G.R. No.
170338 December 23, 2008 committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE
MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO,
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F.
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into
a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on
the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The
tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses
of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority
Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of
Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped
conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the
lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of
the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and
impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and
authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the
chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare
the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction,
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent
House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the
"illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports
and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings
and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from
further using the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on
the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused
the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That
Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide
the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s,
who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the
perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in
nefarious wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was
referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security,
chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two
bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate
ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible
transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to
conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator
Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her
considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession,
replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or
other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public
officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo
Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a
Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as
G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled
legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with
its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and
October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno
Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B.
Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their
Comment16on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP
and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and
testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No.
179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci"
recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing
the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in
the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the
conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the
issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus
standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he
can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality,
the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury
test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has
been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or
validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v.
Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who
failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to
challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National
Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed
the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused
to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and
resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in
keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine
whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate
the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello
Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the
respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral
fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for
prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing
by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of
the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello
Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and
proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing
public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws
and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional
processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of
legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering
that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being
apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but
also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He
further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned
hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the
execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional
right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s
and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the
Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that inFrancisco, rights
personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the
Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they
invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers,
members of Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and
members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were also
supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and
the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude
it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez,
the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili
and intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that
the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination
and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we
mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will
amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a
moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case
becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature
of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the
respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the
said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the
Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and
heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the
committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent
committees.40 Having been overtaken by these events, the Garcillano
petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress. The
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to consequence is that the Rules of Proceduremust be republished
be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve
accomplished.41 Senators.47

- III - The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On
the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court
legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that
derogation of the constitutional requirement. the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not
dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
"[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the
states:
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a RULE XLIV
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive UNFINISHED BUSINESS
one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
session shall be taken up at the next session in the
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44
same status.

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the
publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that
respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in
accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure."
We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure"
requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its
rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the
one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are
held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate
also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate
may thus enact a different set of rules as it may
deem fit. Not having published its Rules of
Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are
therefore, procedurally infirm.
All pending matters and proceedings shall
terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same
status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and
practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that
the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically
have a different composition as that of the previous Congress)
should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the
Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing
body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then
pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course,
continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution
and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s
main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE
RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
Senators elected in the preceding elections shall
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
begin their term of office, the President may endorse
the Rules to the appropriate committee for
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a amendment or revision.
continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four
members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a
The Rules may also be amended by means of a
term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
motion which should be presented at least one day
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of
before its consideration, and the vote of the majority
Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
of the Senators present in the session shall be
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
required for its approval.
Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the
same reasoning inArnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the
1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than
 RULE LII liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of
their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at
the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators
shall begin their term.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.
8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only
for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore,

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall
conspicuously absent from theRules. The Rules simply state
have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31,
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject
thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
contravention of the Constitution.
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the
duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent
upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss
in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
on notice.
petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be
issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
SO ORDERED.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since
1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web G.R. No. L-44143 August 31, 1988
page.49
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules vs.
cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous EUSEBIO NAZARIO, accused-appellant.
language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules
of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional Teofilo Ragodon for accused-appellant.
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or
tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the SARMIENTO, J.:
respondents is illuminating:

The petitioner was charged with violation of certain municipal ordinances

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the
Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in
two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any
other form of publication. Publication in accordance
with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s
of the municipal council of Pagbilao, in Quezon province. By way of
confession and avoidance, the petitioner would admit having committed
the acts charged but would claim that the ordinances are unconstitutional,
or, assuming their constitutionality, that they do not apply to him in any
event.
The facts are not disputed:
This defendant is charged of the crime of Violation of
Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by the
provincial Fiscal, dated October 9, 1968, as follows:
That in the years 1964, 1965 and
1966, in the Municipality of
Pagbilao, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named
accused, being then the owner
and operator of a fishpond
situated in the barrio of
Pinagbayanan, of said
municipality, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously refuse and fail to pay
the municipal taxes in the total
amount of THREE HUNDRED
SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTY
TWO CENTAVOS (P362.62),
required of him as fishpond
operator as provided for under
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955,
as amended, inspite of repeated
demands made upon him by the
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao,
Quezon, to pay the same.
Contrary to law.
For the prosecution the following witnesses testified
in substance as follows;
MIGUEL FRANCIA, 39 years of age, married, farmer
and resident of Lopez, Quezon —
In 1962 to 1967, I resided at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. I know the accused as I worked in
his fishpond in 1962 to 1964. The fishpond of Nazario
is at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon. I worked in
the clearing of the fishpond, the construction of the
dikes and the catching of fish.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I worked with the accused up to March 1964.
NICOLAS MACAROLAY, 65 years of age, married,
copra maker and resident of Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao,
Quezon —
I resided at Pinagbayanan, Pagbilao, Quezon since
1959 up to the present. I know the accused since
1959 when he opened a fishpond at Pinagbayanan,
Pagbilao, Quezon. He still operates the fishpond up to
the present and I know this fact as I am the barrio
captain of Pinagbayanan.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I came to know the accused when he first operated
his fishpond since 1959.
On re-direct examination, this witness declared:
I was present during the catching of fish in 1967 and
the accused was there.
On re-cross examination, this witness declared:
I do not remember the month in 1962 when the
accused caught fish.
RODOLFO R. ALVAREZ, 45 years old, municipal
treasurer of Pagbilao, Quezon, married —
As Municipal Treasurer I am in charge of tax
collection. I know the accused even before I was
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao. I have written the
accused a letter asking him to pay his taxes (Exhibit
B). Said letter was received by the accused as per
registry return receipt, Exhibit B-1. The letter
demanded for payment of P362.00, more or less, by
way of taxes which he did not pay up to the present.
The former Treasurer, Ceferino Caparros, also wrote
a letter of demand to the accused (Exhibit C). On
June 28, 1967, I sent a letter to the Fishery
Commission (Exhibit D), requesting information if
accused paid taxes with that office. The Commission
sent me a certificate (Exhibits D-1, D-2 & D-3). The
accused had a fishpond lease agreement. The taxes
unpaid were for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966.
On cross-examination, this witness declared:
I have demanded the taxes for 38.10 hectares.
On question of the court, this witness declared:
What I was collecting from the accused is the fee on
fishpond operation, not rental.
The prosecution presented as part of their evidence
Exhibits A, A-1, A-2, B, B-2, C, D, D-1, D-2, D-3, E, F,
F-1 and the same were admitted by the court, except
Exhibits D, D-1, D-2 and D-3 which were not
admitted for being immaterial.
For the defense the accused EUSEBIO NAZARIO, 48
years of age, married, owner and general manager of
the ZIP Manufacturing Enterprises and resident of
4801 Old Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, declared in
substance as follows:
I have lived in Sta. Mesa, Manila, since 1949. I buy
my Residence Certificates at Manila or at San Juan.
In 1964, 1965 and 1966, I was living in Manila and
my business is in Manila and my family lives at
Manila. I never resided at Pagbilao, Quezon. I do not
own a house at Pagbilao. I am a lessee of a fishpond
located at Pagbilao, Quezon, and I have a lease
agreement to that effect with the Philippine Fisheries
Commission marked as Exhibit 1. In 1964, 1965 and
1966, the contract of lease, Exhibit 1, was still
existing and enforceable. The Ordinances Nos. 4, 15
and 12, series of 1955, 1965 and 1966, were
translated into English by the Institute of National
Language to better understand the ordinances. There
were exchange of letters between me and the
Municipal Treasurer of Pagbilao regarding the
payment of the taxes on my leased fishpond situated
at Pagbilao. There was a letter of demand for the
payment of the taxes by the treasurer (Exhibit 3)
which I received by mail at my residence at Manila. I
answered the letter of demand, Exhibit 3, with Exhibit
3-A. I requested an inspection of my fishpond to
determine its condition as it was not then in
operation. The Municipal Treasurer Alvarez went
there once in 1967 and he found that it was
destroyed by the typhoon and there were pictures
taken marked as Exhibits 4, 4-A, 4-B and 4C. I
received another letter of demand, Exhibit 5, and I
answered the same (Exhibit 5-A). I copied my
reference quoted in Exhibit 5-A from Administrative
Order No. 6, Exhibit 6. I received another letter of
demand from Tomas Ornedo, Acting Municipal
Treasurer of Pagbilao, dated February 16, 1966,
Exhibit 7, and I answered the same with the letter
marked as Exhibit 7-A, dated February 26, 1966. I
received another letter of demand from Treasurer
Alvarez of Pagbilao, Exhibit 8, and I answered the
same (Exhibit 8-A). In 1964, I went to Treasurer
Caparros to ask for an application for license tax and
he said none and he told me just to pay my taxes. I
did not pay because up to now I do not know
whether I am covered by the Ordinance or not. The
letters of demand asked me to pay different amounts
for taxes for the fishpond. Because under Sec. 2309
of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal taxes
lapse if not paid and they are collecting on a lapsed
ordinance. Because under the Tax Code, fishermen
are exempted from percentage tax and privilege tax.
There is no law empowering the municipality to pass
ordinance taxing fishpond operators.
The defense presented as part of their evidence
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 3-A, 4, 4-B, 4-B, 4-C, 5, 5-A, 6, 6-A,
6-B, 6-C, 7, 7-A, 8 and 8-A and the same were
admitted by the court.
From their evidence the prosecution would want to
show to the court that the accused, as lessee or
operator of a fishpond in the municipality of Pagbilao,
refused, and still refuses, to pay the municipal taxes
for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, in violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as
amended by Municipal Ordinance No. 15, series of
1965, and finally amended by Municipal Ordinance
No. 12, series of 1966.
On the other hand, the accused, by his evidence,
tends to show to the court that the taxes sought to
be collected have already lapsed and that there is no
law empowering municipalities to pass ordinances
taxing fishpond operators. The defense, by their
evidence, tried to show further that, as lessee of a
forest land to be converted into a fishpond, he is not
covered by said municipal ordinances; and finally that
the accused should not be taxed as fishpond operator
because there is no fishpond yet being operated by
him, considering that the supposed fishpond was
under construction during the period covered by the
taxes sought to be collected.
Finally, the defendant claims that the ordinance in
question is ultra vires as it is outside of the power of
the municipal council of Pagbilao, Quezon, to enact;
and that the defendant claims that the ordinance in
question is ambiguous and uncertain.
There is no question from the evidences presented
that the accused is a lessee of a parcel of forest land,
with an area of 27.1998 hectares, for fishpond
purposes, under Fishpond Lease Agreement No.
1066, entered into by the accused and the
government, through the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on August 21, 1959.
There is no question from the evidences presented
that the 27.1998 hectares of land leased by the
defendant from the government for fishpond
purposes was actually converted into fishpond and
used as such, and therefore defendant is an operator
of a fishpond within the purview of the ordinance in
question. 1
The trial Court 2
returned a verdict of guilty and disposed as follows:
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955, as amended by Ordinance No.
15, series of 1965 and further amended by Ordinance No. 12, series of
1966, of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao, Quezon; and hereby sentences
him to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, and to pay the costs of this
proceeding.
SO ORDERED. 3
In this appeal, certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner alleges that:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
4, SERIES OF 1955, AS AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 15, SERIES OF
1965, AND AS FURTHER AMENDED BY ORDINANCE NO. 12, SERIES OF
1966, OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAGBILAO, QUEZON, IS NULL AND
VOID FOR BEING AMBIGUOUS AND UNCERTAIN.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN
QUESTION, AS AMENDED, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING EX POST
FACTO.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ORDINANCE IN
QUESTION COVERS ONLY OWNERS OR OVERSEER OF FISHPONDS OF
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOT TO LESSEES OF PUBLIC LANDS.
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED
ORDINANCE, EVEN IF VALID, CANNOT BE ENFORCED BEYOND THE
TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF PAGBILAO AND DOES NOT COVER NON-
RESIDENTS. 4
The ordinances in question are Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955,
Ordinance No. 15, series of 1965, and Ordinance No. 12, series of 1966,
of the Municipal Council of Pagbilao. Insofar as pertinent to this appeal,
the salient portions thereof are hereinbelow quoted:
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in
places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao, Quezon,
shall pay a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per
hectare of fishpond on part thereof per annum. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. l (a). For the convenience of those who have or
owners or managers of fishponds within the territorial
limits of this municipality, the date of payment of
municipal tax relative thereto, shall begin after the
 lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1. Any owner or manager of fishponds in
places within the territorial limits of Pagbilao shall pay
a municipal tax in the amount of P3.00 per hectare or
any fraction thereof per annum beginning and taking
effect from the year 1964, if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964. 7
The first objection refers to the ordinances being allegedly "ambiguous
and uncertain." 8 The petitioner contends that being a mere lessee of the
fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances speak of "owner or
manager." He likewise maintains that they are vague insofar as they
reckon the date of payment: Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that
parties shall commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the Bureau of
Fisheries." 9 Ordinance No. 12 states that liability for the tax accrues
"beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the fishpond started
operating before the year 1964." 10
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 11 It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targetted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.
But the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be
clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v.
City of Cincinnati, 12 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance
that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any
sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons
passing by." 13 Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because
one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not
annoy others.' " 14
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" 15
act
whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however,
from legislation couched in imprecise language — but which nonetheless
specifies a standard though defectively phrased — in which case, it may
be "saved" by proper construction.
It must further be distinguished from statutes that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. In that event,
such statutes may not be challenged whenever directed against such
activities. InParker v. Levy, 16 a prosecution originally under the U.S.
Uniform Code of Military Justice (prohibiting, specifically, "conduct
unbecoming an officer and gentleman"), the defendant, an army officer
who had urged his men not to go to Vietnam and called the Special
Forces trained to fight there thieves and murderers, was not allowed to
invoke the void for vagueness doctrine on the premise that accepted
military interpretation and practice had provided enough standards, and
consequently, a fair notice that his conduct was impermissible.
It is interesting that in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 17 a divided
Court sustained an act of Congress (Republic Act No. 4880 penalizing "the
too early nomination of candidates" 18 limiting the election campaign
period, and prohibiting "partisan political activities"), amid challenges of
vagueness and overbreadth on the ground that the law had included an
"enumeration of the acts deemed included in the terms 'election
campaign' or 'partisan political activity" 19 that would supply the
standards. "As thus limited, the objection that may be raised as to
vagueness has been minimized, if not totally set at rest." 20 In his opinion,
however, Justice Sanchez would stress that the conduct sought to be
prohibited "is not clearly defined at all." 21 "As worded in R.A 4880,
prohibited discussion could cover the entire spectrum of expression
relating to candidates and political parties." 22 He was unimpressed with
the "restrictions" Fernando's opinion had relied on: " 'Simple expressions
of opinions and thoughts concerning the election' and expression of 'views
on current political problems or issues' leave the reader conjecture, to
guesswork, upon the extent of protection offered, be it as to the nature of
the utterance ('simple expressions of opinion and thoughts') or the
subject of the utterance ('current political problems or issues')." 23
The Court likewise had occasion to apply the "balancing-of-interests"
test, 24 insofar as the statute's ban on early nomination of candidates was
concerned: "The rational connection between the prohibition of Section
50-A and its object, the indirect and modest scope of its restriction on the
rights of speech and assembly, and the embracing public interest which
Congress has found in the moderation of partisan political activity, lead us
to the conclusion that the statute may stand consistently with and does
not offend the Constitution." 25 In that case, Castro would have the
balance achieved in favor of State authority at the "expense" of individual
liberties.
In the United States, which had ample impact on Castro's separate
opinion, the balancing test finds a close kin, referred to as the "less
restrictive alternative " 26 doctrine, under which the court searches for
alternatives available to the Government outside of statutory limits, or for
"less drastic means" 27 open to the State, that would render the statute
unnecessary. In United States v. Robel, 28 legislation was assailed,
banning members of the (American) Communist Party from working in
any defense facility. The U.S. Supreme Court, in nullifying the statute,
held that it impaired the right of association, and that in any case, a
screening process was available to the State that would have enabled it to
Identify dangerous elements holding defense positions. 29 In that event,
the balance would have been struck in favor of individual liberties.
It should be noted that it is in free expression cases that the result is
usually close. It is said, however, that the choice of the courts is usually
narrowed where the controversy involves say, economic rights, 30 or as in
the Levycase, military affairs, in which less precision in analysis is
required and in which the competence of the legislature is presumed.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of
vagueness. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the appellant
falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he
comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the fact that he
financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries into the
fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. 31 While it
appears that it is the National Government which owns them, 32 the
Government never shared in the profits they had generated. It is
therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax under the said
ordinances.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinances are in the character of
revenue measures 33 designed to assist the coffers of the municipality of
Pagbilao. And obviously, it cannot be the owner, the Government, on
whom liability should attach, for one thing, upon the ancient principle that
the Government is immune from taxes and for another, since it is not the
Government that had been making money from the venture.
Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question,
and as the recipient of profits brought about by the business, the
appellant is clearly liable for the municipal taxes in question. He cannot
say that he did not have a fair notice of such a liability to make such
ordinances vague.
Neither are the said ordinances vague as to dates of payment. There is no
merit to the claim that "the imposition of tax has to depend upon an
uncertain date yet to be determined (three years after the 'approval of
the fishpond' by the Bureau of Fisheries, and upon an uncertain event (if
the fishpond started operating before 1964), also to be determined by an
uncertain individual or individuals." 34 Ordinance No. 15, in making the
tax payable "after the lapse of three (3) years starting from the date said
fishpond is approved by the Bureau of Fisheries," 35 is unequivocal about
the date of payment, and its amendment by Ordinance No. 12, reckoning
liability thereunder "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964 if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964 ," 36 does not give rise to
any ambiguity. In either case, the dates of payment have been definitely
established. The fact that the appellant has been allegedly uncertain
about the reckoning dates — as far as his liability for the years 1964,
1965, and 1966 is concerned — presents a mere problem in computation,
but it does not make the ordinances vague. In addition, the same would
have been at most a difficult piece of legislation, which is not unfamiliar in
this jurisdiction, but hardly a vague law.
As it stands, then, liability for the tax accrues on January 1, 1964 for
fishponds in operation prior thereto (Ordinance No. 12), and for new
fishponds, three years after their approval by the Bureau of Fisheries
(Ordinance No. 15). This is so since the amendatory act (Ordinance No.
12) merely granted amnesty unto old, delinquent fishpond operators. It
did not repeal its mother ordinances (Nos. 4 and 15). With respect to new
operators, Ordinance No. 15 should still prevail.
To the Court, the ordinances in question set forth enough standards that
clarify imagined ambiguities. While such standards are not apparent from
the face thereof, they are visible from the intent of the said ordinances.
The next inquiry is whether or not they can be said to be ex post
facto measures. The appellant argues that they are: "Amendment No. 12
passed on September 19, 1966, clearly provides that the payment of the
imposed tax shall "beginning and taking effect from the year 1964, if the
fishpond started operating before the year 1964.' In other words, it
penalizes acts or events occurring before its passage, that is to say, 1964
and even prior thereto."37
The Court finds no merit in this contention. As the Solicitor General notes,
"Municipal Ordinance No. 4 was passed on May 14, 1955. 38 Hence, it
cannot be said that the amendment (under Ordinance No. 12) is being
made to apply retroactively (to 1964) since the reckoning period is 1955
(date of enactment). Essentially, Ordinances Nos. 12 and 15 are in the
nature of curative measures intended to facilitate and enhance the
collection of revenues the originally act, Ordinance No. 4, had
prescribed. 39 Moreover, the act (of non-payment of the tax), had been,
since 1955, made punishable, and it cannot be said that Ordinance No. 12
imposes a retroactive penalty. As we have noted, it operates to grant
amnesty to operators who had been delinquent between 1955 and 1964.
It does not mete out a penalty, much less, a retrospective one.
The appellant assails, finally, the power of the municipal council of
Pagbilao to tax "public forest land." 40 In Golden Ribbon Lumber Co., Inc.
v. City of Butuan 41 we held that local governments' taxing power does
not extend to forest products or concessions under Republic Act No.
2264, the Local Autonomy Act then in force. (Republic Act No. 2264
likewise prohibited municipalities from imposing percentage taxes on
sales.)
First of all, the tax in question is not a tax on property, although the rate
thereof is based on the area of fishponds ("P3.00 per hectare" 42).
Secondly, fishponds are not forest lands, although we have held them to
the agricultural lands.43 By definition, "forest" is "a large tract of land
covered with a natural growth of trees and underbush; a large
wood." 44(Accordingly, even if the challenged taxes were directed on the
fishponds, they would not have been taxes on forest products.)
They are, more accurately, privilege taxes on the business of fishpond
maintenance. They are not charged against sales, which would have
offended the doctrine enshrined by Golden Ribbon Lumber, 45 but rather
on occupation, which is allowed under Republic Act No. 2264. 46 They are
what have been classified as fixed annual taxes and this is obvious from
the ordinances themselves.
There is, then, no merit in the last objection.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R.
ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.
Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June
20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the
COMELEC En Banc directed the Law Department to file the appropriate
Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez
and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to
Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996.5 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration thereon
was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented
hereunder:
On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino
Apostol6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of
the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation
of Section 261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election
Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section
1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages
and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos
S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new
voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as
evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952,
respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and
untruthful representations in violation of Section 1011 of Republic Act Nos.
8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose Street,
Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are
residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan
ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by
Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that
petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not
fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of
time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private
respondent charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda
Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated election
offenses in violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261,
paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any
false or untruthful statements relative to any data or
information required in the application for registration, and of
Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by any
person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without
filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration,
both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec.
12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for
transfer of registration records due to change of residence to
another city or municipality."12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so
warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2
April 2001. They contended therein that they did not make any false or
untruthful statements in their application for registration. They avowed
that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9
May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for
five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San
Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III
Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein
its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for
choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC
Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC
Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the
appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation
and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary
information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper
Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in
relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize
the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a Comelec
Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with the duty
to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from
the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is
hereby directed to file the appropriate information with the
proper court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND
ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in
relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.
Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb
the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments
and issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely
a rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in
[their] Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17
April 2001, the same [w]as already considered by the
Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation
which eventually was made as the basis for the En Banc’s
resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of
request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration
Record does not automatically cancel the registration records.
The fact remains that at the time of application for registration
as new voter of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001
in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their
registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of
the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations
against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner
Erlinda R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No.
BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively.
Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation
to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the
following arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS
THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.22
On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect
Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12
January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC against petitioner
Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and
for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion
alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate Informations,
both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez,
charging her with the same offenses as those charged against petitioner
Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-
06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.
On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of
merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged
by private respondent are entirely different from those which they stand
to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to
petitioners, private respondent’s complaint charged them for allegedly
violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the
Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act;
however, the COMELEC En Banc directed in the assailed Resolutions, that
they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to
Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners are of
the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically,
their right to refute or submit documentary evidence against the new
charges which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover,
petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act is vague
as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of
which would constitute an election offense; hence, it runs contrary to
Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the
COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations
necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as
follows:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be
registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the
city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any
 election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish
an application form for registration as prescribed by the
Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on
any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of
registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of
any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen
signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his
left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of
his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the
expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for
registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the
qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter,
and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application
contains all the data therein required and that the applicant’s
specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are
properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered
election offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed
with the Law Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed
by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC.
Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein.
On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the
Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful
representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in
violation of the requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The
Voter’s Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications
(Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents of 935
San Jose [S]treet, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and
in fact, they were and still are residents of 113
Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong Lipunan ng
Crame, Quezon City and registered voters of
Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, a copy of the
Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon,
Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral
part hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth,
intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces
in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C")
corresponding to the length of time they have resided
in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were
and still are residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as
evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and
26195823, respectively; photocopies of which are hereto
attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a
"Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-
Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District,
Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy
of the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No.
4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification
reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR.
CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES
ROMUALDEZ are registered voters of Barangay
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City,
Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit serial
nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose
it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the
Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they
were and still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as
June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to
register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a
subsisting registration, the new application for
registration will be disapproved. The registrant is also
liable not only for an election offense of double
registration, but also for another election offense of
knowingly making any false or untruthful statement
relative to any data or information required in the
application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a
voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration Record
form in his or her own handwriting, which contains a
Certification which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements
regarding my person are true and correct; that I
possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints,
specimen signatures and photographs appearing
herein are mine; and that I am not registered as a
voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim
that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are
entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before
the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to
be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-
Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the
denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be
covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus
Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the
Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and
which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of
facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the
case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson, petitioners argue
that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual
recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of
such written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his
defense. Let it be said that, inLacson, this court resolved the issue of
whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the
Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the
multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information,
and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in
Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
Complaint or Information.30
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of
lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by
the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the
nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit
and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC,
pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that,
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit
documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC filed with
the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were
granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in private respondent’s
Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-
Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss
with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a
Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due process was not
dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with
the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were
reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against
them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the
evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to
adduce controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages,
petitioners actively participated.
The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the
concerned police officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual
harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of
the anti-sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information
charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that
there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the
Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary
investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that
the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it
is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence
submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be
charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the
allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the
Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary
investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile
exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same
facts and evidence which have already been studied by the
prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to
delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair
notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1)
and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section
45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision
of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations
by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be
scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation35 or an "on-its-
face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so
enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to
do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been
pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law
unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned
in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has
yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it
was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that
a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue
delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal
statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties
whose cases may not have even reached the courts.
Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the
usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context
having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this
evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these
words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of
case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face
invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly
strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as
a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly
been violated must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant has been charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the
dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a
long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial
challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition
should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and
(j) of Republic Act No. 8189—the provisions upon which petitioners are
charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which
are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that
for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not
conjectural or anticipatory.
We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription
anent a facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing
the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless
violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful"
and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a
law may properly be held void on its face and when such
summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our
cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth
adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of
practice and that its function, a limited one at the
outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected
behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves
from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even
if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid
criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in
maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
"spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible
fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct,
not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is
obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to
whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a
law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not
before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law
explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth
technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional
aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third
parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law
becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with
the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third
parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth
doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint
its flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to
petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance
when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did
not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the
ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness
doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application." It is subject to
the same principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it
is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in
all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is
void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.39 This Court has similarly stressed that the
vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for
the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude.40
As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of
election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt,
crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section
45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other
interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no
guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same
vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision,
the import or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark
contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein
petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the
challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the
argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute
is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them; much less
do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there
 is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word
in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will
is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which
is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal
hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted
in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification, unless it is evident that the legislature
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the
act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election
offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is
to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts,
but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the
declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law
articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and
updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the
provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and
(j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under
the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by
the law is sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that
such facts should be set forth in the application. The periods of residence
in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of
residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified
voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the
city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the
case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant
should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple
voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country
strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section
10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voter’s application form for
registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State
has the right to regulate.
It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v.
Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a similar provision as
herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person
who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed
the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The Court
in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this
[A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion of
the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian
considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include
what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very
fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court
ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those
expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly
enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the
law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in
Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws.46 These
provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.
Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative.48We hold that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy
presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in
the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In
the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of
the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges
against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its
finding on a misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of
discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them with the
RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds
statutory expression under Section 26549of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.50 The task of the
COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before it is to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a
determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a
determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a
crime has been committed.51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court,
sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution
of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the
prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound
discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority
to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for
violation of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices.
Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same,
except as may otherwise be provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of
probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case
at bar, held that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal
charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom.
Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for
registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of
Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners’ registration
records as registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the
COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution55 of 28 November 2000 of
Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be
wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would
conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial.
Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is
an election offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and
Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective applications for
registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer
of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively, they
stated under oath that they are not registered voters in other
precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However,
contrary to their statements, records show they are still
registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos.
26195825 and 26195823. In other words, respondents’
registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City
Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of
their voter’s registration record as voter’s (sic) therein, they
cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted upon.
Besides, RA 8189 provides for the procedure in cases of
transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be
complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or
Municipality. – Any registered voter who has transferred
residence to another city or municipality may apply with the
Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his
registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to
the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the
Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon
approval, of the application for transfer, and after notice of
such approval to the Election Officer of their former residence
of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered
mail the voter’s registration record to the Election Officer of the
voter’s new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on
the procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of
transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on
the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged
that the refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms. Estrella
Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper
procedure because respondents should have filed the required
request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte.
Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as
new voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of
their previous registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration
under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted
that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic)
with the office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by
reason of an honest mistake, which they now desire to correct.
(underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such
as violation of election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal
intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice
is beside the point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the
act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully
submits that there is probable cause to hold respondents Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of
Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act
No. 8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as
new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and
voluntarily.56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the
COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or violations of election laws.
Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative,
petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate
and where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election
laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who
shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not to
prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right
to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts
cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a
rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control
of the criminal prosecution.58 Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the
business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get
involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to
prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection
of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any
more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.60
Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC,
through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary
investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a
probable cause, files the Information in the proper court, said court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the
subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the
court. The records show that Informations charging petitioners with
violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic
Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be
allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to
restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and
27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En
Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect
Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have
continued in the proceedings a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated
11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En
Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164171 February 20, 2006
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC), COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, AND CHIEF OF LTO,
SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE, Petitioners,
vs.
SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., represented by its
President JOSE T. DIZON, UNITED AUCTIONEERS, INC.,
represented by its President DOMINIC SYTIN, and MICROVAN,
INC., represented by its President MARIANO C.
SONON, Respondents.
x---------------x
G.R. No. 164172 February 20, 2006
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT 1. with GVW of 6-12 tons covered by an
OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION (DOTC), authority to import issued by DTI;
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, LAND
TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (LTO), COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,
2. with GVW above 12 tons.
SUBIC BAY FREE PORT ZONE AND CHIEF OF LTO, SUBIC BAY
FREE PORT ZONE, Petitioners,
vs. 3.1.5 Special purpose vehicles:
SUBIC INTEGRATED MACRO VENTURES CORP., represented by
its President YOLANDA AMBAR,Respondent. 1. fire trucks

