54. Iglesia Filipina Independiente vs. Heirs of Bernardino Taeza, G.R. No.

179597, February 3,
2014.
FACTS
 Iglesia Filipina Independiente was the owner of a parcel of land situated at Cagayan. The said
lot is subdivided into 4: A, B, C & D
 Between 1973 and 1974, Iglesia, through its then Supreme Bishop Rev. Macario Ga, sold Lot
D to Bienvenido de Guzman
 Lots A & B were likewise sold to to the defendant Bernardino Taeza

 In 1977, a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Sale was filed by the Parish Council of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan against their Supreme Bishop Macario Ga and the defendant Taeza
 Complaint was dismissed

 After the expiration of Rev. Macario Ga's term of office, Bishop Abdias dela Cruz was elected
as the Supreme Bishop.
 Thereafter, an action for the declaration of nullity of the elections was filed by Rev. Ga, with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

 SEC issued an order resolving the leadership issue of the IFI against Rev. Macario Ga.
 Taeza then registered the subject parcels of land and acquired TCT
 Taeza occupied a portion of the land. Iglesia demanded to vacate which he failed to do

 In 1990, a complaint for annulment of sale was again filed by IFI against Taeza.
 RTC ruled in favor of IFI and held that the deed of sale is null and void

Petitioner IFI:
 There was no consent to the contract of sale as Supreme Bishop Rev. Ga had no authority to
give such consent. (Article IV (a) of their Canons: "All real properties of the Church located or
situated in such parish can be disposed of only with the approval and conformity of the
laymen's committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop, with sanction of the Supreme
Council, and finally with the approval of the Supreme Bishop, as administrator of all the
temporalities of the Church.")
 the laymen's committee indeed made objection to the sale
 if the contract is not declared null and void, it should be found unenforceable, as the approval
and conformity of the other entities in their church was not obtained, as required by their
Canons.
ISSUE/S
 Whether or not the deed of sale is null and void or unenforceable - UNENFORCEABLE
RULING
 when the Supreme Bishop executed the contract of sale of petitioner's lot despite the
opposition made by the laymen's committee, he acted beyond his powers
 Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers

 Although Bernardino Taeza had already obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name
over the property in question, since the person supposedly transferring ownership was not
authorized to do so, the property had evidently been acquired by mistake.
55. Anthony Orduña, et al. vs. Eduardo J. Fuentebella, et al., G.R. No. 176841, June 29, 2010.

FACTS
 Armando Gabriel, Sr. was the registered owner of a residential lot located in Baguio City.
 Sometime in 1996, Gabriel Sr. sold the subject lot to petitioner Antonita Ordua, but no formal
deed was executed to document the sale.
 The contract price was apparently payable in installments as Antonita remitted from time to
time and Gabriel Sr. accepted partial payments.
 Gabriel Sr. agreed to execute a final deed of sale upon full payment of the purchase price.

 As early as 1979, Antonita and her sons, Dennis and Anthony Ordua, were already occupying
the subject lot and even constructed their house thereon.
 They also paid real property taxes

 After the death of Gabriel Sr., his son Gabriel Jr., secured TCT over the subject lot and
continued accepting payments from the Orduas.
 Gabriel Jr. wrote Antonita authorizing her to fence off the said lot and to construct a road in
the adjacent lot.
 Gabriel Jr. acknowledged that petitioner had so far made an aggregate payment of PhP
65,000, leaving an outstanding balance of PhP 60,000.

 Despite all the payments made, Gabriel Jr. sold the lot to Bernard Banta without the
knowledge of petitioners.
 Subsequently, Bernard sold to the Marcos and Benjamin Cid the subject lot
 Marcos and Benjamin, in turn, ceded the subject lot to Eduardo Fuentabella through a Deed
of Absolute Sale
 Eduardo then sent a letter to Gabriel Jr. demanding to vacate the premises
ISSUE/S
 whether or not the sale of the subject lot by Gabriel Sr. to Antonita is unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds – NO, enforceable
 whether the instant action has already prescribed - NO
RULING
Statute of Frauds Inapplicable to Partially Executed Contracts
 Gabriel Sr. appeared to have been a recipient of some partial payments.
 The Statute of Frauds expressed in Article 1403, par. (2),[29] of the Civil Code applies only to
executory contracts, i.e., those where no performance has yet been made.
 The Statute of Frauds, in context, provides that a contract for the sale of real property or of
an interest therein shall be unenforceable unless the sale or some note or memorandum
thereof is in writing and subscribed by the party or his agent. However, where the verbal
contract of sale has been partially executed through the partial payments made by one party
duly received by the vendor, as in the present case, the contract is taken out of the scope of
the Statute
 a contract that infringes the Statute of Frauds is ratified by the acceptance of benefits under
the contract

Prescription
 The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is 10
years, reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title, if the plaintiff is not in
possession, but imprescriptible if he is in possession of the property.
 Having possession of the subject lot, petitioners right to the reconveyance thereof, and the
annulment of the covering title, has not prescribed or is not time-barred.
 This is so for an action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is
imprescriptible where the suitor is in possession of the property subject of the acts
56. Berg vs. Magdalena Estate, G.R. No. L-3784, October 17, 1952.

FACTS
 This is an action for partition of the property known as Crystal Arcade situated in the City of
Manila.
 The Berg avers that he and respondent Magdalena are co-owners of said property, the former
being the owner of one-third interest and the latter of the remaining two- thirds.
 The plaintiff and defendant are unable to agree upon the management of the property and
upon the partition thereof.

Defendant:
 In 1943, it sold to plaintiff 1/3 of the property subject to the express condition that should
either of them decide to sell his or its undivided share, the party selling would grant to the
other party first an irrevocable option to purchase the same at the seller’s price.
 In 1946, plaintiff fixed the sum of P200,000 as the price of said share and offered to sell it to
defendant, which offer was accepted, and for the payment of said price plaintiff gave
defendant a period of time.
 In spite of its acceptance of the offer, plaintiff refused to accept the payment of the price.
Defendant asks for specific performance.

 when defendant made attempts to prove documents which constitute a written proof
contemplated by said statute.
 under the law known as Trading with the Enemy Act both Berg and Hemady could not sell or
dispose of their properties without first securing the permit required by it, and so to comply
with this requirement, both Berg and Hemady filed separately an application with said
Department for the purchase and sale of the property in litigation
 these documents constitute a sufficient note or memorandum of the parties’ alleged contract
of purchase and sale within the purview of the statute of frauds.

Plaintiff:
 No such note or memorandum has been made evidencing the transaction
 Transaction falls under the statute of frauds and cannot form the basis of the defense
ISSUE/S
 Whether the documents satisfy the requirements of a written instrument/ memorandum?
RULING
 No document has been presented evidencing that alleged agreement to sell
 BUT the documents presented satisfy all the requirements of the statute as to contents and
signature and, as such, they constitute sufficient proof to evidence the agreement in
question.
 "No particular form of language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or
note in writing under the statute of frauds; any document or writing, formal or informal, written
either for the purpose of furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose, which
satisfies all the requirements of the statute as to contents and signature is a sufficient
memorandum or note.