Competition by Denunciation:

The Political Dynamics of Corruption Scandals in Argentina and Chile

“Politics is knowing when to pull the trigger.”

Don Lucchesi, in The Godfather, Part III.

Manuel Balán
Government Department
University of Texas at Austin

Abstract

In the last two decades, corruption has become a key concern throughout the world. Most
of what we know about corruption comes from those instances in which misdeeds
become public, usually generating a scandal. Why do some acts of corruption become
corruption scandals and others do not? In addressing this question, this article argues that
scandals are not triggered by corruption per se, but that the emergence of corruption
scandals is caused by political competition dynamics within the party or coalition in
government. Government insiders leak information on misdeeds in order to gain power
within the coalition or party in power.
After conceptualizing corruption scandals and dividing their temporal process in three
stages, this article argues that there are two alternative strategies followed by insiders that
lead to scandals. The arguments advanced are evaluated using empirical evidence from
two paradigmatic Latin American cases, Argentina and Chile, from 1989 to 2008. The
findings presented support the notion that corruption scandals emerge as a consequence
of intra-government competition; suggesting that the prevalence of scandals points to
shortcomings in how political systems channel conflicts within the party or coalition in
power.
 Balán |1

During the early nineties, many Latin American countries experienced a number

of major corruption scandals. The current decade followed the same trend, as we

witnessed scandals such as the Mensalão scandal in Brazil, the Senate bribery scandal in

Argentina, and the MOP-Gate scandal in Chile. Corruption scandals shook politics across

the region, and even countries such as Chile and Uruguay—usually held as the region’s

golden examples when it comes to clean politics—saw the stability of their political

sphere being threatened by the disclosure of public misdeeds.

While levels of actual corruption are usually perceived to be quite stable across

time1—signaling that corruption is a structural and systemic phenomenon (Leiken 1997,

Kaufmann 1997, Golden and Chang 2001, Flanagan and Lee 2000)—corruption scandals

emerge only at some points in time, indicating that there must be a number of corrupt acts

that never become public. If this is the case, then what explains why some corrupt acts

turn into scandals, while others remain in the dark, without society ever finding out?

Contrary to existing explanations that extol the role of the media and horizontal or

societal accountability mechanisms,2 or that argue that more scandals simply arise from

corruption,3 this article analyzes the incentives and constraints faced by potential

informants at different stages of scandals’ emergence and contends that most corruption

scandals are triggered by competition among government actors. In other words,

1
Conventional indicators of corruption that rely on perceptions, such as the Corruption Perception Index
developed by Transparency International, show little year-by-year variation. For example, from 2002 to
2008, Chile’s values range between 6.9 and 7.5, and Argentina’s from 2.5 and 2.9.
2
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz (2006: 11) argue that societal accountability exposés and denounces cases of
government wrongdoing. Peruzzotti (2006) focuses on the role of watchdog journalism and societal
controls in generating scandals. Waisbord (2006: 283) pushes the journalistic angle even further pointing
out that “all scandals are media scandals.” Thompson (2000) also emphasizes the role of the media in
uncovering wrongdoings and generating scandals. Pérez-Liñan (2007: 85) states that “greater press freedom
and a new professional ethos among journalists created the right environment for the politics of scandal.”
Lawson (2002: 151) highlights the role of the mass media over other institutional features in generating
Mexican scandals.
3
Weyland (1998) advances the hypothesis that the surge of scandals is due to the rise in levels of
corruption in recent years in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.
 Balán |2

government insiders leak damaging information on other political actors as a part of

intra-government political competition for power and resources. By examining the

politics of corruption scandals, the present analysis shows how scandals are more likely

under specific configurations of inter and intra party or coalition competition. A principal

argument advanced in this study and assessed empirically is that denouncers are generally

government insiders. Hence, contrary to existing literature that highlights the role of the

opposition (Nyhan 2008, Woessner 2005, Davis, Camp, & Coleman 2004) or of societal

groups in denouncing corruption, I contend that the original leak of information comes

from within the party or coalition in government.4

The relevance of corruption and corruption scandals in Latin America cannot be

overstated.5 Public opinion data show6 that societies in the region rate corruption as one

of the most pressing political issues. Legislators and policy-makers have attempted to

respond by pushing a number of anticorruption measures, but with mixed results at best.7

Since we only become aware of corruption when it becomes scandalous, it seems that it is

precisely the salience and frequency of scandals that produced such high concerns about

corruption in the region. Furthermore, according to Hochstetler (2006: 405), scandal is a

crucial factor in explaining why presidents are challenged and eventually fall. However,

and despite growing attention to the issue, it remains unclear how corruption scandals

come to light and how they should be interpreted.

4
The study of coalition governments in presidential systems was initially overshadowed by the analysis of
coalitions in parliamentary systems. However, there is a growing literature that analyzes presidential
coalitions. For some examples see Cheibub et al (2004), Amorim Neto (2002), Figueiredo (2007).
5
A recent report by the Instituto Libertad (2009), estimates the costs of known corruption in Chile from
1990 to 2008 to be as high as $1633 million dollars.
6
Corruption is consistently considered among the three most important problems with democracy in Latin
America according to Latinobarómetro.
7
For a review of mechanisms adopted to fight corruption and an assessment of their success, see Spector
(2005).
 Balán |3

The arguments and empirical evidence presented in this article point to

unresolved issues in Latin American democracies. Instead of showing growing levels of

corruption or highlighting the importance of horizontal control mechanisms, this article

suggests that the emergence of corruption scandals signals the incapacity of political

systems to properly channel conflict and dissent within parties or coalitions in

government.

This article proceeds as follows. First, it defines corruption scandals,

distinguishing them from actual corruption, and proposes to divide their dynamic process

into three distinct stages. Second, arguing that the first stage is key in understanding the

causes of corruption scandals, it develops a theory and hypotheses about how scandals

emerge, based on the analysis of the political incentives and constraints faced by

government insiders. The third section outlines the research design used to evaluate the

hypotheses, detailing the logic behind case selection, measurements and indicators, and

sources of data. The fourth and final section provides a qualitative empirical assessment

of the theoretical expectations with evidence compiled by the author on the cases of

Argentina and Chile from 1989 to 2008. The final section concludes by presenting some

broader implications of the findings presented.

I. Corruption Scandals: Concept and Stages

I.a. Defining Corruption Scandals

Nowadays, Corruption scandals are referred to daily in newspapers and academic

publications. However, it is particularly important to distinguish corruption scandals from

 Balán |4

actual corruption. Despite being used interchangeably by some authors,8 corruption and

corruption scandal are not the same, as corruption—commonly defined as the misuse of

public office for private gain9—does not imply the publicity of the actions, but rather just

the actions taking place. In fact, corruption that does not become scandalous can be

considered to be “successful” corruption, in the sense that it achieves secrecy, which is—

or at least should be—a key concern of those committing the corrupt acts. Corruption

scandals imply both the public disclosure of a misdeed that constitutes corruption10 as

well as the public upheaval it produces. In other words, and going beyond Lowi’s (1988:

vii) definition, corruption scandals are defined as “corruption revealed” that generates a

strong public reaction.

