the
caveat issued by this Court in Searth Commodities
Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals 23 and Vera v. Arca.24
Regarding the P1 million injunction bond fixed by public
respondent, petitioners argue that the same is grossly
disproportionate to the damages that have been and continue
to be sustained by the Republic.
In their Reply25 to private respondents’ Comment, petitioners
additionally plead public respondent’s bias and partiality in
allowing the motions for intervention of a number of
corporations26 without notice to them and in disregard of their
present pending petition for certiorari and prohibition before
this Court. The injunction bond filed by private respondent
Indigo Distribution Corporation, they stress, is not even
sufficient to cover all the original private respondents, much
less, intervenor-corporations.
The petition is partly meritorious.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that only questions relating
to the propriety of the issuance of the May 4, 2005 Order and
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction are properly within the
scope of the present petition and shall be so addressed in
order to determine if public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion. The arguments raised by private
respondents which pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9334 subject matter of the case pending litigation before the
trial court have no bearing in resolving the present petition.
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established.
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of,
or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of
the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights
of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
For a writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the plaintiff must
be able to establish that (1) there is a clear and unmistakable
right to be protected, (2) the invasion of the right sought to be
protected is material and substantial, and (3) there is an
urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.27
Conversely, failure to establish either the existence of a clear
and positive right which should be judicially protected through
the writ of injunction, or of the acts or attempts to commit any
act which endangers or tends to endanger the existence of
said right, or of the urgent need to prevent serious damage,
is a sufficient ground for denying the preliminary injunction. 28
It is beyond cavil that R.A. No. 7227 granted private
respondents exemption from local and national taxes,
including excise taxes, on their importations of general
merchandise, for which reason they enjoyed tax-exempt
status until the effectivity of R.A. No. 9334.
By subsequently enacting R.A. No. 9334, however, Congress
expressed its intention to withdraw private respondents’ tax
exemption privilege on their importations of cigars, cigarettes,
distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines. Juxtaposed to
show this intention are the respective provisions of Section
131 of the NIRC before and after its amendment by R.A. No.
9334:
x x x x.
Sec. 131 of NIRC before R.A. No. 9334 Sec. 1
Sec. 131. Payment of Excise Taxes on Imported Sec. 1
Articles. – Article
(A) Persons Liable. – Excise taxes on imported (A) Pe
articles shall be paid by the owner or importer to articles
the Customs Officers, conformably with the the Cu
regulations of the Department of Finance and regula
before the release of such articles from the before
customs house or by the person who is found in custom
possession of articles which are exempt from posses
excise taxes other than those legally entitled to excise
exemption. exemp
In the case of tax-free articles brought or imported In the
into the Philippines by persons, entities or into th
agencies exempt from tax which are subsequently agenc
sold, transferred or exchanged in the Philippines to sold, tr
non-exempt persons or entities, the purchasers or non-ex
recipients shall be considered the importers recipie
thereof, and shall be liable for the duty and internal thereo
revenue tax due on such importation. revenu
The provision of any special or general law to the The pr
contrary notwithstanding, the importation of cigars the co
and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors of ciga
and wines into the Philippines, even if destined for ferme
tax and duty free shops, shall be subject to all Philip
applicable taxes, duties, charges, including excise free sh
taxes due thereon. Provided, however, That this taxes,
shall not apply to cigars and cigarettes, due th
fermented spirits and wines brought directly cigare
into the duly chartered or legislated freeports and w
of the Subic Economic Freeport Zone, created charte
under Republic Act No. 7227; the Cagayan Econo
Special Economic Zone and Freeport, created Repub
under Republic Act No. 7922; and the Econo
Zamboanga City Special Economic Zone, created Repub
under Republic Act No. 7903, and are not Specia
transshipped to any other port in the Act No
Philippines: Provided, further, That importations of hereaf
cigars and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented law: P
liquors and wines made directly by a government- and cig
owned and operated duty-free shop, like the Duty and wi
Free Philippines (DFP), shall be exempted from all and op
applicable duties, charges, including excise tax Philipp
due thereon; Provided still further, That such applica
articles directly imported by a government-owned such a
and operated duty-free shop, like the Duty-Free owned
Philippines, shall be labeled "tax and duty-free" Free P
and "not for resale": Provided, still further, That if free" a
such articles brought into the duly chartered or the rem
legislated freeports under Republic Acts Nos. goods
7227, 7922 and 7903 are subsequently introduced similar
into the Philippine customs territory, then such distille
articles shall, upon such introduction, be deemed one Fr
imported into the Philippines and shall be subject deeme
to all imposts and excise taxes provided herein custom
and other statutes: Provided, finally, That the
removal and transfer of tax and duty-free goods,
xxxx
products, machinery, equipment and other similar
articles, from one freeport to another freeport, shall
not be deemed an introduction into the Philippine
customs territory.
x x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To note, the old Section 131 of the NIRC expressly provided
that all taxes, duties, charges, including excise taxes shall not
apply to importations of cigars, cigarettes, fermented spirits
and wines brought directly into the duly chartered or
legislated freeports of the SBF.
On the other hand, Section 131, as amended by R.A. No.
9334, now provides that such taxes, duties and charges,
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |44
including excise taxes, shall apply to importation of cigars
and cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines
into the SBF.
Without necessarily passing upon the validity of the
withdrawal of the tax exemption privileges of private
respondents, it behooves this Court to state certain basic
principles and observations that should throw light on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
in this case.
First. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute.29 The burden of proving the
unconstitutionality of a law rests on the party assailing the
law.30 In passing upon the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the government, courts must ever be
mindful of the time-honored principle that a statute is
presumed to be valid.
Second. There is no vested right in a tax exemption, more so
when the latest expression of legislative intent renders its
continuance doubtful. Being a mere statutory privilege, 31 a
tax exemption may be modified or withdrawn at will by the
granting authority.32
To state otherwise is to limit the taxing power of the State,
which is unlimited, plenary, comprehensive and supreme.
The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and
so searching in extent, it is subject only to restrictions which
rest on the discretion of the authority exercising it. 33
Third. As a general rule, tax exemptions are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally
in favor of the taxing authority.34 The burden of proof rests
upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is in fact
covered by the exemption so claimed.35 In case of doubt,
non-exemption is favored.36
Fourth. A tax exemption cannot be grounded upon the
continued existence of a statute which precludes its change
or repeal.37 Flowing from the basic precept of constitutional
law that no law is irrepealable, Congress, in the legitimate
exercise of its lawmaking powers, can enact a law
withdrawing a tax exemption just as efficaciously as it may
grant the same under Section 28(4) of Article VI38 of the
Constitution. There is no gainsaying therefore that Congress
can amend Section 131 of the NIRC in a manner it sees fit,
as it did when it passed R.A. No. 9334.
Fifth. The rights granted under the Certificates of Registration
and Tax Exemption of private respondents are not absolute
and unconditional as to constitute rights in esse – those
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a
matter of law.39
These certificates granting private respondents a "permit to
operate" their respective businesses are in the nature of
licenses, which the bulk of jurisprudence considers as neither
a property nor a property right.40 The licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the grantor sees fit to
impose, including its revocation at pleasure.41 A license can
thus be revoked at any time since it does not confer an
absolute right.42
While the tax exemption contained in the Certificates of
Registration of private respondents may have been part of
the inducement for carrying on their businesses in the SBF,
this exemption, nevertheless, is far from being contractual in
nature in the sense that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution can rightly be invoked. 43
Sixth. Whatever right may have been acquired on the basis
of the Certificates of Registration and Tax Exemption must
yield to the State’s valid exercise of police power. 44 It is well
to remember that taxes may be made the implement of the
police power.45
It is not difficult to recognize that public welfare and necessity
underlie the enactment of R.A. No. 9334. As petitioners point
out, the now assailed provision was passed to curb the
pernicious practice of some unscrupulous business
enterprises inside the SBF of using their tax exemption
privileges for smuggling purposes. Smuggling in whatever
form is bad enough; it is worse when the same is allegedly
perpetrated, condoned or facilitated by enterprises hiding
behind the cloak of their tax exemption privileges.
Seventh. As a rule, courts should avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction which would in effect dispose of the
main case without trial.46 This rule is intended to preclude a
prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on
the burden of proof since by issuing the injunctive writ, the
court would assume the proposition that petitioners are
inceptively duty bound to prove.47
Eighth. A court may issue a writ of preliminary injunction only
when the petitioner assailing a statute has made out a case
of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough, in the mind
of the judge, to overcome the presumption of validity, in
addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy
sought.48
Thus, it is not enough that petitioners make out a case of
unconstitutionality or invalidity to overcome the prima
faciepresumption of validity of a statute; they must also be
able to show a clear legal right that ought to be protected by
the court. The issuance of the writ is therefore not proper
when the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed.49
Ninth. The feared injurious effects of the imposition of duties,
charges and taxes on imported cigars, cigarettes, distilled
spirits, fermented liquors and wines on private respondents’
businesses cannot possibly outweigh the dire consequences
that the non-collection of taxes, not to mention the unabated
smuggling inside the SBF, would wreak on the government.
Whatever damage would befall private respondents must
perforce take a back seat to the pressing need to curb
smuggling and raise revenues for governmental functions.
All told, while the grant or denial of an injunction generally
rests on the sound discretion of the lower court, this Court
may and should intervene in a clear case of abuse. 50
One such case of grave abuse obtained in this case when
public respondent issued his Order of May 4, 2005 and the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 11, 200551 despite the
absence of a clear and unquestioned legal right of private
respondents.
In holding that the presumption of constitutionality and validity
of R.A. No. 9334 was overcome by private respondents for
the reasons public respondent cited in his May 4, 2005
Order, he disregarded the fact that as a condition sine qua
non to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, private
respondents needed also to show a clear legal right that
ought to be protected. That requirement is not satisfied in this
case.
To stress, the possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of an actual existing right would not justify an injunctive
relief.52
Besides, private respondents are not altogether lacking an
appropriate relief under the law. As petitioners point out in
their Petition53 before this Court, private respondents may
avail themselves of a tax refund or tax credit should R.A. No.
9334 be finally declared invalid.
Indeed, Sections 20454 and 22955 of the NIRC provide for the
recovery of erroneously or illegally collected taxes which
would be the nature of the excise taxes paid by private
respondents should Section 6 of R.A. No. 9334 be declared
unconstitutional or invalid.
It may not be amiss to add that private respondents can also
opt not to import, or to import less of, those items which no
longer enjoy tax exemption under R.A. No. 9334 to avoid the
payment of taxes thereon.
The Court finds that public respondent had also ventured into
the delicate area which courts are cautioned from taking
when deciding applications for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. Having ruled preliminarily against
the prima facie validity of R.A. No. 9334, he assumed in
effect the proposition that private respondents in their petition
for declaratory relief were duty bound to prove, thereby
shifting to petitioners the burden of proving that R.A. No.
9334 is not unconstitutional or invalid.
In the same vein, the Court finds public respondent to have
overstepped his discretion when he arbitrarily fixed the
injunction bond of the SBF enterprises at only P1million.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |45
The alleged sparseness of the testimony of Indigo
Corporation’s representative56 on the injury to be suffered by
private respondents may be excused because evidence for a
preliminary injunction need not be conclusive or complete.
Nonetheless, considering the number of private respondent
enterprises and the volume of their businesses, the injunction
bond is undoubtedly not sufficient to answer for the damages
that the government was bound to suffer as a consequence
of the suspension of the implementation of the assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 9334.
Rule 58, Section 4(b) provides that a bond is executed in
favor of the party enjoined to answer for all damages which it
may sustain by reason of the injunction. The purpose of the
injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or
damage by reason of the injunction in case the court finally
decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly.57
Recalling this Court’s pronouncements in Olalia v.
Hizon58 that:
x x x [T]here is no power the exercise of which is more
delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and
sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than
the issuance of an injunction. It is the strong arm of equity
that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury,
where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or
commensurate remedy in damages.
Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation
upon the freedom of action of the defendant and should not
be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only
when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the
emergency demands it,
it cannot be overemphasized that any injunction that restrains
the collection of taxes, which is the inevitable result of the
suspension of the implementation of the assailed Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9334, is a limitation upon the right of the
government to its lifeline and wherewithal.
The power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the
general welfare and well-being of the people.59 That the
enforcement of tax laws and the collection of taxes are of
paramount importance for the sustenance of government has
been repeatedly observed. Taxes being the lifeblood of the
government that should be collected without unnecessary
hindrance,60 every precaution must be taken not to unduly
suppress it.
Whether this Court must issue the writ of prohibition, suffice it
to stress that being possessed of the power to act on the
petition for declaratory relief, public respondent can proceed
to determine the merits of the main case. To halt the
proceedings at this point may be acting too prematurely and
would not be in keeping with the policy that courts must
decide controversies on the merits.
Moreover, lacking the requisite proof of public respondent’s
alleged partiality, this Court has no ground to prohibit him
from proceeding with the case for declaratory relief. For these
reasons, prohibition does not lie.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The writ
of certiorari to nullify and set aside the Order of May 4, 2005
as well as the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by
respondent Judge Caguioa on May 11, 2005 is GRANTED.
The assailed Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction are
hereby declared NULL AND VOID and accordingly SET
ASIDE. The writ of prohibition prayed for is,
however, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-184-CA-J January 31, 2012
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF ENGR. OSCAR L.
ONGJOCO, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD/CEO OF FH-
GYMN MULTI-PURPOSE AND TRANSPORT SERVICE
COOPERATIVE, AGAINST HON. JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ,
JR., HON. RAMON M. BATO, JR. AND HON. FLORITO S.
MACALINO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES, COURT OF
APPEALS
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Judicial officers do not have to suffer the brunt of
unsuccessful or dissatisfied litigants’ baseless and false
imputations of their violating the Constitution in resolving their
cases and of harboring bias and partiality towards the
adverse parties. The litigant who baselessly accuses them of
such violations is not immune from appropriate sanctions if
he thereby affronts the administration of justice and manifests
a disrespect towards the judicial office.
Antecedents
On June 7, 2011, the Court received a letter from Engr.
Oscar L. Ongjoco, claiming himself to be the Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the FH-GYMN
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative (FH-
GYMN).1 The letter included a complaint-affidavit,2 whereby
Ongjoco charged the CA’s Sixth Division composed of
Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (as Chairman),
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and Associate Justice
Florito S. Macalino as Members for rendering an arbitrary
and baseless decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 entitled
FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative
v. Allan Ray A. Baluyut, et al.3
The genesis of CA-G.R. SP No. 102289 started on July 26,
2004 when FH-GYMN requested the amendment of
Kautusang Bayan Blg. 37-02-97 of the City of San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan through the Committee on Transportation
and Communications (Committee) of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (Sanggunian) in order to include the
authorization of FH-GYMN’s Chairman to issue motorized
tricycle operators permit (MTOP) to its members.4During the
ensuing scheduled public hearings, City Councilors Allan Ray
A. Baluyut and Nolly Concepcion, together with ABC
President Bartolome B. Aguirre and one Noel Mendoza (an
employee of the Sanggunian), were alleged to have uttered
statements exhibiting their bias against FH-GYMN, giving
FH-GYMN reason to believe that the Committee members
were favoring the existing franchisees Francisco Homes
Tricycle
Operators and Drivers Association (FRAHTODA) and
Barangay Mulawin Tricycle Operators and Drivers
Association (BMTODA).5 Indeed, later on, the Sanggunian,
acting upon the recommendation of the Committee, denied
the request of FH-GYMN.6
On July 15, 2005, FH-GYMN brought a complaint in the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon charging
Baluyut, Concepcion, Aguirre, Mendoza with violations of
Article 124(2)(d) of the Cooperative Code, Section 3(e) and
(f) of the Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), and Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713
(Code of Conduct for Public Officials and Employees). The
complaint also charged Eduardo de Guzman (FRAHTODA
President) and Wilson de Guzman (BMTODA President).
Eventually, the complaint of FH-GYMN was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence as to the public officials, and for lack
of merit and lack of jurisdiction as to the private respondents.
FH-GYMN sought reconsideration, but its motion to that
effect was denied.7
FH-GYMN timely filed a petition for review in the CA.
In the meanwhile, FH-GYMN filed in the Office of the
President a complaint accusing Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Orlando C. Casimiro, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A.
Gonzales III, and Graft Investigator and Prosecution Officer
Robert C. Renido with a violation of Section 3(i) of Republic
Act No. 3019 arising from the dismissal of its complaint.8
On January 31, 2011, the CA’s Sixth Division denied the
petition for review.9
FH-GYMN, through Ongjoco, moved for the reconsideration
of the denial of the petition for review, with prayer for
inhibition,10 but the CA’s Sixth Division denied the motion.
Thereafter, Ongjoco initiated this administrative case against
the aforenamed member of the CA’s Sixth Division.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |46
In the complaint, Ongjoco maintained that respondent
members of the CA’s Sixth Division violated Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution by not specifically stating
the facts and the law on which the denial of the petition for
review was based; that they summarily denied the petition for
review without setting forth the basis for denying the five
issues FH-GYMN’s petition for review raised; that the denial
was "unjust, unfair and partial," and heavily favored the other
party; that the denial of the petition warranted the
presumption of "directly or indirectly becoming interested for
personal gain" under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 3019;
and that the Ombudsman officials who were probably
respondent Justices’ schoolmates or associates persuaded,
induced or influenced said Justices to dismiss the petition for
review and to manipulate the delivery of the copy of the
decision to FH-GYMN to prevent it from timely filing a motion
for reconsideration.11
Ruling
We find the administrative complaint against respondent
Justices of the Court of Appeals baseless and utterly devoid
of legal and factual merit, and outrightly dismiss it.
Firstly, Ongjoco insists that the decision promulgated on
January 31, 2011 by the CA’s Sixth Division had no legal
foundation and did not even address the five issues
presented in the petition for review; and that the respondents
as members of the CA’s Sixth Division thereby violated
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides as
follows:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a
decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied
without starting the legal basis therefor.
The insistence of Ongjoco is unfounded. The essential
purpose of the constitutional provision is to require that a
judicial decision be clear on why a party has prevailed under
the law as applied to the facts as proved; the provision
nowhere demands that a point-by-point consideration and
resolution of the issues raised by the parties are
necessary.12 Cogently, the Court has said in Tichangco v.
Enriquez,13 to wit:
This constitutional provision deals with the disposition of
petitions for review and of motions for reconsideration. In
appellate courts, the rule does not require any
comprehensive statement of facts or mention of the
applicable law, but merely a statement of the "legal basis" for
denying due course.
Thus, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement when a collegiate appellate court, after
deliberation, decides to deny a motion; states that the
questions raised are factual or have already been passed
upon; or cites some other legal basis. There is no need to
explain fully the court’s denial, since the facts and the law
have already been laid out in the assailed Decision.
(Emphasis supplied)
Its decision shows that the CA’s Sixth Division complied with
the requirements of the constitutional provision, 14 viz:
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner alleged that the Ombudsman erred in not finding
respondents liable for violation of the Cooperative Code of
the Philippines considering that their actuations constituted
acts of direct or indirect interference or intervention with the
internal affairs of FH-GYMN and that recommendation to
deny FH-GYMN’s application was tantamount to "any other
act inimical or adverse to its autonomy and independence."
We disagree.
It is well settled that in administrative proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial
evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act is unequivocal. Findings of fact by the
Office of the Ombudsman, when supported by substantial
evidence, are conclusive. Conversely, when the findings of
fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately supported by
substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the
courts (Marcelo vs. Bungubung, 552 SCRA 589).
In the present case, the Deputy Ombudsman found no
substantial evidence to prove that there was interference in
the internal affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a violation of
the law by the respondents. As aptly ruled by the
Ombudsman:
"While the utterances made by respondents Baluyot, Aguirre
and Mendoza in the course of public hearings earlier
mentioned indeed demonstrate exaltation of FRAHTODA and
BMTODA, to the apparent disadvantage of FH-GYMN, the
same does not imply or suggest interference in the internal
affairs of the latter considering that said remarks or
comments were made precisely in the lawful exercise of the
mandate of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the locality
concerned through the Committee on Transporation and
Communication. It is worthy to emphasize that were it not for
the complainant’s letter-request dated July 23, 2004, the
committee concerned would not have conducted the
aforementioned public hearings, thus, there would have been
no occasion for the subject unfavorable remarks to unleash.
Thus, it would be irrational to conclude that simply because
the questioned utterances were unfavorable to FH-GYMN,
the same constitutes interference or intervention in the
internal affairs of the said cooperative.
In the same vein, while respondents Baluyot, Concepcion
and Aguirre rendered an adverse recommendation as against
complaint’s letter-request earlier mentioned, the same does
not signify giving of undue favors to FRAHTODA or
BMTODA, or causing of undue injury to FH-GYMN, inasmuch
as said recommendation or decision, as the records vividly
show, was arrived at by the said respondents in honest
exercise of their sound judgment based on their interpretation
of the applicable ordinance governing the operation of
tricycles within their area of jurisdiction. Evidence on record
no doubt failed to sufficiently establish that, in so making the
questioned recommendation, respondents Baluyot,
Concepcion and Aguirre acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. It is
likewise worthy to note that, contrary to complainant’s
insinuation, the letter-request adverted to was acted upon by
respondents Baluyot, Concepcion and Aguirre within a
reasonable time and, as a matter of fact, complainant had
been notified of the action taken by the former relative to his
letter-request or proposals.
Time and again, it has been held, no less than by the
Supreme Court, that mere suspicions and speculations can
never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case. Guided by
the same doctrinal rule, this Office is not duty-bound to
proceed with the indictment of the public respondents as
charged. Indeed well entrenched is the rule that "(t)he
purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution
and to protect him from an open and public accusation of
crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial,
and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
trials (Joint Resolution, October 17, 2005, Rollo pp. 142-143).
Moreover, petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the official duties of
respondents by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure
to perform a duty. The presumption prevails and becomes
conclusive until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Every reasonable
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and in
case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness (Bustillo vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 160718, May 12, 2010).
There being no substantial evidence to reverse the findings
of the Ombudsman, the instant petition is denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Petition for Review
is DENIED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated
October 17, 2005 and Joint Order dated April 25, 2006 of the
Deputy Ombudsman of Luzon are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Indeed, the definitive pronouncement of the CA’s Sixth
Division that "the Deputy Ombudsman found no substantial
evidence to prove that there was interference in the internal
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |47
affairs of FH-GYMN nor was there a violation of the law by
the respondents"15 met the constitutional demand for a clear
and distinct statement of the facts and the law on which the
decision was based. The CA’s Sixth Division did not have to
point out and discuss the flaws of FH-GYMN’s petition
considering that the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman
sufficiently detailed the factual and legal bases for the denial
of the petition.
Moreover, the CA’s Sixth Division expressly found that FH-
GYMN had not discharged its burden as the petitioner of
proving its allegations with substantial evidence. 16 In
administrative cases involving judicial officers, the
complainants always carried on their shoulders the burden of
proof to substantiate their allegations through substantial
evidence. That standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
only when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of
although such evidence may not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.17
Secondly, Ongjoco ought to know, if he genuinely wanted the
Court to sustain his allegations of misconduct against
respondent Justices, that his administrative complaint must
rest on the quality of the evidence; and that his basing his
plain accusations on hunches and speculations would not
suffice to hold them administratively liable for rendering the
adverse decision. Nonetheless, he exhibited disrespect for
respondent Justices’ judicial office by still filing this
administrative complaint against them despite conceding in
the administrative complaint itself his having no proof of his
charges, viz:
21. The petition to review in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation had reached this far and may reach
the Supreme Court due to corrupt practices and culpable
violation of the 1987 Constitution committed by Ombudsman
officials and the herein respondents of the Court of Appeals.
A Motion for Reconsideration was submitted with prayer for
the respondents to inhibit themselves to act on it. Otherwise,
it will add to congest the court docket which this Honorable
Court should intercede to look deeper into this matter by
exercising its disciplinary functions over herein
respondents.1âwphi1 The arbitrary denial of the Petition for
Review rendered by the herein respondents is meant that
there is no sufficient ground out of the five (5) issues raised
to engender a well-founded belief that no single offense has
been committed.18
xxx
24. Though there was no clear evidence to link Ombudsman
officials, they may have persuaded, induced or influenced the
herein respondents, who are either their schoolmates or
associates, to deny the Petition for Review in their bid to
establish innocence on the related offense charged against
them on 18 August 2010 before the Office of the President
docketed as OP-DC Case No. 11-C-006. Likewise, they may
have manipulated the delivery of a copy of Decision intended
for the petitioner in order for the latter to fail in submitting a
motion for reconsideration purposely to make the Decision
final and executory by which the said Ombudsman officials
could use such Decision to attain impunity on complaint
against them filed with the Office of the
President.19 (emphasis supplied)
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices to
task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the
groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all,
for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and
prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate
him in his regular performance of the judicial office always
subverts and undermines the independence of the
Judiciary.20
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against
any judge in relation to the performance of his official
functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies.21 Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort
to these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. We explained
why in In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo:22
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by
the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the lower courts
established by law, the question submits to only one answer:
the administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative
or cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Simple reflection will make this proposition amply clear, and
demonstrate that any contrary postulation can have only
intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels
aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet final and
executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge
would, at a minimum and as an indispensable first step,
confer the prosecutor (Ombudsman) with an incongruous
function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is
erroneous in its findings of fact or conclusions of law, or both.
If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of
administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter
more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not,
as already pointed out, within the power of public
prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his Deputies, directly or
vicariously, to review judgments or final orders or resolutions
of the Courts of the land. The power of review—by appeal or
special civil action—is not only lodged exclusively in the
Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with
a well-defined and long established hierarchy, and long
standing processes and procedures. No other review is
allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and
vexatiously repetitive.
In this regard, we reiterate that a judge’s failure to correctly
interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily incur administrative
liability,23 for to hold him administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he
has erred, will be nothing short of harassment and will make
his position doubly unbearable. His judicial office will then be
rendered untenable, because no one called upon to try the
facts or to interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. 24Administrative
sanction and criminal liability should be visited on him only
when the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or is
committed with evident bad faith,25 or only in clear cases of
violations by him of the standards and norms of propriety and
good behavior prescribed by law and the rules of procedure,
or fixed and defined by pertinent jurisprudence. 26
What the Court sees herein is Ongjoco’s proclivity to
indiscriminately file complaints. His proclivity reminds us now
of Joaquin T. Borromeo whom this Court pronounced guilty of
indirect contempt of court he "repeatedly committed over
time, despite warnings and instructions given to him." 27 The
Court imposed the penalty for contempt of court "to the end
that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct
and learn due respect for the Courts and their authority." 28
Having determined that the administrative charge against
respondent Justices had no factual and legal bases, we
cannot hesitate to shield them by immediately rejecting the
charge. We do so because unfounded administrative charges
do not contribute anything worthwhile to the orderly
administration of justice; instead, they retard it.
Nor should we just let such rejected charge pass and go
unchallenged. We recognize that unfounded administrative
charges against judges really degrade the judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for the
Judiciary. Hence, we deem to be warranted to now direct
Ongjoco to fully explain his act of filing an utterly baseless
charge against respondent Justices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court: (a) DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Associate Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., and
Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino for its utter lack of merit;
and (b) ORDERS Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco to show cause in
writing within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court for degrading the
judicial office of respondent Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, and for interfering with the due performance of their
work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |48
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J FEBRUARY 19,
2013
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON
and ANGEL S. ONG, Complainants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON M.
BATO, JR., ISAIAS P. DICDICAN and EDUARDO B.
PERALTA, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before us is a verified Joint Complaint-Affidavit1 filed against
Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
(Justice Bato ), Isaias P. Dicdican (Justice Dicdican) and
Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. (Justice Peralta), all members of the
former Special 14th Division, charging them with grave
misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross
ignorance of the law, gross incompetence, and manifest
partiality.
The complaint alleges that in a Resolution2 dated June 13,
2012, Justice Bato, who was designated on May 31, 2012 by
raffle as acting senior member of the aforesaid
Division, vice the regular senior member, Associate Justice
Jane Aurora C. Lantion (Justice Lantion), who was scheduled
to take a 15-day wellness leave from June 1-15, 2012,
"usurped" the office of ponente in four (4) consolidated
petitions before the CA, namely, CA-G.R. Nos. 122782,
122784, 122853, and 122854. Notwithstanding that the said
cases have been previously assigned to Justice Lantion,
Justice Bato acted on unverified motions to resolve the
petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and
granted the same, without conducting a prior hearing, with
the connivance of the respondents as regular members of the
Division; instead of the said regular members acting on the
motions themselves.
Antecedent Facts
Complainants Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez (Fernandez) and
Antonio A. Henson were elected in August 2010 to the Board
of Directors (Board) of the Nationwide Development
Corporation (NADECOR), a domestic corporation organized
in 1956, which owns a gold-copper mining concession in
Pantukan, Compostela Valley called King-King Gold and
Copper Mine (King-King Mine), while complainant Angel S.
Ong was among those elected to NADECOR’s Board at its
stockholders’ meeting held on June 13, 2012.
At the regular annual stockholders’ meeting held on August
15, 2011, wherein 94% of NADECOR’s outstanding shares
was represented and voted, two groups of stockholders were
vying for control of the company, one group led by Jose G.
Ricafort (JG Ricafort) who then personally controlled 42% of
the issued shares, and the other group led by Conrado T.
Calalang (Calalang), who owned 33%. Elected to the Board
were Calalang, Jose, Jose P. De Jesus (De Jesus), Roberto
R. Romulo (Romulo), Alfredo I. Ayala (Ayala), Victor P.
Lazatin, Fernandez, Leocadio Nitorreda (Nitorreda), and
John Engle (Engle). Later elected as Corporate Secretary
was Luis Manuel L. Gatmaitan (Gatmaitan).
On October 20, 2011, two months after the August 15, 2011
stockholders’ meeting, Corazon H. Ricafort (CH Ricafort),
Jose Manuel H. Ricafort (JM Ricafort), Marie Grace H.
Ricafort (MG Ricafort), and Maria Teresa R. Santos (MT
Santos) (plaintiffs Ricafort), wife and children of JG Ricafort,
claiming to be stockholders of record, sought to annul the
said meeting by filing SEC Case No. 11-164 in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 159. Impleaded as
defendants were NADECOR, the members of the incumbent
Board, and the Corporate Secretary, Gatmaitan.
The plaintiffs Ricafort alleged that they were not given prior
notice of the August 15, 2011 stockholders’ meeting, and
thus failed to attend the same and to exercise their right to
participate in the management and control of NADECOR;
that they were served with notice only on August 16, 2011, a
day after the meeting was held, in violation of the 3-day prior
notice provided in NADECOR’s Bylaws; and that moreover,
the notice announced a time and venue of the meeting
different from those set forth in the Bylaws. The plaintiffs
Ricafort therefore asked the RTC to declare null and void the
August 15, 2011 annual stockholders’ meeting, including all
proceedings taken thereat, all the consequences thereof, and
all acts carried out pursuant thereto.
On November 18, 2011, Gatmaitan filed his Answer to the
complaint in SEC Case No. 11-164; Calalang, Romulo,
Ayala, Fernandez, Engle and Nitorreda filed theirs on
November 21, 2011; and NADECOR filed its Answer on
November 23, 2011. On November 30, 2011, the plaintiffs
Ricafort filed their Answer to the Compulsory Counterclaims.
In the Order dated December 21, 2011, the RTC agreed with
the plaintiffs Ricafort that they were not given due notice of
the annual stockholders’ meeting of NADECOR, and that
their complaint did not involve an election contest, and
therefore was not subject to the 15-day prescriptive period to
file an election protest.3 The fallo of the Order reads, as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court GRANTS, as it
hereby GRANTS the relief prayed for in the Complaint and
DEN[IES] all compulsory counterclaims for lack of merit.
Consequently, Nationwide Development Corporation’s 2011
Annual Stockholders’ Meeting held on August 15, 2011 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID, including ALL matters
taken up during said Annual Stockholders’ Meeting. Any
other acts, decisions, deeds, incidents, matters taken up
arising from and subsequent to the 2011 Annual
Stockholders’ Meeting are hereby likewise declared VOID
and OF NO FORCE and EFFECT.
Defendant Nationwide Development Corporation is hereby
directed to: (a) issue a new notice to all stockholders for the
conduct of an annual stockholders’ meeting corresponding to
the year 2011 since the annual stockholders’ meeting held on
August 15, 2011 was declared VOID, ensuring their receipt
within three (3) days from the intended date of the annual
meeting[;] and (b) hold the annual stockholders meeting
within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.
No pronouncements as to cost.
SO ORDERED.4 (Citation omitted and italics, and emphasis
in the original)
Four separate petitions for certiorari were forthwith filed in the
CA by some members of the new Board and by NADECOR
to assail the validity of the RTC order, all with application for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction, namely:
(a) CA-G.R. SP No. 122782 - filed on January 5, 2012 by
Director Romulo versus CH Ricafort, JM Ricafort, MG
Ricafort and MT Santos (respondents Ricafort). The case
was raffled to Justice Lantion, senior member of the 15th
Division; the chairman of the Division was Justice Dicdican,
while Justice Angelita A. Gacutan (Justice Gacutan) was the
junior member.
(b) CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 - filed on January 5, 2012 by
Directors Calalang, Ayala, Engle and Nitorreda versus the
respondents Ricafort. Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (Justice
Reyes-Carpio) of the 11th Division was the ponente.
(c) CA-G.R. SP No. 122853 - filed on January 6, 2012 by
NADECOR versus the respondents Ricafort. Justice Samuel
Gaerlan of the 6th Division was the ponente.
(d) CA-G.R. SP No. 122854 - filed on January 6, 2012 by
Gatmaitan versus the respondents Ricafort. Justice
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente of the 9th Division was
the ponente.
On January 16, 2012, the 15th Division of the CA denied the
application for TRO and/or preliminary injunction in CA-G.R.
SP No. 122782. On the same day, however, the 11th Division
issued a TRO in CAG. R. SP No. 122784,5stating that the
three (3) conditions for the issuance of an injunctive relief
were present in the said petition, namely: (a) the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) the act sought to be enjoined
is violative of that right; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The fallo of the Resolution of the 11th Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, pending the
determination by this Court of the merits of the Petition, the
Court GRANTS petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |49
temporary restraining order (TRO), to prevent the
implementation and execution of the assailed Order dated
December 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 159,
Pasig City.
The TRO is conditioned upon the filing by the petitioners of
the bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
([P]100,000.00) PESOS each, which shall answer for
whatever damages that [respondents Ricafort] may incur in
the event that the Court finds petitioners not entitled to the
injunctive relief issued. The TRO shall be effective for sixty
(60) days upon posting of the required bond unless earlier
lifted or dissolved by the Court.
During the effectivity of the TRO, the Board of Directors
elected and serving before the August 15, 2011
Stockholders[’] Meeting shall discharge their functions as
Directors in a hold-over capacity in order to prevent any
hiatus and so as not to unduly prejudice the corporation.
Respondents are REQUIRED to submit their Comment to
petitioners’ Petition and why a writ of preliminary injunction
should not be issued within TEN (10) days from notice, and
petitioners, their Reply thereon, within FIVE (5) days from
receipt of the said Comment.
SO ORDERED.6
In light of the declaration by the RTC that the August 15,
2011 stockholders’ meeting was "VOID and OF NO FORCE
and EFFECT," the 11th Division ordered the preceding Board,
elected in August 2010 (Old Board) to take over the company
in a hold-over capacity during the effectivity of the TRO, "to
prevent any hiatus and so as not to unduly prejudice the
corporation," and until a new Board was elected in a
stockholders’ meeting to be called by the Old Board. The new
Board, which entered into its duties on August 15, 2011 (New
Board), had to cease acting and give way to the hold-over
Board.
On February 8, 2012, the 15th Division ordered the
consolidation of all four CA petitions. On February 24, 2012,
the 9th Division also ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP
No. 122854 with CA-G.R. SP No. 122782. On March 9, 2012,
the 11th Division approved the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP
CA-G.R. No. 122784 with CA-G.R. SP No. 122782. The
assailed Resolution7 dated June 13, 2012 of the Special 14th
CA Division includes in its caption CA-G.R. SP No. 122853,
implying that the 6th Division had also agreed to the
consolidation.
On February 17, 2012, the respondents Ricafort filed
their Comment Ad Cautelam8 to the petition in CA-G.R. No.
122784. The petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3)
urgent motions to resolve their application for writ of
preliminary injunction, on March 8,9 on May 22,10 and again
on June 6, 201211. However, after the lapse of the 60-day
TRO but before the CA could resolve the application for writ
of preliminary injunction, Deogracias G. Contreras, Corporate
Secretary of the Old Board who replaced Gatmaitan, issued
on June 6, 2012 a Notice of Annual Stockholders’ Meeting to
be held at the Jollibee Centre in Ortigas on June 13, 2012 at
12:30 p.m. The notice was published on June 7, 2012 in The
Philippine Star,12 and two of the main purposes of the
meeting were:
(a) The ratification of the rescission by the Old Board of
NADECOR’s Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with
the St. Augustine Gold & Copper Ltd. and the St. Augustine
Mining, Ltd., (St. Augustine), both dated April 27, 2010; and
(b) The ratification of the sale of unissued shares of
NADECOR comprising 25% of its authorized capital stock
(for ₱1.8 billion) to a new investor, Queensberry Mining and
Development Corporation (Queensberry), later disclosed as
controlled by the Group of Senator Manuel Villar.
On the same day, the petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784
filed a Supplement to the Third Urgent Motion to Resolve with
Manifestation13 dated June 7, 2012, contending that the
rescission of NADECOR’s MOUs with St. Augustine would
result in grave and irreparable injury to it since St. Augustine
alone had the financial and technical capability to develop its
1,656-hectare area mining claim in Pantukan, Compostela
Valley. NADECOR thus risked having its Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the government, its only
valuable asset, revoked by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
On June 13, 2012 at 12:30 p.m., the announced annual
meeting of NADECOR’s stockholders was held at the Jollibee
Center in Ortigas as scheduled, with Calalang chosen as
presiding officer. Midway through the meeting, however,
Calalang received a facsimile copy of the now assailed
Resolution of the CA’s Special 14th Division, bearing the
day’s date. On motion, Calalang declared the meeting
adjourned in view of the injunctive writ granted by the CA. But
he was overruled by the stockholders and directors holding
64% of the shares, and Calalang and his group walked out of
the assembly. The stockholders who remained in the meeting
ignored the writ and the meeting resumed, with President De
Jesus now presiding. In the meeting, the following were taken
up: the election of the new Board; the ratification of the
rescission by the Old Board of NADECOR’s MOUs with the
St. Augustine; and the ratification of the subscription of
Queensberry to 25% of the capital stock of NADECOR.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction
The assailed Resolution of the Special 14th Division of the
CA granting the writ of preliminary injunction reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction is GRANTED. Let a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the implementation
of the Order dated December 21, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 and allowing the Board of
Directors elected during the August 15, 2011 [stockholders’
meeting] to continue to act as Board of Directors of
NADECOR.