x---------------x 2. ambulances

G.R. No. 168741 February 20, 2006 3. funeral hearse/coaches

HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, 4. crane lorries

THE CHIEF OF THE LAND TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, SUBIC SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE, Petitioners, 5. tractor heads and truck tractors
vs.
MOTOR VEHICLE IMPORTERS ASSOCIATION OF SUBIC BAY 6. boom trucks
FREEPORT, INC., represented by its President ALFREDO S.
GALANG, Respondent.
7. tanker trucks

DECISION
8. tank lorries with high pressure spray gun

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
9. reefers or refrigerated trucks

The instant consolidated petitions seek to annul and set aside the
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, in Civil 10. mobile drilling derricks
Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04, both dated May 24, 2004;
and the February 14, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 11. transit/concrete mixers
SP. No. 83284, which declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive Order
No. 156 (EO 156) unconstitutional. Said executive issuance prohibits the
importation into the country, inclusive of the Special Economic and 12. mobile radiological units
Freeport Zone or the Subic Bay Freeport (SBF or Freeport), of used motor
vehicles, subject to a few exceptions. 13. wreckers or tow trucks

The undisputed facts show that on December 12, 2002, President Gloria 14. concrete pump trucks
Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, issued
EO 156, entitled "Providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and
15. aerial/bucket flat-form trucks
directions for the motor vehicle development program and its
implementing guidelines." The challenged provision states:
16. street sweepers
3.1 The importation into the country, inclusive of the
Freeport, of all types of used motor vehicles is 17. vacuum trucks
prohibited, except for the following:
18. garbage compactors
3.1.1 A vehicle that is owned and for the personal
use of a returning resident or immigrant and covered 19. self loader trucks
by an authority to import issued under the No-dollar
Importation Program. Such vehicles cannot be resold
for at least three (3) years; 20. man lift trucks

3.1.2 A vehicle for the use of an official of the
Diplomatic Corps and authorized to be imported by
the Department of Foreign Affairs;
3.1.3 Trucks excluding pickup trucks;
1. with GVW of 2.5-6.0 tons covered by an
authority to import issued by the DTI.
2. With GVW above 6.0 tons.
3.1.4 Buses:
21. lighting trucks
22. trucks mounted with special purpose
equipment
23. all other types of vehicle designed for a
specific use.
The issuance of EO 156 spawned three separate actions for declaratory
relief before Branch 72 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, all
seeking the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Article 2, Section 3.1
of said executive order. The cases were filed by herein respondent
entities, who or whose members, are classified as Subic Bay Freeport
Enterprises and engaged in the business of, among others, importing
and/or trading used motor vehicles.
G.R. No. 164171:
On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.,
(Southwing) United Auctioneers, Inc. (United Auctioneers), and Microvan,
Inc. (Microvan), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed as Civil Case
No. 20-0-04,1 against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation
and Communication, Commissioner of Customs, Assistant Secretary and
Head of the Land Transportation Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
and the Chief of the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport
Zone.
Southwing, United Auctioneers and Microvan prayed that judgment be
rendered (1) declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional
and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance, Commissioner of
Customs, Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow
the importation of used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the Land
Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special
Economic Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor
vehicles; and (3) in general, to allow the unimpeded entry and
importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the
required customs duties.
Upon filing of petitioners’ answer/comment, respondents Southwing and
Microvan filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the
trial court. On May 24, 2004, a summary judgment was rendered
declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful
usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution with Congress.
The trial court further held that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of
Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods and capital
within the Freeport. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring
Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and
illegal; directing respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow
the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the
mandate of RA 7227; directing respondent Chief of the Land
Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special
Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used
motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation
of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of
the required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.2
From the foregoing decision, petitioners sought relief before this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 164171.
G.R. No. 164172:
On January 20, 2004, respondent Subic Integrated Macro Ventures
Corporation (Macro Ventures) filed with the same trial court, a similar
action for declaratory relief docketed as Civil Case No. 22-0-04,3 with the
same prayer and against the same parties4 as those in Civil Case No. 20-
0-04.
In this case, the trial court likewise rendered a summary judgment on
May 24, 2004, holding that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is repugnant
to the constitution.5 Elevated to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, Civil Case No. 22-0-04 was docketed as G.R. No. 164172.
G.R. No. 168741
On January 22, 2003, respondent Motor Vehicle Importers Association of
Subic Bay Freeport, Inc. (Association), filed another action for declaratory
relief with essentially the same prayer as those in Civil Case No. 22-0-04
and Civil Case No. 20-0-04, against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Finance, Chief of the Land Transportation Office, Commissioner of
Customs, Collector of Customs at SBMA and the Chairman of SBMA. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 30-0-2003,6 before the same trial court.
In a decision dated March 10, 2004, the court a quo granted the
Association’s prayer and declared the assailed proviso as contrary to the
Constitution, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring
Executive Order 156 [Article 2, Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and
illegal; directing respondents Collector of Customs based at SBMA to allow
the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the
mandate of RA 7227; directing respondent Chief of the Land
Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special
Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used
motor vehicles; directing the respondent Chairman of the SBMA to allow
the entry into the Subic Special Economic Zone or SBMA imported used
motor vehicle; and in general, to allow unimpeded entry and importation
of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the payment of
the required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, filed a petition for
certiorari8 with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP. No. 83284) which
denied the petition on February 14, 2005 and sustained the finding of the
trial court that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156, is void for being
repugnant to the constitution. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch
72, Olongapo City, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, accordingly, STANDS.
SO ORDERED.9
The aforequoted decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this
Court and docketed as G.R. No. 168741. In a Resolution dated October 4,
2005,10 said case was consolidated with G.R. No. 164171 and G.R. No.
164172.
Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section
3.1 of EO 156 is valid and applicable to the entire country, including the
Freeeport. In support of their arguments, they raise procedural and
substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of the assailed proviso.
The procedural issues are: the lack of respondents’ locus standi to
question the validity of EO 156, the propriety of challenging EO 156 in a
declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability of a judgment on the
pleadings in this case.
Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation
ban considering that their certificate of registration and tax exemption do
not authorize them to engage in the importation and/or trading of used
cars. They also aver that the actions filed by respondents do not qualify
as declaratory relief cases. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be filed before there is a
breach or violation of rights. Petitioners claim that there was already a
breach of respondents’ supposed right because the cases were filed more
than a year after the issuance of EO 156. In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-
2003, numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against
imported used motor vehicles belonging to respondent Association’s
members.
Petitioners’ arguments lack merit.
The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative
issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a
result of its enforcement11 has been satisfied in the instant case. The
broad subject of the prohibited importation is "all types of used motor
vehicles." Respondents would definitely suffer a direct injury from the
implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration and tax
exemption authorize them to trade and/or import new and used motor
vehicles and spare parts, except "used cars."12 Other types of motor
vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling within the
category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the
prejudice of their business. Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal
standing to assail the validity of EO 156.
As to the propriety of declaratory relief as a vehicle for assailing the
executive issuance, suffice it to state that any breach of the rights of
respondents will not affect the case. In Commission on Audit of the
Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu,13 the Court entertained a suit for
declaratory relief to finally settle the doubt as to the proper interpretation
of the conflicting laws involved, notwithstanding a violation of the right of
the party affected. We find no reason to deviate from said ruling mindful
of the significance of the present case to the national economy.
So also, summary judgments were properly rendered by the trial court
because the issues involved in the instant case were pure questions of
law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that
the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently
devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent
fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt
disposition of a civil action in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue,
not a genuine issue as to any material fact.14
At any rate, even assuming the procedural flaws raised by petitioners
truly exist, the Court is not precluded from brushing aside these
technicalities and taking cognizance of the action filed by respondents
considering its importance to the public and in keeping with the duty to
determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution.15
We now come to the substantive issues, which are: (1) whether there is
statutory basis for the issuance of EO 156; and (2) if the answer is in the
affirmative, whether the application of Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156,
reasonable and within the scope provided by law.
The main thrust of the petition is that EO 156 is constitutional because it
was issued pursuant to EO 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the
Philippines and that its application should be extended to the Freeport
because the guarantee of RA 7227 on the free flow of goods into the said
zone is merely an exemption from customs duties and taxes on items
brought into the Freeport and not an open floodgate for all kinds of goods
and materials without restriction.
In G.R. No. 168741, the Court of Appeals invalidated Article 2, Section 3.1
of EO 156, on the ground of lack of any statutory basis for the President
to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on the importation of used
motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the legislature
and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President
through an executive issuance, is void.
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within
constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised
by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.16 Such delegation
confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the
administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out
the provisions of the law and implement legislative policy.17 To be valid,
an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with
the following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.18
Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, EO 156 actually
satisfied the first requisite of a valid administrative order. It has both
constitutional and statutory bases.
Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in Section
28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution. It provides:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.19 (Emphasis supplied)
The relevant statutes to execute this provision are:
1) The Tariff and Customs Code which authorizes the President, in the
interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security,
to, inter alia, prohibit the importation of any commodity. Section 401
thereof, reads:
Sec. 401. Flexible Clause. —
a. In the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or
national security, and subject to the limitations herein
prescribed, the President, upon recommendation of the National
Economic and Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as
NEDA), is hereby empowered: x x x (2) to establish import quota
or to ban imports of any commodity, as may be necessary; x x x
Provided, That upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and
recommendation of the NEDA, the President may cause a gradual
reduction of protection levels granted in Section One hundred and four of
this Code, including those subsequently granted pursuant to this section.
(Emphasis supplied)
2) Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investment Code of the
Philippines which was issued on July 16, 1987, by then President Corazon
C. Aquino, in the exercise of legislative power under the Provisional
Freedom Constitution,20 empowers the President to approve or reject the
prohibition on the importation of any equipment or raw materials or
finished products. Pertinent provisions thereof, read:
ART. 4. Composition of the board. The Board of Investments shall be
composed of seven (7) governors: The Secretary of Trade and Industry,
three (3) Undersecretaries of Trade and Industry to be chosen by the
President; and three (3) representatives from the government agencies
and the private sector x x x.
ART. 7. Powers and duties of the Board.
xxxx
(12) Formulate and implement rationalization programs for certain
industries whose operation may result in dislocation, overcrowding or
inefficient use of resources, thus impeding economic growth. For this
purpose, the Board may formulate guidelines for progressive
manufacturing programs, local content programs, mandatory sourcing
requirements and dispersal of industries. In appropriate cases and
upon approval of the President, the Board may restrict, either
totally or partially, the importation of any equipment or raw
materials or finished products involved in the rationalization
program; (Emphasis supplied)
3) Republic Act No. 8800, otherwise known as the "Safeguard Measures
Act" (SMA), and entitled "An Act Protecting Local Industries By Providing
Safeguard Measures To Be Undertaken In Response To Increased Imports
And Providing Penalties For Violation Thereof,"21 designated the
Secretaries22 of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the
Department of Agriculture, in their capacity as alter egos of the President,
as the implementing authorities of the safeguard measures, which
include, inter alia, modification or imposition of any quantitative restriction
on the importation of a product into the Philippines. The purpose of the
SMA is stated in the declaration of policy, thus:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State shall promote competitiveness
of domestic industries and producers based on sound industrial and
agricultural development policies, and efficient use of human, natural and
technical resources. In pursuit of this goal and in the public interest, the
State shall provide safeguard measures to protect domestic industries and
producers from increased imports which cause or threaten to cause
serious injury to those domestic industries and producers.
There are thus explicit constitutional and statutory permission authorizing
the President to ban or regulate importation of articles and commodities
into the country.
Anent the second requisite, that is, that the order must be issued or
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, it is necessary
that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly determined. As
in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of
administrative issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only
exception being where the legislature itself requires it and mandates that
the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an
appropriate investigation.23 This exception pertains to the issuance
of legislative rules as distinguished from interpretative rules which
give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed;24 and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.25 A legislative
rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate legislation,
crafted to implement a primary legislation.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of
Appeals,26 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier
Pawnshop, Inc.,27 the Court enunciated the doctrine that when an
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can
facilitate or render less cumbersome the implementation of the law and
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard
and, thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the
force and effect of law.
In the instant case, EO 156 is obviously a legislative rule as it seeks to
implement or execute primary legislative enactments intended to protect
the domestic industry by imposing a ban on the importation of a specified
product not previously subject to such prohibition. The due process
requirements in the issuance thereof are embodied in Section 40128 of the
Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 5 and 9 of the SMA29 which
essentially mandate the conduct of investigation and public hearings
before the regulatory measure or importation ban may be issued.
In the present case, respondents neither questioned before this Court nor
with the courts below the procedure that paved the way for the issuance
of EO 156. What they challenged in their petitions before the trial court
was the absence of "substantive due process" in the issuance of the
EO.30 Their main contention before the court a quo is that the importation
ban is illogical and unfair because it unreasonably drives them out of
business to the prejudice of the national economy.
Considering the settled principle that in the absence of strong evidence to
the contrary, acts of the other branches of the government are presumed
to be valid,31 and there being no objection from the respondents as to the
procedure in the promulgation of EO 156, the presumption is that said
executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations
imposed by law.
To determine whether EO 156 has complied with the third and fourth
requisites of a valid administrative issuance, to wit, that it was issued
within the scope of authority given by the legislature and that it is
reasonable, an examination of the nature of a Freeport under RA 7227
and the primordial purpose of the importation ban under the questioned
EO is necessary.
RA 7227 was enacted providing for, among other things, the sound and
balanced conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extensions into alternative productive uses in the form of Special
Economic and Freeport Zone, or the Subic Bay Freeport, in order to
promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in
particular and the country in general.
The Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7227 specifically defines the
territory comprising the Subic Bay Freeport, referred to as the Special
Economic and Freeport Zone in Section 12 of RA 7227 as "a separate
customs territory consisting of the City of Olongapo and the Municipality
of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval
Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by
the 1947 Philippine-U.S. Military Base Agreement as amended and within
the territorial jurisdiction of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, the
metes and bounds of which shall be delineated by the President of the
Philippines; provided further that pending establishment of secure
perimeters around the entire SBF, the SBF shall refer to the area
demarcated by the SBMA pursuant to Section 1332 hereof."
Among the salient provisions of RA 7227 are as follows:
SECTION 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. —
xxxx
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
xxxx
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and
limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent provisions of
the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone
shall be developed into a self-sustaining, industrial, commercial,
financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and
promote productive foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and
managed as a separate customs territory ensuring free flow or
movement of goods and capital within, into and exported out of
the Subic Special Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives
such as tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital
and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from
the territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other
parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs
duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other
relevant tax laws of the Philippines;
The Freeport was designed to ensure free flow or movement of goods
and capital within a portion of the Philippine territory in order to attract
investors to invest their capital in a business climate with the least
governmental intervention. The concept of this zone was explained by
Senator Guingona in this wise:
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, the special economic zone is successful
in many places, particularly Hong Kong, which is a free port. The
difference between a special economic zone and an industrial estate is
simply expansive in the sense that the commercial activities, including the
establishment of banks, services, financial institutions, agro-industrial
activities, maybe agriculture to a certain extent.
This delineates the activities that would have the least of
government intervention, and the running of the affairs of the
special economic zone would be run principally by the investors
themselves, similar to a housing subdivision, where the
subdivision owners elect their representatives to run the affairs
of the subdivision, to set the policies, to set the guidelines.
We would like to see Subic area converted into a little Hong
Kong, Mr. President, where there is a hub of free port and free
entry, free duties and activities to a maximum spur generation of
investment and jobs.
While the investor is reluctant to come in the Philippines, as a rule,
because of red tape and perceived delays, we envision this special
economic zone to be an area where there will be minimum government
interference.
The initial outlay may not only come from the Government or the
Authority as envisioned here, but from them themselves, because they
would be encouraged to invest not only for the land but also for the
buildings and factories. As long as they are convinced that in such an area
they can do business and reap reasonable profits, then many from other
parts, both local and foreign, would invest, Mr. President.33 (Emphasis,
added)
With minimum interference from the government, investors can, in
general, engage in any kind of business as well as import and export any
article into and out of the Freeport. These are among the rights accorded
to Subic Bay Freeport Enterprises under Section 39 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7227, thus –
SEC. 39. Rights and Obligations.- SBF Enterprises shall have the following
rights and obligations:
a. To freely engage in any business, trade, manufacturing, financial or
service activity, and to import and export freely all types of goods into
and out of the SBF, subject to the provisions of the Act, these Rules and
other regulations that may be promulgated by the SBMA;
Citing, inter alia, the interpellations of Senator Enrile, petitioners claim
that the "free flow or movement of goods and capital" only means that
goods and material brought within the Freeport shall not be subject to
customs duties and other taxes and should not be construed as an open
floodgate for entry of all kinds of goods. They thus surmise that the
importation ban on motor vehicles is applicable within the Freeport.
Pertinent interpellations of Senator Enrile on the concept of Freeport is as
follows:
Senator Enrile: Mr. President, I think we are talking here of sovereign
concepts, not territorial concepts. The concept that we are supposed to
craft here is to carve out a portion of our terrestrial domain as well as our
adjacent waters and say to the world: "Well, you can set up your factories
in this area that we are circumscribing, and bringing your equipment and
bringing your goods, you are not subject to any taxes and duties because
you are not within the customs jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines, whether you store the goods or only for purposes of
transshipment or whether you make them into finished products again to
be reexported to other lands."
xxxx
My understanding of a "free port" is, we are in effect carving out
a part of our territory and make it as if it were foreign territory
for purposes of our customs laws, and that people can come,
bring their goods, store them there and bring them out again, as
long as they do not come into the domestic commerce of the
Republic.
We do not really care whether these goods are stored here. The only
thing that we care is for our people to have an employment because of
the entry of these goods that are being discharged, warehoused and
reloaded into the ships so that they can be exported. That will generate
employment for us. For as long as that is done, we are saying, in effect,
that we have the least contact with our tariff and customs laws and our
tax laws. Therefore, we consider these goods as outside of the customs
jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines as yet, until we draw them
from this territory and bring them inside our domestic commerce. In
which case, they have to pass through our customs gate. I thought we
are carving out this entire area and convert it into this kind of concept.34
However, contrary to the claim of petitioners, there is nothing in the
foregoing excerpts which absolutely limits the incentive to Freeport
investors only to exemption from customs duties and taxes. Mindful of the
legislative intent to attract investors, enhance investment and boost the
economy, the legislature could not have limited the enticement only to
exemption from taxes. The minimum interference policy of the
government on the Freeport extends to the kind of business that
investors may embark on and the articles which they may import or
export into and out of the zone. A contrary interpretation would defeat
the very purpose of the Freeport and drive away investors.
It does not mean, however, that the right of Freeport enterprises to
import all types of goods and article is absolute. Such right is of course
subject to the limitation that articles absolutely prohibited by law cannot
be imported into the Freeport.35 Nevertheless, in determining whether the
prohibition would apply to the Freeport, resort to the purpose of the
prohibition is necessary.
In issuing EO 156, particularly the prohibition on importation under Article
2, Section 3.1, the President envisioned to rationalize the importation of
used motor vehicles and to enhance the capabilities of the Philippine
motor manufacturing firms to be globally competitive producers of
completely build-up units and their parts and components for the local
and export markets.36 In justifying the issuance of EO 156, petitioners
alleged that there has been a decline in the sales of new vehicles and a
remarkable growth of the sales of imported used motor vehicles. To
address the same, the President issued the questioned EO to prevent
further erosion of the already depressed market base of the local motor
vehicle industry and to curtail the harmful effects of the increase in the
importation of used motor vehicles.37
Taking our bearings from the foregoing discussions, we hold that the
importation ban runs afoul the third requisite for a valid administrative
order. To be valid, an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or
beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or
modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for
such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the
government cannot usurp. As held in United BF Homeowner’s Association
v. BF Homes, Inc.:38
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated
legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond
the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control what
rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as well as with
respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make
rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of
a statute.
In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws authorizing the
President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is
the domestic industry. EO 156, however, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the importation of used cars to
the Freeport, which RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign
territory. The domestic industry which the EO seeks to protect is
actually the "customs territory" which is defined under the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7227, as follows:
"the portion of the Philippines outside the Subic Bay Freeport Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,44 is a case involving a resolution issued by
where the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and other the Professional Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from
national tariff and customs laws are in force and effect."39 attending review classes and receiving handout materials, tips, and the
like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the
integrity and purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides
The proscription in the importation of used motor vehicles should be
being unreasonable on its face and violative of academic freedom, the
operative only outside the Freeport and the inclusion of said zone within
measure was found to be more sweeping than what was necessary, viz:
the ambit of the prohibition is an invalid modification of RA 7227. Indeed,
when the application of an administrative issuance modifies existing laws
or exceeds the intended scope, as in the instant case, the issuance Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
becomes void, not only for being ultra vires, but also for being guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be
unreasonable. eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last
three precious days — when they should be refreshing themselves with all
This brings us to the fourth requisite. It is an axiom in administrative
that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental
law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
and psychological make-up for the examination day itself — would be like
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
uprooting the tree to get rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be
rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the
done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and
end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for
stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated
which they were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be
from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out.
invalid.40
Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if
violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked.
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic xxx
industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The deterioration of
the local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used
In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,45 the Court
motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly
likewise struck down as unreasonable and overbreadth a city ordinance
addressed by the President. In the exercise of delegated police power,
granting an exclusive franchise for 25 years, renewable for another 25
the executive can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these
years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common
vehicles. Thus, inTaxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. v. Board of
bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City. While professedly aimed
Transportation,41 the Court held that a regulation phasing out taxi cabs
towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by
more than six years old is a valid exercise of police power. The regulation
the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city, the
was sustained as reasonable holding that the purpose thereof was to
ordinance was held to be beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve
promote the convenience and comfort and protect the safety of the
the traffic problem in the city.
passengers.

