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1) Makati Stock Exchange vs SEC

Makati Exchange Commission (MakEC) filed a review on the resolution issued by the
SEC denying them to operate a stock exchange because the list of securities on its
trading board is already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange (ManEC).

MakEC argued that the Commission has no power to impose it because it is illegal,
discriminatory and unjust.

Under the law, a stock exchange can only do a business in the Ph when it is
previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the
information required by law (Sec. 17, Securities Act/ Commonwealth Act 83). It is
assumed that the Commission may permit registration if this is complied with; if
not, it may refuse.

MakEC is challenging this particular requirement of the Commission (rule against

double listing) may deemed to have shown inability or refusal to abide by its
rules, and thereby given ground for denying registration.


It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are

granted to him by the statute, and these necessarily implied in the exercise

In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no
provision expressly supporting its rule. Nevertheless, it suggests that the power
is "necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it"; but it makes no
explanation, perhaps relying on the reasons advanced in support of its position
that trading of the same securities in two or more stock exchanges, fails to give
protection to the investors, besides contravening public interest.


2) Taule vs Santos
GR No. 90336, August 12, 1991


The Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes convened

in Virac for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.

On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a

letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government,* protesting
the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of
several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. filed his comment
on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities and
denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of
FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting
for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province
being the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes.

Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of

the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V
of the Department of Local Government.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by respondent


The Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving
elective barangay officials is limited to appellate jurisdiction from decisions of
the trial courts. Likewise, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests
over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay composed of
popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted
upon by their respective members. The authority of the COMELEC over the katipunan
ng mga barangay is
limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the
katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own
respective organization.


4) Villaluz vs Zaldivar


Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office

payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.

Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in
1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective
leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of
Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and
ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was
recommended that Villaluz be removed. The President then issued an Administrative
Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no
jurisdiction to remove him.


The Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, being a presidential appointee,

belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as
such he can only be investigated and
removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the
principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be
from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260. Consequently, the Commissioner of Civil
is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against
officials, because his authority to pass upon questions of suspension, separation
removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees
in the
classified service to which classification the administrator does not belong.


Ruiz vs Drilon

On 6 May 1991, President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order ("AO") No. 218
dismissing petitioner Eliseo Ruiz for cause from his office as President of the
Luzon State University ("CLSU").

The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, denied petitioner's

first and second motions for reconsideration there
from, the first for lack of merit and the second for being pro forma.
Consequently, AO No. 218 became final and executory. Petitioner there sought to
annul, as products of grave abuse of discretion,
President Aquino's order dated 13 September 1991 appointing Dr. Fortunato Battad
as the new CLSU President,
as well as DECS Undersecretary Marina Pangan's order dated 24 September 1991
directing petitioner
to turn-over the CLSU Presidency to Dr. Battad.


Petitioner has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or

any act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondents in
the assailed administrative orders.

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of

investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is
only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence made of
and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence
presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees.


Secretary of Justice vs Lantion


The United States Government, on June 17, 1999, through Department of Foreign
Affairs U.
S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the extradition
of Mark
Jimenez, herein private respondent, to the United States. The request was forwarded
following day by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Department of Justice
Pending evaluation of the extradition documents by the DOJ, private respondent
for copies of the ocial extradition request and all pertinent documents and the
holding in
abeyance of the proceedings. When his request was denied for being premature,
respondent resorted to an action for mandamus, certiorari and prohibition. The
trial court
issued an order maintaining and enjoining the DOJ from conducting further
hence, the instant petition.


In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and

evaluation of
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved.

The Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the
sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power
is limited to investigating the facts and making ndings in respect thereto. The
Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication
signies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of the
parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if
agency is not authorized to make a nal pronouncement affecting the parties, then
there is
an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

Pefianco vs Moral


Former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint against respondent Maria
Luisa C. Moral, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National Library for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. library. The DECS Investigating Committee conducted several hearings on
the complaint. On 25 September 1996 Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding
respondent guilty of the charges. She was ordered dismissed from the government
service with
prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her retirement benefits and other

Respondent then filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS Investigation
Committee Report purportedly to "guide [her] on whatever action would be most
appropriate to take under the circumstances." Her petition was, however, denied.
Unfazed, she filed a Reiteration for DECS Committee Report and DECS Resolution
dated September 25, 1996, which Secretary Gloria similarly denied. As earlier
stated, respondent did not appeal the Resolution dated 30 September 1996 dismissing
her from the service.