Likewise, the parties, including the hold-over Board of
Directors elected and acting before the August 15, 2011
Stockholders’ Meeting are enjoined and prohibited from
acting as hold-over board and from scheduling and holding
any stockholders’ meeting, including the scheduled June 13,
2012 stockholders’ meeting. Any effects of said June 13,
2012 stockholders’ meeting, including the ratification of the
rescission of all MOUs dated April 27, 2010 and Related
Transaction Agreements between NADECOR and St.
Augustine Gold and Copper, Ltd. and St. Augustine Mining,
Ltd., the election of any new Board of Directors and their
acting as such thereafter and the sale and ratification of the
sale of Unissued Certificates of Shares of NADECOR
constituting 25% of its authorized capital stock to
Queensberry are also hereby enjoined.
Petitioners are thus mandated to post a bond of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]500,000.00) to answer for any
damages which may result by virtue of the writ of preliminary
injunction.
SO ORDERED.14
Significantly, the Resolution enjoined the Old Board from
acting as a hold-over Board, thereby contravening the TRO
issued by the 11th Division. It then allowed the New Board
"to continue to act as Board of Directors of NADECOR." It
also enjoined the holding of a stockholders’ meeting on June
13, 2012, and ordered a freeze in the enforcement of all
actions taken at the said meeting. In particular, the CA
enjoined the ratification of the rescission of all MOUs and
related Transaction Agreements with the St. Augustine, the
election of a new Board of NADECOR, and the ratification of
the sale to Queensberry of 25% of NADECOR’s authorized
capital stock, which would come from its unissued shares.
The CA Resolution was penned by Justice Bato, the acting
senior member of the Special 14th Division (formerly 15th
Division, following an internal CA reorganization), vice Justice
Lantion who was on a 15-day wellness leave. Concurred in
by Justices Dicdican and Peralta, the Resolution cited "new
and subsequent matters" allegedly not contemplated in the
RTC’s Order dated December 21, 2011, like the rescission of
NADECOR’s MOUs with the St. Augustine, and the
ratification of the 25% subscription of Queensberry. The CA
reasoned that the above actions of the Board could have
injurious consequences on the future viability of NADECOR,
even as they were not intended to merely "prevent a hiatus
[in the operations of NADECOR] and so as not to unduly
prejudice the corporation." The CA thus determined that the
petitioners, as stockholders and members of the Board
elected on August 15, 2011, have a right in esse to seek the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |50
preservation of the only valuable property of NADECOR, its
MPSA covering the King-King Mine in Compostela Valley.
Since, according to the CA, the St. Augustine possessed
technical and financial capabilities to develop the said mine,
the rescission of the MOUs could lead to the recall of the
MPSA by the government, to NADECOR’s grave and
irreparable injury.
The CA further stated that the June 13, 2012 stockholders’
meeting would render moot and academic the four
consolidated CA petitions, since a new Board would
effectively supplant the one elected on August 15, 2011,
although the validity of the latter was still being contested in
the CA.
Administrative Case versus CA Justices
On July 3, 2012, the herein complainants filed with the
Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, G.R.
No. 202257, seeking to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CA’s Special 14th Division. However,
in a Resolution15 dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. No. 202257-60,
entitled "Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson, and
Angel S. Ong v. Court of Appeals (14th Division), et al.," the
Supreme Court dismissed the complainants’ petition for lack
of personality because they were non-parties and strangers
to the consolidated CA petitions.
On July 9, 2012, the complainants also filed with this Court
the present Administrative Case, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-
CA-J, against the members of the former Special 14th
Division of the CA, namely: Justices Dicdican, Chairman;
Bato, Senior Member; and Peralta, Junior Member. On
August 28, 2012, the Court directed the respondent CA
Justices to file their Comment to the administrative complaint
10 days from notice. Justices Bato and Peralta filed a joint
Comment, while Justice Dicdican filed a separate Comment,
both on October 18, 2012. On October 29, 2012, Justices
Dicdican, Bato, and Peralta filed a joint Supplemental
Comment with Very Urgent Motion to Dismiss.16
It is alleged in this administrative complaint that the
respondent Justices are guilty of grave misconduct, conduct
detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law, gross
incompetence, and manifest partiality, to wit:
(a) They acted upon the unverified "Third Motion to Resolve"
and "Supplement to the Third Urgent Motion to Resolve with
Manifestation" in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784, which contained
new factual matters, and then issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, without notice and hearing as required in Section 5
of Rule 58;
(b) It was irregular for Justice Bato, who sat as acting senior
member vice the regular ponente, Justice Lantion, who was
on a 15-day leave of absence (later extended by 10 days), to
have penned the questioned Resolution notwithstanding that
the consolidated CA Petitions had not been re-raffled to him.
(c) Granting that the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction was a matter of extreme urgency, Section 5 of Rule
VI of the Internal Rules of the CA (IRCA) authorizes the two
present regular Division members, Justices Dicdican and
Peralta, to act on the application, not Justice Bato.
(d) The effect of the writ of preliminary injunction is not to
merely preserve the status quo but to dispose of the main
case on the merits.
Our Ruling
We dismiss the complaint. Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
provides the procedure for the discipline of Justices of
the CA and the Sandiganbayan and Judges of regular
and special courts.
Under Rule 140,17 there are three ways by which
administrative proceedings may be instituted against justices
of the CA and the Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and
special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2)
upon verified complaint (as in this complaint) with affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may substantiate said
allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported
by public records of indubitable integrity.18
In this verified administrative complaint, the essential facts
comprising the conduct of the respondent Justices of the CA
complained of are not disputed, and are verifiable from the
copies of orders and pleadings attached to the complaint and
to the comments of the respondent Justices. There is, thus,
no need to assign the matter to a retired member of the
Supreme Court for evaluation, report, and recommendation.
The pertinent provisions of the 2009 IRCA relevant to the
instant administrative complaint are Sections 2(d), 4 and 5 of
Rule VI, quoted below as follows:
Sec. 2. Justices Who May Participate in the Adjudication of
Cases.― 
xxxx
(d) When, in an original action or petition for review, any of
the following proceedings has been taken, namely: (i) giving
due course; (ii) granting temporary restraining order, writ of
preliminary injunction, or new trial; (iii) granting an application
for writ of habeas corpus, amparo, or habeas data; (iv)
granting an application for a freeze order; and (v) granting
judicial authorization under the Human Security Act of 2007,
the case shall remain with the Justice to whom the case is
assigned and the Justices who participated therein,
regardless of their transfer to other Divisions in the same
station. x x x.
Sec. 4. Hearing on Preliminary Injunction.―The requirement
of a hearing on an application for preliminary injunction is
satisfied with the issuance by the Court of a resolution served
upon the party sought to be enjoined requiring him to
comment on said application within a period of not more than
ten (10) days from notice. Said party may attach to his
comment documents which may show why the application for
preliminary injunction should be denied. The Court may
require the party seeking the injunctive relief to file his reply
to the comment within five (5) days from receipt of the latter.
If the party sought to be enjoined fails to file his comment as
provided for in the preceding paragraph, the Court may
resolve the application on the basis of the petition and its
annexes.
The preceding paragraphs notwithstanding, the Court may, in
its sound discretion, set the application for a preliminary
injunction for hearing during which the parties may present
their respective positions or submit evidence in support
thereof.
Sec. 5. Action by a Justice.―All members of the Division
shall act upon an application for temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction. However, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and a Justice is absent, the two other
Justices shall act upon the application. If only the ponente is
present, then he/she shall act alone upon the application.
The action of the two Justices or of the ponente shall,
however, be submitted on the next working day to the absent
member or members of the Division for ratification,
modification or recall.
Justice Bato, sitting as acting senior member of the
Special 14th Division of the CA, had authority to act on
the urgent motions to resolve the petitioners’ application
for writ of preliminary injunction.
Firstly, it must be stated that the designation of Justice Bato
by raffle as acting senior member of the 14th
Division, vice Justice Lantion who went on a 15-day wellness
leave from June 1-15, 2012, was valid, transparent and
regular (Justice Lantion later extended her official leave to a
total of 25 days). The raffle to fill the extended absence of
Justice Lantion was held on May 31, 2012, witnessed by the
members of the CA’s Raffle Committee, namely, Justices
Magdangal De Leon, Francisco P. Acosta, and Gacutan.
Office Order No. 201-12-ABR,19 signed by Presiding Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr., reads:
In view of the leave of absence (Wellness Program) of
Justice JANE AURORA C. LANTION, regular senior member
of the FOURTEENTH DIVISION, Justice RAMON M. BATO,
JR. has been designated by the Raffle Committee as the
acting senior member of the FOURTEENTH DIVISION, in
addition to his duties as regular senior member of the
SECOND DIVISION, to act on all cases submitted to the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |51
FOURTEENTH DIVISION, for final resolution and/or
appropriate action, except ponencia, from June 1 to 15,
2012 or until Justice Lantion reports back for duty.
THIS HOLDS TRUE WITH THE OTHER DIVISION/S
WHEREIN JUSTICE JANE AURORA C. LANTION
PARTICIPATED OR TOOK PART AS REGULAR MEMBER
OR IN AN ACTING CAPACITY.20
Note too, that the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No.
122784 to resolve the application for writ of preliminary
injunction21 was filed on June 6, 2012, with Justice Bato now
sitting as acting member of the 14th Division. On June 7,
2012, the complainants filed a supplement to their said third
urgent motion.22 On June 8, 2012, a Friday, the consolidated
petitions were forwarded to Justice Bato, per Re-agendum
issued by the Division Clerk of Court, Attorney Michael F.
Real (Atty. Real).23 Since the meeting of NADECOR’s
stockholders was scheduled on June 13, 2012, a
Wednesday, it will readily be seen that there was no time for
Justice Bato to set for hearing the application for writ of
preliminary injunction.
The complainants argue, citing Section 5, Rule VI of IRCA,
that with the absence of Justice Lantion, the
original ponente of the consolidated CA petitions, only the
regular 14th Division members present, that is, Justices
Dicdican and Peralta, could validly act on the Calalang
group’s urgent application for preliminary injunction. Noting
that Office Order No. 201- 12-ABR limited Justice Bato’s
authority as acting member of the 14th Division only "to act on
all cases submitted to the FOURTEENTH DIVISION for final
resolution and/appropriate action, except ponencia," they
reason that since Justice Bato penned the Resolution of a
motion for injunctive relief in the consolidated petitions whose
assigned ponente was Justice Lantion, he was in effect
"usurping" the office of the ponente of the said cases, in
gross violation of the IRCA.
That there was no re-raffle of the consolidated CA petitions to
a new ponente is not denied, but rather only a designation of
Justice Bato to sit as acting senior member of the 14th
Division vice Justice Lantion. But because of the urgent
nature of the application for writ of preliminary injunction,
which was an offshoot of the consolidated CA petitions, and
the assigned ponente thereof, Justice Lantion, was on a
wellness leave, the Clerk of Court of the 14th Division, Atty.
Real, transferred the said cases to Justice Bato, the acting
senior member temporarily sitting in the place of the
original ponente, Justice Lantion, so that he could promptly
attend to the urgent motion.
There is nothing in the IRCA which would have required the
Division Clerk of Court to transmit the urgent motion for
action only to the two present regular members of the 14th
Division, as the complainants seem to believe. We agree with
Justice Dicdican that the complainants would have been
correct if the absent member of the Division was not
the ponente herself but either of the other members. This
implies that the ponente if present can act upon the urgent
motion alone or with another member present, provided that
the action or resolution "is submitted on the next working day
to the absent member or members of the Division for
ratification, modification or recall."
The complainants need to realize that a preliminary injunction
is not a ponencia but an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain
from a particular act. It is settled that as an ancillary or
preventive remedy, a writ of preliminary injunction may be
resorted to by a party to protect or preserve his rights and for
no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action.
Its object is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the
case are passed upon. It is not a cause of action in itself but
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit.24 On
the other hand, ponencia refers to the rendition of a decision
in a case on the merits, which disposes of the main
controversy. In this case, the main issue in the four CA
petitions is the validity of the RTC’s Order dated December
21, 2011 declaring as void and of no effect NADECOR’s
stockholders’ meeting on August 15, 2011. Contrary to the
complainants’ insistence, the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the 14th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 did
not settle the controversy therein, but is a mere interlocutory
order to restore the status quo ante, that is, the state of
things prior to the RTC’s Order of December 21, 2011.
That Justice Bato was expected to act on the urgent motion
to resolve in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 is clearly implied from
the instruction contained in Office Order No. 201-12-ABR. It
authorized him to act "on all cases submitted to the
FOURTEENTH DIVISION for final resolution and/or
appropriate action, except ponencia, from June 1 to 15, 2012
or until Justice Lantion reports back for duty."25 The Office
Order also states that the said authority "HOLDS TRUE
WITH THE OTHER DIVISION/S WHEREIN JUSTICE JANE
AURORA C. LANTION PARTICIPATED OR TOOK PART AS
REGULAR MEMBER OR IN AN ACTING CAPACITY."
As a provisional remedy, the timing of the grant of a writ of
preliminary injunction is clearly of the essence, except that in
this case the ponente was on an extended leave of absence
and would have been unable to act thereon seasonably. It
cannot be gainsaid from the above Order that an acting
member of a Division, like a regular member, has full
authority to act on any and all matters presented to the
Division for "final resolution and/or appropriate action," which
surely includes an urgent application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Expressly excepted under the IRCA is the acting
member rendering a ponencia in a case assigned or raffled
for study and report to the absent Division member, whom
the acting member is temporarily substituting in the Division.
Section 4, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that the
requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is
satisfied with the issuance of a resolution requiring the
party sought to be enjoined to comment on the
application within 10 days from notice.
The complainants maintain that Justice Bato should first have
set petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction
for hearing before granting the same, as provided in Section
5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. We have already noted
that there was no time to do this, because Justice Bato
received the rollos of the consolidated CA petitions only on
June 8, 2012, a Friday, and the stockholders’ meeting was
set for the very next Wednesday, June 13, 2012.
Section 4 of Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA provides that "[T]he
requirement of a hearing for preliminary injunction is satisfied
with the issuance of a resolution served upon the party
sought to be enjoined requiring him to comment on the said
application within the period of not more than ten (10) days
from notice."
As discussed below, the CA was justified in dispensing with
the requisite hearing on the application for injunctive writ,
since the so-called "new and substantial matters" raised in
the third urgent motion in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784 and in the
supplement thereto were in fact not previously unknown to
respondents Ricafort, and they had already been previously
ordered to comment on the said application, at the time when
the said "subsequent" matters were already obtaining.
In its Resolution dated January 16, 2012 granting a TRO in
CA-G.R. SP No. 122784, the CA 11th Division through
Justice Reyes-Carpio found that the three conditions for the
issuance of an injunctive relief in favor of petitioners
Calalang, Ayala, Engle, and Nitorreda were present, namely:
"(a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that
the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c)
that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage."26 It thus ordered respondents
Ricafort to file their Comment to the petition 10 days from
notice and to explain "why a writ of preliminary injunction
should not be issued." In compliance with the said order, on
February 17, 2012, respondents Ricafort filed their Comment
Ad Cautelam.27 The petitioners thereafter filed three (3)
urgent motions to resolve their application for preliminary
injunction.
The first urgent motion,28 filed on March 8, 2012, called
attention to a special board meeting of the Old Board on
March 7, 2012 concerning, among others, the appointment of
new bank signatories and the need to establish NADECOR’s
official position vis-á-vis St. Augustine’s non-remittance of
US$200,000.00 allegedly demanded under their June 28,
2011 agreement. The group of Calalang feared that the Old
Board was committing acts not contemplated in its hold-over
authority, since they were "overhauling the management and
business operations of NADECOR."
The petitioners’ second urgent motion,29 filed on May 22,
2012, cited a letter of JG Ricafort and De Jesus to St.
Augustine notifying them that NADECOR was rescinding its
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |52
MOUs/Transaction Agreements with them. The Calalang
group insisted that this act would be injurious to NADECOR,
since allegedly St. Augustine alone had the technical know-
how and funds to develop the King-King Mine.
The third urgent motion of petitioners, 30 filed on June 6, 2012,
mentioned a special meeting of the Old Board held on June
1, 2012 which approved the subscription and recording of
new shares in the name of Queensberry, and the calling of a
stockholders’ meeting to ratify the said subscription and to
elect the new Board. The petitioners expressed surprise that
the subscription of Queensberry had already been recorded
in the books, and insisted that the election of a new Board
would render moot their CA petitions and application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
On June 7, 2012, the petitioners filed a "Supplement to the
Third Urgent Motion to Resolve with Manifestation," 31citing an
announcement that same day in The Philippine Star calling
for an annual stockholders’ meeting on June 13, 2012 to
elect a new Board and to ratify the rescission of the MOUs
with St. Augustine and the subscription of Queensberry.
The complainants now insist that the petitioners’ "Third
Urgent Motion to Resolve" application for preliminary
injunction as well as their "Supplement to the third Urgent
Motion to Resolve with Manifestation" in the four CA cases
were unverified. No hearing was also held on the alleged new
and substantial matters raised therein, yet as early as in the
TRO Resolution dated January 16, 2012, the 11th Division
already took into consideration the matter of a threat by
NADECOR of rescission of its MOUs with St. Augustine. The
CA also mentioned a letter from St. Augustine threatening to
withdraw its "intended investment of around $2.5 Billion into
the mining operations of NADECOR" because NADECOR
"has ‘no unquestioned board’ to act on the conditions it set
forth in its letter dated December 16, 2011."32
The TRO resolution also cited the claim of NADECOR that it
needed to submit to the DENR its Mining Project Feasibility
Plan (MPFP) by May 5, 2012, or risk losing both its
investment in the Pantukan mine and potential foreign
investments. The MPFP depended on the completion of the
Bankable Financial Statement, which was funded by St.
Augustine, and they were now threatening to cut off their
funding.
Lastly, the CA 11th division noted that the plaintiffs Ricafort
could not be ignorant of the August 15, 2011 meeting. The
plaintiffs were the wife and children of JG Ricafort, who was
then the NADECOR President, and JG Ricafort and CH
Ricafort still lived as husband and wife in the same house at
No. 8 Postdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan. 33 The
CA also noted that the plaintiffs Ricafort executed proxies
and nominee agreements in favor of JG Ricafort, as well as
cited an affidavit of Raymond H. Ricafort, a son of JG
Ricafort and CH Ricafort, that his mother CH Ricafort and his
siblings had known about the August 15, 2011 stockholders’
meeting, and that his mother never went to any of the
stockholders’ meetings of NADECOR.
From the foregoing, it will be seen that the CA Special 14th
Division needed only to rely on the TRO resolution of the
11th Division as well as on the Comment Ad Cautelam of
respondents Ricafort to find a basis to issue its preservative
writ of preliminary injunction, and whether the third urgent
motion of petitioners and their supplement thereto were
verified, or whether a hearing was held thereon, were
immaterial to the issuance of the writ.
The members of the Special 14th Division acted
collectively and in good faith and their Resolution
granting a writ of preliminary injunction in the
consolidated CA petitions enjoys a presumption of
regularity.
The CA 11th Division conceded that the petitioners in CA-
G.R. SP No. 122784 have reason to maintain the validity of
the August 15, 2011 stockholders’ meeting. It agreed that the
voiding of the said meeting might seriously derail any
necessary corporate actions needed on the demands of the
St. Augustine, which could lead to serious delays in the
development of the Pantukan mine, and eventually the recall
by the DENR of its MPSA. Thus, the CA feared that serious
damage could result to NADECOR and the stockholders’
investments if in fact St. Augustine had the resources and the
willingness to develop its gold-copper mine.
It is not denied that the group of Jose worked for the
rescission of the MOUs with the St. Augustine group and
facilitated the entry of Villar’s company. Calalang and his
group opposed the contemplated actions of JG Ricafort and
his camp, and wanted to retain the MOUs with St. Augustine,
because they believed the exit of the St. Augustine group
would have serious repercussions on the attractiveness of
NADECOR to foreign investors. Whoever will eventually be
proven correct is anyone’s guess, but this does not detract
from the fact that the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction in the consolidated CA petitions was discretionary,
interlocutory and preservative in nature, and equally
importantly, it was a collective and deliberated action of the
former Special 14th Division upon an urgent application for
writ of preliminary injunction.
The complainants have no personality to assail the
injunctive writ.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who
is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary
writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he cannot be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. 34
Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original
proceedings that gave rise to the petition for certiorari, will not
be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the
injurious writ.35 Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, a person not a party to
the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain
an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the
judgment reviewed.36 Stated differently, if a petition
for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party
in the lower court, he has no standing to question the
assailed order.37
The complainants, who at various times served as elected
members of the Board of NADECOR, did not bother to
intervene in the CA petitions, hence, they are not entitled to
the service of pleadings and motions therein. Complainant
Fernandez was himself a defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164
in the RTC, but he chose not to join any of the four CA
petitions.1âwphi1
In this Court’s Resolution38 dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. No.
202218- 21, entitled "Jose G. Ricafort, et al. v. Court of
Appeals [Special 14th Division], et al.," involving a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by JG Ricafort, De Jesus,
Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. Nalen Rosero-Galang, also
questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Special 14th Division of the CA, we ruled that
persons who are not parties to any of the consolidated
petitions have no personality to assail the said injunctive writ.
In another Resolution,39 also promulgated on July 18, 2012,
in G.R. No. 202257-60, a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed by herein complainants to assail the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA
petitions, we likewise dismissed the petition due to lack of
personality of the petitioners, since they were non-parties and
strangers to the consolidated CA petitions. We pointed out
that they should first have intervened below, and then filed a
motion for reconsideration from the questioned CA order. On
September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for
reconsideration from the dismissal of their petition.
Having established that the herein complainants have no
personality to assail the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the CA’s former Special 14th Division, we cannot now
permit them to harass the CA Justices who issued the same.
For even granting that the issuance of the writ was
erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot
be held administratively liable for every discretionary but
erroneous order he issues.40 The settled rule is that "a Judge
cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively
for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good
faith."41 The case of Cortes v. Sandiganbayan42 is instructive.
We quote:
It must be stressed that as a matter of policy, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action. He cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |53
administrative — for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. Only judicial
errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad
faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try
the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment.
It is also worth mentioning that the provisions of Article 204 of
the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust
judgment" refer to an individual judge who does so "in any
case submitted to him for decision" and has no application to
the members of a collegiate court such as the
Sandiganbayan or its divisions, who reach their conclusions
in consultation and accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently,
that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is
"unjust" cannot prosper.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the judge, but to elevate the
assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and
correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for
certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted with
fraud, malice, or dishonesty. x x x.43(Citations omitted)
It was also emphasized in the above case that as an
established rule, an administrative, civil or criminal action
against a judge cannot be a substitute for an appea1. 44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-
201- CA-J is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667 April 10, 2012
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JAMES V. GO and Clerk of Court MA. ELMER M.
ROSALES, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Branch 2, Butuan City, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Once again, in this administrative case, the Court is called to
rule on the question of whether respondent Judge James V.
Go, presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 2, Butuan City, is still fit to continue as a
member of the bench. The Court takes upon this matter
again in light of the violations Judge Go subsequently
committed after he was found administratively liable by this
Court on September 27, 2007.
This administrative case stemmed from a judicial audit and
physical inventory of pending cases conducted from
September 25, 2006 to October 2, 2006 by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) in the said court.
The audit team found that as of audit date, Judge Go failed to
immediately arraign the accused in 632 criminal cases, to
archive 140 criminal cases, to act on summons (should be
subpoenas) issued in 477 criminal cases, to act on 13 cases
which had not been acted upon for a considerable length of
time, to resolve the pending incidents or motions in 15
criminal cases, to act on 17 civil cases from the time of their
filing, to take further action on 32 civil cases, and to resolve
motions or incidents in 88 civil cases. The audit team also
noted the reports of some court officials and employees that
Judge Go would always leave the court in the morning after
finishing all hearings scheduled for the day and would return
only on the following day. When the audit team confronted
the judge, he replied that he leaves early to rest as he
suffered a stroke before, and that being a judge, he is not
required to render eight hours of service a day. The OCA
recommended that the judicial audit report be treated as an
administrative complaint against Judge Go. 1
On October 4, 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Butuan City and Agusan del Norte Chapter, likewise issued
Resolution No. 2, Series of 2006,2 expressing disappointment
over Judge Go’s inefficiency and incompetence, which has
caused undue delay in the disposition of cases pending
before his court. The Resolution was submitted to the OCA
and was docketed as A.M. No. 07-9-221-MTCC.
In a Memorandum3 dated December 29, 2006, the OCA
required Judge Go to take appropriate action on 1262
criminal cases and 32 civil cases that have not been acted
upon for a considerable length of time, to take appropriate
action on 17 civil cases which have not been acted upon
since their filing, to resolve the pending incidents or motions
in 15 criminal cases and 88 civil cases that have remained
unresolved beyond the reglementary period, and to decide
with dispatch 21 civil cases that have remained undecided
beyond the reglementary period. The OCA likewise directed
Judge Go to resolve the pending motions or incidents in 30
cases and to decide 17 cases submitted for decision, all
within the reglementary period, and to furnish the OCA with
copies of his orders, resolutions and decisions on the said
cases. Judge Go was additionally ordered (1) to render eight
hours of service every working day pursuant to various
circulars4 of the Court; (2) to conduct the raffle of cases every
Monday and/or Thursday pursuant to A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
and to submit compliance within 15 days from notice. Lastly,
the OCA directed him to immediately issue orders on newly
filed cases indicating whether the cases are being tried under
the regular procedure or under the summary procedure as
mandated by Section 2 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
On January 29, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the judicial
audit report as an administrative complaint for gross
inefficiency and gross neglect of duty against Judge Go and
his clerk of court, Ma. Elmer M. Rosales, and required them
to comment within 15 days from notice.5 The audit report,
which was formerly docketed as A.M. No. 07-1-02-MTCC,
was also re-docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667.
Instead of filing a comment, Judge Go wrote a letter 6 dated
March 12, 2007 addressed to the Court Administrator, as
follows:
Sir:
I hereby deny all the allegations in the judicial audit report.
I am electing formal hearing.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
JAMES V. GO
Judge
Nonetheless, Judge Go transmitted copies of constancia,
orders and decisions7 but did not act on the remaining cases.
Neither did he respond to the issue of rendering eight hours
of service every working day.
On September 27, 2007, the Court rendered a
decision8 finding Judge Go and his clerk of court
administratively liable. The Court held:
ACCORDINGLY, we find:
xxxx
2. Clerk of Court Ma. Elmer M. Rosales guilty of manifest
negligence in the performance of her duties and is ordered to
pay a FINE in the amount of ₱5,000.00, with WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. She is also DIRECTED to inform the Court, through
the Office of the Court Administrator, of the status of Civil
Case Nos. 8141 and 8142;
3. Judge James V. Go guilty of undue delay in rendering
decision or order and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for
three months without salary or other benefits effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is also FINED in the amount of
₱10,000.00 for his display of manifest indifference to the
Resolution of this Court and further REPRIMANDED for his
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |54
failure to strictly observe office hours. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act/acts will be dealt with
more severely. He is also DIRECTED to fully comply with the
directives of the Memorandum dated December 29, 2006,
within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.
Clerk of Court Rosales and Judge Go are DIRECTED to
inform this Court of the respective dates of receipt of this
Resolution.
The Office of the Court Administrator is
likewise DIRECTED to conduct an investigation on the
allegation that some court personnel in Butuan City do not
observe the eight-hour working day service requirement and
to submit a Report thereon to this Court.
SO ORDERED.9
On October 15, 2007, the Court, upon the recommendation
of the OCA, resolved to consolidate A.M. No. 07-9-221-
MTCC with A.M. No. MTJ-07-1667.10 Subsequently, on
December 3, 2007, the Court resolved to consider A.M. No.
07-9-221-MTCC closed and terminated considering that this
Court’s September 27, 2007 Decision in A.M. No. MTJ-07-
1667 has resolved the issues raised by the IBP, Butuan City
and Agusan del Norte Chapter, on the delay in the disposition
of cases in the subject court.11 1âwphi1
Judge Go paid the imposed fine and served the penalty of
suspension from October 22, 2007 to January 22, 2008. On
three separate occasions, he also submitted matrices of the
action taken on the cases subject of the audit without,
however, attaching any notice of hearing, order, resolution or
decision. He submitted (1) a 17-page matrix attached to a
letter dated May 20, 2009;12 (2) a 2-page matrix annexed to
his letter dated August 24, 2009;13 and (3) an 11-page matrix
attached to a letter dated September 1, 2009. 14 In the said
letters, he stated that the attached matrices were his and his
co-respondent’s comments.
In a Resolution15 dated March 9, 2009, the Court directed
Judge Go to (1) fully comply with the directives regarding the
remaining cases that require his immediate action and submit
compliance therewith within 60 days from notice; (2) resolve
the pending incidents or motions which remained unresolved
despite the lapse of the reglementary period to resolve the
same and to furnish the OCA copies of the resolutions within
10 days from date of rendition; (3) decide with dispatch the
civil cases which were already submitted for decision but
which have not been decided beyond the reglementary
period to decide the same and furnish the OCA copies of the
decisions within 10 days from the rendition of the said
decisions; (4) comply with the provisions of Circular No. 13-
87 dated July 1, 1987, Circular No. 1 dated January 28,
1988, Circular No. 2-99 dated January 15, 1999, Circular No.
63-2001 dated October 3, 2001 and Circular No. 87-2001
dated November 29, 2001, among others, on the rendition of
eight hours of service every working day; (5) comply with the
provisions of the Administrative Matter No. 03-8-02-SC on
the Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of
Executive Judges and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives
and Duties, which mandate that the raffling of cases be
regularly conducted at two o'clock in the afternoon every
Mondays and/or Thursdays as warranted by the number of
cases to be raffled; (6) submit compliance with said
guidelines within 15 days from receipt; and (7) immediately
issue orders on newly filed cases indicating whether the
cases are being tried under the regular procedure or
summary procedure as mandated by Section 2 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure and submit compliance therewith also
within 15 days from receipt. Judge Go was likewise directed
to explain within 15 days from receipt why he should not be
administratively charged anew for his contumacious
disregard of the directives of the Court.
On April 28, 2010, the Court issued another resolution,
directing Judge Go to inform the Court of the action taken on
each of the cases subject of this administrative matter by
furnishing the Court, through the OCA, with copies of his
orders, resolutions, decisions, subpoenas and warrants
relative to said cases within 30 days from notice. The Court
also ordered Judge Go to fully comply with the directives of
the Resolution dated March 9, 2009, also within 30 days from
notice.16 A copy of the Resolution was received in the MTCC,
Branch 2, Butuan City, on June 15, 2010. 17However,
respondent judge again failed to comply with the Court’s
directives.
Thus, on February 2, 2011, the Court directed Judge Go to
show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with
for noncompliance with the previous Resolution and
reiterated the directive for him to submit copies of the
decisions, orders, subpoenas and warrants issued in the
remaining cases subject of the March 9, 2009 Resolution,
both within fifteen (15) days from notice. 18 Despite the lapse
of a considerable length of time, however, Judge Go still
failed to fully comply with the Court’s directives in the
Resolutions dated March 9, 2009 and April 28, 2010.
Noting Judge Go’s deplorable failure to comply with the said
directives, the OCA in a Memorandum19 dated December 1,
2011, recommended to the Court that Judge Go be
dismissed from the service. The OCA stated that under Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars,
and gross inefficiency are categorized as less serious
charges with the following sanctions: (a) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than
₱10,000 but not exceeding ₱20,000.1âwphi1 However,
considering that Judge Go had previously been suspended
by the Court for three (3) months and fined in the amount of
₱10,000 in the Decision dated September 27, 2007, and
considering further that he had repeatedly ignored and failed
to abide with the directives of the Court's Resolutions
regarding the submission of copies or orders, resolutions and
decisions on cases subject of the judicial audit, the OCA
recommended that Judge Go be dismissed from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch,
agency or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or controlled corporations for his display
of manifest indifference to the Resolutions of this Court.
The recommendations of the OCA are well-taken.
Resolutions of this Court should not be treated lightly. As a
judge, respondent must be the first to exhibit respect for
authority.20 Gaspar v. Adaoag21 teaches:
Judges should respect the orders and decisions of higher
tribunals much more so this Court from which all other courts
should take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court
should not be construed as a mere request and should not be
complied with partially, inadequately or selectively.
The disrespect of respondent becomes more pronounced as
the Court has noted that to date, he has not even complied
with its latest Resolution of February 2, 2011 nor adequately
complied with the Decision dated September 27, 2007.
In Guerrero v. Judge Deray,22 the Court held that a judge
"who deliberately and continuously fails and refuses to
comply with the resolution of [the Supreme] Court is guilty of
gross misconduct and insubordination." This ruling was
reiterated in Dela Cruz v. Vallarta23 and Visbal v.
Tormis.24 Also in Guerrero, this Court held that "indifference
or defiance to the Court’s orders or resolutions may be
punished with dismissal, suspension or fine as warranted by
the circumstances."25
In the present case, we find that Judge Go failed to heed the
above pronouncements. He did not file the required comment
to our show cause resolutions despite several opportunities
granted him by this Court. His willful disobedience and
disregard to our show-cause resolutions constitutes grave
and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness
of the honor and integrity attached to his office. 26 It is
noteworthy that Judge Go was afforded several opportunities
to explain his failure to decide the subject cases long pending
before his court and to comply with the directives of this
Court, but he has failed, and continuously refuses to heed the
same. This continued refusal to abide by lawful directives
issued by this Court is glaring proof that he has become
disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he
purports to belong.27
In view of the foregoing, we find that the dismissal of the
respondent judge from service is indeed warranted. This
Court has long maintained the policy of upholding
competence and integrity in the administration of justice.
Incompetence and inefficiency have no place in the judiciary.
Respondent’s indifference to the charges against him only
proves his lack of commitment to the duties of his office,
making him unfit to continue in public service.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |55
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge James V. Go, presiding
judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Butuan
City is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or
instrumentality of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G.
SOMBILON, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the
law by heart and to have the basic rules of procedure at the
palm of his hands.1
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for
Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision3 and the August 8,
2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an Administrative Complaint5 against
Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch
8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses
Sombilon) were the previous owners of a 601-square meter
property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South
Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon. 6 The said property, which
they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as
security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public
auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the
winning bidder in the amount of
₱2,355,000.00.7Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in PNB’s name, which was
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for Bukidnon on
August 25, 1999.8 The one-year redemption period lapsed
but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property. 9
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey
Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty. Garay), a Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court as
counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and
who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the
property.10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they
wanted to reacquire11 the property from PNB, but had no
money to repurchase it.12 Thus, they were hoping that he
would agree to advance the money and, in exchange, they
promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the
property, where one of the buildings is located, for ₱5
million.13
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses
Sombilon went to PNB to inquire about the status of the
property.14 They were informed by the bank that the property
could be purchased at the fair market value of
₱2,938,000.00.15 The following day, Atty. Garay went to the
bank alone and offered to buy the property by making a down
payment of ₱587,600.0016 or 20% of the purchase price.17
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay
intended to purchase the entire property for himself, spouses
Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB. 18 The
bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the
bank’s total claim19 to formalize their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was
issued in favor of PNB.21
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
94384 was issued in the name of PNB.22
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase
offer of Atty. Garay23 since spouses Sombilon failed to make
the required down payment.24
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance
of a Writ of Possession25 before the RTC of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No.
375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge
Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an
Order26 granting the Petition and, on June27, 2005, he issued
a Writ of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that
Atty. Garay’s offer to purchase the property had been
approved due to their failure to pay the full down payment. 29
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a
reconsideration30 of the issuance of the Writ of Possession
arguing that Atty. Garay,31 who was the former counsel of
Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to
paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an
Order33 holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, a portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the
court because it is a mandatory and ministerial duty under
Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to this rule that if
the implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession
would work [great] injustice to the registered owner because
the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel for the
Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to be said
about the conduct of Atty. Garay in manipulating that the
property in question was finally bought by him from the PNB
not to mention the possible violation of the [canon] of legal
and judicial ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the
version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty. Garay [the
opportunity] to rebut the evidence presented by spouses
Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2, 2005, at
8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be
accommodated in the morning[,] it will proceed in the
afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to
appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of
Possession is hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C.
Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to the house of
Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of
the property, if already implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA
via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Injunction35 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition
for Certiorari for several procedural defects. 37 However, on
reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the Petition.39
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution40 granting the
PNB and Atty. Garay’s application for a TRO. Thus:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |56
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be
issued upon the posting of a Five Thousand Peso
(₱5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof
ordering, [petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive
of, or involves danger to, or alters the nature and condition of
the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the
use of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said
property which they may have already received to the Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth Judicial
Region, Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any
rentals arising from the disputed property to the said Clerk of
Court.
SO ORDERED.41
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision42 granting the
Petition for Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession. 43The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby
GRANTED and the assailed July 14, 2005 Order of the court
a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.44
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA
denied the same in its August 8, 2007 Resolution. 46
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari contending that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND
GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR
CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN
DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8],
MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW
AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.47
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed
the Petition for Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and Atty.
