RP vs Andrea Tan
195072, [August 1,
Issue: whether a declaration that Government-owned land has become
alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property
of the State, making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Ruling: While a prior declaration that the property has become
alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial
confirmation of title under Section 14 (1) of the PRD, it does not suffice
for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. 25 Before
prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following
conditions must concur to convert the subject into patrimonial property:
1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land
in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of
the Constitution;
2. The land must have been classified as alienable and
disposable; 26
3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that
the subject lot is no longer intended for public use, thereby
converting it to patrimonial property.
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin
their public and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept
of an owner.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even
though it has been declared alienable and disposable, the property
has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without
this, prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not
yet been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It remains
outside the commerce of man and the respondent's physical
possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect.
In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal
possession of the property and her physical possession
thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc. v. Singzon Aguirre, G.R. Nos. 170746-
47, [March 9, 2016])
There is no dispute that the respondents' cause of action against the
petitioners has prescribed under the Civil Code. 42 In fact, the same is
evident on the complaint itself. The respondents brought their claim
before a Philippine court only on March 6, 2001, more than 13 years
after the collision occurred. 43 Article 1139 of the Civil Code states that
actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. Accordingly,
the RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted for the motu proprio dismissal
of the complaint filed before it. It is settled that prescription may be
considered by the courts motu proprio if the facts supporting the ground
are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record. 44|||
In the instant case, not only once did the petitioners expressly renounce
their defense of prescription. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider
such waiver as basis in order to reverse the rulings of the courts below
as the dismissal of the complaint had become final and binding on both
the petitioners and the respondents.
(Cabling v. Dangcalan, G.R. No. 187696, [June 15, 2016])
Suffice it to say that the errors ascribed by petitioner to the
RTC Decision are factual issues that properly belong to the jurisdiction
of the CA. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence. If so, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact. 29
Good faith is a question of fact that must be
proved. 30 Similarly, the question of prescription of an action
involves the ascertainment of factual matters, such as the date when
the period to bring the action commenced to run.
(Danan v. Spouses Serrano, G.R. No.
2016])
Notwithstanding the failure by the spouses to comply with the
cancellation requirements under RA No. 6552, however, Bonifacio's
action for specific performance must nonetheless fail on the ground of
prescription.
In Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. v. Valbueco,
Incorporated, 38 the parties therein entered into conditional deeds
of sale on November 29, 1973, which provided that the buyer shall
pay the last installment of the purchase price on November 15, 1974.
The buyer, however, failed to pay said installment. On March 16,
2001, or twenty-seven (27) years thereafter, the buyer filed an action
for specific performance seeking to compel the seller to accept the
balance of the purchase price and to execute the corresponding deeds
of absolute sale. The Court, however, affirmed the action's dismissal
in the following wise:
. . . The Complaint shows that the
Conditional Deeds of Sale were executed on
November 29, 1973, and payments were due on
both Conditional Deeds of Sale on November 15,
1974. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that
actions based upon a written contract must be
brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues. Non-fulfillment of the
obligation to pay on the last due date, that
is, on November 15, 1974, would give rise to
an action by the vendor, which date of
reckoning may also apply to any action by
the vendee to determine his right under R.A.
No. 6552. The vendee, respondent herein, filed
this case on March 16, 2001, which is clearly
beyond the 10-year prescriptive period; hence,
the action has prescribed. 39 ETHIDa
In this case, the parties agreed that the purchase price in
the total amount of P6,000.00 shall be paid in three (3) equal
installments on June 27, 1976, June 30, 1977, and finally, on June
30, 1978. Yet, it is undisputed that not only did Bonifacio fail to pay
the last two (2) installments, it took him twenty (20) years from the
last due date on June 30, 1978 to assert his rights over the property
subject of the contract to sell. As borne by the records, Bonifacio filed
the instant Complaint for Specific Performance only on November 3,
1998 to oblige the Spouses Serrano to execute the proper Deed of
Sale and to cause the transfer of the title over the subject parcel of
land. Yet, as categorically ruled inManuel Uy, such action to enforce
said written contract herein prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned
from the non-fulfillment of the obligation to pay on the last due date.
Thus, Bonifacio should have filed the action before June 30, 1988.
(Buisan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 212376, [January 31,
2017])
The petitioners' statement that there were already heavy rains since
1989 that caused flooding in the area negates their previous claim that
the cause of action arose in 1992. If in fact there were already heavy
rains since 1989, then it can also be argued that prior to 1992, their
properties were already damaged by the floods and that would be the
reckoning point of their cause of action. This further establishes that
their cause of action has already prescribed.|||
Undeniably, the petitioners' money claims which were only filed with the
DPWH in 2004 or even in 2001 had already prescribed. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "[i]t will be the height
of injustice for respondent DPWH to be confronted with stale claims,
where verification on the plausibility of the allegations remains difficult,
either because the condition of the alleged inundation of crops has
changed, or the physical impossibility of accounting for the lost and
damaged crops due to the considerable lapse of time.”
