The Concepts of Power in International Business Negotiations An Empirical Investigation

JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
2017, VOL. 22, NO. 1, 25–52

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15475778.2017.1274613
The concepts of power in international business

negotiations: An empirical investigation
Priyan Khakhara and Zafar U. Ahmedb
a
Haigazian University, Beirut, Lebanon; bAcademy for Global Business Advancement, Fort Worth,
Texas, USA
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article examines the bases of social power, namely Cooperative processes;
individual information power, expert power, legitimate power, integrative outcomes;
and referent power on successful international business international negotiation;
power
negotiations (IBNs). The author conducted an online survey
among international business executives working in the UK for
multinational corporation subsidiaries who were asked to report
on the success of their most recent negotiating experience in
terms of cooperative (integrative) and competitive (distributive)
outcomes. Information power, expert power, and referent
power were supported by these results in terms of significance.
Unexpectedly, however, information power was positively
correlated with integrative or cooperative outcomes and
processes. The correlation related to legitimate power was
negative but not statistically significant so this hypothesis was
not supported. Our results not only contribute to international
negotiation theory, but also can assist in the selection and
training of practitioners. The academic contribution of this
study also relates to model exploration. It brings causal
statistical objectivity to qualitatively developed concepts as an
essential step in development of knowledge. These theoretical
and managerial implications of the study are examined.
Furthermore, directions for future research that build on the
findings of the study are indicated.
Introduction and literature review

International business negotiation is often a key element in marketing success.
Negotiators frequently interact with potential business partners from markedly
different cultural or social backgrounds. To be successful, they must acquire a
complex skill set that must be acquired “on the job”—a skill set that is useful in
preventing undesired perceptions, filtering out communication “noise,” and
that promotes successful negotiation outcomes. To quote Shi and Wright
(2001, p. 91), “In a global business environment, the business executive’s work
has an increasingly international orientation and international business
negotiation becomes an important competency.” Understanding the role and
CONTACT Zafar U. Ahmed zafaruahmed@gmail.com School of Business, American University
of Ras Al Khaimah, P.O. Box 10021, Ras Al Khaimah, UAE.
Prof. Dr. Zafar U. Ahmed is now a professor and associate dean in the School of Business at American University
of Ras Al Khaimah, Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis
26 P. KHAKHAR AND Z. U. AHMED
use of social power, (French & Raven, 1959) therefore, becomes an important
element in formulating these competencies. International business
negotiations, backed up with the advancement in technology, have been the
focus of ambitious managers to find innovative platforms in hopes of
penetrating new markets. Study proves that considerable research has been
conducted on the style of negotiation between countries rather than the culture
of the hosting country (Khakhar & Rammal, 2013). “International” and
“Negotiations” are two important terms present in the agenda of industrial
countries. Negotiation is a process in which two or more parties with different
needs and goals discuss an issue to find a mutually acceptable solution.
The growth of new emerging markets and of the global economy has seen
increasing demand for negotiation training for marketing executives. Training
consultants generally teach negotiation skills by drawing on communication
theory and socio-psychological perspectives. They mostly emphasize
“interest-based negotiation” (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991), where negotiators
work to identify underlying interests on both sides, explore creative options
for mutual gain, and use legitimate standards to determine the best possible
solutions (Senger, 2002). Scholars have offered both comparative and
prescriptive studies (Francis, 1991; Ghauri, 1996; Zartman & Berman, 1982)
since “International negotiators require additional skills and competencies
on top of those required in domestic business negotiations” (Reynolds,
Simintiras, & Vlachou, 2003, p. 236).
The process of business negotiation is generally described as either taking
an integrative or a distributive frame (also known as cooperative versus
competitive frame, associated with win-lose and win-win outcomes e.g.,
Fisher & Ury, 1981; Ghauri, 1996; McCall & Warrington, 1984). Ghauri
(1996) notes that the “atmosphere” of the negotiation can have varying
degrees of either cooperative (associated with an integrative frame), or
competitive (associated with a distributive frame) aspects.
The outcome and processes therefore in international business negotiations
can take the following forms:
. Competitive vs cooperative
. Win-win vs win-lose
. Integrative vs distributive
Competitive behavior relates to conflict “atmosphere” and can be defined
as efforts to gain unilateral concessions from the other party i.e., distributive
agreements. Competitive strategies manifest themselves through behaviors of
the negotiators, hence having competitive behavior in the negotiation process
will result in parties perceiving the negotiation as a game in which there can
only be one winner. With IBNs there may exist conflicts of interest, hence
conflicting atmosphere in the negotiation process. This can be due to differ-
ences in cultural opinions. The environment in which the negotiation is based
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 27
can also affect the cooperation/conflict balance. Foreign exchange instability

for example could cause the power balance to shift, and have effects on the
level of cooperation each part expresses. As stated, two key approaches to
IBNs are widely observed—cooperation and competition. These two strategies
in turn correspond to two negotiation behaviors, namely cooperative and
competitive behaviors during the negotiation process altering the power
dynamics within the negotiations. The competition approach is also referred
to as distributive bargaining, and is utilized by the negotiator to pursue
personal goals, by convincing the opposite party to concede to demands.
The study of international negotiator characteristics (including power
dynamics) and varying negotiating methods has led, however, to prescriptive
literature on the “ideal” ways to communicate and behave, often with refer-
ence to different cultures (e.g., Acuff, 1997; Al-Ghamdi, 1999; Brett, 2000;
Brett et al., 1998; Ferraro, 1996; Ghauri, 1996; Gilsdorf, 1997; Graham, Mintu,
& Rodgers, 1994; Herbig & Kramer, 1991; Khakhar & Leigh, 2015; Khakhar &
Rammal, 2013; Kjaerbeck, 1998; Lewis, 1996; Marrotti, 1998; Martin et al.,
1999; Mintu-Wimsatt & Gassenheimer, 2000; Nair & Stafford, 1998; Oikawa
& Tanner, 1992; Rubin & Sander, 1991; Tracy, 1998; Ulijn & Verweji, 2000;
Woo & Prud’homme, 1999). Other research has focused on negotiation styles,
problem-solving, skills, tactics and conflict resolution from social psychologi-
cal and behavioral theory perspectives (Shi & Wright, 2001). The success of
negotiations in international settings relies on the ability of managers to
effectively communicate their message in different cultural settings (Schoop,
Kohne, & Ostertag, 2010). Managers must be aware of the contextual factors
influencing the negotiation process, and should have the ability to alter their
style and strategies to suit their needs (Saee, 2008).
Various theoretical models have been proposed (Calantone, Graham, &
Mintu-Wimsatt, 1998; Phatak & Habib, 1996). These generally rely on deduc-
tions from literature reviews and qualitative research (Dupont, 1991; Ghauri
& Usunier, 2003). Quantitative tests have been done using student respon-
dents and have been cross-cultural in nature (Graham et al., 1994). However,
perceptions of international negotiator power dynamics have not been exam-
ined empirically among business executives, despite researchers’ speculation
about their effects on negotiation behavior, process, and outcomes (Tung,
1988; Wall & Blum, 1991). For an international business setup to be success-
ful, managers must have the capability to efficiently communicate in different
environments than their actual marketplace (Schoop et al., 2010). According
to Aldrich (1999), a successful manager must be adaptive to fast changes, be
interactive, and be able to adjust towards new cultures. To be able to meet the
needs of the later, managers must have a clean idea about the regulations of
the new culture to be able to fit in (Saee, 2008). There are two opinions of
research regarding negotiations. Study shows both negotiators end up with
a mutual understanding in reaching their ultimate goals through extensive
negotiations and communication (Ghauri & Usunier, 2003; Schellenberg,