By parity of reasoning, the importation ban in this case should also be

The problem, however, lies with respect to the application of the
declared void for its too sweeping and unnecessary application to the
importation ban to the Freeport. The Court finds no logic in the all
Freeport which has no bearing on the objective of the prohibition. If the
encompassing application of the assailed provision to the Freeport which
aim of the EO is to prevent the entry of used motor vehicles from the
is outside the customs territory. As long as the used motor vehicles do not
Freeport to the customs territory, the solution is not to forbid entry of
enter the customs territory, the injury or harm sought to be prevented or
these vehicles into the Freeport, but to intensify governmental campaign
remedied will not arise. The application of the law should be consistent
and measures to thwart illegal ingress of used motor vehicles into the
with the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat
customs territory.
lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases. It is not the
letter alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life.42 To apply the
proscription to the Freeport would not serve the purpose of the EO. At this juncture, it must be mentioned that on June 19, 1993, President
Instead of improving the general economy of the country, the application Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 97-A, "Further Clarifying The
of the importation ban in the Freeport would subvert the avowed purpose Tax And Duty-Free Privilege Within The Subic Special Economic And Free
of RA 7227 which is to create a market that would draw investors and Port Zone," Section 1 of which provides:
ultimately boost the national economy.
SECTION 1. The following guidelines shall govern the tax and duty-free
In similar cases, we also declared void the administrative issuance or privilege within the Secured Area of the Subic Special Economic and Free
ordinances concerned for being unreasonable. To illustrate, in De la Cruz Port Zone:
v. Paras,43 the Court held as unreasonable and unconstitutional an
ordinance characterized by overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of
1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the presently fenced-in former Subic
Bocaue, Bulacan, prohibited the operation of all night clubs, cabarets and
Naval Base shall be the only completely tax and duty-free area in the
dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public morals. As
SSEFPZ. Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and foreigners)
explained by the Court:
residing within the Secured Area are free to import raw materials, capital
goods, equipment, and consumer items tax and dutry-free. Consumption
x x x It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking items, however, must be consumed within the Secured Area. Removal of
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective raw materials, capital goods, equipment and consumer items out of the
of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by Secured Area for sale to non-SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be
a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the subject to the usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided herein.
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought
to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather
In Tiu v. Court of Appeals46 as reiterated in Coconut Oil Refiners
than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be
Association, Inc. v. Torres,47 this provision limiting the special privileges
heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
on tax and duty-free importation in the presently fenced-in former Subic
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
Naval Base has been declared valid and constitutional and in accordance
of police regulation." It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation,
with RA 7227. Consistent with these rulings and for easier management
there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
and monitoring of activities and to prevent fraudulent importation of
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those
merchandise and smuggling, the free flow and importation of used motor
night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to
vehicles shall be operative only within the "secured area."
be earned by those therein employed.
In sum, the Court finds that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is void puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
insofar as it is made applicable to the presently secured fenced-in former terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
Subic Naval Base area as stated in Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Pursuant to
the separability clause48 of EO 156, Section 3.1 is declared valid insofar as
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for
it applies to the customs territory or the Philippine territory outside the
the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and
presently secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area as stated in
the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new
Section 1.1 of EO 97-A. Hence, used motor vehicles that come into the
trial, and avers:
Philippine territory via the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area
may be stored, used or traded therein, or exported out of the Philippine
territory, but they cannot be imported into the Philippine territory outside 1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938,
of the secured fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area. there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED and the May 24,
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
2004 Decisions of Branch 72, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, in
Accounts of native dealers in leather.
Civil Case No. 20-0-04 and Civil Case No. 22-0-04; and the February 14,
2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63284, are
MODIFIED insofar as they declared Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by
Order No. 156, void in its entirety. Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
Said provision is declared VALID insofar as it applies to the Philippine
territory outside the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base area and
VOID with respect to its application to the secured fenced-in former Subic 3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated
Naval Base area. September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
SO ORDERED.
the Philippine Army.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a
company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
propietor, and petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR
collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation
UNION, INC., respondents.
are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for
the Court of Industrial Relations.
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
(the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor
legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has
LAUREL, J.: always been the rule.