I.b. Corruption Scandals through Time:

As Thompson (2000: 72) notes, corruption scandals have “a certain temporal and

sequential structure.” Put differently, corruption scandals are complex and dynamic

processes that unfold through time. Although the evolution of scandals rarely follows a

strictly predefined path, some authors have attempted to disentangle this process

(Thompson 2000 and Jiménez 2004). Building on this literature, this article distinguishes

three stages: the trigger stage, when information on the transgression is leaked; the

spread stage, when the information is made public to a wider audience, and the response

stage, when those involved in the scandal react. The duration and intensity of each stage

8
Golden & Chang (2001), focusing on the case of Italy, argue that intra-party competition results in
increasing levels of actual corruption, measured as the amount of congressional denouncements, which
blurs the distinction between actual corruption and corruption scandals.
9
This definition is widely used in the literature. Its origins date back to Nye (1967).
10
As a matter of fact, as Jiménez (1994: 14) points out, scandals might take place without the acts of
corruption never occurring. Hence, it may be more precise to speak of “purposed” public misdeeds.
 Balán |5

may vary from scandal to scandal, but the general structure allows for comparisons across

corruption scandals that at first sight may seem individually unique events.

The trigger stage begins when damaging information involving corrupt acts by

public officials is disclosed or leaked.11 Not all corrupt acts are triggered to become a

scandal. In fact, the transformation from corruption to scandal does not follow a linear

process. More corruption does not imply more disclosure of these events, and conversely,

just because we observe more disclosure of corrupt activities, it does not necessarily

imply that more corruption is taking place. The disclosure of information requires two

main components. First, the information must be previously concealed, which implies

that someone is revealing events that were unknown to the rest of society. Second, the

information must come from a reliable and credible source, which generally is a function

of the source’s proximity to actors involved in the transgressions.

What actors have access to undisclosed information and are, at the same time,

credible and reliable sources? This article argues that government insiders are in the

privileged position of having access to information that is not generally available, and

that they constitute reliable sources.12 Although insiders are not the only actors who can

leak information on corruption, the arguments advanced suggest that they are more likely

to disclose misdeeds given their position and incentive structure.

In the spread stage the disclosed information becomes available to a wider

audience in society, becoming scandalous. The media plays a key role in this stage,

11
The alleged transgressions themselves occur at a prior point in time and are usually unobservable, as a
process of concealment generally follows illicit activities.
12
This point regarding the importance of inside sources was pointed out by a number of journalists
interviewed by the author. In Argentina, María O’Donnell (2005: 231, and personal interview 9/13/2006),
Jorge Lanata (personal interview 9/5/2006), Martín Rodríguez Yebra (personal interview 10/26/2006),
Pablo Abiad (personal interview, 10/27/2006). In Chile: Guillermo Sunkel (2005: 73), Hugo Traslaviña
(2003: 13), Javier Ortega and Andrea Insunza (personal interview 4/26/2007), Claudia Lagos (personal
interview 4/27/2007).
 Balán |6

receiving and spreading the information about the transgression. Given this mostly

amplifying role, this article argues that the media generally does not uncover corrupt acts,

but rather follows leads and information provided by their sources, spreading this

information to the rest of society.13 As is pointed out by existing literature (Thompson

2000: 78, Sunkel & Geoffroy 2001: 15), the media is far from “innocent.” Each media

company has its own agenda and set of incentives and constraints, which can be

ideological, economic, or both. However, assuming the existence of a competitive media

market and a minimum level of media independence from political power, it can be

argued that an informer who is determined to make information public can usually find

some way of achieving publicity. In other words, even if individual newspapers or TV

channels have political or economic agendas that may sometimes go against the

publication of certain corruption scandals, the existence of a competitive media market

with a plurality of voices ensures that attractive and marketable news—such as corruption

scandals involving government officials—get published.14

After the scandal is out in the public domain, those who are seen as responsible

for the transgression can react to the accusations in the response stage of corruption

scandals. Those implicated may respond by either not addressing the issue or by denying

their involvement, as Eduardo Arriagada did in the MOP-Gate scandal that rattled

Chilean politics in 2002.15 Alternatively, they may claim that their actions were justified

by a higher and more relevant goal, as Carlos Cruz, former public works minister, did in

13
Even proponents of arguments that emphasize the importance of watchdog journalism recognize the
reactive nature of the media and civil society. (Waisbord 2000: xxiii, 93, and 197; Waisbord 2006: 285;
Peruzzotti 2006: 266). They overlook a crucial issue addressed in this article: when and under what
conditions credible information becomes available?
14
It is not clear how media competition can be rigorously assessed, and hence it is difficult to establish
exactly how much competition is necessary. In any case, and according to Waisbord (2000: 69), Argentina
has a relatively high level of media competition.
15
La Segunda, 11/12/2002. p. 221. “Nunca recibimos ni giramos esos cheques.”
 Balán |7

the same Chilean scandal.16 Finally, the allegedly corrupt may respond by producing

counter-allegations implicating other political figures in either the same or a different

transgression. These counter-allegations, if spread to a wider audience, can either prolong

the existing scandal or create the seeds for new corruption scandals.17 Hence, the

response stage, if the denounced decides to make counter-allegations, can become the

trigger for new scandals, building chains of scandals that can potentially attract public

attention and shake politics for extended periods of time.

Identifying different temporal stages of corruption scandals is key to

distinguishing between causes and necessary conditions. Although the spread of

information is a necessary condition for a scandal to happen, the actual causes are present

at the triggering stage, when there is an information leak that allows for a scandal to

develop. As Waisbord (2006: 196) points out, “had [the insiders] not come forward with

sensitive and compromising information, most reporters agree, it is doubtful that most

exposés would have ever surfaced.” The following section builds on the idea that

triggering stage determines the emergence of scandals, and analyzes what factors and

political strategies lead to information disclosure, generating expectations that are later

evaluated exploring the cases of Argentina and Chile.

(Figure 1 about here)

16
El Mercurio 2/12/2003. p.5. “Ex ministro Cruz admite y justifica pagos a empresas.”
17
One of the biggest corruption scandals in Latin America emerged in response to prior allegations: the
Mensalão scandal in Brazil emerged thanks to the counter allegations produced by Roberto Jefferson, in
response to prior accusations (Camarotti & de la Peña 2005: 113-116; Pereira, Powe, & Raile, 2008: 16).
 Balán |8

II. Insiders and Outsiders, Ship-jumping and Leap-frogging

Consider, as was previously stated,18 that there is always a certain level of

corruption happening that if disclosed could become scandalous. As Tumber & Waisbord

(2004) point out, “everyone in politics (…) realizes that if you examine more closely and

for long enough, damaging information can be found on almost anyone” (1034).

Knowledge about such corrupt acts is available to political actors as a function of their

proximity to the acts. Hence, if we define corruption as the misuse of public office for

private gain, we can expect factions or parties19 that are part of the government coalition

to possess information about the misdeeds of government actors. Meanwhile, outsiders—

parties or factions that are not part of government—are less likely to have first-hand

access to such information. Following a similar logic, the level of implication in

potentially scandalous corruption is a function of the level of participation in the

government coalition. Factions or parties that are important members of the government

coalition have more power and are more likely to be implicated in misdeeds. Meanwhile,

minor partners in government are less likely to be involved in corruption as their role in

government and their access to resources and the decision making process is limited.

Given these conditions, this article argues that most original revelations or leaks

of government corruption come from secondary factions or actors inside the government.

Why and under what conditions will insiders decide to disclose misdeeds, potentially

generating a corruption scandal that can hurt the government? The hypotheses presented

18
See footnote 2.
19
Belloni and Beller (1976) draw parallels between the internal competitive dynamics of coalitions and
parties. Rose (1964) and Nicholas (1965) argue that although coalitions are formed by parties and parties
by factions, these only constitute levels of aggregation that do not inherently imply different dynamics.
Internal divisions might be clearer and starker in coalitions than in parties, but the dynamics are similar and
hence comparable.
 Balán |9

here suggest that government insiders have incentives to denounce members of their own

coalition as a function of their competition for political power. According to their

position within the government coalition (the distribution of power resources) and the

electoral threat posed by the opposition, insiders may choose to leak information on

government misdeeds as part of two possible strategies.