1996). Others state that one of the negotiating parties loses in the transaction
and surrenders for the other party to win and gain their wants (Duvalett,
Garapin, Llerena, & Robin, 2004). Peleckis, Peleckiene, and Peleckis (2013)
introduced some of the cultural variances between negotiators stating five
criterions in viewing the cultural differences in international business
negotiations:
. Power Distance: Power of the managers within a company and their
hierarchal level
. Uncertainty Avoidance Dimension:— lack of tolerance between individuals
and the need of strict rules
. Individualism/Collectivism: —the magnitude at which individual interest is
above the collective or group interest
. Masculinity/Femininity: Gender differences and equality
. Emotional Differences: Feeling of belonging
Intercultural negotiations are defined as negotiations that entail communi-
cation between individuals from distinct cultures. Successful negotiations rely
on several factors. Successful negotiators in an international context have the
knowledge and proficiency to work with degrees of communication,
principles, and behavioral indications of individuals from different cultural
backgrounds. Peleckis et al. (2013) declares that it would be hard to identify
which negotiation style to use if you don’t consider the legal atmosphere,
cultural standards, and organizational values of the negotiators. The way
the individual’s thinking is programmed in a certain culture categorizes that
culture (Hofstede, 2001).
Because of the general absence of empirical testing among actual business
negotiators, these models have not been popular with practitioners (Weiss,
2006). This article contributes to filling this gap. In the methodologies of
existing research on international business negotiations, the choice of research
respondents and participants has been criticized (Agndal, 2007; Weiss, 2006).
Much of the research in negotiations is experimental in nature, relying
primarily on students as research subjects. Ramsay (2004) notes that the
academic literature on negotiation is dominated by studies of American
undergraduate psychology students. The rationale for using students is related
to ease of access. There is some discussion whether negotiation behavior of
students accurately reflects negotiation behavior of “real” negotiators, whilst
the negotiating behavior of students has been shown to differ significantly
from that of professionals (Zarkada-Fraser & Fraser, 2001). In this vein, this
study has approached the subject in a non-simulation and non-experimental
manner, with a non-student sample. This will provide a more relevant view of
the negotiation process to provide a full essence of international business
negotiations.
Working definitions
Power
Negotiators have power when they have “the ability to bring outcomes they
desire” or “the ability to get things done the way (they want) them to be done”
(Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). It can be assumed that a party with power can
induce another party to do what the latter otherwise would not do, thereby
affecting the negotiation process (Dahl, 1957; Kotter, 1979). The sources or
elements of power are considered as centrally important to international
business negotiations, and so the question of what constitutes power in
negotiations is of importance. Power has also been studied by social psychol-
ogists (Pruitt, 1981, 1993, 2005; Putnam, 1990; Rubin & Brown, 1975) and
applied to business. These concepts and perceptions of power can also be
found in political science, sociology, and social psychology offering a variety
of distinctions among different types of social power (Asherman & Asherman,
1990). Power in relation to international business negotiations is defined as
having different sources (information, expert, legitimate, and referent) each
resulting in different perceptions at the negotiation level of analysis to both
parties involved.
Negotiation process
The author has assumed that a negotiation process will constitute the path
during a face-to-face negotiation experience. The final process frames in
international business negotiation are described as taking the following
forms as per literature (Atkin & Rinehart, 2006; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Ghauri,
1983, 1996; Hall, 1993; McCall & Warrington, 1984; Phatak & Habib, 1996;
Pruitt, 1981; Putnam, 1990; Rubin & Brown, 1975-seminally; Thompson &
Herbec, 1996; Walton & McKersie, 1965): (1) integrative vs. distributive (also
known as competitive frame and cooperative frame that constitute the
general atmosphere of the negotiation as suggested by Ghauri and Usunier
[2003]); (2) Win-win vs. win-lose corresponding to two negotiation behaviors,
namely cooperative and competitive behaviors during the negotiation process.
The competition approach is also referred to as distributive bargaining, and is
utilized by the negotiator to pursue personal goals, by convincing the
opposite party to concede to demands. These two approaches are not
however absolute per se, i.e., the degree of integration or distribution of the
international negotiation process. This has become common and established
terminology within the study of international business negotiations.
According to Jeswald W. Salacuse, there are two types of negotiators: either
win-win negotiators, who see deal making as a collaborative, problem-solving
process, or win-lose negotiators, who view it as confrontational (Salacuse,
2015).
Effective business negotiation is a core leadership and management skill. In

business, negotiation skills are important in both informal day-to-day inter-
actions and formal transactions such as negotiating conditions of sale, lease,
service delivery, and other legal contracts. Good negotiations contribute
significantly to business success, as they help build better relationships
between the parties involved.
Research question and variables