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial 7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor
Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union,
and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they
termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun
costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-
reaching importance and effect that their admission would
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo rendered herein.
fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por
haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with
colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega
Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon
a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de
the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed
un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en
to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union.
la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que
orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure
dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero,
in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature
of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain
guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had
before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found
no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was
due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken
contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with
sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these
statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary
value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are
specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103).
It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system
of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more
active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive
and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance
with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall
take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and
settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages,
shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided
that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers
involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is
submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the
parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as
existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper
to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section
4,ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the
dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When
directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study
all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such
industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a
maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or
less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary
arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation
or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of
official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial
functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No.
46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out
that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated
September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of
Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity
and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its
mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or
agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial
or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this
legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by
the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this
Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact,
however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it
can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the
language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S.
468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this
court inEdwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce
evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the
board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if
the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can
thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the
evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S.
142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to
support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National
Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15;
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that
"the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion
of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would
not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48
Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville
and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57
Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S.
Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far
as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational
probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No.
4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs.
L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.)
Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
 right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is
enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal
methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may
be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are
only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or
agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or
advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of
the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept
the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In
the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to
observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang
Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is
barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to
predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial
prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that
"the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a
scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the
National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be
proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are
illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to
the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to
the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the
Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the
petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay
and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other
evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation
which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is
new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly,
the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and
the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.
HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS;
DR. NILO ROSAS, in his capacity as REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO ICASIANO, in
his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF THE QUEZON
CITY SCHOOLS and DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O.
BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V.
DIMAGMALIW, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO, ERLINDA B. DE LEON,
CLARISSA T. DIMAANO, WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA
R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S. UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE,
NORMA L. RONGCALES, EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA E.
EVANGELISTA, CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D.
BAGDOG, MARILYNNA C. KU, MARISSA M. SAMSON,
HENEDINA B.CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F.
LACANILAO, MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S.
VILLACRUEL, MA. VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ,
ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and
ELEUTERIO S. VARGAS, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on the
other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial tribunal. The right to
be heard and, ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in
the absence of an independent, competent and impartial tribunal.
Statement of the Case
This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this petition
for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 29107 which affirmed the trial court’s
decision,[3] as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and the appeal is
DISMISSED.
The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as respondent-
appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cariño and henceforth this
fact should be reflected in the title of this case.
SO ORDERED.”[4]
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows:
“On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a return-to-
work order to all public school teachers who had participated in talk-outs
and strikes on various dates during the period September 26, 1990 to
October 18, 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment
of 13th month differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-
cap bill in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative cases
against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of the Mandaluyong
High School. The charge sheets required petitioner-appellees to explain
in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the
mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations, to wit:
1. grave misconduct;
2. gross neglect of duty;
3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable office
regulations;
4. refusal to perform official duty;
5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;
6. absence without leave (AWOL)
At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee to
be placed under preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by DECS-NCR Regional
Director Nilo Rosas on November 7, 1990 to include the specific dates
when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the strike.
Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990. Petitioner-
appellees’ counsel objected to the procedure adopted by the committee
and demanded that he be furnished a copy of the guidelines adopted by
the committee for the investigation and imposition of penalties. As he
received no response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later,
however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.
On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil Case
No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, charging the
committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit and
praying that it be stopped from further investigating them and from
rendering any decision in the administrative case. However, the trial
court denied them a restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari
and mandamus. They alleged that the investigating committee was
acting with grave abuse of discretion because its guidelines for
investigation place the burden of proof on them by requiring them to
prove their innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff
to adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia of the
Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene, alleging that
he was in the same situation as petitioners since he had likewise been
charged and preventively suspended by respondent-appellant Cariño for
the same grounds as the other petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder
the burden of proving his innocence under the committee’s
guidelines. The trial court granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and
allowed him to intervene.
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the petitioner for
certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent DECS Secretary. In the
main he contended that, in accordance with the doctrine of primary
resort, the trial court should not interfere in the administrative
proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its
order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia to
intervene in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a decision
on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees guilty, as charged and
ordering their immediate dismissal.
On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition for
certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-appellees moved for
a reconsideration, but their motion was denied on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a resolution en banc declaring
void the trial court’s order of dismissal and reinstating petitioner-
appellees’ action, even as it ordered the latter’s reinstatement pending
decision of their case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case for
hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads:
“As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be set for pre-
trial conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so as to expedite the
proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño, as the
principal respondent, is hereby ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before
this Court on said date and time, with a warning that should he fail to
show up on said date, the Court will declare him as IN DEFAULT. Stated
otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not recognize
any representative of his.”
By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset on June
26, 1992. However, Secretary Cariño failed to appear in court on the
date set. It was explained that he had to attend a conference in
Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was represented by Atty. Reno
Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn
Pili. But the court just the same declared them as in default. The
Solicitor General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cariño
could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior commitment
in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cariño was represented by Atty. Reno
Capinpin, while the other respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn
Pili, both of the DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of
attorney. But the Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was
denied by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated:
“The “Motion For Reconsideration” dated July 3, 1992 filed by the
respondents thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. It appears
too obvious that respondents simply did not want to comply with the
lawful orders of the Court.
The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the “Manifestation
and Motion,” dated July 3, 1992 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General
is hereby DENIED due course.
SO ORDERED.”
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court that
Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for his
substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with
only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in which it
stated:
“The Court is in full accord with petitioners’ contention that Rep. Act No.
4670 otherwise known as the “Magna Carta for Public School Teachers” is
the primary law that governs the conduct of investigation in
administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with Pres.
Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. Respondents erred in believing
and contending that Rep. Act. No. 4670 has already been superseded by
the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No. 807 and Exec. Order No.
292. Under the Rules of Statutory Construction, a special law, Rep. Act.
No. 4670 in the case at bar, is not regarded as having been replaced by a
general law, Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the
same is manifest. A perusal of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals no such
intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No. 4670 stands. In the event that there
is conflict between a special and a general law, the former shall prevail
since it evidences the legislator’s intent more clearly than that of the
general statute and must be taken as an exception to the General
Act. The provision of Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres.
Decree No. 807 in the composition and selection of the members of the
investigating committee. Consequently, the committee tasked to
investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally constituted,
their composition and appointment being violative of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act.
No. 4670 hence all acts done by said body possess no legal color
whatsoever.
Anent petitioners’ claim that their dismissal was effected without any
formal investigation, the Court, after consideration of the circumstances
surrounding the case, finds such claim meritorious. Although it cannot be
gain said that respondents have a cause of action against the petitioner,
the same is not sufficient reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair
play. The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with illegality. It
is a dismissal without due process. While there was a semblance of
investigation conducted by the respondents their intention to dismiss
petitioners was already manifest when it adopted a procedure provided
for by law, by shifting the burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing
fully well that the teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving
them cause to render judgment ex-parte.
The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it being arbitrary
and violative of the teacher’s right to due process. Due process must be
observed in dismissing the teachers because it affects not only their
position but also their means of livelihood.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby
GRANTED and all the questioned orders/decisions of the respondents are
hereby declared NULL and VOID and are hereby SET ASIDE.
The reinstatement of all the petitioners to their former positions without
loss of seniority and promotional rights is hereby ORDERED.
The payment, if any, of all the petitioners’ back salaries, allowances,
bonuses, and other benefits and emoluments which may have accrued to
them during the entire period of their preventive suspension and/or
dismissal from the service is hereby likewise ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
From this adverse decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary
Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals raising the
following grounds:
“I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in
default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper
substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No.
4670, otherwise known as ‘Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers’, should govern the conduct of the
investigations conducted.
IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal
of the teachers are without due process.”[6]
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision, holding in the main that private respondents were denied due
process in the administrative proceedings instituted against them.
Hence, this petition for review.[7]
The Issues
Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
“I
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents were
denied due process of law.
II
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred and
committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the provision of
R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the investigating committee.
III
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the trial
court’s decision.”[8]
These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single question:
whether private respondents were denied due process of law.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that private respondents were denied due process of law.
Denial of Due Process
At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to determine
whether or not due process of law was observed in the administrative
proceedings against herein private respondents. We note the Solicitor
General’s extensive disquisition that government employees do not have
the right to strike.[9] On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan vs.
Court of Appeals,[10] has recently pronounced, through Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado:
“It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public
service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the
right of government employees to organize, they are prohibited from
staging strikes, demonstrations mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
services. The right of government employees to organize is limited only
to the formation of unions or associations, without including the right to
strike.”
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court
explained the schoolteachers’ right to peaceful assembly vis-a-vis their
right to mass protest:
“Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were not
penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble peacefully and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances. Rather, the Civil
Service Commission found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service for having absented themselves without proper
authority, from their schools during regular school days, in order to
participate in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the
non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of education, for
which they were responsible. Had petitioners availed themselves of their
free time -- recess, after classes, weekends or holidays -- to dramatize
their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the
bounds of law, no one -- not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court --
could have held them liable for the valid exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary stoppage of classes resulting
from their activity necessarily disrupted public services, the very evil
sought to be forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government
workers. Their act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service law,
rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be made
answerable.[12]
In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the private
respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which may warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions against them as a result of
administrative proceedings. As already observed, the resolution of this
case revolves around the question of due process of law, not on the right
of government workers to strike. The issue is not whether private
respondents may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but
whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged proscribed
activity, their right to due process has been violated. In short, before
they can be investigated and meted out any penalty, due process must
first be observed.
 In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to
include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor,
and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.[13]
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’
administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of
the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing
provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the
division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670 read:
“Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. – Every teacher shall
enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of any disciplinary procedure
and shall have:
a. the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a representative
of his choice and/or by his organization, adequate time being given to the
teacher for the preparation of his defense; and
c. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No publicity
shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken against a teacher
during the pendency of his case.
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges against a
teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor,
where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or,
in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization
and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the
Director of Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from
the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That where the
school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Education.”
The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of the
statute; that is, to promote the “terms of employment and career
prospects” of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to
hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not
include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of
RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were
necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a
teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure
an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given
substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
basic requirement of notice and a realopportunity to be heard.[14]
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA
4670, because “all the teachers who were members of the various
committees are members of either the Quezon City Secondary Teachers
Federation or the Quezon City Elementary Teachers Federation”[15] and
are deemed to be the representatives of a teachers’ organization as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective
teachers’ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA
4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to
indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by
the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their
underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of
the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating
committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization
as its representative in said committee.
Contrary to petitioners’ asseverations,[16] RA 4670 is applicable to
this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general law PD 807,
which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with
the latter. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that “repeals
by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed
unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two
laws are so clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot
co-exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the legislature
cannot be overturned by the judicial function of construction and
interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in repealing
statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity
and co-existence.”[17] Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal a
prior special law, “unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although
the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases
embraced in the special law.”[18]
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the
legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving
public schoolteachers. Clearly, private respondents’ right to due process
of law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by RA
4670. Verba legis non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza who is now a member of this Court, perceptively and correctly
stated:
“Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been superseded
by the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and that pursuant to the latter
law the head of a department, like the DECS secretary, or a regional
director, like the respondent-appellant Nilo Rosas, can file administrative
charges against a subordinate, investigate him and take disciplinary action
against him if warranted by his findings. Respondent-appellants cite in
support of their argument the following provisions of the Civil Service
Decree (P.D. No. 807):
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. --
xxx xxx xxx
b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities xxx
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction
xxx .
Sec. 38,. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential
Appointees. -
a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department or officer
of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or
regional directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other persons.
There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service Decree and the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Although the Civil Service
Decree gives the head of department or the regional director jurisdiction
to investigate and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such power
is exercised through committees. In cases involving public school
teachers, the Magna Carta provides that the committee be constituted as
follows:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. - Administrative charges against a teacher
shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized representative
who would at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where the
teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization and a
supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of
Public Schools. The committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from
the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, that where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members
of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of Education.
Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the DECS-
NCR regional director personally conducted the investigation but
entrusted it to a committee composed of a division supervisor, secondary
and elementary school teachers, and consultants. But there was no
representative of a teachers organization. This is a serious flaw in the
composition of the committee because the provision for the
representation of a teachers organization is intended by law for the
protection of the rights of teachers facing administrative charges.
There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way inconsistent
with the Civil Service Decree insofar as procedures for investigation is
concerned. To the contrary, the Civil Service Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms
the Magna Carta by providing that the respondent in an administrative
case may ask for a “formal investigation,” which was what the teachers
did in this case by questioning the absence of a representative of a
teachers organization in the investigating committee.
The administrative committee considered the teachers to have waived
their right to a hearing after the latter’s counsel walked out of the
preliminary hearing. The committee should not have made such a ruling
because the walk out was staged in protest against the procedures of the
committee and its refusal to give the teachers’ counsel a copy of the
guidelines. The committee concluded its investigation and ordered the
dismissal of the teachers without giving the teachers the right to full
access of the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend
themselves. Its predisposition to find petitioner-appellees guilty of the
charges was in fact noted by the Supreme Court when in its resolution in
G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v. Judge Martin Villarama, Jr.) it
stated:
The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and issues in Hon.
Isidro Cariño, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et al. G.R. No. 100206,
August 22, 1961.
As in the Cariño v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department of Culture
and Education are predisposed to summarily hold the petitioners guilty of
the charges against them. In fact, in this case Secretary Cariño, without
awaiting formal administrative procedures and on the basis of reports and
“implied admissions” found the petitioners guilty as charged and
dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated May 16,
1991 and August 6, 1991. The teachers went to court. The Court
dismissed the case.”[19]
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the
factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is not our
function “to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial
and documentary, adduced by the parties particularly where, such as
here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court
coincide.”[20]
It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s decision setting aside the
questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified
reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to them of
salaries, allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their
benefit during the entire duration of their suspension or
dismissal.[21] Because the administrative proceedings involved in this case
are void, no delinquency or misconduct may be imputed to private
respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal meted on them is
baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated[22] and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to
them during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal.[23] This
Court will never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due
process, which is a cornerstone of our legal system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the
part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus AFFIRMED.
PAT. EDGAR M. GO, INP., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Edgar M. Go had been a member of the Olongapo City
Police Department since April 18, 1974. On December 16, 1983, he was
dismissed for alleged involvement in illegal gambling, more particularly
the operation of jai-alai bookies. The decision,[1] dated November 24,
1983, of the Summary Dismissal Board No. 2 of the PC/INP Regional
Command No. 3 at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, stated:
Investigation reveals that on 21 January 1983 at about 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, a team of military personnel raided the house of the respondent
at No. 18 Murphy St., Pag-asa, Olongapo City. The raiding team were
able to apprehend fifteen (15) persons inside the house of PAT. EDGAR
GO to include his wife, Minda Go. Lieutenant Paterno Ding PC, the leader
of the raiding team was able to confiscate the amount of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos, assorted papelitos, ballpen and calculator used in the
operation of Jai Alai Bookies.
Investigation further reveals that another raid was conducted for the
second time at the house of PAT. EDGAR GO. Major Jaime Garcia,
Deputy Commander of Olongapo Metrodiscom Command in his written
report to the Olongapo Metrodiscom Commander stated that on 16 June
1983 PAT. EDGAR GO, together with his brother, Lolito Go were both
involved in Jai Alai Bookies which were being committed right at the
house of the respondent. Witnesses like Rodolfo Ablaza and Rolando dela
Fuente admitted that they were the collector of PAT. EDGAR GO and
Lolito Go in the operation of Jai Alai Bookies.
It was further discovered during the investigation of the case that the first
raid conducted on 21 January 1983, a criminal complaint was filed before
the City Court of Olongapo City against the wife and brother of the
respondent respectively. But PAT. EDGAR GO approached the
Metropolitan Commander for a favor to dismiss the case against his wife
and brother with the promise that the Jai Alai activities committed in his
residence will be stop once and for all. The Fiscal later on dismissed the
case for insufficiency of evidence for failure on the part of the raiding
team to prosecute the case. Moreover, when the second raid was
conducted it was proven that illegal Jai Alai activities was still going on in
the residence of the respondent.
On the other hand, respondent inspite of several notices failed to appear
before the board in order to refute the charges against him. The board in
its desire to base the instant case with impartiality, objectivity and legality
has to postpone the hearing of the case for several times, just to allow
the respondent and his witnesses to appear before the Board, but all our
efforts proved futile with the refusal of the respondent to appear before
the Board in spite of all notices duly served to him by the [illegible]
Metropolitan District Command. So, after four (4) months of several
postponements, the Board proceeded with the hearing and considered
the non-appearance of the respondent as a waiver on his part to present
his evidence.
The Board after receiving both the written and oral
evidences/testimonies, has concluded that it would be inconceivable for
an ordinary man to believe that Pat. Edgar Go, a policeman at that, would
not be able to know what is going on inside his own residence, as a
matter of fact, he made a promise to the Olongapo Metrodiscom
Commander that such illegal activities will never happened again and
yet same was proven to be existing when the second raid was
conducted. While it is true that on 16 June 1983 and 21 January 1983
complainant was in his official assignment, it was clearly established
that PAT. EDGAR GO has the full knowledge on the existence of the
illegal Jai Alai activities and even those apprehended during the first and
the second raid implicated the respondent.
PD 1707 in relation to Memorandum agreement between NAPOLCOM and
Director General, INP dated November 24, 1980 provides that a syndicate
crime and tong collection are serious offenses against an INP members
and is therefore within the jurisdiction of the dismissal authorities.
Petitioner was informed of his dismissal in a memo, dated
December 20, 1983, by Lt. Col. Ferdinand A. Lagman, District
Superintendent, INP of the Olongapo Metropolitan District
Command.[2] He appealed to the Director General of the PC/INP,
complaining of denial of due process. He claimed that no copy of the
complaint with supporting affidavits had been served on him as required
by NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 81-01; that he was simply ordered by radio
to appear before the summary dismissal board for investigation; that he
went to attend the hearing on May 9, 1983 but neither the complainant
nor his witnesses were present and he was advised by the board’s
chairman, a certain Colonel Cinco, to secure the services of a lawyer for
the next hearing; that at the hearing on September 6 or 9, 1983, the
members of the board and complainant and his witnesses were again
absent; that the third hearing scheduled on September 21, 1983 was also
postponed because of the absence of the members of the board; that
although a hearing had allegedly been held on October 19, 1983, he was
not able to attend it because he had not been previously notified; that he
heard nothing more about the case until he was informed of the decision
dismissing him, a copy of which was received by him only on February 20,
1984.
Petitioner claimed that had he been allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses against him, he could have shown that Rodolfo Ablaza and
Rolando de la Fuente, who, according to the board’s decision said they
had worked as jai-alai collectors of petitioner and his brother,
subsequently executed affidavits in which they said they had been misled
into signing their prior statements. Finally, petitioner argued that, in any
event, his dismissal should have taken effect only upon his receipt of a
copy of the decision on February 20, 1984 and not on December 16,
1983. He cited his 11 years of service in the police department and
various awards and commendations which had been given to him and
prayed that he be exonerated and reinstated to the police department
and paid back salaries, from the time of his dismissal to the time of his
reinstatement, and other reliefs to which he might be entitled.
Petitioner’s appeal was denied as the Director General of the
PC/INP noted in a decision, dated August 21, 1990, that “there appears a
factual basis which is legally unassailable” for the summary dismissal
board’s findings.[3]
Petitioner appealed to the National Police Commission which
likewise dismissed his appeal for “utter lack of merit.”[4] In its decision,
dated March 5, 1992, the NAPOLCOM held:
The fact that the Jai alai bookies were operating in the house being
occupied by herein respondent-appellant, the apprehension of his wife
and brother in two (2) successive raids effected by law-enforcement
authority and his intercession for the dismissal of the case filed in
consequence thereof, are tangible proofs that he was, indeed, an
accessory - if not a principal - in said gambling operation.
As to the assertion of respondent-appellant that he was deprived of his
right to due process, anchored on the allegation that he was not served
any notice of hearing, it is belied by the records. On several occasions,
the Summary Dismissal Board sent notices to herein respondent-appellant
requiring him to appear and present evidence in his behalf, but he
ignored said notices, prompting the Board to proceed with the
investigation ex parte.
Hence, this petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of
the NAPOLCOM.
Petitioner maintains that he was not served written charges and
informed of the nature of such charges; that no hearing had actually been
held by the summary dismissal board; and that at any rate he was not
heard.
We find petitioner’s claim meritorious. Petitioner’s case was
decided under P.D. No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1707. While §8-A
of the Decree authorizes summary dismissals “without the necessity of a
formal investigation” of members of the INP “when the charge is serious
and the evidence is strong,” the Decree and the implementing rules
nonetheless give the respondent the right to be furnished a copy of the
complaint and to file an answer within three (3) days. This right consists
of the following:
(1) The Hearing Officer or INP Director concerned shall furnish the
respondent a copy of the complaint with all the sworn statements and
other documents attached thereto with a notification that on the
scheduled date of hearing, the respondent must submit sworn counter-
statements and/or other evidence to disprove the charge, otherwise, the
former shall forthwith recommend his summary removal based on the
evidence on hand[5]
(2) Notification of Charges or Complaint; Order to Answer. - The
respondent INP member shall be furnished with a copy of the complaint
or charges against him and he shall answer said complaint within three
(3) days from receipt thereof, enclosing therewith pertinent supporting
documents or evidences in his behalf. If the respondent fails to answer
the charges within the prescribed period, the Summary Dismissal
Authority shall immediately conduct the investigation ex parte.[6]
The filing of charges and the allowance of reasonable opportunity
to respondent to answer the charges constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. Thus, in Government Service and
Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,[7] §40 of P.D. No. 807, which
similarly authorized the summary dismissals of civil service employees
without formal investigation “when the charge is serious and the evidence
of guilt is strong,” was construed by this Court to require the giving of
notice of charges to a respondent and the right to answer. We said:
We think it is time this Court firms up its position on the validity of
Section 40 of the Civil Service Act. It is clear to us that what the opening
sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or
dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is
equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred [sic] against him, and that the normal way by which the
employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges
made against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute
cannot dispense with and still remains consistent with the constitutional
provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a
reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say,
his defenses against the charges levelled again him and to present
evidence in support of his defenses. The ordinary way by which a Civil
Service employee is given this opportunity is by holding an investigation,
in the course of which the employee may assert his defenses and present
his supporting evidence. If Section 40 of the Civil Service Decree is to be
saved from unconstitutionality, it cannot be interpreted or applied in such
a manner as to deprive a respondent employee of these two (2) minimum
rights. These are not the only indispensable requirements of procedural
due process; they are, however, most directly involved in the matter of
whether or not an investigation of charges against a civil service
employee is essential.[8]
The INP record of this case does not show that a formal complaint
was ever filed against petitioner. Nor are there attached to such record
supporting affidavits of witnesses, if any, against him. Neither the
decision of the board, nor that of the Director General of the PC/INP
denying reconsideration, nor the decision of the NAPOLCOM on appeal
contains reference to any written complaint with supporting affidavits filed
against petitioner.
Petitioner’s complaint that he had not been furnished written
charges with supporting affidavits merited no more than a passing
mention in the decision of the PC/INP Director General. In his appeal to
the NAPOLCOM, petitioner reiterated his claim, but the decision of this
agency, dismissing his appeal, merely rehashed the decision of the
Director General. There was no effort made to deal with the assignment
of errors of petitioner.
Indeed, what the summary dismissal board appears to have done in
this case was simply to receive the report on two raids allegedly
conducted on petitioner’s house on January 21, 1983 and on June 16,
1983, in the course of which what were believed were gambling
paraphernalia (money in the amount of P1,000.00, assorted “papelitos,” a
ballpen, and a calculator) were allegedly found and two witnesses
(Rodolfo Ablaza and Rolando de la Fuente) allegedly admitted they were
collectors of petitioner and his brother Lolito Go. But the report, if it was
ever in writing, is not in the record of this case which the NAPOLCOM
transmitted to the Court. Nor does the decision of the summary dismissal
board disclose on what the supposed report was based. This is in
violation of the rule that in administrative proceedings “the decision must
be rendered on the evidence contained in the record and disclosed to the
party affected.”[9]
In all probability the report of the team which conducted the raids
was not even in writing and the supposed testimonies of the two
witnesses were not taken down. This is evident from the decision of the
board which, instead of referring to the testimonies or affidavits of
witnesses, repeatedly refers to the results of an “investigation.” Thus, the
decision states: “Investigation reveals . . .,” “investigation further reveals
. . .,” “It was further discovered during the investigation. . . .” It is clear
that the facts found by the board were not the result of any investigation
conducted by it but by some other group, possibly the team that allegedly
conducted the raids and that what the board did was simply to rely on
their finding.
Under these circumstances there was no way by which petitioner
could defend himself. In summary dismissal proceedings, unless other
fully effective means for implementing the constitutional requirement of
notice and hearing are devised, it is mandatory that charges be specified
in writing and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the
complaint because these are the only ways by which evidence against the
respondent can be brought to his knowledge. They take the place of
direct examination of witnesses. The formal investigation, which is
dispensed with in summary dismissal proceedings, refers to the
presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and not to the
requirement that the respondent in the administrative case be notified of
the charges and given the chance to defend himself.
The Solicitor General argues that petitioner could not have failed to
inquire what the charges against him were because he admits he
appeared before the board as ordered. That may be so. Petitioner might
have been told what the charge or charges against him were, but not the
details thereof, and, certainly, not what the alleged witnesses against him
might have said because, as already stated, the record of the INP simply
did not contain their alleged testimonies.
Nor does it appear that petitioner was heard in his defense. His
claim, that thrice he appeared before the summary dismissal board but no
hearing was ever held either because complainant and his witnesses did
not appear or the members of the board were absent or both complainant
and witnesses and members of the board were absent, was never
specifically denied in any of the decisions of the administrative authorities,
beyond saying that the claim was belied by the record. There is simply
nothing in the INP record of the case to show this. It may be argued that
the requirements of due process are satisfied if a party initially denied a
hearing is subsequently granted one by means of motion for
reconsideration.[10] That is true indeed if the charges and the evidence
against him are set forth in the record of the case, but not where, as
here, they are not. If in his appeal to the PC/INP Director General,
petitioner presented the affidavits of retraction of two of the witnesses
against him, it was only because the decision of the board mentioned that
these witnesses allegedly said they had acted as petitioner’s collectors
and not because their prior statements were in the record.
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law and
that not even the fact that the charge against him is serious and evidence
of his guilt is — in the opinion of his superiors — strong can compensate
for the procedural shortcut evident in the record of this case. It is
precisely in cases such as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in
the drive to clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are
denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are allowed to
escape punishment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Police Commission is
ANNULLED and petitioner is ordered REINSTATED with backwages for five
(5) years and paid other benefits and RESTORED in his seniority.
Arnold P. Mollaneda, petitioner, vs. Leonida C.
Umacob, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the (a)
Decision[1] dated May 14, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 48902 affirming in toto Resolution No. 973277 of the Civil Service
Commission; and (b) Resolution[2]dated August 26, 1999 of the said court
denying the motion for reconsideration of its Decision.
The case stemmed from the affidavit-complaint for sexual
harassment filed by Leonida Umacob (respondent) against Arnold
Mollaneda (petitioner) with the Civil Service Commission - Regional Office
XI, Davao City (CSC-RO XI) in September 1994 alleging:
“That sometime on September 7, 1994 at around 7:30 o’clock more or
less, in the morning, while inside the office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase,
Admin Officer 2 of Davao City Schools, located at the Division Office
Building, along Palma Gil St., Davao City, to follow-up my request for
transfer from my present assignment to either Buhangin District or
Bangoy District, Davao City, Mr. Rolando P. Suase was not around and it
was school Division Superintendent, Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda who was
seated at his (Rolando's) table, as at the time, the office of Mr. Arnold
Mollaneda just adjacent was being cleaned by a janitor.
That immediately I approached him and seated opposite to him and
handed to him my letter of recommendation from DECS Regional Director,
Region XI, Dr. Ramon Y. Alba, recommending my possible transfer and
after reading the same advised her to return next week as there is no
available item and that he will think about it. However, I insisted that he
will give me a note to fix the time and date of our next meeting and or
appointment at his office. At this instance, he handed me a piece of
paper with his prepared signature and requested me to write my name on
it, after which, he took it back from me and assured me to grant my
request and at the same time, he made some notations on the same
piece of paper below my name, indicating my possible transfer to
Buhangin or Bangoy District of which I thanked him for the
accomodation. At this point, he stood up, bringing along with him the
paper so that I also stood up. However, before I could get outside the
office, he then handed to me the said piece of paper and advised me to
give it to a certain May Pescadero, personnel clerk, for the making/cutting
of the order of transfer. All of a sudden he hugged and embraced me,
then he kissed my nose and lip in a torrid manner. That I tried to resist
but he forcibly held my neck so that he was able to kiss me in an easy
way. That - not contented, he then mashed my left breast. He did the
malicious act for several times, afterwhich he warned me not to tell
anybody what he did to me inside the office.
That as a result of the very unfortunate incident, I was so shocked, that I
was not able to speak or talk or confess to my husband what our School
Superintendent did to me. Likewise, I also informed one Venus Mariano,
also DECS employee, who advised me to stay and remain
calm. However, I decided to report the matter to San Pedro Patrol
Station.”[3] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent furnished the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports - Regional Office XI, Davao City (DECS-RO XI) a copy of her
affidavit-complaint. Thus, on September 30, 1994, Regional Director
Susana Cabahug issued an order[4] directing the formation of a committee
to conduct an investigation of respondent's complaint against petitioner.
On October 4, 1994, petitioner filed with the CSC-RO XI his answer
to the affidavit-complaint denying the allegations therein and alleging that
there are “material contradictions,” in respondent’s version of the
incident, thus:
“1) On the date of the alleged happening of the incident, she was with
her husband who was just outside the Office of Mr. Mollaneda according
to witness Security Guard Raul Moncada, but she did not report the
incident to her husband, nor did she register any complaint on that date
September 7, 1994;
She reported the alleged acts of lasciviousness complained of to the
police only the following day, September 8, 1994, at about 3:45 P.M. as
shown by the extract of the entry of the police blotter attached to her
AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT in this case.
2) In her report to the police as shown by the said police blotter, she
said that “While at the office of Mr. Arnold Mollaneda, Division
Superintendent DECS XI, she was requested by the latter to transfer in
the office of Mr. Rolando Suase as the janitor/security guard was cleaning
the room of the respondent.”
And her version as published in The Mindanao Daily Mirror in the issue of
September 10, 1994 (see ANNEX C of the complaint of Mollaneda to the
City Prosecution Office). “Omacob said Mollaneda in a written note told
her to transfer to the room of a certain Rolando Suase since the janitor
will clean his room. But before she could move to the other room
Mollaneda allegedly hugged, kissed and mashed her breast and told her
not to tell it to anybody.”
3) In her instant Affidavit-Complaint, she again says “while inside the
Office of Mr. Rolando P. Suase x x x to follow-up my request for transfer x
x x Mr. Suase was not around and it was Schools Division Superintendent,
Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda who was seated at his (Rolando) table, as at that
time, the Office of Mr. Arnold P. Mollaneda just adjacent was being
cleaned by a janitor x x x.” It was inside the office of Mr. Suase that she
was given a note on her request for transfer by Mr. Mollaneda to be given
to May Pescadero when “At this point, he stood up bringing along with
him the paper so that I also stood-up, however, before I could get
outside the office, he then handed to me the said piece of paper and
advised me to give it to a certain May Pescadero, personnel clerk for the
making/cutting of the order of transfer and at the same time all of a
sudden, he hug and embraced me, then he kissed my nose and lips in a
torrid manner. That I tried to resist but he forcibly held my neck so that
he was able to kiss me in an easy way. That not contented, he then
mashed my left breast, which he did the malicious act for several times,
afterwhich he warned me not to tell anybody what he did to me inside the
office.”[5]
In the present petition, petitioner alleged his own version of the
incident,[6] thus:
"Petitioner, in his sworn statement, stated that on September 7, 1994, he
had interviewed or conferred with about three (3) persons already who
were applying for new teaching positions or for transfers when
Respondent came to HIS OFFICE. When it was her turn to be interviewed,
petitioner told her that she could not be transferred immediately because
the Division only had very few vacant items and the same were already
given to earlier applicants. Nevertheless, she was told to wait while he
searched for a new vacant item.
Petitioner gave the Respondent a note for her to give to the Acting
Personnel Officer Mildred "May" Pescadero so that Respondent may be
included in the list of teachers applying for transfer. Upon reading the
note, however, the Respondent angrily told him why could she not be
immediately accommodated when she had the written recommendation of
Dir. Ramon Alba. She told Petitioner that asking her to wait was unfair
because there were other applicants from Marilog district who were
transferred and one of them who was slated to be transferred was Mrs.
Daylinda Bacoy.
Petitioner explained to the Respondent that Mrs. Bacoy suffered an injury
when she fell off the horse she was riding on when she went to her
school in Kiopao Elementary School. Petitioner scolded the Respondent
for her insubordinate attitude toward him. She was counting so much on
the recommendation of Dir. Ramon Alba who was Petitioner's superior,
and could not believe that no positive action was made by Petitioner on
the basis of said recommendation. In going OUT OF THE OFFICE OF
PETITIONER, she was heard to have murmured that Petitioner would
regret his act of discrimination.
There was no act of sexual harassment that occurred during the relatively
brief conversation between the herein parties. The witnesses, whose
affidavits were attached to the Affidavit of Mr. Mollaneda, all swore to the
fact that they saw what transpired between Petitioner and the
Respondent and that there was no act of sexual harassment that
occurred. Moreover, they swore to the fact that the interview took place
inside Mr. Mollaneda's office as the both parties were seen through a
glass panel separating Petitioner's office and the anteroom."
Meanwhile, pending resolution by the CSC-RO XI of respondent’s
complaint, the DECS investigating committee recommended to the DECS
Regional Director "the dropping of the case" for lack of merit.8
On June 5, 1995, the CSC-RO XI issued a resolution charging
petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The said office
found there was a prima facie case against him9 and eventually elevated
to the Civil Service Commission (Commission) the records of the case.
Thereafter, the Commission designated Atty. Anacleto Buena to
hear and receive the evidence in the case. A formal hearing was
conducted in Davao City. Both parties were assisted by counsel.
On July 7, 1997, the Commission issued Resolution No. 973277
finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was meted the penalty
of dismissal from the government service with all its accessory
penalties.10 Forthwith, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied in Resolution No. 981761.11
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for review alleging: “first, that the Commission erred in finding
him guilty x x x notwithstanding the fact that he was denied his right to
due process; and second, that the Commission erred in giving weight to
the hearsay testimonies of the witnesses for respondent.”12
On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision13 affirming in toto Resolution No. 973277 of the
Commission. The appellate court held:
“It is a time-honored rule that the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts, tribunals, or
administrative bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers. Unlike
appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony in clear observance of
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial or
hearing. Thus, absent any showing that they have overlooked facts of
substance and value that if considered might affect the result, their
findings must be given weight and respect.
In the present case, nothing significant has been shown to convince this
Court that the Commission acted with bias or ignored something of
substance that could have, in any degree, warranted an exoneration of
petitioner from the charges hurled against him.
It bears mentioning that respondent victim is a public school teacher. If
she is not motivated by the truth, she would not have subjected herself to
the rigors of a hearing before the Commission and airing in public matters
that affect her honor. It is hard to conceive that respondent would reveal
and admit the shameful and humiliating experience she had undergone if
it were not true. In any case, the fact that petitioner could not proffer
any explanation as to why respondent and the prosecution witnesses
would falsely testify against him logically proves that no improper motive
impelled them to accuse the former of such serious offense as sexual
harassment.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, in the present case, may not successfully plead violation of his
right to due process as he, in fact, participated at the pre-trial, agreed to
matters therein taken up, attended the hearing, and lengthily cross-
examined the prosecution witnesses.
Anent petitioner’s contention that the decision of the Commission was in
conflict with newspaper reports of a decision dismissing the case against
him for insufficiency of evidence, suffice it to state that what the movant
considers as a decision is merely a newspaper report. Newspaper
accounts and clippings are hearsay and have no evidentiary
value. (People vs. Aguel, 97 SCRA 795).”14
Rebuffed in his bid for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision, petitioner filed the instant petition, and as grounds therefor
alleges:
“I
THE RELIANCE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ON THE THEORY THAT
FINDINGS OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES ARE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE
WEIGHT, IS MISPLACED IN VIEW OF THE PERTINENT FACTS OF THE
CASE.
II
A SIMILAR ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WAS INSTITUTED IN AND
INVESTIGATED BY THE D.E.C.S. AND A RESOLUTION WAS RENDERED
DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST PETITIONER.
III
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE PETITIONER WERE ALL
EYE-WITNESSES TO THE ACTUAL INCIDENT, WHICH CAST DOUBT ON
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE RESPONDENT’S TESTIMONY.”15
Petitioner contends that the oft-cited rule - the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the x x x
administrative bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers - finds
no application in the present case. According to petitioner, the failure of
the CSC Commissioners to “personally observe the demeanor, conduct
and attitude of the witnesses” and their reliance solely on Atty. Buena’s
recommendation and notes should have discouraged the Court of Appeals
from giving weight to the findings of the Commission. Petitioner also
argues that respondent engaged in forum shopping by filing her affidavit-
complaint with the DECS-RO XI and CSC-RO XI; and that the Court of
Appeals should have considered in his favor the DECS-RO XI’s resolution
dismissing the administrative case against him. Finally, petitioner insists
that the Court of Appeals erroneously gave credence to the “hearsay”
testimonies of Melencio Umacob, respondent's husband, and Venus
Mariano, secretary of the Assistant Division Superintendent of the Davao
City Schools. These witnesses testified that respondent narrated to them
the events concerning the sexual harassment committed against her by
petitioner.
For her part, respondent reiterates the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that in reviewing administrative cases, the appellate court is
traditionally sanctioned to subscribe to the findings of the lower court or
administrative body or agency since it is in a better position to determine
the credibility of witnesses. As to the alleged “act of forum-shopping,”
petitioner claims that in pursuing redress of her grievances, she sought
refuge both in the court and in the Commission for she believed they are
