HEIRS OF MADIO V.

HEIRS OF LEUNG
G.R. NO. 169161, AUGUST 17, 2007
FACTS:
On September 9, 1960, Lot No. 8, located in P. Burgos Subdivision, Baguio City
was awarded to Leung as the winning bidder in an auction sale thereof pursuant to his Townsite
Sales Application.

On July 29, 1964, Miguel Madio filed a protest for the cancellation of the Order of Award
in question on the following grounds: (1) They are the claimants of Lot 8, having been in actual,
continuous, open and adverse occupation of the same since 1947;(2) Leung failed to comply with
specific requirements under the award; i.e., he did not introduce any improvement on the lot
since the award was made to him on September 9, 1960;(3) They were never notified previously
that Lot 8 was the subject of public bidding and that the same was awarded to Leung;(4)They
have already built their houses on Lot 8 and made improvements thereon; and (5) Under
Republic Act No. 730, they are entitled to acquire the property.

On October 3, 1974, the Director of Lands informed Madio that his petition could not be
given due course because the controversy over the award of Lot No. 8 to Leung had already been
resolved in the order dated July 13, 1967 of the Regional Director in Dagupan City. However, the
DENR OIC-Secretary invalidated the award and decreed that said lot 8 be sold to Madio instead.
Aggrieved, Leung elevated the case to the Office of the President (OP). However, his appeal was
dismissed in a resolution dated March 12, 1998 on the ground that the memorandum was not
filed on time.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President erred in dismissing Leung’s appeal
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the OP erred in dismissing the case. The finding of
the Court of Appeals that the memorandum was indeed filed on time as shown by the evidence
presented is conclusive. Petitioners file copies of said documents clearly bear stamp markings
indicating receipt by the OP Legal Office. But assuming that the necessary documents were
indeed not filed, the imperatives of fair play would have impelled the OP to ask for an
explanation, instead of proceeding with its outright dismissal action based on technicality, given
that Leung’s case appears to be prima facie meritorious. In this regard, the court quotes with
approval what the CA said: At any rate, assuming that the documents in question were not filed
together with the motion for reconsideration, possibly due to oversight or inadvertence, the OP
would have done well to require the submission of the omitted attachments, instead of out rightly
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Indeed, judicial action by a party-litigant must be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for
him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities.

LAMSIS, ET. AL. V. DONG-E

G.R. NO. 173021, OCTOBER 20, 2010
FACTS:
This case involves a conflict of ownership and possession over an untitled parcel of land located
along Km. 5 Asin Road, Baguio City. While petitioners are the actual occupants of Lot No. 1, respondent
is claiming ownership thereof and is seeking to recover its possession from petitioners. According to
respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E (Margarita), her familys ownership and occupation of Lot No. 1
can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-aps death, the property was
inherited by his children, who obtained a survey plan in 1964 of the 186,090-square meter property,
which included Lot No. 1.
The heirs of Ap-ap then executed, for a P500.00 consideration, a Deed of Quitclaim on February
26, 1964 in favor of their brother Gilbert Semon (Margaritas father). Sometime between 1976 and 1978,
Gilbert Semon together with his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws Manolo Lamsis and Nancy
Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 together with their respective families. When Gilbert
Semon died in 1983, his children extrajudicially partitioned the property among themselves and allotted
Lot No. 1 thereof in favor of Margarita.The state of affairs changed when petitioners Delfin and Agustin
allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject property and selling portions thereof.[16] Delfin
allegedly sold a 400-square meter portion of Lot No. 1 to petitioner Maynard Mondiguing (Maynard)
while Agustin sold another portion to petitioner Jose Valdez (Jose).

Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and damages
against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City. To bolster
her claim of ownership and possession, Margarita introduced as evidence an unnumbered resolution of
the Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), acting favorably on her and her siblings ancestral land claim over a
portion of the 186,090-square meter property.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the ancestral land claim pending before the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) should take precedence over the reivindicatory action

2. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the case in light of the effectivity of
RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 at the time that the complaint
was instituted

HELD:
1. The Court held that a registration proceeding (such as the certification of ancestral lands) is not
a conclusive adjudication of ownership, hence, it will not constitute litis pendentia on a reivindicatory
case where the issue is ownership. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.The third element is missing, for any
judgment in the certification case would not constitute res judicata or be conclusive on the ownership
issue involved in the reivindicatory case. Since there is no litis pendentia, there is no reason for the
reivindicatory case to be suspended or dismissed in favor of the certification case.

Moreover, since there is no litis pendentia, we cannot agree with petitioners contention that
respondent committed forum-shopping. Settled is the rule that forum shopping exists where the elements
of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other.

2. As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings. An
exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a
party from raising the courts lack of jurisdiction. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998,
the IPRA was already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal; instead they filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the value of the property did not meet the jurisdictional value for the
RTC. They obviously neglected to take the IPRA into consideration.
Thus, even assuming arguendo that petitioners theory about the effect of IPRA is correct (a matter which
need not be decided here), they are already barred by laches from raising their jurisdictional objection under the
circumstances.

COLLADO, ET. AL. V. BOCKASANJO, ETC.,

G.R. NO. 107764, OCTOBER 4, 2002
FACTS:
Edna Collado and co- applicants filed with the land registration court for an
application for registration of a parcel of land about 120 hectares. Attached to the
application was the technical description of the lot signed by the Bureau of Lands.
The petitioners alleged that their possession have been open, public, notorious and
in the concept of owners and that they have declared the lot for taxation purposes
and have paid all the corresponding real estate taxes. Petitioners trace their
possession from Sesinado Leyva who was in open, notorious and continuous
possession in the concept of owner since 1902. Petitioners also alleged that there
have been nine transfers of rights since then and that there are twenty-five co-
owners. The application included a survey which stated that the lot is inside IN-2
Marikina Watershed.
The Republic through the Solicitor General filed its opposition to the
application of Collado et al., as there are no other oppositors; the land registration
court issued an order of general default against the whole world with the exception
of the oppositors. However, in the course of the hearing before the Land
Registration Court, the Republic failed to appear despite notices. The Land
Registration Court, based on the evidence and testimonies presented by Collado et
al., ruled in favor of petitioners. An order was issued the Land Regulation Authority
to issue corresponding decree of registration in favor of the petitioners.

Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals for annulment of the

decision on the ground that pursuant to section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129, there
had been no clear showing that the lot had been previously classified as
alienable and disposable. Bockasanjo ISF Awardes Association, Inc., filed
with Court of Appeals their intervention stating that the lot in dispute is
alienable and alleged that they are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant
to the certificates of stewardship issued by the DENR under the ISF tree
planting purposes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Collado et al., have a registrable title over the lot

HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that Collado et al., does not have a registrable title over
the lot. Firstly because since 1904, EO 33 established the Marikina Watershed
Reservation (MWR) in Rizal, even the survey they petitioners presented stated that
the lot is within the MWR. A watershed reservation is a natural resource and
because of its importance and following the provisions Art. 67 of the Water Code if
the Philippines (PD 1607), and Regalian Doctrine, the lots within the MWR remain to
this day as inalienable properties of the State.
The contention of the petitioners was that the EO 33 contained a saving
clause that the reservation was subject to private rights, if any there be. This is
bereft of merit because mere possession by private individuals of lands does not
create the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable because
Regalian Doctrine dictates that, all lands not otherwise appearing clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The petitioner cannot use
the saving clause in EO 33 because they don’t have documentary title over the lot
and that they have failed to acquire a valid enforceable right or title because of the
failure to complete the required period of possession whether under CA 141 or
under any of its amendments because their predecessor-in-interest, Sesinado
Leyva, was only in possession of the lot for 2 years prior the issuance of EO 33.
Period of occupancy after EO 33 could no longer be counted because it was then
inalienable. The possession of public land, however long the period may have
extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
 Absent any positive Act of the government declaring a parcel of land to be
alienable and disposable or re-classifying an inalienable lot to be alienable, the lot
remains inalienable. The petitioners were not able to present any evidence that the
subject lot was released from the MWR to form part of the alienable and disposable
public land.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated
and vibrant communities as claimed by petitioners because a a forested areas
classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settler may have stripped if of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass and planted with crops
by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains
or out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classifies
as “forest” is released on an official proclamation to that effect to that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