Our main research question for the focus of our study follows, followed by a
discussion of the dependent and independent variables of the study: How do
the bases of social power (expert, referent, legitimate and information power)
affect the negotiation process in terms of being either a cooperative or
competitive atmosphere?
Dependent variable
Given the vast literature explained previously, the researcher has identified the
main dependent variable of this research as the “negotiation process,” which
in turn constitutes constructs of integrative versus distributive (corresponding
to competitive frame versus cooperative frames and win-win versus win-lose
flow).
Hence the dependent variable of this study is the negotiation process,
which varies between the integrative and distributive balance. Agndal
(2007) identified that most of the articles on negotiations published between
1996 and 2005 rightly considered the integrative versus distributive
continuum, balance or frame as the dependent variable, and is hence con-
sidered by the researcher of this study as a dependent variable for this study
given the vast and valid agreement within literature.
Independent variables: Power in negotiations

Most international business negotiation models consider the concepts and
elements of power as an important factor within the negotiation process
(e.g., Ghauri, 1996; Ghauri & Usunier, 2003). It has also been studied exten-
sively by social psychologists in relation to negotiations (e.g., Pfeffer, 1992;
Putnam, 1990; Rubin & Brown, 1975). Literature on the development of the
bases of social power and application to business are detailed in Table 1.
Cavusgil and Ghauri (2002), Kotter (1979) and Pfeffer (1992) point out that
a power relation is a basic characteristic of all international negotiation
processes, and state that the ability to control this relation is linked to the per-
ceived power of the parties (i.e., relative power). Negotiators have power when
they have “the ability to bring outcomes they desire” or “the ability to get
Table 1. Literature: The use and origins of the bases of social power.
Authors Description of study
French and Raven (1959) Proposed the bases of social power
Raven (1965) The relationship between social power and influence
Raven and Kruglanski (1970) Power in the structure of conflict
Kotter (1979) Application of power in management
Raven (1983) The effects of interpersonal power and individual influence
(Podsakoff and Schriesheim (1985) Field studies of French and Raven (1959) bases of
social power
Raven (1992) and Raven et al. (1998) Proposed conceptualization and testing of a interaction
model in relation to interpersonal influence
Pfeffer (1992) Using power in management
Raven (1993) Developments to the bases of power
Colemen (2000) The use of power bases in conflict management
Phatak and Habib (1996), Ghauri (1996), Application of some of the power bases to international
Heiba (1984), Weiss (2004), Lewicki business negotiations
et al. (2006), and Potgieter (2007)
things done the way (they want) them to be done” (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977,
p. 41). It can be assumed that a party with power can induce another party to
do what the latter otherwise would not do, thereby affecting the negotiation
process (Dahl, 1957; Kotter, 1979)). The concepts of power have received sig-
nificant attention in negotiation research and have been referred to as relative
power or power versus dependence (for e.g., Bazerman & Neale, 1983, 1992;
Ghauri, 1983, 1996; Heiba, 1984; McCall & Warrington, 1984; Phatak &
Habib, 1996; Zartman, 1978).
Zartman (1978) points out the importance of power by stating that there
are many phases of power, and that interrelation exists between the sources,
or what constitutes “‘power.” Graham (1987) proposed that power relation-
ships and the perceptions of such power influence negotiation practices, as
well as mentioning the importance of interpersonal skills in the negotiation
process frame (which this study is also exploring). Neslin and Greenhalgh
(1983) in exploring the Nash equilibrium (and cooperative and non-
cooperative “games”), also observe that power provides “the ability of one
party to take the initiative in a given situation and thus shape the issues or
agenda in a way that benefits that party” (p. 32), becoming a key factor in
international business negotiations.
The sources of power are considered as centrally important to international
business negotiations (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2006; Potgieter, 2007) and
have therefore been applied in the international business negotiation study.
Lewicki and colleagues were pressed to answer what constitutes power in
international business negotiations, and to explain the influence on the
negotiation process in terms of integrative processes or distributive processes.
As Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) state:
because power derives from activities rather than individuals, an individual’s or
subgroup’s power is never absolute and derives ultimately from the context of
the situation. The amount of power an individual has at anytime depends, not only
on the activities he or she controls, but also the existence of other persons or means
by which the activities can be achieved and those who determine what ends are
desired. (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977, p. 50)
This has implications for international business negotiations.

The processes of power can be useful as well as complex as they are
often disguised in negotiations (Pruitt, 1981). Power can be observed varying
forms of literature concerning power in political science, sociology and social
psychology offering a variety of distinctions among different types of social
power (Asherman & Asherman, 1990), and debated in organizational beha-
vior and organizational psychology literature. To understand international
business negotiations and the power sources that arise, the study of power
and its effect must first be understood; every interaction and every social
relationship, both inside and outside international organizations, entails the
use of power (Pfeffer, 1992). Potgieter (2007) views power as an easy means
to accomplish things in the desired manner. The power of the manager
who wants more financial resources, for example, is in his skill to obtain these
resources (Pitulla & Nicholson, 2005).
Power is comprised of a relationship between two or more people. The
political scientist Robert Dahl (1957) encapsulated this important relational
focus in his definition of power, “A has power over B to the extent that he
can get B to do something B would not otherwise do. A person or group
cannot have power in isolation. Power has to be exercised or deployed, or
have the potential of being deployed in relation to some other person or
group” (p. 101).
Given this, Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale (2005) in their article “Power
Dynamics in Negotiation” argued that there are different types of power in
negotiations, contending divisions into potential power, perceived power,
power tactics, and realized power. Some empirical findings have indicated
that when the most powerful party acts in a positive way, this generates
integrative negotiations, partly due to the trust it fostered (Anderson &
Thompson, 2004). Other studies have found that negotiators with low
differences in perceived power reach more integrative agreements. The avail-
ability of alternatives (real or relative power in negotiations) also affected the
negotiation processes (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005).
The main purpose in the context of international business negotiations is to
identify literature on the major sources of power and to define them system-
atically, so that one can compare them to the changes that they produce
on the negotiation process. Sources of power imply a “persuasive message
strategy” and can be significant in influencing negotiations, and hence strat-
egy (Miller, 1983). We explore the sources or bases of power. In international
business negotiations, power can take many forms, e.g., a negotiator may hold
power in terms of his standing in an organization (e.g., the CEO) or may hold
less power as he is anxious to receive “referred” business from the other party,
i.e., referent power. In a seminal paper, French and Raven (1959) and revised
by Raven (1993) proposed what constitutes the sources of power, and these
sources have been extensively applied to international business negotiations
(e.g., Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders, 2006) and will therefore be used as the
independent variables of our study. We will explain these sources of power
in relation to international business negotiations while formulating our
hypotheses on this factor.
The perceptions of such sources of power can greatly affect the negotiation
process, as perceptions may vary of the use of such power (Garcia, 2002;
Ghauri & Usunier, 2003) and these perceptions could alter the negotiation
process. It is important to mention that the concept of parity in power is cru-
cial; in negotiations, parity of power is the perception by one party that the
other side can counter any form of power with a similar or different form
of power that would render the further escalation of power useless (Bazerman
& Neale, 1983, 1992). Parity in power demands a balance in power deploy-
ment and is hence key to the behavior of a successful negotiator (Potgieter,
2007). In literature, power and authority are seen as distinct (e.g., Colemen,
2000). Authority is viewed as the formal power that individuals have because
of the position they hold in an organization (Potgieter, 2007) for example,
managers who hold higher positions have legal authority over subordinates
in lower positions. The sources of this power therefore have implications on
the international negotiation process.
The sections following will explain origins of sources of power (e.g., Raven,
1965, 1983, 1993; Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998) and applied to
international business negotiations, followed by the resulting hypothesis
inferred from the literature in terms of the effect on the international business
negotiation process. Table 2 lists the studies in chronological order to
demonstrate the use and origins of the bases of social power in relation to
international business negotiation literature, while the section following
discusses the bases of social power.
Information power
This type of power is associated with the special information an individual
holds as a result of operations he performs and his special relationship with
Table 2. Average power variable scores.