Garay to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed
Order.48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-
shopping when they filed a Motion to Recall Order with the
RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they earlier filed
with the CA.49
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas,
Sr. did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession
because PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply for
a Writ of Possession considering that the subject property
had already been sold to Atty. Garay,50 who they claim is also
not entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is disqualified
from purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph
5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err
in granting the Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr.
acted with grave abuse of discretion when he recalled the
Writ of Possession without notice to him and PNB. 52 He also
emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a
writ of possession after the redemption period has lapsed. 53
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the
subject property, it is entitled to the Writ of
Possession.54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, which he had
earlier issued.55
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or
relationship between Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon. 56 In
any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the
Civil Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay
purchased the subject property from PNB and not from
spouses Sombilon.57
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to
filing a Petition for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration may be dispensed
with as the issue involved is purely one of law, which is an
exception under prevailing jurisprudence. 58
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available at the time considering that Judge Venadas, Sr.
issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording
PNB the opportunity to be heard.59
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming
that it did not institute another action simultaneously with the
Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA. 60
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a
Verified Complaint61 against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging
him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct
when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s
motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance
of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and
for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in
Special Civil Case No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ
of Possession he earlier issued62 and for ignoring Sections
4,63 5,64 and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he
proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.66
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges
against him arguing that he did not annul the Writ of
Possession but merely stayed its execution and
implementation to prevent any injustice.67 He insists there
was no violation of due process because he immediately
scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence. 68
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr.
administratively liable for grave abuse of authority bordering
on gross ignorance of procedure.70 Although the OCA did not
touch on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still
pending with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge
Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5,
and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he acted on the
defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon. 71 It also pointed
out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to
due process as no proper notice was sent to them. 72 Thus,
the OCA recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a
regular administrative complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty
of gross ignorance of procedure; and
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |57
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to
pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00)
with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will be
dealt with more severely.73
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with G.R. No. 179914.74
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1)
whether Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession; and (2) whether he should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession and for
disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is
registered with the Register of Deeds within which to redeem
his property.75 During the one-year redemption period, the
purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for
the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon
the posting of a bond.76 But after the one-year period, the
purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to possess
the property, without need of a bond.77 And once title is
consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the issuance
of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of
the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court.78 Questions
regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale may not be raised as a ground to oppose or
hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as
these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment
of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale. 79 The pendency of
such action is also not a ground to stay the issuance of a writ
of possession.80
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when
PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of
Possession.1âwphi1 In fact, the title over the subject property
had already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was
ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of
Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of the
subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of
Possession may be deferred,81 we find none of these
recognized exceptions present in the instant case. Spouses
Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay
was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the Civil Code. However, the alleged invalidity of the
sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the
Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to
possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for
Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation
of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession
because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the
possession of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a
reconsideration of the assailed Order prior to the availment of
a special civil action for certiorari, we agree with PNB that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with
where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is
violation of due process,82 such as in the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the
Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge
Venadas, Sr., we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with
the three-day notice rule and the required proof of service
embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite
this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion
filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of
their right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge
Venadas, Sr. claims that the motion was personally served
on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they refused to
receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA,
no affidavit was submitted to substantiate such allegation.
Thus, we agree with the Court Administrator that Judge
Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering
on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules
of procedure and law is gross ignorance of the law,83which is
classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of
the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC,
punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for
more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a
fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.84
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and
considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge
Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on
gross ignorance of the law and is hereby fined the amount of
₱20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in
A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of
Judge Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but withheld the
amount of ₱100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this
case. In view thereof, the fine of ₱20,000.00 herein imposed
on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the withheld
amount of ₱100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby
DENIED. The June 13, 2007 Decision and the August 8,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S.
Venadas, Sr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of grave abuse of
authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is
ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld amount of
₱100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the
April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. MTJ No. 04-1526 February 2, 2004
JOCELYN V. GRAGEDA, complainant
vs.
JUDGE NIETO T. TRESVALLES,* Municipal Trial Court,
Virac, Catanduanes, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative case arose when Jocelyn V.
Grageda filed an Affidavit-Complaint1 dated January 18, 2000
charging Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles, Municipal Trial Court,
Virac, Catanduanes, with gross ignorance of the law and
abuse of authority relative to Criminal Case No. 5307 entitled
People v. Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. for murder.
The facts that led to the filing of the complaint as summarized
by Executive Judge Romulo P. Atencia, are as follows:
The complainant in this administrative case was the wife of
Gil Grageda who died at about 8:30 in the evening of
November 24, 2000 in Constantino, Virac, Catanduanes due
to multiple stab wounds. On December 1, 2000, a complaint
charging Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen for the murder of Gil
Grageda was filed for preliminary investigation with the
Municipal Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Virac,
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |58
Catanduanes, presided by respondent Judge Nieto T.
Tresvalles, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 5307.
After Criminal Case No. 5307 was filed in his court for
preliminary investigation, Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles
conducted a preliminary examination on December 5, 2000.
On the same day, December 5, 2000, he issued an Order
which textually reads, as follows:
"After conducting the preliminary investigation, the Court
believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime charged
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. Let therefore a warrant of arrest issue for his arrest.
The bail bond of P30,000.00 is hereby fixed for his
provisional liberty on the ground that the evidence of guilt of
the accused is not strong.
"SO ORDERED."
The corresponding warrant for the arrest of Bernardo Tablizo,
Jr. was issued on the same day, stating that the bail for the
accused’s temporary liberty was in the amount of
P30,000.00.
The accused surrendered on December 11, 2000. The
respondent Judge immediately issued an order committing
the person of the accused Bernardo Tablizo, Jr. y Pitajen to
the Municipal Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology, Virac, Catanduanes. Also on the same day, the
accused, through counsel, filed a motion to strike out the
testimony of witness Perlita Tablizo (wife of the accused) and
to grant accused bail.
The following day, December 12, 2000, the respondent
Judge issued an Order releasing accused Bernardo P.
Tablizo, Jr. from the custody of law after the latter posted a
personal bail bond in the amount of P30,000.00.
In an Order dated February 28, 2001, the respondent
transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, which contained a denial of the
accused’s motion to strike out the testimony of Perlita
Tablizo.
First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Antonio C.A. Ayo, Jr. of
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor thereafter conducted
preliminary investigation (I.S. No. 00-30), ultimately
recommending the filing of an information for murder against
Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr. with the aggravating circumstances
of use of motor vehicle, treachery and evident premeditation.
No bail was recommended for the temporary liberty of the
accused.
Thereafter, an information charging Bernardo P. Tablizo, Jr.
for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
which is now awaiting decision.2
The respondent was, thereafter, charged with gross
ignorance of the law, conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Bench, failure to conduct himself in a manner that would
justify his continued stay in the judiciary, and violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.3 According to the complainant, the
respondent judge granted bail to the accused in Criminal
Case No. 5307 without the requisite bail hearing, despite the
fact that there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a
positive identification of the accused. The complainant also
alleged that the amount of P30,000.00 printed on the Warrant
of Arrest issued by the respondent judge appeared to be
"snowpaked," an indication that another entry was previously
made, possibly a "no bail recommendation." Furthermore, no
counter-affidavit or answer was filed by the accused during
the preliminary investigation conducted by the respondent
judge, and it took the police authorities seven days to arrest
the accused after the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Thus:
16. I hereby execute this Affidavit to respond to the call in
(sic) to encouraging the public to report erring judges to the
Supreme Court and not to the media, as I am also very much
concerned, not only of being a victim of injustice, but also of
being prejudicial to [the] government’s interest as a
consequence of incompetence, gross ignorance, misconduct
of the Presiding Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles of the Municipal
Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes in the granting of bail to the
accused, even when the evidence of his guilt was strong and
without an Application for Bail, considering that a Complaint
for Murder was filed, and without an Order, to which the
judge is to make as Summary of Evidence filed by the
complainant and her witnesses to immediately cut short his
membership in the Bench, be terminated and dismissed from
the judicial service with forfeiture of all his benefits and leave
credits with prejudice to his re-employment in any public
office.4
In his Comment, the respondent admitted that no bail hearing
was conducted in Criminal Case No. 5307, but reasoned that
the evidence of the guilt of the accused was not strong.
According to the respondent, the matter of granting bail is an
exercise of judgment, and that the accused should not be
denied his constitutional right to bail.
It is true that a hearing is necessary before an accused
should be released on bail in cases where the granting of bail
is discretionary on the part of the judge. However, it is also
equally true that in the exercise of his sound discretion and
opinion, he is not also precluded in seeing to it that the
evidence of the prosecution is adduced in support for the
denial of bail to the accused to guide the court on what to do
on the matter. But the public prosecutor failed during the
hearing.5
The respondent also explained that a judge issuing a warrant
of arrest is not an arresting officer. Thus, if it took seven days
for the accused to be arrested after the issuance of the
warrant, it was no longer his concern.
In its Report6 dated June 19, 2003, the Office of the Court
Administrator opined that Sections 7 and 8 of Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court make it mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing before an accused charged with a capital offense is
granted bail, and that failure to do so amounts to gross
ignorance of the law. It was recommended that the complaint
be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that
the respondent judge be fined in the amount of P10,000.00
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same act shall be
dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution dated July 28, 2003, the Court referred the
matter to Executive Judge Romulo P. Atencia. Thereafter, the
Executive Judge submitted his Report and Recommendation
dated November 6, 2003.
According to the Executive Judge, the actual implementation
of a warrant of arrest is the responsibility of other
functionaries of the government. In fact, the respondent
issued the warrant of arrest on December 5, 2000, only four
days after the case was filed in his sala on December 1,
2000. Thus, the respondent cannot be blamed in any wise if
the accused was not arrested or held in custody prior to
December 11, 2000.
According to the Executive Judge, the charge that no bail
was really granted for the provisional liberty of the accused in
the sum of P30,000 and that the said amount was merely
superimposed on the warrant of arrest is not supported by
the records. Since the respondent issued an Order on
December 5, 2000 fixing the bail at P30,000, the contention
that no such order granting bail was issued is, likewise,
devoid of merit. Thus, the Executive Judge concluded, even
assuming that there was such a superimposition on the
warrant of arrest, the same was merely made to conform to
the said Order.
Anent the charge that the accused was not required to file a
comment on the complaint, the Executive Judge found that
no fault could be attributed to the respondent on this regard,
as it is the prerogative of the accused to submit any pleading
in his defense. However, the respondent judge failed to make
any findings of facts and the law supporting his action as
mandated by Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The Executive Judge also stated that at the time the
respondent judge granted bail to the accused on December
5, 2000, no application for bail had as yet been filed by the
accused. Furthermore, no hearing was held to determine
whether the evidence of the prosecution on the guilt of the
accused was strong or not.7 According to the Executive
Judge, a hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for
determining the existence of the facts set forth under Section
6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a
plea of bail. Thus, the grant of bail without due hearing
deprives the prosecution of procedural due process, a right to
which it is equally entitled to as the defense. Thus:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |59
The respondent Judge seeks to justify his grant of bail by
claiming that "the testimonies of the witnesses will not
warrant the charge of murder." This claim, however, is belied
by his own Order granting bail when he stated that "the Court
believes that a prima facie case exists that the crime charged
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof." The offense for which he found the accused to be
probably guilty of is "Murder," since it was "the crime
charged" … The warrant of arrest issued by the respondent
Judge designated the offense as "Murder."…8
The Executive Judge agreed with the finding of the Court
Administrator that the respondent is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law.
We agree that the respondent judge is administratively liable
for granting bail to an accused charged with murder without
conducting the requisite bail hearing.
The importance of a hearing in applications for bail should
once more be emphasized. Section 8, Rule 114 provides as
follows:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. - At the hearing of
an application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for
the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon
motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, or otherwise,
unable to testify.
The importance of the Rule lies on the fact that on the result
of the bail hearing depends the right of an accused to
provisional liberty vis-à-vis the duty of the State to protect the
people against dangerous elements. The resolution of the
issue affects important norms in our society: liberty on one
hand, and order on the other. To minimize, if not eliminate,
error and arbitrariness in a judge’s decision, the Rules
require the judge to hear the parties and then make an
intelligent assessment of their evidence. 9
The respondent’s argument that a hearing is "only necessary
if there is an application for admission to bail" is erroneous.
As found by the Executive Judge:
…[T]he fact that the accused has not even filed yet any
application for bail at the time bail was fixed on December 5,
2000 aggravates matters. To state the obvious, there was no
occasion for the respondent Judge to exercise any discretion
on the matter of bail at that point in time as the accused was
not asking to be released on temporary liberty. The
respondent Judge should have followed the straight and
trodden path, well-traveled by members of the bench, that
bail should not be allowed in cases of murder. It might also
be worth mentioning, in passing, that the right to bail may be
waived considering its personal nature. It arises from the time
one is placed in the custody of the law. The fact that the
respondent Judge already granted bail when the accused
has not been arrested yet compounds the aggravation. 10
Admission to bail presupposes the exercise thereof in
accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an
opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature
of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally,
and within the confines of due process, that is, after the
evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. 11 In
this case, the respondent judge motu proprio granted bail to
the accused. The prosecution was not even afforded an
opportunity to present its evidence, in accordance with the
Rules.
We likewise agree with the finding of the Executive Judge
that the respondent’s claim of good faith will not exonerate
him from administrative liability.
The respondent Judge also argues in his Position Paper
submitted to the undersigned Executive Judge that there is
absolutely no evidence to show that he was motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in granting bail. As such,
he argues that his act which was done in his official capacity
is not subject to disciplinary action. Unfortunately for the
respondent Judge, it is already settled that when a judge
grants bail to a person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
without conducting the required [bail] hearing, he is
considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of
which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence. …12
In the recent case of Rosalia Docena-Caspe v. Judge Arnulfo
O. Bagtas,13 the Court stressed the indispensable nature of a
hearing in petitions for bail, citing a plethora of
cases,14 where judges were found to be grossly ignorant of
the rules and procedures and were fined P20,000.00
therefor.
Moreover, the respondent judge failed to adhere to the
mandate of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 5. Resolution of investigating judge and its review. –
Within ten (10) days after the preliminary investigation, the
investigating judge shall transmit the resolution of the case to
the provincial or city prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for
appropriate action. The resolution shall state the findings of
facts and the law supporting his action, together with the
record of the case which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the
arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the affidavits, counter-
affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the
undertaking or bail of the accused and the order for his
release; (d) the transcripts of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation; and (e) the order of cancellation of
his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the
complaint.
No such report on the findings of fact and law was made by
the respondent. As found by the Executive Judge, the
December 5, 2000 Order of the respondent finding probable
cause that the crime of murder was committed was made
only for the purpose of issuing of a warrant of arrest against
the accused, thus:
It is apparent that the aforementioned finding was made only
for purposes of issuance of a warrant of arrest, as at that
time, the accused was still at large. Strictly speaking, this was
not yet a finding of any prima facie case upon which an
Information charging the proper offense should be filed in
court. The respondent Judge was yet to issue a subpoena to
the accused attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its
supporting affidavits and documents as required under Sec. 3
(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The accused has not yet
submitted any counter-affidavit or has waived the submission
thereof. In other words, preliminary investigation was not yet
terminated. Subsequently, however, the respondent Judge
never issued any other resolution on the result of the
preliminary investigation he conducted up to the time he
transmitted the records to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor. The respondent Judge did not make any findings
of facts and the law supporting his action as mandated by
Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, his
original, premature finding of probable guilt made on
December 5, 2000 was already his verdict on the preliminary
investigation yet to be conducted. This cavalier disregard of
procedural rules leaves much to be desired. 15
A judge owes it to himself and his office to know by heart
basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-how
correctly and justly – anything less than that is constitutive of
the serious charge of gross ignorance of the law, perhaps,
grave misconduct.16 In Celestina B. Corpuz vs. Judge
Orlando F. Siapno,17 we had the occasion to state, thus:
When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws
and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a
judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.18
While the Executive Judge agreed that the respondent
should be held administratively liable, it was recommended
that he be merely reprimanded, as "a balancing of the
equities involved should tilt the scales in favor of the
respondent for his loyalty, diligence and reliability." Thus:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |60
There are six (6) first level courts in the Province of
Catanduanes. Of these, five (5) do not have incumbent
judges. As the only judge in the first level courts, respondent
Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles has, for many years, been Acting
Judge of all the other vacant courts which are scattered
throughout the island province, accessible only through dirt
mountain roads. This necessarily entailed great sacrifices on
the part of the respondent Judge, not to mention that the
extra remuneration given to Judges for sitting in vacant salas
is a mere pittance. Inasmuch as this administrative matter
concerns the official acts of the respondent, equity demands
that the bad be weighed together with the good.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the undersigned is inclined to
adopt the recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator that the respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles
be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt
with more severely. However, considering that the said
respondent is in the twilight of his career with the Judiciary,
as his compulsory retirement is scheduled in January of the
coming year which is barely two (2) months away, and
considering further that the respondent Judge did the
yeoman’s job of single-handedly operating the judicial
machinery in the Province of Catanduanes for many years as
the only first level court Judge in the entire province, it is the
respectful recommendation of the undersigned that
respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles be instead only
REPRIMANDED. …19
The records show that the respondent judge compulsorily
retired on January 22, 2004, having served thirty-four years
in the judiciary. Under the circumstances, the Court finds that
a fine of P10,000.00 is just and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nieto T. Tresvalles is
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED in
the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 January 17, 2011
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3335-RTJ)
SPOUSES DEMOCRITO AND OLIVIA
LAGO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 43, GINGOOG CITY, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
The case arose from an amended complaint1 dated
December 29, 2009, filed by Spouses Democrito C. Lago and
Olivia R. Lago (complainants), charging Judge Godofredo B.
Abul, Jr. (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 43, Gingoog City, with acts and omissions
violative of the Standards of Conduct Prescribed for Judges
by Law, the Rules of Court, and the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
Complainants were the defendants in a civil action for
Preliminary Injunction, Easement of Road Right of Way, and
Attorney’s Fees, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), filed on July 2, 2009 by Christina M. Obico
(Obico) before the RTC, Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, and
docketed as Civil Case No. 2009-905. The action was
spawned by the alleged threats of complainants to close the
access road leading to Obico’s property, where the latter’s
milkfish (bangus) farm is located. Obico claimed that, if the
access road leading to her property was closed, she would
be prevented from harvesting her milkfish, causing massive
fish kills, and leading to heavy financial losses on her part.
Complainants assert that the civil complaint was never
raffled, and that no notice of raffle was ever served upon
them, yet the case went directly to Branch 43, where
respondent judge is the acting presiding judge. He is also the
acting executive judge of RTC, Gingoog City. Complainants
claim that this is violative of Section 4(c), Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court.
On July 7, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order 2 directing
the issuance of a TRO "effective seventy two (72) hours from
date of issue," without requiring Obico to put up a bond.
Complainants allege that at that time, they were not yet in
receipt of the summons and copy of the complaint, as well as
Obico’s affidavit and bond. Complainants claim that this is
violative of Section 4(c) and (d) of Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court.
On July 14, 2009, respondent judge issued an
Order3 extending the 72-hour TRO, which had already
expired, "for another period provided that the total period
should not exceed twenty days." Again, respondent judge
failed to require Obico to put up a bond even as complainants
assert that it is already of judicial notice that a TRO under the
amended new rules has been elevated to the level of an
injunction.
In his Resolution4 dated August 11, 2009, respondent judge
ordered, among others, the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction conditioned upon the application of a bond by
Obico in the amount of ₱100,000.00. Complainants argue,
however, that said directive was violative of Section 5, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court since they were not required "to
show cause, at a specific time and place, why the injunction
should not be granted."
Due to these acts of respondent judge, complainants filed a
motion for inhibition5 from further hearing the case, since they
perceive that respondent judge was bereft of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge. The motion was denied by
respondent judge in his Resolution6 dated October 28, 2009.
Complainants thus consider respondent judge’s non-
inhibition as violative of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as it
denied them due process and equal protection of the law.
On November 11, 2009, respondent judge issued an
Order7 upon Obico’s motion, directing the reduction of the
bond from ₱100,000.00 to ₱50,000.00.
Complainants then filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Further Proceedings8 on the ground of the pendency of their
appeal before the Supreme Court of the Order denying the
motion for inhibition. However, at the December 15, 2009
setting for pre-trial of the civil case, respondent judge issued
an Order9 denying the motion to hold in abeyance further
proceedings. Respondent judge also allowed Obico to
present evidence ex parte on January 26, 2010 for failure of
complainants to appear during the pre-trial.10
In his Comment11 dated February 11, 2010, respondent judge
clarifies that, as of the time of the filing of the civil complaint,
Branches 27 and 43 of the RTC, Gingoog City, had no
regular presiding judges. Branch 27 was temporarily presided
over by Judge Rustico Paderanga, the regular presiding
judge of RTC, Camiguin Province, while Branch 43 was
presided over by respondent judge, who is the regular judge
of RTC, Branch 4, Butuan City.
Respondent judge claims that he had faithfully observed the
provisions of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, with respect to
Civil Case No. 2009-905. He explains that, as the acting
executive judge of RTC, Gingoog City, he took cognizance of
the civil case, convinced that it had to be acted upon
immediately. Thus, the issuance of the 72-hour TRO on July
7, 2009 was by virtue of his sound discretion based on the
civil complaint and its annexes.
Respondent judge said that he explained in his July 14, 2009
Order that he extended the 72-hour TRO to 20 days in this
wise—
Considering that the TRO previously granted was only for
seventy-two hours, the same can be extended for another
period provided that the total period should not exceed
twenty days. In order to prevent plaintiff from incurring
serious damage and heavy financial losses on her part, this
court is inclined to grant the extension of the Temporary
Restraining Order for another period not exceeding twenty
(20) days inclusive of the seventy two (72) hour period
already granted previously by this court. 12
With respect to the July 14, 2009 hearing for the TRO,
respondent judge claims that it was justified since he, as a
mere acting presiding (and executive) judge of RTC, Gingoog
City, conducts hearings in that sala only on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays because he has to travel about 144 kilometers
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |61
from Butuan City, where he is actually stationed. In the same
July 14, 2009 Order, respondent judge asserts that the
conduct of the summary hearings on days other than
Tuesdays and Wednesdays would cause undue prejudice to
the other cases already scheduled way ahead of the subject
civil action, thus, the sheer improbability of being
accommodated.
Respondent judge asseverates that the writ of injunction was
issued only after a serious consideration of all the factual and
legal circumstances of the case. On the other hand, he
insists that the denial of the motion for inhibition was due to
its lack of factual and legal basis.
After due investigation of this administrative case, the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued its Report dated
September 13, 2010, recommending that this case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter, and, based on
its finding that respondent judge was grossly ignorant of the
law and rules of procedure, recommended that he be meted
a fine in the amount of ₱25,000.00, with a stern warning that
a repetition of the same or any similar infraction shall be dealt
with more severely.
The OCA found respondent judge to have been grossly and
deliberately ignorant of the law and procedure for violation of
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, specifically by means of the
following acts: (1) when the civil complaint with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO was filed on July 2, 2009, respondent
judge assumed jurisdiction thereon and, without the
mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to
the adverse party, issued a 72-hour TRO on July 7, 2009; (2)
when respondent judge set the case for summary hearing on
July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether the TRO
could be extended for another period, when the hearing
should be set within 72 hours from the issuance of the TRO;
(3) when he eventually granted an extension of an already
expired TRO to a full 20-day period; and (4) when he issued
a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Obico without prior
notice to herein complainants and without the required
hearing.
We find the recommendations of the OCA to be well-taken.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on
preliminary injunction, pertinent to this case, provide—
SEC. 4. Verified application and bond for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order.—A preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order may be granted only
when:
(a) The application in the action or proceeding is verified, and
shows facts entitling the applicant to the relief demanded;
and
(b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the
court where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond
executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay such
party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason
of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court
should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled
thereto. Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction shall be issued.
(c) When an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or
a temporary restraining order is included in a complaint or
any initiatory pleading, the case, if filed in a multiple-sala
court, shall be raffled only after notice to and in the presence
of the adverse party or the person to be enjoined. In any
event, such notice shall be preceded, or contemporaneously
accompanied by service of summons, together with a copy of
the complaint or initiatory pleading and the applicant’s
affidavit and bond, upon the adverse party in the Philippines.
However, where the summons could not be served
personally or by substituted service despite diligent efforts, or
the adverse party is a resident of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom or is a nonresident thereof, the requirement
of prior or contemporaneous service of summons shall not
apply.
(d) The application for a temporary restraining order shall
thereafter be acted upon only after all parties are heard in a
summary hearing which shall be conducted within twenty-four
(24) hours after the sheriff’s return of service and/or the
records are received by the branch selected by raffle and to
which the records shall be transmitted immediately.
SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice;
exception.—No preliminary injunction shall be granted
without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the
application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex
parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided.
Within the twenty-day period, the court must order said party
or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why
the injunction should not be granted. The court shall also
determine, within the same period, whether or not the
preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue
the corresponding order.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections,
if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive
judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a
single-sala court may issue ex parte a temporary restraining
order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance,
but shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to the service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the
case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to
determine whether the temporary restraining order shall be
extended until the application for preliminary injunction can
be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the
temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days,
including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.
In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary
restraining order is deemed automatically vacated. The
effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible
without need of any judicial declaration to that effect, and no
court shall have authority to extend or renew the same on the
same ground for which it was issued.
However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member
thereof, the temporary restraining order shall be effective for
sixty (60) days from service on the party or person sought to
be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court
or a member thereof shall be effective until further orders.
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or
the Court of Tax Appeals that issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against a lower court, board, officer, or quasi-
judicial agency shall decide the main case or petition within
six (6) months from the issuance of the writ.13
Culled from the foregoing provisions, particularly with respect
to the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, as amended, it is clear that, on the matter of the
issuance of an ex parte 72-hour TRO, an executive judge of
a multiple-sala court (applicable to respondent judge), or the
presiding judge of a single-sala court, is empowered to issue
the same in matters of extreme emergency, in order to
prevent grave injustice and irreparable injury to the applicant.
However, it is also an unequivocal provision that, after the
issuance of the 72-hour TRO, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court is bound to comply with Section 4(c) of the
same rule with respect to the service of summons and the
documents to be served therewith.
The records of this case clearly show that respondent judge
failed to cause the raffle of Civil Case No. 2009-905, since
RTC, Gingoog City, is a multiple-sala court, or to cause the
notification and service of summons to complainants after he
issued the 72-hour TRO. Respondent judge’s July 7, 2009
Order was explicit when the civil case was set for summary
hearing on July 14, 2009, purportedly to determine whether
or not the TRO issued could be extended for another period.
Thus, it is manifest that respondent judge had directly
assumed jurisdiction over the civil action and all together
disregarded the mandatory requirements of Section 4(c),
Rule 58, relative to the raffle in the presence of the parties,
and service of summons. This is gross error.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |62
Even assuming that there was a valid raffle to RTC, Branch
43, Gingoog City, where respondent judge acts as the
presiding magistrate, the supposed extreme urgency of the
issuance of the 72-hour TRO was belied by his setting of the
required summary hearing for the determination of the
necessity of extending the 72-hour TRO to 20 days, one
week after the issuance thereof. Indeed, Section 5, Rule 58 is
explicit that such summary hearing must be conducted within
the said 72-hour period. Notwithstanding the explanation of
respondent judge that he could not set the required summary
hearing except on Tuesdays and Wednesdays, it should be
noted that July 7, 2009, the date of the issuance of the 72-
hour TRO, was a Tuesday, yet respondent judge could have
set the summary hearing on July 8, 2009, a Wednesday. He
failed to do so on the mistaken notion that, aside from his
alleged hectic schedule, he could, at any time, extend the 72-
hour TRO for another period as long as the total period did
not exceed 20 days.
What is more appalling is that respondent judge extended the
72-hour TRO, which had already and obviously expired, into
a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be
extended. Respondent judge should have known that the
TRO he issued in his capacity as an acting executive judge
was valid for only 72 hours. Beyond such time, the TRO
automatically expires, unless, before the expiration of the
said period, he, supposedly in his capacity as presiding judge
to whom the case was raffled, conducted the required
summary hearing in order to extend the TRO’s lifetime.
Indubitably, a 72-hour TRO, issued by an executive judge, is
a separate and distinct TRO which can stand on its own,
regardless of whether it is eventually extended or not. It is
not, as respondent judge attempts to impress upon us, a
mere part of the 20-day TRO issued by a presiding judge to
whom the case is raffled.
Moreover, respondent judge committed another blunder
when he ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction without the required hearing and without prior
notice to the defendants, herein complainants. The records
plainly disclose that the only hearing conducted prior to the
August 11, 2009 Resolution granting the preliminary
injunction was the July 14, 2009 summary hearing for the
extension of the 72-hour TRO. This could be gathered from
the August 11, 2009 Resolution, wherein respondent judge
declared—
During the hearing for the determination of the propriety (sic)
the Temporary Restraining Order should be extended or
whether the Writ of Injunction be granted, the plaintiff
presented Christina M. Obico, who in essence testified that
she operated fish cages at Gingoog Bay. x x x. 14
Again, Rule 58, as amended, mandates a full and
comprehensive hearing for the determination of the propriety
of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, separate
from the summary hearing for the extension of the 72-hour
TRO. The preliminary injunction prayed for by the applicant
can only be heard after the trial court has ordered the
issuance of the usual 20-day TRO. Within that period of 20
days, the court shall order the party sought to be enjoined to
show cause at a specified time and place why the injunction
should not be granted. During that same period, the court
shall also determine the propriety of granting the preliminary
injunction and then issue the corresponding order to that
effect. In the case of respondent judge, he gravely failed to
comply with what the rule requires, i.e., to give complainants
the opportunity to comment or object, through a full-blown
hearing, to the writ of injunction prayed for. Instead,
respondent judge railroaded the entire process by treating
the summary hearing for the extension of the TRO as the
very same hearing required for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.1avvphi1
Verily, the absence of the hearing required by the Rules of
Court is downright reprehensible and, thus, should not be
countenanced. The requirement of a hearing is so
fundamental that failure to comply with it not only amounts to
gross ignorance of rules and procedure, but also to an
outright denial of due process to the party denied such a
hearing. Undoubtedly, the acts and omissions of respondent
judge warrant sanction from this Court.
Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law or of the rules, and that, when committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule applies
only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment.
When the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of
it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of
a judge owes the public and the court proficiency in the law,
and the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well as of
prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.15
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of
a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action. However, the assailed judicial acts must not be in
gross violation of clearly established law or procedure, which
every judge must be familiar with. Every magistrate presiding
over a court of law must have the basic rules at the palm of
his hands and maintain professional competence at all
times.16
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross
ignorance of the law or procedure as a serious offense for
which the imposable sanction ranges from dismissal from the
service to suspension from office, and a fine of more than
₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Under the
premises, this Court finds it appropriate to impose on
respondent judge the penalty of a fine in the amount of
₱25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr., of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43, Gingoog City, is found liable for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Procedure, and is hereby meted a
fine of ₱25,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same, or any similar infraction in the future, shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255 February 8, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3335-RTJ)
SPOUSES DEMOCRITO and OLIVIA
LAGO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Gingoog City, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Subject of this disposition is the motion for reconsideration of
the Court’s January 17, 2011 Decision, filed by respondent
Judge Godofredo B. Abul, Jr. (Judge Abul), Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Butuan City, finding him guilty
of gross ignorance of the law and imposing upon him a fine in
the amount of ₱25,000.00.
Disciplinary action was meted on him for (1) assuming
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2009-905 without the
mandated raffle and notification and service of summons to
the adverse party and issuing a temporary restraining
order (TRO); (2) setting the case for summary hearing
beyond the 72-hour required by the law in order to determine
whether the TRO could be extended; and (3) issuing a writ of
preliminary injunction without prior notice to the complainants
and without hearing.
Judge Abul stresses that contrary to the allegations of the
complainants, the Clerk of Court conducted a raffle of the
case in question. In support thereof, he attached the
Letter1 dated July 3, 2009 of Atty. Rhodora N. Restituto, Clerk
of Court VI, RTC, Misamis Oriental, to prove that the case
was indeed raffled on June 9, 2009 to RTC, Branch 43,
Gingoog City. He explained that he issued the 72-hour TRO
pursuant to the 2nd paragraph of Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules in order to avoid injustice and irreparable damage on
the part of the plaintiff. He pointed out, however, that the 72-
hour TRO was issued only on July 7, 2009 because he was
not physically present in the RTC, Branch 43, from July 2,
2009 to July 6, 2009.
Judge Abul admits not conducting a summary hearing before
the expiration of the 72 hours from the issuance of the ex
parte TRO to determine whether it could be extended to
twenty (20) days. He, however, explained that the holding of
the summary hearing within 72 hours from the issuance of
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |63
the TRO was simply not possible and was scheduled only on
July 14, 2009 because the law office of the plaintiff’s counsel
was 144 kilometers away from Gingoog City and under that
situation, the service of the notice could only be made on the
following day, July 8, 2009. Hence, it would be impractical to
set the hearing on July 8, 2009. In addition, on July 9, 10 and
13, 2009, he was conducting hearings in his permanent
station, RTC, Branch 4, Butuan City.
As to the charge that he failed to cause the service of
summons on the complainants and that no hearing was
conducted prior to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, Judge Abul belies the same by submitting (1) a
certified true copy of the Sheriff’s Return of Service2 dated
July 9, 2009 stating that he actually served the summons on
the complainants on July 8, 2009 together with the copy of
the 72-hour TRO; and (2) a certified machine copy of the
summons3 bearing the signature of complainant Democrito
Lago that he personally received the same.
Judge Abul likewise attached to his motion for
reconsideration a certified true copy of the Order4 dated July
29, 2009 and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes 5 to show
that he conducted a hearing on July 21 and 29, 2009 and that
the parties had a lengthy argument during the hearing and
thereafter agreed to submit the application for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction for resolution.
The Court finds merit in the motion for reconsideration.
With respect to the issues regarding the raffle, the lack of
notice and hearing prior to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, the Court is satisfied with the
explanation of Judge Abul as it is substantiated by the official
records on file.
As to the issue on the delay in conducting the summary
hearing for purposes of extending the 72-hour TRO, the
Court finds the reasons advanced by Judge Abul to be well-
taken. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules permits the executive
judge to issue a TRO ex parte, effective for 72 hours, in case
of extreme urgency to avoid grave injustice and irreparable
injury. Then, after the lapse of the 72 hours, the Presiding
Judge to whom the case was raffled shall then conduct a
summary hearing to determine whether the TRO can be
extended for another period.
Under the circumstances, Judge Abul should not be
penalized for failing to conduct the required summary hearing
within 72 hours from the issuance of the original TRO.
Though the Rules require the presiding judge to conduct a
summary hearing before the expiration of the 72 hours, it
could not, however, be complied with because of the
remoteness and inaccessibility of the trial court from the
parties’ addresses. The importance of notice to all parties
concerned is so basic that it could not be dispensed with. The
trial court cannot proceed with the summary hearing without
giving all parties the opportunity to be heard.1âwphi1
It is a settled doctrine that judges are not administratively
responsible for what they may do in the exercise of their
judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction.6 Not every error or mistake that a judge commits
in the performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he
is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to
do an injustice.7 To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment.8
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that
the subject decision, order or actuation of the respondent
judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to
existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must
be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 9
In this case, complainants failed to show that Judge Abul was
motivated by bad faith, ill will or malicious motive when he
granted the TRO and preliminary injunction. Complainants
did not adduce any proof to show that impropriety and bias
attended the actions of the respondent judge.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.
The Decision dated January 17, 2011 is SET ASIDE. The
administrative complaint filed against Judge Godofredo B.
Abul, Jr. is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. CA-04-38. March 31, 2004
FRANCISCO GALMAN CRUZ, appellee,
vs.
JUSTICE PORTIA ALIÑO-HORMACHUELOS, JUDGE
VICTORIA FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, JUDGE CAESAR A.
CASANOVA, JUDGE RENATO C. FRANCISCO, JUDGE
MANUEL D. J. SYCIANGCO and JUDGE ESTER R. CHUA-
YU, appellants.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified Complaint-Affidavit dated September 29, 2002,
Francisco Galman Cruz charged Court of Appeals Justice
Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos of the Court of Appeals, four
presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, namely: Judge Victoria Fernandez-
Bernardo (Branch 18), Judge Caesar A. Casanova (Branch
80), Judge Renato C. Francisco (Branch 19) and Judge
Manuel D. J. Syciangco (Branch 6); and Judge Ester R.
Chua-Yu of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan,
Bulacan (Branch 1) with Grave Misconduct and Gross
Ignorance of the Law.
It appears that complainant was the defendant in Civil Case
No. 94-98 for ejectment before the MTC of Malolos, Bulacan
involving a parcel of land owned by the Province of
Bulacan.1 The complaint was filed by the then "provincial
attorney", now respondent RTC Judge Syciangco, under a
special power of attorney executed by then Governor
Roberto Pagdanganan in favor of the Provincial General
Services Officer, Engr. Romeo S. Castro.2Initially, the case
was assigned to Branch 2 but when the presiding judge of
said court was transferred to another court, respondent, then
MTC, Judge Syciangco was appointed in his stead.
Respondent Judge Syciangco immediately recused himself
because he was the former counsel for the plaintiff. Civil
Case No. 94-98 was then assigned to Branch 1, presided by
Judge Mario Capellan who also inhibited himself on motion of
the complainant. In view thereof, Executive Judge Natividad
Dizon of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, designated
respondent Judge Chua-Yu of the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan,
to try and decide said ejectment case.3 On September 5,
1997, respondent Judge Chua-Yu rendered judgment
ordering the ejectment of complainant.4
Complainant filed an appeal with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan, docketed as RTC Case No. 884-M-97. The case
was assigned to Branch 80 presided by respondent Judge
Casanova. On March 3, 1999, respondent Judge Casanova
affirmed the decision rendered by respondent Judge Chua-
Yu.5
Dissatisfied, complainant filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52309.6On
February 28, 2000, respondent Justice Portia Aliño-
Hormachuelos, as ponente affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.7
Undaunted, complainant further appealed to this Court but
the same was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
On October 15, 2001, complainant filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 689-M-2001.8 The case was
raffled to Branch 19 presided by respondent Judge
Francisco. On October 22, 2001, respondent Judge
Francisco denied the prayer for temporary restraining order
(TRO) and preliminary injunction.9
On October 29, 2001, complainant filed a motion for inhibition
of respondent Judge Francisco.10 He also filed a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of the prayer for TRO. On
November 5, 2001, respondent Judge Francisco voluntarily
inhibited himself from the case. The case was transferred to
Branch 18 presided by respondent Judge Fernandez-
Bernardo. On January 3, 2002, respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo denied the motion for
reconsideration.11 On September 10, 2002, complainant filed
a motion for voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo. On October 1, 2002, respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo denied the motion for inhibition. 12
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |64
On September 30, 2002, complainant filed the complaint-
affidavit against the above-named respondents13 with the
following allegations:
Respondent Judge Syciangco, as the then "provincial
attorney", acted in connivance with then Governor
Pagdanganan in filing the complaint for ejectment which did
not have the sanction of the Provincial Board. Respondent
Judge Chua-Yu tried and decided the ejectment case
although she did not have jurisdiction considering she was a
not a judge of Malolos, Bulacan where the property was
located. Respondent Judge Casanova affirmed the judgment
of respondent Judge Chua-Yu. Respondent Justice Aliño-
Hormachuelos affirmed the judgment of respondent Judge
Casanova. Respondent Judge Francisco refused to grant a
temporary restraining order (TRO). Respondent Judge
Fernandez-Bernardo refused to issue a TRO based on his
motion for reconsideration. All the respondents committed
"misconduct and corruption, inefficient (sic) and gross
inexcusable negligence; and simple violation of law on
jurisdiction and fraud on administrative law; and knowingly
rendering unjust judgment – void judgment."14
Required to comment, each of the respondents filed separate
comments denying the allegations leveled against them.