The first of these strategies is to attempt to gain greater power within the

government coalition by hurting more powerful allies. An insider may leak information

on wrongdoings by the dominant faction of the coalition as an attempt to “leap-frog” and

strengthen its relative position within the coalition. However, leap-frogging is costly not

only for the dominant faction implicated in the corruption scandal, but also for the

government coalition as a whole, as the emergence of a corruption scandal within the

government hurts its reputation and can potentially help the opposition. Hence, a

powerful opposition acts as a constraint on the insiders looking to leap-frog.

The second strategy is to exit or “jump-ship” from the government coalition,

while in the meantime attempting to hurt its reputation by involving it—or its leaders—in

a corruption scandal. In this case, an insider that is not satisfied by the distribution of

power and posts imposed by the dominant factions chooses to exit the government

coalition and join the opposition. Since these “break-ups” are usually less than friendly,

those exiting the government may choose to leave with a bang, implicating public

officials in corruption and using this as a political weapon that both justifies their

decision to exit the government coalition, and also shines more public attention on their

departure from government.

 B a l á n | 10

The insiders’ decisions on whether or not to jump-ship may also be affected by

the power of the opposition. However, this effect is non systematic and depends on the

specifics of each case. On one hand, if the opposition is weak or fragmented, potential

ship-jumpers may perceive that there is nowhere to jump to. Hence, a weak opposition

can be seen as a constraint. On the other hand, if the opposition is strong, the costs of

defecting increase, as the option taken by potential ship-jumpers implies exiting the

government coalition and entering an already organized opposition, which may have little

room for newcomers.20 In this way, a strong opposition may also pose constraints.

Therefore, intra-government competition poses incentives for ship-jumpers, but the

power of the opposition may or may not pose constraints.

Following the logic described in these two insiders’ strategies, it is possible to

arrive to the following hypotheses:

H1: Governments with high levels of Intra-Government competition among

parties or factions are more likely to experience corruption scandals, as

insiders face increased incentives to either jump-ship or leap-frog.

H2: Governments facing high levels of Inter-Party competition (a strong

opposition) are less likely to experience corruption scandals, as insiders face

increased constraints to leap-frog.

The logic of these arguments is similar to a nested game: “instead of assuming

that people play games in a vacuum, (…) these games are embedded in some higher-

order network” (Tsebelis 1988: 146). In the argument presented, the higher order game is

determined by the constraints imposed by inter-party competition. Meanwhile, the lower

20
The ideological distance of the opposition from the government would also generate a constraint to
trigger a corruption scandal. This effect is not within the scope of this study, and calls for further research
 B a l á n | 11

order game is determined by the incentives to leak information generated by the tensions

emerging from intra-government competition.

III. Research Design and Methods

III.a Design, Case Selection, and Units of Analysis

The following analysis assesses the impact of intra-government and inter-party

competition on the emergence of corruption scandals. Instead on focusing on each

scandal and tracing its origins,21 this article provides two within countries temporal

analyses: Chile and Argentina from 1989 through 2008. This design poses a demanding

empirical test, as the arguments are evaluated in two different political systems. On the

one hand, Chile has a generally stable government coalition composed of four major

parties and a clearly distinguishable powerful opposition coalition. On the other hand,

Argentina’s political system throughout the period under analysis is defined by the

internal struggles within Peronism (PJ), and a single instance of a multiparty electoral

coalition.22 Furthermore, these two cases also differ in their levels of actual corruption.23

While Chile is consistently considered among the cleanest countries in the region,

Argentina is perceived as one of the most corrupt. Therefore, evaluating the arguments

with evidence from these two countries assesses whether they hold regardless of level of

corruption, casting serious doubts over alternative explanations that argue that more

scandals are a symptom or a consequence of higher levels of actual corruption.

These two temporal analyses take two-year periods as units of analysis, which are

defined slightly differently in the two cases. For Argentina, congressional periods are

21
In fact, many times all that is left are rumors and speculations, and there is never certainty about exactly
who “spilled the beans.”
22
The Alianza Government of Fernando de la Rúa in 1999-2001 is one such exceptional case.
23
See footnote 1.
 B a l á n | 12

considered units of analysis, which provides nine cases. In Chile, congressional and

presidential elections coincide in all but one instance (2000 congressional elections).

Therefore, this article employs a combination of congressional and municipal elections

(Alcaldes and Concejales) in order to define the units of analysis, which also provides

nine cases. The resulting two-year periods are compared through time within each

country, assessing whether the hypothesized political configurations actually do generate

more and more relevant corruption scandals.

In addition to the comparative analysis of units within each country, this article

provides an in-depth look at one presidential period in each country in order to trace the

causal mechanisms behind the arguments advanced. Furthermore, these case studies also

help point to shortcomings in alternative explanations based on actual corruption level

and the role of the media.

III.b. Data, Variables, and Measurements.

Dependent Variable: Corruption Scandals

This study relies on an original database on corruption scandals, based on

seventeen years of the newsletter Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR).24 Published by

Oxford Press, the Weekly Report provides “timely and concise risk-oriented briefing.”25

As corruption is perceived as taxing on investments, LAWR is prone to covering

scandals, reporting only the most important events given its weekly format. The analysis

of LAWR generates a dataset with a natural bias toward more dramatic events. Since the

article’s focus is on major, national level, corruption scandals, LAWR offers a reliable

24
LAWR has been employed by a number of researchers in order to assess similar variables as the one
under study in this article. See Hochstetler (2006), and Pérez Liñán (2007).
25
www.latinnews.com/lwr_/LWR_2315.asp.
 B a l á n | 13

and appropriate source that captures the relevant events to score the dependent variable.26

Furthermore, since LAWR’s coverage includes most Latin American countries, it

provides a measure that lessens the biases of looking at each country’s media market. The

database records each corruption scandal that appears in LAWR as well as how many

weeks the issue is reported. Once the initial database on scandals was constructed, the

author also collected data on each specific scandal performing archival research of

printed local media and secondary sources and accounts of each scandal. Finally, the

author performed a number of semi-structured interviews with key informants in order to

complete the story of each scandal and double-check the information gathered through

archival research.

Independent Variables: Intra-government and Inter-party competition.

In order to trace the configurations of intra-government competition, this article

employs three different sources of data. First, it relies on an analysis of the composition

of cabinets in both countries. Cabinet members are generally the highest public officials

appointed politically, providing a cue for how the coalition of government distributed

resources and power among different political forces (Figueiredo 2007, Siavelis 2002).27

Second, this article employs secondary sources that describe intra-government

competition during each period (i.e. Amorim Neto 2006), and personal interviews held by
26
As a reliability check, the author asked 120 politicians, journalists and political insiders to independently
identify the major corruption scandals in their country during the period of study. All scandals covered by
LAWR were mentioned by at least 73.5% of the respondents, and all but one scandal were mentioned by
over 98% of respondents. Conversely, respondents also identified a number of scandals not covered by
LAWR, although most of them corresponded to events that involved either non-corruption scandals (such
as the Spiniak case in Chile, or the Cabezas case in Argentina) or private corruption scandals, which are
outside the scope of the study.
27
Since data on cabinet formation were not available in a single database, the author collected the
information looking at the Official Bulletins (Boletín Oficial) and secondary sources in each country,
tracing the names and party affiliation of each cabinet member. Then, the composition of each cabinet was
analyzed as a whole in order to assess how many different political forces were represented, and with what
level of power. The difference in importance of different cabinet posts—finance or interior ministers
definitely yield more power than, say, environment ministers—was assessed qualitatively.
 B a l á n | 14

the author in order to supplement and cross check the data gathered from other sources.