Information power 3.935
Expert power 3.032
Legitimate power 3.865
Referent power 3.787
sources of information, which are of significance for the performance of

another individual (Raven, 1993). Information on the opposite party, as well
its situation could be used to gain acceptance of proposals (McCall &
Warrington, 1984). Thus, gaining information results in increased infor-
mation power, which could be used in the negotiation process. Such infor-
mation could be obtained through profile checks before the negotiation,
and may also have an effect on the outcome of the negotiation, in terms of
positive or negative process. Information about the other party’s capabilities,
financial position, and limitations gives either party power to influence the
negotiation process (Ghauri, 1996; McCall & Warrington, 1984). Proposals
that are not initially accepted can gain acceptance if the opposing negotiator
indicates knowledge of information of which the other party is unaware
(McCall & Warrington, 1984), though it can also cause suspicion or surprise
on the length the other party goes to obtain information on the negotiating
party. Information gathered may also give the impression of adequate prep-
aration for the negotiation, and thus integrative processes result. Literature
on this variable seems to be split between those who suggest information
power causes distribution; those who suggest it could cause integration, e.g.,
Brooks and Rose (2004) state information gathering could give the impression
of adequate preparation and hence lead to integration, whereas McCall &
Warrington (1984) suggest that it could go either way. Different nationalities
may also have different perceptions of this information power and the effect
on the overall negotiation process, as perceptions of these can be seen con-
flicting between international negotiators. For example, by accumulating
and presenting data intended to change the other party’s point of view or pos-
ition on an issue, and may be seen as offensive in some Asian cultures as they
lose “face” (Fang, 1997). Information on the opposite negotiator can also alter
expectations in the negotiations processes (Scott, 1984), and if these created
expectations are then not met, the process can flow negatively. The opposite
party’s choice of behavior, for example, is affected by transmitting positive
information to opponents about the option they want them to “opt for,” or
by hiding information about an option they don’t want them to choose
(Kim et al., 2005; Potgieter, 2007). The perception of having information
power is inferred to create a degree of suspicion (Garcia, 2002; Kim et al.,
2005) between international negotiators, and hence lead to a distributive
negotiation process frame. We therefore make the following hypothesis:
H1: The perceptions of having more information power by one of the negotiating
parties will lead to a distributive negotiation process.
Expert power
This type of power is the belief that an individual or an organization has
special, unique, or in-depth knowledge or expertise within a given area
(Kotter, 1979; Raven, 1992). For example, an expert winemaker negotiating

with a restaurant chain can exercise “expert” power to the other party, which
may or may not perceive these advantages (Pitulla & Nicholson, 2005). Thus,
viewing the opposite party as superior in terms of expertise can alter the
power perceptions on both sides and affect negotiations. Hence inferring
logically that expertise can lead to a source of power as well as a competitive
advantage. Dunning (1999) calls knowledge or expertise “ownership advan-
tage,” and this has implications for the international business negotiation.
Pfeffer (1992) states that expertise can greatly increase the chances of
gaining a positive “framing,” as knowledge is related to advantages a firm
processes. Such advantages can be perceived positively by the opposite party
(Garcia, 2002; Pfeffer, 1992). Ghauri (1996) goes on to state that if a company
is a leading expert in a particular field, it will use that as a source to influence
the negotiation process, whereas Potgieter (2007) suggests that expert power
will generally aid in clarifying operational details (and hence produce integrat-
ive negotiation processes frames). Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders (2006) state
that expertise, and hence expert power can stem from specialist knowledge
in terms of technology, financial management, and presence in a particular
industry. Yulk and Tracey (1992) mention that “opponents” may give the
impression of expert power in order to influence the negotiation process by
attempting to clarify complex details that may arise. Hence the perceptions
of having expert power may be inferred to better the knowledge between
international negotiators (Garcia, 2002; Ghauri, 1996; Pitulla & Nicholson,
2005; Potgieter, 2007), and hence lead to a positive negotiation process frame,
as well as explicitly being used to influence the negotiation process. Thus, the
following hypothesis is made:
H2: The perception of existing expert power in either negotiating parties will lead
to an integrative negotiation process.
Legitimate power
Legitimate power comes from the ability to influence because of position, and
is sometimes referred to as position-bases power (Raven, 1993). International
business managers at higher levels have power over the people below.
However, each person with legitimate power applies his or her own individual
style (Raven, 1983). Potgieter (2007) points out that occasionally, one party
will use legitimate power as a tactic against another party by:
1. Introducing someone who can influence important decisions, and who has
credibility with the other party; and
2. Assigning a lot of legitimate power to an individual in opposing parties
to use the need for power and status in individuals to get major
concessions.
This is related to the “location in structure” variable suggested by French &