LBP V. ARANETA,
G.R. NO. 161796, ETC., FEBRUARY 8, 2012
FACTS:
At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares,
which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla. On June 21, 1974, Pres.
Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1283, which carved out a wide expanse from the
Watershed Reservation in Rizal, and reserving the segregated area for Townsite purposes, subject
to private rights.
In 1977, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1637, which increased the size of the
Townsite Reservation by 20,312 hectares, subject to private rights. Prior to the issuance of the
Townsite Proclamations, Presidential Decree No. 27, also known as Tenants Emancipation
Decree, was issued. The Department of Agrarian Reform undertook to place under Operation
Land Transfer Program all tenanted rice and corn lands. The tenants of Doronilla applied for
Certificate of Land Transfer. The Department of Agrarian Reform processed the applications of
106 Certificate of Land Transfer covering 73 hectares of the property of Doronilla. However,
only 75 Certificate of Land Titles were distributed. Due to Proclamation No. 1637, the survey of
the property of Doronilla was stopped. In 1978, the Solicitor General filed with the CFI of Rizal
an expropriation complaint against the property of Doronilla. Meanwhile, in 1979, Doronilla
issued a Certification listing 79 bona fide planters. After nine years from the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the expropriation
case.

In 1983, Araneta acquired the property of Doronilla through court litigation. Pres.
Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 131, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. Republic Act No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law, was enacted. Araneta wrote the Department of Agrarian Reform Secretary to convert his lot
from agricultural to commercial and industrial but it was not acted upon. He protested claiming
that the property is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, being a part of
Townsite Reservation. The Office of the Provincial Adjudication Board instead scheduled a
hearing to determine just compensation. The Land Bank of the Philippines paid three million as
just compensation and notified Araneta of its entitlement. In 1990, 912 farmer beneficiaries were
issued Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Araneta filed at the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board against DAR
and LBP for cancellation of compulsory coverage under Presidential Decree 27 and exemption
from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law coverage with regards to his property.
 DARAB turned over the case to PARAD. The Regional Adjudicator dismissed the
complaint of Araneta which was affirmed at the DARAB proper. The case went to Court of
Appeals via Petition for Review and it ruled in favour of Araneta.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lot of Araneta is entirely outside the ambit of the Tenant Emancipation
Decree and Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, thereby excluded from Compulsory Agrarian
Reform Coverage

HELD:
The Court held that the lot of Araneta is excluded from compulsory acquisition except the 75
Certificate of Land Titles issued prior to Proclamation No. 1283. The provisions of R.A. 6657 apply only
to agricultural lands under which category, the property of Araneta, during the period material, no longer
falls, having been effectively classified as non-agricultural under Proclamation No. 1637. It ceased to be
agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the Townsite Reservation.

Before Proclamation No. 1637 was issued, there were already P.D. 27 tenant farmers in the said
property. In a very real sense, private rights belonged to them. CARL shall cover all public and private
agricultural lands. It is referred to as lands devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. Agricultural lands are those which are arable. Indeed,
lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law.

The 75 Certificate of Land Titles issued prior to Proclamation No. 1283 shall be declared valid
but those subsequently issued are nullified.

CRUZ V. SENR
G.R. NO. 135385, DECEMBER 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit of prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A 8371 also
known as Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). Several groups such as Haribon ET. Al, and CHR filed motion to intervene which was
granted by the court.