the proper fora for her criminal and administrative complaints. And lastly,
respondent counters that the Commission did not err in giving more
credence to the testimonies of her witnesses, stressing that petitioner’s
witnesses are biased, they being his subordinates.
During the pendency of this case in this Court, petitioner submitted
the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City, acquitting
him of the crime of acts of lasciviousness which arose from the same
incident involved in the present administrative case.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner is
actually urging us not to give credence to the factual findings of the
Commission on the ground that the Commissioners did not personally
hear the case.
The fact that the Commission assigned Atty. Buena to hear and
receive evidence does not render its factual findings unworthy of
credence. In laying down the precedent that the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by trial courts or
administrative bodies rather than by appellate courts, this Court merely
recognizes that the trial court or the administrative body as a trier of facts
is in a better position to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and the
credibility of their testimonies as they were within its proximal view during
the hearing or investigation. At any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that the
term “administrative body or agency” includes the subordinate officials
upon whose hand the body or agency delegates a portion of its
authority. Included therein are the hearing officers through whose eyes
and ears the administrative body or agency observes the demeanor,
conduct and attitude of the witnesses and listens to their testimonies.16
It must be emphasized that the appointment of competent officers
to hear and receive evidence is commonly resorted to by administrative
bodies or agencies in the interest of an orderly and efficient disposition of
administrative cases. This Court, in American Tobacco Company v.
Director of Patents,17 ruled:
“Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in
the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a
delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the
decision of the administrative agency will be made.“
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter
of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to
investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer
makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion
finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does
due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the
actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the
decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the
decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question
that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short,
there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer
concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said
officer. It is, however, required that to “give the substance of a hearing,
which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the
officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the
evidence which justifies them.
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings
on the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the
ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and questions involved is
left to the Director of Patents. Apart from the circumstance that the point
involved is procedural and not jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in
what manner they have been prejudiced by the proceedings.”
Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may employ
other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to
receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports on the basis
of which the agency shall render its decision. Such a procedure is a
practical necessity. Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down
the cardinal requirements of due process in administrative proceedings,
one of which is that “the tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate.”18 Thus, it
is logical to say that this mandate was rendered precisely to ensure that
in cases where the hearing or reception of evidence is assigned to a
subordinate, the body or agency shall not merely rely on his
recommendation but instead shall personally weigh and assess the
evidence which the said subordinate has gathered. In the case at bar, it
is evident that the Commission itself evaluated in detail the evidence of
both parties as reported by Atty. Buena. In fact, in laying down its
conclusion, it made constant reference to the testimonies of the parties
and of their witnesses and to the documentary evidence presented.
It must be addressed that, the Commission’s act of delegating the
authority to hear and receive evidence to Atty. Buena is not without legal
basis. Section 47, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987) provides that the
Commission may deputize any department or agency or official or group
of officials to conduct an investigation on the complaint filed by a private
citizen against a government official or employee. The results of the
investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation
as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
Going further, petitioner complains that he was not furnished a
copy of Atty. Buena’s notes and recommendation. The Court cannot
empathize with him. In Ruiz v. Drilon,18 we unequivocally held that a
respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendation of any investigating committee created to
inquire into the charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the
administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record and
a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented
against him during the hearing.20 Besides, Atty. Buena's findings and
recommendation are internal communications between him and the
Commission and, therefore, confidential. In Pefianco v. Moral,21 this
Court held:
“Respondent’s (Moral) counsel is reminded that the Report of the DECS
Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself x x x
[t]he report is an internal communication between the Investigating
Committee and the DECS Secretary, and therefore, confidential until the
latter had already read and used the same in making his own
determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed
in the Decision he may make.
The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used
as part - although not controlling - of the basis for the decision. Only
when the party adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected
an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may all the records of the case,
including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. In the latter
appellate tribunal, the respondent’s counsel may be allowed to read
and/or be given a copy of the Report to enable the appellant to file an
intelligent and exhaustive appellant’s Brief Memorandum.”
Petitioner’s second argument requires no lengthy discussion. First,
he did not raise the issue of forum-shopping before the Commission.22 It
bears emphasis that respondent merely furnished the DECS-RO XI a copy
of her affidavit-complaint. And second, we surveyed the records and
there is nothing therein which supports petitioner’s claim that the DECS-
RO XI dismissed respondent's affidavit-complaint. The resolution22 of the
DECS mainly recommended to the Regional Director of the DECS-RO XI
the dropping of the case. A recommendatory resolution does not have
the effect of actually disposing of a case. Its function is merely to advise
the disciplining authority of what action should be taken or what penalty
should be imposed. It is not controlling and the disciplining authority may
or may not conform with the recommended action.
On petitioner’s assertion that the testimony of respondent’s
witnesses are hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, we are
constrained to hold a different view. A reading of the testimonies of
Umacob and Mariano shows that they were not presented to prove the
truth of respondent’s accusations against petitioner, but only to establish
the fact that respondent narrated to them what transpired between her
and petitioner. While it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding
a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of
the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is
otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely
to establish the fact that the statement was made.23 Regardless of the
truth or falsity of a statement, when the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be
shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact.24
Significantly, respondent herself and her witnesses were present
during the hearing of the case. Hence, petitioner was given the
opportunity to cross-examine them. The real basis for the exclusion of
hearsay evidence lies in the fact that a hearsay testimony is not subject to
the tests which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of the
truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for
cross-examination.25
Lastly, petitioner cannot find solace in the dismissal of the criminal
case against him. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the
dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an
administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not
foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean
bill of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the court is simply
saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the
respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for
conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the
Constitution guarantees an accused.27 However, in administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial
evidence.28 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.29 After a more incisive scrutiny of the records, we are
convinced that petitioner’s culpability has been proven by substantial
evidence. Respondent’s testimony was found by the Commission to be
“natural, straightforward, spontaneous and convincing.”30 Unlike
petitioner’s testimony, that of respondent is replete with details consistent
with human nature. Clearly, the dismissal of the criminal case against
petitioner by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City cannot bind
this Court in the disposition of the instant administrative case.31
In sum, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals. While it is unfotunate that petitioner will lose his job because of
a moment’s indiscretion, this Court shall not flinch in imposing upon him
the severe penalty of dismissal. As Schools Division Superintendent,
petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethics. By succumbing to
his moral perversity, he failed to live up to such standard. Indeed, he
provided a justifiable ground for his dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. No. 130442 April 6, 2000
THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL
APPELLATE BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY, petitioners,
vs.
C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review by way of Certiorari of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43872, which set aside the
Decision of the Regional Director (RD) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of Iloilo City, through its Summary Dismissal Board (SDB),
suspending herein respondent C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita from the service for
twenty (20) days for "Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty
under Section 41 of R.A. 6975."
The antecedents are as follows:
On July 6, 1994, the following verified complaints were filed against
C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, herein respondent, by Manuel Puey, Jesus Puey,
Alex Edwin del Rosario:
1) Administrative Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-01- for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Jesus H. Puey in a
complaint dated June 25, 1994;
2) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-02- for Grave Threats filed by
Jesus H. Puey;
3) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-03 for Abuse of Authority and
Illegal Search filed by Jesus H. Puey;
4) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-04 for Abuse of Authority and
Violation of Domicile filed by Jesus H. Puey;
5) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6"-94-05 for Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Jesus H. Puey;
6) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-06 for Conduct Unbecoming
of a Police Officer filed by Manuel H. Puey;
7) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-07 for Illegal Search filed by
Manuel H. Puey;
8) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-08 for Grave Abuse of
Authority and Violation of Domicile filed by Manuel Puey;
9) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-09 for Abuse of Authority
and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Manuel Puey;
10) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-10 for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
11) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-11 for Abuse of Authority
and Grave Threats filed by Alex Edwin del Rosario;
12) Admin. Case Nr. SDHB "B6" -94-12 for Abuse of Authority
and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban filed by Alex Edwin del
Rosario.
The twelve administrative complaints were the subject of administrative
hearings before the Summary Dismissal Board of the PNP. At the pre-trial,
the parties and their respective counsels agreed that the twelve cases
shall be consolidated into one "major complaint" for "conduct unbecoming
of a police officer" under Par. e, Sec. 3, Rule II, Memorandum Circular
No. 92-006 pursuant to RA 69752 . The statement of the case by the
Summary Dismissal Board is as follows:
That sometime last April 26, 1994, after attending the birthday
party of Miss Jessie Vasquez Alex Edwin del Rosario, together
with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristita Dawa boarded
Mazda pick up with plate nr. HHP-808 and driven by Reynaldo
Consejo, proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz City.
While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio Puting
Tubig, the aforementioned Mazda pick-up driven by Consejo
overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro Torcita;
That on board the motor vehicle driven by Torcita were three
females sitted at the back;
That Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the Mazda
pick-up to stop, however, the driver of the Mazda pick-up
refused to abide by the signal and instead accelerated and
proceeded to Hda. Aimee without stopping.
That upon reaching Hda. Aimee Major Lazaro Torcita, entered
the compound and was approached by two persons in civilian
clothes which prevented him from further proceeding; Moments
after, the patrol car of Cadiz PNP arrived and together with
Major Torcita, approached Jesus H. Puey and Alex Edwin del
Rosario, inquiring as to the identity of the persons who
accosted him;
The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and
entered the compound of Hda. Aimee, very drunk, with back-up
vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus H. Puey and
Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate,
shouting in a very, very loud voice, invectives and remarks;
That such act of Major Lazaro Torcita constitute Conduct
Unbecoming of an Officer not worth of respect;
In his answer, the respondent, Lazaro R. Torcita, while
admitting that he entered the premises of the complainants, the
same was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for he was
in the performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect
who committed a crime in his presence;
From the affidavits of the witnesses and testimonies presented
by the complainants and the counter affidavits and the counter
testimonies of the respondent, the ISSUE before the Board is
whether the respondent is guilty of Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer under Republic Act 6975 as implemented by
Memorandum Circular 92-006 of the National Police
Commission under Rule II Section 3, Paragraph C, committed
thru a series of illegal acts consisting of Grave Threats, Illegal
Search, Abuse of Authority, Violation of Domicile and Violation
of COMELEC Gun Ban.
The complainant presented documentary evidence and witnesses
Congressman Manuel Puey, Rosita Bistal, Alex Edwin del Rosario and
Reynaldo Consejo. Respondent Torcita testified in his behalf and
presented Nehru Java, a member of the PNP Cadiz, who was with him
during the incident in question.
The Summary Dismissal Board made the following findings of facts:
That sometime last April 26, 1994, at about 10:30 in the
evening, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro H.
Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, in the front seat and his
wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a
mazda pick-up, in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, about 10
kilometers from crossing Cadiz, owned by Congressman Manuel
Puey and driven Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in
the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, the executive assistant
and financial analyst of Congressman Puey, three (3) helpers
employed under the Congressman, namely, Rosita Bistal,
Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa;
That both parties came from the Municipality of Victorias where
they attended some social functions on the occasion of the
town fiesta;
After the mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, it
accelerated speed and proceeded to Hda. Aimee, a sugarcane
plantation in Cadiz City, also owned by Congressman Manuel
Puey; The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it
reached Hda. Aimee where C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java
alighted and the confrontation with Alex Edwin del Rosario and
Jesus Puey, occurred;
The Complainant tried to establish the fact that nothing unusual
occurred or transpired between the parties in the vicinity of
Sitio Puting Tubig and that Torcita has no business pursuing
them; However the Board is more inclined to give credence to
the affidavits (exhibit 5 & 6) and the testimony of C/Insp.
Torcita that a vehicular collision almost took place due to
reckless driving of the driver of the mazda pick-up;
That it was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police
of Cadiz City and as deputy of the Land Transportation Office to
enforce traffic rules and regulation to prevent chaos and
accidents in roads and highways of the country (exhibit 13);
This observation is further bolstered by the testimony of
Reynaldo Consejo, the driver of the mazda pick-up, that he was
able to overtake the red Cortina Ford only after the latter car hit
the shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his
speed (tsn page 131, August 30, 1994);
This sudden increase in speed of a driver involved in a vehicular
accident is a classic move for one who wants a fast get away
from the scene, to escape responsibility;
Further, Alex Edwin del Rosario testified that upon reaching
Hda. Aimee, he instructed the guard to be on look-out for a car
might be following them and might enter the compound (TSN
page 70 August 30, 1994 ). This conduct would show that
witness is anticipating that red Cortina Ford would follow them
because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which could have
ended in a vehicular collision and finally no proof was presented
to show that no other reason exist as to why C/Insp. Torcita
would pursue the Mazda pick up other than near occurrence of
a vehicular collision;
The Complainant presented the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal
and Reynaldo Consejo and the Affidavit of Alex Edwin del
Rosario, jointly taken, may be considered as proof that C/Insp.
Torcita has committed act or series of acts that would
constitute Grave Threat, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority,
Violation of Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Resolutions
regarding the gun ban, thus CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A
POLICE OFFICER;
That in the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo
(exhibit c; exhibit 2), Bistal attempted to establish the fact that
C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java illegally entered the gate of the
compound but were stopped by the guards armed with cane
stick or batuta, however in her testimony given during the
hearing (tsn page 32, August 30, 1994) she stated that she did
not know what transpired between the two men approaching
and the guards near the gate because she, together with her
companions, were busy unloading kitchen utensil from the pick-
up to the kitchen and Consejo categorically stated that this
portion of their affidavit, specifically paragraph 7, is NOT TRUE;
Alex Edwin del Rosario, in his testimony given in the hearing,
corroborated this fact that he also did not see or hear what
happened for he was in some distance away and he cannot see
them clearly (TSN page 73, August 30, 1994);
The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the
incident which happened near the gate of the compound is the
affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his testimony given in the
hearing of the case that when he was walking towards the
compound together with his aide, PO2 Nehru Java, two armed
civilian guards stopped and threatened him; He identified
himself however, the same had no effect, and PO2 Java
whispered that there are armed men around them and that it is
dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed
for back-up; Since no proof to the contrary was presented by
the Complainant nor was there any witness or witnesses
presented to rebut this allegations, the Board had no other
choice except to consider these allegations as proof; (Exhibit 5
& 6); The Board also resolve to take note that a metropolitan
newspaper with nationwide circulation and with unquestionable
credential, had published a news item about the presence of
armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey exhibit
14); This evidence give more credence to the fact that there
were really armed men in the premises where the
aforementioned incident happened; That this is corroborated
further by the affidavit of PO2 Nehru Java (exhibit 17);
This observation of the Board that there were really armed men
in the premises of Hda. Aimee, is further enhance by the fact
that Major Torcita felt their presence when he desisted from
further entering the compound, a feeling which was developed
and nurtured by years of living under combat conditions and
finally the Board also feels that the presence of armed persons
in the offices and properties of high government officials is
accepted as a necessary consequence for their protection due
to the greater risks they are expose to;
That because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which was
further aggravated by the confrontation near the gate of the
compound of Hda. Aimee, C/Insp. Torcita upon the arrival of
the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place
where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were; This
fact is not disputed by the parties;
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic
drink; However, not to the point of drunkness; The Board is
more inclined to believe this allegation for no sane person will
risks the life of a member of his family by deliberately driving
when he is mentally and physically incapable; Further, C/Insp.
Torcita was able to drive from Victorias to Cadiz City, a distance
of forty kilometers, on a dark night and raining and was able to
avoid collision of the vehicles involved by sheer reflex action
despite the admitted fact that his tire hit the shoulder of the
road;
Further, at the time Chief Inspector Torcita entered the
compound he was fully aware of the presence of armed men
and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching
the compound of Hda. Aimee; The foregoing facts would show
that C/Insp. Torcita was in full command of his senses and was
not affected by the numbing effect of alcohol for a drunk
person does not show any caution and behaves irrationaly.
The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita
threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took
place between the parties. The Board also found that there was no
sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and held that
the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven.
The Board found that Lazaro Torcita was "in the performance of his
official duties when the incident happened; however, he committed a
breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of same. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Board
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Complaint for
CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER under Memo
Cir. Nr. 92-006 pursuant to Sec. 42, RA 6975, be DISMISSED
for lack of sufficient evidence, however finds C/Insp. Lazaro R.
Torcita to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY under Sec. 41, RA 6975, in relation to
NAPOLCOM Memo Cir. Nr. 91-002 and is hereby ORDERED
 SUSPENDED for twenty days (20) and forfeiture of salary for
the same period of time effective upon receipt of this Decision
under Rule 7, Section 2, Sub-par. b of the same Memo Circular.
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the
PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City, but the appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction; Thus,
Under the applicable provisions of Section 45 of R. A. 6975,
however, the disciplinary action imposed by the Regional
Director upon a PNP member shall be final and executory
except those involving demotion in rank or dismissal from the
service. The appealed decision being that of suspension from
the service with corresponding forfeiture of pay only the same
is not subject to review by this Board.3
Whereupon, C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional
trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31, questioning the legality of the
conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, "which conviction
is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law."
Public respondent filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The
regional trial court granted the petition forcertiorari and annulled the
dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita
guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty.
Public respondent appealed from the above-mentioned decision of the
regional trial court, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have
been guilty of irregularity considering that "the twelve (12) cases treated
as Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer were eventually dismissed."
The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the
reversal of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:
1 THE OFFENSE OF "SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY" IS NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN THE
CHARGE OF "CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER."
2 THE DECISION OF THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD (SDB)
AND THE NAPOLCOM REGIONAL APPELLATE BOARD HAS
BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.4
The petitioners submit that the offense of "Conduct Unbecoming of a
Police Officer" is broad enough to include any act of an officer which
tends to bring dishonor and disgrace to the PNP organization, and Simple
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty is one act which brings such
disgrace and dishonor as contemplated by law. Moreover, the dismissal
has become final and executory and the trial court erred when it
proceeded with the petition in violation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
In his comment, respondent Torcita insists that his right to due process of
law was "corrosively abridged and impaired", and pleads for an
affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The appeal has no merit. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the
decision of the trial court granting the petition for certiorari.
The administrative disciplinary machinery for dealing with complaints or
charges against any member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) is laid
down in Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the "Department of
the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990." This law defines the
summary dismissal powers of the PNP Chief and Regional Directors,
among others in cases, "where the respondent is guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a police officer."5 Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
prescribes the "Rules and Regulations in the conduct of summary
dismissal proceedings against erring PNP members" and defines conduct
unbecoming of a police officer under Section 3 (c), Rule II, as follows:
"Conduct unbecoming of a police officer" refers to any behavior
or action of a PNP member, irrespective of rank, done in his
official capacity, which, in dishonoring or otherwise disgracing
himself as a PNP member, seriously compromise his character
and standing as a gentleman in such a manner as to indicate
his vitiated or corrupt state of moral character; it may also refer
to acts or behavior of any PNP member in an unofficial or
private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing himself
personally as a gentleman, seriously compromises his position
as a PNP member and exhibits himself as morally unworthy to
remain as a member of the organization.
On the other hand, the acts constituting "simple irregularity in the
performance of duty" are defined in Memorandum Circular No. 91-002. It
is a light offense, incurred, among others, by a member of the PNP who
shall, among others, be found to "have the odor or smell of alcohol on his
breath while on duty, or possess alcoholic beverages on his person, police
vehicle, post or office." (Sec. 2. A, Rule VI).
As above-stated, the Summary Dismissal Board absolved the C/Insp.
Torcita of the consolidated charge of "conduct unbecoming of a police
officer" but found him guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of
duty under Sec. 41, R.A. No. 6975, in relation to Napolcom Memorandum
Circular No. 91-002 and imposed a penalty of suspension for twenty (20)
days and forfeiture of salary for the same period.
We are unable to sustain the theory of the petitioners that the definition
of "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" as earlier granted, is broad
enough to include any act of an officer which tends to bring dishonor and
disgrace to the PNP organization, and that there is "no legal prohibition"
which would prevent the Summary Dismissal Board from finding petitioner
guilty of the lesser offense. While the definition of the more serious
offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an
offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and
tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary
requirements of due process.
The series of twelve complaints filed against C/Insp. Torcita were solely
based on the incident that occurred on April 26, 1994 at about 11:00
o'clock in the evening, wherein Torcita, who was off-duty and was in
civilian clothes, riding in his private vehicle with members of his family,
chased another vehicle which overtook his car in a reckless manner and in
violation of the Traffic Code; the hot pursuit ended at the Hacienda
Aimee, where he allegedly entered the place without lawful warrant and
while inside, belligerently shouted invectives, challenging everyone to a
fight, pointed his gun at somebody and urinated in full view of the
persons therein. The Dismissal Board found the above charges
unsubstantiated and held that Torcita was in the performance of official
duty when the incidents happened. "However, he committed breach of
internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of
same."
It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve
administrative cases filed against C/Insp. Torcita, earlier quoted, that
none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the
specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The
records do not bear out the specific acts or conduct constituting the
charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at the pre-
hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police
Officer." Thus, the Board defined the issue before the Board as "whether
the respondent is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a police officer under
Republic Act 6975, as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 92-006
of the National Police Commission under Rule II, Section 3, Paragraph c,
committed though a series of illegal acts consisting of grave threats,
illegal search, abuse of authority, violation of domicile or violation of
Comelec Gunban." Notably, there is no indication or warning at all in the
summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was also being
charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic
drinks while in the performance of his duties.
The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of
the offense for which he was not notified nor
charged.1a\^/phi1 Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by
specific requirements of notification of the charges together with copies of
affidavits and other attachments supporting the complaints, and the filing
of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that
consistent with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing is limited,
and the manner of conducting the hearing is summary, in that sworn
statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-
examination is confined only to material and relevant matters, and
prolonged arguments and dilatory proceedings shall not be entertained.
(Section 4, Memorandum Circular No. 92-006). However, notification of
the charges contemplates that respondent be informed of the specific
charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was being
charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he
could traverse the accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his
defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be heard on the
multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of
specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not
a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the
legal process (Alonte vs. Savellano Jr., 287 SCRA 245).
It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the
litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons
that led to the conclusions of the Court (ABD Overseas Manpower Corp.
vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 454). Memorandum Circular No. 92-006 specifically
prescribes that the decision shall contain "a brief statement of the
material facts and the findings of the summary dismissal authority as well
as the disposition thereof" (Sec. 6). The cursory conclusion of the
Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by
taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been
substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. As it
turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not
drunk and found that he was in full command of his senses where he
tried to apprehend the driver of the maroon Mazda pick-up. Although
Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the
party which he attended before the incident, the records show that he
was then off-duty and the party was at the Municipality of Victorias, which
was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other hand, the hot
pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City
with the members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself,
the hot pursuit was motivated by the duty "inherent to the position as
Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the Land Transportation
Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and
accidents in roads and highways" (Decision, p. 76). The Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out that even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or
smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on
duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip
fetching his wife.
Premises considered, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found
that the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction, as respondent Torcita was found guilty of an
offense for which he was not properly charged. A decision is void for lack
of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity of
being heard (Palu-ay vs. CA, 293 SCRA 358). A void judgment never
acquires finality (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA 255 SCRA 672;
Fortich vs. Corona, 298 SCRA 678). Hence, aforementioned decision
cannot be deemed to have become final and executory.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September l, 1997 of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 115147 January 4, 1995
GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails the resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of
respondent Civil Service Commission ("CSC") relative to an administrative
case, entitled "Land Bank of the Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as well
as its resolution, dated 03 March 1994, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I
of the Land Bank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits
of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February
1988, by the LBP President with having committed the following offenses:
(1) Dishonesty;
(2) Receiving for personal use of fee, gift or other
valuable thing, in the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such fee, gift, or other
valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment
than that accorded other persons;
(3) Committing acts punishable under the Anti-Graft
laws;
(4) Pursuit of private business vocation or profession
without the permission required by Civil Service Rules
and regulations;
(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. 1
Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Manager of Wynner which had
a pending loan application with LBP, that he could facilitate the
processing, approval and release of the loan if he would be given a ten
percent (10%) commission. Rivera was said to have subsequently
received a P200,000.00 commission out of the P3,000,000.00 loan
proceeds from the LBP. From Lao, who had substantial investments in
Wynner, Rivera supposedly likewise received the amount of approximately
P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to the United States, as well as
additional funds for his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and pocket
money for still another trip to Hongkong.
Rivera was further charged with, among other things, having served and
acted, without prior authority required by Civil Service Rules and
Memorandum Circular No. 1025 of the Office of the President of the
Philippines, as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various
companies where Lao had investments. He drew and received salaries
and allowances approximately P20,000.00 a month evidenced by
vouchers of Edge Apparel, Inc., J & M Clothing Corporation, and JME
Trading Corporation.
Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive
suspension (effective 19 February 1988). After a formal investigation, the
LBP held Rivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank
and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section 12,
Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was also found to have
transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The
penalty of forced resignation, without separation benefits and gratuities,
was thereupon imposed on Rivera.
On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit Systems Protection
Board ("MSPB") which held. 2
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from
is hereby modified that respondent-appellant George
I. Rivera is considered guilty only of committing acts
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Considering that this is his first offense on record, the
penalty of Forced Resignation without separation
benefits and gratuities to which he may be otherwise
be entitled under the laws is reduced to one (1) year
suspension. 3
The LBP filed a motion for the reconsideration of MSPB's decision. In its
resolution, 4 promulgated on 08 June 1992, the MSPB denied the motion.
Rivera and the LBP both appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-
1189, 5 the CSC resolved only the appeal of Rivera (rejecting that of the
LBP pursuant to the rule laid down by his Court in Magpale vs. Civil
Service Commission [215 SCRA 398]). The resolution, in part, read:
The Commission is inclined to sustain the original
decision of the Land Bank of the Philippines.
Committing an act punishable under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) is considered a
Grave Misconduct. It is a wanton and/or blatant
violation of law. As an officer of the Bank, respondent
Rivera should know better that it was illegal and
improper for him to accept regular monthly
allowances from a private firm which is a client of his
Bank. More so, that such act is prohibited and
punishable under Sec. 3(d) of RA 3019.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Commission resolves to dismiss the appeal of
Respondent George Rivera. Moreover, the
Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct for
which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from
the service. Accordingly, the MSPB decision is hereby
set aside. 6
Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CSC denied in its
Resolution No. 94-1276. 7
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in
imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated
finding and conclusions.
On 26 May 1994, this Court resolved to dismiss the petition for
petitioner's failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Rivera filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly
asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde,
who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the
MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for
reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the
resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. The
Court, in its resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion, to
reinstate the petition and to require respondents to comment thereon.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its comment, dated 15 September
1994, sided with petitioner and suggested that the CSC be given an
opportunity to submit its own comment. CSC did in due time.
This is not the first time that the Court has been confronted with this kind
of prejudicial issue.
In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of Appeals, 8 the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was set
aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned
an appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he handed down
while he was yet the incumbent Director of Mines. Calling the act of the
Secretary a "mockery of administrative justice," the Court said:
In order that the review of the decision of a
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce,
then reviewing officer must perforce be other than
the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise,
there could be no different view or there would be no
real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be
the same view since being human, he would not
admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the
case.
The Court similarly struck down a decision of Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo Clave over a resolution of the Civil Service Commission,
in which he, then concurrently its chairman, had earlier "concurred." 9
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should have behooved
Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in
resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and
consequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument that
Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29
August 1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate,
indeed has concurred, in MSPB's resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the
motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990.
WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No. 94-1276 is SET ASIDE, and the case is
REMANDED to respondent Civil Service Commission for the
resolution, sans the participation of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, of
herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 93-
1189. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S.
J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO
KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL
ALBAR, ATTYS. MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE
CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA.
petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-
Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST MONTECILLO,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR.,
MANUEL ESCONA and JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenes for
petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner
Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.
Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to
compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of
Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the
Ateneo de Manila University regarding accreditation of common students,
to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during
summer, to continue her studies. 1 Squarely meeting the issue, we
dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of
petitioner possess, not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the
institution. Not having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of
a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty,
on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the petition did not
prosper.
In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the Constitution, the
concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.
Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to
its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University proper, is again
challenged.
Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the
individual concerned was not a regular student, the respondents in the
case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-
admission. Moreover, in the earlier case, the petitioner was refused
admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and character
orientation, or even inability to meet the institution's academic or
intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The
school pointedly informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best
interest to work with a Faculty that is more compatible with your
orientations."
On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into
petitioner University have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. The case attracted much publicity due to the death of
one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.
Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the
concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, this time a
case fraught with social and emotional overtones.
The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as
follows:
As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in
the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on February 8, 9 and 10,
1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such
initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner
university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on
February 10, 1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another
freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious
physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.
In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo
created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating
Committee 2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within
72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said
notice also required respondent students to submit their written
statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although
respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to
file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive
suspension. 3 Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of
the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-
Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements
and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case
against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School
Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4
Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to
the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would
be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.
On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board
composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice Venicio Escolin,
Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear
the charges against respondent students.
In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed
that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on Discipline contained in
the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge
against you arose from initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The
evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your
participation in acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it
ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above
charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed
to have waived their defenses. 5
In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through
counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in
abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence
against them. 6
Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it
at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to
the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No.
3. However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February 27, 1991, counsel
for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February
28, 1991 to March 1, 1991. 7
Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2,
1991 for clarificatory questions. 8 They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in
accordance with the rules laid down in the case
ofGuzman vs. National University; 9
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the
affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School
catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the
proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;
d) The Board will take into consideration the degree
of participation of the petitioners in the alleged
hazing incident in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to
the President of the University, i. e., Respondent
Joaquin Bernas S. J.
On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases
where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose the penalty of
dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty
to the Administration so that this case be decided not just on the Law
School level but also on the University level." 10
In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent
students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board
found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies"
during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies
privilege," which allows them to participate in the physical hazing.
Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and
attend to the needs of the neophytes, actually they were assigned a
definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was
heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction
of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The
Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral
process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced respondents
guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the
Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration. 11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo
waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the
President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents
or not.
Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin
G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila University, accepted the
factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they
exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that even assuming they did not lay
hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in
accordance with the principle that "where two or more persons act
together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the
physical volition of one or of all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the
whole." Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of
Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can be
characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian
education and contrary to civilized behavior." Accordingly, he imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12
In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr.
Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas and Mendoza
from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at
the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet
submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the
investigation of the two students on March 21, 1991.
On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the
second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining
order is issued, they would be prevented from taking their examinations.
The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in
their dismissal.
On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order
the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and
stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing
incident. 15
Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining
order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order
were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the
expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a
Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa,
and Ramon Ereñeta to investigate the charges of hazing against
respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental
Petition of certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the
aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents to the
original petition. 16
Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the
creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition
which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the
Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a supplemental
petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and
that the supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its
mandatory 20-day lifetime. 17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the
supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order,
Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted
respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18
On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate
respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to
conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which
allegedly the students were not allowed to take, and enjoined them to
maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo
Mendoza pending final determination of the issue of the instant case.
Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00. 19
On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating
petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their names
from its roll of students. 20
The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ
of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated
May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.
Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement
of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. 21
In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on
academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within its rights in
expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its
disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether or not the penalty
imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.
We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering
readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been
denied due process in the investigation of the charges against them.
It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of
petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the Ateneo de
Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them
their right to procedural due process. We are constrained to disagree as
we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary,
respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as
enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National University, 22 Alcuaz v.
PSBA, Q.C. Branch 23 and Non v. Dames II 24 have been meticulously
respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held
before they were expelled.
Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument
that it is Ang Tibay case 25 and not theGuzman case which is applicable in
the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements
of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case,
since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
that they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them with the assistance of counsel, if
desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce
evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.26
It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not
met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del
Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required
respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four
hours their written statement on the incident, 27 the records show that
instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their
counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the students mentioned in the
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to
February 18, 1991 to file their statements. 29
Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately
spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is
to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of
its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue
was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners'
notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that
respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in
their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of
the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty-Student
Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put
in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements
which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they
were denied procedural due process. 31 Granting that they were denied
such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the
observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need
not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative
proceeding conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing
activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A
closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the
rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that
respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals
that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz. 32
Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed
to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February 14,
1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several
witnesses. 33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10,
1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent
students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners
for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege that there is no
proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School
Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of
students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be
overemphasized that the charge filed before the Joint Administration-
Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not
a criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely
administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the
specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare
in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings identical to
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of
justice.34 Accordingly, disciplinary charges against a student need not be
drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having
given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not
defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with
Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina,
petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient for
purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.
Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal
or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing frequency of injury,
even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters."
Assuredly, it passes the test of reasonableness and absence of malice on
the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship
and esprit d' corps, it has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of
those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.
Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the
instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion
for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the
latter and the Court of Appeals. 35
It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, 36 as
in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have
been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from
petitioner university.
Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary
Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer irreperable
damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No
one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated and found by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules
and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration
of the school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic
freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present
1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms
subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom"
cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 37 thus: (1) who may
teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who
may be admitted to study.
Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the
title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for himself a respected
place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual
inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most
sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In
399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for
alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own
words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of
academic freedom, came about:
Young men of the richer classes, who have not much
to do, come about me of their own accord: they like
to heart the pretenders examined, and they often
imitate me, and examine others themselves; there
are plenty of person, as they soon discover, who
think that they know something, but really know little
or nothing; and then those who are examined by
them instead of being angry with themselves are
angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say;
this villainous misleader of youth. And then if
somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he
practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell;
but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss,
they repeat the ready-made charges which are used
against all philosophers about teaching things up in
the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods,
and making the worse appear the better cause; for
they do not like to confess that their pretense of
knowledge has been detected — which is the truth;
and as they are numerous and ambitious and
energetic, and are all in battle array and have
persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with
their loud and inveterate calumnies. 38
Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have
similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church,
or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas.
Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought
control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval
universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost
their autonomy.
XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to
whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein,
ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of
freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts
to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." 40

