Presenting my dissenting opinion on the case of Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C.

Calida vs. Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno on the following grounds:

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Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding.

Answer: No. Chief Justice Sereno may only be removed from position through impeachment, not through quo
warranto.

Section 2, Article XI provides that the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment.

The constitutional provision cited classifies the specific public officers who may be removed by impeachment and the
other public officers and employees who may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Invoking the verba legis principle in statutory construction, the Republic is correct to say that Section 2, Article XI
does not expressly prohibit resort to other means to remove impeachable officers in position. However, since the
constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation. Meaning to say, no other meaning may be given to the cited provision, otherwise, the laws will be open
to various interpretations. Therefore, the only meaning that may be accorded to the Section 2, Article XI with respect
to members of the Supreme Court is that a member may be removed by impeachment. In addition, the legal maxim
ejusdem generis also applies. The provision specifies the public officers that may be removed by impeachment and a
distinction is made as to the other public officers and employees who may be removed from office but not by
impeachment. If the provision is to be interpreted as allowing the specified public officers to be removed from office
through means other than impeachment, the distinction made in Section 2, Article XI will be rendered inutile.

Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription

Answer: Yes. Assuming arguendo that the quo warranto is an appropriate action to oust the Chief Justice, the action
has already prescribed, hence it shall outrightly dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Section 11, Rule 66 provides that nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a
public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose. The law is clear and applying again
the principle of verba legis, the defense of the Republic that the questioning of the qualification for office commenced
only upon the discovery of the cause of the ouster will not prosper. The law does not contemplate the discovery of the
cause of the ouster as it clearly provides that the point of reference as to the commencement of action shall be at the
time the cause of such ouster or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose. Therefore, the action
for quo warranto is already prescribed.

Office of the Solicitor General claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the
government. I beg to differ. This is a fallacy of faulty authority as the support of contention relied only on jurisprudence
whereas Section 2, Rule 66 specifically mandates the prescriptive period. By allowing this principle to operate on quo
warranto, all positions in government offices become susceptible to actions to remove public officers and employees
that may be instituted by the OSG without limitation as to time. Quoting the words of Justice Leonen, public officers
cannot rest easy with the threat of being unseated at any time looming over their heads. It is not proper that the title to
a public office be subjected to continued uncertainty for the people’s interest requires that such right be determined as
speedily as possible.
Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC
and whether such determination partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and
review powers.

Answer: Yes.

Although the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is under the supervision of the Supreme Court, it still has the exclusive
jurisdiction in determining the qualification of candidates for the highest position in the judiciary. In Angara vs. The
Electoral Commission, it was held that the JBC is a separate constitutional organ, invested with the necessary authority
in the performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. The grant of
power is intended to be complete and unimpaired. Moreover, in Drilon v. Lim, it was held that the power of supervision
is the authority to ensure that the rules are followed, but without the power to lay down rules nor the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, the power of supervision involves the authority to order the
work done or re-done. Supervising officials may not prescribe the manner by which an act is to be done. They have
no judgment on that matter except to see that the rules are followed. In addition, the Supreme Court may exercise
judicial review if there has been a grave abuse of discretion. The act committed by the JBC does not constitute as
grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, the decision of the JBC as to the determination of qualification with respect to
Sereno’s application is beyond the powers of judicial review.

Translating this to categorical syllogism:

All acts which constitute grave abuse of discretion (m) are subject to judicial review. (P)

Some acts subject to judicial review are not acts not made by the JBC. (m)

Therefore, some acts made by JBC (s) are not subject to judicial review. (P)

This is an AOO-2 valid form which is consistent with the dissenting opinion of Justice Leonen.

As to the issue of SALN as a requirement, if it is so material as a qualification for the position, the failure of the JBC
to squarely address the issue is not consistent with its material importance as part of qualification for the position in
the judiciary. Regardless of the reason on the failure of JBC to address the issue, clearly, the principle of estoppel
applies, hence the Supreme Court cannot declare Sereno as ineligible as a consequence of JBC’s failure to address the
issue.

1) JBC is the one in charge in assessing the qualifications of the candidates and the imprimatur. Although it is
under the supervision of the SC, it still has the exclusive jurisdiction in determining the qualified candidates
for the highest Court. The supervision of the SC only pertains to the administration of the mandate of the
JBC but not in the direct carrying out of its duties in assessing qualified candidates.

12th.

1) It was required that for candidates coming from the government, SALN shall be filed “during” the period of
tenure in the government while those coming from the private sector shall file “as of” a certain date.
Considering that Sereno has already resigned from the UP College of Law and has become a private
practitioner, after which she resumed government service on 2009, it is only but appropriate that her SALN
shall only include from year 2009. It is of no moment that Sereno’s filing of only 3 SALNs during her 20-
year stint as professor in UP College of Law shall bar her from qualifying for the highest position in the
Judiciary since the SALNs from the said period are no longer part of requirement to qualify as this has already
been overtaken by the fact that she has transferred to the private sector on 2006. Since her government service
was not continuous, it is only but reasonable that the SALNs filed as required by the JBC for the position
shall only commence from the time she came back to government serviec.
The Court ruled that the provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot
be construed as having a mandatory effect. Translating this to categorical syllogism:
Section 2, Art. XI is permissive.
All permissive laws are not mandatory.

The word “may” is a permissive term which means optional and not mandatory. The language of Section 2, Article XI
of the Constitution uses the word “may be removed from office”. Therefore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution is only optional and not mandatory. The logical form of this argument is AII- 3, this form is unconditionally
valid according to the rules of logic, also, it is based from the existing laws of the land, hence the petitioner’s contention
is tenable.