Petitioners aver that provisions of RA 83171 in sections of IPRA particularly the sections
3(a) and 3(b), section 6, 7 and 8 and sections 57 and 58, being contrary to the regalia Doctrine.
They also assailed the provisions of RA 8371 defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
on the ground that the provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed sections of the IPRA law are unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court was divided equally, where 7 members voted for the dismissal and the other 7
voting for the grant of petition. As majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon,
However after such redeliberation, the voting remained, pursuant to the Rules of Court, the
petition was dismissed. Thus we look upon the separate opinions made by Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban to look upon how the issue was addressed in their opinions.

SEPARATE OPINION BY JUSTICE PUNO

Justice Puno voted to uphold the constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples Righrs Act
of 1997. His separate opinion started by showing the history of land ownership and how it came
to these days Torrens system. RA8137 does not violate the Regalian Doctrine. The ICCs/IPs has
long been in possession of the lands they occupy, they have lived there even since time
immemorial, thus, even before the Spaniards (who introduced the concept of jura regalia) came.
Thus ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Thus Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part
of the lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Sec 3 Art XII of
the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into: a) agricultural; b) forest or
timber; c) mineral lands, and; d) national parks. Sec. 5 of the same Art XII mentions ancestral
lands and domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify
them as public lands under any of the four classes will render the enter IPRA law a nullity. The
spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA
addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. The 1987 Constitution
mandates the state to “protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands” and that “Congress provide for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.” It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct
rights of ownership over their ancestral lands that breathe life into this constitutional provision.
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains
are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of
public domain. The communal right is not the same as corporate rights over real property, much
less corporate condominium rights. Thus communal rights to the land are held not only by the
present possessors of the land but extend to all generation of the ICCs/IPs, past present and
future, to the domain.

Examining IPRA there is nothing the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs ownership in their
ancestral domains includes ownership, but this “ownership: is expressly defined and limited in
Sec 7 (a). Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State
and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right to “manage and conserve” them for future
generations, “benefit and share” the profits from their allocation and utilization and “negotiate
the terms and conditions for their exploration” for the purpose of “enduring ecological and
environmental protection and conservation measures”. The right to negotiate terms and
conditions over the natural resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose
of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the
ancestral domain. It does not extend to exploitation and development of natural resources.
Justice Puno in his conclusion said that “…. If the Filipinos as a whole are to participate
fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is this Court’s duty to acknowledge the
presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the
land laws in our national system.”

SEPARATE OPINION BY JUSTICE VITUG

Justice Vitug voted to grant the petition of Isagani Cruz assailing the constitutionality of
the RA 8371. IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain so-called ancestral domains
covering literally millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not
only matters of proprietary interest but also forms of governance over the curved-out territory.
Justice Vitug held in view that the provisions of IPRA, are in totality, in his view, beyond the
context of the fundamental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an
unacceptable abdication of Sate authority over a significant area of the country and its patrimony
thus , it violates the regalia doctrine. In his opinion he emphasizes that the collective will of the
people expressed in the Constitution cannot be overridden. It is in them that the sovereignty
resides and from them that all government authority emanates. It is not then for court ruling or
any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to
adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.

SEPARATE OPINION JUSTICE KAPUNAN

Justice Kapunan opined that the challenged provisions of IPRA must be construed in
view of such presumption of constitutionality. Further the interpretation of these provisions
should take into account the purposes of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional
mandate that the rights of the rights of the indigenous peoples should be recognized and
protected. Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to
ancestral lands, ancestral domains and natural resources are unconstitutional. Petitioners posit
that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and other
natural resources. Sec 3(a) of IPRA merely defines the coverage of ancestral domain, and
describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domain by setting forth standards and
guidelines in determining whether the particular area is within the ancestral domains. Its purpose
is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. The IPRA is not intended to bestow
ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from the bicameral
conference committee on section 7 which recites the rights of indigenous peoples over their
ancestral domains.
The provisions of the IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resources are not
unconstitutional. The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural
resources under sections 7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under
existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (RA 7942) RA 7942 declares that no
ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without prior consent if he indigenous
cultural community concerned and in the event the members of such indigenous cultural
community give their consent to mining operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be
paid to them by the parties to the mining contract. There is nothing in the assailed law which
implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of concessions. Nor does the law
negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. It must be emphasized that the
grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority to disregard pertinent
laws and regulations.