Respondent Judge Syciangco alleges that he is being
charged for acts he performed when he was the Provincial
Legal Officer of Bulacan. The other respondents aver that
they acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence in
deciding the case before them. All the respondents submit
that the complaint is baseless and complainant should be
sanctioned for filing an unfounded complain which robbed
respondents of precious time which could otherwise have
been devoted to the cases in court.
In its Evaluation Report dated January 29, 2003, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit inasmuch as complainant
questions the correctness of the decisions or orders issued
by respondents which is not within the province of an
administrative case. The OCA further recommended that
complainant be required to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court.15
Approving the recommendation of the OCA, the Court, in a
Resolution dated February 24, 2003, dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit and required complainant to show cause why
he should not be held in contempt of court.16
On March 21, 2003, complainant filed a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the complaint. 17 The Court
denied the same in a Resolution dated July 8, 2003 and
reiterated the Resolution dated February 24, 2003 requiring
complainant to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court.18
On August 4, 2003, complainant filed his compliance. He
strongly reiterates that, with all honesty and belief, his
complaint contains "full of proof of pieces of evidentiary facts"
that would show a prima facie case against respondents
which the Court should investigate. Complainant points out
that it was former Governor Roberto Pagdanganan who
ordered the filing of ejectment case against him in the sala of
Judge Syciangco who used to be the Legal Counsel of the
Province of Bulacan. Complainant submits that this fact
proves connivance, fraud and deception between Governor
Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan which he made as
one of his basis in filing the administrative case. 19
In his Memorandum Report dated February 12, 2004, Court
Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that
complainant be cited for contempt of court for filing an
unfounded or baseless complaint. He opines:
Complainant’s explanation is lacking in substance, and his
theory of conspiracy is based on mere suspicion and
speculation. The connection which complainant seeks to
establish from the order to file ejectment case against him
and the decision reached in said case is tenuous, and that
the conclusion he seeks to draw that there was conspiracy is
without any basis.
.........
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to
obstruct, embarrass or influence the court in administering
justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a
pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose and on
the contrary constitutes direct contempt of court or contempt
in facie curiae and a violation of the lawyer’s oath and a
transgression of the canons of professional ethics, for which
a lawyer like complainant may be administratively disciplined.
It is therefore appropriate to enjoin herein complainant and
other members of the bar who file administrative complaints
against members of the bench that they should do so after
proper circumspection so as not to unduly burden the Court
in the discharge of its function of administrative supervision
over judges and court personnel.
The Court has meted the corresponding disciplinary
measures against erring judges, including dismissal and
suspension where warranted, and welcomes the honest
efforts of the Bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers like
complainant should also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to
courts as well as to their clients and that the filing of
unfounded or frivolous charges against judges such as the
one at hand as a means of harassing them whose decisions
have not been to their liking will subject them to appropriate
disciplinary action as officers of the court.
The Court finds the recommendation of the Court
Administrator to be well taken.
The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held
administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their
rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross
ignorance on their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred
simply because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a
judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling
or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable.20 Much less can a judge be so held accountable
where to all indications, as in this case, the judgment
complained of is far from erroneous. The judgment in the
ejectment case has gone through all the levels of review, it is
high time that any doubts on the validity of the decision be
laid to rest.
Furthermore, there is no cogent reason to delve into the
allegations of connivance, fraud and deception between
Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan as they
are not sustained by an iota of evidence but are only based
on the unfounded perception of complainant. Familiarity
between Governor Pagdanganan and the judges of Bulacan
is insufficient proof, as connivance or conspiracy transcends
companionship. This Court can not give credence to charges
based on mere suspicion or speculation. 21 It is well settled
that in administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in
his complaint.22 In the absence of contrary evidence, what
will prevail is the presumption that the respondents have
regularly performed their official duties, 23 as in this case.
A thorough review of the record also reveals that complainant
has the penchant for calling for the inhibition of judges when
he perceives the judge is partial or when he receives an
unfavorable order or decision from a judge. In fact, the
ejectment case passed through more than five different
judges due to complainant’s proclivity to file motions for
inhibition. In doing so, complainant has shown that he was
avidly shopping for judges favorable to his cause. His
actuations caused needless clogging of court dockets and
unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss
of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Complainant may strongly disagree with the decisions of the
respondents but unsubstantiated allegations of grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law serve no purpose
other than to harass judges and cast doubt on the integrity of
the entire judiciary. As a member of the bar for half a
century,24 complainant should know better than to file an
unfounded administrative complaint.
Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that,
although the Court will never tolerate or condone any act,
conduct or omission that would violate the norm of public
accountability or diminish the peoples’ faith in the judiciary,
neither will it hesitate to shield those under its employ from
unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt rather than
promote the orderly administration of justice. 25
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer26 are enlightening:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |65
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one
such duty: `To observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first
canon of legal ethics which pronounces that `[i]t is the duty of
the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it
peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts
against `unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should
be `with all good fidelity . . . to the courts.' Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts ‘can
only be maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.’
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is other’s lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not
be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court’s
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give
due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men
are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.27
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 28 Justice
Sanchez further elucidated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of
the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the
courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the
continuity of government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice."
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client.
A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their
first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is
wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics." As rightly
observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-known treatise, a
judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to
defend himself and it is the attorney, and no other, who can
better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr. Justice
Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal
for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful
obedience to the court. It may happen that counsel
possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of
the peace or judge who presides over the court. It may also
happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may
grossly err in their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and
self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are
not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the
language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and
degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper
conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice — is
thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of
court.29 (Citations omitted)
In fine, the administrative case against respondents is utterly
devoid of factual and legal basis. It is frivolous, calculated
merely to harass, annoy, and cast a groundless aspersion on
respondents’ integrity and reputation. Complainant’s
unfounded imputations against respondents is malicious and
offends the dignity of the entire judiciary. For this,
complainant is guilty of contempt of court and must be
sentenced to pay a fine of ₱20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, complainant lawyers Francisco Galman Cruz
is found guilty of Contempt of Court and is FINED in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888. February 11, 2005]
EDGARDO O. MAQUIRAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE
JESUS L. GRAGEDA, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint[1] filed by Edgardo O.
Maquiran against Judge Jesus L. Grageda of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, for
grave abuse of discretion, direct bribery, violations of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and rendering manifestly unjust judgment under Article 206 of
the Revised Penal Code committed in relation to Civil Case
No. 95-45.[2]
Complainant is the Chairman of the Banned Chemical
Research and Information Center, Inc., association of Filipino
claimants banana plantation workers who were exposed to a
certain chemical dibromochloropropane used in the
plantation which caused ill-effects on their reproductive
organs. Filipino victims together with other victims from
twelve countries filed civil cases for mass torts and damages
against the U.S. based multinational corporations with the
U.S. courts which dismissed the cases on ground of forum
non conveniens; and required the claimants to file actions in
their home countries. Hence, the more than 7,000 Filipino
claimants filed four civil cases in four different venues against
the U.S. corporations, namely: Shell Oil Co., Dow Chemical
Company and Occidental Chemical Corporation, Standard
Fruit Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands
and Del Monte Fresh Produce. One of these civil cases was
raffled to respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-45 in
1995. Sometime in July 1997, the cases were globally settled
in the U.S. by virtue of a document known as the
Compromise Settlement, Indemnity and Hold Harmless
Agreements, referred to as the Settlement. Plaintiffs and
defendants in this subject case moved for the approval of the
settlement.
On December 20, 2002, respondent issued an Omnibus
Order approving the Settlement by way of a judgment on
compromise.[3]
Plaintiffs moved for the execution of the Omnibus Order
which was opposed by the defendant corporations on the
ground that there is nothing more to execute since the
compromise agreements have long been satisfied.
Respondent granted the issuance of a writ of execution on
April 15, 2003.[4] Accordingly, the writ of execution was
issued on April 23, 2003, to wit:
...
NOW THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause
the execution of the Omnibus Order of this court dated
December 20, 2002 specifically to collect or demand from
each of the herein defendants the following amounts to wit:
1. Defendants Dow Chemical Company (Dow) and
Occidental Chemical Corporation (Occidental) the amount of:
a. $22 million or such amount equivalent to the plaintiffs claim
in this case in accordance with their Compromise Settlement,
Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement (Annex A); and
b. The amount of $20 million or such amount equivalent to
the plaintiffs claim in this case in accordance with their
Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless
Agreement (Annex B)
2. Defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte
Fresh Produce Company (formerly Del Monte Tropical Fruit,
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |66
Co.) (collectively, the Del Monte defendants) the amount of
One Thousand Eight and No/100 Dollars ($1,008.00) for
each plaintiff in accordance with their Release in Full
Agreement;
3. Defendants Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands,
International, Inc. (collectively the Chiquita Defendants) the
amount of Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Seven and
No/100 Dollars ($2,157.00) for each plaintiff in accordance
with their Release in Full Agreement.
You are likewise directed to make a return of the proceedings
taken thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. [5]
The Sheriff returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.
Defendant corporations filed their separate motions for
reconsideration of the issuance of the writ of execution and
for the quashal thereof, insisting that there is nothing left to
execute since plaintiffs claims had already been paid in
accordance with the compromise agreements. They prayed
for the reception of evidence to prove their defense; that
respondent himself oversee and monitor the photocopying,
certification and authentication of the individual release and
other related settlement documents which are in the
safekeeping of the law firm in Houston, Texas, U.S.A. They
likewise manifested that they are willing to defray the
expenses of the proceedings in the U.S. Plaintiffs counsel
opposed such motions and argued that it is too late for the
presentation of evidence and objected to the presentation of
evidentiary documents in the U.S.
On June 30, 2003, respondent issued an Order [6] granting
defendants separate motions for reception of evidence in the
U.S., at the expense of defendant corporations; and stating
that further implementation of the writ of execution which was
returned unsatisfied is held in abeyance or suspended until
the proceedings in the U.S. shall have been terminated
and/or completed.
Respondent wrote the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) a letter dated July 3, 2003, requesting permission to
be on court duty pursuant to his Omnibus Order dated June
30, 2003 and/or for leave of absence after the completion of
such court duty to visit his daughter in New York, U.S.A. to
last not later than August 26, 2003.[7]
On July 18, 2003, respondent issued an Order to
supplement/ implement his Order dated June 30, 2003
outlining the details of the U.S. proceedings, to wit: members
of the parties, venue, duration, and the reasonable expenses
for travel, food and accommodations, personnel and
equipment which shall be jointly shouldered by the
defendants.
While respondents request for an authority to be on court
duty was pending action, he wrote another letter dated
August 11, 2003, asking permission to travel in the U.S. for
the purpose of visiting his daughter, which the Court granted.
The travel authority dated August 27, 2003 authorized
respondent to travel to the U.S. from August 26 to September
15, 2003 to visit his daughter which shall be at the expense
of respondent and chargeable against his forfeitable and
cumulative leave credits.
However, while in the U.S., respondent conducted
proceedings in the Philippine Consulate General Office, San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., from August 27 to September
29, 2003, and issued an Order dated September 29, 2003,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, hereby, RESOLVES:
...
2. To direct once more the Consulate Generals Office, again,
through the support and assistance of Consul General Delia
Menez Rosal, Consuls Eduardo Malaya, and Leoncio
Cardenas, and all their staff to transmit to Branch 4, Regional
Trial Court, Hall of Justice, Panabo City, Davao del Norte,
Philippines, the evidentiary documents consisting of affidavits
of witnesses, separate and distinct Compromise Agreements,
Amendment to the Compromise Agreement, Trust
Agreements, Court records pertaining to the probate of the
Trust Agreement, the Releases in Full for the manufacturers
Dow, Occidental and Shell, the Releases in Full of Chiquita
and the Releases in Full of the Del Monte defendants, the
checks and drafts duly authenticated, including microfilm
copies and bank certificates, the bank documents pertaining
to the deposit of the settlement amounts of the respective
settling defendants Dow, Occidental, Shell, Chiquita and Del
Monte, the settlement plaintiffs, retainer agreements,
executed by the plaintiffs, and various Court records
submitted by Fred Misko, pertaining to the RICO case he
filed against Atty. Macadangdang, et al., the various statutes
and applicable American cases testified on by Judge Ruby
Kless Sondock, and the original transcripts prepared and
signed by the court reporters from the American Reporting
Services, and all other documents authenticated by the
undersigned and/or received by the Court in the proceedings
conducted in this venue.
...
5. To declare the photocopies of all the aforesaid documents
that were viewed, examined, and thoroughly scrutinized by
the Court as aforesaid, vis--vis their originals as
unquestionably authenticated personally by the undersigned,
as faithful, true and correct copies of their respective
originals.
6. And finally, to declare the proceedings in the above-
entitled case in this venue terminated and/or the task set out
to be done by the Court in coming to the Consulate Generals
Office of San Francisco, California, U.S.A. functus oficio. [8]
Complainant filed the instant administrative case against
respondent alleging that respondent committed (1) grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the Order dated June 30, 2003,
staying the service of the writ of execution and directing
himself and his staff to go to the U.S. for further reception of
evidence; (2) direct bribery when he suspended the writ of
execution because defendants offered him free trip to the
U.S., with free passport and visa services, free round trip
tickets, free hotel accommodations, food and daily
allowances for the duration of his stay therein; (3) violation
of B.P. Blg. 129 on territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court when he conducted court sessions in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., from August 27 to September 29, 2003
without authorization from the Supreme Court; (4) violations
of Canons of Judicial Ethics (a) for not being studiously
careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law, and
(b) when he accepted the offer of defendants for a free trip
with accommodations to the U.S.; and (5) violation of Art. 206
of the Revised Penal Code by issuing an unjust Order dated
September 29, 2003 ordering the stay of the execution of the
writ in order to gather, receive and appreciate xerox copies of
evidence submitted to him in the course of the illegal court
session held in the U.S.
Judge Grageda filed his comment which is summarized by
the OCA in its Memorandum,[9] as follows:
On the charge of Grave Abuse of Discretion
...
5. It is a brazen and wanton lie for the complainant to claim
that the defendants offered him free passport and visa
services since the same were issued in the normal course of
procedures in and by the Department of Foreign Affairs and
the US Embassy. His passport was issued on 27 September
1999, three (3) years and eleven (11) months before he
conducted proceedings in California, USA, and his visa was
granted on 15 May 2000, three (3) years and three (3)
months before he conducted said proceedings. Hence,
complainant not only brazenly lied, but also committed
perjury in stating under oath that the defendants offered him
free passport and visa services;
6. He vehemently denies that he made a complete turn-
around and ordered a stay of the writ of execution and
directed himself and his staff to have a trip to USA in blatant
disregard of the rules of court. The complainant did not state
what particular rule was violated. On the contrary, the Order
dated 30 June 2003 was arrived at by virtue of his authority in
the same manner and with the same bases as his other
orders and issuances. In fact he cited in his said order the
rule and the law supporting his conclusions;
IV. On the charge of Direct Bribery
1. He denies the charge for being baseless;
2. He did not order the suspension of the service of the writ of
execution, which was in fact served and implemented by the
sheriff;
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |67
3. In support of complainants claim that the defendants
offered him a free trip to USA should he (Judge Grageda)
suspend the service of the writ of execution are the
pleadings/motions filed by the parties in the subject case, but
nowhere in said pleadings/motions could they find support to
such claim;
4. As a judge, it is his bounden duty to act on all motions. His
ruling on the motions filed before him or his orders and
issuances are correctible by ordinary appeal or certiorari,
which complainant dismally failed;
5. His trip to San Francisco was prayed for by the defendants
and agreed by the plaintiffs. The reason for said trip is to
ferret out the truth regarding the diametrically conflicting
claims of the plaintiffs and the defendants as to payment of
defendants obligations to plaintiffs pursuant to the
compromise settlement approved by the court. It is his lawful
discretion and duty under the law to hold in abeyance the
further implementation of the writ of execution to avoid a
miscarriage of justice;
V. On the charge of Violation of BP 129 -
1. The rationale for the conduct of proceedings in the
Philippines Consulate Generals Office, San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. was explained in full in his Order dated 30
June 2003;
2. BP 129 is silent on his conduct of proceedings in the USA,
but which conduct of proceedings finds support in the Rules
of Court, International Law, and implied in the inherent
powers of the court to exercise its discretion in adopting
necessary means and procedure to properly resolve issues
of facts and law brought up before it in a case subjudice and
in so doing, administers justice properly.
VI. On the charge of Violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics -
1. The charge is self-serving. As explained above, he
conducted the subject proceedings abroad as part of his
faithful and lawful performance of his duties and functions as
judge to properly resolve the issues brought before his court
in the interest of the proper administration of justice;
2. His actions on the motions filed by the parties are
correctible only by ordinary appeal or certiorari, which the
complainant failed to do. His conduct stands in the absence
of modification, correction or reversal by the appellate courts;
3. To suit their ends, complainant grossly twisted and
misinterpreted his Order dated 18 July 2003, which he is
estopped to question because it was issued after due
deliberation in court and with the conformity of the parties;
VII. On the charge of Violation of Art. 206 of the Revised
Penal Code -
1. The charge is self-serving, baseless and erroneous or
twisted misinterpretation of his orders primarily because he
did not decide Civil Case No. 95-45 on 15 April 2003 and
neither did he issue an order to stay the execution of the writ
of execution on 29 September 2003;
2. Contrary to complainants claim, original documents and
not mere xerox copies, were the ones presented before him
during the proceedings held in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A.
In addition, respondent alleges that complainant is an ex-
felon and an ex-convict; that complainant is the chairman of
an association engaged in nothing more than a pseudo
defense of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-45 promising to
protect their interests but demanding a large percentage of
their recoverable award from court litigation knowing that
such recovery is no longer possible; that complainant has
hardly come to court with clean hands.
In its Report, the OCA submitted its findings and
recommendation, as follows:
After a careful perusal and evaluation of the parties
respective positions and arguments, together with letter-
request of Judge Grageda for authority to conduct
proceedings abroad, as well as all the pleadings and
documents on record, this Office finds that there are
reasonable grounds to hold the respondent administratively
liable.
This Office received Judge Gragedas letter dated July 3,
2003, requesting permission to be on court duty in
connection with an Omnibus Order dated 30 June 2003,
which he issued in the subject case. Full text of the said letter
is quoted as follows:
Sir,
May I ask your permission to be on court duty pursuant to
Omnibus Order in Civil Case No. 95-45, dated 30th June
2003, copy whereof I had caused you to be furnished but for
your immediate reference I have hereto appended another
copy and/or for leave of absence on my forfeitable leave after
the completion of the court duties in accordance with the
above-mentioned order to visit relatives, particularly, a
daughter in New York I have not seen for the last three (3)
years to last not later than August 26, 2003.
Trusting in your esteemed condescension on the matter with
my unstinting loyalty and devotion to the service, I am.
Very truly yours,
Jesus L. Grageda (SGD.)
JUDGE
A memorandum dated July 18, 2003 was prepared and
submitted by DCA Christopher O. Lock to the Office of
Justice Velasco, recommending that:
1. The request of Judge Jesus L. Grageda, RTC, Branch 4,
Panabo City, to be on court duty while overseeing and
monitoring the photocopying, certification, and authentication
of the original release and related documents, etc., and to
conduct the cross-examination of defendants witnesses in
Houston Texas, U.S.A. relative to the Omnibus Order dated
30 June 2003 in Civil Case No. 95-45, be DENIED;
2. Judge Jesus L. Grageda, RTC, Branch 4, Panabo City, be
AUTHORIZED to travel abroad on leave of absence to visit
his daughter in New York, U.S.A. from August 11-25, 2003 at
no government expense.
...
On a follow-up made by Judge Grageda, he was informed
that his request will be denied because a Filipino judge has
no legal authority to exercise judicial powers and render
judicial services outside the Philippine territory. Thus, he filed
a letter dated August 11, 2003 asking instead permission to
travel to the United States only to visit a daughter. Full text of
said letter-request is quoted as follows:
Sir,
May I ask your permission to travel to the U.S. to visit a
daughter using my forfeitable leave from August 26-30, 2003
and from Sept. 1 to 15, 2003 and/or vacation leave.
...
Notwithstanding the fact that no authority was given to Judge
Grageda to conduct proceedings on the subject cases in the
United States, he still proceeded with the evaluation and
reception of evidence pertaining to the said cases. Worse,
the proceedings were held beyond the period granted him as
per travel authority issued by the Office of the Court
Administrator. The request for extension of Judge Gragedas
leave of absence, filed through his daughter, was denied for
not being seasonably filed.
Judge Grageda primarily cites good faith in justifying his
conduct of proceedings in the US. In his almost nine (9)
years in judicial service, Judge Grageda held a good
performance record. In this case, he honestly believed that
as a presiding judge over the case, he was mandated by law
to resolve the very difficult issues in the case before him
using all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary and if the procedure to be followed is not specified
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |68
by law, he may adopt any suitable process or mode of
proceeding which appears conformable to the spirit of said
law or rules. When Judge Grageda decided to grant
defendants motions for the reception of evidence in the US, it
was supposedly in the interest of justice and a relentless
pursuit for the truth. To Judge Gragedas credit, it was his
earnest desire to resolve the case which, according to him,
involves difficult issues and numerous parties. Such good
faith mitigates his liability but it does not really absolve him.
Likewise, the charge of Judge Grageda against complainant
in the instant administrative matter does not operate to
absolve him of administrative liability. Whether or not the
allegations against the complainant are true, the fact remains
that Judge Grageda acted without authority from the Court
when he conducted proceedings in the Philippine Consulate
Generals Office in San Francisco, U.S.A.
Evidently, for conducting what Judge Grageda himself called
as not-so-usual proceedings, he should be held
administratively liable. His actuations, despite his good and
honest intentions, created doubts on his impartiality. Although
the defendants did not provide for his passport and visa for
the trip, he nevertheless benefited therefrom as he was able
to travel to the U.S.A. and visit his daughter all expenses
paid. This the Honorable Court should not countenance.
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the
consideration and approval of the Honorable Court are to
(sic) recommendations that:
1. The matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative
matter;
2. Judge Jesus L. Grageda be suspended for a period of six
(6) months for Grave Misconduct in conducting judicial
proceedings at the Consulate Generals Office in San
Francisco California USA, without authority from the
Honorable Court.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA
that respondent should be held administratively liable for
conducting the proceedings in the U.S. without the Courts
approval.
It clearly appears in the records that respondent was granted
authority to travel in the U.S. from August 26 to September
15, 2003 for the sole purpose of visiting his daughter. While
he did ask the permission of this Court to be on court duty for
the photocopying, certification, authentication and submission
of all original documents, relative to defendants claim of
payment of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-45, there is no
showing that the same was granted. In fact, Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Christopher Lock had submitted to the
Court Administrator a memorandum dated July 18, 2003
recommending for the denial of such request. Although, such
denial had not been submitted to and passed upon by the
Court, respondent wrote another letter requesting permission
to travel to the U.S. to visit his daughter using his forfeitable
and/or vacation leave from August 26 to September 15, 2003
which was granted by the Court. However, as embodied in
respondents Order dated September 29, 2003, he conducted
the proceedings from August 27, 2003 up to September 29,
2003 despite the fact that his authority to go to the U.S. was
only to visit his daughter from August 26 to September 15,
2003. From September 16 onwards, he was already absent
without leave as his request for an extension made through
his daughter in Manila was denied by the Court because the
same was not seasonably filed.
Respondent claims that his action in conducting the
proceedings in the U.S. was motivated by his honest belief to
ferret out the whole truth in very complicated issues.
Pertinent portions of the June 30, 2003 Order read:
To reiterate at the core of the pending matter(s) to be
resolved is whether or not on the bases of the settlements
entered into by the plaintiffs and defendants Shell Oil, DOW
& Occidental, Del Monte and Chiquita the former have been
paid or have received the monetary proceeds or benefits
arising from the said settlements which this Court approved
by way of Judgment(s) on Compromise under the milestone
omnibus order of December 20, 2002 under which, the
plaintiffs moved for execution resulting in the questioned
order of April 15, 2003 and the equally questioned writ issued
on April 23, 2003.
The Court expected that after issuing the questioned order
matters would be put to rest between and among the parties.
But it was not meant to be. The expectation has been in vain.
For rather than put matters to rest, the questioned stirred, so
to say, a hornets nest. And like aroused killer bees in droves
the movant defendant swarmed upon the courts said order.
But this court is amazed at the vehemence and consistency
of the movants arguments before and after the issuance of
the questioned order which came to be because the court
honestly believed that the lowly plaintiffs claim that they have
not been paid nor received the monetary benefits of the
settlements they entered into with the settling defendants
was meritorious. And after the issuance of the said
questioned order and cognizance of a few documents and
reliable testimonies indicating that at least some plaintiffs
have already been paid or received monetary benefits from
the settling defendants, the Court is no longer so sure about
the absolute veracity of the plaintiffs claim that they have not
been paid or received monetary benefits arising from the
settlements with the movant defendants. As a result of these
developments the courts duty is to dig deep and thoroughly
into the matter to ferret out the whole truth which is the sole
basis for the validity and integrity of its issuances, the latter,
in turn thus becoming potent, because untainted, instruments
in the dispensation of impartial justice to the parties . . . [10]
In fine, the court agrees with the movant defendants and
holds that the examination of documents to determine their
existence, due execution or authenticity is imperative as such
examination will supply conclusive answers to the burning
questions on whether or not the plaintiffs have been paid, or
in the alternative, the defendants have satisfied or complied
with their obligations under the settlements or compromise
agreements, approved by this court, which they respectively
entered into with the plaintiffs.
The approval of the proceedings prayed for by the movant
defendants appear [s] to be squarely supported by the
following provision of the Rules of Court thus:
Means to carry jurisdiction into effect When by law jurisdiction
is conferred on a court or a judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect
may be employed by such court or officer; and if the
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is
not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of processing may be adopted
which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules
(Sec. 6, Rule 135, Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
underscoring supplied).
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Sect. 6, Rule 135, supra,
defendants Shell Oils Amended Motion as well as the kindred
motions of defendants Del Monte, Chiquita and Dow &
Occidental for reception of evidence and or examination,
photocopying, authentication . . . etc. of documents, being
meritorious are, hereby, GRANTED. Said defendants are
ordered to submit to this court for examination. On August 4,
2003 and everyday thereafter until proceedings are
completed, all their documentary evidence, to wit: settlement
or release documents with the plaintiffs, trust agreements
with commercial or banking institutions, payment checks to
the latter and/or to the individual plaintiffs with the latters
acknowledgment receipts, authority of certain
agents/attorneys to represent the plaintiffs and all other
related documents in an appropriate consular office of the
Philippines in the United States pursuant to the principle of
extra-territoriality, the expenses, facilities, equipment and
support personnel to carry out in full the said court
proceedings to be borne proportionately by the movant
defendants in accordance with their
agreement/manifestations, supra, before this court; to
expedite the conduct of the said proceedings herein ordered
to be undertaken, the defendants are likewise, pursuant to
Sec. 3, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court directed to submit
supporting affidavits of their witnesses attesting to the factual
averments in their respective motion for reconsideration and
to furnish plaintiffs with copies thereof within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof and said witnesses should be made
available for cross-examination in the proceedings to be
conducted, as aforesaid, in the United States; action on the
motions for reconsideration of the order dated 15th April 2003,
and on the Ex-Parte Motion for Amendment of the Writ of
Execution, the further implementation, which to date has
been returned by the sheriff, supra, unsatisfied, of the writ of
execution and the quashal or recall thereof are held in
abeyance or suspended until the said proceedings in the
United States shall have been terminated and/or completed.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |69
Let copies of this order be immediately served upon the
parties for their respective information, guidance and
compliance.[11]
Respondents purpose for his action may be commendable
since he wanted to be sure that the contentions of defendant
corporations that plaintiffs had already been paid in
accordance with their settlement by the proofs of plaintiffs
execution of release and receipt documents. However, the
means in which he set his intention cannot have the approval
of the Court. It must be remembered that no matter how
noble respondents intention was, he is not at liberty to
commit acts of judicial indiscretion. The proceedings
conducted by respondent abroad are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippine Courts. He is the Presiding
Judge of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Region, the territorial jurisdiction of which is
limited only to Panabo, Davao del Norte. [12] This Court had
not granted him any authority to conduct the proceedings
abroad.
Secondly, respondents reliance on Section 6, Rule 135 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., when there is no specific law or rules to
carry out courts jurisdiction, he may adopt suitable process or
mode to effect the same, to justify his action is unacceptable.
Notably, respondent, in his reply to DCA Locks
memorandum, admitted that he asked permission to conduct
the proceeding abroad to receive evidence, thus he knew
that he must first secure the Courts approval. It bears
stressing that cases are decided on the basis of evidence
presented before the court, thus it is incumbent upon the
party who is to be benefited by such evidence to produce the
same, no matter how voluminous and burdensome, in
accordance with the rules for the courts appreciation and
evaluation. It is not respondents duty to secure these
documents for the defendants, as he is the judge in the
pending case and not the counsel of the defendants. Judges
in their zeal to search for the truth should not lose the proper
judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution
of their duties, they do not overstep the limitations of their
power as laid by the rules of procedure. [13] The Court finds
respondent guilty of gross misconduct in conducting the
proceedings in the U.S. without the Courts authority.
Complainant further claims that respondent abused his
discretion in issuing the Order dated June 30, 2003
approving the reception of defendants evidence in the U.S.
Assuming respondent might have acted in abuse of
discretion in issuing the orders complained of, it does not
necessarily follow that he acted in bad faith. Abuse of
discretion by a trial court does not necessarily mean ulterior
motive, arbitrary conduct or willful disregard of a litigants
rights.[14] As held in Balsamo vs. Suan,[15] we held:
. . . [A]s a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous. He cannot be subjected to liability
civil, criminal or administrative - for any of his official acts, no
matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In
such a case, the remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file
an administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate
the error to the higher court for review and correction. The
Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased and partial. Thus, not
every error or mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him liable, unless he is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to
do an injustice. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.
Complainant likewise charges respondent of bribery when he
ordered the suspension of the service of the writ of execution
after he was allegedly offered by the losing party defendants
a free trip to the U.S. for the reception of further evidence
despite plaintiffs vehement opposition. We find such claim as
mere conjecture. Notably, after the issuance of the writ of
execution on April 23, 2003, the sheriff implemented it the
following day by serving notices of garnishment to the head
offices of the various banks operating in the country based in
Metro Manila. However, these banks replied that defendants
have no assets with them subject for garnishment, thus the
writ of execution was returned unsatisfied. [16] Defendant
corporations filed several motions for reconsideration of the
order of execution and to quash the writ of execution.
Respondent, after reviewing those motions, admitted that he
was no longer sure on the claims of plaintiffs that they had
not been paid arising from the compromise settlement from
the defendants specially since the defendants have
shown prima facie bases that they have documentary
evidence tending to prove that they have satisfied their
obligations under the compromise agreement. Respondent
honestly believed that there was a need for further reception
of defendants documentary evidence proving payment
thereof, thus, he granted defendants motion for reception of
evidence where the expenses for such trip will be
proportionately shared by the defendant corporations as
manifested. Clearly, respondent ordered the suspension of
the further implementation of the writ of execution only after
the same was returned unsatisfied and because he was no
longer sure of the validity and integrity of such issuance; and
not because he was offered a free trip to the U.S. It just so
happened that the documentary evidence which would prove
payment is in the U.S., hence defendants prayed for the
reception of evidence in the U.S. and offered to defray the
expenses. Respondent approved the conduct of the judicial
proceedings abroad which, however, is improper for being
outside of his courts territorial jurisdiction and without the
courts approval.
Notably, respondent, in implementing his Order dated June
30, 2003 for the reception of evidence in the U.S., issued
another Order dated July 18, 2003, where he stated among
others, the persons who will represent the plaintiffs which
included plaintiffs counsel and herein complainant, whose
travel and accommodation expenses for the trip shall also be
jointly shouldered by the defendants. Although plaintiffs
counsel did not attend the proceedings, records show that he
received the said order since he even filed a motion to
include his wife as a member of the plaintiffs party. Clearly,
respondents action showed that he wanted all the parties to
be represented and given the chance to examine the
documents and ferret out the truth.
Complainant charges respondent of violating Canon 22 of
Judicial Ethics which provides that the judge should be
studiously careful himself to avoid even the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be demoralizing example to
others. He contends that respondent violated the Canon
when he conducted an illegal court session in the U.S.
Although respondent erroneously conducted the proceedings
abroad, we find that his action was done in good faith. He
was of the honest belief that it was sanctioned by law.
Complainant further accuses respondent of violating Section
29 of Canons of Judicial Ethics which states that he should
not accept any presents or favors from litigants or from
lawyers practicing before him. He claims that respondent
accepted the offer when he issued the Orders dated June 30,
2003 and July 18, 2003 directing himself and his staff to go to
the U.S. for the reception of evidence. Again, the charge is
baseless. Records show that respondent indeed went to the
U.S. for the purpose of receiving the evidence of the
defendants. In his Compliance to DCA Locks Memorandum
dated October 27, 2003 directing him to explain (1) why he
conducted the court proceedings in the U.S. without authority
from the Court and while he was on leave, and (2) pointing
out that his travel authority was from August 26, 2003 to
September 15, 2003 thus after September 15, 2003 he was
considered AWOL, respondent submitted the following
explanations, thus:
As early as 3 July 2003, I wrote a letter to the Hon. Presbitero
J. Velasco, our indefatigable and esteemed Court
Administrator, asking permission to conduct the proceedings.
But, unfortunately, in my honest recollection, I did not receive
any information that action, whether favorable or not, was
taken on my request. When the period determined in the said
orders came about, things having been set irretrievably in
motion with all parties notified and preparations in the chosen
venue done, I did travel to San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
and conducted the proceedings in the Consulate Generals
Office of the said place by virtue of my duties and functions
as presiding Judge over the said case. I did so in good faith
and in the clear honest belief that as the sole judge over the
said case I am, exclusively, in the first instance, absent any
superior courts prohibition, called upon and mandated by law
to resolve very difficult issues, as said above, brought up
before me. I also honestly believe that as the sole judge over
the said case I was indubitably vested by law not only with
incidental but express powers or authority to successfully
perform my job, however difficult, in the said case. I also
honestly believe that I would be held accountable if I did not
act either way while indubitable empowered by law with the
exclusive discretion and authority to do so and, finally, I
honestly believe that it is for such mandatory performance of
duties and functions that I was duly appointed judge, qualified
and invested by law with the necessary powers and authority
to perform judicial duties, which modesty aside, with the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |70
guiding hand of the Almighty I exactly did to the best of my
ability and without blemish in the more than eight (8) years
now that I have served the judiciary in the capacity of RTC
judge.
With due respect, let me stress that I was thousands of miles
away in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. It was thus nigh
impossible for me to personally file or execute a written
application for the extension of my leave of absence. The
only way I thought would be feasible under the circumstances
to effectively reach the OCA was to ask, by texting mode
over a cellphone, the help of no less than a daughter of mine,
namely, Sheila Marie Grageda-Florendo, a Clerk III in Branch
47 of the RTC in Manila to do the errand for me. At first my
said daughter was reluctant to do my bidding but I told her:
go to the OCA and request an extension of my leave of
absence. Identify yourself as my daughter and because you
are my daughter they will believe you.
My said daughter did go to the OCA in accordance with my
instructions. But she was informed that my request was late
because a request for an extension of a leave of absence
had to be filed ten (10) days before expiration of the original
period of allowed leave of absence of the applicant. In the
face of such peremptory information from a person in the
OCA my daughter easily lost heart at the requirement of ten-
days before and thus, I failed to get an extension of my leave
of absence. But I was in San Francisco not on a vacation, in
mid-stream drowned at hard work and compelled to proceed
with the work until terminated as envisioned in the said order,
supra, dated 30 June 2003.
Thus, definitely I had attempted to secure an extension from
the OCA of my leave of absence but such attempt was,
unfortunately unsuccessful due to an unexpected confluence
of events and circumstances occasioned principally by
pressure of work aggravated by distance from the OCA. [17]
...
With due respect, may I say that the proceedings I presided
over as a judge in San Francisco were done purely along the
lines of duty and in furtherance of justice. While admittedly
unprecedented, such proceedings, as said above, were
necessary for the resolution of very difficult and intractable
issues raised by the parties in the said Civil Case No. 95-45
pending before my sala.
However, in embarking on the pursuance of such
proceedings abroad I realized and regret in full that I may
have incurred shortcomings, such as my unsuccessful
attempt to secure an extension of my leave of absence
pursuant to the usual regulation of the OCA. [18]
Respondent performed his duties and conducted the
proceedings abroad as evidenced by his Order dated
September 29, 2003, to wit:
. . . From August 27, 2003 up to now, September 29, 2003,
the court performed exactly the job it set out to do by virtue of
the said orders.[19]
...
In the course of the proceedings, the defendants called to the
witness stand to testify on various pending issues no less
than twelve (12) witnesses, in the following order, namely
Michael L. Brem, Fred Misko, Jr., Richard Burt Ballanfant, D.
Ferguson McNeil, Rue Lynn Allen, retired Supreme Court of
Texas Judge Ruby Kless Sondock, Laureen Suba, Beth
Defenbaugh, Mickey M.A. Mills, Samuel E. Stubbs, Robert
Greig, and Stephen Ostrowski, six (6) of whom are besides
counsel or representatives of the defendant corporations
faithfully performing specific tasks for the respective
defendants. They hailed from as far as New York City and
Dallas and Houston, Texas. In particular, said witnesses,
under the direction and control of the respective defendants
Philippine counsel brought to the Court tens of boxes of
voluminous documents in their original and photocopies, the
latter for marking as exhibits and for viewing, inspection, and
authentication by the Court vis--vis their respective originals,
which the Court, through the undersigned, meticulously, in
fact, viewed, inspected, noted, authenticated, box after box,
volume after volume, page after page, entry upon entry,
signature after signature, particularly and painstakingly
leaving nothing to chance, even a speck, color, condition of
the documents, or any discrepancy in spelling of names and
initials, with decided, deliberate and purposeful rigorous
scrutiny of the said documents in the faithful performance of
the task of properly authenticating them, the raison detre for
the Courts repairing(sic) to this venue in the Consulate
Generals Office of San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
The Court, after crossing the ocean from the Philippines and
coming to the friendly shores of San Francisco, fully realized
the magnitude of the task it was duty-bound to do. In the best
interest of truth as the only sound basis for the proper
administration of justice, after it has duly authenticated each
and every photocopy of the documents consisting of
Compromise Agreements, Hold Harmless Agreements, and
Releases in Full and receipts of the settlement proceeds by
the plaintiffs from the defendant corporations, Shell Oil, Dow
and Occidental, Del Monte defendants and the Chiquita
defendants, drafts, checks, and microfiche copies including
23 other releases and drafts for the plaintiffs whose status as
parties in the above-entitled case is not clear now, but ad
cautelum, have been provisionally received and/or admitted
by the Court to preclude the need for the Court to repair(sic)
back to this venue in case those individuals are indeed
plaintiffs in the above-entitled case.