Raven (1959) and Raven (1983) which implies power derived from occupying
a key position in a hierarchical organization, or control over control of supply
flows and resources. According to Raven (1983), legitimate power is seen as
the foundation of the modern social structure, i.e., when groups of individuals
organize into any social system such as a task force or a negotiating team,
which immediately creates a form of structure or hierarchy. The effectiveness
of formal authority is derived from the willingness of followers to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of the organizational structure, and the system of rules
and regulations that empowers its leaders such as CEOs (Raven, 1993). There-
fore, in the context of international business negotiations; to the extent that a
negotiator can convince the opposite party that he or she has a right to make a
particular demand or proposal, the likelihood of an offer being accepted is
increased (Podsakoff & Schriesheim, 1985). Sending “top management” to a
negotiation can therefore affect the atmosphere if the other party is aware
of this status, as assumptions will be made that high power would mean
quicker decision-making processes, thus a positive atmosphere and smoother
negotiations (Ghauri, 1996; Pfeffer, 1992). It is also possible to apply the
notion of legitimate power to certain social norms or conventions, that exert
strong control over people (Kotter, 1979; Raven, 1993; Raven et al., 1998) and
hence resulting negotiations, as legitimate power brings with it the notions of
control of available resources that are brought to the negotiating table by
decision-making higher management, who have control of these resources,
which the other party perceives (Potgieter, 2007).
Legitimate power may also bring reciprocity (favors for favors) and
dependence (future business through the top management at the negotiating
table as suggested by Khakhar & Rammal, 2013 when discussing the use of
“Wasta”1 in the Middle East), if the other party recognizes this legitimate
power. The ability to control and dispense these resources is a major power
source in organizations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974) and hence international
negotiation processes. In his book Managing with Power, Jeffrey Pfeffer illu-
strated how powerful corporate figures have built successful businesses based
on legitimate power (Pfeffer, 1992). Colemen (2000) also suggests that if this
power is used appropriately, conflict (i.e., distribution) can be avoided. Hence
the following hypothesis is made:
H3: The perception of having greater legitimate power by one of the parties will
lead to an integrative negotiation process.
Referent power
This type of power results from the willingness of one individual to be
associated with another and to maintain such an association, in anticipation
of future productive dealings (Raven, 1965, 1993). This could be with the
same company or a company that it has been referred to. It seems to appear
that such willingness may come from knowing that the opposite party is one
with potential “influence” for business; this may cause concession making as
well as a dependency role for a particular company. Referent power is made
“salient” when one party identifies the dimension of commonality in an effort
to increase power over the other. Thus, a negotiator might start getting to
know the other to discover commonalities (i.e., they may discover that they
could do “business” in the future, which may hopefully create a bond between
the parties and facilitate agreement. It refers to the personal characteristics
of the negotiator, i.e., a person who is perceived as reference has more power,
as the other party can depend on him for business (implicitly implied by
McCall & Cousins, 1989; McCall & Warrington, 1984). Therefore, a nego-
tiator with this ability is inferred to have personal power that can positively
contribute to the negotiation process frame.
Yan and Gray (1994) presume that the party in a negotiation that has more
equity (referred business assumed here to be intangible equity) has more
power in the negotiations, and will therefore influence the process, and men-
tions management control of the project, special access to markets, favorable
government relationships, and superior knowledge of new markets, whereas
Cavusgil and Ghauri (2002) point out that the market position of either of
the negotiating parties is an element influencing the negotiation process.
All these elements contribute to reference power. Pitulla and Nicholson
(2005) state that if there is at least a potential for a long-term gain to be made
in future business, the negotiators will be inclined to concede in present nego-
tiations for the sake of achieving greater gain in terms of business in the
future; this keeps the negotiation process fairly straightforward, resulting in
a positive process or frame. Colemen (2000) implies that negotiators differ
in processing social information about such power, stating, “whether it is
limited or expandable, competitive or cooperative (i.e., distributive or inte-
grative), or equal or unequal” (p. 23) will depend on the orientation of the
situation and their willingness to use this power. International negotiations
are also characterized by long-term expectations of future business (Ghauri
& Usunier, 2003) implying the importance of reference. Garcia (2002) states
if this source of power is made transparent, positive processes are likely.
Hence the following hypothesis is made:
H4: The perception of reference or the use of referent power by either party will
lead the negotiation toward an integrative process.
Figure 1 represents the proposed relationships between the sources of

power and the international business negotiation process frame. It represents
the perceptions of power by either of the parties in the negotiation and their
existence is assumed to affect negotiation process frames.
Figure 1. Proposed hypothesized relationships of elements of power and the negotiation

process.
Research methodology
Participants in the study were executives who had been involved in
international business negotiations. To gain an appropriate population we
assumed that foreign multinational enterprise (MNE) managers of
subsidiaries based in the UK would have international business negotiation
experience within their work environments with UK or European counter-
parts. The rationale for this assumption was that most business transactions
are preceded by business negotiations (Reynolds et al., 2003), and therefore
foreign MNE managers of subsidiaries would have appropriate international
business negotiation experience. The initial population consisted of managers
from lists that were obtained from various sources, such as (1) The British
Chambers of Commerce Directory of International Members based in the
UK; (2) Manchester Business School Alumni Network lists; and (3) lists of
foreign MNE subsidiaries based in the UK obtained from the database
AMEDUS. These lists were considered reliable and comprehensive in detail-
ing the electronic contacts, names, and positions, as well as identifying which
foreign subsidiaries were inactive within the UK. We identified 1,213 potential
respondents, who were sent a series of invitation and reminder e-mails
describing the nature of the study, and an invitation to participate if they felt
that they could be classified as executives with experience in international
business negotiations. Thereafter, they were asked to recall their last inter-
national business negotiation experience when filling in the questionnaire.
Following two reminder e-mails explicitly inviting the participation of
experienced business negotiators only, 155 useable questionnaires were com-
pleted online. This data collection process took approximately three months.
The study encompassed relevant respondents including business managers