Third and last, in the case of Chile, the data on congressional and municipal elections

also provides an indicator of intra-government competition, as the vote share received by

each party within the government coalition, Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia

(Concertación) is indicative of the relative power of each of the members.

The relative power and level of fragmentation of the opposition is analyzed using

data from three sources. First, the composition of legislative bodies provides insight on

the cohesiveness and relative strength of the opposition. Second, in the case of Argentina,

the control of governorships by different parties is also indicative of levels of competition

among different parties. Third, in the case of Chile, data on municipal elections also

allows for an understanding of the power of the opposition coalition, Alianza por Chile,

as well as of its members, Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Renovación

Nacional (RN). Secondary sources and key informant interviews are also employed in

order to provide a more thorough assessment.

IV. Corruption Scandals and Political Competition through Time.

IV.a. Argentina. A hot bed for Corruption Scandals.

From 1989 to 2007, there were 44 national corruption scandals in Argentina. 21

of those made it to the front page of at least two major newspapers, and LAWR reported

on corruption a total of 171 weeks. If scandals were a direct consequence of corruption,

and if corruption were in fact as systematic and structural as many authors point out, we

would expect scandals and coverage to be distributed evenly through time. This would

mean a corruption scandal arising every year, or about 10 weeks of news on corruption

per year. Alternatively, if some governments were more corrupt than others and scandals
 B a l á n | 15

were a direct consequence of corruption, we would expect these governments to

experience more corruption scandals. On the contrary, the data collected show that

corruption scandals in Argentina are not evenly distributed through time, and that there

are important differences in the amount and intensity of scandals, even within

presidencies.

(Table 1 about here)

During the first half of Carlos Saúl Menem’s second presidency, there were 38

weeks with reports on corruption; while in the second half of this term, the number drops

to only 8 weeks. Did corrupt practices simply stop from one day to the next? It seems

unlikely. A closer look at this four-year presidency provides a comparison that traces the

process of the theorized causal mechanisms at play.

Menem began his second presidency after defeating the candidates from Unión

Cívica Radical (UCR), Horacio Massacessi, and Frepaso, José Octavio Bordón, by more

than 15% of the votes. He had convinced Argentineans that he was essential to the hard

earned economic stability experienced during the last years. Domingo Cavallo, Menem’s

“star” economic minister, considered himself to be creator of the argentine model and the

key guarantee for stability, given his ties to foreign interests. But he represented only one

of the three main factions that had been present within Menem’s government since 1989.

The peronist Celestes were closer to Cavallo: they had become market believers in the

early nineties. On the other hand, the peronist Rojo Punzó—a group composed mainly of

personal acquaintances from Menem’s days as Governor of La Rioja—had less sympathy

towards the self-proclaimed “father of the model.” The feeling was mutual, and had

already become evident as Cavallo denounced and pushed the Yoma Gate in 1991 and
 B a l á n | 16

the Arms Sale scandal that shocked Argentina in 1995 (Cavallo 1997, Santoro 1998, and

Santoro, personal interview 10/17/2006), which implicated the major figures among the

Rojo Punzó faction.

While conflict grew within the PJ government, the opposition was in crisis. The

historical UCR came in third in the 1995 presidential election, discredited after signing

the Pacto de Olivos that allowed for Menem’s reelection. Frepaso, a coalition of former

peronists and small center-left leaning parties, was still weak at the national level, since it

lacked any sort of party machinery. The PJ had achieved absolute majority in both

chambers of Congress, and 14 provinces had PJ governors. There was simply no party

that could compete with the powerful PJ.

In this context, high intra-government competition and low inter-party

competition generated plenty of incentives and little constraints for government insiders

to leak damaging information. In line with theoretical expectations, this two-year period

is the most scandalous of all periods analyzed, with 9 new scandals—6 of which made it

to the front page of national newspapers—that generated 38 weeks of coverage in

LAWR. Alberto Kohan and the rest of the Rojó Punzó pushed the IBM-Banco Nación28

and the Parallel Customs scandals, which involved some of Cavallo’s closest

collaborators, tarnishing his “anti-mafia image.” (Soriani 1996: 239-243, Cavallo 1997:

160-172, Bonasso 1999: 336). In the meantime, Cavallo denounced the businessman

Alfredo Yabrán and his maneuvers to gain monopoly of the mail, revealing his ties with

many members of the Rojo Punzó and Celestes factions, including Kohan and Erman

González, among others (Bonasso 1999). Cavallo also provided information on the

involvement of Rodolfo Barra (close Menem and Kohan ally, and supreme court justice
28
Página/12 8/17/1995. Cada Cual defiende su juego. P. 3.
 B a l á n | 17

at the time) in shady deals, and on his fascist past.29 Menem’s closest allies finally won

the battle for power, and Cavallo left the government.

The internal turmoil and the array of corruption scandals that emerged from cross

allegations among government insiders had an impact on the government approval and

power. As the 1997 congressional elections approached, the two largest opposition forces

(UCR and Frepaso) had joined forces in the Alianza, while the PJ government had lost

public support as a result of the impact of corruption scandals and a slowing economy

after the Tequila Effect. As a result, PJ lost its absolute majority in the House of

Representatives, with the Alianza a close second. Within government, the main source of

conflict had been removed after Cavallo resigned and left office. Furthermore, the old

division between Celestes and Rojo Punzó, which had punctuated the first years

Menem’s government, was now deactivated (Carlos Corach was only remaining Celeste

in the cabinet).

Political dynamics had shifted, and now intra-government competition was

relatively low, and the opposition was more powerful, posing a viable electoral threat to

the ruling PJ. In line with the hypotheses presented in this article, insiders’ incentives to

leak information were low, and constraints were growing, as the opposition had become

powerful. As a result, there were only 3 new corruption scandals during this period, none

of which made it to the front page of national newspapers. The press was not any less

29
Clarin. 7/11/1996. Barra renunció tras las denuncias sobre su pasado de ultraderecha. Gallo, personal
interview
 B a l á n | 18

independent than it was during 1995-1997,30 and there is no reason to believe that actual

corruption was not as rampant as before.

Going beyond Menem’s second presidency, an overall analysis of Argentina from

1989 to 2007 provides further support for the arguments advanced. As shown in Table 2,

intra-government competition was high or mid to high during all three congressional

terms in Menem’s first presidency (1989-1991, 1991-1993, and 1993-1995), as Celestes,

Rojo Punzó, and Cavallistas struggled for power and dominance. During the first two

periods, privatization processes also drove internal conflict, as different political insiders

(Roberto Dromi, González, María Julia Alsogaray) acted as brokers for potential buyers

of national enterprises and services (Capalbo & Pandolfo 1992: 170-173, Cavallo 1997:

75, and 194-195, Corrales 1997-1998: 644). As was analyzed in preceding paragraphs,

Menem’s second presidential term had a high level of intra-government competition

during the first two years, and a considerably lower level the last two.