The Court also, viewed the originals and authenticated the
photocopies of the following documents: consisting of
affidavits of witnesses, five (5) separate and distinct
Compromise Agreements of Shell, Dow, Occidental, Del
Monte and Chiquita, First Amendment to the Compromise
Agreement (Shell, Dow, Occidental), trust Agreements, Court
records pertaining to the probate of the Trust Agreement
(Shell, Dow and Occidental), the Releases in Full for the
manufacturers Dow, Occidental and Shell, the Releases in
Full of Chiquita and the Releases in Full of the Del Monte
defendants, the checks and drafts, including microfiche
copies and bank certificates, the bank documents pertaining
to the deposit of the settlement amounts of the respective
settling defendants Dow, Occidental, Shell, Chiquita and Del
Monte, and related documents thereto.
In addition, consularized affidavits attached to faithful copies
of statutes and cases were also received and marked as
exhibits to prove the applicable Texas law.
Finally, also received and marked as exhibits were hundreds
of settlements statements and payment vouchers containing
photographs of the settling plaintiffs contained in two (2)
boxes sent by Fred Misko to Samuel Stubbs and received by
the latter while he was testifying in Court on September 23,
2003. Also in the said boxes were photocopies of retainer
agreements executed by the plaintiffs and according to the
testimony of Fred Misko, the originals thereof are in the
possession of Atty. Renato Ma. Callanta. Fred Misko also
sent a copy of the Final Judgment rendered by the Texas
Court in the RICO case he filed against Atty. Macadangdang,
DCAI, Alberto Lanohan and Edgardo Maquiran, without
prejudice to proper authentication in the future. [20]
Considering that respondent went to the U.S. for the purpose
of conducting the proceedings, his travel was paid for by the
defendant corporations pursuant to his June 30, 2003 Order
wherein it was provided that the expenses, facilities,
equipment and support personnel who would carry out in full
the court proceedings in the U.S. shall be borne
proportionately by the defendants as manifested by them.
Thus, the payment of respondents expenses for the U.S. trip
cannot be considered as acceptance of favors.
Based on the foregoing, it would appear that respondents
intention in going to the U.S. was really for the purpose of
conducting the proceedings in the Consulate Office and he
merely used the reason of visiting his daughter to be granted
a travel authority. His travel authority to visit his daughter was
granted from August 26 to September 15, 2003, and as soon
as he was in the U.S., he started conducting the proceedings
from August 27 to September 29, 2003.
Finally, complainant also charges respondent of knowingly
rendering unjust judgment under Art. 206 of the Revised
Penal Code, which constitutes a serious charge under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,[21] for his Orders
dated June 30, 2003 and September 29, 2003. We find the
same devoid of merit. As a rule, the acts of a judge which
pertain to his judicial functions are not subject to disciplinary
power unless they are committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption or bad faith. To hold otherwise would be to render
judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering
justice can be infallible in his judgment. [22] While respondent
issued the Order dated June 30, 2003 for the reception of
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |71
evidence in the U.S. and the Order dated September 29,
2003, which may not be in accordance with the rules, it
cannot be a basis for administrative action under this charge
since there was no showing that he intentionally and willfully
rendered it knowing it to be unjust. The failure of respondent
to correctly interpret the law does not render him
administratively liable. The ruling in Basa Air Base Savings &
Loan Association, Inc., vs. Judge Gregorio G. Pimentel,
Jr.,[23] is instructive:
A charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
constitutes a criminal offense. The keyword in said offense is
knowingly. Thus, the complainant must not only prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it
was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice. A judges mere error in the interpretation or
application of the law per se will not warrant the imposition of
an administrative sanction against him for no one is infallible.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will
protect a judicial officer from the charge of rendering an
unjust decision.
Moreover, the alleged error committed by respondent in
issuing the subject Orders pertains to the exercise of his
adjudicative functions. Such error cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies. [24] As held in Flores vs.
Abesamis:[25]
As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial remedies
against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial
Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies
against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as
normal in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of
evidence, or in construction or application of procedural or
substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of judgment or final order, a
motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed
extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical, capricious,
despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are, inter
alia, the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change
of venue, as the case may be.
Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these
judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort
to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the
entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding,
are pre-requisites for the taking of other measures against
the persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil,
administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available
judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate
tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry
into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.
Flores resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of
criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the
specific modes of appeals or review provided by law from
court judgments or orders, on the theory that the Judges'
orders had caused him undue injury. This is impermissible,
as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and
logic decree that administrative or criminal remedies are
neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where
such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof.
Indeed, since judges must be free to judge, without pressure
or influence from external forces or factors, they should not
be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and
dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties
and functions; and it is sound rule, which must be recognized
independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable
for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of the judge can be
had only if "there be a final declaration by a competent court
in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and ** also
evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable
negligence, on the part of the judge in rendering said
judgment or order" or under the stringent circumstances set
out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
As earlier stated, it is the act of respondent in conducting the
judicial proceedings abroad without authority from the Court
that constitutes gross misconduct for which he should be
administratively liable. Under Section 11, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, gross misconduct is a serious charge
punishable by dismissal from the service; suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; and a fine of more
than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The fact that
this is respondents first offense in his 9 years of judicial
service with a good performance record is a mitigating
circumstance. Hence, we find that suspension for six months
without salary and other benefits is a just penalty to impose
upon respondent.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge guilty of gross
misconduct, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the service for
six (6) months without salary and other benefits. He is
WARNED that the commission in the future of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. CA-09-47-J February 13, 2009
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-121-CA-J]
GENARO SANTIAGO III, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR. of the Thirteenth
[13th] Division, Court of Appeals, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Ist Indorsement1 dated January 3, 2008, the Court
Administrator referred to this Court’s Clerk of Court for
appropriate action the verified Complaint dated December
27, 2007,2 with enclosures, of Genaro Santiago III
(complainant) against Court of Appeals Justice Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. (respondent), for gross ignorance of the law and
jurisprudence and gross incompetence in connection with his
rendering of alleged unjust judgment in CA-GR CV No.
84167, "Genaro C. Santiago III versus Republic of the
Philippines," which was promulgated on December 3, 2007. 3
The antecedent facts of the case follow:
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Quezon City a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed
Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of
Pantaleona Santiago and Blas Fajardo.
By Decision of September 2, 2004, Branch 220 of the
Quezon City RTC granted the petition.4 The Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where it was
docketed as CA-GR CV No. 84167.
The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison
(Justice Gonzales-Sison) of the appellate court’s Thirteenth
Division of which respondent was Chairperson. Completing
the composition of the Division (of three) was Justice Vicente
S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso).
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her
Report,5 which was used as basis for the Division’s
consultation and deliberation.6 By letter of July 18, 2007
addressed to Justices Gonzales-Sison and Veloso,
respondent expressed his dissent from the Report.7 Justice
Veloso, who originally concurred in the Report, requested
Justice Gonzales-Sison, by letter of July 19, 2007, to take a
second look at respondent’s Dissenting Opinion, 8 as "the
reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are strong enough to be
ignored by plain technicality."9
In view of his dissent, respondent requested on August 23,
2007 the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals to
designate two associate justices to complete the composition
of a Special Division of five.10 The Raffle Committee, by
Special Order dated August 24, 2007, designated Justices
Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz) and Lucas P. Bersamin
(Justice Bersamin) as additional members of the Special
Division.11
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with
respondent’s Dissenting Opinion.12 Justice Bersamin
expressed his concurrence with the Report of Justice
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |72
Gonzales–Sison,13 while Justice Cruz expressed his
concurrence with respondent’s Dissenting
Opinion.14lawphil.net
Respondent’s Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority
opinion of the Special Division and the Report-opinion of
Justice Gonzales-Sison with which Justice Bersamin
concurred became the Dissenting Opinion.
The Decision of the Special Division reversed and set
aside the September 2, 2004 Decision of the Quezon City
RTC. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was received by the appellate court on December 20,
2007.15 On December 27, 2008, complainant filed the present
complaint.
On January 9, 2008, complainant filed a Motion for
Disqualification and/or Inhibition [of respondent] pursuant to
Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 13716 on the ground that he
(complainant) had filed this administrative complaint against
respondent. The appellate court denied the motion by
Resolution of April 20, 2008.17
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges, inter alia, that:
xxxx
. . . despite the overwhelming evidence of complainant, all
corroborated by several government agencies like the
original duplicate certificate of OCT No. 56, certified copy of
Decree No. 1275, PC Crime Laboratory report, Bureau of
Lands record, tracing cloth of survey plan, blue print plan,
certified technical description – all approved by the Bureau of
Lands, among others and adduced and offered in evidence
during trial, Associate Justice Enriquez deliberately twisted
the law and existing jurisprudence to grant the appeal, to the
extreme prejudice of complainant. For this reason, this
administrative charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF
LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is now being filed against
respondent Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. No one is
above the law.18 (Emphasis and italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
In compliance with this Court’s Resolution of January 22,
2008,19 respondent filed his Comment,20 branding the
complaint as "a mere nuisance," a "dirty tactic" in order to
harass him for the purpose of making him inhibit from
handling the case the decision on which was pending
consideration. He denies any irregularities attendant to his
arrival at the Decision which, he maintains, has factual and
legal basis and is not contrary to law and jurisprudence.
At any rate, respondent contends that the administrative
complaint was filed prematurely considering that
complainant’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision was
pending, and that assuming that the Decision was indeed
unjust and contrary to law, then Justices Cruz and Veloso,
who concurred in his ponencia, should also be charged.
Finally, and at all events, respondent contends that the
administrative complaint is not the proper forum for the
determination of whether the Decision is erroneous or
contrary to law and jurisprudence.
In compliance with the directive of the Court, 21 complainant
filed a Reply dated 20, 2008 to respondent’s Comment 22 in
which he contends that the cases cited by respondent to
support the Decision are not applicable.
The complaint is bereft of merit.
That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable,
and the appreciation of evidence and facts is erroneous, do
not necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative
complaint against a judge, unless the Decision is tainted with
fraud, malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice.23
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the judge, but to elevate the
assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and
correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate
remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition
for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted
with fraud, malice, or dishonesty…
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
clearly indicative of the arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice, not every error or mistake
that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders
him liable…The failure to interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily
render a judge administratively liable.24 (Italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that respondent’s citation of cases in
support of the Decision and his appreciation of the facts and
evidence were erroneous, since there is no showing that the
Decision, reconsideration of which was still pending at the
time the present complaint was filed, is tainted with fraud,
malice or dishonesty or was rendered with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.
The principle of "judicial immunity" insulates judges, and
even Justices of superior courts, from being held to account
criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision
rendered in good faith.25 To hold otherwise would render
judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts
or interpret the law in the process of administering justice
could be infallible in his judgment. 26
. . . A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil
action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial
function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and
Arnalot v. Johnson, " … it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a
judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall
be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself." This
concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of
public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal
application and applies to all grades of judicial officers from
the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who
sits as a court.27 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing of
charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not
rendered by respondent in his individual capacity. It was a
product of the consultations and deliberations by the Special
Division of five. Consider the following pronouncement
in Bautista v. Abdulwahid:28
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May
31, 2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in
his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate
court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation
and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a
collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper.
Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member
of a division of the appellate court is
inappropriate. 29 (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, while this Court will not shirk from its responsibility to
discipline members of the bench if they err, it too will not
hesitate to shield them if they are charged with unmeritorious
charges that only serve to disrupt, rather than promote, the
orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-03-1757 December 10, 2003
GRIO LENDING SERVICES, complainant,
vs.
SALVACION SERMONIA, CLERK IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 26, ILOILO CITY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |73
Before the Court is the Verified Complaint dated November 6,
2002, filed against Salvacion Sermonia, Clerk IV of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, for willful failure
to pay just debts.
The verified complaint was filed by Mitchill Grio, who alleged
that on November 5, 1999, respondent Sermonia obtained
loans from the Grio Lending Services in the total amount of
forty thousand pesos (₱40,000.00) payable in installments.
When the loans became due, and upon demand by the
complainant, the respondent issued postdated checks in
favor of the latter as follows:
Check No. Date Amount
Pilipinas Bank Check
No. 0040325 March 31, 2000 ₱20,000.00
0040326 March 31, 2000 ₱20,000.00
0040327 April 1, 2000 ₱ 2,000.00
0040328 April 1, 2000 ₱ 2,000.00
Total ₱44,000.001
When the checks were presented for encashment, however,
these were dishonored by the bank with the notation
"account closed" stamped thereon. Despite repeated
demands on the respondent, she failed and refused to pay
her obligation. Consequently, the complainant was
constrained to file the present administrative complaint.
In her Comment dated July 4, 2003, the respondent averred
that she had already explained to the complainant her
financial predicament and requested that she (the
respondent) be given more time to pay her obligation. Finding
the respondent’s explanation acceptable, the complainant
agreed to withdraw her complaint against the respondent.
Attached to the respondent’s comment are the complainant’s
Affidavit of Desistance dated December 2, 2002, and her
letter of even date addressed to Executive Judge Tito G.
Gustilo, RTC of Iloilo City, requesting for the withdrawal of
the complaint she filed against the respondent. The
complainant alleged that she and the respondent had
reached an amicable settlement and the latter had made
arrangements for the payment of her obligation.
Upon evaluation of the verified complaint and the comment
thereon, Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño
recommended that the respondent be reprimanded and
severely warned to be more circumspect in the conduct of
her activities as a court employee, and to observe strict
propriety and decorum in dealing with other people. 2
The Court agrees with and adopts the foregoing
recommendation.1âwphi1
As correctly pointed out by Deputy Court Administrator
Elepaño, despite the amicable settlement reached by the
parties, the respondent should nonetheless be held
administratively liable for her actuations. Significantly, it was
only when the verified complaint was filed against her that
respondent exerted efforts to make arrangements to pay her
obligation to the complainant. Before the filing of the
complaint, the respondent consistently ignored the
complainant’s repeated demands.
The respondent is, thus, liable under Section 46, Chapter 7,
Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) which covers the respondent as a
court personnel. The said provision reads in part:
Section 46. Discipline: General Provisions. – (a) No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or
dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process.
...
(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
...
(22) Willful failure to pay just debts or willful failure to pay
taxes to the government . . .
Further, Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the 1987 Administrative Code defines "just
debts" as including those "claims the existence and justness
of which are admitted by the debtor." It cannot be gainsaid
that the respondent admitted the existence of her debt to the
complainant in this case.
The same rule classifies the willful failure to pay just debts as
a light offense and prescribes the penalty of reprimand for the
first offense, suspension for one (1) to thirty (30) days for the
second offense, and dismissal for the third offense.
Apparently, this is the respondent’s first offense; hence, the
penalty of reprimand is proper. It must be stressed that the
penalty imposed by the law is not directed at the
respondent’s private life but at her actuation unbecoming a
public official.3
It bears stressing at this point that employees of the judiciary
should be living examples of uprightness not only in the
performance of official duties but also in their personal and
private dealing with other people so as to preserve at all
times the good name and standing of the courts in the
community.4
WHEREFORE, respondent Salvacion Sermonia, Clerk IV of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26, is
REPRIMANDED for her willful failure to pay just debts, which
amounts to conduct unbecoming a court employee. The
commission of the same or similar acts in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court, Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-09-2633
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR …
Complainant
versus
ROLANDO C. TOMAS and ANGELINA C. RILLORTA,
former Officers-in-Charge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago
City, Isabela … Respondents
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2338
ANGELINA C. RILLORTA … Complainant
versus
JUDGE FE A. MADRID, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21,
Santiago City, Isabela … Respondent
PRESENT: SERENO, CJ; CARPIO; VELASCO, JR;
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO; PERALTA; BERSAMIN; DEL
CASTILLO; PERLAS-BERNABE*; LEONEN; JARDELEZA;
CAGUIOA; MARTIRES**; TIJAM; REYES, JR AND
GESMUNDO, JJ
Promulgated: January 30, 2018
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
A.M. No. P-09-2633 stems from the result of the financial
audit conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Santiago City,
Isabela while A.M. No. RTJ-12-23381 is an offshoot of A.M.
No. P-09-2633. The Financial Audit Team found, among
others, shortages in the judiciary funds, tampering of official
receipts, and overwithdrawal of cash bonds allegedly
committed by Angelina C. Rillorta (Rillorta), Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela (now
retired). The administrative complaint in A.M. No. RTJ-12-
2338 was filed by Rillorta against Judge Fe Albano Madrid
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |74
(Judge Madrid), formerly Presiding Judge, Regional Trial respectively, in order to finalize the audit on said accounts x x
Court, Branch 21, Santiago City, Isabela (now retired), for x
dishonesty, involving the same audit findings in A.M. No. P-
09-2633. xxx

The facts, as narrated by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), are as follows:
A.M. No. P-09-2633
In OCA Memorandum dated March 12, 2009, the Financial
Audit Team reported shortages in the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF), General Fund (GF) and Sheriff’s General Fund
(SGF) of the former Officers in-Charge as follows:
(4) to DIRECT Mrs. Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge,
Regional Trial Court, Santiago, Isabela to RESTITUTE within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice, the shortages
incurred in the JDF, General Fund and Sheriff’s General
Fund amounting to Twenty-Three Thousand Eight Hundred
Thirty-Nine Pesos and 67/100 (P23,839.67), Seven
Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and 65/100
(P7,884.65) and Twelve Pesos (P12.00), respectively, in
order to finalize the audit on the said accounts, x x x

a) Rolando C. Tomas - P18,639.50 (JDF) and P14,538.45 (5) to require Mrs. Rillorta to SUBMIT to the Fiscal Monitoring
(GF) Division, CMO, OCA the machine-validated deposit slip(s) as
proof of compliance;
b) Angelina Rillorta - P23,839.67 (JDF); P7,884.65 (GF) and
P12.00 (SGF) (6) to require Mrs. Rillorta to SUBMIT to the Fiscal Monitoring
Division, Court Management Office, Office of the Court
A review of the court orders and acknowledgment receipts of Administrator, the Court orders and acknowledgment receipts
the withdrawn cashbonds to determine the Fiduciary Funds of the withdrawn cashbonds (Annexes A, B & C) to finalize
also revealed a shortage amounting to Six Million Five the audit on the Fiduciary Fund account within thirty (30)
Hundred Fifty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Nine days from receipt of notice with information that non-
Pesos and 70/100 (P6,557,959.70). submission of the. supporting documents will incur a
shortage amounting to Six Million Five Hundred Fifty- Seven
Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Nine Pesos and 70/100
Balance per LBP SA# 1361- (P6,557,959.70) for the Fiduciary Fund, x x x
0025-27 as of 4/30/04
However, in case the following supporting documents of the
Add: Deposit on 5/26/04 based P5,969,511.40 cash bonds will be submitted, the shortage shall be reduced
on the initial findings of the to One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Six
Audit Team 936.000.00 Pesos and 16/100 (P113,286.16) x x x
Total P6,905,511.40 xxx
Less: Net Interest (withdrawn Complying with the above directives, Mrs. Angelina Rillorta,
on 4/26/05 P3,516.18 in her undated letter, informed the Court that she has already
3,566.18
deposited the shortages incurred in the JDF, GF and the
Unwithdrawn interest
SGF. She argued that she did not misappropriate any money
50.00 P6,901,945.22
and explained that she committed a mistake in depositing her
collections in the proper account for which the Commission
Adjusted Bank Balance as of
o[n] Audit (COA) had called her attention. With regards to the
4/30/04
submission of the orders and acknowledgment receipts in
support of the withdrawn cash bonds, she claimed that she
Beginning Balance only secured copies of some orders and acknowledgment
receipts because some case records were not made
Collections for the period P32,539.30 available to her. She also explained that she has submitted
10/18/91 to 4/30/04 her monthly financial report from December 1994 to April
16,419,498.96 2005 together with copies of the orders and acknowledgment
Balance receipts to the Accounting Division, Financial Management
P16,452,038.26
Office (FMO), OCA and if there was anything wrong or
Less: Valid Withdrawals (same irregular in her reports, the Accounting Division should have
2,993,533.34
period) called her attention or asked her to explain. Further, she
P13,458,504.92 argued that if the amount of the cash bonds was not given to
Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund the persons who requested the withdrawal thereof, a lot of
as of 4/30/04 complaints could have been filed against her in Court. She
added that in order to comply with the directive of the Court,
the Accounting Division, FMO, OCA, be directed to produce
Unwithdrawn Fiduciary Fund the financial reports and that she be given time to follow-up
as of 4/30/04 the said records with the said office.
P13,458,504.92
Less: Adjusted Bank Balance In her Supplemental Explanation dated September 3, 2009,
6,901,945.22
as of 4/30/04 Mrs. Rillorta narrated that when she assumed as Officer-In-
P6,556,559.70 Charge, OCC, on March 10, 1995, the court’s financial
Balance of Accountabilities/ records were not formally turned over to her. She had to
Shortage figure out by herself what to do. She explained that the
monthly financial reports were submitted to Executive Judge
Fe Albano Madrid for approval and signature and every time
the latter went over the reports, she would change or correct
The shortage referred to above represents the cash bonds
the entries to conform with the entries in the passbook for the
which were withdrawn but with incomplete documents such
fiduciary account. After the corrections were incorporated in
as court orders and acknowledgment receipts. However,
the report, Judge Madrid would sign it.
according to the Financial Audit Team, if the supporting
documents of the withdrawn cash bonds would be submitted, Mrs. Rillorta further narrated that sometime in January 2003,
the shortages would be reduced to One Hundred Thirty-Six she reviewed the financial records and discovered that the
Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Six Pesos and 16/100 monthly report did not jibe with the bank book entries. Hence,
(P136,886.16). she requested the COA, Tuguegarao City, to audit her books
of account and after a preliminary audit, she was instructed to
On April 22, 2009, the Court, through the First Division,
inform Judge Madrid of the discrepancies. She immediately
issued a Resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:
informed Judge Madrid and the latter made some
xxx adjustments to the report. She alleged that on May 24, 2004,
a team from the OCA came to conduct a financial audit.
(2) to DIRECT Mr. Rolando C. Tomas, former Officer-in- When the audit was about to be completed, an exit
Charge, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela to conference was held. She was expecting to be called to
RESTITUTE within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice, attend the conference, hence, she asked the team leaders if
the shortages incurred in the JDF and General Fund her presence was needed and was told "Di ka naman
Amounting to Eighteen Thousand Six Hundred Thirty-Nine pinatawag ni Judge. ” She was never required to respond to
Pesos and 50/100 (P18,639.50) and Fourteen Thousand Five any findings and was therefore under the impression that
Hundred Thirty-Eight Pesos and 45/100 (P14,538.45) Judge Madrid had sufficiently explained the discrepancies. It
was only when she was going over the records of the court
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |75
that she discovered that an Observation Memorandum dated
May 17, 2004 prepared by the audit team was given to Judge
Madrid. Thus, she requested the Court for a reinvestigation
and hearing on the complaint which was referred to the OCA
on December 16, 2009.
Complying with the directive of the Court, the OCA, in its
Memorandum dated May 20, 2010, recommended that the
motion to conduct another investigation be denied because it
was no longer necessary considering that Angelina Rillorta
has already remitted her shortages and that she was directed
to explain in writing why she should not be dismissed from
the service for violation of OCA Circular No. 22-94 dated April
8, 1994 (Re: Guidelines in the Proper Handling and Use of
Official Receipts), it appearing that official receipts were
tampered:
xxx
The OCA added that only the supporting documents such as
court orders and acknowledgment receipts of the withdrawn
cash bonds with incomplete documents should be submitted
in order to finalize the accountabilities of Mrs. Rillorta in the
Fiduciary fund.
On June 1, 2011, the Court adopted the OCA’s
recommendation and noted the Ex Parte Manifestation dated
February 22, 2010 of Executive Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
and Clerk of Court, Norbert Bong S. Obedoza, both of the
RTC Santiago City, praying that respondent Rolando C.
Tomas’ death on February 10, 2010 be considered with
humanitarian consideration in the resolution of this case.
In another Memorandum dated June 13, 2011, the OCA
requested that (a) the recommendation in its Memorandum of
May 20, 2010 denying the motion of Mrs. Rillorta for the
conduct of another investigation be set aside; (b) the Land
Bank of the Philippines, Santiago City, Isabela Branch, be
directed to submit a certification as to the authorized
signatory from August 1991 to April 30, 2004, for Savings
Account No. 1361-0025-27 of the Fiduciary Fund of the RTC,
Santiago City; (c) Judge Madrid be required to submit her
comments on the unsigned letter and additional Supplement
to the Motion for the Conduct of Another and/or Additional
Investigation both dated September 28, 2010 filed by Mrs.
Rillorta; and (d) the motion to conduct another investigation
as well as the manifestation of the heirs of respondent
Rolando Tomas be held in abeyance pending the submission
of Judge Madrid’s comment. OCA’s recommendations were
adopted by the Court in its Resolution of August 03,2011.
In compliance with the June 1, 2011 Resolution, Mrs. Rillorta
filed her Explanation with Motion for Reconsideration dated
July 24, 2011 alleging that she was denied her right to due
process when she was not allowed to participate in the exit
conference with the Financial Audit Team. She also informed
the Court that she filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Judge
Madrid before the OCA x x x.
For her part, Judge Madrid, in her undated Compliance which
was received by the OCA on October 20, 2011, stated that
she was not aware of the unsigned letter dated September
27, 2010 and additional supplement to the motion for the
conduct of another and/or additional investigation filed by
Mrs. Rillorta. She claimed that the latter executed an Affidavit
dated March 3, 2011 and two Supplemental Affidavits which
were the basis of OCA IPI No. 11-3614-RTJ pending in the
OCA, and requested a copy thereof if the said letter referred
to a different matter for her to comment thereon. On the other
hand, the Land Bank of the Philippines, Santiago Branch,
Isabela, issued a Certification dated October 24, 2011 stating
that Account No. 1361-0025-27 RTC, Branch 21 (Fiduciary
Fund) was opened on March 29, 1993 by Judge Madrid who
was the authorized signatory.
On December 3, 2012, the Court granted the request of Mrs.
Rillorta for the conduct of another and/or additional
investigation and referred the matter to the Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals who was designated to investigate
A.M. OCA IPI No. 11-3614-RT[J] (Re: Angelina C. Rillorta vs.
Honorable Fe A. Madrid, Presiding Judge, Branch 21, RTC,
Santiago City) [now A.M. No. RTJ-12-2338] for a joint
investigation. The Court also directed the Financial
Management Office, OCA, to deduct the amount of
P33,177.95 from the equivalent money value of the total
earned leave credits of the late Rolando Tomas who was
dismissed from the service pursuant to the Resolution of the
Court in A.M. No. P-09-2660 (Francisco C. Taguinod vs.
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Tomas, Branch 21, RTC, Santiago
City).
OCA IPI No. 11-3614-RTJ
This is an offshoot of A.M. No. P-09-2633. On March 3, 2011,
Mrs. Rillorta filed the instant administrative complaint against
Judge Madrid praying that an investigation be conducted and
that Judge Madrid be directed to answer or explain the
charges against her. In her Affidavit- Complaint, Mrs. Rillorta
reiterated the allegations in her Supplemental Explanation in
A.M. No. P-09-2633. She averred that the monthly reports did
not dovetail with the bank book entries, that is, the amount
collected appearing in the monthly report was only
P700,000.00 while the amount appearing in the bank account
was more or less P6,000,000.00. This discrepancy alarmed
her, so she voluntarily submitted herself to an audit by the
COA in Tuguegarao City. She informed Judge Madrid about
the COA findings and in order to balance the discrepancies
found, Judge Madrid instructed her and Susan[a] Liggayu to
make some adjustments in the official receipts issued by the
court. For instance, in the bail bond posted by then retired
Judge Alivia of the RTC, Cauayan City for his client, Judge
Madrid asked for the General Fund receipts and instructed
her to write in the original receipt the true amount of the
bailbond but to reflect the amount of P20.00 or P30.00
(clearance fee) in the duplicate and triplicate copies. She
then asked Judge Madrid “Ma’am, why not issue na lang
Court Order para minsanan na ma-withdraw yung bina-
balance mo ” to which she replied “No, this is better. ” She
claimed that every time Judge Madrid instructed her to do it,
she asked Susan[a] Liggayu to make a list so that they would
have a record of the amounts collected for the Fiduciary
Fund. She also narrated that Judge Madrid instructed her to
alter the amounts of the cash bond withdrawn. For instance,
if the amount of the bail bond deposited was P110 ,000.00,
the amount to be withdrawn would be P110,000.00. This
happened on several occasions. Likewise, in Criminal Case
Nos. 4161 and 4162 (People vs. Pua) and Criminal Case No.
21-4225 (People vs. Alejandro Ramos), the release orders
did not indicate the Official Receipt (O.R.) number which is
the usual practice of the court.
Again, in her Second Supplemental Affidavit dated April 6,
2011, Mrs. Rillorta described how Judge Madrid effected the
adjustments in the official receipts issued by the court. In
Criminal Case No. 3423, Judge Madrid added zero “0” in
O.R. No. 10706949 in between the digits three “3” and zero
to make it appear that the amount received was Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and superimposed the letter
“y” at the end of the word three (in the box amount in words
to jibe with Thirty Thousand Pesos). She also alleged that
every time there was an excess in the amount withdrawn,
she or Susan[a] Liggayu delivered the same to Judge Madrid
by leaving the money on her table. The amounts were always
put inside an envelope which was labelled by Susan[a]
Liggayu by writing the corresponding case number. There
were times when the withdrawals were done in the afternoon
and in those instances, the excess amounts were delivered
to Judge Madrid’s house. She further alleged that Judge
Madrid drafted her answer in A.M. No. P-09-2633 but did not
submit the same because said comment made her admit the
charges. Judge Madrid even insisted that she submit the
same to avoid dismissal from the service since the argument
raised was that she acted in good faith. She thus suspected
that she was made a sacrificial lamb. She admitted that she
was not knowledgeable in accounting procedures which was
why she never questioned the acts of Judge Madrid and
followed her orders and instructions.
For her part, Judge Madrid, in her Comment dated April 6,
2011, alleged that Mrs. Rillorta is a stenographer but could
not take stenographic notes in open court. Her work then was
to assist Clerk of Court Teofilo Juguilon and to type
decisions. After the retirement of Atty. Juguilon, she thought it
wise to designate her as OlC-Clerk of Court because she
was already familiar with the workings of the office. In the
beginning, she strictly monitored the collections and
disbursements until Mrs. Rillorta gained her complete trust
and confidence. So she just let Mrs. Rillorta do her work with
little supervision. At that time, the court was a single sala
court and had many cases to attend to which left her little
time for financial management. She added that she could not
remember if there was a formal turnover of the court’s
financial reports to Mrs. Rillorta, but an inventory of the
records was received by the latter. Mrs. Rillorta prepared the
monthly reports which she would note and sign after a review
of the attached official receipts, order and acknowledgment
receipts, as well as deposit slips and withdrawal slips.
Corrections were made to conform to the supporting
documents or to correct wrong computations. She does not
have her own separate records as alleged by Mrs. Rillorta. A
separate record would be an extra work which she would not
like to do. She admitted that the monthly reports did not jibe
with the bank book in that, the money in the bank is more
than what is stated in the monthly reports. However, this did
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |76
not alarm her because there was more money which meant
there was no shortage.
Judge Madrid further claimed that she did not know that Mrs.
Rillorta had voluntarily submitted herself for audit to the COA
but knew that the COA has always been auditing the financial
records of the court because Mrs. Rillorta has been regularly
submitting the monthly reports to the COA Office in Ilagan,
Isabela. She was then informed by Mrs. Rillorta about the
discrepancy between the monthly reports and the money in
the bank but denied instructing Mrs. Rillorta and Susan[a]
Liggayu to make some adjustments on the official receipts.
She could not remember asking Mrs. Rillorta to give her the
GF receipts in connection with the bail bond posted by retired
Judge Alivia. She could have asked for the GF receipts to
check on something but not to show how to tamper the bail
bond receipts. Also, after the financial audit, the audit team
informed her of the P900,000.00 shortage in the court’s
collection. She told the audit team to call Mrs. Rillorta so that
she could be given a chance to produce the money and
conduct a cash count. However, the audit team said that no
cash count could be done because some receipts were
tampered. She immediately talked to Mrs. Rillorta about the
audit team’s observations and told her to deposit the
shortage right away. In addition, she could not remember if
she was given an Observation Memorandum by the audit
team except for a piece of paper that was shown to her by
the audit team. She also confirmed that she is the signatory
of the LBP account and that the withdrawals she signed were
supported by official receipts and court orders. She also
confirmed that she helped Mrs. Rillorta prepare her answer to
the administrative charge against her but did so only upon
her request and that she only included those statements
which Mrs. Rillorta told her and of her fear of dismissal
because of the charge of dishonesty and told her that she
could plead good faith because there was no intention on her
part to be dishonest.
Judge Madrid also argued that all instructions given to Mrs.
Rillorta and the other court employees were lawful and
proper and expected that the instructions be carried out. The
corrections she made in the monthly reports were all proper
and did not make any alterations or adjustments on any
official receipts, deposit slips, withdrawal slips or
acknowledgment receipts.
In her Comment on the Supplemental Complaint dated April
28, 2011, Judge Madrid maintained that the same is a
repetition of her original affidavit to which a comment had
already been made. She claimed that she only signs the
orders of release and it was Mrs. Rillorta who processed the
documents which presented to her for signature. The order of
release is a standard form and it was the duty of the OIC to
check that the documents are complete before they are
brought to her for signature. With regards to the undertaking
attached to the complaint, she claimed that she did not know
who prepared it but the blanks were filled up with the use of
Mrs. Rillorta’s typewriter. She does not usually scrutinize the
word and every document presented in connection with the
bail bond and if she noticed the typewritten insertions, she
could have asked what they meant considering that the
typewritten insertions are alien to the documents.
Refuting the allegations in the Supplemental Affidavit-
Complaint, Judge Madrid, in her Comment dated June 6,
'2011, denied that she inserted the letter “O” and
superimposed the letter “Y” in Official Receipt No. 10706946.
She claimed that she had no access to the documents which
were in the custody of the monitoring team as they did not
show her any documents when they talked to her after the
audit. She also vehemently denied that the alleged excess in
the withdrawn amount was delivered to her by Mrs. Rillorta or
Susan[a] Liggayu either in the office or in her house. The only
money she received were those withdrawn from the bank
when she requested Mrs. Rillorta to encash her salary
checks. When she confronted Susan[a] Liggayu about the
tampering and withdrawals, the latter denied any knowledge
about them and even executed an affidavit to that effect. In
addition, she admitted to be the lone signatory of withdrawals
but this was not by any sinister design as alluded to by Mrs.
Rillorta. When the Clerk of Court retired from the service, the
money was transferred to the RTC which is represented by
her being then the Executive Judge. However, she did not
personally make withdrawals and has always authorized Mrs.
Rillorta to do the withdrawals instead.
In her Reply Affidavit dated June 13, 2011, Mrs. Rillorta
narrated that Judge Madrid called her in her chambers on
May 26, 2004, at around 1:30 [p.m.] to 2:00 p.m. Judge
Madrid told her to go to the bank and deposit the money
wrapped in a newspaper and placed inside a plastic bag. She
also handed her a piece of paper indicating the amount of
P947,000.00 - P11,200.00 = P936,000.00 in her own
handwriting. When she went out of Judge Madrid’s room,
Susan[a] Liggayu was waiting and handed her the piece of
paper which Judge Madrid gave and they both counted the
money. Susan[a] Liggayu then prepared the deposit slip
based on the amount they counted and what was written on
the piece of paper, after which she gave the prepared deposit
slip to Judge Madrid who affixed her signature. This incident
proved that monies were delivered to Judge Madrid and
when the amount was needed to be deposited, it was readily
and immediately produced by Judge Madrid for deposit and
return.2
In his Report, Investigating Justice Elihu Ybanez detailed
how Judge Madrid manipulated the Fiduciary Fund, to wit:
First. In Criminal Case No. 21-4225, entitled People vs.
Alejandro Ramos, for Violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
6076, the Undertaking executed by the accused and his
Bondsman, appears that the cash bail posted is only
P20,000.00 without the Official Receipt issued was stated in
the Undertaking but a marginal note ‘NO RECEIPT ISSUED’
admitted by respondent Judge as her own handwriting.
Despite the fact that the bailbond posted was only
P20,000.00 and respondent Judge [wrote a] marginal note
that no proper receipt was issued for the cash bond of
P20,000.00, respondent Judge still authorized the withdrawal
and release of P120,000.00 which is over and above the
actual amount of the cash bail posted of P20,000.00. How
could respondent Judge in good faith sign the withdrawal slip
after checking on the Undertaking which stated that cash bail
posted was only P20,000.00 and by her own handwriting
even noted in the same Undertaking that there was no
Official Receipt issued for the cash bond posted. Per
admission of respondent-complainant, she tampered with
Official Receipt No. 1721363 dated 2 June 2003 to make the
P120,000.00 upon the instruction of respondent Judge.
Repondent-complainant testified further that from the
withdrawn amount of P120,000.00, P100,000.00 went to
respondent Judge and P20,000.00 was released to the
Bondsman.
Second. Respondent Judge signed the withdrawal slip
despite the fact that the original Official Receipt which is
being presented by the Bondsman/ Party and attached to the
documents for the release of the cash bonds provides for a
much smaller amount or different in amount than the amount
for withdrawal for the refund/ release of the cash bond
posted.
Third. Respondent Judge transferred the RTC Santiago City
Bank Accounts by her as the lone signatory. This, without
following the guidelines set by the Supreme [C]ourt requiring
a co-signatory to the account who are the Executive Judge
and the Clerk of Court/OIC. Being the lone signatory to the
RTC Santiago City General Fund, Fiduciary Fund and JDF
Bank Accounts, respondent Judge had full control of the
amount[s] deposited to and withdrawn from the RTC Bank
Accounts. It would be far[-] fetched that funds of the court
would be dissipated without respondent Judge knowing what
is happening because she is the sole signatory to the bank
deposits of the Fiduciary Funds of the RTC, Santiago City. In
fact, respondent Judge on cross examination acknowledged
full responsibility of the deposits to and withdrawals from the
accounts.
Fourth. Respondent Judge had the final say on what should
be stated in the Monthly Report of Collections/ Deposits/
Withdrawals and Disbursements such that she had full
knowledge early on if and when any amounts have been
receipted, deposited, and/or withdrawn. Respondent-
complainant Angelina Rillorta, witnesses Jaime Gumpal,
Virginia Manuel and Susan[a] Liggayu all confirmed that
respondent Judge would change the data contained in the
Monthly Report before she signed it.