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the
way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited
the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was
exemplified by the professors of the new German universities in the 16th
and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Helmstatdt
(1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry
gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human rights of
the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved
to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has
traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression
and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university
communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to
investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to
follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and
external interference or pressure.
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked:
"When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom
shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that,
it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought,— "the
faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 41 we have consistently upheld
the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning
is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of
the student rather than a right. While under the education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to
existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,"
such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. 42

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and
exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license.
regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This .
Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have been
. . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral
stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of
(if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and
independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of
cooperate with the schools." 43
tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been
categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules
It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could
may include those governing student discipline." 44 Going a step further,
have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As
the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as
inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and
vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution,
otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In
but to its very survival.
the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what
shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to
study. Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in
the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked
for themselves from the ponoply of academic freedom their own rights
In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of
encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the
Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no
learn under the rules laid down by the school.
mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of
"academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the
institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a
Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection. Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and
assidously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and
integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus,
The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the
St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and
1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State
ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that
shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at that time,
universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills
being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by
of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay,
some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense
the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.
of the rest.

In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that

In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973
the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or
Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher
profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the
learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the
renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education
provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a
which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely
brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila has been
grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as
lost on the respondent students.
distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." 39

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the

Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an
Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may
attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the
foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986 came up
enrolled, as well as those who come after them.
with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students,
by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing
speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v.
was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and
orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the
circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's
children and to reintegrate them to the student body." 46Thus, the
decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the
gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between
the offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed
in Malabanan v. Ramento.47
Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by
petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on
the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the
Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent
students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of
the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while
Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of
respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as
"brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the
imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension?
We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal
upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section
146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. 48
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent
Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents students into
petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner
Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of Ateneo de Manila University dated
March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board
DISMISSING respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA
dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. I do not join in the statement in the ponencia which
seem to me to be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against the private
respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.
# Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. I do not join in the statement in the ponencia which
seem to me to be a prejudgment of the criminal cases against the private
respondents for the death of Lenny Villa.
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD
HOLMES, JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA
QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO and JAMES YAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN
AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and
ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na
estudyante na nasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang
karapatang akademiko ng isang pamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard
Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU) and
College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint Discipline Board because of their
involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James
Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is
the backdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents'
right to education vis-a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition
for certiorariagainst respondent Judge and private respondents Aguilar,
Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of the CA dated
October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;3 (3) Order
dated January 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36
Manila granting private respondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of
preliminary injunction;4 and (4) Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14,
1996 of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) exonerating private
respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private
respondents from expulsion to exclusion.5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline
Board, two violent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private
respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it
appears that one week prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap
was eating his dinner alone in Manang's Restaurant near La
Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and
apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of
the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned
the remarks to his two other brods while watching television.
These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at
Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other persons
went back to Manang's and confronted the two who were still in
the restaurant. By admission of respondent Bungubung in his
testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two
heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student
Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an
apology. "Kailanganng apology" in the words of respondent
Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to
the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus.
Among them were respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Papio. They were looking for a person whose description
matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly
"nambastos ng brod." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of
them remarked "Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap
went out of the campus using the Engineering Gate to buy
candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft
Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys
were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what
to do. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head
with something heavy in his hands – "parang knuckles."
Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching
him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of
him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived;
and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group
who attacked him. With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap
said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok
siya." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running
with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point,
Mr. Dennis Pascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual
accompanied Yap to the university clinic; reported the incident
to the Discipline Office; and informed his fraternity brods at
their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of the
Domino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with
Dennis Pascual, saw him under the clock in Miguel Building.
However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain
Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of Dagonoy
Street because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for
his friend from another friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass
the Kolehiyo ng Malate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several
guys inside the restaurant. He said not to mind them and just
keep on walking. However, the group got out of the restaurant,
among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano
told Mr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo." But, respondent Lee hit
Mr. Cano without provocation. Respondent Reverente kicked
Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee also hit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano
and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling and they were
chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first
kicked him, Mr. Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He was
able to run, but the group was able to catch up with him. His
shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of his head with a
lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez,
then returned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as
among those who hit him. Although Mr. Pascual did not see
respondent Valdes hit him, he identified respondent Valdez (sic)
as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He
was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while
respondent Pascual who managed to run was stopped at the
end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. Respondent Valdes
shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo." Respondent Reverente hit Mr.
Pascual for the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their
handiwork, the group left. The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual
proceeded to a friend's house and waited for almost two hours,
or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to the
campus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were
three cars roaming the vicinity.6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims,
namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and
Michael Perez, are members of the "Domino Lux Fraternity," while the
alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul
Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of
"Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with
the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private respondents with "direct
assault." Similar complaints8 were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson
Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and Reverente.
Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v.
Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB-
PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee
(EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A.
Papio (AB-MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-
25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private
respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing
them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private
respondents filed their respective answers.9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the
mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to
investigate the incidents. Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel
Sales sent notices of hearing12 to private respondents on April 12, 1995.
Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board
had been constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against
you for violation of CHED Order No. 4 arising from the written
complaints of James Yap, Dennis C. Pascual, and Ericson Y.
Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board
scheduled on April 19, 1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon
Hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony and present
evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when
you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide
the Board, through the Discipline Office, with a list of your
witnesses as well as the sworn statement of their proposed
testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure
to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their
proposed testimony will be considered a waiver on your part to
present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995,
private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi, summarized
by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995
was one of the few instances when he was picked-up by a
driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent
Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on this particular
date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his
permission to use the car and thus, his dad instructed this
driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr. Carillo is not a family
 driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for the Philippine
Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent
Bungubung, Mr. Carillo said that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56
p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.; took the Roxas Blvd.
route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque (on a
Wednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m.
Respondent Bungubung was dropped-off in his house, and
taking the same route back, Mr. Carillo arrived at the South
Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority is located at
the South Harbor.14
xxxx
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends
at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He
said that he left McDonald at 5:50 p.m. together to get some
medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation. He said
that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to
McDonald, all within a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of
respondent Valdes, a certain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to
corroborate Valdez' alibi.15
xxxx
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he
was at his home at 5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that
he was given the responsibility to be the paymaster of the
construction workers who were doing some works in the
apartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the
evening, the workers according to him would wait for him
sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrives from his classes.
The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the
workers listed there, supposedly attesting to the fact that he
paid the workers at the date and time in question.16
xxxx
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left
DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some of
the officers that we were preparing."17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a
Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the
supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No.
4.20 The dispositive part of the resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds
respondents ALVIN AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250)
and RICHARD V. REVERENTE (AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of
having violated CHED Order No. 4 and thereby orders their
automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-
MGT/9251227), the Board acquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22 before the
Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The
motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila,
against petitioners a petition for certiorariand injunction under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as Civil Case No.
95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch 36. The petition
essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office
of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a
TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or
other persons acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from
implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated
June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of
Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to
amend his petition to correct an allegation in paragraph 3.2125 of his
original petition. Respondent Judge amended the TRO26 to conform to the
correction made in the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the
case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,28 in view of the
authority granted to it under Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and
later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122.
Respondent Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders
to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30 in behalf of
all petitioners, except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a
supplemental motion to dismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order32 denying
petitioners' (respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement,
and granted private respondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The pertinent part of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any
and all other persons acting for and in its behalf is/are
restrained and enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated
May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of
petitioner and the petitioners-in-intervention from the
De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated
June 1, 1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3,
1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-
in-intervention in the courses offered at respondent
De La Salle University and to immediately allow them
to enroll and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation thereat in
accordance with the standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted.
Respondent, its agents, representatives, or any and all persons
acting for and its behalf are hereby restrained and enjoyed
from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated
May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsion of
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention and the
Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
 2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and
petitioners-in-intervention in the courses offered at
respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwith
allow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
to enroll and complete their respective
courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive
bond in the amount of P15,000.00 executed in favor of
respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter
may suffer by reason of the injunction if the Court will finally
decide that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention are not
entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for
lack of merit. Respondents are directed to file their Answer to
the Petition not later than fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment
by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995
for the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995,
Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners
(respondents there) in contempt of court.34Aguilar also prayed that
petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with
respondent Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25,
1995, respondent Judge issued35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the
relevant portion of which reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA that until further orders, you the said
DE LA SALLE University as well as your subordinates, agents,
representatives, employees and any other person assisting or
acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist from
implementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the
automatic expulsion of petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU,
and the letter-resolution dated June 1, 1995 affirming the said
Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist from
barring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the
courses offered at DLSU and to allow them to enroll and
complete their degree courses until their graduation from said
school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's
September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated
September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No.
181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all
private respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated,
while other private respondents were to be excluded.38 The
Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE
UNIVERSITY (DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE
APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR.
ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R.
VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V. REVERENTE BE, AS
IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE
DLSU TO IMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR.
AGUILAR AND THE LOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR.
JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR. ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic)
MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V. REVERENTE FROM
EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private
respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting
his lawyer to write several demand letters40 to petitioner DLSU. In view of
the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED
wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed to petitioner Quebengco
requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue
attending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for
reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco
refused to do so, prompting CHED to promulgate an Order dated
September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through
counsel enjoining De La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with
CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et
al. v. DLSU) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr. Aguilar and finding
the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plain
and speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for
enrollment this current TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent
further prejudice to his rights as a student of the institution,
DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is hereby directed
to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending the
Commission's Resolution of the instant Motion for
Reconsideration filed by DLSU.
SO ORDERED.41
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner
Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll.
Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter
to petitioner DLSU.42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED
Resolution No. 181-96, filed a motion to dismiss43 in the CA, arguing that
CHED Resolution No. 181-96 rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution
granting the motion to dismiss of private respondent Aguilar,
disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is
hereby directed.
SO ORDERED.44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is
immediately executory in character, the pendency of a Motion
for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the
CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has
jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitating the transfer of the
case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ
of preliminary injunction, private respondent Aguilar filed an urgent
motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25,
1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned
order granting private respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to
reiterate preliminary injunction. The pertinent portion of the order
reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to
reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and
respondents' motion to dismiss is denied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is
declared to be in force and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by
the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at petitioners'
expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll
in petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of
preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 and to the outcome of
Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion
for the issuance of a TRO50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and
enjoined respondent Judge from implementing the writ of preliminary
injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued in Civil Case No. 95-74122,
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his
manifestation51 stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner
DLSU. He finished and passed all his enrolled subjects for the second
trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records52 issued
by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of
completion/graduation in his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority
to review decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose
disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary
rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in
expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process
of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic
freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by
substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private
respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioners53 that while
CHED Resolution No. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private
respondents, it nonetheless authorized their exclusion from petitioner
DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of the CA case, petitioner DLSU
is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the
CHED and the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private
respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge
ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their
degree courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits,
brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues
involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at
bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and importance of the
issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.54 This is
in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence
that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice, such that when its rigid application tends to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice, this Court has the duty to suspend their
operation.55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the
power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng
pagsubaybay at pagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng
mga institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion
cases, even those involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is
vested in the DECS not in the CHED. In support of their stance,
petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)59 and 7060 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the "Education Act of
1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the
CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg.
232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the right and duty of learning
institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline among its
students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED
was academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and
development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions
of higher learning. The enumeration of CHED's powers and functions
under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student
disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 to CHED's "coverage" of
institutions of higher education is limited to the powers and functions
specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED
has replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over,
never had any authority over student disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as
"An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating
Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the
CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. –
In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission
 on Higher Education is hereby created, hereinafter referred to
as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and
attached to the office of the President for administrative
purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting
programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public
and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of
R.A. No. 7722. They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The
Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such
other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out
effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its
effective operations and for the continued enhancement of
growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No.
7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review
over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no
reservations of powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher
learning are concerned. They show that the authority and supervision
over all public and private institutions of higher education, as well as
degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide
disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would render
nugatory the coverage of the CHED, which is "both public and private
institutions of higher education as well as degree granting programs in all
post secondary educational institutions, public and private." That would
be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational
institution which offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the
CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering
and promotion of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at
all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education
shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring
and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and
observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the
advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible
and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level
professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its
members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the
tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for
the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right
to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the
Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority
over student disciplinary cases. In fact, the responsibilities of other
government entities having functions similar to those of the CHED were
transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline
cases should therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of
R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating
that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-
supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and
tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On
Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that
what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation,
recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs
and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners
would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to
the CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any
jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg.
232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng
batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.64 The
constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating
school discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be
met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these
are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if
desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process.67 Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due
process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.69So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or
defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial
of due process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision
can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of
testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings
and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded,
there is no denial of due process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against
them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales.
They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as
they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed
of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings
before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to
adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process
when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against
them. This argument was already rejected in Guzman v. National
University73where this Court held that "x x x the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions
and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential
part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning,
possesses academic freedom which includes determination of
who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-
aaral, ay nagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang
karapatang pumili ng mga mag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of
higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for
some restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine
for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the
student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of
learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly,
the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom
"what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the
Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their
field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established
academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic
institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its
school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and
Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung,
Reverente at Valdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang
substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common
defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense,
"the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense
and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime."78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked
where the identity of the assailant has been established by
witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and
consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants
whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.80 Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak
defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended
parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who
can positively identify the accused.82Alibi is an inherently weak defense
and courts must receive it with caution because one can easily fabricate
an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial, like alibi, is inherently weak
and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses who
testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the
crime and were the victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies
that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former
must prevail.84 Alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot
prevail over the positive identification of accused by the witnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline
cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of
evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations,86 it means "such reasonable evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents
Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1They were unable to show
convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29,
1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover,
their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of
several students found guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate
reinstatement of respondent students who have been
investigated and found guilty by the Disciplinary Board to have
violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards
will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of
the school. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's
academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973
and the present 1987 Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do
not deserve to claim a venerable institution as their own, for they may
foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently
enrolled, as well as those who come after them.88 It must be borne in
mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect
and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and
attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total
man.89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give
credence to his alibi that he was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the
time of the incident in question on March 29, 1995. This claim was amply
corroborated by the certification that he submitted before the DLSU-CSB
Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by
way of this Certification that sometime on March 29,
1995, at about and between 4:30 P.M. and 5:30 P.M.,
we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at Kiangan
Hall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in
connection with an affair of our class known as Class
 7, Batch 89 of the Philippine Constabulary discussing
on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMA PHI
from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that
evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our permission to leave
and we saw him leave Camp Crame, in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-
Organized Crime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp
Crame, Quezon City), PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame,
Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M. Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The
rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply
corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It is true that alibi
is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escape
criminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays
lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes
commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the presumption of
innocence in favor of accused.92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when
accused has no other possible defense for what could really be the truth
as to his whereabouts at the crucial time, and such defense may, in fact,
tilt the scales of justice in his favor.93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private
respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private
respondents ay hindi angkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students
as subsumed in their academic freedom and that "the establishment of
rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining
to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival."94 This
power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to
impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the
misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed
and the sanction imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness
intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the
penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts
committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.
Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only for few seconds and the
victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially
where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly
into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a
mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of
colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it, conscious of the
fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated
as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97 only, not
expulsion,98 imposed on them by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section
77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSU may exclude or drop the names of
the said private respondents from its rolls for being undesirable, and
transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997
areANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated
May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation
in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude
or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition seeking review of the resolutions, dated March 30, 1994
and August 26, 1994, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner
Ruben Serrano’s complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for
reconsideration. The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a
security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of
merchandise.[1] Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis,
petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In
1988, he became head of the Security Checkers Section of private
respondent.[2]
Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided
to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an
independent security agency. For this reason, it wrote petitioner the
following memorandum:[3]
October 11, 1991
MR. RUBEN SERRANO
PRESENT
Dear Mr. Serrano,
......In view of the retrenchment program of the
company, we hereby reiterate our verbal notice to
you of your termination as Security Section Head
effective October 11, 1991.
......Please secure your clearance from this office.
Very truly yours,
[Sgd.] TERESITA A. VILLANUEVA
Human Resources Division Manager
The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint on
December 3, 1991 for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay.[4]
The parties were required to submit their position papers, on the basis of
which the Labor Arbiter defined the issues as follows:[5]
Whether or not there is a valid ground for the
dismissal of the complainant.
Whether or not complainant is entitled to his
monetary claims for underpayment of wages,
nonpayment of salaries, 13th month pay for 1991
and overtime pay.
 Whether or not Respondent is guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Thereafter, the case was heard. On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. He
ruled that private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its
security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private
respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private
respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees
whose employment would be terminated; that private respondent had not
shown that petitioner and other employees in the security section were so
inefficient so as to justify their replacement by a security agency, or that
"cost-saving devices [such as] secret video cameras (to monitor and
prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags on the merchandise" could not
have been employed; instead, the day after petitioner’s dismissal, private
respondent employed a safety and security supervisor with duties and
functions similar to those of petitioner.
Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered:[6]
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment
is hereby decreed:
(a)......Finding the dismissal of
the complainant to be illegal and
concomitantly, Respondent is
ordered to pay complainant full
backwages without qualification
or deduction in the amount
of P74,740.00 from the time of
his dismissal until reinstatement
(computed till promulgation only)
based on his monthly salary
of P4,040.00/month at the time
of his termination but limited to
(3) three years;
(b)......Ordering the Respondent
to immediately reinstate the
complainant to his former
position as security section head
or to a reasonably equivalent
supervisorial position in charges
of security without loss of
seniority rights, privileges and
benefits. This order is
immediately executory even
pending appeal;
(c)......Ordering the Respondent
to pay complainant unpaid wages
in the amount of P2,020.73 and
proportionate 13th month pay in
the amount of P3,198.30;
(d)......Ordering the Respondent
to pay complainant the amount
of P7,995.91, representing 10%
attorney’s fees based on the total
judgment award of P79,959.12.
All other claims of the
complainant whether monetary
or otherwise is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its resolution of March
30, 1994, reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered
petitioner to be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for
every year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
The NLRC held that the phase-out of private respondent’s security section
and the hiring of an independent security agency constituted an exercise
by private respondent of "[a] legitimate business decision whose wisdom
we do not intend to inquire into and for which we cannot substitute our
judgment"; that the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between
"retrenchment" and the employment of "cost-saving devices" under Art.
283 of the Labor Code was insignificant because the company official who
wrote the dismissal letter apparently used the term "retrenchment" in its
"plain and ordinary sense: to layoff or remove from one’s job, regardless
of the reason therefor"; that the rule of "reasonable criteria" in the
selection of the employees to be retrenched did not apply because all
positions in the security section had been abolished; and that the
appointment of a safety and security supervisor referred to by petitioner
to prove bad faith on private respondent’s part was of no moment
because the position had long been in existence and was separate from
petitioner’s position as head of the Security Checkers Section.
Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following issue:
IS THE HIRING OF AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY
AGENCY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
REPLACE ITS CURRENT SECURITY SECTION A VALID
GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEES
CLASSED UNDER THE LATTER?[7]
Petitioner contends that abolition of private respondent’s Security
Checkers Section and the employment of an independent security agency
do not fall under any of the authorized causes for dismissal under Art.
283 of the Labor Code.
Petitioner Laid Off for Cause
Petitioner’s contention has no merit. Art. 283 provides:
Closure of establishment and reduction of
personnel. - The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation
of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to
prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operations of the establishment or undertaking unless
the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on
the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. In case of termination due to
the installation of labor-saving devices or
redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one
(1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of
closure or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
In De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[8] this Court
upheld the termination of employment of three mechanics in a
transportation company and their replacement by a company rendering
maintenance and repair services. It held:
In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as
part of the company’s cost-saving program, the
 services rendered by the mechanics became
redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly
terminable. The company merely exercised its
business judgment or management prerogative. And
in the absence of any proof that the management
abused its discretion or acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the court will not interfere with the
exercise of such prerogative.[9]
In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[10] the Court likewise upheld the termination of employment
of water pump tenders and their replacement by independent contractors.
It ruled that an employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy
program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of
an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated
employees to promote economy and efficiency.
Indeed, as we pointed out in another case, the "[management of a
company] cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and
attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for its operation.
To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be
performed by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies . . . [While
there] should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid
to what management decides."[11] Consequently, absent proof that
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.[12]
In the case at bar, we have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in
abolishing the security section, private respondent’s real purpose was to
avoid payment to the security checkers of the wage increases provided in
the collective bargaining agreement approved in 1990.[13] Such an
assertion is not a sufficient basis for concluding that the termination of
petitioner’s employment was not a bona fide decision of management to
obtain reasonable return from its investment, which is a right guaranteed
to employers under the Constitution.[14] Indeed, that the phase-out of the
security section constituted a "legitimate business decision" is a factual
finding of an administrative agency which must be accorded respect and
even finality by this Court since nothing can be found in the record which
fairly detracts from such finding.[15]
Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioner’s services was for
an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence, pursuant to Art. 283 of the
Labor Code, petitioner should be given separation pay at the rate of one
month pay for every year of service.
Sanctions for Violations of the Notice Requirement
Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee
for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at
least one (1) month before the intended date thereof." In the case at bar,
petitioner was given a notice of termination on October 11, 1991. On the
same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to
be given written notice before the termination of his employment, and the
question is the appropriate sanction for the violation of petitioner’s right.
To be sure, this is not the first time this question has arisen.
In Sebuguero v. NLRC,[16] workers in a garment factory were temporarily
laid off due to the cancellation of orders and a garment embargo. The
Labor Arbiter found that the workers had been illegally dismissed and
ordered the company to pay separation pay and backwages. The NLRC,
on the other hand, found that this was a case of retrenchment due to
business losses and ordered the payment of separation pay without
backwages. This Court sustained the NLRC’s finding. However, as the
company did not comply with the 30-day written notice in Art. 283 of the
Labor Code, the Court ordered the employer to pay the
workers P2,000.00 each as indemnity.
The decision followed the ruling in several cases involving dismissals
which, although based on any of the just causes under Art. 282,[17] were
effected without notice and hearing to the employee as required by the
implementing rules.[18] As this Court said: "It is now settled that where
the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is
so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he
was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be
heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned
for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe,
due process."[19]
The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even
though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the termination of
employment is for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is
illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine
took place in 1989 in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC.[20] In announcing the
change, this Court said:[21]
The Court holds that the policy of ordering the
reinstatement to the service of an employee without
loss of seniority and the payment of his wages during
the period of his separation until his actual
reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years
without qualification or deduction, when it appears he
was not afforded due process, although his dismissal
was found to be for just and authorized cause in an
appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly
prejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose
on him the services of an employee who has been
shown to be guilty of the charges that warranted his
dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize
the rank and file if the undeserving, if not
undesirable, remains in the service.
....
However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to
account for failure to extend to private respondent
his right to an investigation before causing his
dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The
dismissal of an employee must be for just or
authorized cause and after due process. Petitioner
committed an infraction of the second requirement.
Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for its failure to
give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as
required by law before dismissing petitioner from
employment. Considering the circumstances of this
case petitioner must indemnify the private
respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure of
this award depends on the facts of each case and the
gravity of the omission committed by the employer.
The fines imposed for violations of the notice requirement have varied
from P1,000.00[22] to P2,000.00[23] to P5,000.00[24] to P10,000.00.[25]
Need for Reexamining the Wenphil Doctrine
Today, we once again consider the question of appropriate sanctions for
violations of the notice requirement in light of our experience during the
last decade or so with the Wenphil doctrine. The number of cases
involving dismissals without the requisite notice to the employee,
although effected for just or authorized causes, suggests that the
imposition of fine for violation of the notice requirement has not been
effective in deterring violations of the notice requirement. Justice
Panganiban finds the monetary sanctions "too insignificant, too niggardly,
and sometimes even too late." On the other hand, Justice Puno says
there has in effect been fostered a policy of "dismiss now, pay later"
which moneyed employers find more convenient to comply with than the
requirement to serve a 30-day written notice (in the case of termination
of employment for an authorized cause under Arts. 283-284) or to give
notice and hearing (in the case of dismissals for just causes under Art.
282).
For this reason, they regard any dismissal or layoff without the requisite
notice to be null and void even though there are just or authorized causes
for such dismissal or layoff. Consequently, in their view, the employee
concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages.
Validity of Petitioner’s Layoff Not Affected by Lack of Notice
We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and Panganiban,
that we should rethink the sanction of fine for an employer’s disregard of
the notice requirement. We do not agree, however, that disregard of this
requirement by an employer renders the dismissal or termination of
employment null and void. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the
discredited pre-Wenphil rule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and
paid backwages when it is shown that he has not been given notice and
hearing although his dismissal or layoff is later found to be for a just or
authorized cause. Such rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really
unjust to require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty, for
example, of an attempt on the life of the employer or the latter’s family,
or when the employer is precisely retrenching in order to prevent losses.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation
on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private
power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code.
This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the
life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what
are considered civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due
Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear
upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an
aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day
written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an
opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The
purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his
job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes
do exist justifying the termination of his employment.