Thereafter, Fernando de la Rúa’s two-year presidency was also marked by intra-

government tensions. The UCR and Frepaso had joined forces with the sole purpose of

defeating the PJ, and once in power, the differences became evident. From policy

decisions to political appointments, both parties and their most prominent political

leaders—President de la Rúa and Vice President Carlos “Chacho” Álvarez—seemed at

odds almost from the get go. Political and economic crisis forced de la Rúa out of office,

and after a period of uncertainty, Eduardo Duhalde took office. His term had low levels

of intra-government competition, with political conflict taking a back seat to economic

turmoil.

30
Freedom House Scores remained the same (www.freedomhouse.com), and there was very small variation
in the Governance Indicators’ Voice and Accountability score, calculated by the World Bank
(www.govindicators.org).
 B a l á n | 19

Néstor Kirchner took office with little popular support,31 but quickly managed to

put most of the PJ machinery behind him. The first two years of his term (2003-2005),

intra-government competition was low to mid, as his economic Minister, Roberto

Lavagna, seemed to pose the only counterbalance for Kirchner’s small and compact

group of collaborators (Aníbal and Alberto Fernández, Julio De Vido, his sister Alicia

Kirchner, and his wife Cristina Fernández). During 2005-2007, intra-government

competition intensified, as Lavagna left government and Albertistas and Pingüinos

(Penguins32) struggled to become prevalent, while the government coalition became

wider and included some UCR governors, known as Radicales K.

(Table 2 about here)

The UCR opposition was weak during Menem’s first four years in office, 1989-

1991 and 1991-1993. After driving the country into crisis and having to leave office early

in 1989, the opposition witnessed how risky and costly economic policies brought

stability to Argentina’s economy. The PJ controlled both chambers and most of the

governorships. As presidential elections approached in 1995, while the UCR negotiated

the Pacto de Olivos allowing for a second Menem term, Frepaso emerged as the stronger

opposition force. Still, competition at the party system level remained relatively low, and

Menem won a second term by a landslide. As said before, opposition was weak during

the first two years (1995-1997) of Menem’s second presidency, and much stronger in the

second two (1997-1999), with the creation of the Alianza.

31
He came in second to Menem in the first round election with 22.3% of the popular vote, and was
declared the winner after Menem declined to participate in the run-off election.
32
The name Penguins was due to their origin: they were collaborators of Kirchenr since he was governor of
Santa Cruz, a southern province in Argentina’s Patagonia.
 B a l á n | 20

Although divided after 10 years in power, the PJ remained a powerhouse in

Argentine politics during de la Rúa’s government. It kept an absolute majority in the

Senate and more than half the governorships, including Buenos Aires, Córdoba,

Mendoza, and Santa Fe. Then, as Duhalde took office, the Alianza shattered, and the

resulting pieces made up a weak and divided opposition.

Kirchner faced an increasingly fragmented opposition in 2003-2005. While the

UCR had lost most of its historical support, a couple of center-right wing figures

(Ricardo López-Murphy, Mauricio Macri, Jorge Sobich) started to emerge, but lacked

cohesiveness and party organization. On the center-left, to which Kirchner claimed to

belong ideologically, Elisa Carrió and her Afirmación para una República Igualitaria

(ARI) posed a vociferous yet rather weak opposition. Furthermore, Kirchner lacked the

undisputed support of the PJ, and some center-right peronists (Alberto Rodriguez Saá,

Ramón Puerta, Menem) opposed him.33 In the second half of his term, 2005-2007, as

Kirchner became more powerful, the opposition became even weaker. The government

secured absolute majority in the senate, and a large majority in the House of

Representatives, while controlling over two thirds of the governorships.

(Table 3 about here)

The possible combinations of intra-government and inter-party competition result

in four categories, as depicted in Table 4. In support of Hypothesis 1, there are more and

more relevant scandals in periods when insiders have high incentives—high intra-

government competition—to leak information. On the other hand, empirical evidence is

inconclusive regarding Hypothesis 2, as constraints posed by a powerful opposition do

not seem to have an important effect on insiders’ motivations to compete for power
33
Soon, Duhalde, who had picked Kirchner as his successor, would also move to the opposition.
 B a l á n | 21

within government, suggesting that the jump-shipping strategy may be prevalent in these

cases. In all, these findings show the prevalence of corruption scandals in Argentina

during the period under analysis, and provide evidence that highlights the importance of

intra-government dynamics in explaining the emergence of scandals.

(Table 4 about here)

IV.b. Chile. Politics after the transition: The Binominal System and growing Scandals.

In line with conventional wisdom, Chilean politics produced far less scandals than

Argentina. However, of the 15 scandals that appeared in LAWR, 13 made it to the front

page of national newspapers, and the average duration of each scandal in LAWR was

over 5 weeks (30% longer average duration than Argentinean scandals). Chile’s gradual

transition to democracy explains the lack of national level corruption scandals during

Patricio Aylwin’s presidency (the only two scandals actually involved members of

former dictatorial regime).34 As Cavallo (1998) points out, military forces were still

powerful, and the stability of democracy was far from ensured. After those initial years,

more corruption scandals emerged, as political conflicts and debates shifted away from

the stability of the regime, and towards struggles for the control of democratically

established power. In fact, some periods were signaled by the recurring emergence of

scandals. Hence, and similarly to what happened in Argentina, corruption scandals in

Chile are far from evenly distributed through time.

(Table 5 about here)

Table 5 shows noticeable differences in the number and intensity of scandals,

even during a single presidency. During Ricardo Lagos’ first four years in office (2000-

34
A quick look at Argentina’s first four years after the transition to democracy shows the same result: few
if any corruption scandals.
 B a l á n | 22

2004), Chile experienced 8 corruption scandals—all of which made it to front page of

national newspapers—that generated 41 weeks of coverage in LAWR. Conversely,

during the last two years of his term (2004-2006), no new corruption came to light and

generated a scandal. Did the press stop reporting even after equating corruption during

the Concertación governments to violations of human rights during the bloody

dictatorship of the seventies and eighties?35 Did anti-corruption policies actually work

wonders and cleaned corruption from the Chilean State? Once again, these explanations

seem highly unlikely. The following paragraphs provide an analysis of the mechanisms at

play during the Lagos government that explains the remarkable variation in corruption

scandals from 2000-2004 to 2004-2006.

Lagos took office in early 2000, after narrowly defeating Alianza candidate

Joaquín Lavín (UDI) in the run-off election. As the first Concertación President not

coming from Democracia Cristiana (DC), Lagos faced important challenges within his

own coalition. He attempted to maintain the balance of power among DC, Partido

Ssocialista (PS), Partido por la Democracia (PPD), and Partido Radical Social

Demócrata (PRSD), granting a majority of slight cabinet posts to DC (including Soledad

Alvear, Mario Fernández Baeza, and Claudio Huepe García), while having more PS and

PPD ministers that ever before (José Miguel Insulza, Michelle Bachelet, Nicolás

Eyzaguirre Guzmán, José Antonio Gómez Urrutia). Still, the tensions between the leftist

parties (PPD and part of PS) pushing for a “true” social democratic presidency after 10

years of market policies coming from DC, and the centrist DC who supported a

35
A famous article published in El Mercurio on 11/3/2002, entitled “El Memorial de la Corrupción,” was
explicitly pointing to parallels with the Memorial for the Detained-Disappeared.
 B a l á n | 23

continuation of prior policies, were prevalent and growing. Meanwhile, Lagos’ popularity

and the divisions inside the Alianza generated a sense of a rather weak opposition.