Fifth. The evidence points to the fact that after the OCA Audit
Team completed the court financial audit, respondent Judge
returned the amount of P936,000.00 which respondent-
complainant Rillorta and witness Susan[a] Liggayu deposited
to the Landbank. Respondent- complainant testified on cross-
examination that respondent Judge called her in the Judge’s
Chamber and gave her the blue SM plastic bag containing
the P900,000.00 plus money. Respondent Judge also wrote
in a piece of paper P947,200.00 minus P11,200[.00] =
P936,000.00, which is the amount to be deposited
representing the missing funds. The testimony of respondent-
complainant is corroborated by witness Susan[a] Liggayu
who testified on cross examination that she saw Judge
Albano Madrid hand to Angelina Rillorta a blue plastic bag
containing money which she and Angelina Rillorta counted.
She further testified that she prepared the corresponding
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |77
deposit slip and handed it to Angelina Rillorta which the latter
in turn gave to Judge Madrid for the Judge’s signature.
Afterwards, she and Angelina Rillorta deposited the money to
Landbank. While respondent Judge claims that it was
respondent-complainant who returned the P936,000.00
money, however, respondent-complainant could not have
returned the amount as she was not the one informed by the
OCA Audit Team but respondent Judge who in return did not
tell respondent-complainant of the amount, x x x.
Sixth. Respondent Judge took undue interest in preparing the
pleadings for respondent-complainant or even went the extra
mile to control what will be written in the pleadings. The first
draft answer made by respondent Judge for respondent-
complainant was that the latter kept the money which was not
agreed to by respondent-complainant. Respondent Judge
forced respondent-complainant to submit to the Supreme
Court the answer (Exhibit 14) she made for her but
respondent-complainant refused, and submitted a different
answer without saying that she kept the money.
While respondent Judge claims that she only took pity on
respondent-complainant, so she prepared the pleadings for
her, the draft pleadings tell that respondent Judge wanted to
make it appear that it was respondent-complainant who took
the missing funds. She was also discouraged by [respondent
Judge] in approaching DCA Villanueva when the latter was in
Tuguegarao City; also prevented respondent-complainant
from telling anyone about the shortages. Withal, respondent
Judge also encouraged if not stopped respondent-
complainant from consulting a lawyer after she received the
notice from the OCA re the missing Judiciary Funds.
Seventh. The assurances of respondent Judge on
respondent- complainant that the latter won’t be accused of
malversation because respondent Judge already returned the
money, referring to the P936,000.00 deposited after the audit
conducted by the SC, is also indicative of her hand in the loss
and return/ deposit of the fiduciary funds.
Eighth. The testimony of respondent Judge’s witness Arcelio
F. [De] Castillo, former Legal Researcher of RTC Branch 21,
Santiago City, who testified on the strict and meticulous
character of respondent Judge only bolstered the fact that the
incidents of tampering, non-deposit and overwithdrawal could
not have passed respondent Judge without her knowledge
and understanding.
xxx3
The same Report highlighted Judge Madrid’s telling
admissions:
x x x [R]espondent Judge admitted that: (1) General Fund,
Fiduciary Fund and JDF Accounts are by the Judge only; (2)
she was the lone signatory to the Fiduciary Funds and the
General Fund Accounts explaining that the decision was
made at the time when the Clerk of Court retired and the
latter had to transfer to her the account; (3) she was also the
lone signatory not only to the bank accounts and likewise to
the reports; (4) she did not bother to change the signatory to
the accounts after COC Atty. Suguilon retired because the
RTC only had an OIC not a Clerk of Court; (5) respondent
Judge knew and was aware of the SC Circular re the
required signatories to the court funds; (6) notwithstanding
the guidelines set by the Supreme Court requiring a co-
signatory for the account saying that the said circular was
only issued after [the] RTC Santiago City became a multiple
sala court emphasizing that the OIC was not a Clerk of Court;
(7) respondent Judge being the only signatory,
acknowledged full responsibility of the deposits and
withdrawals thereon[.]4
The Investigating Justice recommended the following:
(1) Judge Fe Albano Madrid be held liable for SERIOUS
DISHONESTY and GROSS MISCONDUCT. All her
retirement benefits, except her accrued leave benefits be
ordered forfeited in favor of the government, if any, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Any
computed shortages of the Fiduciary Fund yet to be restituted
be charged against said accrued leave benefits.
Judge Albano Madrid be likewise DISBARRED for violation of
Canon[s] 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and her name ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys; and
(2) Angelina C. Rillorta be liable for SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
DUTY and be meted a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) with a stern warning that repetition of the same
or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. 5
The OCA recommended the following:
1. Judge Fe Albano Madrid (formerly Presiding Judge,
Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, now
retired) be found GUILTY of serious dishonesty and gross
misconduct and that all her retirement benefits, except her
accrued leave benefits, be ordered FORFEITED, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations;
2. Judge Fe Albano Madrid be DIRECTED to SHOW CAUSE
why she should not be DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1
and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;
3. Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, now
retired, be found GUILTY of gross misconduct and that all her
retirement benefits and accrued leave benefits be
FORFEITED, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations;
4. The Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative
Services, Office of the Court Administrator be DIRECTED to
compute the balance of the earned leave credits of Angelina
Rillorta and forward the same to the Finance Division,
Financial Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator, for the computation of the monetary value of
her earned leave credits. The amount as well as other
benefits Angelina Rillorta may be entitled to shall be applied
as partial restitution of the computed shortages in the amount
of P6,555,559.70;
5. Angelina C. Rillorta be DIRECTED to RESTITUTE her
shortages in the Fiduciary Fund after deducting the money
value of her accrued leave credits and other benefits; and
6. [T]he Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator be
DIRECTED to initiate appropriate criminal proceedings
against Judge Fe Albano Madrid and Angelina C. Rillorta in
light of the above findings.6
The issues in this case are whether Judge Madrid is guilty of
grave misconduct and serious dishonesty and whether
Rillorta is guilty of grave misconduct.
The Court adopts the findings of the OCA and agrees in its
recommendations, except as to the computation of the
amount to be restituted by Rillorta.
Judge Madrid is Guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious
Dishonesty
Public office is a public trust. This constitutional principle
requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so
because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at
all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the
visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing
justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a
manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the
people.7
Judge Madrid failed to live up to these exacting standards. In
this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA,
which affirmed the evaluations of the Investigating Justice,
“that official receipts were tampered and that there were
overwithdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account amounting
to Nine Hundred Thirty Six [Thousand] (P936,000.00) Pesos.
The Audit Team’s findings were not refuted by Judge Madrid
and Mrs. Rillorta during the investigation.”8 These acts of
tampering of official receipts and overwithdrawals from court
funds clearly constitute grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or
wrong behavior.9 The misconduct is grave if it involves any of
the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be
established by substantia] evidence. As distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule must
be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct. 10
Dishonesty, on the other hand, is defined as a disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |78
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray.11
The Court agrees with the OCA in rejecting Judge Madrid’s
contention that she did not include Rillorta as co-signatory
because the latter is only an OIC. Being designated as acting
Clerk of Court or OIC, Rillorta had the same duties and
responsibilities of a regular clerk of court.12 Indeed, if Judge
Madrid were uncomfortable that only an OIC was assigned to
the Office of the Clerk of Court, she, as then Executive
Judge, should have declared the position open so that a
regular clerk of court could be appointed. However, Judge
Madrid did not do so.
The Court likewise sustains the OCA’s finding that Judge
Madrid’s only witness, Arcelio F. De Castillo (De Castillo),
then Court Legal Researcher, did not help her case as the
latter had no knowledge of the tampering of official receipts.
In his Judicial Affidavit,13 De Castillo stated that payments of
bailbonds were made in the office of the OlC-Clerk of Court;
that he had not seen payments of bailbonds made inside the
office or chambers of Judge Madrid; that he had not
participated in any transactions involving the payment of
bailbond; and that it was the criminal docket clerk Jaime U.
Gumpal (Gumpal) who attended to the posting of bonds and
his only participation was the review of documents after the
requirements were completed.
On the other hand, the Judicial Affidavits 14 of Gumpal, Court
Interpreter, and Susana B. Liggayu (Liggayu), Clerk III, both
of Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, bolstered
the fact that Judge Madrid manipulated the Fiduciary Fund
collections and reports submitted to the OCA. Liggayu
testified, among others, that Judge Madrid ordered the
tampering of official receipts; and that she and Rillorta made
a list to monitor Judge Madrid’s overwithdrawals and
undeposited amounts because Rillorta was already worried
how much Judge Madrid would still order withdrawn.
As recommended by the OCA, this administrative case
against Judge Madrid for grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty shall also be considered as a disciplinary
proceeding against her as a member of the Bar,15 in
accordance with A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, which provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based
on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary
action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized
as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution.
Accordingly, Judge Madrid is directed to show cause why she
should not be disbarred for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly Canons 1 16 and
717 and Rule 1.0118 thereof.
Rillorta is Guilty of Grave Misconduct
Rillorta is liable for grave misconduct for her participation in
the tampering of receipts, non-deposit to and
overwithdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund.
Rillorta admitted having tampered some official receipts.
However, she claims that the tamperings were upon the
instructions of Judge Madrid. This does not excuse her from
any liability because obviously tampering of such official
documents is unlawful which should never be countenanced.
The Court sustains the OCA’s statement that “as a public
officer, her duty was not only to perform her assigned tasks,
but to prevent the commission of acts inimical to the judiciary
and to the public, in general.”19 It is grave misconduct when
Rillorta participated or consented to the commission of the
unlawful acts of tampering receipts and overwithdrawals from
court funds simply because of following the orders or
instructions of her superior, Judge Madrid.
As correctly found by the OCA, “[w]hen Judge Madrid
ordered [Rillorta] to alter an official receipt at the first
instance, Mrs. Rillorta should have reported the matter to the
OCA who has supervision over all judges and court
personnel of the lower court[s]. Rather, she kept silent and
allowed herself to be used by Judge Madrid and even
facilitated the tampering of official receipts and
overwithdrawals on several occasions. She knew the
repercussions of her acts because she kept a record of the
transactions on the tampering of bail bond receipts which,
according to her, was a precautionary move and to keep
track of the balances in the Fiduciary Fund account. She also
failed to prove during the investigation that she was
threatened, coerced or terrorized by Judge Madrid into doing
such unlawful acts.”20
The Court likewise rejects Rillorta’s claim that when she
assumed the position of OIC, the court’s financial records
were not formally turned over to her and she was not
knowledgeable in accounting procedures. Unfamiliarity with
procedures will not exempt Rillorta from liability. As a Clerk of
Court, she is expected to keep abreast of all applicable laws,
jurisprudence and administrative circulars pertinent to her
office.21 Further, Rillorta had been the OIC for nine years
when the financial audit was conducted, and therefore, she
was presumed to know her functions and responsibilities.22
Penalties on Judge Madrid and Rillorta
As this Court has repeatedly stated, the conduct and
behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility.23 The Court has not hesitated to impose the
ultimate penalty on those who have fallen short of their
accountabilities. Any conduct that violates the norms of public
accountability and diminishes, or even tends to diminish, the
faith of the people in the justice system has never been and
will never be tolerated or condoned by this Court. 24
Since Judge Madrid is found guilty of the grave offenses of
grave misconduct and serious dishonesty, the penalty of
dismissal from the service is proper even for the first offense
in accordance with Section 46A(1), Rule 10 of the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. However,
since Judge Madrid has already retired from the service, the
penalty of dismissal can no longer be imposed. Instead, all of
her retirement benefits, except accrued leave benefits, are
forfeited, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of
the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
With regard to Rillorta’s offense and penalty, the OCA’s
recommendation differed from that of the Investigating
Justice’s.
The Investigating Justice found Rillorta guilty of simple
neglect of duty25 while the OCA found Rillorta guilty of gross
misconduct. The Investigating Justice noted that there were
mitigating circumstances favoring Rillorta. These were “(1)
making a list noting the non-deposit of cash bonds,
underdeposit to and overwithdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund
made at the instance of Judge Albano Madrid, (2) in going
regularly to the COA Regional Office for Audit, (3) immediate
restitution of the missing funds as ordered by the Supreme
Court, (4) her previous administrative sanctions
notwithstanding because as admitted by Judge Albano
Madrid, she actually directed [Rillorta] to continue to function
as Officer-in-Charge x x x despite the resolution of the
Supreme Court suspending [Rillorta] x x x, (5) the moral
ascendancy and control exercised over her by Judge Albano
Madrid x x x, and (6) her staunch and determined efforts in
pursuing the administrative complaint against Judge Albano
Madrid x x x.”26
On the other hand, the OCA found that this is not the first
time Rillorta has been administratively sanctioned by this
Court. In Antonio T. Quebral v. Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-
in-Charge/ Clerk of Court, and Minerva B. Alvarez, Clerk IV,
both of RTC, Branch 21, Santiago City, Isabela,27 she was
found guilty of neglect of duty for violation of Administrative
Circular No. 3-2000 which requires fees to be duly collected
and receipted in case clearances are issued by the trial court
and was suspended for three months without pay, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same would warrant a
more severe penalty. In that case, Rillorta issued court
clearances free of charge to people who are “friends of court
employees” which the Court found to be highly irregular as
she had no power, authority, or discretion to dispense with
the payment of the said fees. Also, in Re: Anonymous
Complaint against Angelina Casareno-Rillorta, Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court,28 Rillorta was found
guilty of gross misconduct for performing her duties/ reporting
for work while under preventive suspension by the Court.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |79
Since Rillorta’s grave misconduct, aside from her previous
infractions, undermined the people’s faith in the courts and,
ultimately, in the administration of justice, the OCA’s
recommended penalty of dismissal is proper.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Pacheco,29 the Court
found Pacheco guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and
gross neglect of duty and consequently dismissed her from
the service when she tampered with receipts and incurred
cash shortages.
Similarly, in Office of the Court Administrator v.
Recio,30 Recio was found guilty of gross misconduct,
dishonesty, and gross neglect of duty for failing to remit cash
collections and misappropriating the same. She was also
found to have tampered with receipts and the cash book and
failed to submit the required monthly reports which the Court
considered as acts which “evince a malicious and immoral
propensity.”31
The circumstances which the Investigating Justice
considered mitigating do not overcome the fact that Rillorta
repeatedly committed offenses which aggravated the grave
offense she committed in this case. However, since Rillorta
has already retired from the service, the penalty of dismissal
can no longer be imposed. Instead, all of her retirement
benefits, except accrued leave benefits, are forfeited, with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Court notes that there is a finding in the report of the
Financial Audit Team that “in case the following supporting
documents of the cashbonds will be submitted, the shortages
would be reduced to One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty-Six Pesos and 16/100
(P113,286.16).”32 Rillorta insists that with regard to the
submission of the orders and acknowledgment receipts in
support of the withdrawn cash bonds, she only secured
copies of some orders and acknowledgment receipts
because some case records were not made available to her.
She also explained that she had submitted her monthly
financial report from December 1994 to April 2005 together
with copies of the orders and acknowledgment receipts to the
Accounting Division, Financial Management Office, OCA.33
If the copies of the orders and acknowledgment receipts are
indeed in the custody of the Accounting Division, Financial
Management Office of the OCA, then the amount of the
shortages Rillorta incurred will certainly be reduced. There is
no doubt that Rillorta has been remiss in her duty to retain
copies of the supporting documents of the withdrawn cash
bonds; however, this does not automatically carry with it the
restitution of P6,557,959.7034 if this is not the exact amount
of the shortages. It appears that there are means to reconcile
the records available to Rillorta with the records available to
the Financial Audit Team and the Accounting Division,
Financial Management Office of the OCA and to compute the
exact amount of the shortages. The finding that the shortages
would be reduced to P113,286.16 if the supporting
documents of the withdrawn cash bonds would be submitted
clearly means that the Financial Audit Team was able to
compute a much reduced amount of shortages based on
available records. To order Rillorta to restitute the amount of
P6,557,959.70 as shortages when in fact this amount is
incorrect is without basis. Therefore, in the interest of justice,
Rillorta should be given the opportunity to reconcile the
records available to her, including the supporting documents
already submitted to this Court, and the monthly reports
allegedly containing the orders and acknowledgment receipts
supposedly in the custody of the Accounting Division,
Financial Management Office of the OCA for the computation
of the exact amount of the shortages that should be
restituted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Fe Albano Madrid,
formerly Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21,
Santiago City, Isabela, now retired, GUILTY of grave
misconduct and serious dishonesty and all her retirement
benefits, except her accrued leave benefits, are FORFEITED,
with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Judge Fe Albano Madrid is further DIRECTED
to SHOW CAUSE why she should not be DISBARRED for
violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The Court finds Angelina C. Rillorta, Officer-in-Charge, Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Santiago City,
Isabela, now retired, GUILTY of grave misconduct and all her
retirement benefits, except her accrued leave benefits, are
FORFEITED, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Angelina C. Rillorta is DIRECTED to
RESTITUTE her shortages in the Fiduciary Fund after the
computation of the exact amount of the shortages.
The Accounting Division, Financial Management Office of the
Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to produce
the orders and acknowledgment receipts in its custody, if
there are any, related to these consolidated cases and
forward the same to the Office of the Court Administrator for
reconciliation and computation of the exact amount of the
shortages within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to
recompute the amount of the shortages incurred by Angelina
C. Rillorta after the submission of the orders,
acknowledgment receipts and other supporting documents
for reconciliation and to submit its findings within ten (10)
days from receipt of the documents, if any, from the Financial
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator.
The Legal Office, Office of the Court Administrator is
DIRECTED to initiate the appropriate criminal proceedings
against Judge Fe Albano Madrid and Angelina C. Rillorta in
view of the foregoing findings.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1638 December 8, 2003
ATTY. MANUEL T. MOLINA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE BENEDICTO A. PAZ, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan and JUDGE SEGUNDO B.
CATRAL, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri,
Cagayan, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case stemmed from a Letter dated 5
February 19971 and a Sworn Statement2 executed by Atty.
Manuel T. Molina ("Atty. Molina") charging respondents
Judge Benedicto A. Paz ("Judge Paz") of the Regional Trial
Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6 ("RTC-Branch 6") and
Judge Segundo B. Catral ("Judge Catral") of the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 8 ("RTC-Branch 8"),
with misconduct and grave abuse of authority. Atty. Molina
filed a Supplemental Complaint dated 21 April 19973 charging
respondents with grave misconduct and dishonesty.
The Court will delve into the merits of the administrative
complaint only as against respondent Judge Paz because in
the Resolution dated 6 May 2002, we dismissed the
administrative complaint against Judge Catral for lack of
merit.
The Facts
Mayor Licerio Antiporda, Jr. ("Mayor Antiporda") and Atty.
Franklin Tamargo ("Atty. Tamargo") were candidates for the
mayoralty post in Buguey, Cagayan in the 8 May 1995
elections. On the night of election day, seven persons
belonging to the political group headed by Mayor Antiporda
were killed in Barangay Pattao. On the same date, three
political followers of Atty. Tamargo were killed and one
person was injured in Barangay San Isidro. Cases for
multiple murder and attempted murder were filed against
Licerio, the son of Mayor Antiporda, and other John Does.
These cases were raffled to RTC-Branch 8, presided by
respondent Judge Catral, and docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 08-879 to 08-882. This Court subsequently ordered the
transfer of the murder cases to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 22. However, the seven cases for multiple
murder filed against Attys. Molina and Tamargo, Godofredo
Flores, Roy Flores, Quirino Cabeza and ten other John Does
were raffled to respondent Judge Paz.4
In the instant administrative complaint, Atty. Molina alleges
that sometime in November 1996, respondent Judge Paz and
Mayor Antiporda sought his help in settling the cases filed
against Licerio, the son of Mayor Antiporda. Attys. Molina and
Tamargo were the private prosecutors in the criminal cases
against the mayor’s son. Atty. Molina claims that at a meeting
held at the Rembrandt Hotel in Quezon City respondent
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |80
Judge Paz assured Atty. Molina that the criminal cases for
murder against Attys. Molina and Tamargo would be
dismissed should there be a settlement of the cases of the
mayor’s son.
Atty. Molina further claims that at another meeting held in
December 1996, respondent Judge Paz and Mayor Antiporda
asked him to go to Buguey, Cagayan to convince the
Tamargo group to settle the cases against the mayor’s son.
Judge Paz allegedly reminded Atty. Molina that it would be
best to settle the cases of the mayor’s son so that the cases
against Atty. Molina and his co-accused could also be
settled. Judge Paz purportedly told Atty. Molina that Judge
Catral had been urging the transfer of the cases to the latter’s
court, which had been designated a special court for heinous
crimes. Judge Catral, according to Judge Paz, would
certainly issue a warrant of arrest since he knew Atty. Molina
as the counsel of Flaviano Cortes who had filed numerous
administrative cases against Judge Catral.
Atty. Molina claims that at a meeting held on 11 January
1997, he informed respondent Judge Paz and Mayor
Antiporda that the complainants in the murder cases did not
want to settle the cases against the mayor’s son. Respondent
Judge Paz allegedly expressed his disappointment and
remarked that he did not issue a warrant of arrest against
Attys. Molina and Tamargo hoping that the cases would be
settled. Atty. Molina claims that respondent Judge Paz then
asked him to postpone the hearing of the cases pending in
Manila for a "cooling-off period," to which Atty. Molina
agreed.
On 20 January 1997 during the next hearing of the Manila
cases, Atty. Molina as requested by respondent Judge Paz
asked for postponement of the hearing. However, when
Attys. Molina and Tamargo left the judge’s chamber,
policemen from Buguey, Cagayan, armed with a warrant
issued by Judge Catral, arrested them and brought them to
the Manila City Hall Police Detachment. There they were
presented, in handcuffs, before media reporters and then
brought directly to Buguey jail.
Atty. Molina claims that Judge Catral hastily issued the
warrant of arrest because the logbook of respondent Judge
Paz does not show that the records of the murder cases had
been transferred to Judge Catral.
In his Supplemental Complaint, Atty. Molina accuses
respondent Judge Paz of unlawfully using the power of his
office when Judge Catral issued another warrant of arrest
after the Court of Appeals had granted the petition for writ of
habeas corpus filed by him and Atty. Tamargo.
For his part, respondent Judge Paz admits having facilitated
the meeting of Atty. Molina and Mayor Antiporda but claims it
was out of sheer compassion, devoid of bias and prejudice.
Respondent Judge Paz claims he accepted the invitation of
Mayor Antiporda to act as mediator between the warring
political opponents solely to restore peace in the Municipality
of Buguey, Cagayan.
This Court referred the administrative case to Justice Ruben
T. Reyes ("Investigating Justice") of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Report of the Investigating Justice
The Investigating Justice found nothing in the records to
establish respondent Judge Catral’s direct involvement in the
alleged "barter" of the cases. Respondent Judge Catral
issued the warrant of arrest after the transfer of the records of
the case to his sala on 10 January 1997. Judge Catral took
four days to determine the existence of probable cause.
Respondent Judge Catral issued the warrant of arrest on 13
January 1997. The Investigating Justice found as devoid of
merit Atty. Molina’s claim that Judge Catral hastily issued the
warrant of arrest. The Investigating Justice opined that the
determination of the existence of probable cause rests on the
sound judgment of respondent Judge Catral. An
administrative case is not the proper remedy for an error
allegedly committed by a judge in deciding a case or issuing
an order. Likewise, there was no proof of the alleged
falsification of judicial records. Hence, the Investigating
Justice recommended the exculpation of respondent Judge
Catral from the charges.
The Investigating Justice likewise found no sufficient
evidence to establish the charges of grave misconduct,
abuse of authority and dishonesty against respondent Judge
Paz. However, the Investigating Justice recommended that
respondent Judge Paz be fined ₱1,000 for improper conduct.
Good faith and an earnest desire to forge a reconciliation
between the parties may have motivated respondent Judge
Paz to intervene as mediator. However, the Investigating
Justice believed that respondent Judge should have
remembered the cardinal rule that judges should avoid not
just impropriety in their conduct but also even the mere
appearance of impropriety.
The case was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator ("OCA") for evaluation, report and
recommendation. The OCA agreed with the findings and
conclusions of the Investigating Justice and adopted in
toto the latter’s recommendation.
On 6 May 2002, this Court issued a Resolution adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Justice to dismiss the
administrative complaint for lack of merit only as against
respondent Judge Catral.
Thus, in the instant case, the Court will resolve only the
administrative case against respondent Judge Paz.
The Court’s Ruling
Respondent Judge Paz compulsorily retired from the service
on 21 September 1998 and has not received his retirement
benefits because of this pending administrative case. In the
Resolutions5 dated 7 June 2000 and 7 August 2000, this
Court denied his request6 for partial release of his retirement
benefits considering the gravity of the charges against him
and the ongoing investigation. On 20 December 2000,
respondent Judge Catral filed a Motion to Resolve and/or to
Dismiss the case because of the Manifestation dated 24 July
2000 of Atty. Molina to "discontinue to prosecute his
complaint."7
The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the
service does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he should still be answerable. 8 The
withdrawal or recantation of the complainant by the
administrative charges does not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the administrative case. We have repeatedly
ruled that:
xxx, withdrawal of a complaint or subsequent desistance by
the complainant in an administrative case does not
necessarily warrant its dismissal. Administrative actions
cannot depend on the will or pleasure of the complainant who
may, for reasons of his own, condone what may be
detestable. Neither can the Court be bound by the unilateral
act of the complainant in a matter relating to its disciplinary
power. The Court does not dismiss administrative cases
against members of the Bench merely on the basis of
withdrawal of the charges. Desistance cannot divest the
Court of its jurisdiction to investigate and decide the
complaint against the respondent. To be sure, public interest
is at stake in the conduct and actuations of officials and
employees of the judiciary. And the program and efforts of
this Court in improving the delivery of justice to the people
should not be frustrated and put to naught by private
arrangements between the parties.9
Respondent Judge Paz, in his Comment,10 admitted having
facilitated the meeting of Atty. Molina and Mayor Antiporda
out of court, with the aim of settling the disputes between the
two political factions. He claims, however, that it was out of
sheer compassion, devoid of bias and prejudice. He avers he
accepted the invitation of Mayor Antiporda to sit between the
warring political opponents as a mediator hoping to restore
mutual understanding and peace in the Municipality of
Buguey, Cagayan.
Respondent Judge Paz may have good and noble intentions.
However, the Code of Judicial Conduct11 mandates that a
judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence. He should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities. His personal behavior, not only
while in the performance of official duties but also outside the
court, must be beyond reproach, for he is the visible
personification of law and of justice. 12
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |81
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states:
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities.
RULE 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary.
xxx
RULE 2.04. – A judge shall refrain from influencing in any
manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or administrative agency.
Even the personal behavior of judges in their everyday lives
should be beyond reproach. Judges should avoid even the
slightest infraction of the law.13 Those who occupy exalted
positions in the administration of justice must pay a high price
for the honor bestowed on them. Their private as well as their
official conduct must be always free from the appearance of
impropriety.14
Judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants
and counsel appearing before them to avoid even a mere
perception of possible bias or partiality. Judges need not live
in seclusion, nor avoid all social interrelations. When time
and work commitments permit, judges may continue to relate
to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors in such fields
of interest as are in keeping with the noble objectives of the
legal profession.
However, in pending or prospective litigations before them,
judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that
may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social
or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only
must judges possess proficiency in law, they must also act
and behave in such manner that would assure litigants and
their counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and
independence.15
In the present administrative case, respondent Judge Paz
admitted to facilitating a meeting between Atty. Molina and
Mayor Antiporda with the aim of forging a settlement between
the warring political factions. Respondent Judge Paz saw
himself as a mediator between the contending political
factions in the Municipality of Buguey. However, Atty. Molina
was at that time facing a multiple murder case in the sala of
respondent Judge Paz and the victims of the multiple murder
case were the political followers of Mayor
Antiporda.1âwphi1 In short, respondent Judge Paz held a
private meeting with Atty. Molina, who was then accused of
multiple murder before respondent Judge. Respondent Judge
Paz knew that Atty. Molina was a private prosecutor in the
criminal cases against the mayor’s son pending with another
court. The disputes between the political factions involved
grave felonies, which respondent Judge Paz should have
known could not be the subject of compromise.
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a
judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities. A judge must not only be
impartial, he must also appear to be impartial. Public
confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges. Fraternizing with litigants
tarnishes this appearance.16
Respondent Judge Paz’s actuation constitutes simple
misconduct, which for a first offense is punishable with
suspension of one month and one day to six
months.17 However, respondent Judge Paz had retired
compulsorily on 21 September 1998. In lieu of suspension,
respondent Judge Paz should be fined, not ₱1,000 as
recommended by the Investigating Justice, but ₱20,000
considering that simple misconduct is a less serious
charge.18
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Benedicto A. Paz is
adjudged guilty of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and FINED
Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000) to be deducted from his
retirement benefits. Let the retirement benefits of respondent
Judge Benedicto A. Paz be released immediately, subject to
the deduction of the ₱20,000 fine and the usual clearances.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 755-MJ January 31, 1978
ROGELIO PESOLE, complainant,
vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE LUCIO L. RODRIGUEZ, of Tabogon,
Cebu. respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
In his verified complaint, dated may 16, 1974, complainant
Rogelio Pesole of Cebu City charged respondent Lucio L
Rodriguez, Municipal Judge of Tabogon, Cebu, with
"Misconduct and/or Misbehavior" for having acted as counsel
of one Pedro Apa in the preliminary investigation for
falsification before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu,
and for having notarized the documents of said Pedro Apa,
which documents became the basis of the falsification
charge.
Required to comment on the complaint, respondent Judge
vehemently denied the charged, explaining that he notarized
the affidavit of Pedro Apa in his capacity as ex-officio notary
public and that during the preliminary investigation of the
falsification charge against Pedro Apa, a cultivator of a piece
of land belonging to him (respondent), he acted not as
counsel but as "moderator" or amicus curiae", with the
implied permission of the Fiscal. Subsequent to the filing of
said comment, respondent filed with this Court no less than
four (4) petitions, all praying for the formal investigation of the
complaint or its dismissal for being malicious or groundless.
Pending investigation of the administrative charges, the
President of the Philippines accepted respondent's courtesy
resignation. In view thereof, this Court, in a Resolution dated
March 10, 1976 be set aside and that his urgent petition
dated May 7, 1976 praying, among other things, for formal
investigation of this case at the earliest date convenient to
the Court, be entertained. On august 10, 1976, this Court
resolved to set aside its previous order and to refer the
complaint to the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Pursuant to said referral, Judge Mariano A. Zosa, Executive
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City, set the
complaint for hearing on September 20, 21, and 22, but
because the complainant was not duly notified thereof, the
hearing was reset to October 6, 8, and 11, 1976. Meanwhile,
Judge received a letter, dated September 30, 1976, from
complainant Rogelio Pesole formally withdrawing his
complaint against respondent on the ground of lack of
interest with the further information that he was no longer
appearing in the scheduled investigation to substantiate his
complaint.
Notwithstanding the formal withdrawal of the complaint by the
complainant, respondent insisted on presenting his evidence
which the Investigating Judge accordingly received on
October 6, 1976. The evidence presented by the respondent
to prove the falsity of the charges consisted of documents,
namely: letter of the respondent dated August 13, 1974
address to the Provincial' Fiscal of Cebu requesting for -
clarification on the quest-Ion of whether or not he appeared
as counsel for Pedro Apa (Exhibit "1"), and the 1st
Indorsement thereon dated August 19. 1974 of Provincial
Fiscal Santiago N. Medina stating that as per record of the
investigation there is no such appearance (Exhibit "1-A");
certification of the stenographer during the formal
investigation, stating that nobody entered his appearance
counsel for Pedro Apa (Exhibit "2"): transcript of stenographic
notes evidencing that, respondent did not enter any
appearance a counsel for Pedro Apa (Exhibit "5"); and the
certification of Judge Eusebio Arnoco, Acting Municipal
Judge of Tabogon, Cebu, to the effect that the affidavit
executed by Pedro Apa was subscribe and sworn to before
respondent Judge in his capacity as Municipal Judge and ex-
officio notary public of Tabogon Cebu.
In his Findings and Recommendation the Investigating Judge
recommends the dismissal of the complaint and the
exoneration of the respondent on the ground that the charges
have not been substantiated.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |82
Upon an examination of the records of this case, We find the
of the Investigating Judge well-taken. The rule is that charges
of misconduct against judges should be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise they should be dismissed.
Thus, in Valle v. Campos. Jr., 1 where the complainant in like
mariner as the complaint in the present case, manifested in
writing that he was withdrawing his complaint because he
was no longer interested in the further prosecution of the
case, We dismissed the complaint because the charges
thereon could not be substantiated. so, too, in Pawaki v.
Malik, 2 where the complainant appeared for the hearing of
the administrative case without counsel and witnesses, and,
upon being asked if he was ready to proceed with the
investigation of the charges filed against respondent judge
therein, manifested that he was withdrawing his complaint for
the simple reason that he had no evidence to support it, We
dismissed the complainant to substantiate the charges.
Considering that in the present case complainant not only
failed to present any evidence to substantiate his complaint
but, on the other hand, respondent has presented proofs
which show the falsity of the charges, We can do no less
than approve the recommendation of the Investigating Judge.
It may be apropos to mention here that in certain cases, the
acceptance by the President of respondent's courtesy
resignation does not necessarily render the case moot or
deprive Us of the authority to investigate the charges.
In Perez v. Abiera, 3 We have said that the rule that the
resignation or retirement of the respondent in an
administrative case renders the case moot and academic is
not a hard and fast rule. Each case is to be resolved in the
context of the circumstance present thereat. Thus, We
explained:
... (T)he jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent public official had ceased to be in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official
innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant
with dreadful and dangerous implications. ... If innocent,
respondent official merits vindication of his name and
integrity as he leaves the government which he has served
well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserve to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable
under the situation.
WHEREFORE, the present complaint is DISMISSED and the
respondent exonerated of the charges therein.
A.M. No. 12535-Ret April 22, 2008
RE: Application for Retirement/Gratuity Benefits under
R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 5095 and P.D. No.
1438 filed by Mrs. Cecilia Butacan, surviving spouse of
the late Hon. Jimmy R. Butacan (former Judge, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City), who
died on July 28, 2005.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
May the heirs of a judge who was found guilty of gross
neglect of duty and dismissed from the service with
disqualification from holding public office for an offense
committed before he was appointed judge, be entitled to
gratuity benefits?
Jimmy R. Butacan was appointed as Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4,
Tuguegarao City, on June 19, 1995.1
Prior to his appointment to the judiciary, i.e., on February 14,
1995, Butacan, as Chief of the Legal Division, Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. 2 was charged with
grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty by the CSC, in
connection with the tampering of evidence in the custody of
the Legal Division.2
In Resolution No. 96-2722 dated April 12, 1996, the CSC
found Judge Butacan guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and was
imposed the penalty of "dismissal from the service with all the
accessory penalties including disqualification from holding
public office and forfeiture of benefits."3 The CSC held that
although it was not established that Butacan was responsible
for the tampering of evidence, he was the Chief of the Legal
Division and as such had the duty to supervise all areas of
operation including the security and safekeeping of
documents in their custody. Because of his gross negligence,
the CSC held, that the Picture Seat Plan and application
form, which were vital evidence in a case, were tampered
with and the photographs originally attached thereto were
substituted.4
Through a letter dated June 26, 1996, the CSC informed the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of its Resolution
dismissing Butacan from the service.5 The Court in a
Resolution dated October 2, 1996, treated the CSC
Resolution as an administrative complaint, docketed the
same as A.M. No. MTJ-96-11016 and required Judge
Butacan to comment thereon.7 Judge Butacan filed his
Comment8 adopting the Petition for Review dated August 8,
1996 which he filed with the Court of Appeals (CA).9 On July
2, 1997, the Court resolved to hold the administrative matter
in abeyance, pending the resolution of the CA case. 10
In its Decision11 dated August 15, 2003, the CA affirmed the
Resolution of the CSC. An entry of judgment was made and
the CA decision became final and executory on September
11, 2004.12
Ten months thereafter, Judge Butacan died of acute
myocardial infraction or heart attack on July 28, 2005,
rendering a total of 10 years and 27 days of service in the
judiciary.13
In a letter dated May 6, 2006, Cecilia L. Butacan, widow of
Judge Butacan asked for the release of whatever benefits are
due them.14
In a Resolution dated June 28, 2006, the Court resolved to
consider A.M. No. MTJ-96-1101 as closed and terminated in
view of the death of Judge Butacan.15
Meanwhile, the issue on whether the heirs of Judge Butacan
are entitled to gratuity benefits was referred by the OCA to
the OCA Legal Office.16
The OCA Legal Office, in its Memorandum dated October 27,
2006 opined that A.M. No. MTJ-96-1101 must be resolved on
the merits notwithstanding the death of Judge Butacan in
order to determine the rights of the heirs to gratuity
benefits.17 The then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock,
in his Report dated December 14, 2006 agreed with the OCA
Legal Office and requested the Court to clarify the effects of
the phrase "closed and terminated" in relation to the merits of
the complaint filed by the OCA against the late Judge
Butacan and the grant of gratuity benefits to his heirs under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910 as amended.18
The Court does not agree with the OCA Legal Office and the
OCA. The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge
Butacan by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote
v. Judge Eduardo19 where the Court held that in view of the
death of Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is
inappropriate to impose any administrative liability of a
punitive nature; and declared the administrative complaint
against the respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and
terminated.
What then is the effect of the final decision of the CA
affirming the CSC Resolution dated April 12, 1996 finding
Judge Butacan, as then Chief of the Legal Division of CSC
Regional Office No. 2, guilty of grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty and imposing the penalty of dismissal from
service with all the accessory penalties including
disqualification from holding public office and forfeiture of
benefits?
The Court resolves that upon the demise of Judge Butacan
on July 28, 2005, his heirs are entitled to all gratuity benefits
under R.A. No. 910, to be reckoned from June 19, 1995, the
date of his appointment as MTCC Judge up to September 11,
2004 when the CA Decision affirming the CSC Resolution,
became final and executory.
Judge Butacan was appointed as Presiding Judge of the
MTCC while the administrative charge against him as Chief
of the Legal Division, CSC Regional Office No. 2 was
pending with the CSC. Records on hand do not show
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |83
whether he divulged the administrative charge filed against
him when he filed his application for judgeship with the
Judicial and Bar Council. Neither could it be determined
whether his application was made prior to the filing of the
administrative charges against him in the CSC. In any event,
his appointment to the judiciary does not erase any
misfeasance which he may have committed while in the
CSC.
In effect, his appointment as MTCC judge is conditional, that
is, subject to the final determination of the administrative
complaint against him. And this is where the role of the
judiciary came in. Upon being notified by the CSC of the
conviction of Judge Butacan for grave misconduct and gross
neglect of duty, the OCA initiated the corresponding
administrative complaint against Judge Butacan. This step
finds support in Heck v. Santos20 where the Court held that
while the infraction was committed before the respondent’s
appointment as judge, the Court may still discipline him
therefor.