Meanwhile, Secretary Gloria was replaced by Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco who was
thereafter substituted in the case for Secretary Gloria.


Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the
resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it will serve no useful
now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a copy of the investigation report.

Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to

respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, the Court had
held that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of
the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire
into charges filed against him.
He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence
made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence
presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee.
Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.




The case concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue
warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting
illegal recruitment.

Public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso ordered the seizure of the

and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment by petitioner, Hortencia Salazar. On January 28, 1988,
petitioner request that the personal properties seized at her residence last
January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was
contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Thereafter, before POEA
could answer the letter, petitioner ?led the instant petition; on even date, POEA ?
led a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal.


The Court ruled that it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional
and of no force and effect.


Catura vs CIR

Pablo Catura et al are both holds a position in their employees association in

Philippine Virginia Tobacco. A complaint was filed before the petitioners for the
alleged "unauthorized disbursement of union funds.

Respondents Tabaniag filed a complaint before the Court seeking for an injunction
to prevent now petitioners Pablo Catura who, it turned out, was again elected as
President in an election on from taking his oath of office in view of his alleged
persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as
well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial
transactions of the union. Associate Judge therefore, instead of granting the
injunction sought, limited itself to requiring and directing personally the
respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively,
of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to
deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank
accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related
to the
finances of the said labor union at the hearing of this petition on January 3, 1967
at 9:00
o'clock in the morning. Petitioners therefore filed MR on the ground that the order
was beyond the power of CIR.


The Court ruled the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the
very least, requires
an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be
constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a
failure to
comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the
conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a
statute, in
this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The
was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and
effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is
arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No
showing has been made; no such showing can be made. To repeat, there should be no
question about the correctness of the order herein challenged.


Evangelista vs. Jarencio


The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO), created by

President pursuant to his special powers duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code to forestall nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil
service and
vested with the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of
same Code, issued to respondent Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer
Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at
then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of
obeying the subpoena respondent Manalastas assailed its validity and filed with the
of First Instance of Manila a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of
injunction against the PARGO and/or other persons acting in its behalf from further
subpoenas to respondent. When the respondent court granted the petition, the matter
elevated to the Supreme Court.


The Supreme Court, set respondent court's order aside and held that the disputed
subpoena is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of

investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not
probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not
necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of
violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough
that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.

office of court admin vs Canque


The Court does not agree with the finding of the Ofce of the Court Administrator in
its rst Report dated June 13, 2006
recommending that the Investigation Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set
aside and that the
complaint be investigated anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be
by herself and counsel during the investigation � an omission allegedly amounting
to a
denial of her right to due process. The essence of due process is that a party be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may
have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. 1 31 3 A formal or
hearing is not required.


IN RE: Carmelo Ramos


Rule 64 (Contempt) of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior
courts and does not comprehend
contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies, unless said contempt
is clearly considered and
expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of
the Revised Administrative Code..
One who invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code must first show that
he has authority to
take testimony or evidence before he can apply to the courts


Bedol vs Comelec

The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi judicial
power in pursuit
of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective,
the Task Force conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them
the opportunity to argue and support their respective positions.

In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals
who refuse to appear during a fact-nding investigation, despite a previous notice
order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC's investigative power, which is
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest
credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however
when petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer
questions regarding the various election documents which, he claimed, were stolen
while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could
punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.


Masangkay vs COMELEC


The Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its ministerial functions, such as

the distribution of ballots and
other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities, has no power to
punish for
contempt, because such power is inherently judicial in nature.

The Court also rukled that the Commission, although it cannot be classified as a
court of justice
within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely
administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as
controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction.


Gaoiran vs Alcantara

It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo

was not
concededly verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he
against the petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These
could very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner.
In fact,
this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of,
not only
unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or
for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon
that a
government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its
powers. After all, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
evidence are not strictly applied.

In any case, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the letter-complaint of

Castillejo is not a "complaint" within the purview of the provisions mentioned
above. In the
fairly recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, 1 51 5

this Court held that the "complaint" under E.O. No. 292 and CSC rules on
administrative cases "both refer to the
actual charge to which the person complained of is required to answer and indicate
whether or not he elects a formal investigation should his answer be deemed not



The High Court held that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and
equity and
substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence
may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs.
Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the
Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it,
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
and investigations of an administrative character.