Within this context, there were plenty of incentives to leak information due to the

high levels of intra-government competition, while there were low constraints, since the

opposition seemed incapable of winning an election. As expected following the

arguments advanced, cross allegations did not take long to appear. Already on

10/10/2000, La Tercera, one of Chile’s most important newspapers, noted that: “the

compensation scheme scandal emerged from fights within the Concertación.” María

Soledad Lascar (PPD) had leaked information on René Labraña (DC). The conflict made

it all the way to Lagos, who publicly stated that the scheme was going on already during

Eduardo Frei’s administration (1994-2000). This scandal initiated a series of counter-

allegations, mainly between PPD and DC, which generated an array of new scandals

(Golden Handshakes, Bribes in Health Sector), and magnified the MOP-Gate scandal

that had started a few months back.

The Concertación paid the price for these scandals in the 2002 legislative

elections, losing over 10% of the support held in the House of Representatives. However,

the opposition remained weak and divided, leaving the door open to continuous struggles

within the Concertación. Four more corruption scandals emerged in 2002-2004, and some

of the prior period scandals made their way back to the news, with information fed by

political insiders.36 The Corfo, Inverlink, and Roncagua Bribes scandals took front stage

and defined the second third of Lagos presidency.

Although Lagos was able to maintain his popularity, the continuing corruption

scandals and allegations took their toll, and by mid 2004 Lavín was leading the
36
Eugenio Lahera, personal Interview, 3/22/2007, and Patricia Politzer, personal interview 4/02/2007.
 B a l á n | 24

presidential polls for 2006 (CEP, June-July 2004). The opposition was on the upswing,

and the government coalition seemed to be going towards its first electoral defeat since

the return to democracy in 1990. Under these conditions and facing a probable defeat, the

government coalition members closed rank and decided to go against a tradition of

behind the doors decisions, and let popular support decide the next Concertación

presidential candidate. Intra-government competition declined sharply, while the

opposition was seen as posing a credible electoral threat. As a result of this change in

political dynamics, Chile went from having 8 news scandals and 41 weeks of coverage in

2000-2004, to having no new scandals in 2004-2006.

A complete analysis of Chile from 1990 to 2008 provides further support for the

arguments of this article, despite the fact that corruption scandals seem to constitute

rather rare events compared to what happens in Argentina.

As Engel & Navia (2006) and Huneeus (2006)—among others—point out, the

binominal electoral system imposed in Chile by the dictatorship has had paradoxical

effects on political competition. On the one hand, the system promoted competition

within coalitions and not among political adversaries, since it punished the coalition

receiving the majority of votes, while favoring the first minority (Huneeus 2006:15). On

the other hand, this system led parties within the Concertación to “protect” themselves

and each other. They avoided true competition within the coalition and negotiated within

a context of discipline in order to maintain the artificial equilibrium among parties,

foregoing the goal of maximizing their electoral chances (Huneeus 2006:26, Engel &

Navia 2006: 74, 108, 139).

 B a l á n | 25

Table 6 reveals that the Concertación maintained intra-government competition

under check during the first years of the period under study. Aylwin (1990-1992)

managed a young Concertación, where the DC was the dominating force, and the other

parties in the coalition played along, in light of the remaining threat posed by the

military. As DC continued in power during Eduardo Frei’s government, the transition to

democracy seemed completed. Some internal conflicts emerged in 1994-1996 as the PS,

PPD, and PRSD slowly began the contest for second and the right to file a presidential

candidate from their ranks. (Engel & Navia 2006: 122) The disputes became less

important during 1996-1998: Concertación parties coordinated their candidacies for the

upcoming municipal elections (Engel & Navia 2006: 129-132). Conflict became even

less prevalent in 1998-2000, when Lagos was established as the next Concertación

candidate with over 70% of the vote in the primaries, and the detention of former dictator

Augusto Pinochet in England monopolized public attention (Huneeus 2007).

Intra-government competition during Lagos’ government was analyzed in depth

in prior paragraphs. Suffice to say that internal conflict was high during 2000-2002 and

2002-2004, and became far less intense in 2004-2006. Then, Michelle Bachelet faced

high internal conflict, after her attempt to renew politics appointing young and rather

inexperienced collaborators angered the old guard of both the PS—her party—and the

DC (Engel & Navia 2006: 110).

(Table 6 about here)

The opposition during this period was also affected by the Chilean binominal

electoral system. Furthermore, parties on the right and center-right struggled for years to

detach themselves from the Pinochet dictatorship, which accentuated a cleavage that
 B a l á n | 26

defined Chilean politics for years after the transition to democracy. The two main

opposition parties, RN and UDI, joined forced in a coalition since 1989, known today as

the Alianza. During Aylwin’s government (1990-1994), the opposition was powerful:

what it lacked in popular support (the Concertación won every election since 1990), it

compensated in institutional strength. Among other things, the Military had established

the presence of nine designated senators that ensured an opposition majority in the

Senate.

The electoral problems of the opposition became ever so evident in the

presidential election that designated Frei as president. The Alianza received less than

25% of the vote, compared to 57% received by Frei. However, the opposition retained

certain strength in 1994-1996 thanks to its apparent invulnerable majority in the Senate.

The following municipal elections again showed the popular support for the

Concertación, as it achieved absolute majorities of Alcaldes and Concejales (1996-1998).

In the last two years of Frei’s government (1998-2000), inter-party competition grew, as

economic conditions worsened (Doussaillant 2005: 141, Navia 2006: 15), and Pinochet’s

detention in England allowed the Alianza and it’s presidential candidate, Lavín from

UDI, to “distance himself from the octogenarian general” (Navia 2001: 4).

As was sad before, the defeat in the 2000 presidential election left the opposition

thinking it could have defeated the Concertación. The figure of Lavín generated

divisions, and RN and UDI were in conflict. As a result, the opposition was weak,

particularly during the first two years of Lagos’ government. The corruption scandals of

those years slowly made the opposition slightly more powerful (2002-2004), and by

2004-2006, they were the front-runners for the upcoming presidential election. Somewhat
 B a l á n | 27

surprisingly given the political context, Bachelet won the presidency, maintaining the

government in power of the center-left coalition. This defeat left the opposition even

more divided: Lavín’s power weakened, and Sebastian Piñera (RN) was the self-

proclaimed new leader of the opposition. In 2006-2008 the Concertación had, for the first

time, majorities in both chambers of Congress. The opposition had missed another

opportunity.

(Table 7 about here)

As with the analysis of the cases in Argentina, the possible combinations of intra-

government and inter-party competition result in four categories. The findings support

Hypotheses 1 and 2: there are more and more relevant scandals during periods when

insiders have high incentives and low constraints to leak information. In contrast to the

Argentina case, the power of the opposition seems to pose a more restricting constraint.

This finding can be explained by the difficulties to jump-ship posed by a political system

where there is a clear ideological distance between government and the opposition. The

dominating strategy for insiders when intra-government competition is high is to attempt

to gain power within their existing coalition. More generally, these findings track the

emergence of corruption scandals in Chile, which becomes more prevalent as the traces

of the old dictatorial regime begin to disappear. Competition within government and

among coalitions drives the likelihood of corruption scandals in Chile.

(Table 8 about here)

 B a l á n | 28

V. Conclusion

Corruption Scandals emerge as a consequence of political competition dynamics.

This article provides evidence that undermines the validity of views that extol the role of

watchdog journalism or civil society in triggering corruption scandals. It also puts into

question the assertion that more corruption leads to more corruption scandals, at least

within countries.