However, upon his demise, the administrative complaint of
the OCA had to be considered closed and terminated. As it
stands therefore, there is no valid reason why the heirs of
Judge Butacan should not be entitled to gratuity benefits for
the period he rendered service as MTCC Judge up to the
finality of the CSC Resolution on September 11, 2004 which
imposed the penalty of "dismissal from service with all the
accessory penalties including disqualification from holding
public office and forfeiture of benefits."
Although the CSC Resolution is dated April 12, 1996, the
penalty of disqualification from holding public office and
forfeiture of benefits which became final only on September
11, 2004, may not be applied retroactively. Accordingly,
Judge Butacan having rendered service in the judiciary from
June 19, 1995 up to September 11, 2004, he is considered
entitled to any benefits due him under the law. As of
September 11, 2004, however, Judge Butacan should be
considered terminated from service in the judiciary as his
appointment as MTCC Judge is deemed conditional upon his
exoneration of the CSC administrative charges against him.
Forfeiture of benefits under the CA Decision refers only to
benefits arising in the CSC prior to his appointment in the
Judiciary.
In fine, considering that Judge Butacan was in active service
when he died on July 28, 1995, the Court finds that his heirs
should be given the gratuity benefits provided for in Section 2
of R.A. No. 910. However, from such benefits should be
deducted the amount of P10,000.00 which he was ordered to
pay as fine by the Court in its Decision dated November 22,
2000 in A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, entitled "Antonio Bangayan
v. Judge Jimmy Butacan" for Gross Misconduct and Grave
Abuse of Discretion which according to the OCA Docket and
Clearance Division has not yet been paid. 21
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to grant the heirs of
the late Judge Jimmy R. Butacan, Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Tuguegarao City,
gratuity benefits under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 910 as
amended, from which sum shall be deducted the amount
of P10,000.00 as fine in A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, entitled
"Antonio Bangayan v. Judge Jimmy Butacan."
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 3086. May 31, 1989.]
IN RE: Petition for the dismissal from the service and/or
disbarment of JUDGE BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
113. HON. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, Commissioner of
Customs, petitioner-complainant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MALICE OR CRIMINAL INTENT; NOT
ESSENTIAL IN OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY SPECIAL
LAWS. — In offenses punished by special laws, proof of
malice or deliberate intent is not necessary. The offenses are
mala prohibita.
2. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; ORDER OF DISMISSAL
MAY BE MODIFIED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES; CASE AT BAR. — After another
painstaking look at the records of this administrative case, we
have decided to act favorably on the respondent’s plea to
view with less rigor the error of judgment he committed. We
have also taken into account the long government service of
the respondent spanning more than twenty-six (26) years.
There is no clear indication from the records that the
respondent’s assailed decision was inspired by corrupt
motives or a reprehensible purpose to set the plainly guilty
free. There is gross misjudgment — yes, but not a deliberate
twisting of facts to justify his decision. His plea that because
the penalty for violation of CB Circular No. 960 was that
provided for in the Revised Penal Code, he believed that
intent or malice was an essential element of the offense of
course deserves but scant consideration. But because such
belief is clearly wrong does not rule out its being held and
acted upon in good faith, not from improper motives. There is
likewise no question that he did not transgress the procedural
requirements needed for the rendition of a judgment in a
criminal case. The facts are all stated in the decision. It was
his egregiously erroneous interpretation of the law which led
us to discipline the Respondent. Respondent Judge Dizon
has, in our view, sincerely evinced a humble repentance. He
admits his errors in interpreting the law but he pleads that
they are not of such gravity as to deserve a penalty of
"virtually capital punishment." Our decision to dismiss the
respondent Judge took effect on February 23, 1988. On the
basis of the foregoing considerations, we feel he has been
sufficiently punished for the administrative infraction. We,
therefore, order his reinstatement.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERIOD DURING WHICH RESPONDENT
JUDGE WAS ORDERED DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
CONSIDERED SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE. — The
motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The
judgment in the Resolution of this Court dated February 23,
1988 is MODIFIED. Respondent Judge Baltazar R. Dizon is
considered suspended from office without pay for the period
from February 23, 1988 to the date this resolution is
promulgated. He may, therefore, be REINSTATED to office
immediately. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the
respondent’s personal record.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
Judge Baltazar R. Dizon praying that the resolution of this
Court dated 23 February 1988 in this case be reconsidered,
the Court took a second hard look at the present case in the
light of the various arguments raised by the movant.
The sole charge brought against the respondent by the
former Commissioner of Customs, Hon. Alexander A. Padilla,
of which we found him guilty in our Resolution of February
23, 1988, is that he rendered a manifestly erroneous decision
in Criminal Case No. 86-10126-P entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Lo Chi Fai" through gross incompetence and
gross ignorance of the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It was alleged that Judge Dizon not only acquitted Lo Chi Fai
of the crime of violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 in
spite of the accused having been apprehended with
US$355,349.57 worth of foreign currencies while boarding a
plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must
first prove the criminal intent to violate the law and benefit
from the illegal act; he also ordered the return of
US$3,000.00 out of the US$355,349.57 thus seized to the
accused on the grossly wrong interpretation that Central
Bank Circular No. 960 exempts this amount from seizure and
forfeiture proceedings.
This court pointed out that in offenses punished by special
laws, proof of malice or deliberate intent is not necessary.
The offenses are mala prohibita. C. B. Circular No. 960 also
requires a tourist upon arrival to declare any foreign currency
he is carrying if the same exceeds US$3,000.00. Respondent
having manifestly disregarded and failed to apply this plain
and fundamental legal principle, despite the fact that the
record did not so clearly bear out the second charge-in fact, it
would now appear that the US$3,000.00 was never returned
to Lo Chi Fai by order of the respondent or otherwise — we
considered that "his actuations in this case amount(ed) to
grave misconduct prejudicial to the interest of sound and fair
administration of justice" and ordered his dismissal from the
service.
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |84

The respondent now comes to us appealing for a
compassionate review of the Court’s judgment. He admits
that his decision was erroneous but pleads that his mistaken
judgment proceeded from good faith and not from a
deliberate desire to pervert his position. He pleads also"
(E)ven for the sake of his family alone, . . . for a review of
(such a) pronouncement which not only imposes the stigma
of removal from his position, but adds the trauma of the loss
of all benefits derived from his long years of service and the
forfeiture of further gainful employment in the Government."
(Motion for Reconsideration, p. 2)
After another painstaking look at the records of this
administrative case, we have decided to act favorably on the
respondent’s plea to view with less rigor the error of judgment
he committed. We have also taken into account the long
government service of the respondent spanning more than
twenty-six (26) years.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The story of Lo Chi Fai that he and five other business
associates from Japan and Hongkong separately brought the
foreign currencies into the Philippines for a business venture
and that he tried to declare his US$50,000.00 and Yen
8,500,000.00 upon arrival but the Central Bank representive
refused to accept his declaration pending confirmation from
the Hongkong source is, as we ruled, palpably concocted.
Instead of looking for criminal intent, the respondent should
have immediately rejected the unbelievable story.
This notwithstanding, there is no clear indication from the
records that the respondent’s assailed decision was inspired
by corrupt motives or a reprehensible purpose to set the
plainly guilty free. There is gross misjudgment — yes, but not
a deliberate twisting of facts to justify his decision. His plea
that because the penalty for violation of CB Circular No. 960
was that provided for in the Revised Penal Code, he believed
that intent or malice was an essential element of the offense
of course deserves but scant consideration. But because
such belief is clearly wrong does not rule out its being held
and acted upon in good faith, not from improper motives.
There is likewise no question that he did not transgress the
procedural requirements needed for the rendition of a
judgment in a criminal case. The facts are all stated in the
decision. It was his egregiously erroneous interpretation of
the law which led us to discipline the Respondent.
In our February 23, 1988 resolution, we stated that" (A) judge
can not be held to account or answer, criminally, civilly, or
administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him
in good faith." (Emphasis supplied) The foregoing doctrine
remains the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
We do not, by any means, exonerate the respondent from all
blame nor do we completely overlook the erroneous
judgment. His act remains unjustified. It does not speak well
of an officer who must "read, study and ponder" and
"personify learning and equanimity." (Lopez v. Fernandez, 99
SCRA 603 [1980]). In the case of Fajota v. Balonso (105
SCRA 1, 4 [1981]), this Court reiterated the strong
admonition of former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in
his concurring opinion in Quizon v. Baltazar, Jr. (65 SCRA
293, 299 [1975]), to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a truism that the learning process in law does not stop
upon graduation from college and admission to the Bar.
There should be, on the contrary, more sustained intellectual
effort on the part of the members of the legal profession.
Certainly, judges are not exempt from this obligation. It is
even more incumbent on them as they are thought of as the
oracles of law.’ There is likely then to be a disillusionment in
the judicial process if, as did happen here, an occupant of the
bench was found to be woefully lacking in legal knowledge. . .
. The efforts for improvement in the mode of administering
the government in all its manifold complexity would come to
naught if our people can harbor the suspicion that judges do
not even know what the law is."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the Court does not require perfection and infallibility, it
reasonably expects a faithful and intelligent discharge of duty
by those who are selected to fill the positions of
administrators of justice.
In considering the respondent’s humble submission which
"respectfully entreats the kind of indulgence and sympathetic
understanding of this most Honorable Supreme Court," we
have taken into account the overloaded dockets of Metro
Manila trial judges, the unceasing strain caused by daily
hearings on complex cases and the sad lack of libraries,
decent courtrooms, office equipment, supplies, and other
court facilities which sometimes result in less than thorough
appreciation of all relevant data and applicable laws thus
leading to lapses and errors which we find difficult to
comprehend once the case reaches us. Still, a Judge must
rise above environmental difficulties and keep a clear and
cool mind when writing down his decisions.
The respondent states that in his five years as a trial Judge,
he disposed of 2,601 cases. In 1985, we assigned him to
handle the cases in Branch 112 in addition to his regular
work as Presiding Judge of Branch 113 of the Pasay City
Regional Trial Court. He has never found time to go on leave
except when compelled by illness. He has never gone on a
foreign trip.
The factors mentioned in the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and subsequent motions for reinstatement do
not excuse or exculpate but they suggest that our earlier
penalty of dismissal may be mitigated.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in a few other recent
decisions, this Court also applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in judging the errant Judge’s misdeeds. (People v.
Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712 [1985]; Cathay Pacific Airways v.
Romillo, 142 SCRA 262 [1986]; Prudential Bank v. Castro,
142 SCRA 223 [1986]; and Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47 [1988] We
differentiate this case from these cited cases.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
In these res ipsa loquitur resolutions, there was on the face of
the assailed decisions, an inexplicable grave error bereft of
any redeeming feature, a patent railroading of a case to bring
about an unjust decision, or a manifestly deliberate intent to
wreak an injustice against a hapless party. The facts
themselves, previously proven or admitted, were of such a
character as to give rise to a strong inference that evil intent
was present. Such intent, in short, was clearly deducible from
what was already of record. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine
does not except or dispense with the necessity of proving the
facts on which the inference of evil intent is based. It merely
expresses the clearly sound and reasonable conclusion that
when such facts are admitted or are already shown by the
record, and no credible explanation that would negative the
strong inference of evil intent is forthcoming, no further
hearing to establish them to support a judgment as to the
culpability of a respondent is necessary.
Thus, when asked to explain the clearly gross ignorance of
law or the grave misconduct irresistibly reflecting on their
integrity, the respondent Judges were completely unable to
give any credible explanation or to raise reasonable doubt
which have justified a more lenient judgment of their conduct.
Respondent Judge Dizon has, in our view, sincerely evinced
a humble repentance. He admits his errors in interpreting the
law but he pleads that they are not of such gravity as to
deserve a penalty of "virtually capital punishment." Even as
he asked for "mercy, compassion, and humanity in the light
of his good faith and long years of dedication and devoted
service to the government," he begs leave to state that "no
man is perfect" and that he himself "is subject to commission
of mistakes." He submits, however, that his error "was not
motivated by any improper considerations." The respondent
"sincerely declares that he respects the wisdom of this
Honorable Court, its unquestionable disciplinary authority
over the members of the bench and the lofty purposes sought
to be subserved by the exercise of such constitutional
power." He ends his motion for reconsideration with a
"respectful and earnest prayer" that we reconsider our
Resolution in this administrative matter.
Our decision to dismiss the respondent Judge took effect on
February 23, 1988. On the basis of the foregoing
considerations, we feel he has been sufficiently punished for
the administrative infraction. We, therefore, order his
reinstatement.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion
for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The judgment in the
Resolution of this Court dated February 23, 1988 is
MODIFIED. Respondent Judge Baltazar R. Dizon is
considered suspended from office without pay for the period
from February 23, 1988 to the date this resolution is
promulgated. He may, therefore, be REINSTATED to office
immediately. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the
respondent’s personal record.
G.R. No. L-64276 March 4, 1986
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |85
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LTD., petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
PLANA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order directed against
respondent Judge's order declaring petitioner in default,
judgment by default, and the order denying petitioner's
motion to set aside said order and judgment.
Samir Beiruty and Mohammed Al-Sulain arrived at the Manila
International Airport via Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (CPA)
from Hongkong, but they were denied entry for lack of visas
and they had to return to Hongkong.
Having lost two luggages on the way back to Hongkong
allegedly because CPA personnel in Manila negligently gave
their claim tags to other persons, the said passengers
subsequently filed a complaint for damages with the former
Court of First Instance of Rizal against CPA.
Summons was served on the defendant on May 5, 1982.
CPA filed two motions for extention to file its answer: the first
was for 15 days or up to June 4, while the second was for 10
days or up to June 14, 1982. No action was taken by the
court on either motion. Before the expiration of the second
extension requested, CPA filed its answer, i.e., on June 11,
1982.
After the answer had been filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
declare the defendant in default. That was on June 25.
Cathay received a copy of the motion on June 29 and filed its
opposition on July 2, 1982. On June 30, however, even
before CPA filed its opposition, the court issued the order of
default. (For some unknown reason, this order was not
served on CPA until December 9, 1982, i.e., more than four
months later.)
Thus, plaintiffs presented their evidence ex-parte before a
deputy clerk of court. On November 9, 1982, a decision was
rendered by the trial court, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment by default is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the following.
a) P412,960.00 as actual or compensatory damages;
b) P19.500,000.00 as and for loss of earnings or unrealized
profits;
c) P3,000,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P600,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e) P500,000.00 as and for attomey's fees; and
f) the costs of suit. (Rollo, p. 68.)
Copies of the decision including the order of default were
served on CPA on December 9, 1982. It was only then that
CPA came to know of the order of default.
Within thirty days from receipt of the decision or on January
7, 1983, CPA filed a motion to lift the order of default and set
aside the default judgment.
The motion was denied in an order dated February 15, 1983
(received by CPA on February 22, 1983) principally on the
ground that the motion was filed almost seven months from
the issuance on June 30, 1982 of the default order and the
decision by then (February 15, 1983) had already become
final and executory.
On February 22, 1983, the trial court granted a writ of
execution, also on the ground that the judgment by default
had become final and executory, the motion to lift the order of
default and set aside the judgment filed by defendant not
having the effect of suspending the period for perfecting an
appeal.
The following day, February 23, CPA filed a notice of appeal.
This was, however, declared by the trial court to have filed
out of time, for which reason, the records of the case have
never been elevated to the appellate court.
It was against this backdrop that petitioner has filed the
instant petition assailing the order of default and the default
judgment, and praying that the said order and judgment be
annulled and set aside, that respondent Judge be enjoined
from executing the assailed decision, and that he be ordered
to admit petitioner's answer and proceed to set the case for
pretrial and trial on the merits.
Upon the filing of the petition, the Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from executing
the judgment by default dated November 9, 1982 and from
holding any aircraft or properties of petitioner preparatory to
execution. (Rollo, p. 130.)
We find the petition meritorious.
It was after petitioner had filed its answer to the complaint
(within the second extension of time sought) that private
respondents, as plaintiffs, moved that petitioner be declared
in default, which the trial court did although there was no
indication of an intent on the part of petitioner to delay the
case or that admission of the answer would in any way
prejudice private respondents.
In Ladislao vs. Pestano, 96 Phil. 890, this Court ruled:
. . . no prejudice could have been caused to plaintiff by the
admission of defendant's answer, since the latter had not yet
been declared in default and plaintiff had not yet presented
her evidence on the merits. The lower court, therefore, in the
exercise of its discretion petition, should have admitted
defendant's answer instead of declaration her in default. (p.
893.)
Similarly in Trajano vs. Cruz, 80 SCRA 712, we set aside an
order of default upon facts closely similar to the case at bar.
The conclusion that becomes inescapable from the fact that
petitioners filed their answer before respondents asked for a
declaration of default is that respondents were not particularly
diligent in the exercise of their rights and that they were not in
any way prejudiced by the late filing of the answer by
petitioners. Further, there was no evidence showing that
petitioners intended to unduly delay the case. On the
contrary, petitioners even attached their 'Answer' to the
complaint upon the filing of their 'Motion for Admission of
Answer' and did not even file an extension of time to file the
same or any other dilatory motion.
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, We hold that the trial court erred in issuing the
order dated January 21, 1977 setting aside the order of
November 4, 1976 and in maintaining its stand in the order
dated March 21, 1977. (p. 716.)
It should be borne in mind that the policy of the law is to have
every litigated case tried on the merits as much as possible.
It is for this reason that judgments by default are frowned
upon.
The needless delay and trouble spawned by the unfortunate
order of default and judgment by default assailed in the
instant case warrant calling attention once more to a previous
reminder made by this Court through Mr. Justice Claudio
Teehankee:
Time and again the Court has enjoined trial judges to act with
circumspection and not to precipitately declare parties in
default, needlessly compelling the aggrieved party to undergo
the additional expense, anxiety and delay of seeking the
intervention of the appeciate courts and depriving them of the
much needed time and attention that could instead have well
been devoted to the study and disposition of more complex
and complicated cases and issues. (Akut vs. Court of
Appeals, 116 SCRA 213, 220.)
Accordingly, the questioned order of default dated June 30,
1982, the default judgment of November 9, 1982, the order of
February 15, 1983 denying the motion to lift the said order
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |86
and judgment, and all proceedings taken thereafter in the
court a quo are hereby annulled and set aside. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City is directed to
cause the re-raffle of Civil Case No. 0018-P (Beiruty and Al-
Sulain vs. Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.). The lower court is
ordered to admit thereafter petitioner's answer and set the
case for pretrial and trial on the merits, after which another
judgment shall be rendered upon the evidence presented.
Treble costs against private respondents,
Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why he should not be dealt with
administratively for having awarded in favor of private
respondents what per se appear as outrageously exorbitant
damages.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008
Re: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121, CALOOCAN
CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR
CHILD ABUSE
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is yet another administrative case
confronting respondent Adoracion G. Angeles (respondent),
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
121, Caloocan City (sala) filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator1 (OCA) recommending that she be suspended
pending the outcome of this administrative case.
The Facts
On July 17, 2006, the RTC, Branch 100, Quezon City
rendered a Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-69655-56
convicting respondent of violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
7610.3 The criminal cases are now on appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA).4
On July 25, 2006, Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y.
Velasco (SSP Velasco) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
wrote a letter5 to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
inquiring whether it is possible for this Court, in the public
interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of
the respondent in view of the aforementioned RTC Decision.
SSP Velasco opined:
1. Judge Angeles now stands convicted on two counts of a
crime, child abuse under Republic Act 7610, which involves
moral turpitude. Until she clears her name of such conviction,
her current moral qualification to do the work of a judge is
under a dark cloud. Litigants seeking justice in our courts are
entitled to a hearing by judges whose moral qualifications are
not placed in serious doubt.
2. Although her conviction is not yet final, the presumption of
innocence that Judge Angeles enjoyed during the pendency
of the trial has already been overcome by its result. The
presumption today is that she is guilty and must clear her
name of the charges.
xxxx
It simply would not be right to have a person presumably
guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude to hear and
adjudicate the cases of others.
3. Under section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, since the RTC of Quezon City convicted Judge
Angeles of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, she no longer has a right to
bail and, therefore, should ordinarily be held in prison
pending adjudication of her appeal. That the RTC of Quezon
City chose
to exercise its discretionary power to nonetheless grant her
bail does not change the fact that, except for the bail, Judge
Angeles' rightful place by reason of conviction is within the
confinement of prison.
It would seem incongruous for the Supreme Court to allow
convicted felons out on bail to hear and adjudicate cases in
its courts.
4. Finally, as a sitting judge who wields power over all
persons appearing before her and has immeasurable
influence within the judicial system as one of its members,
Judge Angeles could definitely cause pressure to bear, not
only on the members of the Court of Appeals and, possibly,
the Supreme Court, but also on the Office of the Solicitor
General that prosecutes her case on appeal. Only temporary
suspension from official function, pending resolution of her
case, will neutralize her judicial clout and clear the air of any
kind of suspicion that justice is not going well in her case.
On July 27, 2006, the matter was referred to the OCA for
comment and recommendation.6
On the basis of SSP Velasco's letter and by virtue of this
Court's Resolution7 dated March 31, 1981, the OCA
submitted to this Court a Report8 dated August 25, 2006 with
an attached Administrative Complaint,9 the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this
administrative complaint be given due course and,
respondent be ordered to file her Comment within ten (10)
days from receipt. Considering the evidence is prima facie
strong, it is respectfully recommended that she
be INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED pending the outcome of the
instant case or until further orders from this Court. It is further
recommended that after the Comment is filed, the
administrative proceeding be suspended to await the final
outcome of the criminal cases filed against her.
In a Resolution10 dated September 18, 2006, this Court's
Second Division approved all of these recommendations,
thus, suspending respondent from performing her judicial
functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal
cases or until further orders from this Court.
On October 6, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration11 of the aforementioned Resolution.
Respondent claimed that the suspension order was wielded
against her without affording her the opportunity to be heard
since she was not furnished copies of SSP Velasco's letter
and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Thus, respondent
submitted that her suspension is essentially unjust.
Moreover, respondent manifested that the two criminal cases
against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore,
not yet attained finality. As such, respondent still enjoys the
constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension
clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a
prejudgment of her guilt.
On the other hand, on October 11, 2006, SSP Velasco filed
an Urgent Appeal/Manifestation12 to the Court En Banc on
the alleged unethical conduct of respondent, seeking the
immediate implementation of this Court's Resolution dated
September 18, 2006. On October 16, 2007, SSP Velasco
filed an Opposition to the said Motion for
Reconsideration,13 manifesting that respondent continuously
defied this Court's Resolution dated September 18, 2006 as
she did not desist from performing her judicial functions
despite her receipt of said Resolution on October 6, 2006.
SSP Velasco stressed that an order of suspension issued by
this Court is immediately executory notwithstanding the filing
of a motion for reconsideration. Moreover, SSP Velasco
reiterated that due to her conviction on two counts of child
abuse, respondent no longer enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence and should remain suspended in
order to erase any suspicion that she is using her influence to
obtain a favorable decision and in order to maintain and
reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary.
Correlatively, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Caloocan,
Malabon, Navotas Chapter (IBP-CALMANA Chapter),
through its Public Relations Officer (PRO) Atty. Emiliano A.
Mackay, wrote a letter14 dated October 18, 2006 addressed
to the Second Division of this Court inquiring as to the
effectivity of the Resolution suspending the respondent so as
not to sow confusion among the legal practitioners and party
litigants with pending cases before the respondent's sala.
Likewise, the IBP-CALMANA Chapter manifested that
respondent did not cease to perform her judicial functions as
evidenced by a Commitment Order15 issued by respondent
on October 16, 2006, and handwritten manifestations 16 of
some party litigants attesting that on various dates they
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |87
attended hearings before respondent's sala. In the same
vein, in an undated letter17 addressed to Associate Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Concerned Trial Lawyers in
the City of Caloocan raised the same concern before this
Court.
In her Reply18 to SSP Velasco's Opposition, respondent
admitted that she continued discharging her bounden duties
in utmost good faith after filing her motion for reconsideration.
She averred that she did not have the slightest intention to
defy or ignore this Court's Resolution which did not
categorically state that the said suspension is immediately
executory. Respondent reiterated her arguments against the
suspension order on the grounds that she was deprived of
due process; that her conviction is not yet final; and that the
crimes for which she was convicted have nothing to do with
the discharge of her official duties. Lastly, respondent
claimed that the instant case is but another harassment suit
filed against her by SSP Velasco because she earlier filed an
administrative complaint against the latter for maliciously
indicting respondent with respect to another case of child
abuse.
On October 25, 2006, respondent filed a Manifestation of
Voluntary Inhibition19 stating that she is voluntarily inhibiting
from handling all cases scheduled for hearing before her sala
from October 25, 2006 to November 13, 2006.
On October 27, 2006, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in
respondent's sala. Per Report20 of the judicial audit team, it
was established that from October 6, 2006 to October 23,
2006, respondent conducted hearings, issued orders,
decided cases and resolved motions, acting as if the order of
suspension which the respondent received on October 6,
2006 was only a "mirage." The Report was brought to the
attention of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock (CA Lock). 21
On October 30, 2006, SSP Velasco filed an Administrative
Complaint against respondent for violation of the Court's
Circulars, the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Civil
Service Rules and Regulations, and for Gross Misconduct,
asseverating, among others, that the suspension order was
immediately executory22 and that integrity as mandated by
the New Code of Judicial Conduct is essential not only to the
proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.
In her Comment,23 respondent, in addition to her previous
contentions, argued that the Resolution dated September 18,
2006 ordering her suspension was issued only by a Division
of this Court contrary to Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that "the Supreme Court en
banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in the case and voted thereon."
On November 9, 2006, SSP Velasco filed a Supplement to
the Opposition to Respondent's Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration24 of the Resolution dated September 18,
2006. Thereafter, numerous pleadings 25 were filed by both
parties practically repeating their previous allegations.
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated February 19, 2007, this
Court lifted the suspension of respondent on the ground that:
Upon verification, it appears that the Office of the Clerk of
Court, Second Division, indeed failed to attach a copy of the
OCA complaint to the copy of our resolution dated
September 18, 2006 sent to Judge Angeles. Due process
requires that Judge Angeles be accorded the opportunity to
answer the complaint.
Respondent was then given a fresh period of ten (10) days
from the receipt of the OCA Administrative Complaint within
which to file her comment.
On March 15, 2007, respondent filed her Comment 26 with the
following material assertions: (1) that CA Lock as Court
Administrator and who in behalf of the OCA stands as the
complainant in this case, has no personal knowledge of the
facts, issues and evidence presented in the criminal cases;
(2) that the instant case, filed eleven (11) years after the
criminal charges for child abuse were filed by Nancy Gaspar
and Proclyn Pacay, smacks of malice and bad faith on the
part of CA Lock; (3) that CA Lock is a friend and former
subordinate of then National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Director Epimaco Velasco (Director Velasco), father of
herein party SSP Velasco, thus, CA Lock's ill motive against
respondent is clear; (4) that CA Lock should not use the OCA
to harass a member of the judiciary; (5) that the decision in
the aforementioned criminal cases has not yet become final;
(6) that the acts for which she was convicted are totally alien
to her official functions and have nothing to do with her
fitness and competence as a judge; (7) that there is no
wisdom in the imposition of the suspension which in this case
is preventive in character because respondent cannot do
anything through her office that could possibly cause
prejudice to the prosecution of the child abuse case; (8) that
the lifting of the suspension order retroacts to the date of its
issuance; (9) that the instant case should be struck down
because the judgment of conviction was contrary to law and
jurisprudence; and (10) that under the circumstances, all the
charges were merely concocted by respondent's detractors in
order to embarrass, humiliate and vex her.
In his Motion for Reconsideration27 of this Court's Resolution
dated February 19, 2007, SSP Velasco argued that
respondent's deprivation of her right to due process was
cured when she filed her motion for the reconsideration of the
suspension order; thus, there is no need to lift such order. He
reiterated his previous statement that "as a sitting judge who
wields power over all persons appearing before her and thus
has immeasurable influence within the judicial system as one
of its members, Judge Angeles could definitely cause
pressure to bear, not only on the members of the Court of
Appeals and, possibly, the Supreme Court, but also on the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that prosecutes her
case on appeal. Only her suspension from official function,
pending resolution of her case, will neutralize her judicial
clout and clear the air of any kind of suspicion that justice is
not going well in her case."28
In response, respondent filed a Comment/Opposition to the
said motion with a Motion to Declare SSP Velasco in
contempt of Court29 due to this aforementioned statement.
Respondent argued that such statement betrays SSP
Velasco's cheap and low perception of the integrity and
independence of this Court, of the CA and of the OSG. It also
shows his utter lack of respect for the judicial system.
Moreover, respondent added that since she was not
furnished a copy of the OCA Administrative Complaint, the
issuance of the suspension order deprived her of her right to
due process and prevented her from fully ventilating her
arguments. Respondent, likewise, questioned SSP Velasco's
legal personality in this case as it was the OCA which, motu
proprio, initiated the filing of the said case.
In a Resolution dated July 4, 2007, this Court, among others,
directed SSP Velasco to file his comment on respondent's
motion to cite him for contempt. On August 21, 2007, SSP
Velasco filed his Comment claiming that he has legal
personality to file pleadings before this Court because it was
he who initiated the filing of this case through his letter to
then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban on July 25, 2006.
He admitted that the allegedly contemptuous statements
were merely lifted from said letter. He argued that the former
Chief Justice or the Court for that matter, did not find any
contemptuous statement in the letter. Taking the letter in its
entire context, SSP Velasco posited that he did not commit
any act of disobedience to the orders of this Court; neither
did he bring the Court's authority and the administration of
law into disrepute nor did he impede the due administration
of justice. Nowhere in the letter was it stated that this Court,
the CA and the OSG could be pressured; the letter merely
stated that respondent could cause pressure. SSP Velasco
pointed that the letter to the then Chief Justice, in itself,
shows his respect for the judiciary and the promotion of the
administration of justice.
In her Reply30 to said Comment, respondent argued that it
cannot be said that somebody could cause pressure if no one
is believed to be susceptible to pressure. Thus, the use of
this kind of language tends to degrade the administration of
justice and constitutes indirect contempt. She stressed that
SSP Velasco's act of misrepresenting himself as the
complainant in this case while it is clear from the Resolution
of this Court that the OCA motu propriofiled the same, is per
se contemptuous.
Meanwhile in its Memorandum,31 the OCA reiterated its
earlier position that respondent should be suspended
pending the outcome of this administrative case. The OCA
opined that the Resolution lifting the suspension order was
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |88
basically premised on the ground that respondent was not
accorded her right to due process. By filing her Comment
raising arguments against her suspension, respondent has
fully availed herself of such right. However, the OCA
submitted that respondent's arguments are devoid of merit on
the following grounds: (1) the Court Administrator need not
personally know about the criminal cases of respondent
because the instant case is based on a public document, i.e.,
the decision of the RTC convicting the respondent of child
abuse; (2) the fact that said decision has not attained finality
is of no moment for what is being sought is merely preventive
suspension. Thus, in the event that respondent is acquitted in
the criminal cases of which she stands accused, she will
receive the salaries and other benefits which she would not
receive during her suspension; (3) even if the acts of child
abuse have no connection with respondent's official functions
as a judge, it is established that the private conduct of judges
cannot be dissociated from their official functions; (4)
respondent's preventive suspension shall serve an important
purpose: it will protect the image of the judiciary and preserve
the faith of the people in the same; and
(5) citing the case of Leonida Vistan v. Judge Ruben T.
Nicolas,32 the RTC decision convicting respondent of child
abuse is prima facie evidence that respondent committed the
said crime which indicates the moral depravity of the offender
and, as such, warrants the punishment of dismissal from the
service. Thus, the OCA recommended that respondent be
suspended pending the outcome of this administrative case
and that the CA be directed to resolve the criminal cases with
dispatch.
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues in this case:
First, whether or not grounds exist to cite SSP Velasco for
indirect contempt of Court; and
Second, whether or not grounds exist to preventively
suspend the respondent pending the resolution of this
administrative case.
The Court's Ruling
We resolve the first issue in the negative.
In Pilar Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Romeo C. Albarracin,33 we
held:
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court, such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.
There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct
contempt and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed when a person is guilty of misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the
court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be
sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit
or deposition when lawfully required to do so. Indirect
contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed
out of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice would constitute indirect
contempt.
In her Comment/Opposition with Motion to Declare SSP
Velasco in contempt of Court, respondent espoused the view
that SSP Velasco is guilty of indirect contempt for using
language which tends to degrade the administration of
justice. But if this were so, respondent should have availed
herself of the remedy in accordance with Section 4, Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, viz:
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. - Proceedings for
indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed by an order or
any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be
commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with
the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions in the court concerned . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
A charge of indirect contempt must be filed in the form of a
verified petition if it is not initiated directly by the court against
which the contemptuous act was committed. On previous
occasions, we clarified that such petition is in the nature of a
special civil action. Certified true copies of related documents
must be submitted with the petition and appropriate docket
fees must be paid. The requirement of a verified petition is
mandatory. As Justice Florenz D. Regalado has explained:
This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper
procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While
such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action
under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice,
tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere
motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and
without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of
[Section 4].34
On the charge of indirect contempt of court, we therefore find
that SSP Velasco's statement, while irresponsible, did not
necessarily degrade the administration of justice as to be
considered contumacious. The salutary rule is that the power
to punish for contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective
and not retaliatory idea of punishment. A lawyer's remarks
explaining his position in a case under consideration do not
necessarily assume the level of contempt that justifies the
court's exercise of the power of contempt. 35 We note that
SSP Velasco's statement was made in support of his
argument for the imposition of preventive suspension, i.e., to
prevent the respondent from using her current position to
alter the course of the investigation and the disposition of the
appealed criminal cases.
Nevertheless, SSP Velasco must bear in mind that as a
lawyer, he must be circumspect in his language. We remind
him of our admonition to all lawyers to observe the following
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
read:
Canon 8. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Canon 11. A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
A lawyer is an officer of the Court. It is a lawyer's sworn and
moral duty to help build and not unnecessarily destroy the
people's high esteem and regard for the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.
A lawyer's language may be forceful but should always be
dignified;
emphatic but respectful, as befitting an advocate. Arguments,
whether written or oral, should be gracious to both court and
opposing counsel, and should use such language as may be
properly addressed by one person to another.36
We likewise resolve the second issue in the negative. The
Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation of the
OCA.
Pertinent is our ruling in Emmanuel Ymson Velasco v. Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles,37 which involved the same parties and
where we held:
An act unrelated to a judge's discharge of judicial functions
may give rise to administrative liability even when such act
constitutes a violation of penal law. When the issue is
administrative liability, the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Evidence to support a conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the
criminal case against the respondent in an administrative
case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative
case. Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |89
automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the
administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule
that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, and each must be disposed of
according to the facts and the law applicable to it.
In Nuñez v. Atty. Arturo B. Astorga,38 the Court held that the
mere existence of pending criminal charges against the
respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or
suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the
door to harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of
numerous criminal cases against them.
By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by
the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We
agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of
the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA,
the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still
enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. It must
be remembered that the existence of a presumption
indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy
the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the
inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the
lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is
shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence
continues.39 In Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan,40 the Court held
that respondent Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse
of discretion, correctible by certiorari, when it ruled
that despite her convictions, "Preagido has still in her favor
the constitutional presumption of innocence x x x (and until) a
promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional
mandate prevails." The Court therein further held that such
ruling is not bereft of legal or logical foundation and cannot, in
any sense, be characterized as a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment. So also must we hold in this case.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint
leveled against a judge must always be examined with a
discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are, by their
nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands
to face the sanction of dismissal or disbarment. 41 As
aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases against judges
may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run
create adverse consequences. The OCA, as well as SSP
Velasco, failed to prove that other than the fact that a
judgment of conviction for child abuse was rendered against
the respondent, which is still on appeal, there are other lawful
grounds to support the imposition of preventive suspension.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the
resolve that, while it is true that preventive
suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a
penalty,42 the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not
having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are
amorphous at best.43 Likewise, we consider respondent's
argument that there is no urgency in imposing preventive
suspension as the criminal cases are now before the CA, and
that she cannot, by using her present position as an RTC
Judge, do anything to influence the CA to render a decision
in her favor. The issue of preventive suspension has also
been rendered moot as the Court opted to resolve this
administrative case.
However, even as we find that the OCA and SSP Velasco
have not clearly and convincingly shown ample grounds to
warrant the imposition of preventive suspension, we do note
the use of offensive language in respondent's pleadings, not
only against SSP Velasco but also against former CA Lock.
To reiterate our previous ruling involving the respondent, her
use of disrespectful language in her Comment is certainly
below the standard expected of an officer of the court. The
esteemed position of a magistrate of the law demands
temperance, patience and courtesy both in conduct and in
language.44 Illustrative are the following statements: "CA
Lock's hostile mindset and his superstar complex";45 "In a
frenzied display of arrogance and power"; 46 "(CA Lock's)
complaint is merely a pathetic echo of the findings of the trial
court";47 and "when (CA Lock) himself loses his objectivity
and misuses the full powers of his Office to persecute the
object of his fancy, then it is time for him to step down." 48 In
the attempt to discredit CA Lock, respondent even dragged
CA Lock's son into the controversy, to wit:
It is noteworthy to mention that CA Lock's hostile attitude was
aggravated by his embarrassment when the undersigned
mentioned to him that she knew how he used his influence to
secure a position for his son at the RTC Library of Pasay City
which was then managed by Judge Priscilla Mijares. CA Lock
had made sure that his son be assigned to the library to
enable the latter to conveniently adjust his schedule in
reviewing for the bar examination.
Neither was SSP Velasco spared. Of him, the respondent
said: "A reading of the motion for reconsideration readily
discloses that it is mainly anchored on SSP Velasco's
malicious speculations about the guilt of the
undersigned. Speculations, especially those that emanate
from the poisonous intentions of attention-seeking
individuals, are no different from garbage that should be
rejected outright";49 and "His malicious insinuation is no less
than a revelation of his warped mindset that a person's
position could cause pressure to bear among government
officials. This brings forth a nagging question. Did SSP
Velasco use his position at the DOJ to 'cause pressure to
bear' and obtain a favorable disposition of the administrative
cases lodged against him by the undersigned? Is he afraid of
his own ghost?"50
It must be stressed again that, as a dispenser of justice,
respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times,
avoiding vulgar and insulting language. She must maintain
composure and equanimity. The judicial office circumscribes
the personal conduct of a judge and imposes a number of
restrictions. This is the price that judges have to pay for
accepting and occupying their exalted positions in the
administration of justice.51
One final word. The parties herein have admitted in their
various pleadings that they have filed numerous cases
against each other. We do not begrudge them the
prerogative to initiate charges against those who, in their
opinion, may have wronged them. But it is well to remind
them that this privilege must be exercised with prudence,
when there are clearly lawful grounds, and only in the pursuit
of truth and justice. This prerogative does not give them the
right to institute shotgun charges with reckless abandon, or
allow their disagreement to deteriorate into a puerile quarrel,
not unlike that of two irresponsible children.