The need is for a rule which, while recognizing the employee’s right to
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the
notice before he is dismissed or laid off, at the same time acknowledges
requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process
the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes
Clause of the Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial
enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the
stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the
authorized causes mentioned in Arts. 283-284. If the Wenphil rule
essence of procedural due process. Thus, compliance by the employer
imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an
with the notice requirement before he dismisses an employee does not
employee for cause without prior notice is deemed ineffective in deterring
foreclose the right of the latter to question the legality of his dismissal. As
employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is not to
Art. 277(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be
declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid grounds for such
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
dismissal or if the termination is for an authorized cause. That would be
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of
to uphold the right of the employee but deny the right of the employer to
the National Labor Relations Commission."
dismiss for cause. Rather, the remedy is to order the payment to the
employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court
finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal Indeed, to contend that the notice requirement in the Labor Code is an
must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his aspect of due process is to overlook the fact that Art. 283 had its origin in
dismissal is ineffectual. Art. 302 of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882 which gave either
party to the employer-employee relationship the right to terminate their
relationship by giving notice to the other one month in advance. In lieu of
For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in
notice, an employee could be laid off by paying him a mesada equivalent
Arts. 283-284, i.e., installation of a labor-saving device, but the employer
to his salary for one month.[28] This provision was repealed by Art. 2270
did not give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of termination in
of the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950. But on June 12,
advance, then the termination of his employment should be considered
1954, R.A. No. 1052, otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law, was
ineffectual and he should be paid backwages. However, the termination
enacted reviving the mesada. On June 21, 1957, the law was amended by
of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be
R.A. No. 1787 providing for the giving of advance notice or the payment
paid separation pay as provided in Art. 283 in addition to backwages.
of compensation at the rate of one-half month for every year of
service.[29]
Justice Puno argues that an employer’s failure to comply with the notice
requirement constitutes a denial of the employee’s right to due process.
The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law but a
Prescinding from this premise, he quotes the statement of Chief Justice
regulatory measure, the purpose of which was to give the employer the
Concepcion in Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sengbengco[26] that "acts of
opportunity to find a replacement or substitute, and the employee the
Congress, as well as of the Executive, can deny due process only under
equal opportunity to look for another job or source of employment.
the pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw
Where the termination of employment was for a just cause, no notice was
are subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary
required to be given to the employee.[30] It was only on September 4,
notwithstanding." Justice Puno concludes that the dismissal of an
1981 that notice was required to be given even where the dismissal or
employee without notice and hearing, even if for a just cause, as provided
termination of an employee was for cause. This was made in the rules
in Art. 282, or for an authorized cause, as provided in Arts. 283-284, is a
issued by the then Minister of Labor and Employment to implement B.P.
nullity. Hence, even if just or authorized causes exist, the employee
Blg. 130 which amended the Labor Code. And it was still much later when
should be reinstated with full back pay. On the other hand, Justice
the notice requirement was embodied in the law with the amendment of
Panganiban quotes from the statement in People v. Bocar[27] that
Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on March 2, 1989. It cannot be that the
"[w]here the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
former regime denied due process to the employee. Otherwise, there
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction."
should now likewise be a rule that, in case an employee leaves his job
without cause and without prior notice to his employer, his act should be
Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process void instead of simply making him liable for damages.

The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer, however, to
the denial of due process by the State, which is not the case here. There
are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of
the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process
resulting in the nullity of the employee’s dismissal or layoff.
The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be
considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer
cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own
cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause
under Art. 282 (i.e., serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and habitual neglect
of duties, fraud or willful breach of trust of the employer, commission of
crime against the employer or the latter’s immediate family or duly reinstated and paid backwages. To contend, as Justices Puno and
authorized representatives, or other analogous cases). Panganiban do, that even if the termination is for a just or authorized
cause the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages
would be to amend Art. 279 by adding another ground for considering a
Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE will prove
dismissal illegal. What is more, it would ignore the fact that under Art.
that many cases have been won by employees before the grievance
285, if it is the employee who fails to give a written notice to the
committees manned by impartial judges of the company." The grievance
employer that he is leaving the service of the latter, at least one month in
machinery is, however, different because it is established by agreement
advance, his failure to comply with the legal requirement does not result
of the employer and the employees and composed of representatives
in making his resignation void but only in making him liable for
from both sides. That is why, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
damages.[38] This disparity in legal treatment, which would result from the
Court of Appeals,[31] which Justice Puno cites, it was held that "Since the
adoption of the theory of the minority cannot simply be explained by
right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a property and that the labor
invoking President Ramon Magsaysay’s motto that "he who has less in life
agreement between him and [his employer] is the law between the
should have more in law." That would be a misapplication of this noble
parties, his summary and arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of
phrase originally from Professor Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law
his property without due process of law." But here we are dealing with
School.
dismissals and layoffs by employers alone, without the intervention of any
grievance machinery. Accordingly in Montemayor v. Araneta University
Foundation,[32] although a professor was dismissed without a hearing by Justice Panganiban cites Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC,[39] in support of
his university, his dismissal for having made homosexual advances on a his view that an illegal dismissal results not only from want of legal cause
student was sustained, it appearing that in the NLRC, the employee was but also from the failure to observe "due process." The Pepsi-Cola case
fully heard in his defense. actually involved a dismissal for an alleged loss of trust and confidence
which, as found by the Court, was not proven. The dismissal was,
therefore, illegal, not because there was a denial of due process, but
Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual
because the dismissal was without cause. The statement that the failure
of management to comply with the notice requirement "taints the
Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are dismissal with illegality" was merely a dictum thrown in as additional
simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a grounds for holding the dismissal to be illegal.
party can be exercised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian
precept, embodied in the Civil Code,[33] to act with justice, give everyone
Given the nature of the violation, therefore, the appropriate sanction for
his due, and observe honesty and good faith toward one’s fellowmen.
the failure to give notice is the payment of backwages for the period
Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the
when the employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed
failure either of the employer or the employee to live up to this precept is
or his employment terminated. The sanction is not the payment alone of
to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or
nominal damages as Justice Vitug contends.
resignation, as the case may be) void. The measure of damages is the
amount of wages the employee should have received were it not for the
termination of his employment without prior notice. If warranted, nominal Unjust Results of Considering Dismissals/Layoffs Without Prior
and moral damages may also be awarded. Notice As Illegal