The analysis of the cases of Argentina and Chile reveals that although more

corrupt countries may experience more corruption scandals, variation through time in the

number and relevance of scandals is explained by the incentives and constraints posed on

insiders by intra-government and inter-party competition. Moreover, since most measures

of corruption are based on perceptions, it may even be the case that the relative

prevalence of scandals in some countries determines whether we consider a country as

corrupt or not. Further research is necessary in order to test this claims.

In any case, the findings of this study suggest that more emphasis needs to be

placed on the analysis of intra-party or intra-coalition dynamics in presidential systems,

as corruption scandals are a by product of political strategies based on struggles for

power within government. As the emergence of corruption scandals breeds more

scandals, competition by denunciation generates political instability and turmoil as it

hinders the credibility not only of the actors involved in corruption scandals, but also of

the political system as a whole. Political systems in Argentina and Chile as well as

elsewhere, seem ill equipped to properly channel conflict and dissent within parties or

coalitions in government.
 B a l á n | 29

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 B a l á n | 32

FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1. Stages.

Act of Corruption

STAGE 1: Trigger

If there is a leak If there is no leak

No scandal

STAGE 2: Spread

If the information
If the information spreads does not spread No scandal

CORRUPTION SCANDAL

If implicated actor STAGE 3: Response

counter-denounces
 B a l á n | 33

Table 1. Dependent Variable: Corruption Scandals in Argentina.

Period Corruption Total Weeks in Made Front Level of

Scandals LAWR Page of National Scandal
Newspapers
Menem I. 10 Scandals 20 2 High
1989-1991
Menem I. 9 Scandals 20 3 High
1991-1993
Menem I. 2 Scandals 24 2 High
1993-1995
Menem II. 9 Scandals 38 6 High
1995-1997
Menem II. 3 Scandals 8 0 Low
1997-1999
de la Rúa 3 Scandals 33 3 High
1999-2001
Duhalde 0 Scandals 0 0 Low
2002-2003
Kirchner 2 Scandals 3 0 Low
2003-2005
Kirchner 6 Scandals 25 5 High
2005-2007
TOTAL 44 Scandals 171 21
Sources: LAWR, Clarin, Página/12, La Nación, Diario Perfil, Revista Veintitrés, Revista Noticias, Crítica.
 B a l á n | 34

Table 2. Independent Variable. Intra-Government Competition in Argentina

Period Intra-Government Competition

Cabinet Dynamics Score
Menem I. 6 Cabinet Changes.Power struggle between 2 main factions: Celestes (Bauzá, Dromi,), and Rojo High
1989-1991 Punzó (Kohan, Mera Figueroa, González). Business sector is over-represented in relation to prior
campaign.
Menem I. 5 Cabinet Changes. Cavallo emerges as powerful figure, deepening existing struggles between High
1991-1993 Celestes (Bauzá, Manzano), and Rojo Punzó (Kohan, González).
Menem I. 3 Cabinet Changes. Cavallo becomes even more powerful, gets closer to Celestes, which brings Mid to High
1993-1995 balance between factions.
Menem II. 4 Cabinet Changes. Cavallo enters important conflict with Menem and supporters. Cavallo High
1995-1997 Leaves cabinet. Celestes and Rojo Punzó struggle to see who remains dominant.
Menem II. 1 Cabinet Change. Cavallo is out. Rojo Punzó control cabinet (Kohan, Granillo Ocampo, Low to Mid
1997-1999 González, Dominguez, Rodriguez). Only Celeste in cabinet is Corach.
de la Rúa. 6 Cabinet Changes. Frepaso starts with some cabinet posts (Meijide, Flamarique, J.P. Cafiero), High
1999-2001 eventually loses them. Also, deep divisions between old school radicals (Storani, L. Murphy, G.
Lavedra, Terragno) and delaruistas (J. de la Rúa, Gallo, Colombo, R. Giavarini). Outsiders also
get posts in cabinet (Bullrich, Cavallo).
Duhalde. 2 Cabinet Changes. All PJ cabinet members. After economic crisis there is little room for Low
2002-2003 struggles. Few truly powerful ministers (Lavagna, Ruckauf).
Kirchner. 2 Cabinet Changes. Kirchner does not hold cabinet meetings and makes a point of having one-on- Low to Mid
2003-2005 one meetings with each cabinet member, not allowing for groups to form. Lavagna is only
powerful figure in cabinet.
Kirchner 2005- 3 Cabinet Changes. Lavagna leaves the government. Kirchner still keeps a close circle of insiders, High
2007 but two opposing factions clearly emerge: Pingüinos (De Vido, A. Kirchner) and Albertistas (A.
Fernandez, Bielsa, Filmus, Miceli).
Sources: Argentina’s Official Bulletin: www.boletinoficial.gov.ar, Amorim Neto (2006), Keesing´s record of world events: www.keesings.com, 60 interviews
conducted by the author.
 B a l á n | 35

Table 3. Independent Variable: Inter-Party Competition in Argentina

Period Inter-Party Competition

Composition of Congress Control of Governorships Score
Menem I. PJ has simple majority in House (difference with 17/23 Provinces in control of PJ. UCR controls 2 Low
1989-1991. opp. is > 10%) and absolute majority in Senate. provinces (including Córdoba).
Menem I. PJ has simple majority in House (difference with 14/23 Provinces in control of PJ. UCR controls 4 Low to Mid
1991-1993 opp. is > 15%) and absolute majority in Senate. provinces (including Córdoba).
Menem I. PJ has simple majority in House (difference with 14/23 Provinces in control of PJ. UCR controls 4 Mid
1993-1995 opp. is > 15%) and absolute majority in Senate. Provinces (including Córdoba).
Menem II. PJ has absolute majority in both chambers. 14/24 Provinces in control of PJ. UCR controls 5 Low
1995-1997 a Provinces (including Córdoba and city of BA).
Menem II. PJ has simple majority in House (difference with 14/24 Provinces in control of PJ. Alianza controls Mid to
1997-1999 opp. is < 5%) and absolute majority in Senate. 5 Provinces (including Córdoba and city of BA). High
de la Rúa. Alianza has simple majority in House (difference 7/24 Provinces in control of Alianza (including High
1999-2001 with opp. is > 10%) and PJ has absolute majority city of BA). PJ controls 15 Provinces (including
in Senate. Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Santa Fe, and Mendoza)
Duhalde. PJ has simple majority in House (difference with 14/24 Provinces in control of PJ. Low
2002-2003 opp. is < 10%) and absolute majority in Senate. Former Alianza controls 9 Provinces (including
city of BA).
Kirchner. FPV has simple majority in both chambers with 16/24 Provinces in control of PJ (Not all support Mid to
2003-2005 less than 40% (no opp. Party has > 20%). Kirchner). Former Alianza controls 6 Provinces High
(including city of BA).
Kirchner 2005- FPV has simple majority in House (difference 14/24 Provinces in control of PJ. UCR controls 8 Low
2007 with opp. is > 15%) and absolute majority in provinces (but 4 are considered Radicales K, who
Senate. support Kirchner.)
Sources: Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio de Interior.
a
Number of senators increased from 48 to 72 and City of Buenos Aires became an independent district similar to a province after Constitutional Reform of 1994.
 B a l á n | 36

Table 4. Argentine Cases

Intra-Government Competition
Low and Low to Mid High and Mid to High
Inter-Party Low and Duhalde (02-03) Menem I (89-91)*
Competition Low to Mid Kirchner (03-05) Menem I (91-93)*
Menem II (95-97)*
Kirchner (05-07)*
Mid to High Menem II (97-99) de la Rúa (99-01)*
Menem I (93-95)*

* Indicates scandal driven periods.