Judge Angeles and SSP Velasco should bear in mind that
they are high-ranking public officers whom the people look up
to for zealous, conscientious and responsive public service.
Name-calling hardly becomes them.
Cognizant of the adverse impact and unpleasant
consequences this continuing conflict will inflict on the public
service, we find both officials wanting in the conduct
demanded of public servants.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Nevertheless,
respondent Adoracion G. Angeles, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, is
hereby REPRIMANDED for her use of intemperate language
in her pleadings and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar act shall merit a more severe sanction.
Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the
Department of Justice is hereby WARNED that he should be
more circumspect in the statements made in his pleadings
and that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely. The motion to cite him for contempt is DENIED for
lack of merit.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve CA-G.R. CR
No. 30260 involving respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 134-J January 21, 1974
IN RE: THE HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, JUDGE OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
BRANCH I, SILAY CITY.
RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |90
In a verified complaint filed on October 15, 1968 by
Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Zulueta, of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental, and Eva Mabug-at, widow of the deceased
Norberto Tongoy, respondent is charged with gross
malfeasance in office, gross ignorance of the law, and
for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.
The aforecited charges stemmed from the order of
respondent dated September 5, 1968 and his decision
acquitting accused Carlos Caramonte promulgated on
September 21, 1968, in Criminal Case No. 690, entitled
"People the Philippines versus Isabelo Montemayor, et
al.," for Robbery in Band with Homicide.
In the Resolution of this Court dated October 22, 1968,
the complaint was given due course, and respondent
was required to file, an answer to the complaint within
ten (10) days from notice thereof, and after the filing of
respondent's answer, the case was referred on
December 17, 1968 to the Hon. Nicasio Yatco, Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, for investigation and
report. On April 11, 1968, after conducting the requisite
investigation thereon, the investigator submitted his
Report recommending the exoneration of respondent.
It appears from the record that Acting City Fiscal
Norberto L. Zulueta, of Cadiz, Negros Occidental, filed a
charge for Robbery in Band with Homicide against
thirteen (13) persons as principals, seven (7) persons as
accomplices, and two (2) persons as accessories, with
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, in
Criminal Case No. 690.<äre||anº•1àw> The case was
assigned to Branch I, Silay City, presided over by the
respondent. Out of the 13 persons charged as principals
for the crime, only Carlos Caramonte was arrested and
tried (the six other alleged principals, including Isabelo
Montemayor, remained at large), while of the persons
charged as accomplices and accessories, the case with
respect to them was dismissed at the instance of the
prosecution or with its conformity, in the following
manner:
(a) Before arraignment: —
Jorge Canonoyo
(b) After arraignment: —
Agustin Cañete
Rosendo Cañete
Arsenio Luyao
Elias Giducos
Pedro Layon
Antonio Placencia
(c) Accused Luciano Salinas was discharged from the
information and utilized as state witness; and
(d) Accused Honorato de Sales, Paulino Quijano, Cristeta
Jimenez, Constancio Pangahin, Julio Elmo, Primitivo
Mata, and Rene Fernandez before the Amended
Information of April 26, 1968, were dropped.
After the case was submitted for decision, respondent
issued an order, dated September 5, 1968, which reads
as follows:
The parties are notified that the Court intends to take
judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy
Compound Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing
industry operating in the Visayas; that the said
compound is only about 500 meters away from the
Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz; that the
neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated. SO
ORDERED.
Thereafter, or more particularly, on September 21, 1968,
respondent promulgated his decision in the case
acquitting Carlos Caramonte.
Subsequently, Acting City Fiscal Zulueta appealed
aforementioned decision to this Court; and when
required to comment on said appeal, Solicitor General
Antonio P. Barredo, now an Associate Justice of this
Court, submitted his comment on November 28, 1968 to
the effect that prosecution cannot appeal from the
judgment of acquittal in view of the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy, and made the
observation that "While the validity of the ocular
inspection conducted by the lower court is open to
doubt, the unvarnished fact remains that the judgment of
acquittal was not premised solely on the results of said
ocular inspection, as erroneously contended by
prosecutor. A cursory perusal of the decision will at
once show that said acquittal was predicated on other
well-considered facts and circumstances so thoroughly
discussed by the lower court in its decision and the least
of those was its observation arising from the ocular
inspection.
On January 30, 1969, this Court, through Justice
Fernando, promulgated its Resolution dismissing the
appeal (G.R. No. L-29599). In the meantime, on October
15, 1968, the aforementioned complaint against
respondent was instituted as aforestated..
In his Report, the investigator stated:
Under the first indictment, complainants bewail as gross
malfeasance in office and gross ignorance of the law, the
following behaviour of the respondent Judge in the case:
I. GROSS MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE
and
GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
After both parties submitted their respective
Memorandum attached herewith as Annexes "C" and
"D", Criminal Case No. 690 for "Robbery in Band with
Homicide" was closed and submitted for Decision on
July 1, 1968.
About one and a half (1-½) months thereafter, or at about
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, 11 August 1968,
respondent judge made a secret ocular inspection of the
poblacion of the City of Cadiz. Without anybody to guide
him, he visited the places which he thought erroneously
were the scene of the robbery where the Chief of Police
was killed by the Montemayor gang at about 11:00
o'clock of the dark night of December 31, 1967. It should
be noted that Cadiz City is 65 kms. away from Bacolod
City, the capital of the province. Because of that
undeniably biased ocular inspection, the honorable trial
judge, who is reputed to be brilliant, issued a reckless,
extremely senseless and stupid order dated 5 September
1968, to wit:
The parties are notified that the Court intends to take
judicial notice that the Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy
Compound in Cadiz City is the hub of a large fishing
industry during industry operating in the Visayas; that
the said compound is only about 500 meters away from
the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz; and that the
neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated.
SO ORDERED. —
which Order, as any student of law would tell you, is null
and void, and illegal per se. Why respondent Honorable
Judge went out of his way to gather those immaterial
and "fabricated" evidence in favor of the accused is
shocking to the conscience. To say the least, it is gross
ignorance of the law. Why did respondent judge show
his hand unnecessarily and prematurely? Perhaps, a
psychologist or a psychiatrist would explain that the
Order of September 5th is that of an anguished mind; an
Order issued by a Judge who for the first time had to
violate his oath of office; by a judge who, due to political
pressure and against his will and better judgment, had to
acquit councilor Carlos Caramonte of the municipality of
Bantayan, province of Cebu. Like an amateur murderer
respondent judge left telltale clues all around. A
murderer, however, may have a strong motive. But what
of a judge who knowingly commits a "revolting injustice"
or through gross ignorance of the law?
It could be gleaned from a careful perusal of the
complaint that complainants bemoaned the fact that the
respondent Judge conducted a "secret ocular
inspection" of the poblacion of the City of Cadiz at about
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |91
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon Sunday, August 11, 1968,
without anybody to guide him, less in the presence of
the prosecution and concluded that such alleged secret
ocular inspection was the basis of the Order of
September 5, 1968. A painstaking scrutiny of the records
as well as the evidence presented by the parties does
not show any concrete proof that respondent Judge did
conduct a "secret ocular inspection" of the poblacion of
the City of Cadiz as seriously charge by the
complainants. In fact, the lone witness presented by the
complainants in this case did not even make an
insinuation supporting such serious allegation of said
complainants. The fact is, from the order of September 5,
1968, the respondent Judge took judicial notice "that the
Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy Compound in Cadiz City is the
hub of a large fishing industry operating in the Visayas;
that the said compound is only about 500 meters away
from the Police Station and the City Hall in Cadiz; and
that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-populated.
Nowhere therefrom could it be deduced that respondent
Judge took judicial notice of these facts by virtue of an
ocular inspection he conducted on the date alleged by
the complainants.
In any event, there is likewise nothing in the record to
support the charge of the complainants that the order of
September 5, 1968, was made by the respondent Judge
as the sole basis for the acquittal of Carlos Caramonte.
In fact, the decision of the respondent Judge shows that
in rendering judgment of acquittal in the case before
him, said respondent entertained serious doubts as to
the guilt of Caramonte because of the failure of anyone
— in the Chua and in the Uy households, the security
guards, the policemen who engaged the robbers in battle
— to identify Caramonte as one of the participants in the
alleged crime. Thus, the decision pertinently reads:
Is Caramonte guilty?
In spite of the admission of Caramonte's Exh. C and the
damaging inferences derived from his staying from the
ceremony when the newly-elected officials of Bantayan
were inducted into office, there is doubt in the mind of
the Court as to his actual participation in then bold raid
in Cadiz City on December 31, 1967, because of the
failure of anyone — the adults and the children in the
Chua and in the Uy households, the security guards, the
policemen who engaged the robbers in battle — to say
on the stand that Caramonte was indeed one of the
robbers.
The Uy spouses and Mateo Chua all took the stand. They
and the other members of the household were tied up by
the robbers, who then ransacked the two houses for
about an hour. Thereafter, some of them were taken to
the seashore to prevent the police from firing on the
retreating robbers:
Mateo Chua said at the trial:
Q — At about 9:30 in the evening of Dec. 31, 1967, where
were you?
A — I was in my house.
Q — Do you remember anything unusual that happened
that evening in
your house?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — Please tell the Court what happened?
A — Several men, pirates, came up my house and broke
into my house.
Q — About what time did you notice those pirates forced
themselves
inside your residence?
A — Between 9:30 and 10:00 that evening.
Q — What was the first thing you noticed when the
pirates as you said
arrived?
A — I was about to sleep when they came up, three of
them went
straight up my house.
Q — How many floors has your house?
A — Two floors.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — What did the robbers do when they came up your
house?
A — They hogtied me and made me lie flat on the floor
face down.
Q — At that time were not your family inside your
house?
A — Yes, sir, my children and my wife.
Q — What did the robbers do with your wife and
children?
A — Because I was hogtied and was lying flat on the
floor face down, I
cannot tell what did they do to my wife and children.
Q — What did the robbers do in your house?
A — They ransacked my house.
Q — How many minutes did the armed robbers stay pin
your house?
A — Almost one hour.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — After nearly one hour, did the robbers who came up
your house leave?
A — I don't know because I was lying flat on the floor.
Q — How did they come out, you cannot tell?
A — No, sir.
Q — Who untied you that evening?
A — My son untied me after the men left.
Court —
This witness did not identify any of the accused?
Fiscal —
No, Your Honor.
On her part, Mrs. Ong Sy San (wife of Uy) related on the
witness stand that:
Q — Please tell the Court what unusual thing happened
that evening
in your house?
A — The robbers broke into our house.
Q — More or less, how many robbers broke into your
house that evening of
Dec. 31, 1967?
A — About four or five.
Q — Were they armed?
A — Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — After the four or five persons fired their shots inside
your house, what did
they do?
A — We were downstairs when they broke into our
house, using the axe at the
door and then after entering the first floor they went up.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — Can you identify any of the robbers that came up
your house from among
the accused in courtroom?
A — I cannot, because I was frightened, I did not have a
chance to look at them.
The bold assault did not take place in absolute darkness.
Why could no one in the Chua and Uy households say
that Carlos Caramonte was one of the team of robbers?
The police battled with the raiders from a distance of
about 60 meters, according to Patrolman Armando
Maravilla. Two security guards employed by Uy
(Placencia and Giducos) remained with the besieged
families thru the raid.
Security Guard Elias Giducos gave this testimony:
Q — At about 10:00 o'clock of that same evening of
December 31, 1967, do you remember if there was
anything unusual that happened?
A — Yes, sir.
Q — What was that which happened?
A — At about that time we heard a voice of a man and
woman and they asked us where we were guarding.
Q — What did you answer?
A — At that time we were on duty at the gate of the
house of Mateo Chua and then we heard the voice of a
man and a woman.
Q — After you heard those voices of a man and a
woman, what happened?
A — Then we were told not to go to the seashore
because there were armed men.
Q — What did you do after hearing that?
A — My companion Antonio Placencia called me
because he was the one who had talked to those
persons. He told me not to go to the seashore because
there were armed men there.
Q — What did you do after that?
A — My companion also suggested that we better call
the Police Department by telephone because that was
already 10:50 in the evening.
Q — Were you able to call the Police Department by
telephone?
A — We went to the house of Erning Tan because there
is a telephone there connected with the Police
Department and the stand is also at the window
overlooking the Caltex Station. So Antonio Placencia
told me to call the Police Department and tell them that
there are armed men in the seashore.
Q — What did you do after that?
A — Then we saw Erning Tan entered his store to use
the telephone and then we saw Antonio (Kaya) Uy on the
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |92
other side so we went to him and told him that there
were armed men in the seashore and Antonio Uy told us.
"If anything happen don't resist because my children
might be hit."
xxx xxx xxx
Q — So what did you do after that?
A — Because there was a policeman there, we asked him
where our companion security guard was.
Q — And what was his answer?
A — The policeman informed us that he did not report for
duty and that it was Guarino who reported for duty that
evening.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — When you went down, what happened?
A — When I went down, Antonio Uy saw me so he
reprimanded me. He said, "Why are you walking there?
Come up."
Q — And then you obeyed his order? You came up.
A — Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — What did Kaya Uy do when he heard the news?
A — Our employer Antonio Uy told us not to resist. He
said, "If they want to get something, just allow them to
get it."
Q — What happened after that?
A — Because we were there with him, we went to office
to hide.
Q — Did you notice anything while you were hiding
there?
A — Yes, sir, we heard something.
Q — What did you hear?
A — We heard several shots.
xxx xxx xxx
Q — After the shots lasted, where did you go?
A — After the shooting stopped, the mother of Antonio
Uy came to him and informed Mr. Uy that his wife was
brought along by the armed men.
Q — What did Mr. Uy do because you were there.
A — He went down and returned to his own house.
Q — When Mr. Uy went down and returned to his own
house, what did you do?
A — I followed him.
Q — Where did you go?
A — To his house and I called the rest of the guards.
Q — Were you able to reach his house?
A — Yes, sir. —
which indicates that many people in the compound must
or could have seen some or all of the robbers — and no
one could say that Caramonte was one of them.
The Court takes notice that the Uy Chua compound is
the hub of a large fishing industry, and is located barely
500 meters from the Cadiz police station and City Hall.
Also that there are many houses in the neighborhood.
Under the circumstances, the failure of anyone —
members of the Chua and Uy households, the security
guards and other employees of the fishing business, the
police, the neighbors — to perceive the presence of
Caramonte at the time of the attack raises doubts as to
his participation therein. (Decision, pp. 12-16).
Be that as it may, under Section 173 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the grounds for removal of a judge
of first instance are (1) serious misconduct and (2)
inefficiency. For serious misconduct to exist, there must
be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to
violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules. (In re Impeachment of Hon. Antonio
Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212). In the case at bar, there has
been no proof that in issuing the order of September 5,
1968 (Exh. B), and in rendering a judgment of acquittal
the respondent Judge was inspired by a dishonest or
corrupt intention which prompted him to violate the law
or to disregard well-known legal rules. In fact, in spite of
the biting language of the complainants in their
complaint and in their memorandum, they admit that the
respondent Judge is not dishonest as far as they know.
Of course, there has been an insinuation that
"respondent Judge prostituted this Court and acquitted,
obviously in bad faith, Councilor Caramonte of
Bantayan, province of Cebu, in all likelihood because of
the dirty hands of power politics." Inasmuch as
proceedings against judges as the case at bar, have
been said to be governed by the rules of law applicable
to penal cases, the charges must, therefore, be proved
beyond reasonable doubt (In re Horrilleno, supra), and it
is incumbent upon the complainants to prove their case
not by a preponderance of evidence but beyond a
reasonable doubt, and in this venture, it is believed they
failed. There is, indeed, a paucity of proof that
respondent Judge has acted partially, or maliciously, or
corruptly, or arbitrarily or oppressively.
xxx xxx xxx
In issuing the order of Sept. 5, 1968, respondent Judge
as stated in his answer, was guided by the Model Code
of Evidence cited by Chief Justice Moran in his
Comments on the Rules of Court. Whether in taking
judicial notice of the facts stated in the order of
September 5, 1968, respondent Judge erred or not, it is
believed, this is not the proper forum to dwell on the
matter. Since this is an administrative case against him
the controlling factor should be the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of such
order — whether in doing so the respondent Judge was
arbitrary, corrupt, partial, or oppressive. As heretofore
stated, the undersigned finds no proof beyond
reasonable doubt along that line.
Furthermore, it appears from the record that the Office of
the City Fiscal received a copy of the Order of September
5, 1968 on September 13, 1968. If it were true as alleged
by the complainants that the issuance of such order was
and that the matters taken judicial notice of therein were
wrong, it behooves upon Fiscal Zulueta, as the
prosecutor of the case, to seek for the reconsideration of
such order and at the same time to invite the attention of
the court to the alleged errors, if there were any. But as
the records show, the prosecution in the said case did
not take any steps — from September 13 to September
21, or a span of eight — to protect the interests of the
State against what complainants herein term to be an
"illegality." Of course, the complainants herein lean on
the argument that —
Fiscal Zulueta —
Because if I do that, Your Honor, respondent Judge
would realize his mistake which we believe malicious (p.
29, t.s.n.).
It may be pertinent to state at this juncture, that this
attitude of the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 690 does
appear to be commendable. A prosecutor should lay the
court fairly and fully every fact and circumstance known
to him to exist, without regard to whether such fact tends
to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused
(Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 123) and to this
may be added without regard to any personal conviction
or presumption of what the Judge may do or is disposed
to do. Prosecuting officer presumed to be men learned in
the law, of a high character, and to perform their duties
impartially and with but one object in view, that being
that justice may be meted out to all violators of the law
and that no innocent man be punished (Malcolm, p. 124).
In the pursuit of that solemn obligation, therefore,
personal conviction should be ignored lest it may lead to
a sacrifice of the purpose sought to be achieved.
Fortunately, in Criminal Case No. 690, the very witness of
the complainants affirmed the correctness of the matters
taken judicial notice of by the respondent Judge. Thus,
Mr. Agustin Javier, lone witness for the complainants,
testified —
Atty. Aquino —
Q — When Fiscal Zulueta on September 13, 1968 showed
you that order of Judge Climaco wherein he stated that
he was taking judicial notice that Mateo Chua-Antonio Uy
Compound in Cadiz City is a hub of a large fishing
industry operating in the Visayas; that said compound is
only a five hundred (500) meters from the City Hall in
Cadiz and that the neighborhood is well-lighted and well-
populated, after reading that order, did you make any
comment to Fiscal Zulueta?
A — No, sir.
Q — But the statements here in the order are true?
A — Yes, you mean the "Uy-Chua Compound"?
Q — I mean the statements in the order are true?
A — Yes, sir. (pp. 64-65, t.s.n.)
The charges impute upon respondent (a) dereliction of
duty or misconduct in office ( prevaricacion), which
contemplates the rendition of an unjust judgment
knowingly, and/or in (b) rendering a manifestly unjust
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |93
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance.
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond
doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law
or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice. "Es tan preciso," commented Viada, "que la
falta se cometa a sabiendas, esto es, con malicia, con
voluntad reflexiva, que en cada de uno de estos articulos
vemos consignada dicha expresion para que por nadie y
en ningun caso se confunda la falta de justicia producida
por ignorancia, la preocupacion o el error, con la que
solo inspira la enemistad, el odio o cualquiera otra
pasion bastarda y corrompida. Esta es
la prevaricacion verdadera."1
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of a manifestly unjust
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance,
it must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has
acted without malice, he failed to observe in the performance
of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law is
entitled to exact in the rendering of any public
service.2 Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation.3 Inexcusable mistake only exists in
the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is
to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, in the contrary it
results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal
precept.4
It is also well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to
exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally, for
any error he commits, provided he acts in good faith.
From a review of the record, We find that the decision
respondent contains clearly and distinctly the facts and law
on which it is based. We cannot conclude on the basis
thereof that respondent has knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment, much less could it be held that respondent in the
performance of his duty has failed to observe the diligence,
prudence and care required by law.
As noted in the aforecited report, the Acting City Fiscal of
Cadiz had employed offensive and abusive language his
complaint and memorandum. It bears emphasis that the use
in pleadings of language disrespectful to the court or
containing offensive personalities serves no useful purpose
and on the contrary constitutes direct contempt. 5
We must repeat what this Court thru Justice Sanchez stated
in an earlier case:6
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself,
an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
(People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855.). His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice." (In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602.).
Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity
of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people." (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p.
160.).
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[as] an officer of the
court, it is his own and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
(People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580.).
... It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession."
(5 Martin, op. cit., p. 97.). It is Sotto's duty as a member of
the Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause
with which he is charged." (Section 20 (f), Rule 138, Rules of
Court.).
We have analyzed the facts, and there is nothing on the
basis thereof which would in any manner justify their
inclusion in the pleadings.
WHEREFORE, respondent judge is hereby exonerated of the
aforestated charges. Acting City Fiscal Norberto L. Zulueta,
of Cadiz City, is, nevertheless, censured for his use of
offensive and abusive language in the complaint and other
pleadings filed with this Court, with a warning that repetition
of the same may constrain Us to impose a more severe
sanction.
A.M. No. 227-RTJ October 13, 1986
GREGORIO R. ABAD, complainant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO BLEZA, respondent.
A.M. No. R-561-RTJ October 13, 1986
CRISANTO P. CRUZ, complainant,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ILDEFONSO M. BLEZA, RTC of Bacoor,
Cavite, respondent.
A.M. No. 5249-RET October 13, 1986
Application for Disability Retirement.
Judge ILDEFONSO M. BLEZA, applicant.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Two administrative cases were filed against Judge Ildefonso
Bleza of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor,
Cavite, the first when he was contemplating optional
retirement due to poor health and the second, after he had
filed his application. Bleza's entitlement to disability
retirement benefits depends on the resolution of these cases.
On October 15, 1984, Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio Abad of
the Philippine Constabulary charged Judge Bleza with
rendering a decision with malice, ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, and misconduct as a judge. The
complaint is docketed as Adm. Case No. R-227-RTJ.
After a cockfight held at the Imus, Cavite cockpit on July 19,
1981, complainant Abad and one Potenciano Ponce had a
verbal tussle which culminated in Abad's being shot in the
chest by Francisco Sabater, Jr., an alleged bodyguard of
Ponce. Sabater, was charged with frustrated homicide and
Potenciano Ponce with attempted homicide before the
Regional Trial Court where the respondent presides.
The prosecution alleged that during the aforementioned
cockfight, Abad's gamecock lost to the one owned by Ponce.
A remark by Ponce that complainant's cock was weak and
lacked more care (mahina, kulang sa alaga) led to a heated
argument between the two but they were pacified by certain
local officials Abad then went to the cockpit carinderia to take
a snack. Ponce followed him shouting, "Where is the Colonel,
walang Colonel Colonel sa akin, papatayin ko yan, babarilin
ko yan." As Ponce was approaching and holding a gun aimed
at Abad, the latter grabbed a glass and hurled it at Ponce
who was hit at the head, causing him to fall down in a sitting
position. While thus seated, Ponce's gun was taken by his
bodyguard, Francisco Sabater. Jr. Abad was then advised by
a certain Captain Diaz to go home. Outside the cockpit gate,
bodyguards of Ponce approached Abad and engaged him in
a fistfight. At this juncture, Francisco Sabater, Jr., upon the
order of Ponce, fired six (6) shots at Abad, the last one hitting
him on the chest, the slug exiting at the back of his right
shoulder. Abad was rushed to the Cavite Medical Center in
Cavite City where he underwent an operation. On the 4th day
he was transferred to the V. Luna Hospital at Quezon City
where he was again operated on-to remove the slug
imbedded in his back. He stayed in the hospital for 123 days.
Sabater and Ponce presented a contrary version of the
incident.
Potenciano Ponce testified that on his way out of the cockpit,
Abad uttered obscenities against him which he answered in
kind. However, common friends like Mayor Jamir of Imus,
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |94
Barangay Captain Enrique Diaz, and Cavite City Fiscal
Gabriel pacified them. After cooling off, Ponce decided to go
home but on his way out of the main gate of the cockpit,
Abad, who was drinking beer at a carinderia, hurled
invectives at him. Ponce then approached Abad to ask for an
explanation. Abad hit him on the forehead with a bottle of
beer causing him to fall down unconscious. Upon regaining
consciousness, he was brought to the Cavite Medical Center.
Ponce denied having aimed his gun at Abad, insisting that his
gun was never taken out of its holster. He also contradicted
the testimony of Abad that his permit to carry his firearm
outside of his residence was no longer valid on July 19, 1981,
stressing that his permit expired on November 18, 1981.
Francisco Sabater, Jr. testified that he was at the cockpit that
same afternoon as a bet taker or casador. He declared that
at about 5:30 in that afternoon, he heard Abad utter the
following words at Ponce: "Putang-ina mo, Pare pipilipitin ko
ang leeg mo." Ponce reacted by approaching Abad who then
took hold of a beer bottle from the table and hurled it at
Ponce hitting him on the forehead. Ponce fell down.
Thereupon, Francisco Sabater, Jr., took the gun of Ponce
and as Abad refused to be pacified, he went outside the
cockpit and fired the gun five (5) times upwards to call the
attention of the authorities. When Abad approached him,
holding a broken bottle of beer and tried to stab him with it,
he was forced in self-defense to fire the gun at Abad who
was hit on the chest.
On August 11, 1984, the respondent judge promulgated his
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. B-82-119,
entitled People v. Pontenciano Ponce y Dayacap, for
Attempted Homicide, said accused is hereby ACQUITTED for
insuffiency of evidence, with cost de oficio. The case bond
posted in his favor is ordered reimbursed to him by the
Municipal Treasurer of Bacoor, Cavite.
In Criminal Case No. B-82-57, entitled People v. Francisco
Sabater, Jr. for Frustrated Homicide, said accused is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
Frustrated Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 250
of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense and without
any intention to kill the victim, without any aggravating
circumstances to offset the same and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as amended, he is sentenced to
suffer imprisonment ranging from four (4) months and twenty
(20) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, and to indemnify the
victim the sum of P9,750.00 for medical and hospital
expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the cost.
It is this decision which forms the basis of Abad's complaint.
On August 23, 1985, we referred this case to Associate
Justice Santiago Kapunan of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court for investigation and recommendation. The
investigating Justice submitted the following
recommendation:
Coming to the question of respondent's culpability of the
charges thus levelled against him on the basis of the facts,
the arguments and the applicable provisions of law, it
appears inescapable that respondent has not committed any
wrongdoing to evoke disciplinary action in acquitting Ponce of
attempted homicide. The ground for acquittal was
insufficiency of evidence due to inconsistencies of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which he
specifically pointed out in the decision. In addition,
respondent found that Ponce never pulled the gun tucked at
his waist during the incident, although prosecution witnesses
testified otherwise. In the face of conflicting evidence, it is
difficult to impute dishonesty and unfairness to respondent in
arriving at his conclusion as to which side told the truth. And
even if he made an error in his perception of the facts as he
saw them, it cannot be justly presumed that he did it in bad
faith or with malicious intent. For not every error or mistake of
a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable
therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that
he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position unbearable. (Dizon v. De Borja, G.R.
Adm. Case No. 163-J, Jan. 28, 1971; Gamo v. Cruz, G.R.
Adm. Matter No. 467-NJ, October 22, 1975; Rodrigo v.
Quijano, G.R. Adm. Matter No. 731-MJ, Sept 9, 1977; Sec. of
Justice v. Marcos, G.R. Adm. Matter No, 207-J April 22,
1977). For no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law can be infallible in his judgment (Paulino v. Guevarra,
G.R. Adm. Matter No. 584-CJ, March 30, 1977; Lopez v.
Corpuz, G.R. Adm. Matter No. 425-MJ, Aug. 31, 1977).
Indeed, assuming that Ponce really pulled out his gun and
pointed it at Abad as he approached him, it would not be
easy to fault respondent's reasoning that Ponce had ample
opportunity to fire the gun at the victim if he had the intention
to kill him. All what Ponce had to do was to press the trigger
while Abad was about to hurl the bottle, or glass at him. On
this point, Justice Luis B. Reyes' Revised Penal Code (p.
100, 1981 ed) has this to say:
To constitute attempted homicide the person using a firearm
must fire the same, with intent to kill at the offended party,
without however inflicting a mortal wound on the latter.
On the matter of the non-imposition by respondent of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the decision
did not mete out the penalty of fine on Sabater. There being
none, subsidiary imprisonment could not have been imposed,
pursuant to Art. 39 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent, however, was in error in appreciating as a
mitigating circumstance "lack of intention to kill the victim" in
fixing the penalty imposed on Sabater.
xxx xxx xxx
The kind of weapon used by Sabater which was a .38
revolver and the location of the wound of Abad would
undoubtedly give the presumption that Sabater had the intent
to kill and which inevitably led respondent to convict him of
the crime of frustrated. For in attempted/frustrated homicide
the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is
no intent to kill on the part of the offender he is only liable for
physical injuries. Therefore, the fact alone that respondent
found Sabater guilty of the crime of frustrated homicide would
prove that he had no doubt in his mind that Sabater had the
intent to kill Abad. Respondent's appreciation as mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater is
palpably out of place. Presumably, what respondent had in
mind was to consider the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
under Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is different
from lack of intention to kill.
It is believed that while respondent committed an error thus
described, the same was done without malice or deliberate
intent to perpetrate an injustice. But in any case, there was
negligence for which he should be reprimanded.
ACCORDINGLY, the undersigned recommends that
respondent be reprimanded, with warning that a similar
transgression in the future will be more severely dealt with.
The recommendation is well taken although the reprimand
may be dispensed with considering the respondent's poor
health and his impending retirement.
As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous (Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619).
However, while judges should not be disciplined for
inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or
errors of judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they should
be conversant with basic legal principles (Ubongon v. Mayo,
99 SCRA 30) They are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes (Aducayen v. Flores, 51
SCRA 78) and to keep themselves abreast of the latest laws,
rulings and jurisprudence affecting their jurisdiction (Vasquez
v. Malvar, 85 SCRA 10).
In the case of Ajeno v. Inserto (71 SCRA 166, 172), this
Court held that: ... Even in the remaining years of his stay in
the judiciary, he should keep abreast with the changes in the
law and with the latest decisions and precedents. Although a
judge is nearing retirement, he should not relax in his study of
the law and court decisions. Service in the judiciary means a
continuous study and research on the law from beginning to
end...
The records fail to show malice, ill-will or even bias on the
part of respondent judge. His decision pointed out, one by
one, the glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution's evidence
which led to the exculpation of defendant Ponce. In Pabalan
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |95
v. Guevarra (74 SCRA 53, 58), this Court held that ... Even
on the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the
appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively
or civilly liable for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot
be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in
the exercise of his judicial function however erroneous...
The second case docketed as Administrative Matter No.
R561-RTJ was filed by Crisanto P. Cruz on December 11,
1985, against Bleza for knowingly rendering a wrong
judgment. This case originated from the decision in an action
for damages filed by one Pacifico Ocampo against
complainant Cruz.
Pacifico Ocampo alleged in the damage suit that on April 16,
1984, he filed with the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA) an administrative complaint against a certain Ricardo
F. Ortiz; that complainant Cruz persuaded Him to withdraw
the complaint with a threat that if he would not withdraw the
same, Cruz will cause his dismissal from the Fire and Rescue
Division of the MIAA; that because he did not accede to Cruz'
demand, the latter filed against him an administrative case for
inefficiency and serious neglect of duty, insubordination,
absenteeism, and habitual tardiness; that because of that
baseless complaint, he has suffered embarrassment, mental
shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and loss of appetite. In his
answer, Cruz denied knowledge of the administrative case
between Pacifico Ocampo and Ricardo Ortiz and averred that
Ocampo's inefficiency, absenteeism, and tardiness are
substantiated by company records.
After trial, the respondent judge ruled in favor of Pacifico
Ocampo. He ordered complainant Cruz to pay Ocampo the
sum of P150,000.00 for moral damages, P30,000.00 for
examplary damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees.
The administrative complaint filed by Cruz alleged that the
respondent judge disregarded the defendant's
incontrovertible evidence and knowingly rendered a wrong
judgment against him.
In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the
decision, subject matter of this case, is pending appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. This allegation was
not refuted by the complainant. Thus, any action we can take
in this case would be premature. For only after the appellate
court holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's alleged
errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith may a
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled
against him. This is the pronouncement of this Court in
several cases (See Garcia v. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta.
Maria v. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; and Gahol v. Riodique, 64
SCRA 494). In the meantime, the presumption is that official
duty was regularly performed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
administrative cases are hereby, DISMISSED. The
recommendation dated June 6, 1984 submitted by the Court
Administrator that the respondent judge be retired from office
due to hypertensive heart disease and congestive heart
failure with cardiomegally (enlarged left ventricle) under
Permanent Total Disability, as endorsed by Dr. Antonio
Valero of this Court, is hereby APPROVED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138 August 5, 2009
OLGA M. SAMSON, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and
falsification of a public document against respondent Judge
Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.
In her complaint,1 complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that
respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been
appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional
qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence2, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any
applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.3
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC
interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had
pending administrative charges against him.
She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of
Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and
administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of
Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in
the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003.
At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly
committed certain improprieties4 and exceeded his powers by
overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he
conducted.
On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the
charges.5 It also denied the complainant’s motion for
reconsideration.6
Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review7 on
October 28, 2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a
decision8 dated November 25, 2005, the appellate court held
that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges
against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to
criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way
of a petition for certiorari.9 As to the administrative aspect,
the CA reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of
the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent.
The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the
administrative charges against respondent.
While the complainant’s petition was pending in the CA,
respondent was interviewed several times in the JBC from
February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge.
On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC, Branch
30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The complainant charged
that respondent never informed the JBC of his pending
cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to be
nominated and, subsequently, appointed.
In his comment,10 respondent admitted that complainant had
lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the
Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already
dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and
executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman.
Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him
during his interviews in the JBC from February to August
2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his
nomination to and assumption of the position of judge.
However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said
cases.
The complainant filed a reply,11 stating that the March 24,
2004 decision of the Ombudsman was not yet final and
executory as it was timely appealed by way of a petition for
review filed on October 28, 2004 in the CA. In fact, the
petition was even granted.
To further support her charge of dishonesty against
respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of
Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator
(OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division.12 According to her,
respondent categorically denied ever having been
charged formally with any infraction.
On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by
both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively
liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document
for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended
respondent’s dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government service.
We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is
guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld
information from the JBC, as both he and complainant never
backed their respective allegations with concrete
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |96
evidence.13 Thus, no probative value can be given either to
the charges or to the defenses.
However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of
the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his
pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he
committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating
"No" to the question "Have you ever been formally charged?"
in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC
Personnel.14
Respondent’s act of making an obviously false statement in
his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere
inadvertence on his part when he answered "No" to that very
simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the
question called for and what it meant, and that he was
committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it
anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle
his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges
against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative
answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges
were already dismissed was immaterial, given the
phraseology of the question "Have you ever been formally
charged?," meaning, charged at anytime in the past or
present.
In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,15 we held that the making of
untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the
nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully
well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could
subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to
evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former
public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure
that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the
letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable.
There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental
qualification of a member of the judiciary.
Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should
conduct himself in a manner which merits the respect and
confidence of the people at all times, for he is the visible
representation of the law.16 Regrettably, we are convinced of
respondent’s capacity to lie and evade the truth. His
dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the image of the
judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for what he did
as he sees nothing wrong with it.
He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service.
This administrative case against respondent shall also be
considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a
member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-
SC.17 This resolution, entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of
Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such
Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar," provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are
based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the
disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the
Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized
as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in
both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and
disbarment cases against members of the bar who were
likewise members of the court were treated
separately.18 However, pursuant to the new rule, an
administrative case against a judge of a regular court based
on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action
against members of the Bar shall be automatically
considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as
a member of the Bar.19
This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of
judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a
breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR):20
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION…
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND
GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for
membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also
reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys
the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a
lawyer.21 In this particular case, respondent’s dishonest act
was against the lawyer’s oath to "do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court."
Respondent’s misconduct likewise constituted a
contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit,
otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC in a plethora of cases.22 Of particular importance
to this case is our decision in Cañada v. Suerte23 where we
applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic
disbarment.1avvphi1
In Cañada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge
Suerte with grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct,
grave coercion, dishonesty, harassment, oppression and
violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged, among
others, that respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-
up truck and Daewoo car to complainant. The latter refused.
Their friendship later on turned sour when they failed to reach
an agreement on the commission respondent was supposed
to receive as agent-broker for the contemplated sale of
complainant’s beach lot. The complainant voiced out his fear
that respondent would use his judicial power to persecute
PALE JUS SUSP DISC |97
him for what respondent may have perceived as Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons
complainant’s infractions against him. 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from
In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the the Roll of Attorneys.
vehicles to complainant since, according to him, he never
owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck nor could he recall if Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondent’s
he had a Daewoo car in 1998. records in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
However, a perusal of respondent’s Statements of Assets on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
and Liabilities for the years 1998-2001 revealed that among courts in the country.
his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996
and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we SO ORDERED.
found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely
denied that he ever owned the aforementioned vehicles. For
his infraction, respondent judge was fined in the amount of
₱40,000. He would have been dismissed from the service
were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed
therefrom because of an earlier case.24

Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed

respondent Judge Suerte’s administrative case as
disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well, and
proceeded to strip him of his membership in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be

required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule does
not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable
as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to
comment on and show cause why he should not be
disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order
for him to comment on why he should not be held
administratively liable as a member of the bench. 25 In other
words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to
give an explanation on why he should not be held
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but
also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable
meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases
against justices and judges26 to disciplinary proceedings
against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary
replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint
filed against a member of the bench27 also as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the
rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar
is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative
case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of
Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or
second-level court.28

It cannot be denied that respondent’s dishonesty did not only

affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral
character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue
in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is
not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.29If the practice
of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its
basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also accord
continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral
character is of much greater import, as far as the general
public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning.30

A parting word.

The first step towards the successful implementation of the

Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit
members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition
of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is
extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible
representation of the law, they should set a good example to
the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of
integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than
that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives
them the right to judge.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G.

Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30,
Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of
an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except
accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment
in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

PALE JUS SUSP DISC |98