In the case at bar, laches has set in as the elements 24 thereof are
present. Firstly, the premature opening by the DPWH of the Project
allegedly causing flash floods, and damaging the petitioners' properties
took place in 1989 or even in 1992. Secondly, the petitioners took 15
years to assert their rights when they formally filed a complaint in 2004
against the DPWH. Thirdly, as the petitioners failed to file a formal suit
for their claims before the COA, there is an apparent lack of notice that
would give the DPWH the opportunity to defend itself.
Dy v. People, G.R. No. 189081, [August 10, 2016])
We note that while there is no written contract of loan in
this case, there is an oral contract of loan which must be brought
within six years. 65 Under the facts of the case, it appears that any
breach in the obligation to pay the loan may have happened between
1996 and 1999, or more than six years since this case has been
instituted. This notwithstanding, we find that the civil action arising
from the contract of loan has not yet prescribed.
We held in numerous cases that it is the legal possibility of
bringing the action that determines the starting point for the
computation of the period of prescription. 67 We highlight the unique
circumstances surrounding this case. As discussed in this decision,
there has been diverse jurisprudence as to the propriety of ordering
an accused to pay an obligation arising from a contract in the criminal
case where the accused was acquitted on the ground that there is no
crime. Litigants, such as MCCI, cannot be blamed for relying on prior
rulings where the recovery on a contract of loan in a criminal case
for estafa was allowed. We have found the opportunity to clarify this
matter through this decision. As it is only now that we delineate the
rules governing the fusion of criminal and civil actions pertaining
to estafa, it is only upon the promulgation of this judgment that
litigants have a clear understanding of the proper recourse in similar
cases. We therefore rule that insofar as MCCI is concerned, the filing
of an action, if any (that may be sourced from the contract of loan),
becomes a legal possibility only upon the finality of this decision which
definitively ruled upon the principles on fused actions.
We add, however, that upon finality of this decision,
prospective litigants should become more circumspect in ascertaining
their course of action in similar cases. Whenever a litigant erroneously
pursues an estafa case, and the accused is subsequently acquitted
because the obligation arose out of a contract, the prescriptive period
will still be counted from the time the cause of action arose. In this
eventuality, it is probable that the action has already prescribed by
the time the criminal case shall have been completed. This possibility
demands that prospective litigants do not haphazardly pursue the
filing of an estafa case in order to force an obligor to pay his or her
obligation with the threat of criminal conviction. It compels litigants
to be honest and fair in their judgment as to the proper action to be
filed. This ruling should deter litigants from turning to criminal courts
as their collection agents, and should provide a disincentive to the
practice of filing of criminal cases based on unfounded grounds in
order to provide a litigant a bargaining chip in enforcing contracts.
(People v. Egagamao, G.R. No. 218809, [August 3, 2016])
The private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during
the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.|||
(Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210, [October 5, 2015])
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive death and
an action for recovery therefore may be generally pursued but only
by filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. 38 This separate civil
action may be enforced against the estate of the accused. 39
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil actions. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, only a single suit is filed and tried. 40 This rule was
enacted to help declog court dockets, which had been packed
with B.P. 22 because creditors used the courts as collectors.
As a necessary consequence of this special rule, the civil
liabilities arising from the issuance of a worthless check are deemed
instituted in a case for violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did
not automatically extinguish the action. The independent civil liability
based on contract, which was deemed instituted in the criminal action
for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against her estate in the present
case.
People v. Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302, [April 20, 2016])
We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon
extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages
from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time
predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources
of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil
action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced." 27
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the
different causes of action. If the act or omission complained of arises
from quasi-delict or, by provision of law, results in an injury to person
or real or personal property, the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 28 On the other hand, if the
act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
[Cited People vs Bayotas, katong 4 ka rules]
(Development Bank of the Phils. v. Guariña Agricultural &
Realty Development Corp., G.R. No. 160758, [January 15,
2014], 724 PHIL 209-226
By its failure to release the proceeds of the loan in their entirety, DBP
had no right yet to exact on Guariña Corporation the latter's
compliance with its own obligation under the loan. Indeed, if a party
in a reciprocal contract like a loan does not perform its obligation, the
other party cannot be obliged to perform what is expected of it while
the other's obligation remains unfulfilled. 30 In other words, the
latter party does not incur delay
(The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Limited v.