 B a l á n | 37

Table 5. Dependent Variable: Corruption Scandals in Chile.

Period Corruption Total Weeks in Made Front Level of

Scandals LAWR Page of National Scandal
Newspapers
Aylwin 2 Scandals 5 1 Low
1990-1992
Aylwin 0 Scandals 0 0 Low
1992-1994
Frei 1 Scandal 8 1 Mid
1994-1996
Frei 1 Scandal 1 0 Low
1996-1998
Frei 0 Scandal 0 0 Low
1998-2000
Lagos 4 Scandals 20 4 High
2000-2002
Lagos 4 Scandals 21 4 High
2002-2004
Lagos 0 Scandals 0 0 Low
2004-2006
Bachelet 3 Scandals 22 3 High
2006-2008
TOTAL 15 Scandals 77 13
Sources: LAWR, La Tercera, El Mercurio, Revista Qué Pasa?, La Segunda, La Época, La Nación.
 B a l á n | 38

Table 6. Independent Variable. Intra-Government Competition in Chile

Period Intra-Government Competition

Legislative Seats & Municipal posts within Cabinet Dynamics Score
Government
Aylwin House of Representatives: 32.5% DC, 6.7% PPD, 0 Cabinet Changes. All coalition parties represented in Low
1990-1992 4.17% PRSD, 13.3% PS. cabinet. DC has over half the posts. No conflicts within
Party: DC Senate: 23.9% DC, 4.34% PPD, 4.34% PRSD, government. Democratic stability is perceived to be
10.87% PS most important goal.
Aylwin Alcaldes: 30.88% DC, 8.36% PS, 8.12% PPD, 6.87% 1 Cabinet Change. All coalition parties were represented Low
1992-1994 PRSD in cabinet, but DC had over half the posts (including
Party: DC Concejales: 28.93% DC, 8.53% PS, 9.21% PPD, interior and defense).
4.91% PRSD
Frei House of Representatives: 30.8% DC, 12.5% PPD, 2 Cabinet Changes. Cabinet starts with dominance by Mid
1994-1996 1.6% PRSD, 13.3% PS DC (half the posts), but changes add PPD (Lagos) and
Party: DC Senate: 25% DC, 6.8% PRSD, 11.36% PS, 2.27% PS figures (Insulza).
PPD
Frei Alcaldes: 27.23% DC, 11.13% PPD, 10% PS, 8.97% 4 Cabinet Changes. Changes bring back some DC Low
1996-1998 PRSD figures, giving it control of over half the posts. Lagos to
Party: DC Concejales: 26.21% DC, 11.74% PPD, 11.15% PS, and Insulza remain in cabinet. Mid
6.54% PRSD
Frei House of Representatives: 31.7% DC, 13.3% PPD, 2 Cabinet Changes. After two DC governments, rotation Low
1998-2000 3.3% PRSD, 9.17% PS is agreed, and Lagos set as candidate early on. He leaves
Party: DC Senate: 29.17% DC, 4.17% PRSD, 8.33% PS, 2.08% cabinet in 1998 to campaign.
PPD
Lagos Alcaldes: 23.96% DC, 11.44% PPD, 11.25% PS, 1 Cabinet Change. Balance of forces in cabinet is even High
2000-2002 5.51% PRSD among parties. Some new faces, this upsets balance and
Party: Concejales: 21.62% DC,11.41% PPD, 11.28% PS, dominance of DC. Conflicts begin to emerge.
PPD/PS 5.42% PPD
 B a l á n | 39

Lagos House of Representatives: 15.32% CD, 16.12% PPD, 4 Cabinet Changes. Conflicts become more evident, High
2002-2004 4.84% PRSD, 8.88% PS particularly between PPD and DC.
Party: Senate: 25% DC, 4.17% PPD, 4.16% PRSD, 10.41%
PPD PS
Lagos Alcaldes: 21.9% DC, 11.8% PS, 6.41% PPD, 3.06% 4 Cabinet Changes. Coalition closes rank and conflicts Mid
2004-2006 PRSD disperse. Main worry is to maintain control of
Party: Concejales: 20.3% DC, 10.9% PS, 9.97% PPD, 4.6% government after 2006. Instead of negotiating a
PPD PRSD successor, decision is left to polls.
Bachelet House of Representatives: 13.11% CD, 15.6% PPD, 5 Cabinet Changes. Bachelet begins term by getting rid High
2006-2008 5.74% PRSD, 13.2% PS of old guard and assigning new people to cabinet posts
Party: PS Senate: 10.52% DC, 7.89% PPD, 7.89% PRSD, (ensures half female ministers). Parties establishments
18.42% PS resist and conflict emerges.
Sources: Political Database of The Americas (Georgetown University and OAS), Servicio Electoral República de Chile, Ministerio de Interior, Gobierno de
Chile, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, Amorim Neto (2006), Keesing´s record of world events: www.keesings.com, Engel & Navia (2006), 60
interviews conducted by author.
 B a l á n | 40

Table 7. Independent Variable. Inter-Party Competition in Chile

Period Inter-Party Competition

Composition of Congress/ Municipal Election Fragmentation of Opposition Score
Aylwin Concertación has absolute majority in House House RN has twice the seats of UDI. Senate has High
1990-1992 (difference with opp. is > 15%). Opposition controls Senate. 15% of seat taken by Military.
Aylwin Concertación wins majority of Concejales and Alcaldes. RN gets twice the votes of UDI. High
1992-1994 Military is still powerful.
Frei Concertación has absolute majority in House House RN has twice the seats of UDI. Senate Mid to
1994-1996 (difference with opp. is > 20%). Opposition controls Senate. majority is still granted thanks to Military. High
Frei Concertación wins majority of Concejales and Alcaldes. Gap between RN and UDI gets smaller. Low to
1996-1998 Mid
Frei Concertación has absolute majority in House House RN has more seats in House, UDI has more Mid to
1998-2000 (difference with opp. is > 20%). Opposition has slight seats in Senate. Military seats still ensure High
majority in Senate. Senate majority
Lagos Concertación wins majority of Concejales and Alcaldes by a RN and UDI are tied for votes in municipal Low
2000-2002 landslide. Lagos wins presidency in run-off election. UDI’s Lavin emerges as leader of
opposition. Resisted by RN.
Lagos Concertación has majority in House. Virtual tie in Senate. UDI gets 10% more votes than RN. Low to
2002-2004 Mid
Lagos Concertación wins slight majority of Concejales and RN and UDI get almost same amount of High
2004-2006 Alcaldes. Opposition gets more votes than in prior elections. votes. Popular opinion supports opposition
and next president may be from Alianza.
Bachelet Concertación wins simple majority in both chambers. RN and Alianza get almost same % of votes. Low
2006-2008 Bachelet wins presidency in run-off, after opposition fails to Failure to present single candidate and to win
present single candidate in first round election that seemed easy divides opposition.
Sources: Political Database of The Americas (Georgetown University and OAS), Servicio Electoral República de Chile, Ministerio de Interior, Chile.
 B a l á n | 41

Table 8. Chile

Intra-Government Competition
Low and Low to Mid Mid to High
Inter-Party Low Frei (96-98) Lagos (00-02)*
Competition and Lagos (02-04)*
Low to Bachelet (06-08)*
Mid
Mid to Aylwin (90-92) Frei (94-96)
High Aylwin (92-94) Lagos (04-06)
Frei (98-00)
* Indicates scandal driven periods