SEPARATE OPINION JUSTICE MENDOZA

The separate opinion was focused on whether petitioners had legal standing in the
petition, which, they had none. He also opined that there is no genuine controversy in the matter
before the court and that the presumption of constitutionality must be accorded to IPRA until an
actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA.

SEPARATE OPINION JUSTICE PANGANIBAN

Justice Panganiban opined that RA 8371 violates and contravenes the constitution insofar
as : 1) it recognizes or, worse grants rights of ownership over “lands of the public domain,
waters, x x x and other natural resources” which under sec 2 of Article XII of the Constitution , “
are owned by the State” and “Shall not be alienated”; and 2) it defeats, dilutes or lessens the
authority of the state to oversee the “exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources,” which the Constitution expressly requires to “be under the full control and
supervision of the State”. Under Sec 3 (a) ancestral domains encompass the natural resources
found therein and section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rights of ownership
and possession over such domains. RA 8371 speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands
and domains. In fact, by mere definitions they could covers vast tract of the nation’s territory.
RA 8371 abdicates the State duty ti take full control and supervision of natural resources.
It relinquishes constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar, as natural
resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and
possession, they may develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the
profits from the allocation and the utilization therof. And they may exercise such right without
any time limit, unlike non ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years,
renewable for a like period. Consistent with the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit,
develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period.

THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, ETC. V. MASWENG, ET. AL.,

G.R. NO. 180206, FEBRUARY 4, 2009
FACTS:

The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued by the City Mayor of
Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the demolition of the illegal structures constructed by
Lazaro Bawas, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of the Busol
Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits
and in violation of Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential Decree
No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279. Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices
dated September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of the intended
demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to 20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan,
Narciso Basatan and Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for
injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting
City Mayor, Reynaldo Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-Squatting
Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division, among others, (collectively called
petitioners) before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative
Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-
CAR-06.

In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the lands where their
residential houses stand are their ancestral lands which they have been occupying and possessing
openly and continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof have been
expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922 and recommended by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of
the Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of their residential houses is
a violation of their right of possession and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the
Constitution and the law, perforce, must be restrained.

Also, private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation is subject to ancestral land
claims. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest
reserve, allegedly did not nullify the vested rights of private respondents over their ancestral
lands and even identified the claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve. This
claim of ownership is an exception to the government’s contention that the whole area is a forest
reservation.

Regional Hearing Officer Atty. Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed
temporary restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons acting for and in
their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition
Order dated September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004; Demolition Order
No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No. 28, Series of 2004, for a total period of twenty
(20) days.

Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution dated November 10, 2006
granting the private respondents’ application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of
an injunctive bond each in the amount of P10, 000.00.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not NCIP has jurisdiction to issue has the authority to issue temporary
restraining orders and writs of injunction
2. Whether Respondents have the right to claim over the property
HELD:
The Court held that the NCIP is the primary government agency responsible
for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to
protect and promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their
ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. In order to fully effectuate
its mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIP’s
assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall
have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws and have
obtained a certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated
in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved.
 In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003, known as the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the
NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and enumerates the actions that may be
brought before the commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall
exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases
pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not
limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of

ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICCs/IPs;

c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of

customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and

settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been
settled under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of

Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired
by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of
R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of
registration.