and negotiation practitioners from (1) international management consultan-
cies specializing in advising on international negotiation strategies; (2) inter-
national business negotiators within international trade; (3) procurement
consultants; (4) real-estate negotiators; and (5) sales negotiators. More than
60% of the respondents were male; most responders were 36–40 years old,
and 37% were 41 years of age or older. Approximately 4% of responses came
from individuals aged 61 years or above. More than 57% of the participants
had greater than three years of international business negotiation experience,
confirming the appropriateness of our sample. Only 19% of the respondents
had less than one year of international business negotiation experience. More
than 52% of the respondents were in senior management, 29% were in middle
management, 61% had completed postgraduate studies, and 20% were
educated to undergraduate level.
A two-step approach recommended by Anderson and Gerbing (1988) was
utilized in analyzing the data using structural equation modeling (SEM). This
was executed using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to provide the
reliability and validity of our scales. It is also consistent with other business
research (e.g., Chia-Ling, 2005; Hadjikhani & Thilenius, 2005). Our resulting
model had two components: a measurement model and a structural model.
Substantive research in the social sciences has employed a two-step modeling
approach for theory development and testing (e.g., Bollen, 1989; Chia-Ling,
2005; Li & Calantone, 1998). In this approach the measurement model is
separately estimated prior to the estimation of the structural model. By doing
so, more reliable measurements were secured to avoid interaction between the
measurement and the structural model. After running both measurement and
structural models, our analysis shifted to calculation of the parameter
estimates of the structural model to determine their statistical significance.
Findings
The mean of each of our variables (on a scale from 1 to 5) are shown in
Table 2. We analyzed the data by assessing the measurement model through
CFA analysis, as the measurement items are required to provide adequate
construct validity and reliability for the results of the data analysis to be
credible (Ghauri & Grønhaug, 2005). Putnam (2005) recommends the use
of factor analysis within negotiation research due to its general popularity
within social science. An approach recommended by Anderson and Gerbing
(1988) was utilized to assess the measurement model. A satisfactory measure-
ment model using CFA demonstrates good reliability and validity (Anderson
& Gerbing, 1988). In this research, evidence suggested that the indicator
variables or questions really did measure the underlying constructs of interest
and the model adequately fits the data. For both reliability and validity, there
are a number of different ways that they may be measured using CFA. The
model chi-square was 4029.865 with 1259 degrees of freedom, p < 0.0001.
The “normed” or relative chi-square was (4029.865/1259) = 3.2. RMSEA =
0.113, 90% CI for RMSEA = 0.110; 0.117. The comparative fit index (CFI)
was 1.000 and the goodness of fit index (GFI) was 0.945, and consistent with
the fit statistics suggested by Stevens (2002). Fornell and Larcker (1981)
recommend a minimum composite reliability of .60. An examination of the
composite reliabilities revealed that all meet that minimum acceptable level.
The variance extracted estimates assess the amount of variance that is
explained by an underlying factor in relation to the amount of variance due
to measurement error. Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest that constructs
should exhibit estimates of .50 or larger. Estimates less than .50 indicate
that variance due to measurement error is larger than the variance
captured by the factor. The variance extracted estimates meet this minimum
threshold, so the validity of our latent constructs as well as the associated
constructs was acceptable. Results for various reliability estimates are shown
in Table 3.
Data analysis thereafter focused on assessing the structural model fit. The
aim of the structural model is to determine if the data fits the model well
(Chia-Ling, 2005). A more “parsimonious” model was re-estimated yielding
the following fit statistics. The chi-square for the model was 477.693 with
276 degrees of freedom (p < 0.001). The normed chi-square was 1.73. RMSEA
was 0.065; the 90% CI was 0.055; 0.075. The comparative fit index (CFI) was
1.000 and the goodness of fit index (GFI) was 0.986. These values are indica-
tive of a model that fits very closely with the data. All indices were also better
than those in the previous measurement model. Analysis then moved to the
deduction of the correlations between the constructs of this structural model
to ascertain relationships between the dependent and independent variables.
The results are presented in Table 4.
Hypotheses one stated “The perceptions of having more information
power by one of the negotiating parties will lead to a distributive negotiation
process.” Examination of Table 4 revealed that the correlation between
information power and negotiation process was 0.902, and significant at the
5% level (t = 2.183; p < 0.05). The hypothesized relationship was negative,
suggesting an integrative negotiation process. The results do not support
Table 3. Reliability estimates.

Constructs Composite reliability Variance extracted Cronbach alpha
Information power 0.927 0.568 0.986
Expert power 0.508 0.328 0.828
Legitimate power 0.701 0.541 0.947
Referent power 0.701 0.541 0.947
Negotiation/process 0.670 0.582 0.711
Table 4. Summary of the correlation analysis.

Explanatory variables Proposition Correlation
Information power Competitive/distribution 0.902* (t = 2.183; p < 0.05)
Expert power Cooperative/integration 0.081*(t = 1.171; p < 0.05)
Legitimate power Cooperative/integration 0.056 (t = −0.948; p > 0.10)
Referent power Cooperative/integration 0.145*(t = 2.282; p < 0.05).
*p value < 0.05 (significant).
the hypothesis but suggest that the perceptions of having information power
in either negotiating party will lead to an integrative negotiation process.
Hypothesis two stated, “The perception of existing expert power in either
negotiating parties will lead to an integrative negotiation process.” The
correlation between expert power and negotiation process was negative and
not significant and hence the hypothesis is not supported at the 10% level
(t = −1.171; p > 0.10), and the results cannot be verified.
Hypothesis three stated, “The perception of having greater legitimate power
by one of the parties will lead to an integrative negotiation process.” The cor-
relation between legitimate power and negotiation process was negative and
not statistically significant. These results do not support the hypothesis at
the 10% level (t = −0.948; p > 0.10), and the results cannot be verified.
Hypothesis four stated, “The perception of reference or the use of referent
power by either party will lead the negotiation toward an integrative process.”
Examination of Table 3 revealed that the correlation between referent power
and negotiation process was 0.145 and statistically significant at the 5% level
(t = 2.282; p < 0.05). The results support the hypothesis that the existence of
referent or the use of referent power by either party in a negotiation will lead
to an integrative negotiation process.
In summary, H1, H2, and H4 are thus supported by these results in terms
of significance. Unexpectedly, however, information power was positively
correlated with integrative and cooperative outcomes and processes. The
correlation related to H3 was negative but not statistically significant so this
hypothesis was not supported.
Discussion and implications