We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the
employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not
constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a
procedure for the termination of employment which makes the
termination of employment merely ineffectual. It is similar to the failure to
observe the provisions of Art. 1592, in relation to Art. 1191, of the Civil
Code[34] in rescinding a contract for the sale of immovable property.
Under these provisions, while the power of a party to rescind a contract is
implied in reciprocal obligations, nonetheless, in cases involving the sale
of immovable property, the vendor cannot exercise this power even
though the vendee defaults in the payment of the price, except by
bringing an action in court or giving notice of rescission by means of a
notarial demand.[35] Consequently, a notice of rescission given in the letter
of an attorney has no legal effect, and the vendee can make payment
even after the due date since no valid notice of rescission has been
given.[36]
Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the
termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal.
This is clear from Art. 279 which provides:
Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized
by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement.[37]
Thus, only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes
provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should be
The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the
employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause
can result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and
hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say,
theft, or even of an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer
will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust.
It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic
force."[40] But so does it declare that it "recognizes the indispensable role
of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides
incentives to needed investment."[41] The Constitution bids the State to
"afford full protection to labor."[42] But it is equally true that "the law, in
protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer."[43] And it is oppression to compel the
employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or to force the
employer to remain in operation when it is not economically in his interest
to do so.
In sum, we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it
is shown that the termination of employment was due to an authorized
cause, then the employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated
even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice
requirement. Instead, he must be granted separation pay in accordance
with Art. 283, to wit:
In case of termination due to the installation of labor-
saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one month for every year of service, whichever
is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation
pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at
 least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given
separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is
reinstated or only granted separation pay, he should be paid full
backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days
in advance.
On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if
it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes
mentioned in said Art. 282, then, in accordance with that article, he
should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the
time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the
termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear
him before he is dismissed renders the termination of his employment
without legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private
respondent Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid
salary, and his proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full
backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11,
1991 up to the time the decision herein becomes final. For this purpose,
this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the
separation pay, backwages, and other monetary awards to petitioner.
G.R. No. 95279 July 25, 1991
ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO, herein represented by
SILVESTRE F. TAN, Administrator, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR A. MEMORACION, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Isabela, Basilan Province, Branch 2, MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA,
Basilan Province, herein represented by BENJAMIN VALENCIA, in
his capacity as Municipal Mayor, Isabela, Basilan Province,
ROGELIO L. IGOT, FELICISIMO PIOQUINTO, DANIEL PADINAS,
ANTONIO CABANGON, FELIX ROXAS, BENJAMIN FERRER,
GREGORIO TABADA, EFREN DELOS REYES, FLORENCIO HUGO,
JESUS FRANCISCO, ALFREDO TUBILAG, PABLO
ANDRES, respondents.
Bienvenido G. Martin for petitioner.
Laurencio Saavedra for private respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
Litigated herein is a quonset building situated in Port Area, Strong
Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, which was ordered demolished by respondent
Municipal Mayor, Benjamin Valencia. Respondent municipal employees
implemented the demolition, for which reason they are also impleaded.
The quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces in 1944.
It was purchased in 1946 by Gregoria Francisco, who died in 1976. It
stands on a lot owned by the Philippine Ports Authority and faces the
municipal wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President
Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use of port
facilities.
On 10 January 1989, the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
issued to Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of Gregoria Francisco, a permit to
occupy the lot where the building stands for a period of one (1) year, to
expire on 31 December 1989. The permittee was using the quonset for
the storage of copra.
On 8 May 1989, Respondent Mayor, through respondent Municipal Action
Officer, notified Tan Gin San by mail to remove or relocate its quonset
building, citing Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the municipality; noting its
antiquated and dilapidated structure; and. stressing the "clean-up
campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong
Boulevard." This was followed by another letter of 19 May 1989 of the
same tenor.
Since the notifications remained unheeded by petitioner, Respondent
Mayor ordered the demolition on 24 May 1989.
Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and
Damages before the Regional Trial Court of Basilan, Branch 2 (docketed
as S.P. No. 4).
On 7 August 1989, the Trial Court 1 denied the Writ of Prohibition and
upheld the power of respondent Mayor to order the demolition without
judicial authority, adverting to Zoning Ordinance No. 147 of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan. Petitioner duly interposed an appeal.
On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was completely
demolished (Rollo, p. 49). In its place sprang shanties and nipa huts,
photographs of which have been attached to petitioner's Memorandum.
On 25 January 1990, the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. SP No.
18822) 2 initially reversed the Trial Court and issued a Writ of Prohibition.
It ruled that Respondent Mayor was not vested with power to order
summarily, and without any judicial proceeding, the demolition of the
quonset building, which was not a nuisance per se and that petitioner is
in legal possession of the land on which the building stands by virtue of
the permit issued by the Philippine Ports Authority (Zamboanga Province).
The restoration to petitioner of the building materials removed upon
demolition, and the payment to it of attorney's fees of P10,000.00, were
also ordered.
However, upon reconsideration sought by reswever, upon reconsideration
sought by respondent officials, Respondent Court 3 reversed itself on 13
June 1990 stating that "although Municipal Mayor Valencia initially issued
an order demolition without judicial process, the deficiency was remedied
when appellant (petitioners herein) filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction and was heard on oral argument after appellees (respondent
officials) filed their answer." Respondent Court then quashed the Writ of
Prohibition and set aside the order of restitution and payment of
attorney's fees.
Petitioner's plea for reconsideration having been denied, it is now before
us seeking a reversal.
The focal issue for determination is whether or not Respondent Mayor
could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of
petitioner's quonset building.
Respondent justify the demolition in the exercise of police power and for
reasons of health, safety and general welfare. It also relies on Ordinance
No. 147 (CA Records, pp. 85-104) of the Municipality of Isabela. For its
part petitioner consistently denies to the Mayor, such power, invoking
provisions of the Local Government Code.
Ordinance No. 147, enacted on 27 December 1977, and relied upon by
respondents, is entitled "An Ordinance Establishing Comprehensive
Zoning Regulations for the Municipality of Isabela . . ." It is not disputed
that the quonset building, which is being used for the storage of copra, is
located outside the zone for warehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as
a non-conforming structure, which should be relocated. And in the event
that an immediate relocation of the building can not be accomplished,
Section 16 of the Ordinance provides:
 A certificate of non-conformance for all non-
conforming uses shall be applied for by the owner or
agent of the property involved within twelve (12)
months from the approval of this Ordinance,
otherwise the non-conforming use may be
condemned or removed at the owner's expense.
Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate of Non-
conformance, the foregoing provision should not be interpreted as
authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the
municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in
contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by
the respondent Court.
Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the
Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator (Article VII, Secs. 1 and
2, Ordinance No. 147). It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal
to institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of
the Ordinance (id., Sec. 2, Ibid.). And any person aggrieved by the
decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the
Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals (id., Sec. 7, Ibid.).
That a summary remedy can not be resorted to is further evident from
the penal provisions of said Ordinance, reading:
Any person who violates any of the provisions of this
ordinance shall, upon conviction, be punished by a
fine of not less than fifty pesos (P50.00) but not more
than two hundred pesos (P200.00) or by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not
exceeding six (6) months, or both, at the discretion
of the Court . . . (ibid., Sec. 11). [Emphasis ours].
Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor
to avail of extra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government
Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted judicial
proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local
Government Code, Sec. 141 [2] [t]).
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That
tenet applies to a nuisance per se or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123
[1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate
business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It
is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without
judicial intervention.
The provincial governor, district engineer or district
health officer is not authorized to destroy private
property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily
and without any judicial proceedings whatever under
the pretense that such private property constitutes a
nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in navigable
rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond
may be a nuisance per accidenswhere it endangers or
impairs the health or depreciates property by causing
water to become stagnant. (Monteverde v.
Generoso, supra).
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a
nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a
particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The
nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as
a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such
thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize
the extra judicial condemnation and destruction of
that as a nuisance which, in its nature, situation or
use is not such. These things must be determined in
the ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . .
the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per
se. It is a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that
question cannot be determined by a mere resolution
of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and
impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo Cold
Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by
virtue of a permit from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga)
when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its
property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing
before a tribunal authorized to decide whether the quonset building did
constitute a nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for
precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating
summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived petitioner of
its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner filed a
suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the
defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been
a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a
judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
For the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to
just compensation, the amount of which is for the Trial Court to
determine. We are not inclined to grant petitioner damages, however, as
it simply ignored the demand to remove or relocate its quonset building.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated 13 June 1990, is SET ASIDE; its original Decision, promulgated on
25 January 1990, is REINSTATED; and this case is ordered REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Basilan, Branch 2, for the determination of the
just compensation due petitioner for the demolition of its quonset
building.
SO ORDERED.
ABELARDO LIM and ESMADITO GUNNABAN, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DONATO H.
GONZALES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
When a passenger jeepney covered by a certificate of public
convenience is sold to another who continues to operate it under the
same certificate of public convenience under the so-called kabit system,
and in the course thereof the vehicle meets an accident through the fault
of another vehicle, may the new owner sue for damages against the
erring vehicle? Otherwise stated, does the new owner have any legal
personality to bring the action, or is he the real party in interest in the
suit, despite the fact that he is not the registered owner under the
certificate of public convenience?
Sometime in 1982 private respondent Donato Gonzales purchased
an Isuzu passenger jeepney from Gomercino Vallarta, holder of a
certificate of public convenience for the operation of public utility vehicles
plying the Monumento-Bulacan route. While private respondent Gonzales
continued offering the jeepney for public transport services he did not
have the registration of the vehicle transferred in his name nor did he
secure for himself a certificate of public convenience for its
operation. Thus Vallarta remained on record as its registered owner and
operator.
On 22 July 1990, while the jeepney was running northbound along
the North Diversion Road somewhere in Meycauayan, Bulacan, it collided
with a ten-wheeler-truck owned by petitioner Abelardo Lim and driven by
his co-petitioner Esmadito Gunnaban. Gunnaban owned responsibility for
the accident, explaining that while he was traveling towards Manila the
truck suddenly lost its brakes. To avoid colliding with another vehicle, he
swerved to the left until he reached the center island. However, as the
center island eventually came to an end, he veered farther to the left until
he smashed into a Ferroza automobile, and later, into private
respondent's passenger jeepney driven by one Virgilio Gonzales. The
impact caused severe damage to both the Ferroza and the passenger
jeepney and left one (1) passenger dead and many others wounded.
Petitioner Lim shouldered the costs for hospitalization of the
wounded, compensated the heirs of the deceased passenger, and had the
Ferroza restored to good condition. He also negotiated with private
respondent and offered to have the passenger jeepney repaired at his
shop. Private respondent however did not accept the offer so Lim offered
him P20,000.00, the assessment of the damage as estimated by his chief
mechanic. Again, petitioner Lim's proposition was rejected; instead,
private respondent demanded a brand-new jeep or the amount
of P236,000.00. Lim increased his bid to P40,000.00 but private
respondent was unyielding. Under the circumstances, negotiations had to
be abandoned; hence, the filing of the complaint for damages by private
respondent against petitioners.
In his answer Lim denied liability by contending that he exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees. He
further asserted that as the jeepney was registered in Vallarta’s name, it
was Vallarta and not private respondent who was the real party in
interest.[1] For his part, petitioner Gunnaban averred that the accident
was a fortuitous event which was beyond his control.[2]
Meanwhile, the damaged passenger jeepney was left by the
roadside to corrode and decay. Private respondent explained that
although he wanted to take his jeepney home he had no capability,
financial or otherwise, to tow the damaged vehicle.[3]
The main point of contention between the parties related to the
amount of damages due private respondent. Private respondent Gonzales
averred that per estimate made by an automobile repair shop he would
have to spend P236,000.00 to restore his jeepney to its original
condition.[4] On the other hand, petitioners insisted that they could have
the vehicle repaired for P20,000.00.[5]
On 1 October 1993 the trial court upheld private respondent's claim
and awarded him P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22 July 1990 as
compensatory damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. In support of
its decision, the trial court ratiocinated that as vendee and current owner
of the passenger jeepney private respondent stood for all intents and
purposes as the real party in interest. Even Vallarta himself supported
private respondent's assertion of interest over the jeepney for, when he
was called to testify, he dispossessed himself of any claim or pretension
on the property. Gunnaban was found by the trial court to have caused
the accident since he panicked in the face of an emergency which was
rather palpable from his act of directing his vehicle to a perilous streak
down the fast lane of the superhighway then across the island and
ultimately to the opposite lane where it collided with the jeepney.
On the other hand, petitioner Lim's liability for Gunnaban's
negligence was premised on his want of diligence in supervising his
employees. It was admitted during trial that Gunnaban doubled as
mechanic of the ill-fated truck despite the fact that he was neither tutored
nor trained to handle such task.[6]
Forthwith, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
17 July 1996, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In upholding the
decision of the court a quo the appeals court concluded that while an
operator under the kabit system could not sue without joining the
registered owner of the vehicle as his principal, equity demanded that the
present case be made an exception.[7] Hence this petition.
It is petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the decision of the trial court despite their opposition to the
well-established doctrine that an operator of a vehicle continues to be its
operator as long as he remains the operator of record. According to
petitioners, to recognize an operator under the kabit system as the real
party in interest and to countenance his claim for damages is utterly
subversive of public policy. Petitioners further contend that inasmuch as
the passenger jeepney was purchased by private respondent for
only P30,000.00, an award of P236,000.00 is inconceivably large and
would amount to unjust enrichment.[8]
Petitioners' attempt to illustrate that an affirmance of the appealed
decision could be supportive of the pernicious kabit system does not
persuade. Their labored efforts to demonstrate how the questioned
rulings of the courts a quo are diametrically opposed to the policy of the
law requiring operators of public utility vehicles to secure a certificate of
public convenience for their operation is quite unavailing.
The kabit system is an arrangement whereby a person who has
been granted a certificate of public convenience allows other persons who
own motor vehicles to operate them under his license, sometimes for a
fee or percentage of the earnings.[9] Although the parties to such an
agreement are not outrightly penalized by law, the kabit system is
invariably recognized as being contrary to public policy and therefore void
and inexistent under Art. 1409 of the Civil Code.
In the early case of Dizon v. Octavio[10] the Court explained that
one of the primary factors considered in the granting of a certificate of
public convenience for the business of public transportation is the
financial capacity of the holder of the license, so that liabilities arising
from accidents may be duly compensated. The kabit system renders
illusory such purpose and, worse, may still be availed of by the grantee
to escape civil liability caused by a negligent use of a vehicle owned by
another and operated under his license. If a registered owner is allowed
to escape liability by proving who the supposed owner of the vehicle is, it
would be easy for him to transfer the subject vehicle to another who
possesses no property with which to respond financially for the
damage done. Thus, for the safety of passengers and the public who
may have been wronged and deceived through the baneful kabit system,
the registered owner of the vehicle is not allowed to prove that another
person has become the owner so that he may be thereby relieved of
responsibility. Subsequent cases affirm such basic doctrine.[11]
It would seem then that the thrust of the law in enjoining
the kabit system is not so much as to penalize the parties but to identify
the person upon whom responsibility may be fixed in case of an accident
with the end view of protecting the riding public. The policy therefore
loses its force if the public at large is not deceived, much less involved.
In the present case it is at once apparent that the evil sought to be
prevented in enjoining the kabit system does not exist. First, neither of
the parties to the pernicious kabit system is being held liable for
damages. Second, the case arose from the negligence of another vehicle
in using the public road to whom no representation, or misrepresentation,
as regards the ownership and operation of the passenger jeepney was
made and to whom no such representation, or misrepresentation, was
necessary. Thus it cannot be said that private respondent Gonzales and
the registered owner of the jeepney were in estoppel for leading the
public to believe that the jeepney belonged to the registered
owner. Third, the riding public was not bothered nor inconvenienced at
the very least by the illegal arrangement. On the contrary, it was private
respondent himself who had been wronged and was
seeking compensation for the damage done to him. Certainly, it would
be the height of inequity to deny him his right.
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that private respondent has
the right to proceed against petitioners for the damage caused on his
passenger jeepney as well as on his business. Any effort then to frustrate
his claim of damages by the ingenuity with which petitioners framed the
issue should be discouraged, if not repelled.
In awarding damages for tortuous injury, it becomes the sole
design of the courts to provide for adequate compensation by putting the
plaintiff in the same financial position he was in prior to the tort. It is a
fundamental principle in the law on damages that a defendant cannot be
held liable in damages for more than the actual loss which he has inflicted
and that a plaintiff is entitled to no more than the just and adequate
compensation for the injury suffered. His recovery is, in the absence of
circumstances giving rise to an allowance of punitive damages, limited to
a fair compensation for the harm done. The law will not put him in a
position better than where he should be in had not the wrong
happened.[12]
 In the present case, petitioners insist that as the passenger jeepney
was purchased in 1982 for only P30,000.00 to award damages
considerably greater than this amount would be improper and
unjustified. Petitioners are at best reminded that indemnification for
damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but also
that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. In other words,
indemnification for damages is not limited to damnum emergens or actual
loss but extends to lucrum cessans or the amount of profit lost.[13]
Had private respondent's jeepney not met an accident it could
reasonably be expected that it would have continued earning from the
business in which it was engaged. Private respondent avers that he
derives an average income of P300.00 per day from his passenger
jeepney and this earning was included in the award of damages made by
the trial court and upheld by the appeals court. The award therefore
of P236,000.00 as compensatory damages is not beyond reason nor
speculative as it is based on a reasonable estimate of the total damage
suffered by private respondent, i.e. damage wrought upon his jeepney
and the income lost from his transportation business. Petitioners for their
part did not offer any substantive evidence to refute the estimate made
by the courts a quo.
However, we are constrained to depart from the conclusion of the
lower courts that upon the award of compensatory damages legal interest
should be imposed beginning 22 July 1990, i.e. the date of the
accident. Upon the provisions of Art. 2213 of the Civil Code, interest
"cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when
the demand can be established with reasonable certainty." It is axiomatic
that if the suit were for damages, unliquidated and not known until
definitely ascertained, assessed and determined by the courts after proof,
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum should be from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification
of damages may be deemed to be reasonably ascertained).[14]
In this case, the matter was not a liquidated obligation as the
assessment of the damage on the vehicle was heavily debated upon by
the parties with private respondent's demand for P236,000.00 being
refuted by petitioners who argue that they could have the vehicle
repaired easily for P20,000.00. In fine, the amount due private
respondent was not a liquidated account that was already demandable
and payable.
One last word. We have observed that private respondent left his
passenger jeepney by the roadside at the mercy of the elements. Article
2203 of the Civil Code exhorts parties suffering from loss or injury to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the
damages resulting from the act or omission in question. One who is
injured then by the wrongful or negligent act of another should exercise
reasonable care and diligence to minimize the resulting damage. Anyway,
he can recover from the wrongdoer money lost in reasonable efforts to
preserve the property injured and for injuries incurred in attempting to
prevent damage to it.[15]
However we sadly note that in the present case petitioners failed to
offer in evidence the estimated amount of the damage caused by private
respondent's unconcern towards the damaged vehicle. It is the burden of
petitioners to show satisfactorily not only that the injured party could
have mitigated his damages but also the amount thereof; failing in this
regard, the amount of damages awarded cannot be proportionately
reduced.
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision awarding private
respondent Donato Gonzales P236,000.00 with legal interest from 22 July
1990 as compensatory damages and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees is
MODIFIED. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
computed from the time the judgment of the lower court is made until the
finality of this Decision. If the adjudged principal and interest remain
unpaid thereafter, the interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time judgment becomes final and executory until it is
fully satisfied.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
pouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco)
may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged
meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision[1] and the April 10, 2000
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The
decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is
hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant
MERALCO is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are
hereby ORDERED to pay defendant-appellant MERALCO the differential
billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered
electrical consumption.”[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in
this wise:
“Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private
corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons, including the
government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly
authorized and approved by the Board of Energy (now the Energy
Regulatory Board).
“Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners
of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City,
which they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio
Santos. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export
of furnitures under the business name ‘Loran Industries’ and recipient of
the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is
a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of
the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director
of Chamber of Furniture.
“On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellant’s inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-
the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows
Avenue. House no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned
by plaintiffs-appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating
procedure of asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their
secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the
inspection. After the inspection, defendant-appellant’s inspectors
discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter
cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned
and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Defendant-appellant’s
inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-appellees’ secretary, who in
turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna Quisumbing, who was
outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the
tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by defendant-
appellant’s inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to
their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the
event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to
temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The
laboratory testing conducted on the meter has the following findings to
wit:
‘1. Terminal seal was missing.
‘2. Lead cover seals (’90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were
tampered by forcibly pulling out from the sealing
wire.
‘3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the
register were found out of alignment and with
circular scratches at the face of the register which
indicates that the meter had been opened to
manipulate the said dial pointers and set manually
to the desired reading. In addition to this, the
meter terminal blades were found full of scratches.’
“After an hour, defendant-appellant’s head inspector, E. Orlina returned
to the residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter
had been tampered and unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01
representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be
disconnected. Orlina informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just
following their standard operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were
further advised that questions relative to the results of the inspection as
well as the disconnection of her electrical services for Violation of Contract
(VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal
Service Department. However, on the same day at around 2:00 o’clock in
the afternoon defendant-appellant’s officer through a two-way radio
instructed its service inspector headed by Mr. Orlino to reconnect
plaintiffs-appellees’ electric service which the latter faithfully complied.
“On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
despite the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to
furnish electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that defendant-
appellant acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent
manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due
process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind,
social and business reputation.
“In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric
service at the plaintiffs-appellees’ house but denied liability citing the
‘Terms and Conditions of Service,’ and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise
known as ‘Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994.’
“After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in
favor of plaintiffs-appellees.”[4] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have
given the Quisumbing spouses (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to
dispute the alleged meter tampering.
It held that respondent had acted summarily and without
procedural due process in immediately disconnecting the electric service
of petitioners. Respondent’s action, ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi
delict.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals overturned the trial court’s ruling and
dismissed the Complaint. It held that respondent’s representatives had
acted in good faith when they disconnected petitioners’ electric
service. Citing testimonial and documentary evidence, it ruled that the
disconnection was made only after observing due process. Further, it
noted that petitioners had not been able to prove their claim for
damages. The appellate court likewise upheld respondent’s counterclaim
for the billing differential in the amount of P193,332[5] representing the
value of petitioners’ used but unregistered electrical consumption, which
had been established without being controverted.
Hence, this Petition.[6]
The Issues
In their Memorandum,[7] petitioners submit the following issues for
our consideration:
“4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter
enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite
the absence of an ERB representative or an officer of the law?
“4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie
presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a)
iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive?
“4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service?
Corollarily, whether the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of
Appeals (157 SCRA 243) applies to the case at bar?
“4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?
“4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of
damages?”[8]
In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court
will address: (1) whether respondent observed the requisites of law when
it disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2) whether such
disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3) whether petitioners
are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Compliance with Requisites of Law
Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical
service was not validly effected because of respondent’s noncompliance
with the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the “Anti-Electricity and Electric
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994.” They insist that the
immediate disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly effected
only when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To constitute
prima facie evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must be “personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).”
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by
petitioners is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon. It
argues further that this issue, which was not raised in the court below,
can no longer be taken up for the first time on appeal. Assuming
arguendo that the issue was raised below, it also contends that
petitioners were not able to specifically prove the absence of an officer of
the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB when the discovery
was made.
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity
We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states:
(a) The presence of any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of
illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the
person benefited thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1)
the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to such
person after due notice, x x x
x x x x
x xxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing
circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB).”[9] (Italics supplied)
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will
authorize immediate disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of
certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and
attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative
when the discovery was made.
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of
facts. However, it may pass upon the evidence when the factual findings
of the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals, as in
this case.[10]
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate
court’s holding that “the actions of defendant-appellant’s service
inspectors were all in accord with the requirement of the law.”[11]
Respondent’s own witnesses provided the evidence on who were
actually present when the inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the
head of the Meralco team, testified:
“Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you
discovered these findings you testified earlier, who was
present?
A The secretary, sir.”[12]
“ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team
that conducted this inspection at Greenmeadows
Avenue on that day, March 3, 1995?
A The composition of the team, sir?
Q Yes.
A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
Q You were four (4)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who is the head of this team?
A I was the head of the team, sir.”[13]
Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team,
stated that only Meralco personnel had been present during the
inspection:
“Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on
that day, right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
A Two or three of his men.
Q All members of the inspection team?
A Yes, sir.”[14]
These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter
tampering was discovered, only the Meralco inspection team and
petitioners’ secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of the
law or ERB representative at that time. Because of the absence of
government representatives, the prima facie authority to disconnect,
granted to Meralco by RA 7832, cannot apply.
Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners’
secretary was present at the time the inspection was made. The law
clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery
x
“must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or
a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board
(ERB).”[15] Had the law intended the presence of the owner or his/her
representative to suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our
jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is
free from doubt.[16] Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be
taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see
to it that the mandate is obeyed.[17]
In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John
H. Osmeña, its author, stressed the need for the presence of government
officers during inspections of electric meters. He said:
“Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or
situations which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima
facie evidence, I think they should be prudent enough to bring in
competent authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate
their finding. If they were to summarily proceed to disconnect on the
basis of their findings and later on there would be a court case and the
customer or the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section
2, then they could be in a lot of trouble.”[18] (Italics supplied)
Neither can we accept respondent’s argument that when the
alleged tampered meter was brought to Meralco’s laboratory for testing,
there was already an ERB representative present.
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed,
the discovery of the illegal use of electricity must have been personally
witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an authorized
ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected
immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which
was witnessed only by Meralco’s employees. That the ERB representative
was allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco
laboratory will not cure the defect.
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted
their inspection and found alleged meter tampering, they immediately
disconnected petitioners’ electrical supply. Again, this verity is culled from
the testimony of Meralco’s Orlina:
“A When she went inside then she came out together with
Mrs. Lourdes Quis[u]mbing at that time. We did tell
our findings regarding the meter and the consequence
with it. And she was very angry with me.
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what
exactly did you tell Mrs. Quisumbing?
A We told her that the service will be temporarily
disconnected and that we are referring to our Legal
Department so could know the violation, sir.”[19]
“A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir.
 Q What is the first name of this supervisor?
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir.
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over
the telephone, what happened?
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be
temporarily disconnected and she has to go to our
Legal Department where she could settle the VOC, sir.
Q You are talking of ‘VOC,’ what is this all about Mr. Orlino?
A ‘VOC’ is violation of contract, sir.”[20]
As to respondent’s argument that the presence of an authorized
ERB representative had not been raised below, it is clear, however, that
the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a valid issue in
the CA. The presence of government agents who may authorize
immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed,
we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in
imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all,
Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power from the
government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect would be
equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled
that “[w]here the issues already raised also rest on other issues not
specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and
close relation to the former and as long as they arise from matters on
record, the Court has the authority to include them in its discussion of the
controversy as well as to pass upon them.”[21]
Contractual Right to Disconnect
Electrical Service
Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to
disconnect electrical service based on Exhibits “10”[22] and “11,”[23] or on
Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory
Board). The relevant portion of these documents concerns
discontinuance of service. It provides:
“The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the
Customer is in arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the
adjusted bills in those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register
the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to comply with any
of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the
Company. Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud,
the Company may adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if the
adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may disconnect the same. In case
of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former
Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be
observed. Any such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract
between the Company and the Customer.”[24]
Petitioners’ situation can fall under disconnection only “in case of or
to prevent fraud upon the Company.” However, this too has requisites
before a disconnection may be made. An adjusted bill shall be prepared,
and only upon failure to pay it may the company discontinue
service. This is also true in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No.
1 of the former Public Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour
written notice before a disconnection may be justified. In the instant
case, these requisites were obviously not complied with.
Second Issue
Damages
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco
lacks legal, factual or contractual basis, we will now pass upon on the
right of petitioners to recover damages for the improper disconnection.
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision,
which awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees. All these were overturned by the CA.
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof
is necessary before our award may be made. The appellate court ruled
as follows:
“Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be
recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be
presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be presumed but
must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree and certainty. A
court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact
and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that
they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If
the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded.”[25]
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position where it was before it was injured.[26] They
pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and
susceptible of measurement.[27] Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss as it has duly proven.[28]
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the
amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the
best evidence obtainable.[29]
Petitioners’ claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna
Quisumbing’s bare testimony as follows:
“A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that
furniture exhibit. That furniture exhibit is only once a
year.
Q What is this furniture exhibit?
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care
of exporters and exclusive marketing of our products
around the world. We always have that once a year
and that’s the time when all our buyers are here for us
to show what we had that was exhibited to go
around. So, my husband had to [fly] from Cebu to
Manila just for this occasion. So we have an
appointment with our people and our buyers with
SITEM and also that evening we will have to treat them
[to] dinner.
Q Whereat?
A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at
our residence.
Q What happened to this occasion?
A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to
get in touch with them and change the venue.
Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your
buyers?
A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Season’s
Restaurant. But it was very embar[r]assing for us
because we faxed them ahead of time before they
came to Manila.
Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because
of the disconnection of the electric power on that day,
Friday, what damage did you suffer?
A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a
h[a]ssle it was so embarras[s]ing for us.
 Q Can you tell us how much amount?
A Approximately P50,000.00.”[30]
No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare
statements. She has not shown how she arrived at the amount
of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial
evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual
damages.
While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses
incurred by the spouses in moving the dinner out of their residence due
to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have been
adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To
reiterate, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but
must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is
dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have
suffered and of the actual amount thereof.[31] The award must be based
on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court;
and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial
proof.[32] Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling denying the grant of
actual damages.
Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that
petitioners are entitled to moral damages, albeit in a reduced amount.
The RTC opined as follows:
“This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and
equity to protect itself from any fraud. However, such right should not be
exercised arbitrarily but with great caution and with due regard to the
rights of the consumers. Meralco having a virtual monopoly of the supply
of electric power should refrain from taking drastic actions against the
consumers without observing due process. Even assuming that the
subject meter has had history of meter tampering, defendant cannot
simply assume that the present occupants are the ones responsible for
such tampering. Neither does it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs
of their right to due process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs
simple opportunity to dispute the electric charges brought about by the
alleged meter-tampering, which were not included in the bill rendered
them. Procedural due process requires reasonable notice to pay the bill
and reasonable notice to discontinue supply. Absent due process the
defendant may be held liable for damages. While this Court is aware of
the practice of unscrupulous individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which
causes thousands if not millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric
companies, this does not give the defendant the right to trample upon the
rights of the consumers by denying them due process.”[33]
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral
damages may be recovered. One such case[34] is when the rights of
individuals, including the right against deprivation of property without due
process of law, are violated.[35]
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury.[36] Although incapable of pecuniary
computation, such damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
results of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.[37]
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral
damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or
psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of
the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[38]
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately
disconnect petitioners’ electrical supply without observing the requisites of
law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more
circumspect and prudent, petitioners could have been given the
opportunity to controvert the initial finding of alleged meter tampering.
Said the RTC:
“More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting
the electric service constitutes a breach of public policy. For public
utilities, broad as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they
do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on
their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play
is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such
is the case at bar.”[39]
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA[40] that
respondent is required to give notice of disconnection to an alleged
delinquent customer. The Court said:
“x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as
MERALCO, having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro
Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in
such areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these
areas, justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the
business of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner
MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done
through Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service
Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a
public utility such as MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to a
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the
customer is required before disconnection of the service. Failure to give
such prior notice amounts to a tort.”[41]
Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We
cannot allow such rights to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the
Court sympathizes with respondent’s efforts to stamp out the illegal use
of electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the
rights of our people. As has been we succinctly said: “there is a right way
to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.”[42]
However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the
sound discretion of the courts, should be granted in reasonable amounts,
considering the attendant facts and circumstances.[43] Moral damages,
though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty.[44] Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the
expense of the defendant.[45] They are awarded only to obtain a means, a
diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
the injured party has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable
action.[46] They must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[47]
It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the
electrical supply of petitioners on the same day. Verily, the inconvenience
and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection was thereafter
corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTC’s grant of moral damages to the
more equitable amount of P100,000.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of
example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.[48] It is not given to enrich one
party and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive to socially deleterious actions.[49] In this case, to serve
an example -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be
effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be
faithfully complied with -- we award the amount of P50,000 to petitioners.
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of
attorney’s fees is likewise granted.[50] It is readily apparent that
petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to
the extent of elevating the matter to this Court;[51] thus, an award
of P50,000 is considered sufficient.
Final Issue:
Billing Differential
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of
damages -- the lack of due process in immediately disconnecting
petitioners’ electrical supply -- respondent’s counterclaim for the billing
differential is still proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should
be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it presented, both
documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the
differential.

Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been
conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount
of P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through
which this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco’s Senior
Billing Computer Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by
documentary evidence showing the account’s billing history and the
corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of
inspections and examinations presented by respondent to prove that,
indeed there had been meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and
unpaid electrical consumption.

The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with

Assumption of Mortgage[52] does not necessarily mean that they are no
longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence
to show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the
date of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted[53] that
they did not have any contract for electrical service in their own
name. Hence, petitioners effectively assumed the bills of the former
occupants of the premises.

Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing

documentary and testimonial evidence presented by respondent, was not
controverted by petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The

assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners
are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96;
while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorney’s
fees. No pronouncement as to costs.