Therefore, since based on the allegations of the respondents, they are members of the
Ibaloi tribe who first settled in Baguio City claiming ownership of the property subject of the
case as an ancestral land clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which axiomatically
determine the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of a particular tribunal, squarely qualify it
as a "dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs" within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO.
 Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents’ ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion
of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact,
Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement.
It provides that pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and twenty-six of Act
Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven [,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation
to be administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and protecting water
and timber, the protection of the water supply being of primary importance and all other uses of
the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the
following described parcels of the public domain situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of
Baguio, Mountain Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:

The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was declared by the
Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.The declaration of the
Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private property.
Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest
lands.

All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction, we are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the relief
granted by the Commission.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY V. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, ET. AL.,
G.R. NO. 184869, SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
FACTS:

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution

owned and run by the State. In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476,
reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for
CMU. Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under
Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162. Meanwhile, the government
distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to
the area’s cultural communities.

Forty-five years later, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential

Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMU’s registered lands for distribution to
indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon. On
April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive
Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and
Commissioner of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor
of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential
Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.
 The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to
an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila
RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMU’s
application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial
reconsideration of the RTC’s order denying their motion to dismiss.

On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a
resolution granting NCIP, et al’s motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMU’s action
for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was
constitutional, being a valid State act. The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the
State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf. CMU filed a motion for reconsideration
of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19, 2004. This prompted CMU to appeal
the RTC’s dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station. However, the CA
dismissed the case ruling that CMU’s recourse should have been a petition for review on
certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law—bearing mainly on
the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310. The CA added that whether the trial court
can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the
application for injunction is also a pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 310 can validly distribute lands already owned by
CMU to the ICCs/IPs in Musuan, Marang, Bukidnon

HELD:

No, these state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and
technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and
development of this country. It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case,
attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and
cultural communities. As already stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable
from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMU’s use in scientific and technological
research in the field of agriculture. They have ceased to be alienable public lands.

Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act

(IPRA) or Republic Act 8371 in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that "property
rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested" upon its
effectivity "shall be recognized and respected." In this case, ownership over
the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958. Consequently,
transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is
not in accord with the IPRA.

ALCANTARA V. COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, ET.

AL.,
G.R. NO. 14583, JULY 20, 2001
FACTS:
Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease
Agreement by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Under said
FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease Nine Hundred Twenty-Three (923) hectares of public
forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for grazing purposes for a
period of twenty-five (25) years to expire on 31 December 2018. However, private respondent
Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop filed a letter-complaint with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA
No. 542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the Blaan and Maguindanaoan tribes. The
case was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-052.
Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since
the dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case
should have been filed with the DENR since it is the latter which has jurisdiction to administer
and dispose of public lands, including grazing lands. Notwithstanding petitioner’s objection to
the COSLAPs exercise of jurisdiction over the case, said body continued the hearings thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems has jurisdiction over
the case

HELD:
The Court held that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP since he participated actively in the proceedings before said body by filing an Answer,
a Motion for Reconsideration of the COSLAPs decision and a Supplement to Respondents
Motion for Reconsideration.
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the active participation of a respondent in
the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to a
recognition of that courts or body’s recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction
Moreover, Executive Order No. 561 creating the COSLAP, the law then prevailing when
private respondents filed their complaint for cancellation of FLGLA No. 542, provides in Section
3, paragraph 2(a) thereof that said Commission may assume jurisdiction over land disputes
involving occupants of the land in question and pasture lease agreement holders. The
Commission shall promulgate such rules of procedure as will insure expeditious resolution and
action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the
foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or
decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction
over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty
(30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court.
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Atty. Jerico G. Gay-ya

"We envision Saint Louis University as an excellent

missionary and transformative educational institution zealous in developing human
resources imbued with the Christian Spirit and who are creative, competent and socially
involved."

SAINT LOU IS UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW
OCTOBER 6, 2015
 Balicdang, Berto D.
Cruz, Alexandra S.
Lumbas, Dawn April G.
Valdez, Jaylord Q.
Yapit, Clyde Ciddrick S.