We proposed that the perception of having an information advantage that
yielded information power in the negotiation process would lead to the process
being distributive in nature, i.e., a competitive or one-sided process. It is inter-
esting to note that analysis did not support this hypothesis even though it was
statistically significant. Literature regarding information power was divided
between two streams. First, it had pointed out that information power may
be applied in a distributive manner by allowing the information to be manipu-
lated so that parties can manage the options that are available to the other. The
counter party’s choice of behavior, for example, was affected by transmitting

positive information to the other party about the option they want them take,
or by hiding information about an option they don’t want them to take (Raven,
1992) thereby creating suspicion. This use could be perceived as a tactic (e.g.,
Kim et al., 2005). Second, literature indicated information gathered may also
give the impression of adequate preparation for the negotiation and thus inte-
grative processes (e.g., McCall & Warrington, 1984). Our result may however
be explained by observing Brett et al. (1998) who suggested that different
nationalities have different perceptions of information power, and hence the
effect on the overall negotiation process as perceptions of these can be seen
as varying between international negotiators.
Although literature indicated that information power could lead to distri-
bution, our findings suggest an association to integration. Information on
the other party may therefore not be perceived as a tactic or a negative
element within the negotiation itself, but may for instance be seen by the
parties involved as adequate preparation for the negotiation, in terms of gain-
ing information on each of the parties. This preparation may therefore be
perceived in positive terms as an effort to gain better understanding of the
international partners and companies involved, and result in more integrative
process frames for both the parties.
We hypothesized that the perceptions of having expert power is inferred to
better the knowledge between international negotiators, and hence lead to an
integrative negotiation process frame. Viewing the opposite party as superior
in terms of, for example, technology, management, or know-how could alter
the power perceptions, and thus affect negotiations. Lewicki, Barry, and
Saunders (2006) went further to suggest that expert power would aid in clari-
fying operational details. If the negotiating party acts in a negative way with
their expertise, this may lead to distributive negotiations (Anderson &
Thompson, 2004; Kim et al., 2005). The perceptions of this expertise could
also vary from culture to culture (Ghauri & Cateora, 2006).
Information power is negative and significant in terms of statistical signifi-
cance. Schrieshiem, Hinkin, and Podsakoff (1985) pointed out that expert
power can be correlated with information power, though were differentiated
in conceptual terms stating “theoretical reasons for expecting the power bases
to be correlated in real-world samples do exist” (p. 55). Expert power may
have elements of information power, i.e., expert knowledge; either tacit or
explicit is composed of information and knowledge accumulated by compa-
nies (Penrose, 1959). With this rationale, we can propose (conceptually) that
expert power may yield integrative processes given our results on H1.
This study proposed that the perceptions of legitimate power (e.g., top
management) at the negotiation would lead to an integrative process, through
the presence of decision makers in the negotiation. The results cannot be
verified due to lack of statistical significance, though the direction can be
observed to be negative. The perception of legitimate power stemming from

top management may be negative if used inappropriately with some
nationalities. Power if used positively can lead to favorable perceptions of real-
ized power to both the parties. Hence if legitimate power is used negatively,
distribution is possible.
The existence of reference or the use of referent power was inferred to
create the potential of future business, and hence lead to an integrative
negotiation process. Our analysis supports this hypothesis to a significant
level. The potential for reference can create a cooperative or integrative atmo-
spheres and outcomes in negotiations (Khakhar and Rammal [2013] state that
informal connections in IBNs greatly aid outcomes in the Middle East).
Cavusgil and Ghauri (2002) point out that the strong market position of either
of the negotiating parties (implying the possibility of reference through domi-
nance in the market) is an element that influences the negotiation process.
The ways international negotiators process information about such power
may usually differ, and even if the negotiations are cooperative or competitive,
would depend essentially on the orientations of the situation in terms of per-
sonal motivation (Khakhar & Leigh, 2015) and general willingness to use this
referent power. This is also consistent with existing theory and the conceptual
model by Ghauri and Usunier (2003), i.e., power is relative to both sides in an
negotiation process, and one may have relatively greater power, if there is an
equal “dependence” Ghauri (1983, 1996) by an opposite party. The potential
of referred business may create this dependence as also implied by Khakhar
and Rammal (2013).
With regard to the implications of this finding, it will also depend on
whether parties actually use referent power and their individual motivation
to share personal points of reference and connections. Negotiators’ personal
motivational issues can come from personal gains (e.g., bonuses for successful
negotiations), possibility of developing connections as well as value placed on
personal performance (Pitulla & Nicholson, 2005). A negotiator’s self-
motivation may influence the negotiation, as there are perceptions the
opposite side can make on the strength of the particular team by observing
individual motivation of their members Manning and Robertson (2004) also
suggested that the negotiator must be motivated at a personal level to achieve
integrative processes. Brooks and Rose (2004) argue that negotiation pro-
cesses are also influenced by the reward structure as well as power relations.
Game theory however, stated individuals make decisions that ultimately lead
to self-gain (e.g., Myerson, 1999), and mould all mental processes to achieve
this personal gain. The Theory of the Firm also suggested the notion of indi-
vidual “opportunism” implying individual motivations (Murnighan, Babcock,
Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999). It is interesting to note that Myerson (1999)
states that all human actions are dictated and altered, at either an explicit
or implicit conscious level for self-gain. In this situation the best outcome
would be some monetary gain at the personal level (e.g., bonuses for perfor-
mance), and at worst, no loss at the individual level (Duvalett et al., 2004).
Hence, we can infer that if an international negotiator thinks something
can be gained at an individual level (through reference and hence referent
power), his or her actions (e.g., motivations) could be altered in achieving this
personal gain dictating corresponding behaviors. This resulting behavior has
implications for both integrative and distributive negotiation process frames.
If it does, concessions could be made in the short term in view of long-term
business and relationships. This is prevalent in literature concerning Chinese
negotiations (e.g., Fang, 1997) and their importance based on forming future
relationships. If referent power is not used, then short-term concessions that
could have been made would not arise. Given this, the issue of trust must be
taken into account (Khakhar & Rammal, 2013) i.e., giving the impression of
future reference when it does not exist (and if this is realized by either of the
parties) may be viewed as a tactic, possibly leading to distributive or competi-
tive negotiation frames. Our analysis only indicates that the perception of ref-
erence leads to integrative process frames and that the relative perception of
genuine referent power can lead to integrative process frames. We have not
explored the relationship between the genuine or non-genuine perception of
referent power in the international business negotiation process, leaving this
question open for a potential base of future research. However, in a study by
Hadjikhani and Thilenius (2005), higher trust was positively associated with
commitment in business networks. Hence it may be possible to infer that a
greater the relationship trust between the parties would entail a greater com-
mitment between the parties in a business network implying a genuine use of
referent power. Again, for genuine future referred business, the element of
trust is important (Kim et al., 2005) as there is a possibility that it could be
perceived as a tactic (Khakhar & Rammal, 2013).
Limitations and directions for future research

It is important to note some of the limitations of the current study. Where
possible, we recommend further investigation to enhance our findings. Even
though the response rate is comparable to studies of a similar nature in social
sciences, it is still subject to the common biases associated with similar
methods. Examples of these biases include sample selection bias and self-
reporting bias.
Second, this study highlighted the important elements of social power
inspired by Raven (1965), but did not study the impact of each of the elements
on different parties in the negotiation, i.e., dyads. Instead, as previously stated,
the view was taken that the underlying factors would apply to all parties, and
ultimately their interests in the negotiation could be both mutual and conflict-
ing in terms of price or cost (Cavusgil & Ghauri, 2002; Ghauri & Usunier,
2003). As a result, we did not distinguish the operational types of negotiations.