National Steel Corp., G.R. No. 183486, [February 24, 2016])
HSBC's persistent refusal to comply with its obligation
notwithstanding due presentment constitutes delay contemplated
in Article 1169 of the Civil Code.117 This provision states that a
party to an obligation incurs in delay from the time the other party
makes a judicial or extrajudicial demand for the fulfillment of the
obligation. We rule that the due presentment of the Letter of Credit
and the attached documents is tantamount to a demand. HSBC
incurred in delay when it failed to fulfill its obligation despite such
a demand.
Under Article 1170 of the Civil Code, 118 a party in
delay is liable for damages. The extent of these damages pertains
to the pecuniary loss duly proven. 119 In this case, such damage
refers to the losses which NSC incurred in the amount of
US$485,767.93 as stated in the Letter of Credit. We also award
interest as indemnity for the damages incurred in the amount of
six percent (6%) from the date of NSC's extrajudicial
demand. 120 An interest in the amount of six percent (6%) is also
awarded from the time of the finality of this decision until full
payment. 121
(Limlingan v. Asian Institute of Management, Inc., G.R. Nos.
220481 & 220503, [February 17, 2016])
Citing Nacar case
To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines
laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly
modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows:
 I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached,
the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions
under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the
concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the
payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under
and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the
amount of damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the
demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art.
1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so
reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of
money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or
paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being
deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.
(Fausto v. Multi Agri-Forest and Community
DevelopmentCooperative, G.R. No. 213939 (Resolution),
[October 12, 2016])
Anent the petitioners' claim that no notice or demand was
sent to them, the CA correctly ruled that the instant case falls under
the exceptions to the necessity of demand. Specifically, Article 1169,
paragraph 1 of the Civil Code provides that demand is not necessary
when the obligation or the law expressly so declares. In the
promissory notes signed by the petitioners, there is a uniform
provision which states that "[i]n case of default in payment of any
installment due as herein agreed, the entire balance of this note
shall immediately become due and payable at the option of the
[respondent] without any notice or demand." This amounts to the
express waiver of the need for demand before the debtor incurs in
delay.
The petitioners cannot evade liability by invoking that the
stipulation on the waiver of notice applies only to the principal. It
bears noting that the promissory notes state that the petitioners
bound themselves jointly and severally liable with the principal
debtor for the entire amount of the obligation. A solidary or joint and
several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation. 47 The petitioners being co-makers, their liability is
immediate and absolute as the principal debtor. The terms of the
promissory notes apply to co-makers in equal force as with the
principal debtors. This includes stipulation on the waiver of notice
from the creditor before the obligation becomes due and
demandable.
(Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc. v. Sunnyside Heights
Homeowners Association, Inc., G.R. No. 198745, [January 13,
2016])|||
Cited Eastern Shipping Lines
||| (Cabanting v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.,
G.R. No. 201927, [February 17, 2016])
The CA is correct that no prior demand was necessary to
make petitioners' obligation due and payable. The Promissory Note
with Chattel Mortgage clearly stipulated that "[i]n case of my/our
[petitioners'] failure to pay when due and payable, any sum which
I/We . . . or any of us may now or in the future owe to the holder
of this note . . . then the entire sum outstanding under this note
shall immediately become due and payable without the necessity
of notice or demand which I/We hereby waive." 6 Petitioners argue
that such stipulation should be deemed invalid as the document
they executed was a contract of adhesion. It is important to stress
the Court's ruling in Dio v. St. Ferdinand Memorial Park, Inc., 7 to
wit:
A contract of adhesion, wherein one
party imposes a ready-made form of contract
on the other, is not strictly against the law. A
contract of adhesion is as binding as
ordinary contracts, the reason being that
the party who adheres to the contract is
free to reject it entirely.
Further, the Court even ruled
in Navarro v. Escobido that prior demand is
not a condition precedent to an action for a
writ of replevin, since there is nothing in
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that
requires the applicant to make a demand on
the possessor of the property before an action
for a writ of replevin could be filed. 10
Article 1169 (1) of the Civil Code allows a party to waive
the need for notice and demand. Petitioners' argument that their
liability cannot be deemed due and payable for lack of proof of
demand must be struck down.
(Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PAL Employees Savings & Loan
Association, Inc., G.R. No. 201073, [February 10, 2016])|||
In addition, the Court finds that an award of interest is
in order. In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 42 the Court clarified that:
When an obligation, not constituting
a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when
or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the
demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from
the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but
when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may
be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
(Osmeña III v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities
Management Corp., G.R. No. 212686 (Resolution), [October 5,
2016])
The Court explained in The Wellex Group, Inc. v. U-Land Airlines, Co.,
Ltd. 11 that, under Art. 1185, if an obligation is conditioned on the non-
occurrence of a particular event at a determinate time, that obligation
arises (a) at the lapse of the indicated time, or (b) if it has become
evident that the event cannot occur. |||
In the case at bar, PSALM's obligation to award the contract in TPVI's
favor was dependent on the non-occurrence of an event: SPC's legal
and valid exercise of its Right to Top. As phrased by PSALM: "the
approval of the sale to TPVI was a conditional one, the consummation
of which is dependent on the non-exercise by SPC of its right to
top." 13 It has become apparent, however, that such event will never
occur. SPC can never legally and validly invoke its Right to Top in view
of its nullity. The condition, therefore, is deemed complied with by
operation of law, and the obligation to execute the purchase contracts
in favor of TPVI, due and demandable.|||
(Sagun v. ANZ Global Services and Operations (Manila), Inc.,
G.R. No. 220399 (Resolution), [August 22, 2016])
In this case, the Court agrees with the finding of the CA that
there was already a perfected contract of employment when petitioner
signed ANZ's employment offer and agreed to the terms and conditions
that were embodied therein. Nonetheless, the offer of employment
extended to petitioner contained several conditions before he may be
deemed an employee of ANZ. Among those conditions for employment
was the "satisfactory completion of any checks (e.g., background,
bankruptcy, sanctions and reference checks) that may be required by
ANZ." 40 Accordingly, petitioner's employment with ANZ depended on
the outcome of his background check, which partakes of the nature of
a suspensive condition, and hence, renders the obligation of the would-
be employer, i.e., ANZ in this case, conditional.|||
Here, the subject employment contract required a satisfactory
completion of petitioner's background check before he may be deemed
an employee of ANZ. Considering, however, that petitioner failed to
explain the discrepancies in his declared information and documents
that were required from him relative to his work experience at Siemens,
namely: (a) that he was only a Level 1 and not a Level 2 Technical
Support Representative that conducts troubleshooting for both
computer hardware and software problems; and (b) that he was found
to have been terminated for cause and not merely resigned from his
post, that rendered his background check unsatisfactory, ANZ's
obligations as a would-be employer were held in suspense and thus, had
yet to acquire any obligatory force. 45 To reiterate, in a contract with a
suspensive condition, if the condition does not happen, the obligation
does not come into effect. Thus, until and unless petitioner complied
with the satisfactory background check, there exists no obligation on the
part of ANZ to recognize and fully accord him the rights under the
employment contract. In fact, records also show that petitioner failed to
report for work on or before July 11, 2011, which was also a suspensive
condition mandated under sub-paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 of the
contract.
Galleon's stockholders. The M emorandum of Agreement was
executed on August 10, 1981, giving the parties no more than sixty
days or up to October 9, 1981, to prepare and sign the share
purchase agreement. However, it was only on April 26, 1982, or
more than eight months after the Memorandum of Agreement was
signed, did NDC's General Director submit his recommendation on
Galleon's outstanding account. Even then, there was no clear
intention to execute a share purchase agreement as compliance
with the Memorandum of Agreement. Article 1186 of the Civil Code
is categorical that a "condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfilment." Considering NDC's
delay, the execution of the share purchase agreement should be
considered fulfilled with NDC as the new owner of 100% of
Galleon's shares of stocks.
The due execution of the share purchase agreement is
further bolstered by Article 1198 (4) of the Civil Code, which states
that the debtor loses the right to make use of the period when a
condition is violated, making the obligation immediately
demandable:
Article 1198. The debtor shall lose every right
to make use of the period:
(1) When after the obligation has been
contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he
gives a guaranty or security for the debt;
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor
the guaranties or securities which he has
promised;
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said
guaranties or securities after their
establishment, and when through a fortuitous
event they disappear, unless he immediately
gives new ones equally satisfactory;
(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking,
in consideration of which the creditor agreed
to the period;
(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond.
(Emphasis supplied)
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact made by a
trial court and the Court of Appeals are accorded the highest
degree of respect by this Court, and, absent a clear disregard of
the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the
case, those findings should not be ignored.

Consequently, no employer-employee relationship was

said to have been created between petitioner and ANZ under the
circumstances, and the dismissal of the former's complaint for
illegal termination from work, as held by the NLRC, was correctly
sustained by the CA.
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Sta. Ines Melale Forest
Products Corp., G.R. Nos. 193068 & 193099, [February 1,
2017])| |

We uphold the Court of Appeals' finding that the failure

to execute the share purchase agreement was brought about by
NDC's delay in reviewing the financial accounts submitted by