This study approached the topic from a culture-neutral point of view.
Therefore, the current study is limiting in this area. However, given this, an
interesting area of further investigation with regard to individual motivation
arises; researchers could assess the perceptions of personal motivation and the
use of referent power in different types of negotiations (and distinguishing
negotiating parties), or varying perceptions of motivations in different cul-
tures or nationalities (e.g., applying the scales in this study between competing
sets of cultures in international business negotiations can be proposed to infer
conclusions that could be added to various prescriptive cross-cultural issues).
Could it also be possible that motivated or “eager” negotiators (overstating
their referent power or connections) cause competitive negotiation processes,
with varying results for type of negotiations as well as potential cultural
parties involved? As this research report did not examine these areas, further
study is recommended to build upon our conclusions. Again, these percep-
tions could be either culture or negotiation specific and addressing these
points could also generate a deeper understanding of the complexity of
international business negotiations.
The third limitation can be viewed in general terms by questionnaires.
Questionnaire surveys are a good method of researching negotiations if the
objective of the study is to deduce perceptions, and assess the distribution
of those among the population. A major drawback of questionnaires, parti-
cularly in international negotiation research, is that the questions that are
asked are couched in the researcher’s frame of reference, and hence run the
great risk of missing important information that is outside that frame
(Wright, 1990). The influence of different researchers means that survey items
which may be inferred by one researcher may not be precisely those inferred
by another researcher. The questionnaire items obtained by the researcher in
this research are obtained from the ‘lens’ or the mind-frame of the researcher,
and therefore experience a degree of subjectivity, in relative terms to other
researchers who may have conducted the same study.
The fourth limitation relates to our methodology including measurement
and structural models; it must be noted that a SEM is not absolute, but relative
per se. We accept that simplifying subjective concepts in negotiation study to
linear structural equations may not reveal the true complexity and dynamism
of negotiations themselves. Although structural equations analyses are intended
for, and very effective in hypothesis-testing analysis among a comprehensive set
of variables, it remains a statistical approach for determining causality, not a
temporal one. Negotiations vary and their related variables may also alter with
time (Ghauri & Usunier, 2003). Repeating the study using different sequences
of actual negotiations can, however, be a very difficult task and may signifi-
cantly reduce the sample size required for a SEM method. The possibility of
following a negotiating team within the frame of one (or several related)
business deals for a longer time might yield important new insights into negoti-
ation process. To do this, either a researcher might be present during sequential
negotiations, or participants would be asked to keep a protocol or complete
questionnaires of their actions at every stage of the process (Agndal, 2007).
Another important objective would be to determine how training should be
designed to help negotiators act collaboratively and the use of certain forms of
power. At the same time, can negotiators also learn assertive behavior
(or learn to alter power dynamics) to probe and test the other party’s limits
in an aim to achieve a more favorable outcome as suggested by Khakhar
and Leigh (2015)?
Conclusion
Research on international business negotiation has been underway for 35 years
and has developed within two major paradigms: the macro-strategic, which
focuses on organizational wholes, and the micro-behavioral, which focuses
on individuals (Weiss, 2006). This research report adds to the micro-
behavioral stream focusing on individuals and the bases of social power.
The purpose of this research was to further the empirical understanding of
factors related to international business negotiations and concepts of social
power, and their link to corresponding processes. Previous prescriptive
studies, although extremely useful in contributing to the understanding of
often complex and dynamic negotiation processes, are sometimes lacking in
quantitative analysis of real-life negotiation experiences.
Gaining an empirical understanding of the factors studied will add to the
existing body of academic and practical knowledge in a specific way. The study
of international business negotiations is often subjective and theories about
them are constantly being updated. An existence of a body of empirical analy-
sis will aid the evolution of the discipline for both scholars and practitioners.
Successful negotiation experiences should result in both parties feeling more
satisfied with the relationship, thus enabling the parties to reap the benefits stem-
ming from a long-term involvement. Thus, negotiation can be examined as a
management mechanism that can allow both parties to benefit from the experi-
ence and move toward a stronger relationship (Atkin & Rinehart, 2006).
Research that explores the impact of negotiator characteristics on negotiations
will, we believe, facilitate the creation of these strong relations through the prag-
matic understanding of the impact of these individual level characteristics.
Note
1. Wasta is an Arabic word that loosely translates into nepotism, “clout,” or “who you
know.” The English word cronyism overlaps in meaning but is not precisely the same. It also
refers to someone with a good leverage of social capital.
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The Concepts of Power in International Business Negotiations An Empirical Investigation

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JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL MANAGEMENT

2017, VOL. 22, NO. 1, 25–52

The concepts of power in international business

Introduction and literature review

can also affect the cooperation/conflict balance. Foreign exchange instability

negotiations and communication (Ghauri & Usunier, 2003; Schellenberg,

Effective business negotiation is a core leadership and management skill. In

Research question and variables

Independent variables: Power in negotiations

This has implications for international business negotiations.

Table 2. Average power variable scores.

sources of information, which are of significance for the performance of

(Kotter, 1979; Raven, 1992). For example, an expert winemaker negotiating

This is related to the “location in structure” variable suggested by French &

Figure 1 represents the proposed relationships between the sources of

Figure 1. Proposed hypothesized relationships of elements of power and the negotiation

The study encompassed relevant respondents including business managers

Table 3. Reliability estimates.

Table 4. Summary of the correlation analysis.

Discussion and implications

counter party’s choice of behavior, for example, was affected by transmitting

observed to be negative. The perception of legitimate power stemming from

Limitations and directions for future research

2003). As a result, we did not distinguish the operational types of negotiations.

Dupont, C. (1991). International business negotiations. In V. A. Kremenyuk (Ed.),

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